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EDITED

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, Ph.D.

ELIOT PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
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*Others to be announced later.*
PLATO

(From the bust in the Vatican. The inscription Ζήλων is modern.)
PLATO
THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

EDITED BY
ISAAC FLAGG
PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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INTRODUCTION

Dialogue, dialectic; διάλεγονται, διάλογος, διαλεκτικός. These words furnish a clue to the Socratic wisdom. It was a methodical exercise of the reasoning faculty that enabled Socrates, first of all men, to realize completely the Delphian maxim, γνώθι σαυτόν. By no other way than through self-scrutiny, critically applied in the form of question and answer, could he have been led to affirm, what no man had learned to say before, δὴ μὴ οἶδα οἶδα οἶμαι εἰδέναι, and to announce the conviction formulated in the words, ὁ ἀνεξήγητος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπη. The identity of knowledge and virtue, as maintained by Socrates; the union of intellectual and moral excellence in the person of the sage, celebrated by both of his eminent companions,—such a consumption can hardly be comprehended without taking some account of the process whereby we know it to have been achieved.

In the time of Xenophon and Plato, whose chief writings formed a memorial and as it were a continuation of the life work of their illustrious master, a philosophical terminology had not yet been elaborated in the Greek language. At that period the word "philosophy" itself was vague and unsettled in its application, and a groundwork for the now familiar and important distinction between art and science had only just begun to be wrought out. A few words, however, were gradually assuming, side by side with their popular usage, a special meaning adapted to more exact or conscious modes of thought than properly pertain to poetry or eloquence; and other new words were coming to be framed to meet the needs of newly recognized activities of the mind. The familiar verb διάλεγονται 'to converse' acquires
a special significance and value though Socrates’ habitual method of testing the genuineness of knowledge, while, under the same impulse, the adjective διαλεκτικός, already employed in a technical way, is finally converted to an exclusively philosophical use.

That Socrates was himself aware of a special coloring that attached to the word διαλέγεσθαι, as he used it, is indicated by a curious pointed reference to διαλέγειν ‘to distinguish,’ which he makes in one of the conversations with Euthydemus reported by Xenophon. Speaking of temperance and self-control, he averred that it was the faculty of distinguishing between what was good and what was bad for a man that enabled the possessors of these virtues to direct their conduct in accordance with them; and he said that διαλέγεσθαι took its name from διαλέγειν, because it meant mutual deliberation in the way of discriminating by classification.¹

The διαλεκτικός ἄνηρ is he who knows how to ask and to answer questions.² A deficiency in such skill on the part even of superior minds is apt to betray inaccuracy in the use of language and more or less of the accompanying confusion of ideas. The young men who listened to Socrates occasionally undertook to imitate him and try their own hand at cross-questioning the unwary. Xenophon has preserved a specimen of this sort of experiment in a conversation said to have passed between Alcibiades when a mere youth and his guardian and maternal

¹ Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12 ἐφ' ὅ διαλέγεσθαι δρομασθῆναι εκ τοῦ συνόντας κοινῆς βουλευσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. The Inventor of Dialectic, as Aristotle terms him, was Zeno of Elea in Italy, an older contemporary of Socrates. But the Zenonian dialectic was purely critical and destructive, a weapon wielded to overthrow the theories of the anti-Eleatics. It was in the hands of Socrates that the art first came to be employed in the logical processes of Definition and Division or Classification.

² Plat. Crat. 390 c τὸν ἐρωτάν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον . . . διαλεκτικόν.
relative Pericles, the foremost man of Athens.—*Alcibiades.*
Can you tell me, Pericles, what *law* is? *Pericles.* Certainly I can. *Alcibiades.* Do pray instruct me, then. I hear some commended as law-abiding persons, but I fancy no one would deserve this compliment who did not know what law is. *Pericles.*
Well, Alcibiades, in trying to find out what law is, you are in quest of no very difficult matter. Laws are what the assembled people enact and approve, indicating what ought to be done and what not. *Alcibiades.* In the belief that what is good ought to be done, or what is bad? *Pericles.* What is good, to be sure, young man, not what is bad. *Alcibiades.* If, however, it is not the people who assemble, but supposing a few men, in an oligarchy somewhere, get together and enact what ought to be done, what is that? *Pericles.* All deliberate enactments or prescriptions by the controlling power of the state receive the name of law. *Alcibiades.* If a tyrant, then, in control of the state, prescribes to its members what they are to do, is that law too? *Pericles.*
Yes, the prescriptions of a tyrant who governs the state are likewise termed law. *Alcibiades.* But what is force and lawlessness, Pericles? Is it not when the stronger constrains the weaker to do what he chooses, not with the weaker man’s consent, but by compulsion? *Pericles.* Yes, I think it is. *Alcibiades.* Then what a tyrant by his prescriptions compels the citizens to do against their will, is that lawlessness? *Pericles.* I believe it is. I take back what I said about the arbitrary prescriptions of a tyrant being law. *Alcibiades.* But the enactments of the few, based on superior power, not on the consent of the many, are we to call that force, or not? *Pericles.* I think that all compulsion, exercised by one person upon another, against the will of the latter, by enactment or otherwise, is rather force than law. *Alcibiades.* And what the sovereign people, then, superior in power to those who possess property, enacts
against the will of the latter, would that be force rather than law?  *Pericles.* Alcibiades, we were ourselves, at your age, tolerably clever at this sort of thing. We used to practice at precisely the same quibbles that you seem to be practicing now. *Alcibiades.* Oh, Pericles, how I wish I could have been with you then, when you were at your best in the business! — The story is a good one in an illustrative way, and it acquires a piquant flavor by being attached to two such distinguished names as those which figure in it. Among the several classes of persons enumerated in the Platonic Apology to whom Socrates applied his tests, the statesmen are said to have proved especially incompetent to give a rational account of the matters which occupied their attention. There would indeed be far more subtle difficulties to contend with in the discussion of political and ethical questions than the mere ambiguity of such a term as *vómos,* before sufficient dialectical skill could be attained to command sound reasoning, either in one’s own mind or in the minds of others.

To live for philosophy, *examining myself* and other men, such I conceived to be my mission — declares Socrates to his judges, in the Apology. — While *διαλέγεσθαι* is properly said of conversation among several persons, the word can easily be transferred to the questioning of one’s own mind, the communing of the spirit with itself, ὁ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῷ πρὸς αὐτῆς διάλογος. — Ἀλλὰ τί ἡ μοι ταύτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; Thuc exclaims Hector, as he awaits the onset of Achilles, nerving himself to overcome the promptings of invalorous discretion. — In the *Symposium* of


2 Χ 122, cp. Λ 407, Ρ 97, Φ 562. In Homer the self-interrogating formula quoted is employed to mark the turning-point of what would ordinarily be regarded as a moral conflict in the speaker’s soul. In the theory and practice
INTRODUCTION

Plato; Socrates, while on his way to the house of Agatho, there to meet by invitation Aristophanes, Alcibiades, and other friends of the tragic poet, encounters one of his devoted followers, whom he takes along to the banquet as an uninvited guest, promising to make his apology to their host. — Socrates seemed rather preoccupied and disposed to lag behind (relates Aristodemus), and the upshot of it was odd enough. When we reached the house we found the door open. A servant met me and conducted me at once into the presence of the banqueters already reclining at table. ‘Welcome, Aristodemus,’ exclaimed Agatho; ‘if you have come for anything different from the dinner, pray defer it. I meant to invite you, but could not find you yesterday. But why haven’t you brought Socrates?’ Then I turned round, and lo! no Socrates was to be seen. ‘I came with Socrates,’ I said, ‘by his invitation, to your banquet.’ ‘Excellent,’ said Agatho; ‘but where is the man?’ ‘He was right behind me a moment ago,’ I replied; ‘but I am as much at a loss as you are, where he can be now.’ Upon this a servant was sent to look up the missing guest (so the history proceeds), and, returning presently, reported that Socrates was standing in the vestibule of a neighboring house and would pay no attention to any summons to the feast. ‘Ridiculous! go and call him again, and don’t let him off.’ ‘Nay, not so’ (interposed Aristodemus); ‘leave him to himself. It’s a way he has. He steps off a bit, wherever it happens to be, and stands there. He will be here directly; but don’t disturb him, just let him be.’ The banquet then proceeded, and Socrates came not; nor would Aristodemus suffer the repeated orders of the host to fetch him to be carried into effect. Finally, when the feast was

of Socrates, however, as he disciplined his own character, a distinction of moral and intellectual was not recognized, nor felt. The preceding quotation is from Plato, Soph. 263 E.
about half over, the philosopher presented himself. ‘Come and take your place by me, Socrates’ (said Agatho), ‘and give me the benefit of the clever idea that came to you in the vestibule. You have caught it and bagged it, I know, or you would never have left the spot.’—Again, in the campaign before Potidæa (Alcibiades is here the narrator) one day early in the morning some reflection had taken shape in his mind, and he stood studying it out. As he did not get on with it, he would not give it up, but remained standing to continue the investigation. Finally, by noonday, the thing began to attract observation, and the word passed wonderingly from mouth to mouth, that Socrates had been standing up in a brown study ever since early in the morning. At last, when evening came, some of the men brought their blankets out after dinner, and slept in the open air—it was the summer season—keeping a wakeful eye on Socrates all the time, to see if he would stand up all night. And stand he did, till day broke again; then saluted the sun and went his way.\(^1\) —How the mind of the philosopher was

\(^1\) See Plat. *Symp.* 174, 175, and 220 C D. The habit attributed to Socrates in these passages, that of the "absent-minded" man, "absence of mind," popularly so termed, would evince in Plato's estimation the most complete presence of the conscious intellect, a concentrated power of abstraction and analysis, as opposed to the inspired working of poetic and other artistic genius, where according to Plato the mind of the man is 'absent.' Ion 534 B ou πρῶτερον αὖθις τε ποιεῖν [ὁ ποιητής], πρὸν ἀν ἑκάστος τε γένηται καὶ ἑκάστος καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι εἰν αὐτῷ ἐνύ. Cp. *Apol.* 22 B C, where Socrates is made to say of the poets examined by him, that they could give no rational account of the poems which they had themselves composed. Aristophanes seems to have hit on somewhat of the same view, *Ach.* 398. Here the servant of Euripides, on being asked whether the poet is at home, replies that his mind has gone out, but he is himself in the house, upstairs, writing a tragedy:

\[ \text{ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἐξω κυλλέγων ἐπόλλια} \]
\[ \text{οὐκ ἑνδον, αὐτὸς δ' ἑνδον ἀναβάδην ποιεῖ} \]
\[ \text{τραγῳδιαν.} \]

For ἑμαυτῶν ἐκείνως, Plat. *Apol.* 28 E, cp. 38 A.
INTRODUCTION

occupied at such moments and to what sort of purpose his self-communings were put, there can be no doubt, in view of the solemn asseverations of the Apology taken in connection with the illustrations furnished elsewhere of the tests which he applied to other minds.

You have affirmed (says Socrates to Protagoras in the Dialogue named in honor of the great sophist) that wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, are not names of one and the same thing, but that they are parts of a whole—that whole being virtue. And you maintain that these parts of virtue are not quantitative and similar, like separate portions of a mass of gold, but qualitative and dissimilar, as are the features—the eyes, nose, mouth, etc., which are the parts that go to make up the whole face or countenance. Protagoras. I do indeed affirm that all these are parts of virtue; but while four of the five parts stand fairly upon a like footing, yet one of them, courage (ἀρετή), is quite different from the others. There are many persons who are unjust, unholy, intemperate, and ignorant, but yet in a high degree courageous. Socrates. Do you term courageous persons bold? Protagoras. Yes, and forward enough, where the most are backward. Socrates. Do you admit that virtue is a beautiful thing, and act upon the assumption that it is beautiful? Protagoras. Certainly I do. Socrates. Is virtue something partly beautiful (καλόν) and partly ugly (αλάξρόν), or is it wholly beautiful? Protagoras. Wholly beautiful, by all means. Socrates. Do you know of men going boldly down into deep wells, under the water? Protagoras. Yes. Socrates. Is it because they understand the business that they can do this thing? Protagoras. Yes. Socrates. In fighting on horseback, is it they who understand, or they who do not understand horsemanship, who do this fighting boldly? Protagoras. They who understand. So in other matters, those who understand
are bolder than those who do not. Socrates. But have you never seen persons, unskilled in matters of this kind, yet bold in regard to them? Protagoras. Yes, I have, very bold indeed. Socrates. Are, then, such bold persons as these also courageous? Protagoras. Nay, in that case, courage would be an ugly thing in very truth. Such persons are simply mad! Socrates. But did you not term the courageous bold? Protagoras. Yes, and I do now. Socrates. So then, these persons, bold in the manner last described, are seen to be not courageous, but mad. But those previously described, the wise and skillful, they also are bold, and, in being bold, courageous. So, according to the argument, knowledge would be courage, would it not? — The respondent in the above conversation had seen fit to assert that courage consists with ignorance. The questions and answers that ensue show that the assertion is itself inconsistent with what the maker of it believes and admits. He had, in fact, undertaken to discuss courage before defining the word to his own mind, and had proceeded as if ἀνδρεία and θάρρος were terms having the same connotation or comprehension. By the dialectic interrogatory he is checked and reminded that one of the terms is more comprehensive than the other. Thus:

All courage is boldness.
Some boldness is not courage.

In a conversation with Euthyphro, a soothsayer, who had undertaken to prosecute his own father for homicide, an attempt is made to arrive at a definition of holiness (ἁγιός). — Is holiness (asks Socrates) something consistent and invariable in all its manifestations, and is unholiness something consistently and invariably opposed to holiness, presenting always one and the same form or appearance (ὀνόμα)? Euthyphro. Yes, certainly. Socrates. Tell me now, what you call the holy and the unholy?

1 Plat. Prot. 350 c.
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Euthyphro. I say that the holy is just what I am doing now, indicting a wrong-doer in a matter of bloodguiltiness, or sacrilege, or something of that sort. To fail so to act is unholy. Socrates. You are not answering my question. I asked you what the holy (τὸ ἁγιόν 'holiness') is; but you have only told me that the thing which you are now doing is holy. Are not many other things also holy? Euthyphro. Yes. Socrates. Well, then, I did not request you to cite one or two of the many things that are holy, but to name the precise mark (εἴδος, species) whereby all things holy are recognized as holy. You remember, do you not, that you admitted just now that holy things are holy and unholy things unholy, by presenting always one and the same form or appearance? Euthyphro. I do. Socrates. Tell me, then, what that form is. Euthyphro. That which is acceptable to the gods is holy, the unacceptable to the gods is unholy. Socrates. Are we told that the gods have their mutual differences, that there is enmity among them? Euthyphro. We are, indeed. Socrates. Now, then, if you and I had a difference about odd and even in number, or about greater and less in size, or heavier and lighter in weight, would such differences render us inimical, or should we resort to counting, or to measuring, or to weighing, and settle our difference? Euthyphro. That is what we should do. Socrates. But in case we happened to differ about right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, good and bad, we might find ourselves continually at enmity, for having no criterion whereby we could settle the difference — might we not? Euthyphro. Yes. Socrates. Then it must be that the gods cherish their reputed mutual enmities for this reason, because they have no criterion to determine what is good and bad, right and wrong, etc.? Euthyphro. It must. Socrates. But they love what is beautiful and good, and hate the opposite, do they not? Euthyphro. Certainly. Socrates. But, as you concede, the same things are
held to be good by some of the gods, and bad by others—this being the cause of their dissensions? *Euthyphro.* Yes. *Socrates.* Thus, apparently, the same things would be beloved by gods and hated by gods? *Euthyphro.* Apparently. *Socrates.* Then the same things would be both holy and unholy, according to this reasoning? *Euthyphro.* It looks that way. . . . *Socrates.* So, then, you have not answered my question yet. Let us correct our statement, and say that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what they all love is holy. *Euthyphro.* Why not? *Socrates.* But note again, is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? *Euthyphro.* I don’t know what you mean. *Socrates.* I mean like this. Is that which is beloved, for example, beloved because it is loved, or is it loved because it is beloved? *Euthyphro.* The former. It is beloved because it is loved. *Socrates.* How, then, with the holy? Is it holy because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is holy? *Euthyphro.* The latter. It is loved by the gods because it is holy. *Socrates.* So, again, you have not told me yet what the *essence* (*οὐσία*) of holiness is; you have only named one of its accidents (*πάθος τι*), viz. that it is loved by the gods.  

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1 Plat. *Euthyphr.* 5 c, 9 d.
merely a verbal proposition, not a real proposition, nor a definition. And, finally, it is impressed upon his mind that the corrected statement, That which is holy is loved by the gods (δ οὐν ἵστι φιλείται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν), though a real proposition, nevertheless affords no definition of the term holiness.

The two condensed and abbreviated examples above presented — scraps from the sumptuous profusion spread out in the Platonic writings — will have served partially to illustrate the essential features of the art of which Socrates made himself the champion. By it were evolved the first principles of Logic. Forming, as that science does, the common framework of the whole edifice of the sciences since erected, Logic had its origin in the conversations of Socrates. "In our present state of knowledge . . . every student has been rendered familiar with the ordinary terms and gradations of logic and classification,—such as genus, definition, individual things as comprehended in a genus; what each thing is, and to what genus it belongs, etc. But familiar as these words have now become, they denote a mental process of which, in 440–430 B.C., few men besides Socrates had any conscious perception. Of course, men conceived and described things in classes, as is implied in the very form of language, and in the habitual junction of predicates with subjects in common speech. . . . But though this was done . . . it was wanting in that analytical consciousness which would have enabled any one to describe, explain, or vindicate what he was doing. The ideas of men—speakers as well as hearers, the productive minds as well as the recipient multitude—were associated together in groups favorable rather to emotional results, or to poetical, rhetorical narrative and descriptive effect, than to methodical generalization, to scientific conception, or to proof either inductive or deductive. That reflex act of attention which enables men to understand, com-
pare, and rectify their own mental process, was only just beginning. . . . It may be doubted whether any one before Socrates ever used the words 'genus' and 'species,' originally meaning family and form, in the philosophical sense now exclusively appropriated to them. Not one of those many names — called by logicians names of the second intention — which imply distinct attention to various parts of the logical process, and enable us to consider and criticise it in detail, then existed. All of them grew out of the schools of Plato, Aristotle, and the subsequent philosophers, so that we can thus trace them in their beginning to the common root and father, Socrates.” And further, “His conversations . . . exhibit the main features of a genuine inductive method, struggling against the deep-lying, but unheeded, errors of the early intellect acting by itself, without conscious march or scientific guidance, — of the intellectus sibi permittus, — upon which Bacon so emphatically dwells.”¹ The mighty consequences of such an initiative not even the imagination of a Plato was capable of prefiguring; but the fervid enthusiasm of both master and disciple, inspired by the conscious power which the new instrument enabled them to exercise, gave earnest of its future. To us, as we look back, the results of the way of reason, then for the first time clearly opened up and methodically

¹ Grote, History of Greece, v. 8, c. 68. In a footnote Mr. Grote adds: Socrates "sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics; he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and with particulars, too, the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Socrates described in his language as 'conceit of knowledge without the reality' is identical with what Bacon designates as the primary notions, the puerile notions, the aberrations, of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them."
pursued, are so momentous that, before it appeared, true learning seems hardly to have had an existence or a name. To Plato, with equal right, the Dialectic which Socrates had taught him was the culmination of all doctrines, the coping stone and crown of education.¹

The Socratic labors were in fact a methodical quest of truth. To clear the ground for a reception of the truth, by dispelling the confusion and eradicating the error which he found inherent in the minds of men and of which by profound self-scrutiny he had sought to purge his own mind, was the end to which the efforts of that wonderful life were devoted, not only with a zeal absolutely disinterested, but with a concentration and intensity equal to the rapt devotion of inspired art. First it was Periclean Athens, then the whole period of the depressing and exhausting War, finally the brief reign of the Thirty, followed by the few years of the Restored Constitution which Socrates survived to see. In the city colonnades, at the gymnasia and the palaestrae, wherever the youth were wont to resort, or with a congenial friend or two in the plane-trees’ shade by the Ilissus, at the camp or on the march in Boeotia or Thrace, back again in the teeming marketplace,—each day, early and late, the singular figure of the philosopher was to be seen, the stirring voice and the responses evoked by it were to be heard. It was a unique specimen of the sophistic tribe, and a homely one enough, with his eternal illustrations from cooks and carpenters, from shoemaking and horse-breaking, always saying the same things,² and never

¹ Plut. Rep. 534 έ δοξεί... οπέρ θριγμός τοῖς μαθημασίγι η διαλεκτική ἡμῶν ἑπάνω κεῖται, καὶ οὐκέτι ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μάθημα αὐτέρω ὁρθῆς δὲν ἐκτίθεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐχειν ἑδή τέκον τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων.

² Plut. Gorg. 490 έ Callicles. Ἡ ἡ δεῖ ταῦτα λέγει, δ Σώκρατες. Socrates. Οδ μένον γε, δ Καλλικλεῖς, ἀλλά καὶ περί τῶν αὐτῶν. Callicles. Νή τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀπεχρώσ γε δεί σκπεια τε καὶ καρφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ λατροῦσ οἴδην
seeming to arrive at any tangible conclusions. Here were indeed no imposing theories of the Cosmos to be promulgated, no elaborate discourses to win admiration for the learning and eloquence of their author. Here was no assumption of wisdom, nothing dogmatical to replace the seeming blank left in men’s minds after the incisive interrogatory had traversed them. Burdened by no conceit of his own, he rarely was at pains to spare the conceit of others,¹ barraging an often playful manner, and that irony, which, while it professed to mitigate, must frequently have aggravated, the humiliation of the respondent. The victim writhed, the bystanders jeered and applauded. Sometimes it was fierce anger and a blow. The remorseless dialectic, handled with a specialist’s unerring skill, cut deep—whether the questioner so willed or not—into hazy conventional beliefs, the prejudices and hypocrisies of traditional, localized habits of thought. Surely (men said) there must be something behind so much pretending not to know. What was

παθέται. Cp. Symp. 221 e. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 6 (a conversation with the sophist Hippias) "Εις γάρ σύ, ἐφη, ὁ Ὀσκρατής, ἐκεῖνα τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις, καὶ ἕγω πάλαι ποτὲ σοι ἢκουσα; καὶ ὁ Ὀσκράτης ὁ δὲ γε τούτον δεινότερον, ἐφη, ὁ Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Mem. 1. 2. 37 records a reference to one of Socrates’ similes by a member of the Board of Thirty, brought home to the philosopher in a very pointed way.

¹ Of the young men who were subjected to the Socratic interrogatory some, after the first encounter, never went near the examiner again (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 40); others fell under the spell of his teaching and became his constant followers. Xenophon relates, in the chapter just cited, how in dealing with Euthydemus Socrates showed consideration for the youth’s feelings, and, upon finding him favorably disposed toward learning, notwithstanding the shocks already given to his pride, held a further conversation with him alone, to save him from the humiliation caused by the presence of spectators. The motives of those who attached themselves to the philosopher were, of course, not all the same. Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 39 says that Critias and Alcibiades listened to Socrates for the time being, not because they liked him, but hoping thus to further the schemes of political ambition which they cherished from their earliest years.
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this threadbare sophist driving at? — this fanatical fellow with his Daemon that some of his mad followers could tell about, giving him signs and portents not vouchsafed to ordinary mortals. The disturbing effects of the Socratic procedure, in public and private, were inevitable and far-reaching, as they were subtle and penetrating. But of the misunderstanding sure to follow, of the ridicule, the enmity, the danger, he took no account. It was the self-forgetting ardor of the scientific observer and investigator, when science and philosophy were yet one, and when the moral phases of reasoned truth were first beginning to reveal their luster — a complete devotion such as merely human motives seemed inadequate to explain. — That you have in me (Plato makes Socrates say to his judges) one to be recognized as given by God to Athens, here is the proof: it does not look human-like, thus for so many years to have taken no thought of my own interests, letting my domestic affairs go all-unheeded, to gain time for looking after you. For that care I have accepted no compensation. This poverty is my witness.¹

The temperament of Socrates, pure-human and intense, impelled his mind to proceed on the convergent lines of one unerring method toward sure and definite achievement. He was moved to carry into the province of intellectual labor an orderly concentration of energy analogous to that specializing in the field of art which his countrymen so perfectly understood. The contrast presented by the skilled artisan, on the one hand, proceeding according to an elaborate set of rules, based more or less consciously upon well-tested principles, and, on the other hand, the statesman, dealing at haphazard with the exigencies of government, or the professional sophist, complacently purveying of his store of encyclopaedic learning, was repeatedly

¹ Plat. Apol. 31 B.C.
brought forward in the Socratic conversations.\(^1\) Himself at first trained in the craft of his father, to be a sculptor, the son of Sophroniscus had been born for philosophy; and his birth occurred at a moment when the times were ripe for a genius such as his. The middle of the fifth century B.C. was, not too soon to begin, here and there, to give a specific direction to the purely intellectual activities, by turning the rays of reason through a burning glass as it were, with effects of irrefutable certainty, upon some chosen point. The field of cosmical speculation, as it lay before Socrates, a scene of apparently interminable strife, not only afforded no opportunity for the exercise of his peculiar powers, but was repulsive to his religious sentiment. He was instinctively led, by the very constitution of his mind, to maintain a conservative attitude toward the religious observances of his native city.\(^2\) There were points

\(^1\) Cp. Plat. Gorg. 455 B, consultation of experts by the Athenian state. Crit. 47 B, see note on 48 A. Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 5, an amusing parody offered by Socrates to ridicule the purely empirical way of taking hold of political matters.

\(^2\) To this fact in particular Xenophon bears witness with abundant emphasis, as, in general, the most orthodox and least thoughtful of the Socratics has laid wearisome stress upon those external traits and homely virtues of the master which were common to all the best, and which he himself shared and could understand. We are not to suppose that Socrates' conception of divinity answered to the vulgar notion of gods, whatever he may have allowed his friend Xenophon to infer from his outward observance of religious rites. He knew how to respect the aspirations of the great thinkers who were his predecessors and his contemporaries, not the less because he could not accept any of their positive conclusions; and in his youth he had lived, as we are credibly informed, on terms of intimacy with Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras. The words put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato, Apol. 35 D, are significantly phrased — concluding, νομίζω γάρ, ὃ καὶ δὴρ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς οὐκέτι τὸν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων. Mr. Grote observes, H.G., v. 8, c. 68, citing Cic. Tusc. 5. 4. 10, where Socrates is said to have brought down philosophy from the heavens to the earth, that "his attempt to draw the line between that which was and was not scientifically discoverable" is "remarkable, inasmuch as it
enough wherein the popular theology was conspicuously unworthy, and upon these the Athenian sage was not the first to lay his finger; but a skeptical demeanor, where no conflict between religion and morality was apparent to him, would have been logically impossible for Socrates. Such a course would have been equivalent to an overstepping of his appointed province—a meddling with matters that were not amenable to the only touchstone which he knew. He found no way of applying his elenchus here. Whatever misgivings may have been stirred in his heart by the great voices to which he listened in his youth, it was foreign to his disposition to suffer a speculative doubt to divert him from actions which not only involved no human wrong, but seemed to provide means of satisfying a powerful and inexplicable human craving. To find a trace of insincerity in the religious conduct of Socrates were to make him forestall some of the remotest consequences of his own labors.

Not the whole of Nature, therefore, appealed to the aspirations of such a mind or lent itself to dialectic treatment, but only that small part of Nature which is man,—of man, however, the transcendent, supremely human portion, his moral being. The primary motive of Socrates' activity must be sought, not in an intellectual (to draw for the moment a distinction which to him was meaningless), but in a moral, impulse. His philosophizing was in the fullest sense practical; it was nevertheless pure philosophy, for the very reason that he felt the springs of virtue and knowledge within himself as flowing from a common source. The identity of virtue and knowledge was a working hypothesis, so to speak, furnished by his consciousness: in his own spiritual experience he had found that right living was secured by sound shows his conviction that the scientific and the religious point of view mutually excluded one another, so that where the latter began, the former ended.”
thinking; and he applied this theory to explain the aberrations which he observed in the lives of others.\textsuperscript{1} Socrates craved a knowledge of the truth as something preëminently \textit{useful}; and he recognized no utility detached from moral and intellectual well-being. For the ultimate happiness of the individual he could not conceive of a disharmony between the good and the true, the true and the useful, between intellectual and moral good. To him, truth was not divisible; it was something elementary and simple. Unhappiness and discontent; the shortcomings and perversities of human conduct; the injustice, bad faith, and calamity which he was forced daily to contemplate in the social and political world,—all these he marked as radically the effects of \textit{ignorance}. Not ignorance as popularly apprehended, but ignorance of self—and consequently of what is best for oneself: an ignorance nourished by a false conceit of knowledge. Wisdom consisted in the absence of such conceit. This purblind folly it was that caused men to grope darkly and wander far astray in search of their fancied welfare. In his own person he had proved that the cure of ignorance is the cure of evil; and the mighty force of his conviction swept him forward to apply the cure to others by the same philosophy.

When the position of Socrates as the apostle of sound thinking and right living, the determined adversary of mental inertia,

\textsuperscript{1} For discussion and criticism of the paradox, \textit{ôdēi \varepsilon\kappa\omicron\omega\upsilon \varepsilon\kappa\alpha\mu\alpha\rho\pi\acute{t}\acute{a}\nu}, see \textsc{Grote}, \textit{Plato}, v. 1, pp. 398 ff.; \textsc{Gomperz}, \textit{Griechische Denker}, Eng. Transl., v. 2, c. 4. It is touched upon in Xen. \textit{Mem.} 4. 2. 19, and Plato (who deals with it explicitly elsewhere) brings it into the \textit{Apology}, 25 b. "Considering the fanciful, far-fetched ideas, upon which alone the Pythagoreans and other predecessors had shaped their theories respecting virtues and vices, the wonder is that Socrates, who had no better guides to follow, should have laid down an ethical doctrine which has the double merit of being true, as far as it goes, legitimate, and of comprehensive generality: though it errs, mainly by stating a part of the essential conditions of virtue—sometimes also a part of the ethical end—as if it were the whole." —\textsc{Grote}, \textit{H.G.}, v. 8, c. 68.
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has once been clearly recognized, there is little difficulty in apprehending why it was the Negative Arm of Philosophy (as the dialectical method has been termed) which the steadfast search for truth would call mainly into exercise. No lengthy explanation is needed to account for the sharp antithesis of dialectic and rhetoric that impressed itself upon the mind of the master and has been brought to view in his name with signal force by Plato the disciple. In the story of Socrates the Art of Persuasion, as commonly practiced, invites mention only to be summarily dismissed. — I am a forgetful sort of a fellow, Protagoras (he remarks at the close of a brilliant and applauded sally by the learned sophist, impatient at being held down to answers continually redounding to his own confusion), — my memory is short, and if anybody makes a long speech I am apt to forget what the conversation is about. If I happened to be a trifle deaf and you wanted to talk with me, you would naturally feel bound to speak a little louder to me than to the others; in the same way now, finding me as forgetful as I am, pray contract your replies and make them briefer, if you expect me to follow you.¹ — The proper function of rhetoric was to enforce the personal views and aims of the rhetor himself, or, at the best, to set forth matters of fact and advance arguments couched in the unreasoned and unchallenged terms of commonplace. Not only was rhetoric an inappropriate instrument of philosophy, of the disinterested pursuit of truth pure and simple, but the Socratic art and the expository art moved on lines of precisely contrary direction. Thus, further, Socrates was compelled emphatically to disclaim the name of teacher. The word διδάσκαλος conveyed a notion of authority, of learned acquirement and the imparting of positive doctrine. But the dialectic interrogatory rested on no authoritative basis in the mind of the

questioner, and aimed to destroy in the mind of the questioned any conceit of knowledge based solely on the authority of custom or tradition. Even though the novice seemed to undergo a shock of intellectual paralysis, it were well so, provided his mind could be cleared and a way opened up for reasoned truth to enter. — The Thessalian Meno, in the Dialogue which bears his name, a fluent talker who had communed with Gorgias himself, cross-examined by Socrates, and repeatedly baffled in his attempts to make such replies as shall define the meaning he attaches to *virtue* (ἀρετή), — which at the outset, in an inquiry of his own, he had assumed as perfectly well understood, — exclaims, upon receiving the suggestion to start afresh and renew the search from the beginning: — Before I met you, Socrates, I used to hear it said that you were little better than a mass of perplexity yourself and an author of perplexity in others; and here you are now, calling down your spells and incantations upon me, until I am utterly bewildered. You seem — if I am to perpetrate a bit of mockery — to bear a close resemblance, as to your features and in every other way, to that flat-looking fish we have in the sea, the torpedo. It stuns and dazes everybody who comes near enough to touch it — just as you have stunned and dazed me. Body and soul, I am so benumbed that I can frame no answers to your questions. Yet I have discoursed a thousand times about virtue, to hearers without number, and with good success, as I fancied. But now I cannot even state what virtue is. Were you to practice in any other city than Athens what you are doing here, you would stand a good chance of being arrested as a sorcerer. — Well, Meno (rejoins Socrates), if this flatfish of yours only dazes people because it is completely dazed itself, I certainly resemble it; otherwise, I do not. It is no freedom from perplexity in my own mind that enables me to produce perplexity in the minds
of other men. On the contrary, I am quite as much at a loss myself as are those who find themselves at a loss to answer me. ¹

Nevertheless, we know that the mission of Socrates was to teach. His life affords a typical illustration of the distinction which requires to be drawn between the current and a more exquisite meaning of the word “teacher.” The Sophists who were his contemporaries were teachers in the current sense, dealing with matters analogous to much that is comprised

¹ Plat. Men. 80. “One of the most important lessons in this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having settled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is; and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he still feels no interest in the fundamental inquiry, but turns aside to his original object of curiosity, ‘Whether virtue is teachable.’ Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated, long-familiarized, notions — τὸ γὰρ ἀρθοῦσθαι γνῶμαν, ὁδυνή.” — Grote, Plato, v. 2, p. 12. “Such terms as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, are tossed about in the wars of words as if everybody knew what they meant, and as if everybody used them in the same sense; whereas most people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time, perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors, but never taking stock, never either inquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realizing the fullness of their meaning according to the strict rules of logical definition.” — Max Müller, Lectures on Language, Second Series, pp. 526, 527 (quoted in Mill’s Review of Grote’s Plato, Edinburgh Review, April, 1866). Xenophon, Mem. i. 1. 16, enumerates the usual subjects of Socratic investigation thus: περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί δίκαιον· τί σωφρόσυνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δείλια· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχή ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, κτλ. Platonic examples are: Charmides σωφρόσυνη, Euthyrho σωφρόνης, Hippias Major τὸ καλὸν, Laches ἀνδρεία, Lysis φιλία, Meno ἀρετή, Republic δικαιοσύνη.
under the term "higher education" at the present day. They were widely versed in the learned accomplishments of their time; fluent and attractive lecturers; a few of them great original thinkers, as Protagoras of Abdera; some with special proclivities, like Prodicus of Ceos, who expounded the synonyms of the language. In an era of freshly stimulated intellectual vigor and rapidly widening opportunities for its exercise they were the professors of the liberal arts and sciences as then known; and the instruction they offered was eagerly sought for by young men who could afford to pay the fees, whether the motive might be an innate love of learning, or, as would be true of the great majority of cases, the ambition to cultivate effectively those talents believed to be most helpful in enabling their possessor to rise to a position of influence and distinction in public affairs. The methods of the Sophists were not merely expository, but in a way also dialectical and critical, the fundamental difference between their activity and that of Socrates being given in the antithesis of rhetoric and Socratic dialectic already explained. An attempt to find the counterparts of the Sophists of the fifth century B.C. in modern education, not professional or technical, would require us first to eliminate those teachers of the mathematical and physical or natural sciences who are at the same time trained investigators, and further, in considering the residue, to make a proper deduction for the employment of strictly reasoned method in the teaching of subjects not themselves of scientific character, or not yet brought completely under the domain of science.\footnote{The suspicion and mistrust felt in early times toward all persons of studious habit and believed to possess superior intellectual attainments (cp. Euripides, Medea, 294 ff.) was complicated in the case of the Sophists with a popular prejudice regarding the custom of taking pay for imparting such accomplishment to others. There seemed to be especial ground for suspecting the motives of a class of men prepared to teach the art of "making the worse
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For Socrates, on the other hand, so unique was his environment, so unexampled his historical position, we should vainly seek a modern counterpart, whether as typified in a class or embodied in an individual. It can be conceived as the spirit of all true learning personified,—as the ideal teacher,—imparting of himself rather than of his acquisitions, keeping first principles steadily in sight and never mistaking the semblance for the reality of knowledge.

What is called "personal magnetism" pertains to a spiritual realm unexplored and impenetrable. The ultimate sources of this influence lie in the emotional, unconscious regions of the soul; and no one undertakes to account completely for its manifestations, even in the case of individuals often seen and intimately known. To Socrates his contemporaries have attributed a power over the minds of his companions and hearers which seemed to them something magical and superhuman. In fact the Athenian sage united in his personality, to an unparalleled degree, the temperament of strong feeling, of ardent, even violent passions, and a supreme intellectual faculty, holding appear the better reason" to any who would pay liberally for the instruction.

The words "sophistry," "sophistical," so far as they are used to denote fallacious reasoning exercised with the intent to deceive, cannot be fitly applied to the Sophists of the fifth century B.C. as a class, nor to any individual among them of whom we have received accounts. In fact, a great part of the sophistry (to give the word its widest meaning) that is always rise, consists of unsound doctrine which is not recognized as fallacious by those who inculcate or disseminate it. "It has been the practice of writers on logic . . . to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners. This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms . . . are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those ever-renewed 'inadvertencies of ordinary thinking' which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or 'reasoned truth' to rectify."—GROTE, Plato, v. 1, p. 550.
the will in check and guiding it upon lines of pure reason.\textsuperscript{1} The rare "combination of moral enthusiasm and logical discipline" could not fail to produce marvelous effects in those upon whose minds it was systematically brought to bear. It was a character complex, yet simple in its unsullied consistency; precepts of justice, temperance, courage — ideas weighed in cold thought and issuing in burning words — were to be seen exemplified in every action, proved in every ordeal or opportunity. How came such a soul to be lodged in the uncouth frame and to play behind the gross features of a satyr, unless indeed the spirit of a divinity were hidden under that disguise? — The

\textsuperscript{1} "All centuries have produced their quota of strong, clear, cool heads; and there has rarely been any lack of warm hearts. But the two are rarely combined, and the rarest phenomenon of all is a heart of mighty power working with all its force to keep the head above it cool, as a steam engine may give motion to a refrigerating machine. Such a combination occurs but once in a millennium on any large scale. But when it does occur, it exerts, as if to compensate for its rarity, an influence which persists unexhausted for a long train of centuries." — GOMPERZ, \textit{Griechische Denker}, Eng. Transl., v. 2, p. 45. The author goes on to remark on enthusiasm and emotion generally, as tending rather to obscurity than to clearness of mental vision. Compare, however, the following, from J. S. MILL, on \textit{Poetry and its Varieties}: "That capacity of strong feeling which is supposed necessarily to disturb the judgment is also the material out of which all motives are made, — the motives, consequently, which lead human beings to the pursuit of truth. The greater the individual's capacity of happiness and misery, the stronger interest has that individual in arriving at truth; and, when once that interest is felt, an impassioned nature is sure to pursue this, as to pursue any other object, with greater ardor: for energy of character is commonly the offspring of strong feeling." The observations above quoted are helpful in the difficult task of separating the Socratic and the Platonic elements intimately fused in the composition of the Dialogues, which, while borrowing the name and voice of him by whose example they were inspired, are at the same time permeated by the genius of the author who conceived and elaborated them. Plato and Socrates were similar in temperament. But we note one significant difference: the Socratic intelligence remained unclouded by obtrusions of the synthetic imagination; the spirit of Plato refused to hover in a single sphere. The mystic background
comparison I am going to make (declares Alcibiades in the *Symposium*) shall be for truth's sake, and no jesting whatever. I say that Socrates is precisely like the Silenus-figures we see in the shops, fashioned in a sitting posture, with flutes or Pan's pipes in their hands. Such is their exterior; but when you open them, images of gods are disclosed within. I compare him also to the satyr Marsyas. That you resemble those beings in form and feature, Socrates, you would not yourself venture to deny; and that the likeness holds good in all respects, listen while I explain. To begin with, you are one of the wantons — What, no? — confess, or I produce my witnesses. A musician too. Ay, a performer more wonderful than Marsyas

of the soul was, indeed, all-important to Socrates. There were fixed the roots of his deep religious sentiment; there dwelt and thence spoke his *Daemon*, the admonitory Voice. But for him there was no blurring of the boundary line between the Conscious and the Unconscious; his mental vision was disturbed by no confusion of fantasy and reason. With Plato it was far otherwise. To the universal forms so vividly conceived through the Socratic process of abstraction and generalization — to these *ideas* Plato, turning his back on the particulars from which they flow, saw fit to attribute *reality*, denying to them their source and origin, and translating them to an alien region. Though he consecrated his life to Philosophy with sincerest devotion, Plato was still incapable of deserting the Muses. Socrates, as it appears, felt certain compunctions on this score, and was moved, at the eleventh hour, to absolve himself, by a pair of humble creative efforts, thus offering some atonement to the Genius of Poesy. Many times during his life a Dream had visited him — the same Dream under divers shapes, but addressing him always in the same words: Ἑ Ἡ νεῖκος, μοσθη μοσθή, καὶ ἰργάτον. Until the time came for him to die he had taken it for granted that this 'music' meant philosophy — that the purpose of the Dream had been only to encourage and strengthen him in the good work he was actually doing. But now, in the prison cell, on the eve of his departure, he felt bound to guard against the consequences of a possible misunderstanding of the divine injunction. There is a profound suggestiveness in this tale. Socrates, perhaps, did well to absolve himself. It is not the Socratic, but the Platonic, philosophy that could be fairly thought of as μεγίστη μουσική. — *Phaed.* 61.
by far! It was with the instrument into which he breathed that he enchanted all hearers, as all are enchanted now who hear his tunes. The tunes of Olympus, learnt from Marsyas, are the only spells in the world that really bind. Whether the player who performs them be of the best or of the poorest, they are sure to work their will, and by the divinity that is in them reveal the divine needs and religious cravings of the hearer's soul. In only one way do you differ from Marsyas, Socrates, in that with no instrument, but by your bare words, you produce the same effect. When we hear any other speaker, be he never so eloquent, or other words than yours, nobody cares at all, so to say, for that; but when one hears you, or your words spoken by another, though it be a sorry spokesman, let the listener be man, woman, or child, we stand smitten and spellbound. For my own part, gentlemen, if you were not sure to think this wine had completely got the better of me, I would declare to you on oath, how I have been affected by his words, and how they affect me even now. When I hear them, the heart within me bounds more wildly than do the frenzied worshipers of the Great Goddess; tears burst from my eyes at the words he utters. And very many besides myself are affected in the same manner. While listening to Pericles, or to harangues delivered by other eloquent men, I thought they spoke well, to be sure, but they never moved me in this way: there was no tumult in my soul; it did not cry out upon me that I was no better than a slave. But this Marsyas here has made me feel, over and over again, that, being such as I am, it were better not to live. You will not deny the truth, Socrates, of what I say. And I am well aware, to this very day, that if I would lend my ears I could not withstand the spell, but I should have the same experience over again. He compels me to confess, that with all these shortcomings of my own I yet neglect myself to attend to the affairs
of Athens. Therefore perforce I stop my ears and flee away as it were from the Sirens' song, that I may not stay right here and grow old seated at the feet of Socrates. He is the only man before whom I have felt, what no one would expect to find in me, the sense of shame. Before him and him alone I do feel it. For I am conscious that I cannot rebuih his proofs of my evil-doing, and yet that, when I am away from him, I am powerless to resist the promptings of ambition. Hence it is that I fly from him and shun him, and when I do see him am ashamed of the admissions I have made. Oftentimes I think I would gladly see him no longer among the living; yet again, if that were to happen, I know it would distress me far more — so that I am at a loss what to do with such a man.¹

An appreciable part of the dramatic power of the Dialogues is furnished by their scenery. The scene of a Socratic conversation may either be adapted merely in a general way to the haunts and habits of the philosopher, as when a gymnasium is chosen, or a grove by the Ilissus, or a friend's house in the

¹ Plat. Symp. 215, 216. As we read Alcibiades' confession of his pricks of conscience and remorse, the allusion to Pericles recalls a line of Eupolis touching the eloquence of that statesman, which might be applied with singular fitness to Socrates himself. Of all the speakers (the comic poet said) Pericles was the only one who always left the sting behind (bee-like) in his listeners: —

—— μὴν ῥητὸραν τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις.

Socrates' power over souls would inevitably take on a sinister aspect in the popular mind, and could not fail to enhance the belief that he was a "corrupter of youth." Cp. Ar. Av. 1553 λίμνη τις ἔστι δοντός ὅβ γυε καθαιμνησεῖ. — If it were true that I had harmed the young men (the Defendant says), then their fathers and elder brothers, here present at the trial, ought to be testifying against me, and not in my favor as they all do. Here, for example, is the brother of Theodotus. Theodotus himself is dead, so that he, at any rate, cannot have begged his brother off. Apol. 33 E.
Piraeus; or it may be historical, suggested by some memorable occasion in his career. Scenes of the latter sort are those laid in the prison, where Socrates was confined after he had been condemned to death, awaiting the return of the Sacred Galley from Delos, the signal for his execution; and that of the *Apology*, which transports us to the court-room, into the presence of the accused with his little group of friends, of the three accusers and the five hundred Athenian judges. It must not be supposed, however, that because the scene of a dialogue has been derived from a real event the conversation itself can be taken as a transcript of actual utterances, nor even that the words attributed to the master may not serve to convey views and doctrines peculiar to the disciple. Plato was no recorder of mere facts. The transcendent truth of ideality pervades his writings. They require, in order to distinguish and hear aright the mingled voices, the judgment of sympathetic insight, a certain faculty of divination on the reader's part. Thus, in the *Crito*, a prison scene, the tender to the prisoner of some means of effecting an escape and his firm refusal to avail himself of the opportunity, are to be noted as facts; and the one all-sufficient argument of consistency advanced in support of the refusal, as well as the principles of right conduct sketched in dialectic form, we promptly recognize as Socratic: we are compelled to judge otherwise of the famous personification of the Laws of Athens, their special plea and grievance, a noble piece of rhetoric, which Plato has seen fit to introduce, to perfect the design of the Dialogue as a whole. The *Phaedo*, again, depicting, with infinite pathos, the last moments in the life of Socrates and his death by the draught of hemlock, forms, thus far, an historical record of inestimable value: but his discourses on the nature and destiny of the soul, the poetic mysticism and the myth-making, with all their artistic appropriateness to such
a scene and such an hour, betray their immediate source in the speculative Platonic imagination. These dramatic fictions justify themselves by the laws of art. Yet another sort of combination is met with in the Apology or Defense of Socrates before his Judges. That Dialogue,—for the tone and even the form of dialogue are assumed as far as the fiction of a judicial argument would permit,¹—although its scene is historical, does not record the discourse that was pronounced on the occasion to which it is adapted; nevertheless, in vindicating his master to the world at large, while presenting under the lineaments of Socrates a picture of the ideal sage in its simple unity and integrity, Plato would be moved by feelings of piety, no less than by the sense of artistic fitness, to exclude every feature not essentially characteristic, every line or shade of color not genuine and true to the life.

The Platonic Apology would indeed have seemed most inadequate, whether viewed as vindication or as portrait, had it been made to include no more than the Defendant’s plain rejoinder to the indictment considered by the Athenian dicastery, or, composed as it was after the events of the trial were publicly known, had its author omitted to point with scathing force the moral lesson of the verdict rendered, as well

¹ The opening sentences of the Apology are designed (with allusion to the speeches of the prosecution supposed to be just concluded) to present forcibly the contrast of rhetorical methods and the defendant’s customary mode of expression—the only mode competent to him—for which he craves the indulgence of the court. The liberty conceded in the Athenian dicasteries to either party in a suit of questioning his opponent enables the Apology to take on at one stage the precise form of dialogue, 24 D. But the familiar conversational tone pervades the whole work, even where its eloquence is most solemn and impressive. It is but a short time we have had to converse with one another (the speaker says), ὅλγον γὰρ χρόνον ἄλληλοι διειλήγαμε θα 37 A. And, again, 39 E, τοῖς ἀνυψησαμένοις ἥδεος ἃν διαλεχθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος toutou πράγματος.
as to sound that note of inspired eulogy which no great man is capable of voicing for himself. Socrates in fact pleaded his cause in words the ‘truest, the most free, the most just, that were ever heard’—as Xenophon avers, who, though he could not be present at the trial, has put together a rambling and fragmentary report of the defense, as described to him, with his own interpretation of its tone. But the pious task that lay before Plato was a larger one than the accused himself had been called upon to undertake, as it is a worthier and greater thing to redeem and immortalize the memory of a man than merely to defer his death. In the indictment preferred by Meletus there were two counts to which Socrates had to answer: the charge of disbelieving in the deities recognized by the state, and importing new ones; and that of corrupting the morals of Athenian youth by teaching such irreligion. Of these offenses (embraced under the comprehensive term ἄσεβεια) a majority of the judges pronounced him guilty. But the author of the Apology widens the field of accusation to include the serious charge of atheism, as well as that of “making the worse appear the better reason,” involved in the deep-seated popular misunderstanding, the inveterate prejudice and odium, which had grown up around the name and person of Socrates, and in which Plato finds the remote and principal cause of his condemnation. The rebuttal and denial of such erroneous opinions would be sharp and brief. But while the false view was dispelled, a vision of the truth, sublime and ineffaceable—of the

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1 Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 1 τὴν δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἄληθεστατα καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτα καὶ δικαίωτα εἶναί. Cp. his Apologia Socratis. Xenophon can find no worthier explanation of Socrates’ lofty contempt of death than the readiness to be spared the failings and infirmities of extreme old age; and to the Oracle, which in Plato is so finely applied to the Socratic wisdom, Xenophon gives a different turn: ἀνέιλεν ὁ Ἀστυλλων μεθανα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθερωτέρον μήτε δικαίωτερον μήτε σωφρονέτερον.
real Socrates and his heavenly commission—must come to replace it for all time.¹

When, in obedience to the divine mandate, I examine men's minds (the Defendant says) and show them that they think they know that whereof they know nothing, or when the youths who imitate me confute in like manner those who fancy themselves wise, the anger they feel is not for themselves and their own ignorance, but is visited on me, and they proceed to talk about 'one Socrates, a pestilent fellow, who makes young people bad.' When asked what he does or what he teaches, to deserve this reproach, they are at a loss for a reply, but to hide their embarrassment fall back upon the current charges indiscriminately urged against all philosophers, of studying what is in the heavens and what is beneath the earth, and of making the worse appear the better reason. Naturally they would not choose to state the truth, that they are exposed in their pretense of knowing what they do not know.²—But it was not merely motives of wounded vanity, of petty jealousy and malice, that formed the basis of such misrepresentation. Under the circumstances of the time a perverted conception of the character of Socrates was inevitable on the part of a numerous class of steady-going persons of conventional habit and stereotyped

¹ Schanz, Einleitung, p. 91, observes that the 'centre of gravity' of the Apology lies, not on the negative or defensive, but on the positive or expository, side. The substance of the indictment is thus reported in Xen. Mem. i. 11: ἂδικεὶ Σωκράτης, οὗ μὴν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦς σὺ νομίζων, ἄτερα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων. ἂδικεὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. Cp. Plat. Apol. 24 B Σωκράτης φησιν ἂδικεὶν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρωντα καὶ θεοῦς οὐν ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἄτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων. Schanz, Einleitung, p. 16, conjecturally restores the official form as follows: Μελήτου τοῦ δεῖνος Πιστεύων Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωτεκήθεν ἀσφείας· τιμημα θάνατος. ἂδικεὶ Σωκράτης οὗ μὴν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦς σὺ νομίζων, ἄτερα δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα τοὺς νέους διδάσκων.

² Plat. Apol. 23 C D.
modes of thought, who were instinctively opposed to the innovations in education, art, and religion that the awakened spirit of intellectual inquiry threatened to effect, and who neither cared nor were competent to discriminate between the individuals whom they identified with the new movement as a whole. The Old Attic Comedy regularly made itself the champion of things as they have been, are, and always should be. For his Clouds, a play designed to cast ridicule upon the entire family of philosophers, Aristophanes found a convenient typical protagonist in the familiar and striking personality of Socrates—an opportunity of effectively presenting a medley of absurdities under a single role. All imaginable reputed crimes of free-thinkers, scientist or sophist, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα, are inculcated with object-lessons and glorified by the Socrates of this Comedy, which is still extant in a form sufficiently near to that of its first representation to enable us to judge fairly of its effects. The impression left upon the popular imagination by such a caricature, drawn with the comic poet's unscrupulous art, would form a nucleus round which vague floating opinions could gather, becoming in course of time indistinguishable from an actual knowledge of the man. Upon the prejudice due to such causes the Accusers of Socrates, as Plato affirms, could confidently rely, to enforce their contention, when the circumstances of the Athenian state finally prompted the attack.¹

We shall not attempt to lay before readers of the Apology in advance a detailed summary of its contents or argument. Its threefold division, into defense proper, consideration of penalty after the verdict, and concluding talk with the judges, requires no lengthy explanation; while the composition of the first and

¹ Plat. Apol. 19 ν ἡ ἔμη διαβολή, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεῶν Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. Mention of the Clouds, 19 c.
most comprehensive of the three parts is of a nature that does not readily lend itself to formal analysis. Throughout the work, in the presentation of its subject on the positive side, each essential trait is revealed with unobtrusive art, the whole character is gradually brought to view, the clear light of the simple Socratic philosophy shines over all, its inherent irony too true and genuine to seem to suffer from Plato's added strain of caustic satire. The evidence of conspicuous illustrative events is incidentally recorded: the protest and steadfast refusal of Socrates as Chairman of the Prytanes to put an illegal motion to the vote of the stormy Assembly on the Pnyx; his quiet disregard of an unjust command imposed by the Thirty Tyrants; and casually as it were, the brief mention of military campaigns wherein he had served the city as a soldier in the phalanx. But matters of fact are everywhere subordinated to the ideal portraiture. Not even the characteristic doctrinal features are permitted, as such, to disturb the true ethical proportions, to mar the moral perspective of this incomparable picture—unfolding as it does the vision of a soul at once so simple and so great, that each several aspect only helps reveal the unity in which it quickly becomes merged and lost. The eloquence of the Apology, of a sort alike unfamiliar to court or ecclesia, to advocate or rhetor, is borne in upon us as the voice of a martyr—bearing witness not to the truth of a belief, but to the belief in truth itself. In the presence of Socrates before his Judges the adherents of all creeds and speculative dogmas can stand together for a brief moment on the terra firma of that wisdom which perfectly comprehends the limitations of human knowledge. It is the sure and unassailable ground of the Agnostic. The singular beauty and impressiveness of the con-

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1 See, in the Index, the articles ἀναμνήσεις, Λέων, Ἀμφίτολος, Δήλον, Ποντίδαλα.
cluding words, when the sage comes to speak of his impending doom, we note as largely attributable to his clear pointing of the boundary line between the unknown and the known.— "Α μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἷομαι εἰδέναι. — Άλλα χρὴ εὐλπιδαὶ εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἦσθι ἄνδρὶ ἄγαθῷ κακὸν οἰδὲν οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.

The ingenuous reader will do well to hesitate before committing himself to the judgment prompted by the feelings that first arise on contemplating the treatment of Socrates by his native city. What Athens really did was to offer him the choice between a residence elsewhere and a painless death. Protagoras and Anaxagoras, the aliens, facing the same alternatives, could choose the former one; Socrates, the Athenian, who knew himself and had defined to his own mind with precision the evil and the good, was bound to choose the latter. "To be great is to be misunderstood"; and the city gave fresh proof of her incapacity to understand the greatest of her citizens, when she expected him to avoid presenting himself at court in answer to the indictment, or, once there, to propose for himself what would ordinarily be regarded as the lesser penalty. But while she failed to comprehend his essential attributes, there were accessory traits of character and accidental circumstances in the career of the Philosopher that had been noted with grave suspicion by the jealous guardians of civic integrity. Not only had he stood aloof from public life, so far as any voluntary participation in the business of the city was concerned, but he had been wont to criticise various details of a form of polity which he could not thoroughly admire; and men who had worked irreparable damage to the state had been marked as his disciples — notably Critias and Alcibiades, not to mention the

1 Years after the trial the orator Aeschines said to the people in the Ecclesia, You put to death the sophist Socrates, because it was made clear that he
renegade, philo-Laconian Xenophon. Political and religious heterodoxy would be felt to have united their baneful influences in depraving the minds of these and other youthful followers who had turned out badly. — The Athenians do not greatly trouble themselves (we read in the *Euthyphro*) about any cleverness they fancy a man to possess, provided he keep it to himself and refrain from teaching his accomplishment to others; if he does that, it provokes their ire.¹ — Figuratively speaking, the ancient Grecian commonwealths stood in daily terror of their lives. Over and above the danger from external foes, the spirit of faction within the walls never remitted its secret activity, watching for opportunities of open force, while the shadow of the tyrannis was always hovering near. Athens at the close of the fifth century B.C., the Restored Democracy, or, in Aristophanic phrase, the venerable *Demus of Pnyx*, set on his feet again, — this worthy patriarch, enfeebled by a long and painful illness, with more than one dangerous outbreak of domestic strife attending it, and just escaped from assassination at the hands of a parcel of malcontents, — impatient and mistrustful of his own celebrated tolerance of eccentric deportment on the part of his progeny, has still not lost his native magnanimity, though ready to adopt now and then a drastic measure, retroactive or precautionary, deemed by the family council indispensable to his future security and peace of mind. The same Athens that in 399 B.C. suppresses the voice of Socrates, had, four years earlier, under the lead of Thrasybulus, set an example of purely political clemency up to that time without a parallel in history.


¹ Plat. *Euthyphr.* 3 c.
## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

**B.C.**

469. Birth of Socrates.


455. First tragedy of Euripides.

450. Withdrawal of Anaxagoras from Athens.

449. Birth of Alcibiades?

440. The *Antigone* of Sophocles. Revolt and surrender of Samos. Sophocles a colleague of Pericles as general before Samos.

438. The *Alcestis* of Euripides. Completion of the Parthenon.

432. Prosecution of Phidias and Aspasia for *d-editor*.


428. Third Invasion of Attica.

427. Visit of Gorgias to Athens as envoy of Leontini. Fourth Invasion of Attica.

424. Defeat of Athenians by Thebans at Delium.

423. The *Clouds* of Aristophanes.

422. Battle of Amphipolis.

415. Sailing of the Sicilian Expedition under Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades. Alcibiades accused of profaning the Mysteries, and condemned to death in his absence.

413. Destruction of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

B.C.
407. Return of Alcibades to Athens.
404. Surrender of Athens to Lysander. Tyranny of the Thirty; suppressed in the eighth month. Death of Alcibiades.
401. Expedition of Cyrus the Younger (described in the Anabasis of Xenophon).
399. Death of Socrates.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΟΤΣ

17 Α Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπώθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἔγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ ἀυτὸς ὑπ' ἀυτῶν ὑλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὖν πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἄλλης γε, ὡς ἄτοσ εἶπεῖν, οὐ δὲν εἰρήκασιν. μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὅν ἐπεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν φ' ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆ ὑμᾶς ἐνλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαιπατήθητε, ὡς δεινοῦ ἂντος ἐλέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθήναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἐργῷ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ' ὅπωστείν φαινο-ιμαί δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτο μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντό-

17 Α-18 Α.

The defendant professes himself bewildered by the persuasive eloquence of his accusers, yet amazed at their extremity of falsehood—above all at their effrontery in warning the judges against him as a clever speaker. Can it be they recognize a sort of eloquence quite unlike their own—the eloquence of truth? Its language is not ornate and studied, but spontaneous and simple—even such as becomes the defendant's years.

Therefore he begs his judges to suffer him to speak in his accustomed way, and not in the manner of the courts of law, to which he is a stranger. He deems it fair that they should grant this boon; for the question is, indeed, not one of oratory, but of truth and justice.

2. Ἐγὼ δ' οὖν... ἐπελαθόμην: 'as for me, they almost made me forget who I was.' For ὑπ' αὐτῶν see Index, πάσχειν.

5. αὐτῶν: i.e. τῶν κατηγόρων, gen. of possession, with ἐν. So below, ἐν, with τοῦτο.
татоν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὕτωι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὦμολογοῦσιν ἀν ἔγαγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἡ οὖδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν. ύμεῖς δὲ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μὲντοι μὰ Δία, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπτέμενους γε λόγους, ὡσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμαζε τὸ καὶ οὐνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν οὖν ὁμόμοιοι πιττεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἂν λέγω, καὶ μηδείς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν δήποτε πρέποι, ὁ ἄνδρες, τῒδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὡσπερ μειρακίων πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς υμᾶς εἰσεῖναι. καὶ μὲντοι καὶ πάνω, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν ἔσομαι καὶ παρίειμαι. ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστη μον ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὄντος εἰσεῦα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἑπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἢν υμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασιν, καὶ

1. δεινὸν . . . λέγων: the phrase is amplified and emphasized by placing καλοῦσιν οὕτωι within it. The arrangement thus gives clear efficiency to the irony of δεινὸν λέγων here, which the speaker ventures to suggest as an equivalent of τάληθη λέγοντα. Index, δεινὸς.

2. εἰ . . . τοῦτο λέγουσιν: 'if that is what they mean.' What they really meant was Socrates' skill in the dialectic method, popularly regarded as an instrument of sophistry, τῶν ἦττω λόγων κρείττω ποιεῖν.

3. οὗ κατὰ τούτους: 'tho' not after their manner,' ou belongs not to the sentence, but to the phrase, which is parenthetical in tone. Unabbreviated, ὄμολογοῦσιν ἄν εἶναι ῥήτωρ, οὐ μὲν κατὰ τούτους, ἀλλ' ὦμος.

4. ἢ τι ἡ οὖδέν: Index, τίς.

5. εἰς ὑμᾶς: Index, εἰσέλθειν.

6. δι' ὄντως εἰσεῦα λέγειν: σρ. εἰς τῷ εἰσαγωγεὶ τρόπῳ κτλ. 27 B. The conversational tone is meant, tending to the form of dialogue, as 20 A, B, and elsewhere.

7. ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν: i.e. at the counters of the money-changers, "on 'change."
αλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζεων μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτον ἑνεκα.

Δέχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτη γεγονὼς ἐβδομῆκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὐν
4 ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ώσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ
18 άντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ἄν, ξυνεγγυνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι,
εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, εἰν ὑσπερ
ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δή καὶ νῦν τούτῳ ὑμῶν δέμα τίκαιν,
ὡς γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως· εἰν (ὡς μὲν
γὰρ χείρων, ὡς δὲ βελτίων ἄν εἴη), αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο σκο-
τείν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ·
dικαστὸν μὲν γὰρ αὐτή ἀρετή, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθη λέγειν.

3. ἶτη ... ἐβδομῆκοντα: Index, Ὀκράτης.

4. τῷ διπτι ξένος: i.e. ξένος in the proper sense of the word, not
figuratively as ξένως above. A
foreigner or alien might be unable
to address the court even in the
Attic dialect (φωνή).

7. καὶ ... τούτῳ ... δώματι:
δίκαιον ὡς γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκῶ: divide
thus in reading, likewise in trans-
lating. δίκαιον, while rhetorically
emphatic (first word in the group),
is grammatically a predicate-
adjective. See the following
note.

11. αὐτή ἀρετή: sc. ἱστον.
The subject αὐτῆ, by assimilation
of gender; for τούτῳ, i.e. τὸ τοῦ·
αὐτὸ σκοτείν κτλ. There is no
ambiguity in the assimilated form
of expression; ἀρετή must be
predicative, otherwise the article
would be required, with οὕτος, ὡς,
ἐκάνος, in prose.

18 A–E

Two sets of accusations there
are, he affirms, and two compan-
ies of accusers, the old and the
new—not merely the formidable
Anytus and his friends, but the far
more formidable ORIGINAL ACCUS-
ERS. These have had the ear of
the Athenian public, of the men
who now sit in judgment, from
childhood up. Many in number,
intangible and nameless (barring
a comic poet or two), impossible to
bring to book, they, whether in
jealousy and malice, or themselves
believing what they said, have de-
scribed “one Socrates, a wise man,
given to meteoric and subterranean
enquiries, a perverter of right
reason.” They have classed the
Πρώτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμὶ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπείτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ύστερα καὶ τοὺς ύστερους. ἕμοι γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὐς ἕγω μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἧ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτὸν, καὶ περ ὄντας καὶ τοῦτος δεινοὺς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἕμοι, ὡς ἐστιν τοῖς Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα καὶ τά υπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἦττο λόγον κρείττων σπουδ. οὕτως, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάζαντες οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι. οἱ
defendant with those philosophers who are thought to disbelieve in gods. He asks the judges, then, to concede the twofold scheme; and he claims the right, in pleading his cause, to deal first with the charges that were first preferred.

4. πολλοὶ and πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἐτη οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες are attributives of κατήγοροι, connected by καὶ. Not so in English. ‘Many have there been to bring accusation, and these many years has the slandering gone on.’ Grammatically different below C, where πολλοὶ and πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες and λέγοντες are predicative in the Greek.

5. πρὸς ὑμᾶς: with κατήγοροι, not with γεγόνασι. The verb alone forms the predicate.

7. καὶ περ... δεινοὺς: not without irony; the ύστεροι might feel themselves slighted, were they not distinctly recognized as δεινοί. This recognition, however, is virtually retracted below C, οὕτως... οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι.

9. ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν: ‘pressed unceasingly their criminations.’ For the charges which follow, see the Index, σοφὸς, σοφιστής, Ἀναξιγόρας, λόγος.

13. οἱ δεινοὶ κτλ.: forms the predicate. Regularly the subject is distinguished from the predicate by the presence of the article with the former, but sometimes, as here, the article is essential to
the meaning of the predicate-noun independently of grammatical structure. They ‘are the (truly) formidable accusers with whom I have to deal.’ The thought is that all other charges are of comparatively little moment beside that of atheism (below οὐδὲ θεοῦ νοµίζειν), here indirectly made.

2. ἐπειτὰ κτλ.: reverting to the two main points, πολλαῖς and πάλαι. A consequence of the second point is the depth of the impression made upon the minds of the present judges, who were children or mere boys when they first listened to misrepresentations of Socrates. The Athenian δικαστής must be at least thirty years of age: it was now twenty-four years since the Clouds of Aristophanes, in which Socrates was caricatured, had been presented to the public (423 B.C.); and he must have been at that time already well known and much talked of.

6. ἐρήμην κτλ.: Index, δίκη.

9. οἱ ... ἀνέπειθον: contrasted with the κομμοδοποιοῖς, who were neither unknown nor animated by jealousy and malice.

10. οἳ δὲ (‘others’) ... ἄλλους (‘more’) πειθόντες: enlarges and corrects the main statement. Cp. εἰνοὶ δὲ ... μειράκια, above C.

13. σκιαμαχεῖν: a fanciful counterpart of the proceedings at a δίκη ἔρημη. Here it is the defendant who presents himself at court, but he is bound to lose his case,
because the accusers do not make their appearance, to be confused by him. Index, ἀτεχνῶς. The whole expression, σκαμαχεῖν...ἀποκριμόμενον, is made to include ἐλέγχειν and ἀποκρίνεσθαι as characteristic features of the Socratic method.

19 A
He proceeds to his defense. How difficult the task, in one short hour to relieve men's minds of a prejudice of long years' standing —that he knows full well. But the law calls for a defense; the issue may be left to God.

11. Καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἑαυτῷ: but especially for them. Cp. 30 D, where he says, πολλοὺ δὲν ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι...ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, κτλ.

12. πλέον...ποιήσαι: Index, ποιεῖν.

19 B-D
He formulates the ancient calumny, after the model of a real indictment: —“Guilty of overmuch infernal and supernal in-
τι δὴ λέγοντες διεβάλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὡσπερ
οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώριαί αὐτῶν.
Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ
τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια, καὶ τὸν ἦττον λόγον
5 κρείττων ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδά-
σκαν. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδία, Σωκράτη των ἐκεῖ
περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολ-
λὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ἃν ἕγω οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα
10 οὔτε μικρὸν περὶ ἐπατώ. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω
τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς
ἐστιν· μὴ πως ἕγω ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσάτας δίκας
vestigation, sophistry, teaching of
the same to other men.” The
judges have seen it all with their
own eyes, represented in a play
now famous — one “Socrates”
suspended in mid-air, prating of
aerial matters whereof the real
Socrates knows nothing — without
offense to anybody who does un-
derstand them, be it said. Many of
his judges have listened to his
conversations. If any have heard
him utter a word upon subjects of
this nature at any time, let them
become witnesses to their fellows.
— They are silent! He points at
the inference to be drawn from
this reticent demeanor.

8. Ἀπεργατέων: ἀπεργατώ καὶ
περιφρονῶ τὸν ἠλιον Ar. Clouds 225.
11. περὶ τῶν τοιούτων: ο.ε. τῶν
τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνιων. Below
26 ἔ, where the tone is not ex-
actly the same as the irony of
the present passage, astronomical
views of Anaxagoras are spoken
of as ἀτοπα.

12. μὴ πως . . . φύγωμι: he
prays fervently not to be called
to account on so grave a charge
as that — for offending in some
way the philosophers of the day;
even as the poets, politicians, etc.,
feeling themselves aggrieved have
employed Meletus to call him to
account. Index, φεύγειν.

12. δίκαιον: the plural here, to
avoid too specific an application
of the meaning of the word.
Generalizing Plural.
φύγομι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι,
δούδεν μετέστων. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑμῶν πολλοὺς παρέ-
χομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν,
ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πάστοτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ
5 ὑμῶν οἱ τοιὸτοι εἰσὶ· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πάστοτε ἡ
μικρὸν ἡ μέγα ἥκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιὸτων
dιαλεγομένων· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαύτ' εστὶν
cαὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτε τούτων οὔδέν, οὔδε γ' εἰ τινὸς ἄκη-
κόατε ὡς ἕγω παιδεύων ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρή-
 Epidem alpha πράττομαι, οὔδε τούτο ἄλθεις. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ γέ

2. μάρτυρας: Predicate-sub-
3. διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν: cp. έπειθον τε καὶ κατ' ήγόρον 18 B. Other similar couplets 20 A, 28 E,
29 C, D, E.
5. οἱ τοιὸτοι: i.e. οἱ ἄκηκοοτες μοι διαλεγομένου. In English we should be apt to invert the sub-
ject and predicate of the Greek sentence, 'Many of you are of the number.'
7. ἐκ τούτου: i.e. from the fact
that not one of the judges speaks up to cite a case of such talk on
the part of Socrates. An effective
7. τοιαύτα: i.e. in like manner
not to be substantiated by explicit
evidence. The frequent occur-
rence of τοιαύτα here marks the
informal conversational manner.
8. τάλλα κτλ.: covers the
vague popular reproach τὸν ἦττον
λόγον κρείττω τοιῶν 18 B, 19 B.

Likewise the allegation that he
undertakes to educate men and re-
cieves pay therefor, this also he
declares untrue—again no offense
to any distinguish educator who
may be competent to convey the art
of a successful life to grateful
and enthusiastic youth. The pos-
sessor of such skill (with its emol-
ments) the defendant pronounces
happy. Socrates would feel proud
if he himself possessed it.
9. Οὔδε γε: 'no indeed, nor.'
For οὔδε following οὔτε see the
Index.
11. ἐπεί: 'for'. ἐπεί attaches to
something like καί οὐχ ὡς ἀτμά-
ξων λίγω κτλ. 19 C, to be men-
tally supplied. The tone of the
μοι δοκεῖ καλῶν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἰός τε εἰή παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, ὥσπερ Γοργίας τέ οἶ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ἡ Ἡλείως. τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἵνα εἰς ἕκαστην τῶν πόλεων, τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἐαυτῶν ποιητῶν προίκα ἔννειν ὥς ἄν βούλοις ἀλλωταῖ,—toύτως πείθουσιν τάς ἐκείνων ἡμοιοσίας ἀπολιπόντας, σφίςων ἔννειν χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστιν ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἦσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα, ἔτυχον γὰρ ἰο προσελθὼν ἄνδρι δε τετελεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ζύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκοι. τούτων οὖν ἀνηρόμην, ἐστον γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ὑε, ὗν Καλλία, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τῷ ὑε πόλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἀν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι,

two passages is the same. Compare καὶ τούτῳ γε with τῇν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην; εἰ τις οἰός τε εἰη with εἰ τις . . . σοφός ἦσιν.

1. εἰ . . . εἰθ: see note on Crit. 46 B.

4. τοὺς νέους κτλ.: '(taking) the young men, etc. The speaker had in mind some such thought as παιδεύειν δύναται when he began the sentence and had got as far as τοὺς νέους, but he is diverted therefrom by a new consideration that intervenes (οἷς ἔξεστι κτλ.), growing out of his mention of the itinerant character of the sophist's profession (ἐκαστος . . . εἰς ἕκαστην).

6. τούτως πείθουσιν: 'they prevail upon the young men (I say).'

7. σφίςων: 'with them,' the sophists. Emphasized by the contrast with ἐκείνων, τῶν ἐαυτῶν ποιητῶν.

8. ἐπιλ.: elliptical, as above 10. E. Gorgias and Hippias need not fancy themselves the only wise men in the world, 'for,' etc.

8. ἐνθάδε: in Athens.

9. εἶχα: 'I myself.'

9. ἔτυχον κτλ.: differently in the Protagoras Socrates, in company with a young friend Hippocrates, goes to the house of Callias on purpose to see and hear the great sophist Protagoras, who was stopping there at the time.

12. ἢν δ' ἐγώ: Index, ἢν.
δός ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιῆσειν τὴν προσ-
βήκουσαν ἄρετήν. ἢν δ' ἂν οὖτος ἢ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἢ
tῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν δ', ἐπειδὴ ἄνθρωπος ἔστω, τίνα
aυτοῖν ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τις τοιαύτης
5 ἄρετής, τῆς ἄνθρωπος τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων
ἔστιν; οἴμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑέων κτήσεων.
ἐστι τις, ἔφην ἔγω, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὥς. Τίς, ἢν δ'
ἔγω, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὖν, ἔφη, ὡ
Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μῦν. — καὶ ἔγω τὸν Εὐηνο
10 ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ός ἄληθος ἔχω ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ
κοῦτως ἐμμέλεως διδάσκοι. ἔγω οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνό-
μην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταύτα: ἀλλ'
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι.
Τοπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἵσως. Ἀλλ', ὡ Σώκρατες,

1. δός ἐμελλεν... ποιῆσειν: assimilation of δός ποιῆσει (Final
Relative clause of Purpose) to the
past form of the sentence. This
is regularly done as here by means
of the periphrastic future with
μέλλειν. Index, μέλλειν. With
ἀνθρωπον τε καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρετή
compare Aristotle’s ἄνθρωπος
φύσει πολιτικὸν (‘social’) ζῶν
Pol. 1. 2. 9.
8. Εὔνοι... Πάριος, πέντε
μῦν: thus it appears, from the
business-like reply of Callias, that
a Parian variety of ἄρετη πολιτικὴ
could be had for about $85.50.
10. ἔχει... διδάσκει: the past
phase of ἔχει... διδάσκει. Ob-
jective Conditional clause.

20 C–21 A

He will explain (and if the
explanation seem an extraordi-
nary one, his hearers must bear
with him, for there is somewhat
more than the mere word of the
defendant to vouch for its truth)
how the name and blame of “wise
man” have indeed come of a cer-
tain sort of wisdom after all—
not that arrogated by the sophists,
but a kind of wisdom really attain-
able by man. Herein, the God of
Delphi had declared that no man
was wiser than Socrates.
20 D]

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

53

tò σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὕται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον, σοφὸν γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔπειτα τοσαῦτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς 5 περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.—ταύτι μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια δὲ λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, τί ποι' ἐστιν τὸτε ὁ ἔμοι πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἵσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παιζευν, εὖ μὲντοι ὑπὲρ, πᾶσαν ὑμῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔρω. ἐγὼ 10 γὰρ, δὴ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλη ἡ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχεκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἦπερ

1. Τὸ σὸν . . . πράγμα: τὸ σὸν is emphasized in the question, conceding a distinction between the activity of Socrates and that of the philosophers in general and of the sophists, with all of whom he affirms that he has nothing in common.

2. οὐ γὰρ δῆπον . . . γέγονεν: 'all this talk has not arisen, of course, without any gratuitous proceeding on your part.' The Greek sentence, by its order, is more forcible than the English paraphrase, and it is more pointed than it would have been if a conditional form of statement had been chosen. σοφὸν . . . πραγματευομένου is put as a fact (οὐδὲν, not μηδέν): incompatible there-with (thereon, ἔπειτα) is the admitted fact, τοσαῦτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γ.γόνεν.

2. περιττότερον: Socrates might not be a sophist or a philosopher of the ordinary stamp, nevertheless there was an unmistakable odor of superfluity about him as compared with men in general.

8. ἀκούετε δὴ: note (here and in what follows) the deliberateness, the tact and caution, the apparent hesitation,—in other words, the dramatic skill so characteristic of Plato's Ἀπολογία, with which the great paradox of the Socratic wisdom is introduced, expounded step by step, and set forth finally in all its solemn significance.

11. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην: the accusative case, under the influence of διὰ above. That σοφίαν is predicative is shown by the absence of the article. See the note on αὕτη ἄρετη 18 A.

An expanded ποία δὴ σοφία αὕτη
έττιν ίσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ δὲ γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἰναι σοφός· οὔτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἂν, οὕς ἀρτι ἐλεγον, ἐμείζω τυώ· ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὔκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ’ ἵστις φησὶν ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολή τῇ ἐμῆ λέγει. καὶ μοι, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ εἰς δόξω τι υἱῆς μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὅν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξίοχρεων ύμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστίν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ύμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαϊρεθώντα γὰρ ἵστη ποι. οὕτος ἐμὸς ἐταῖρός τε ἴν ἐκ νέου καὶ δι’ ἣν ἐσχηκα would be far from idiomatric. The Greek attains to this forcible succinctness of expression thro’ the facility and clearness with which it can distinguish predicate-noun from subject or object, in all cases and constructions. Cp. below ε, οὗ γὰρ ἐμὸν . . . τὸν λόγον, and again εἰς ἀξίοχρεων . . . τὸν λέγοντα. Also ἵκανον . . . λέγω 31 c, and the note.

1. κινδυνεύων: see the Index.

6. καὶ μοι κτλ.: he resumes his cautious exposition. What immediately precedes, οὕτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἂν κτλ., was a momentary digression, designed not merely as a thrust at the sophists, but to help in deprecating any seeming arrogance on the part of Socrates regarding the σοφία which he attributes to himself. Later he says, ἡ ἀνθρωπόνησιν σοφία ὄλγου τινὸς ἀξία ἕστιν καὶ οὐδενὸς 23 Α. 9. τῆς . . . ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστίν σοφία: cp. Dem. 18. 20 ἡ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλληνῶν εἶτε χρη κακίαν εἰτ’ ἄγνοιαν εἶτε καὶ ἀμφότερα ταῦτ’ εἰπεῖν. This may be regarded, grammatically, as an attraction of the substantive into the subordinate clause, with the necessary adaptation of the case construction. Rhetorically, in both examples, the irregularity is produced by a desire to avoid the plain speaking that might give offense (μεγάληγορία, on the part of Socrates).

10. Χαϊρεθώντα . . . ἵστη: Index, εἰδέναι.

11. ἐμὸς ἐταῖρός τε ἴν . . . καὶ υἱῶν τῷ πλήθει εὐνύφων κτλ.: Index, φυγῆ, κατελθεῖν. The remark made (note τῇ . . . καὶ) as if in
21 B] ΑΠΟΔΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ 55

υμῶν τῷ πλήθει ευνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' υμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ οἶος ἦν Χαερέφων, ὃς σφο-
δρός ἐφ' ὃ τι ὄρμησεν. καὶ δὴ ποτὲ καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἔτολμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι (καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω,
5 μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὃ ἄνδρες). ἦρετο γάρ δὴ, εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἰς
σοφότερον. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὁ ἄδελφος υμῶν ἀυτοῦ οὐτοσὶ
μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

Β  Σκέψασθε δὲ ὅν ἔνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ υμᾶς
10 διδάξεων, οἴον μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταύτα γὰρ ἐγὼ

the remembrance of Chaerephon there were a link of sympathy be-
tween the accused and his judges. — In Chaerephon both sides
really had something in common. Thus, as Socrates could pardon
the extravagant zeal of his life-
long friend, so the court, repre-
sentative of the youthful and
rather self-conscious Restored De-
mocracy, would be led to reflect
that Chaerephon the Socratic had
his redeeming features. The
speaker would need his utmost
tact at this highly critical stage of
the exposition. Captatio bene-
volentiae. See the Index, Χα-

derefōn.

21 B–E

How, then, out of that oracu-
lar response the columns and all
this odium have grown, the de-
fendant bids his judges mark.

He would solve the divine riddle, and with much misgiving he
devised a way. Conscious of no
wisdom in himself, he would go
out and show forth the wisdom of
other men, thus putting the oracle
to the test, even as it were to prove
it untrue. But lo!—his visits,
one by one, to those reputed great
and wise, revealed the fact that
they knew not their own igno-
rance, while Socrates knew well
that he knew nothing. In so far
was he indeed wiser than they.—
But of each man thus exposed
he made an enemy; likewise, of
many a one that had witnessed
the exposure.

9. Σκέψασθε κτλ.: he reminds
them of the judicial motive of his
recital, ὑμῶν πειρᾶσμαι ἀποδείξαι,
tί ποτ' ἔστιν τούτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποί-
κεν τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν
20 D.
ἀκούσας ἑνεθυμοῦμην οὕτωσι· Τί ποτε λέγει ο θεός, καὶ
tί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν
ξύνοιδα ἐμαντῷ σοφὸς ὁν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει, φάσκων ἐμὲ
σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δῆπον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέ
5 μις αὐτῷ. — καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἡπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει,
ἐπείτα μόνις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινα ἐτρα-
pόμην. Ἑλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούσων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς
ἐνταῦθα, εἰτερ ποῦ, ἐλεγξὼ τὸ μαντεῖν καὶ ἀποφανῶν
τῷ χρήσμῳ, ὅτι Οὐγοσί ἐμοί σοφότερος ἔστι, σὺ δ´ ἐμὲ
10 ἐφήσατα. — διασκοπῆς ὁν τοῦτον — ὁνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν
δέομαι λέγειν, ἣν δ´ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὅν ἐγὼ σκο-
pῶν καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ τοιαύτον τι ἔπαθον, δ´ ἀνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι — ἐδοξέ μοι οὕτος ὃ ἀνήρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι
σοφὸς ἀλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ,
15 εἶναι δ´ οὔ· καπεῖτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύσαι, ὅτι οὕτω
δ´ οὐ· ἐντεῦθεν ὅν τοῦτῳ τε ἀπη-
χθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαντὸν δ´ οὖν
ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι Τοῦτον μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ

1. οὕτωσι· i.e. as in the self-
questioning that follows. Charac-
teristic of Socrates is the dialogue
with himself; cp. πρὸς ἐμαντῶν
ἐλογιζόμην below D.
2. ὁστε μέγα ὧστε σμικρὸν: with
σοφὸς. As above, ταύτην σοφὸς,
sοφίαν σοφοὶ 20 D.
3. λέγει φάσκων: Index, λέγειν.
7. Ἑλθον: Explanatory Asyn-
deton (i.e. omission of the usual
γάρ), referring to τοιαύτην τινα.
In the same way below, ἐδοξέ μοι
21 C, referring to τοιαύτον τι; and
again, οὐ μὲν . . . εἰδοκιμοῦντες
κτλ. 22 A. Also 22 D.
11. πρὸς ὅν . . . ἔπαθον: for
πρὸς in this connection see In-
dex, πάσχειν.
13. ἐδοξέ μοι· ‘I came to be-
lieve.’ The same Ingressive Aor-
ist below, ταύτα . . . ἐδοξέ δ΄;
22 A and D. Cp. ἀπηχθόμην 21 E.
18. τοῦτον μὲν: cp. τοῦτον γε
below. The emphasis with μὲν
consists in marking τοῦτον as the
first person in a series; others are to be examined later. The second step in the series is marked by ἐντεύθεν (ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦ).  
2. οὔδεν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν: Index, καλὸς. —As far as positive knowledge was concerned, what either Socrates or the candidate had to show was nothing great. But negatively, in self-criticism, without which no man can lay claim to the possession of σοφία; and in freedom from conceit of knowledge, and hence from error, Socrates was the superior.  
4. σμικρὴ τινὶ αὐτῷ τοῦτο σοφότερος: 'a trifle wiser just here,' wiser by σμικρὸν τι αὐτῷ τούτῳ, viz. ὅτι ἀ μὴ οἶδα κτλ.  
5. οὔδε οἶομαι εἰδέναι: cp. above, οὔδε οἶομαι. See Index, οὔδε.
ἀπαντάς τοὺς τὸ δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κόνα, ὃ
22 λαὸς Ἀθηναῖοι ἔνδοκι-μοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὁλίγον δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς
5 ἐναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦντες φαινό-
τεροι ἐπιεικεῖστεροι ἦν ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως. ἔχειν.
δεὶ δὴ ὡμί τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ἀστέρε πόνον
τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μὴ μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία
γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς
10 τοὺς τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διηθράμβων καὶ
βτοὺς ἀλλούς, ὃς ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος
ἐμανῇ ἀμαθῶστερον ἐκεῖνων ὅτα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν
αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγμα-
τεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἄν αὐτοὺς, τὰ λέγοιεν, ἵν’ ἀμα
importance’; of higher moment
than anything else, especially
higher than his own comfort or
safety (καὶ λυποῦμενοι καὶ δεδώσαν.
1. νῆ τὸν κόνα: such oaths
afforded a convenient way of
avoiding the too frequent men-
tion of the deity. Similar devices
in modern speech are familiar
enough. They often convey a
tone of irony, as here.
6. τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν: i.e. the
conscious intellectual state and
critical exercise of reason. A
noteworthy variation of τὸ σοφοῦς
ἐλναι, τὸ εἰδέναι τι, in the Socratic
sense.
7. δεὶ δὴ κτλ.: the farther he
got in his travels the more labori-
ous became his efforts to avoid
failure in the original undertaking
(ὡς ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντείον 21 c).
7. ὠστέρ πόνος τινὰς: 'as it
were a round of labors.' The
phrase is pointed by its sugges-
tion of the familiar tale of Hercu-
les, hence ὠστερ and τινὰς.
8. πονοῦντος: the genitive is
adapted to the possessive τὴν
ἐμὴν.
8. ἵνα μὴ κτλ.: 'to the end
that I might not find the oracular
response quite (καὶ) irrefutable.'
The purpose of πόνους πονοῦντος.
14. ἵν’ ἀμα τι καὶ κτλ.: while
showing forth their knowledge he
would also acquire somewhat of
it for himself ('kill two birds
τι καὶ μανθάνομαι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ύμῶν εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἄνδρες, τάληθή· ὅμως δὲ ῥήτεον. ὥς ἔσος γὰρ εἴπεῖν, ὃλιγον αὐτῶν ἁπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἄν βέλτιον ἠλεγον περὶ ὁν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ cτῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλιγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖν ἄποιοίν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τυλὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἀπότερ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοὶ. καί γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσοντι δὲ οὖδὲν ὃν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτών τι μοι ἔφανησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπνυθότες.

1ο καὶ ἀμα γνῶθι διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἦσαν. ἀπὸν οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι φύτερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦς χειροτέχνας ἃ. ἔμαντῷ γὰρ

with one stone”). A Socratic trait is here noted, yet not without the usual irony.

1. αὐτῶν: ‘than they’; with βέλτιον. αὐτῶν by its position within the phrase ὅλιγον ἁπαντες οἱ παρόντες escapes emphasis, while the phrase itself gains in prominence. See the note on δεινόν... λέγειν 17 B.

1ο. τὴν ποίησιν: not their poetry, but the making of poetry, their poetic faculty.—To Plato, poetic inspiration was as far as possible removed from τὸ φιλονίμος ἔχειν; for, so long as the poet was inspired, reason was absent. And here the Platonic Socrates is further led to note that poets are by no means assured by their peculiar gift against a false conceit.

22 C–E

Finally, he found that those versed in special arts were indeed thereby wiser than himself, each with his peculiar knowledge, whereof the defendant possessed no sort; yet, since they would extend their claim to wisdom far beyond their sphere of skill, that which they really had was thus outweighed and clouded. —So, when he asked himself whether, in order to win their learning, he would assume their folly, he was forced to answer, No!

14. With the χειροτέχνα the
60 ἌΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

Ἐννήθη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἶπεν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἦδη ὅτι εὐρήσωμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐφεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἀ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἦπιστάμην, καὶ μου ταύτη σοφότεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', 5 ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξαν ἔχειν ἄμαρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημοσιογοι. διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστὸς ἦξιν καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφότατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστε ἐμὲ ἐμαυτόν ἀνερωτάν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξιῶθην ἄν οὕτω ὑσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ἄν τὴν

first question is not of eídēnai, but of ἐπιστασθαι, το θην λοι. Their ἐπιστήμη, the understanding of certain definite rules and principles consciously and rationally applied to the practice of some particular την ἐν την is conceded to be a positive σοφία. Accordingly, of the three classes into which the Athenian community is roughly divided, the artisans are ranked highest in the scale of knowledge. Of those previously examined the first class, the πολιτικοί', had not got beyond sheer empiricism; while the power of the ποιηταί, the second class, was inborn and unreasoned: both were devoid even of positive σοφία.

5. ταύτη: 'in this way,' i.e. on the positive side.

8. τά μέγιστα: especially τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τε καὶ πολιτικά, cp. 20 B. It was because matters pertaining to the well-being of the community at large were popularly regarded as the most important subjects of knowledge that Socrates in his tour of examination went first to the πολιτικοί, who were believed to be versed therein above other men.

8. αὐτή ἡ πλημμέλεια κτλ.: the absence of the negative, or peculiarly Socratic, σοφία is equivalent to downright ἄμαθα. It is a 'false note,' destructive of harmony in the entire man, and against it a trifle of technical knowledge could avail him nothing. Socrates is thus forced to give the preference to his own mental condition, which involves nothing false or discordant. — The opposite of πλημμέλεια is ἐμμέλεια, cp. ἐμμελῶς, 20 C.
ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνων ἑχονσιν ἑχειν. ἀπεκρίναμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ διὸ μοι λυσιτελοῖ ἄσπερ ἑχειν.

4 Ἑκ ταυτηθῇ δὴ τῆς ἑξετάσεως, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 23 ἃ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγοναυν καὶ οἴαι χαλεπώ- 

tatai καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν 

gegonénai, ónoma δὲ τοῦτο λέγομαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οὐνται 

γὰρ μὲ ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφῶν, 

ἄν ἄλλον ἑξελέγξω τὸ δὲ κωδυνεύει, ὁ ἄνδρες, τῷ

23 A, B

Precisely here, in this array of questioning, he reminds his judges, 
lies the source, not merely of the 

deep-seated enmity and its attendant calumnies, but also of the 

name of “wise.” Men suppose the ex-

aminer to possess that knowledge 

wherein the examined are found wanting — forgetting that God 

only knows; wherefore the oracle, 

employing the name of Socrates, 

would indicate the true and proper 

attitude of man toward wisdom. 

—So, not concerns of city or of 

household, but the probing and 

testing of men’s minds — this 

thing still claims his whole devo-

tion, as servant of the divine will.

5. ὅσιοι . . . βαρύταται: οἶος 

with the superlative, like ὡς or 

ὅτι. ‘The gravest possible.’

7. ἄνων . . . τοῦτο λέγομαι: 

i.e. τοῦτο ἄνωμαξομι (ἀνωμα λέ-

γομαι). ‘I am thus designated.’

7. οὖνται κτλ.: if, for example, 
in attempting to frame a definition 

of ἀρετή or of δικαίωσις, a man 

was confuted and reduced to 

silence through his own replies 

to the questions put to him, the 

bystanders, who had no concep-

tion of the purely negative atti-

tude assumed by Socrates, con-

cluded that he could himself give 

a complete account of ἀρετή or 

of δικαίωσις, if he chose to 

do so.

9. τὸ δὲ: ‘in fact, however.’ 

Cp. τὸ μίγμαν 41 B, τὸ τοῦ ὘μη- 

ρον 34 D. These phrases are 

adverbial in character, serving as 

it were to announce what follows 

in explanation of them.

9. τῇ δὲντ.: ‘really.’ — Here, 

finally, Plato reverts to the usual 

and proper meaning of σοφός, a 

word of essentially positive sig-

nification, and interprets the great 

paradox in clear and most im-

pressive language.
όντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπήσις σοφία ὀλγοῦ τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτῷ ὁ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιοῦμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι, ὅτι Οὐδός υἱῶν, ὥς ἀνθρωποκράτους, σοφώτατος ἔστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκέν ὁτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔστι τῇ ἄληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' ὦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περικων ἰστώκω καὶ έρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστών καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δεχῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἕνδεικνυμαι ὁτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τῷ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν· ζάξον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

2. ὀλγοῦ τινὸς ... καὶ οὐδενὸς: Index, τίς.
3. τοῦτο οὔ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη: τοῦτο, viz. σοφὸν εἶναι.
The Double Accusative with λέγειν. Cp. above, τοῦτο λέγομαι, where the accusative of the person is represented by the subject of the passive verb.—It is now seen (φαίνεται), the speaker says, that the oracle does not mean to assert literally of Socrates that he is σοφὸς (τῷ ὄντι γὰρ ο θεὸς σοφὸς ἐστὶν), but employs the name of Socrates merely for the sake of illustrating the negative principle enunciated.
10. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cp. above, ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ 22 Ε; below, τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν 23 C; τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν 30 A.

23 C–24 A

He has had his followers and imitators—in young men of leisure, nowise displeased to try their hand at examining people. And those examined visit the anger to which their own folly provokes them upon Socrates; calling him a corrupter of youth and alleging that he teaches what other wise ones are supposed to teach, atheism and sophistry. No feeble spirits they, nor few in number! Their aspersions, through all the years, have borne fruit in the present indictment—with a prosecutor.
severally to avenge the grievances of each class in the community. — Here is the truth and the whole truth, the defendant declares, about the calumnies. Let the judges who have heard it thus plainly spoken look into their own hearts for its confirmation.

1. Ἐπακολουθοῦντες . . . αὐτόματοι: i.e. their following was not in consequence of any professions or inducements offered by Socrates. Herein he contrasts himself with the sophists. See 19 ἐπιθυμεῖν κτλ.

3. χαίροντος . . . ἐξετάζειν: cp. oi μειρακίσκοι, . . . μμούμενοι τοῦς ἐξελέγχοντας, αὐτοὶ ἀλλοι ἐξέλέγχοντο, χαίροντες κτλ. Rep. 7. 539 B.

4. ἐίτα: 'so.' Their imitating consists, or rather issues (ἐίτα), in their essaying to examine people.

8. Σωκράτης τῆς: cp. 18 B.
καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τοῦτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτος καὶ Δύκων, Μελητός μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημουργῶν, Δύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· 5 ὅστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἤγω ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἂν εἰ οἴσι τε εἰσὶν ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην· τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν ὑπωτος ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ ὑπὸ τὴν πολλήν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτ' ἔστων ὑμῖν, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίοι, τάληθή, καὶ ὑμᾶς ὑπερ μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυφαμένος ἤγω λέγω οὕδ' ὑποστελάμενος. καίτοι οἴδα σχεδόν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἄληθή λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμή καὶ τὰ αἰτία

1. ἐκ τοῦτων κτλ.: the outcome of all this is the present systematic attack, in judicial form. Cp. ἡ . . . διαβολὴ, ἡ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μελητός κτλ. 19 B.
2. τῶν ῥητόρων: i.e. τῶν πολιτικῶν. — The fiction of allowing the prosecutors to stand severally as representatives of the three classes into which, for purposes of exposition, the Athenian community has been divided, serves admirably to afford an easy transition from the “original” to the real accusers, and is otherwise highly effective. See the names in the Index.
3. δπερ . . . ἔλεγον: see 19 A.
4. τάθα . . . τάλῆθη: ‘here you have the truth’ as promised above, ὑμεῖς δ’ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσας τὰ σαν τὴν ἄληθεν 17 B. The remark applies to all that precedes in the defendant's plea.
5. ὅμοιοι σωτοὶ . . . μικρὸν: Double Accusative with ἀποκρυφαμένος and ὑποστελάμενος. For the position of ἢ γω λέγω, see the note on δεινὸν . . . λέγεν 17 B; also that on αὐτῶν 22 B.
6. τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις: ‘for this very reason’; τούτοις, i.e. τῷ μεν ἀποκρυφαμένῳ μηδὲ ὑποστελασθαι.
7. τεκμήριον κτλ.: the judges can verify Socrates’ account by the feelings which it has stirred within them as they listened.
8. αὕτη: ‘even as I have described it.’ αὕτη and ταύτα are predicative. Note the chiasitic arrangement, αὕτη . . . η διαβολὴ > τὰ αἰτία ταύτα. The main
B ταύτα ἔστων, καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν εάν τε ἀδίσε ζητήσητε ταύτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δὲν οἱ πρῶτοι μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρων αὐτὴ ἔστων ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον 5 τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. ἀδίσε γὰρ δὴ, ὡσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων οὕτων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐτὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως φησί· Σωκράτης φησίν ἄδικεν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς 10 ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐτερα δὲ δαμώνια κανά.

Στὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτον ἔστων. τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν. φησί γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους

emphasis is upon the pronoun, but the emphasis is shifted to τὰ αἰτία, which comes forward as a direct suggestion from ἡ διαβολή. ‘Such the calumny, its causes such.’

24 B, C

Enough for the misrepresentations of the past. Now for these latter-day accusers, with their high-minded spokesman,—whose indictment reads, “A corrupter of the youth of Athens, a denier of her gods.”—First, then, it is against the charge of corrupting the youth that he must defend his life—a charge preferred thus lightly by Meletus, who (as shall be shown forth) never laid to heart its meaning.

7. ὡσπερ . . . κατηγόρων: cp. above 19 B, ὡσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων . . . αὐτῶν. Here, the words ἐτέρων κατηγόρων are predicative: ‘just as if Meletus and Co. (τοῦτων) were really a second set of prosecutors.’ The speaker will not suffer his telling fiction of the πρῶτοι κατήγοροι to be forgotten for a moment.

7. λάβωμεν αὐτ.: see 19 B, ἀναλάβωμεν κτλ.

8. ἔχει δὲ πως ἢ δὲ: the exact words of the indictment are not reproduced (πως). Similarly Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 1, ἡ γραφὴ τοιάδε τις ἦν. In substance, Xenophon’s statement is the same as Plato’s. See the Introduction, p. 35, note.

—Below 26 B, the highly significant word διὰ τινων is apparently attributed to the indictment.

12. φησί: ‘he asserts.’
ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μελητον, ὅτι σπουδὴ χαριντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστάς ἄνθρωπος, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κύδεσθαι, δὲν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πάποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὃς δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἐχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

1. ἐγὼ δὲ γε... φημὶ: 'and I assert.' Note the repetition also of ἀδικέω.

2. σπουδὴ χαριντίζεται: this is a very serious kind of pleasantry, says the defendant, little short of an indictable offense (ἀδικεῖν φημὶ) in itself—lightly putting men on trial for their lives, while naming as subjects of accusation matters of which the accuser can give no rational account. Plato is about to show ὑπὸ Meletus, προσποιούμενον μὲν εἰδέναι τι, εἰδότα δὲ οὐδέν. His blundering is ironically termed χαριντίζεσθαι; and, with satirical humor, playing upon the prosecutor's name, Plato charges him with not caring; instead of not knowing, what he is talking about (τὴν Μελήτου ἄμελειαν).

5. τούτῳ: not αὐτῷ. In legal parlance "the other party" is constantly designated as present in court—pointed at with the finger as it were (οὗτος, οὗτοι, — thus the judges themselves are οὗτοι).

Cp. above B, τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν, not αὐτῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν.

Differently 19 B (τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν... αὐτῶν) of the πρῶτοι κατήγοροι, who could not, in the nature of things, be personally in evidence.

6. καὶ ὑμῖν: i.e. he will try to make the fact as clear to the judges as it is to the speaker's own mind (καὶ).

In the scene that follows, the counterpart of many a real Socratic ἔκτασις, Meletus represents the candidate for honors in σοφία, while the judges and the spectators in the court-room stand for the παρώντες (22 B, 23 A). Or again, to go one step farther, the candidate may be said to represent, not any particular class in any particular community, but the whole community of the world of fools; the παρώντες, the readers of Plato, thro' all the generations.

For the dialogue here introduced by Plato into the Ἀπολογία, see the Index, δίκη (ἐρώτησις).

23 C—25 C

Q. Is it desirable that the youth be led to become good men?
Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἀλλο τι ἡ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὁς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἐστονται; Ἐγώγω.  
Δ' ἵππη δὴ νῦν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίστους ποιεῖ; δήλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐσθα μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα 5 ἔξευρόν, ὅς φής, ἔμε, εἰσάγεις εἰς τούτους καὶ κατηγο- 
ρεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίστος ποιοῦντα ἢι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον 
αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. ὃρᾶς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι συγγάζας καὶ οὐκ 
ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμαῖ καὶ 
ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέ- 
10 ληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ῥογαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνων ποιεῖ; ὃ 
Εὐνόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' τίς 
ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδεν, τοὺς 

A. Ay. Q. Who, then, corrupts them not, but makes them better? — Speak. A. The laws. Q. Nay, not what? but who? A. The judges. Q. What, the judges! A. Ay, verily, every one of them. Q. And the counsellors, likewise, and the voters of Athens, do they make better men of the youth? A. Ay, all of them, everybody except Socrates. Q. But is the same thing true of animals? Is an animal improved in the handling of it by everybody, except only one person who spoils it? — What, no answer? Well, no indeed, of course not. Only the young men of Athens can claim that happiness.

3. Τοῦτοι: τοὺς δικαστάς. So below, εἰς τούτους. See the note on τοῦτο 24 C.

4. μήλον γά σοι: 'what you care so much about.' Assuming that you are interested in this subject, the defendant says to his prosecutor, and have studied it with sufficient care to have discovered that in truth I am the one who corrupts the youth of Athens, then you surely must know something about those who do not corrupt, but improve them.

10. οἱ νόμοι: by this reply Meletus attempts to evade the question, which he is so reluctant to answer at all, as he foresees that οἱ ἀμείνων ποιοῦντες τοὺς νέους must be made to include a very large portion of the community, if he is to justify his attack upon Socrates in particular as διαφθεί- 

12. δοςτε κτλ.: i.e. one who
makes young men better naturally be a νόμιμος ἀνθρωπός to begin with.

1. οὗ τοιο... οἱ δικασταί: Meletus, who cannot of course answer the question by naming a new individual, seizes upon the nearest set of persons at hand for his reply, guided partly by the suggestion in τοὺς νόμους. For Plato, this is an opportunity to score the worthy judges in passing (πῶς λ.γ.υ. έν γε, πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν).

20. έναν... οὗ φήτε: Index, φάμμ. The play upon the name (Μέλητε, Διμέλητα, Μεμέλητα) has already occurred above 24 C D (twice), and is repeated below 26 B. Not merely this word-play, but also the very frequent Ἐ Μλητρ., and especially the famil-
έαν τε φήστε· πολλή γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰη περὶ τοὺς
νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνον αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι
ὡφελοῦσιν. ἅλλα γὰρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἰκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι
ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀπο-
5 ψαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοὶ μεμέληκε
περὶ ὧν ἔμε εἰςάγεις.

Εἰπὶ δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπὲ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον ἐστιν
οἰκεῖω ἀμείων ἐν πολῖταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν,
ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι χαλεπῶν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν
10 πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοῦ, ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν
οντας, οἱ δ᾽ ἄγαθοὶ ἄγαθον τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἑστὼν οὖν
ῥόστεις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνυόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκρινω, ὦ ἄγαθε· καὶ γὰρ ο νόμος κε-
λεύει ἀπόκρινεσθαι. ἐσθ᾽ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;
15 Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις δὲν ὡς δια-
φθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα
ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἐγώγε. Τι δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε;

iar and the intensified vocative phrases (ὡ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, ὦ
tάν, ὦ ἄγαθε, ὦ θαυμάσει Μέλητε,
ὥ φίλε Μέλητε, ὦ ἄριστε ἄνδρον) help to sustain the tone of irony
and satire.

4. ἐφρόντισας: a highly sig-
nificant variation of ἐμέλεητε σοι.
Index, φροντίζειν, φρόνησις.

25 C—26 A

Q. Is it true that we are
harmed by bad neighbors, and
helped by good ones? A. Ay.
Q. Is there any man who had
rather be harmed than helped?
A. Nay. Q. Do you accuse Soc-
rates of making the young men
bad willingly, or unwillingly?
A. Willingly. Q. Is Socrates,
then, so ignorant as not to know
that if he makes a bad man of
his neighbor he is likely to be
harmed by him?—hence, can MEAN
to do this mischief?—Nay, such
ignorance is inconceivable on his
part. Therefore, if he corrupts the
youth, he corrupts them without
meaning to do so; and should be
taught better, not prosecuted at law.
tosou'ton su 'emou sofasteros ei, thlíkou'ton ou'tos thlí-kósde ov, oipse su 'mén egwokas óti oí 'mén kakoi kakón ti éryaçontai aí touts máliста plesiów éautwv, oí de E'ágathoi ágathón· égw de dh eis tosoú'ton amathias 'hk, 5 oipse kai tóut' ágnoú, óti, éan tina moxythorn poíșow tov xwióntwv, kiṿnυvóstow kakón ti labéiv up' autoú, oipse tóutò to tosoú'ton kakón ekwv poiw, óws phísv su'; taúta ègw sou ou peíðomaí, dé Meletes, oímaí dé oude 9 állon ánthropwv ouvéna· áll' h ou diafthéirw h dia-
26 áfthéirw akwv, oipse su ge kata' ámfótera yevdei. eí de
ákoun diafthéirw, tov toioútwv amarthmátwv ou deýro
vómoos eiðágein estin, áll' idía labónta didáskein kai
nouthein· dhlon gáp óti, éan máthw, pàúsmoi ou ge

1. Thlíkou'ton . . . thlíkósde: contrasting the ages of the two
men, supposed to be seen together in the court-room.

5. moxythorn poíśow: i.e. dia-
áfthéirw (diafthéirai); cp. above D, 
poṿνροτέρουs poíšwv.

6. kakón . . . labéiv: i.e. ka-
kúws pa拜wv, hence upó. Cp. 17 A, 
up' autów . . . épeladómen.

7. èste . . . ékow poiw: as re-
sult of ágnoéwv.

8. tauta: 'herein'; Cognate
Accusative.

9. áll' h ou . . . h . . . akwv: 
excluding a third term ekwv dia-
fthéirw, because ignorance on the
part of Socrates that he would be
likely to suffer harm at the hands
of one corrupted by him is incon-
ceivable. — Here the validity of
another characteristic doctrine of
Socrates is assumed — a paradox
only second in importance to that
of the Socratic wisdom itself, viz.
the identity of virtue and knowl-
edge. Plato was bound to intro-
duce it, not merely for the sake of
rendering his picture of the
master complete and consistent,
but also to afford the connecting
link between the intellectual and
the moral side of the Apology.

10. kata' ámfótera: i.e. in either
case. To be impaled upon one
horn of a dilemma is to be at the
mercy of both horns.

11. toioútwv: i.e. akoušwv.

11. amarthmátwv: Genitive of
the Charge. Index, eiðágein.

12. vómoos . . . estin: see the
Index.
ἀκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ εὐγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφυγε καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δέωρ δὲ εἰσάγεις, σ᾽ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μαθήσεως.

5 Ἄλλα γάρ, δὲ ἁγνεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δήλον ὡς ἂν 
βέστιν, δὲ ἑγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτῳ οὐτε μέγα οὐτε

3. κολάσεως . . . οὐ μαθήσεως: although the notions of διδάσκειν, νοουθετεῖν, κολάζειν had not in the time of Plato, and have not even at the present day, come to be practically and universally recognized as all alike essential to the idea of punishment, this fact no-wise invalidates the profound truth underlying the doctrine, οὐδὲς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει. — The true criminal, willing to do a thing known to be κακόν, who will, for example, deliberately lead the young into ways of crime—such a man, deficient in that sense which enables better men instinctively to feel that what is bad for others is bad for themselves also, stands so low in the scale of intelligence as to need κολάσεως. He cannot be set aright by mere instruction, but he must be taught better by forcible means (to the extent even of cutting short, if need be, his existence as an individual), for the protection and improvement of humanity as a whole, as well as to check the folly of the offender himself. Very different is the case of those who know enough to avoid doing what is bad, but might not always be sure whether what they are doing is bad or good. They can be set aright through μαθήσεως. Socrates is one of the latter sort. If his conversation with young men is harmful to them in any way, he is unaware of it. Show him how it is harmful, and he will refrain from such conversation. Meletus asserts that Socrates is a criminal, making young men bad on purpose, as Meletus himself would not do. That is to say, Socrates is more ignorant than Meletus!

26 B–27 Α

Q. How does Socrates corrupt the youth of Athens? Is it by teaching them to regard other deities than those regarded by the community? A. Most assuredly it is. Q. Pray define your position clearly. Do you mean to say that Socrates inculcates a belief in the existence of gods, only they are not the same gods as those in which the community believes? — or do you
assert that he is a disbeliever himself and teaches other men to disbelieve in gods? A. I mean to say that he does not believe in gods at all. Q. What, are not even the sun and moon gods to Socrates? A. No, indeed, he declares that the one is fire, and the other is earth. Q. Ah! Is, then, this court held to be so illiterate as to accept the published doctrines of Anaxagoras as imputations against Socrates? Verily, young people learn from Socrates absurdities which they can promptly expose as plagiarized by him. But, for Heaven’s sake, do you imagine that in this way he believes in no god at all? A. In none at all, none at all! Q. Now see, there you are, eating your own words — making sport of serious matters, by coming into court just for the fun of finding out whether your wise man Socrates is clever enough to catch you when you contradict yourself.

1. ὅμως δὲ κτλ.: altho’ it is clear, the defendant says, that we are dealing with an accuser who has not qualified himself to give a reasoned account of the subject of accusation, nevertheless the defense must go on.

3. διδάσκοντα: sc. φης μὲ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.

5. ταύτα: with διδάσκοντα.

7. ἰν: Objective Genitive with δο λόγος, nearly the same in meaning as περὶ ἰν.

9. πότερον: followed by ἦ 'or (whether),' p. 73, l. 1.

12. οὖ μέντοι: sc. νομίζω. The same ellipse occurs with δη ἦτερος below.
εστιν ο μοι έγκαλεισ, οτι έτερους ἡ παντάπασι µε φής
οὔτε αυτῶν νοµίζεις θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδά-
σκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νοµίζεις θεοὺς.
4 Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τι ταὐτα λέγεις; οὔδε ἥλιον
D οὔδε σελήνην ἄρα νοµίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ
ἀλλοὶ ἀνθρωποί; Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν
μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Σω-
κράτους οἱ κατηγορεῖν, οὐ̄ρη Μέλητε, καὶ οὔτω κατα-
φρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἰει αὐτούς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι,

1. παντάπασι: with οὔτε . . . νοµίζειν. Cr. τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος
above. For οὔτε . . . τε, see the Index.

3. ταῦτα λέγω κτλ.: Socrates
was indicted and executed for ἀσέβεια. The charge of atheism
was not contained in the indictment headed by Meletus. This
charge, however, had been insinuated often enough by the πρῶτον
κατηγοροῦ: it formed a part of the popular misunderstanding and
misrepresentation of Socrates; see 18 C and 19 D, where it is indi-
rectly rebutted. In order to throw his refutation of the popular charge
of atheism into the characteristic form of dialectic, Plato has intro-
duced it into the Apology at this point; representing Meletus as
cleverly inveigled by his questioner into the indiscretion of
overstepping the strict limits of the writing for which he stands.

4. ἵνα τι: see the Index.

6. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: beguiled
by another leading question, Mele-
tus turns with a triumphant air to
the judges. The design of Plato
in the question (οὔδε ἥλιον κτλ.)
is to emphasize once more the dif-
ference between Socrates and the
kosmical philosophers (see 19 C, D), in connection with the
mention of Anaxagoras, and at the
same time to involve the accuser
more deeply than ever in the in-
consistency and self-contradiction
presently to be exposed. For the
form of address, see note on 40 A.

7. Σωκράτους . . . Ἀναξαγόρου
κτλ.: you fancy, says the defen-
dant to his prosecutor, that you
are accusing Socrates—that the
judges take your word for it when
you attribute these irreligious doc-
trines to Socrates; as if they were
so unlearned and illiterate as not
to be aware that you are really ac-
cusing Anaxagoras. This is a sort
of contempt of court.
"οστε ούκ ειδέναι ὅτι τὰ 'Αναξαγόρου βιβλία τού Κλαζο-
μενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων: καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι
tαῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν; ἀ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνω
ἐπολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοι Σωκρά-
τους καταγελᾶν, εὖν προσποιήται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλως
tε καὶ οὗτος ἄτοπα ἄντα. ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς Διὸς, ὀντωσί
σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζεις θεοὺν εἶναι; Οὐ μένοι μὰ Δἴ
οὐδ' ὀπωσδήποτε. 'Απιστός γ' εἰ, ὅ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα
μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ
10 οὔτοσί, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνω εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ
ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταῦταν ὑβρεί τινὶ
cαὶ ἀκολούθη καὶ νέοτητι γράφασθαι. ἔσκεκν γὰρ
27 ἤσπερ αἰνύγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπεραμένω, Ἄρα γνώσεται

2. καὶ δὴ καὶ κτλ.: strongly
ironical. The works of Anaxagoras
of Clazomenae may not be on
sale at every shop in Athens; but
the highest price a copy of his
Περὶ Φύσεως will bring is yet low
enough to estop Socrates from
appropriating its lore — supposing
that were not too absurd to be
worth pirating.

4. ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας: see the
Index.

6. ἄτοπα: Socrates averred, ac-
cording to Xenophon’s report,
Mem. 4. 7. 7, that Anaxagoras
had gone crazy (παρεφρόνησεν)
in his views of the sun and the
moon. In general, he declared
that the cosmical philosophers
stultified themselves in their spec-
culations, id. 1. 1. 11 ff.

6. οὐσίω: with νομίζειν. ‘In
this way’; i.e. even as Anaxagoras
disbelieves. This amounts, how-
ever, to saying, ‘so completely,’
‘utterly.’

8. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι: ‘and that,
too.’

12. νεότητι: i.e. in a spirit of
recklessness. Index, Μέλητος.

12. ἔσκεκν . . . ξυντιθέντι | δια-
περαμένῳ ἀρὰ γνώσεται κτλ.: divide
thus in reading. Cp. τοῦτο . . .
δὲομαι | δικαίων ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ 18 A.

13. ξυντιθέντι: Supplementary
Participle. For the dative, which
results from the essential meaning
of ἔσκεκνα, cp. the construction
with ἐξενιδέναι 22 D. There the
participle is in agreement with
ἐμαυτῷ; here it is itself substantive.

13. διαπεραμένῳ: ‘to test the
Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεύειομένου καὶ ἐναντί ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἥ ἔξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥστε ἄν εἰ εἴποι· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο ἐστι παιζόντος.

Ἀνέπεισκέψασθε δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ

question.' Attempt implies purpose; hence usually the imperfect stem περώμενος, not the future. Cp. below 27 E, ἀποτελόμενος.

1. ὑπὸ: the genitive with γνώμα follows the analogy of ἀληθάνεσθαι, ἀκούειν, etc.

1. χαριεύειομένου κτλ.: see above 24 c and the note.

5. Ἀδικεί κτλ.: the self-contradiction presently to be exposed by dialectic means is anticipated in a formula of concise and explicit statement.

27 A–E

Q. Does any man believe in the existence of things human, yet not in that of human beings? — or in things musical, yet not in musicians? — and so on? What, no answer? Well, of course not. Now, is there any man who believes in the existence of things daemoniac, yet not in that of daemons? A. There is not.

Q. Thank you. How obliging you are, to answer when you cannot help it. Then, since you accuse Socrates of regarding and teaching things daemoniac, he must, according to your own account, regard daemons also. But, farther, are the daemons held to be either the offspring of gods or themselves gods? Yes, or No?

A. Yes. Q. Well now, if Socrates, as you concede, believes in daemons, then, whether the daemons be gods themselves or only the offspring of gods, in either case he must believe in gods, and you must be pronounced guilty of tomfoolery. That is to say, you either wanted to bring Socrates up here for the purpose of trying his common sense, or you were determined he should be brought up here at any rate, and, since you could find no true charge against him, you set down a blundering lie.

7. Ταῦτα: i.e. τὰ ἐναντία αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ.
Β κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνησθε μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, εὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσόδῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινόμεθα, δὸ ἀνδρεῖς, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἐσθ’ ὅστις ἰππος μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἰππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, δὸ ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ 9 σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοιοῦτοι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ τούτω C γε ἀπόκριναι· ἐσθ’ ὅστις δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ’ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. ὡς ὄνησας, ὅτι μόνις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοῦτοι ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαίμονια μὲν φής με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ’ οὖν κατὰ εἰτε παλαια· ἀλλ’ οὖν δαίμωνα γε νομίζω 15 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγου, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῷ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμωνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δῆπον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτως εἴη; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογούτα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. D τούς δὲ δαίμονας οὐξὶ ἦτοι θεοῦς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν 20 πάθασ; φής η οὐ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαῖ-
μονες, τουτ' ἂν εἰ, ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεύτερον, θεοῦς οὐχ ἤγομενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοῦς αὐ τῆς ἤγεισθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἠγούμαι·
εἰ δ' αὐ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παιδεῖς εἰσὶν νόθοι τινὲς ήτοι
5 ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀλλων, δὲν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παιδας ἡγοῦτο εἶναι, θεοῦς δὲ μή; ὤμοιως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἰς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων
Εμὲν παιδας ἡγοῦτο καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμίονας, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῦτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὃ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἐστὶ
10 ὅπως σὺ οὐχὶ ἀποσπαράμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράφω τὴν γραφὴν
tαύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθείς ἀδίκημα·
ὅπως δὲ σὺ τυχα δεῖδαι ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἤχουτα ἀνθρώπων, ὃς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν καὶ δαίμονα καὶ θεία

1. αἰνίττεσθαι: see above A, αἰνιγμα ξυνηθέντι.
2. θεοῦς οὐχ ἤγομενον ... θεοῦς αὖ τῆς ἤγεισθαι πάλιν: αὖ πάλιν emphasizes the contradiction; cp. below ε, καὶ δαίμονα καὶ θεία ἤγεισθαι, καὶ αὖ μὴν δαίμονας μὴ θεοῦς. We should be apt to say, at the same time.
4. παιδεῖς ... νόθοι: finds its analogue in ἡμίονας below.
7. ἵππων μὲν παιδας ... καὶ ὄνων: predicative; 'as offspring, etc.'
8. τοὺς ἡμίονας: the article, not merely for grammatical clearness (see the note on ποιάν δή κτλ. 20 D), but as adapted to τοὺς δαίμονας above C, οἱ δαίμονες D (twice). The analogy here intro-
duced constitutes a pointed feature of the sarcasm of the passage.
11. ἢ ἀπορῶν δ τι κτλ.: these words present the serious view of Meletus' case.
12. ὅπως δὲ κτλ.: at the close, as at the outset (27 A), of the scene the self-contradiction is summed up in concise and explicit terms.
12. τυχα ... ἀνθρώπων: the phrase is strongly put, with so many words intervening. The force of the expression can be rightly appreciated only thru' fluent enunciation by the living voice. Such effects cannot be estimated by the eye, nor can any translation adequately reproduce them to the ear and mind.
ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς, οὐδεμία
μηχανή ἐστιν.

'Αλλὰ γάρ, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοις, ὃς μὲν ἔγω οὐκ ἄδικῶ
κατὰ τὴν Μελητοῦν γραφήν, οὐ τολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι
ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ίκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· δὲ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆς μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν
καὶ πρὸς τολλούς, εἰ ἱστε ὅτι ἁληθὲς ἐστιν. καὶ
τοὺτ' ἐστιν δὲ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἶναις ἄρη, οὐ Μέλητος
οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος.
δὲ καὶ ἐν τολλούς καὶ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἱρηκεν, οἷµα
δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.

1. οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν: 'there
is no way of contriving,' i.e. it is
impossible to imagine.

28 A

However, but few words are
needed, the defendant avers, to
dispose of Meletus and his little
charge. Enough for it. Not to
this prosecutor or that prosecutor
will Socrates owe his conviction, if
conviction come; but to the spiteful
throne, which has claimed many a
victim in the past, and will yet
claim many more.

5. Ἀπολογίας: Predicate-gen-
itive with ἐνω, in meaning nearly
the same as if ἀγαυον were ex-
pressed; 'to need no lengthy
argument.' The subject of δοκεῖ
is the clause, ὃς . . . οὐκ ἄδικῶ.
5. ταύτα: 24 B-27 E.
5. δὲ δὲ . . . ἴκανον κτλ.: by
reverting to the subject of the
πρῶτον καθ'γωρον the writer throws
the comparatively trivial matter of
the formal indictment into the
background, and relegetates it to a
position of inferiority.

8. αἱρῆσει . . . αἱρῇ . . . ἱρηκεν
. . . αἰρήσεως: Index, αἱρεῖν. The
repetition of the word marks the
tone of caustic satire—directed
against a civil polity that enabled
the irresponsible masses to vent
their spite upon great men under
the form of law. The present
passage is one of many in the
Ἀπολογία which acquired much of
their power and solemnity by
being written after the sentence
of this famous court had been
pronounced and executed.

11. οὐδὲν . . . δεινόν: Index,
δεινός.
11. ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ: 'come to a
standstill in my case’; i.e. the case of Socrates is not likely to be the last one of the sort.

28 B–D

Aye, his course has been a perilous one, he acknowledges; but here is a question, not of danger, but of duty. Where would be the great names, where the heroic spirits of history and song, had they seen fit to hesitate when the question of duty arose? The man who is good for anything at all, stands firm at his post, from a sense of honor, taking no account of life and death.

1. Ἡγούσε δὲ ἄν ... εἶπο τις κτλ.: cp. 20 C, ὑπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις κτλ. Here, as there, the sup-posed interrogatory affords an easy transition from negative to positive, from defense (ἀπολογία) to exposition (δήγγεια).

6. ἐκέιτο:  illud, i.e. the memorable thing that follows. Differently (more lightly) above 18 Α, τούτο σκοπάν.

13. θεᾶς οὐσα: hence the event predicted is inevitable.

13. οὕτωσι πως: cp. ἔχει δὲ πως οδέ 24 B.

13. ὡς ... οἷμαι: ‘I believe’; as I remember it, we should be apt to say. In fact, Homer is partly quoted, partly paraphrased here. Thetis says, ἄκυμορος δὴ μοι τέκος ἔσται, οἷς ἄγορευεις; "αὕτικα γὰρ τοι ἐπειτα μεθ’ Ἑκτορα πότιμος ἐτοίμος. To which Achilles
εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τοῦ φόνου καὶ Ἐκτορά ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησί, μεθ’ Ἐκτορά πότιμος ἔτοιμος· δὲ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κωδυόνων ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ ἐμὸν δεῖσας τῷ ξην κακὸς ὡς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν. Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἄδικοντι, ἵνα μὴ ἑνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νησί κωρώνοιν, ἄχθος ἄροιρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἰε φροντίζαι θανάτου καὶ κωδυόνων; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὔ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξει ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, μὲν οὖν κωδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομενον μήτε θάνατον μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ ἀἰσχροῦ.

responds, αὐτίκα τεθναίην, ἕπει οὖκ ἂρ’ ἐμελλόν ἑταίρῳ κτενομένῳ ἐπαμέναι . . . ἄλλ’ ἦμαι παρὰ νησίν ἐτώνοιν ἄχθος ἄροιρης | κτλ. Σ 95–104. Index, Θείτης, Πάτροκλος.

1. εἰ τιμωρήσεις . . . καλ . . . ἀποκτενεῖς: note the admonitory tone of the Real Condition of the Future.

6. αὐτίκα: the response is pointedly adapted to the warning by the repetition of this word.

8. μὴ . . . οὖν: ‘do you imagine’? Index, μή.

13. πρὸ τοῦ ἀἰσχροῦ: cp. above C, παρὰ τὸ ἀἰσχρόν τι ὑπομείνα. ‘Before’ and ‘beside.’

28 E–30 B

Were the defendant, accordingly, to abandon thro’ fear of death the station divinely assigned to him, the station of a philosophical life, then would he indeed render himself liable to the charge of impiety and unbelief. Then would he be guilty of the folly of pretending to know what one knows not—in fearing that thing which may perchance be not one of man’s ills, but his greatest blessing. Be death what it may; disobedience to authority, human or divine, he knows to be a bad thing, and a wrong. The known evil he will fear and flee; the unknown, never. Even tho’ his judges would release him, on his promise to obey them and abstain from philosophy and search, such an offer on the part of his fellow-citizens he assures them he would
'Εγώ οὖν δεινα ἂν εἰρηγασμένος, ὁ ἀνδρες Ἄθη-
Εναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὖς ὑμεῖς
εἰλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφίπολει
καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλώ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἔκεινοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὁσπέρ
5 καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκυδύνευον ἀποθαναῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ

decline — promising rather to obey
GOD, and never to cease philos-
opherizing and laboring with his
fellows, to make them wiser and
better men, to the end that above
all possessions they should prize
the welfare of their souls. So
then, let them acquit or condemn
his own course is clear, tho' the
penalty were many deaths.
1. Ἔγω . . . εἰργασμένος: 'ac-
cordingly, I should myself be
guilty, etc.' The emphatic Ἔγω
introduces a specific illustration
of the general truth stated above,
οὗ δὲν τις ἑαυτόν τάξιν κτλ.
2. εἰ . . . τότε μὲν . . . ὑμῶν
. . . ἑνταῦθα δὲ . . . λέομεν τὴν
τάξιν: 'if, after remaining at my
post on those occasions there, I
were to desert it here.' The
'shocking thing' (δεινόν) would
consist in the discrepancy — aban-
doning his divinely appointed mis-
sion, when in affairs human he
had evinced a clear sense of duty
and the courage that supports it,
—as if the command of God were
less strenuous than the command
of man! Periods of this form
usually, as here, involve an argu-
ment from the less to the greater,
the μὲν member presenting a sup-
position of conceded fact, to which
the hypothesis of the δὲ member
must a fortiori adapt itself.
3. ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ κτλ.: there is
pathos in this indirect mention of
the sturdy military services of
Socrates in behalf of his country.
See the names in the Index.
5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος . . .
ἑνταῦθα δὲ: the second δὲ is
merely a repetition (reminder) of
the former one. Note that μὲν is
likewise repeated above, in the
first member of the compound
period: ὅτε μὲν . . . τότε μὲν.
In general, either μὲν or δὲ, or, as
here, both particles, may be re-
peated to secure distinctness in
the line of thought, especially
in passages of considerable length
or complexity. Cp. the frequent
repetition of ἄν, as below 31 Α.
τάττοντος, ώς εγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ύπ. ἐλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά
με δεῖν ζήν καὶ εξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,
29 Α ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτι οὖν πράγμα
λίπουμ ξήν τάξιν. δεινόν τῶν εἰπ., καὶ ὦς ἄληθῶς τότ' 5
ἀν με δικαῖως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω
θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπεθάνων τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιώς θάνατον καὶ
οἰόμενος σοφῶς εἶναι οὐκ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδε-
ναι, ὡς ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφῶν εἶναι
μὴ οὖν: δοκεῖ εἰπ. ἐστὶν ἄ. οὐκ οἶδεν. οἴδε
10 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῦ θάνατον οὐδὲ εἰ πυγχάνει τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ
πάντων μέγιστον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδιώκει ὡς εἰ ἐκότες
Β ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶν. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμα-
θία ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἢ ἐπονειδιστὸς, η τοῦ οἰσθαί εἰπ. ἐστὶν ἄ
οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὡς ἄνδρες, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἰσως διαφέρω
15 τῶν πολλῶν ἄνθρωπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του
φαίνω εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν
"Αἰδοῦν, οὔτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰπ. ἐστὶν: τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῶ καὶ ἄνθρωπῳ, ὃτι κακὸν

4. δεινόν τοι κτλ.: it is here
seen that δεινά, δεινόν is said
mildly instead of the more specific
ἀσεβής, ἀσεβές, or even (as the
passage forcibly suggests) ἀθεόν.
4. ὦς ἄληθως: 'in very truth,'
Crit. 46 D, 48 C. ὦς, as in ὦς
tάχυστα, ὦς βέλτιστος, etc.
6. ἀπειθα... καὶ δεδιωθάνατο
κτλ.: God commands me through
his oracle (the speaker has just
said) εξετάζειν ἐμαυτόν. I might
well be charged with impiety, or
even atheism, were I to disobey
such a command and act as if I
knew death to be a bad thing for
me, before examining myself to
make sure whether it is not a
good thing.
12. ἀμαθία... ἐπονειδιστὸς:
'unwisdom of the reprehensible
sort that has been noted (αὐτῆς).'
14. καὶ ἐνταῦθα: 'right here,'
even herein.
16. τοῦτο δὲ: sc. φαίνω εἶναι.
18. ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίων: this is
the species of ἀδικεῖν now under
consideration.
καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὄντος οἶδα ὁτι κακά ἐστιν, ἢ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυχάνει 
οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ἃστε οὖδ' εἰ μὲ 
σὺν ύμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, διὸ ἐφ' ἦ 
τὴν 5 ἀρχὴν οὗ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν, ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσήλ-
θον, οὐχ οὖν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς 
ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξόμην, ἢδη ύμῶν οἱ ύμεῖς, ἐπιτηδεύον-
τες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει, πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρ-
σονται—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταύτα εἴποτε· Ὡ Σώκρατες, νῦν 
10 μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πειθόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τοῦτο 
μέτοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν 
μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλως ἔτι τούτο πράττων, 
Δαμοθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἴπον, ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἀφίωτε, 
eἴποιμ' ἂν ύμῶν ὅτι Ἕγω ύμᾶς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
15 ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ

1. πρὸ . . . τῶν κακῶν: cp. πρὸ 
tοῦ αἰσχροῦ 28 D.
3. οὖν εἰ μὲ νῦν . . . ἀφίετε: ‘not 
even if you are ready to release me 
now.’ Cp. below, ἀφίεμέν σε, ‘we 
release you,’ i.e. we are ready to 
do so. The conclusion to be 
expected here, οὖν ὁστὸς ύμῶν 
πείσομαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ, is displaced 
and modified by the meanderings 
of the sentence. In its altered 
form it occurs below D, εἴποιμ' ἄν.
5. εἰσοδεῖν: equivalent in 
sense to the passive of εἰσαγαγεῖν. 
Anytus had said: Either Socrates 
ought not to have been prosecuted 
to begin with, or, once prosecuted, 
he must not be suffered to escape 
the death penalty. To acquit him, 
Anytus urged, would be to set the 
stamp of approval upon his doings, 
and so make a bad matter worse.
7. εἰ διαφευξόμην: the words 
of Anytus were, εἰ διαφεύγηται, 
admonitory. Cp. εἰ τιμωρήσεις 
κτλ. above 28 C, and the note.
10. οὖ πειθόμεθα: ‘we are not 
disposed to comply.’
13. εἰ . . . μὲ . . . ἀφίετε: ‘sup-
posing you, then, as I say, to be 
ready to release me on this con-
dition.’ Supposition of the Ideal, 
adapted in form to εἰ . . . εἴποτε 
above, instead of repeating the 
original εἰ . . . ἀφίετε.
15. ἀσπάζομαι μὲν: Index, μέν.
ύμιν, καὶ ἔωστερ ἄν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶδας τε ὅ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶ καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος τε καὶ ἑνδεκανύμενος ὅτι ἄν ἂν ἐνυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων ολίτερ εἰσιν, ὅτι Ὁ ἁμαρτεὶν ἄνδρῶν, Ἄθηναις ὃν, πόλεως 5 τῆς μεγίστης καὶ ἑυδοκιμώτατης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελοῦμενος, ὡς σοι ἔ̾τσι καὶ πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς δὲ βελτίωτη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὔδε φρονίζεις; καὶ ἐὰν τις ὑμῶν ἄμφιοβτητικός καὶ φη ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὕθες ἀφῆσω αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσουμαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἔξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὦ νειδιόν δι' τὰ πλέοντα ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαινότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρα καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτως ἄν ἐνυγχάνω, ποιήσω, 30 οὐκ ἂν ξένως καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοὺς ἀστοιχίας, ὡς μοι ἐγγυντέρω ἐστέ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελέει ὁ θεὸς, εὖ ἢ ἢστε, καὶ ἐγώ οὐκ εὑρέθω πω ὑμῖν μείζων ἁγάθον γενέσθαι εἰς τῇ πόλει ἢ τῇ ἐμῇ τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν 30 γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων υμῶν καὶ

1. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι: for the double negative, see Index, οὐ.
2. παρακελεύομενος: this first mention of exhortation may be said to mark the point in the Apology where (without the least abruptness of transition) the intellectual comes to be merged in the moral view—identity of knowledge and virtue. A preparatory note was sounded 25 c–26 A.

7. φρονήσως: the words that occur here, in passing from φρονήσως to ἀρετή, are instructive—ἀλήθεια, ἡ ψυχή, βελτίωτη, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, φρονίζειν, ἐρωτάν, ἐξετάζειν, ἐλέγξειν.
19. τὴν ... υπηρεσίαν: cp. τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν 23 c.
20. πιθήκων: 'trying to prevail upon'; variation of παρακελεύομενος.
νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
β μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς
ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἐσται, λέγων· Οὐκ ἐκ χρημά-
tων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρημάτα καὶ τάλα
5 ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ.
eἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθεῖρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἀν
εἰ ὑπερβρᾶ· εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ ταῦτα,
οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνην ἂν ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι,
ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνδρόν ἡ μη, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἡ μη, ὡς ἐμοῦ
10 οὖν ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις
στενάναι.

2. πρότερον: cp. πρὸ 28 D, 29 B.
3. οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ... ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρημάτα: χρημάτα, to point the contrast rhetorically. The spirit of the remark is made
clear by what follows, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ... ἀπαντὰ κτλ. Note, 
too, that ἀρετῇ is of intellectual
as well as of moral excellence.
6. ταῦτα λέγων... ταῦτ' ἂν: ταῦτα, twice strongly emphasized.
In the third instance, ἄλλα... ἡ ταῦτα, the word has receded to
an unemphatic position.
6. ταῦτ' ἂν εἰ ὑπερβρᾶ: ‘that
can pass for harmful.’
8. οὐδὲν λέγει: Index, λέγειν.
8. πρὸς ταῦτα... ἡ πείθεσθε
Ἀνδρός ἡ μη, κτλ.: the words φαίνη
ἀν ὃ ἄ. 'Ἀ. are parenthetical. πρὸς
tαῦτα (‘so then’) with the sentence. For the tone conveyed by
this phrase see the following note, 
and cp. the words of Prometheus, 
πρὸς ταῦτα μπετόσθω μὲν ἀλβα
λοῦσα φλόξ,... γνάψῃ γὰρ
οὐδὲν τῦνδε με, Aesch. Prom. 992.
9. ὃς... οὖκ ἂν ποιήσαντος
ἄλλα: ‘resting assured that I am
one incapable of doing differently.’
The participial and the potential
form (also φαίνῃ ἂν, at the beginning) lend urbanity to a
determined and, indeed, defiant
utterance. The sentence loses
not a whit of its solemnity and
power by being gently put.
10. πολλάκις στενάναι: cp. 41 A, 
and see Index, θυγατέραι.

30 c–31 c

Once more he prays his judges
to hear with patience; and, tho' he
Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμείνατε μοι οῖς ἔδειξθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖτε ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούετε· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἔγω ὄλμαι, ὄνησθεθε ἀκοῦοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἵσωσ 5 βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τούτο. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖνῃ τοιούτοις ὡντα οὖν ἔγω λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἡ ὑμᾶς αὐτοῦς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν

1. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε κτλ.: the profound silence immediately following such an utterance as the last would speedily be broken by lively manifestations of displeasure.

2. ἔδειξθην: above 17 D, 20 E.

4. ἄττα . . . καὶ ἄλλα: 'one or two things more.' For ἄττα, see Index, τῆς.

5. βοήσεσθε: βοῶν, more than merely θορυβεῖν. The specific word is stronger than the generic.

5. μηδαμῶς κτλ.: the request is made here for the last time. The fiction of a judicial plea of defense, so framed as to involve a counter-accusation of those who sit in judgment, couched in terms of paradox and satire, could go no farther than it is carried in what here follows. After the verdict, 35 E, on the other hand, when their revenge is certain, the court can easily be imagined as tolerant of further caustic utterances on the part of the condemned man.

7. ἦμα . . . "Ἀννυος: 'no Meletus or Anytus can do me any harm.'

7. οὖθε . . . ἄν δεῦματο: 'his
ἀν βλάψεις οὖτε Μέλητος οὖτε Ἄνιτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
dύνατο· οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνοι ἄνδρε

2. οὖ... θεμιτὸν κτλ.: for Socrates, a man does not experience

κακὰ, so long as he is not him-

self κακὸς. According to the
doctrine here briefly enunciated, but

consistently supported in word

and act by Socrates thro' the

Ἀπολογία and elsewhere, the χεῖ-

ρον ἄνὴρ cannot harm τὸν ἀμεῖ-

μονα, because he cannot make him

bad.

3. ἀποκτείνει μέντοι ἄν κτλ.

‘he might, to be sure, very likely

cause him (me) to be put to
death, or banished, or deprived

of civic privileges.’

4. οὗτος μὲν ἵως: ‘tho' he

(Meletus) probably.’

5. καὶ ἄλλος τίς ποιεῖ: ‘and

many another, doubtless.’

6. ποιεῖν α... ποιεῖ, κτλ.: what

Meletus does is κακὸν for him, be-

cause he is himself κακὸς in doing it.

7. νῦν οὖν, κτλ.: it is readily

seen what the defendant means

when he warns his judges that he is

pleading their cause. As we

look back upon the martyrdom

of Socrates and the ignominy of

Athens, we require no arguments

to convince us of the truth of

Plato's contention.

8. ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν: cp. εἴ τι ἄμεινον

καὶ ὑμᾶν καὶ ἐμοὶ 19 λ.

12. εἴ καὶ... εἴπειν: ‘tho' it

be a somewhat ludicrous com-

parison.'

13. μὲν: see the Index.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

υπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δειμένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι
υπὸ μύσπος τινος· οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἔμε τῇ
πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτόν τινα δὲ υμᾶς ἐγείρων
καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ένα ἐκαστὸν, οὐδὲν παύομαι
τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος
ὁ λοιπὸν ὁ ἄλλος οὐ καὶ ῥαδίως υμῖν γενήσεται, ὡς
έκατος ἐκινήση μοι· υμῖς δὲ ἵσως τάχ’ ἂν
ἀρκόμενοι, ὡσπερ οἱ νυσταξότες ἐγείρομενοι, κρούσαν-
tes ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἂνοίγω, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείνων,
τός τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύδοντες διατελοῖ ἂν, εἰ μὴ
των ἂλλων ὁ θεὸς υμῖν ἐπιπέμψεις κραδόμενος υμῶν.
ὅτι
ἐγὼ τυχάνον ἂν τοιοῦτος οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει
Βδεόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαι τὸ ἄρθρον ἀνθρωπίνῳ
ἐσεῖ δὲ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ
ἀνέχομαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἥδη ἔτη.

2. ὑπὸ μοιχεῖς τινος: 'by some
sort of spur.' But the rider is
mainly thought of. It is to the
rider, who applies the stimulus,
that Socrates is made to compare
himself.

2. οἶον δὴ: 'even as'; con-
n junctional phrase. Even so, we
should say.

3. προστεθεικέναι: adapted to
προσκείμενον above, προσκείμενον
being precisely the passive of
προστεθεικέναι.

3. ἐγείρων: adapted to ἐγεί-
rεσθαι above. With the partic-
ciples that follow, the figurative
language gives way to the proper
usage.

4. ἐνα ἐκαστόν: not under the
influence of ὀνειδίζων, which re-
quires the dative case, but in dis-
tributive apposition to υμᾶς.

7. τάχ’ ἂν . . . ἀποκτείνων:
the repeated ἂν serves to mark
off with distinctness the several
preliminary stages of the event
(τὸ ἀποκτείνων); indicated here, as
so often, in participial form.

9. πειθόμενοι ἆνετοι: reminisc-
cence of 29 C.

13. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῃ δοικεί: cp.
δοικεί . . . ἠνίγμα ἐνυπθέντι 27 Λ.

14. τὸ ἐρι . . . ἀρτέρας: the arti-
cle comprehends all that follows
it as subject of the sentence.

15. τῶν . . . ἐμαυτοῦ . . . ἡμα-
τὸ δὲ ύμετέρον πράττειν ἀεί, ἵδια ἐκάστῳ προσώπῳ ἡ ἀδελφὸν προσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἄρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τί ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκκελεύομην, εἰχον ἄν 5 τους λόγους νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦν τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες εἰ τοῦτο γε ὁμιλεῖ τοῖς ἑγένοντο ἀπανασχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα ὡς εγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἡ ἑπραξάμην μισθὸν ἡ ἠτέσσα. ἤκανον γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἁληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

λητέοις καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι . . . ἐμελευμένοι: one and the same idea is here presented from different points of view. Not only the active and the passive side of the matter, but also the final fact as such (perfect, ἡμέληκα) and the prolonged strain (imperfect, ἐνέχομαι) are contrasted. τὰ ἐμαντοῦ and τὰ οἰκεία are not, in meaning, contrasted expressions.


7. παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα: explanatory of τοῦτο . . . ἀπανασχυντῆσαι. Cp. ἀναισχυντῆσαι διαλεγόμενος, Crit. 53 C. Note that here both infinitive and participle are aorists. ‘They could not compass that shamelessness — of furnishing a witness, etc.’ Such a witness would necessarily have been suborned, and would have been confronted with the very substantial voucher produced by the defendant in his own person.

9. ἤκανον . . . λέγω: ‘sufficient, I fancy, is the witness that I furnish of the truth of my words.’ See the note on ποιαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην 20 D.

31 C–E

Tho’ to his hearers it may sound strange, his mission, he affirms, was bound to be fulfilled in private life. His divine monitor (that mystic warning voice whereof he has often made mention) forbade him to choose the public way. Intuition is confirmed by reflection. Had he tried to work thro’ politics, his beneficent labors had long since been closed. No righteous man,
he tells them plainly, can stand up firm and consistent against the Athenian or any other throng, and live.

2. ξυμβουλεύω: the word is adapted to ξυμβουλεύων (τῇ πόλει) below. Except for this point, παρακελεύομαι would have been said with ἴδια.

2. πολυπραγμονέων: cp. above B, τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ . . . ἧμεληκέναι . . . τὸ δὲ ύμέτερον πράττειν ἰδία. That was πολυπραγμοσύνη, as ordinarily understood, the meddling with other people’s affairs, instead of minding one’s own (ἢνυχών ἢνει). Here, πολυπραγμονέων is said from the point of view of some supposed objector (ὅτι δὴ). Below 33 A we find the defendant from his own point of view using the words λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος (‘attending to my business’—of looking after that of other people). Index, πολυπραγμονέων.

3. ἀναβαίνων: see Index, ἐκκλησία.
ἐστὶν έκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γυνομένη, ὡς ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτο, δὲ ἄν μέλλω, πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕποτε· τούτ’ ἐστιν δ’ μοι ἑναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γε μοι δοκεῖ ἑναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ᾧστε, ὥς ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἔγω ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἄν ἀπολύσῃ ἐκαὶ οὕτ’ ἂν ὑμᾶς ὑφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ’ ἂν ἐμαχότον. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθ ς· οὗ γὰρ ἐστιν ὡς ὁ ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὐτε ὑμῖν οὐτε ἄλλω πληθεὶ χρόνην ἑκεῖνοι ἡγησίως ἑναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύουν πολλά ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν αὐτὸν τῷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μὲλλει ὁλίγον χρόνον σωθῆσεσθαι, ιδιωτεύων, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύων.

15 Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγώγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων,

finest irony the wretched Meletus is dignified by this comparison to the comic poet. Cp. 18 D, and the note on ὅσοι δέ.

1. ἵπποι . . ἀρξάμενον: 'this I have had, beginning with my childish years.'

1. φωνή τις: 'as it were a voice.' Index, δαιμόνιος (δαιμόνιον).

2. ἀποτρέπητα . . πράττειν: cp. ἑναντιοῦται πράττειν, below.

8. μὴ ἄχθεσθα: the very plain words that follow are of the sort ἐφ’ οἷς ἦσας βοηθεσθει 30 C.

12. καὶ . . ὁλίγον χρόνον: 'for never so short a time.' Index, μέλλειν.

32 A–D

Yet such a man is the defendant—one whom no fear of bonds or death can deter from standing steadfast on the side of right. The proof thereof may be found in that which speaks louder than words—in his actions: once, when, as presiding officer of the popular Assembly, he braved the stormy threats and denunciation of the multitude, and refused to put an illegal motion to the vote; and, again, when the Thirty Tyrants commanded him in vain to help in arresting one of their guiltless victims.
οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὁ υμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδήτε ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνὶ υπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ ύπεικάθωμεν δὲ ἀμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῶν φορτικὰ μὲν 5 καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πῶς τοῦ ἡράξα εν τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλεύσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή προτανεύονσα, ὡσς ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσαθε αὐρώνιος κρίνειν, παρα- 10 νόμως, ὃς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξεῖν. τότ’ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν προτάνεων ἡναυτυθήνη μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεκυνών, καὶ ἀπαγόμεν τῶν ἒτερων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βουλόμενον, 5 μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὁμὴν μᾶλλον με δεῖν δια- κωνυνεῖν ἡ μὲθ’ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δικαια βουλευομέ- νων, φοβηθέντα δεσμοῦ ἡ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἐτὶ ἐν δημοκρατομένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγέ-

2. ὁδ . . . ἐνι. ‘to no man living.’
3. μὴ ὑπεικὰν ἐν: ‘but yielding not.’ Index, μὴ.
4. φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά: ‘what is warisome enough, to be sure, and savors of the law-courts’; viz. a recital of one’s own exploits and merits. The recital is Plato’s; but the self-laudation is put into the mouth of Socrates, here, as elsewhere, with consummate tact and dramatic skill. Index, βουλεύειν, βουλῇ.
9. ἀδρόνους: i.e. by a single vote (μαξ. ψήφῳ), instead of allowing each man a separate trial, as the law provided. Index, ναυμαχία.
12. ἐνδινυνῦνα . . . καὶ ἀπαγόμεν: see these verbs in the Index.
13. τῶν ῥητόρων: i.e. τῶν πολιτικῶν, cp. 23 ἐ.
15. μὲθ’ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι: ‘To side with you.’ For ὑμῶν, here and above B, see the note on υμεῖς εἴλεόσθε 28 ἐ.
15. μὴ κτλ.: this form of the negative, under the influence of the infinitive construction.
νετο, οι τριάκοντα αυτη μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αϊτὶν
εἰς τὴν θόλου προσέταξαν ἁγαγενιν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Δέοντα
τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα ἀποθάναι· ολα δὴ καὶ ἀλλοις ἐκεῖνοι
4 πολλοὶς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλεύστους
παναπλήσαι αἰτίων· τότε μέντοι ἔγω οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ ἔργῳ
αὐτη ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἔμοι θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροι-
κότερον ἤν εἰπών, οὐδὲ ὑπον, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικον μηδὲ
ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει· ἐμὲ γὰρ
ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἄρχῃ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν ὦτως ἵππυρα ὦσα, ὡστε
10 ἀδικὸν τι ἐργάζασθαι, ἀλλὰ ἠπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξῆλθο-
μεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτοι ὑπὸντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον
Δέοντα, ἔγω δὲ ὑφήμην ἀπὸν ὦκαδε. καὶ ἰσως ἂν διὰ
ταῦτα ἀπεθάνον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἄρχῃ διὰ ταχέως κατελύθῃ·
Εκαὶ τοῦτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

1. πέμπτον αἴτων: i.e. with four others.
5. ἀναπληραί: 'to implicate.' But in Greek the figure is of
smirching.
6. δια... οὐδ' ὑπον: 'that, for death, I care (were it not too
rude a thing to say) not a whit.' Such a remark, if the speaker
did not strictly mean all that he
said, would be a mere piece of vul-
gar levity. Uncultivated persons
habitually use such expressions
(οὐ μὲλει μοι οὐδὲ ὑπον), even
regarding solemn matters, with
thoughtless irreverence.
7. τοῦ δὲ... τοῦτον δὲ: see
the note on ἐνταῦθα δὲ 28 Ε.
11. οἵ μὲν... ὑπὸντο... ήγὼ δὲ ὑφήμην κτλ.: note the an-
tithetic arrangement, including the
pointed repetition of the verb.
13. διαταχῶν: 'speedily.' In-
dex, τριάκοντα.

32 Ε−33 Β

Nay, in public life, there is
truly no man who could have
stood forth an uncompromising
champion of pure and simple
justice, and have attained to the
defendant's age. But such has
been his course, even in affairs of
state, when by chance in contact
therewith; and ever in private
relations, from first to last—no
concession to any man's wrong-
doing, while yet every man has
Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν μὲ οἰσθὲ τοσάδε ἐτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων άξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὃσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περί πλεῖ-χαρόν τὸν ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι.

33 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ πού τι ἐπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἵδια ὁ ἄντος οὕτος, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἑγγεκρής τις οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὗτος ἄλλῳ οὗτε τούτων οὐδενι, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασίν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς ἰοεῖναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδασκαλος μὲν οὐδενῶς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην. εἰ δὲ τῖς μοι λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοὶ άκούειν, εἶτε νεώτερος εἶτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐφθάνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέ-

been free to hear and to follow. If of his hearers or followers any has proved bad, that is not the defendant's fault. Disciples they are falsely termed. He has had no doctrines to impart, no tuition fees to gather. And no one can claim to have derived aught from him wherein all others might not share.

1. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν... διαγενέσθαι: 'would I, then, think you, have lived on, etc.?'

7. οὐδεὶ... ἑγγεκρής... παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον: explanatory of τούτων and ὁ αὐτός οὗτος. The participle is at the same time supplementary to φανοῦμαι.

8. τούτων οὐδεὶς κτδ.: here the discourse reverts to the negative or defensive form— to the charge of corrupting the youth, touched upon, but not finally disposed of, in the examination of Meletus, above 25 C–26 Α.

9. οἱ διαβάλλοντες... φασίν: the popular designation of his companions and followers as μαθηταί, and of himself as their διδάσκαλος, was repudiated by Socrates, because it implied, first, that he talked for pay, as the professional sophists did; and, again, that he had positive doctrines to impart, when in fact he was establishing truth in a negative way.

13. οὐδέ... οὗ: 'nor is it true, that I converse if I receive pay, but otherwise do not converse.'
γομα, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὖ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλονσίῳ καὶ πένθι παρέχω ἐμαυτόν ἔρωταν, καὶ εἰς τις βούλη-
ται ἀποκριψόμενος ἀκούει ψφ ἄν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ
εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γύνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἄν δικαίως τὴν
5 αἰτίαν ὑπέχωμι, ὃν μήτε ὑπεχώρημη μηδενὶ μηδὲν
πῶποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· ei δὲ τίς φησί παρ' ἐμοῦ
πῶποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
πάντες, εὖ ἰστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

2. ἐρωτάν: 'to be questioned,' we should say. The English idiom
requires the passive voice.

2. καὶ εἶν τις... ἀκούειν
κτλ.: instead of bluntly saying,
"or to be the questioner," he
puts it gently: 'or if any hearer
prefers to do the answering (I
put the questions myself).' Thus
the final discomfiture of the re-
spondent would not be due to
any aggressive movement on the
part of Socrates at the outset.

3. τούτων: 'as for these per-
sons.' The genitive, with τίς.

3. ἐγὼ: placed in juxtaposi-
tion with τούτων to emphasize the
contrast.

4. εἴτε τις... εἴτε μή: whether
one or another of them turns out
well or ill. γύνεται, Historical
Present. See the Introduction,
p. 38.

5. δὲν... μηδενὶ μηδὲν...
ἐδίδαξα: 'when to no man of them
all have I at any time either prom-
ised or given instruction of any
sort whatever.' τούτων, the ante-
cedent of δὲν, is wholly indefi-
nite in its reference; the relative
clause itself, a conditional one.
Observe the accumulation of nega-
tive words.

33 C–34 B

What attracts these followers
he has explained before—it is
indeed attractive to hear the con-
versations, to witness the humbling
of vain pretenders to knowledge.
For the defendant himself, how-
ever, the motive is no merely
human strain, but the impulse
of a mighty divine command. If
the influence exerted upon the youth
who follow him be a harmful one,
there is abundant opportunity to
test the matter. Here at the trial
now are many of them present,
and with them their fathers or
their older brothers. How comes it,
that not only the youths who
have been corrupted, but likewise
the uncorrupted elderly men, their
'Αλλα διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ’ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τως πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβουντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· πᾶσαν ὑμᾶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔγω εἰπὼν, ὅτι ἄκουόντες χαίρουσιν ἔξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, 5 οὖς δ’ οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἄγδες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο, ὥς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, οὐπερ τὶς ποτε καὶ ἀλλή θεία μοίρα ἀνθρώπω καὶ ὅτι οὖν προσέταξε πράττειν. 9 ταῦτα, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν καὶ εὐδελεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώγε τῶν νέων τούς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δῆπον, εἴτε τως αὐτῶν πρε- relatives, are present not to de-nounce, but to support him who is charged with being the doer of this harm?

2. Ἀκηκόατε: above 23 c, χαίρουσιν ἄκουόντες ἔξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

3. ἄκουόντες χαίρουσιν: the participle is emphasized, because it contains the answer to διὰ τί in the question asked above.

4. ἔξεταζομένως τοῖς οἰομένοις κτλ.: the dative, with χαίρουσιν. The genitive which appears in the passage above quoted from 23 c is under the influence of ἄκουόντες.

6. καὶ ἐκ μαντείων . . . καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, οὐπερ κτλ.: thus we see that the story of the oracular response granted to Chaerephon (20 E) was merely illustrative of the inner conviction and irresistible impulse that held Socrates, as one inspired, to his memorable life work.

8. μοίρα: ‘dispensation.’

9. ταῦτα . . . εὐδελεγκτα: Socrates’ own course he must pursue; on the other hand, it was inevitable that this philosophizing would attract numerous followers and win the devotion of some of them. Since, however, it was carried on in public places, while its adherents were well known and many of them easily accessible, the means of testing its moral soundness would not be far to seek.

11. χρῆν δῆπον: ‘then, of course.’ In translating, χρῆν may well be deferred till νῦν κτλ. is reached: ‘they ought to be coming up here now themselves, etc.’

11. εἶτε: the speaker begins as
σβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγνώσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πᾶστέ τι ἐννεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαινοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἦθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ 5 ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκουσας, εἰπέρ ὡς ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπετόθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνησθαί. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταθοὶ, οὐς ἐγὼ ὄρω, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὕτως, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, ἐΚριτοβουλοῦ τούδε πατήρ· ἐπειτα Δυστανίας ὁ Σφήτιοτος, Ἀισχύνου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι δ᾽ Ἀντιφὼν ὁ Κηφισιαῖος οὕτως, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοῖς οὕτωι, ἄν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζωτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύθηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἄν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη 15—, καὶ Πάραλος ὁδὲ, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἂν Θεάγης ἀδελ-

34 Αφός· οὐδὲ δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνός, οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὕτως Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὐ Ἀπολλόδωρος οὐδὲ ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν,

if he were going to say something like εἴτε αὐτῶν τινες... εἴτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐγνώσαν κτλ. But εἴτε is forgotten, and εἰ δὲ enters below, as if εἰ μὲν had preceded.

6. νῦν μεμνησθαί: the infinitive depends on χρῆν.

7. πάντως: ‘in fact’

11. τοίνυν: ‘again’; passing from the mention of fathers to that of brothers of young men who have been his followers.

14. ἐκείνος γε: whatever might be surmised as to the influence exerted by the living youths upon their respective fathers or brothers, to prevail upon them to refrain from bearing witness against the deluder of their souls, here is a case at any rate where τὸ καταδεηθῆναι is impossible.

17. οὕτως Πλάτων: evidence that the writer of the Apology was present at the trial of Socrates. Similarly from the Phaedo (59 b) we learn that Plato was unable to be with the master on the occasion of his death.
αὐτὶ ἔχων μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἄλλα τούτον πάν τινι τοιναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακᾶ ἐργαζομένῳ τούς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντως. 

βαύτοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάξιν ἀν λόγων ἔχουσιν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἄδιαφρατοί, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσιν λόγων βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλα ἦ τῶν ὀρθῶν τε καὶ δίκαιων, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν πευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι; 

Ἐλευθέρως· ὃ ἀνδρεῖς· ἃ μὲν ἔγω ἔχωμι ἀν ἀπολογεῖσθαι,

1. μάλιστα μὲν: see the Index.
2. παραχωρῶ: 'I yield the floor,' as we say.
7. τάξιν ἀν λόγων ἔχουσι: because they might be as it were bewitched by the defendant. For λόγων ἔχειν, see Index, λόγος.
10. ἄλλα ἦ: Index, ἄλλα.

34 C–35 B

As to the pleading of his cause, enough—there is hardly need to add more words. — And now the moment has arrived, when, were the defendant to follow the example of many (perchance even of one or another of the very men who sit in judgment here), he would be seen to weep and supplicate his judges, causing his little ones to be brought into court, to excite pity and earn votes of acquittal by such means. Yet 't is assured beforehand, that Socrates will do nothing of the kind—not because he stands in the world alone, nor, again, because he feels himself better than his hearers in any way, but for the reason that was made clear when he spoke of death. — And what will the world think of Athens, he asks, if, in her courts of law, men deemed great or wise or brave, are to beg with womanish entreaty for a little prolongation of that life which must in nature end so soon? Nay, let the vote of "guilty" be cast the more surely against him who thus demeans himself.

12. Ἐλευθέρως: marks the conclusion of the defense proper. What follows (34 C–35 E) is a sort of afterpiece. Cp. Ἐλευθερως 19 A, mark-
ing the end of the introductory remarks, and the beginning of the defense proper.

2. ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτῷ: i.e. calling to mind some trial in which he had himself been defendant. The Athenian δικαστής, like the modern jurymen, was but an ordinary citizen; on one day it was his lot to try his neighbor, on another to be tried himself.

2. εἴ δὲ μὲν ... ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἵκέτευσι ... ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ... τούτων τοιήσω: one or another of the judges, noting that Socrates is apparently not about to make the piteous scene that he can remember to have himself made on some similar occasion, might be piqued at the contrast—feeling his own inferiority thus brought home to him.—For the form of the period, see 28 ε.

2. καὶ ἔλαττω ... ἀγωνιζόμενος: i.e. even when not on trial for his life as Socrates is now.

7. ἄρα: it can be inferred with tolerable certainty, from what the defendant has already said, that he will not beg for mercy.

8. ταῦτα ἐννοήσας κτλ.: the consequence of such a reflection might be a fit of stubborn pride on the part of the juror, strong enough to overcome his native sense of justice. Note the comparative αὐθαδέστερον, and the aorist σχόη.

9. αὐτοὶς τούτοις: ‘at just that’; when, but for that, he would perhaps vote the other way.

11. ὅπε ἄξιόν μὲν ... ἔδε οὖν: ‘I do not expect it of you, to be sure; if, however,’—as I say—(this be true of any of you).
The case imagined above c is assumed as real (εἰ ... οὕτως εἶχα) merely for the sake of the argument, while the broken form of the sentence mitigates the harshness of the whole suggestion.—It is noticeable that Plato’s criticism of the judicial abuse here considered is milder and more conciliatory in tone than most of the other strictures upon the Athenian courts attributed to the defense of Socrates. At his trial there could have been no opportunity for this familiar evil to manifest itself; and it is only by means of an ingenious fiction that any consideration of it could be introduced into the Apology. The consistent attitude of the sage, however,—never so great in what he did as in what he would not do,—is pictured here with powerful effect. And unquestionably, at the real trial, his unshrinking, independent demeanor, as well as his freedom of utterance, must have prompted many a wavering juror to unfavorable decision.

2. ἐστὶν μὲν: the correlative to μὲν appears in ἀλλ’ ὁμοι, below.

2. καὶ οἰκεῖοι: i.e. he does not stand alone by himself; there are also (καὶ) kindred souls at home, so καὶ again below, after ὀστε.

3. τοῦτο ... Ὀμήρου: ‘even as Homer hath it.’ See the note on τὸ δὲ 23 λ. The quotation is from the Odyssey, where Penelope requests the disguised Odysseus to reveal his origin, adding: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσει παλαιόφατον, οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης, τ. 163.

5. καὶ ὑπὶ: ‘even sons.’ Index, Σωκράτης.

8. οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος ... οὐδ’ ἀτιμάζων: the defendant must make clear to his judges, what men in general are slow enough to comprehend or believe of anybody, that the motives which animate him are not personal, but rational (moral). It is no spirit of self-will or offishness, he says, nor
any disposition to slight his hearers (if the court would really feel flattered by being appealed to with prayers and tears) that leads him to refrain from supplicating them, but considerations of a higher nature.

1. ἄλλα κτλ.: the discourse would regularly have been continued in participial form. Since, however, the prime motive (τὸ βαραλέως ἔχειν πρὸς θάνατον) has been discussed elsewhere (ἄλλος λόγος), the waiving of this gives a new turn to the structure of the sentence.

3. δόξαν: cp. καλῶν and αἰσχρῶν, below. Here is a matter, he says, which concerns, to begin with, the good name of Athens, and of every citizen of Athens.

5. τοῦτο τὸ ἄνωμα: σοφῶν εἶναι.

7. εἰ . . . τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται: the Real Condition of the Future has an admonitory effect here, cp. 28 C. Below, in εἰ ἀποθανοῦται, its effect is of apprehension, dread.

8. οἱ δοκοῦντες: adapted to δεδομένον, above. If things are to go on in this way, urges Plato, —if men who are believed to be superior to their fellows cannot live up to the reputation (δόξα) which they enjoy, it looks very badly indeed.

11. ὡς . . . ολομένους: ‘apparently imagining, etc.’

12. ὁσπερ κτλ.: ‘just as if they would be exempt from death, provided you do not inflict it.’

13. ἀθανάτων ἔσομένων: not
οἱ ἔμοι δοκοῦσιν ἅσχυνην τῇ πόλῃ περιάπτεν, ὅστ' ἂν των καὶ των ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες β’ Αθηναίων εἰς ἄρετίν, οὗς αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γνωσκόν 5 οὐδὲν διαφέροντι. ταῦτα γὰρ, ὥ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρῆ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὑπηρεῖν τι εἶναι, οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τούτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταφησίεισθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεενὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέ-ιο λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος.

Κρίνει δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὥ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ κεῖναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἐςομένους. With the new view introduced by ὅσπερ the grammatical connection becomes loosened ("absolute").

1. οἱ: an initial relative pronoun lends gravity and force to the sentence. It is usually to be translated by an emphasized personal pronoun ("they").
2. αἰσχύνην: adapted to αἰσ-χρόν, above.
4. µᾶλλον: i.e. will condemn rather than acquit.

Furthermore, 'it is wrong to appeal to the feelings of the court rather than to their reason and the sense of justice. The juror is sworn to cast his ballot, not by favor, but according to the law. To beg for his favor is to prompt him to perjury and impiety. The defendant is charged with impiety — shall he, then, while on his defense, do that which would substantiate the accusation? Shall he put himself on a level with his accusers, and seem to cherish no worthier a belief in God than theirs?

11. οὐδὲ δίκαιον: 'not right either;' as we colloquially say. Index, οὐδέ. The speaker might have said here, ὅσπερ δ' ἐστὶν αἰσχρόν, οὔτω καὶ ἄδικον κτλ.
12. οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν: we should hardly repeat the negative, which in the Greek still belongs to δίκαιον. 'And try to get off by begging.'
άλλα διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταύτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεύοις οἷς ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἄλλα δικάσεων κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκον 5 χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἑθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἑθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὔσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἄξιοντέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττεν ἀ ηγοῦμαι, μήτε καλὰ εἶναι, μήτε δίκαια μήτε δόσια, ἄλλως τέ μέντοι νῦ Ἔδια καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου ποιοῦ. σαφώς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι υμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζούμην ὄμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἀν διδάσκομι μὴ γηγεύσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνὸς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτῷ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δὲν οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- 15 ναῖοι, ὃς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ύμίν ἑπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κριναί περὶ ἐμοῦ ὑπ' ἐμίλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ύμῖν.

4. δοκῆ: sc. χαρίζεσθαι.
7. δεῖν: repeats the notion of ἀξίον contained in ἄξιοντε.
8. μήτε καλὰ . . . μήτε δίκαια μήτε δόσια: the climax neatly brings to view the skillful transition to the thought of ἀσεβείας and ἀθεον with which the defense closes.
9. ἄλλως τε κτλ.: 'most especially, by Heaven, when I am standing on my defense against a charge of impiety preferred by Meletus here!'
10. εἰ πείθωμι: not πείθειν in the proper sense, but δεόμενον πείθειν is meant; following the thought of δεόμενον ἀποφείγειν, above c. The meaning is made doubly clear by τῷ δείσθαι in the latter part of the phrase.
11. θεοὺς . . . εἶναι: for the arrangement, see the note on δεινοῦς . . . λέγειν 17 B.
12. ἀτεχνῶς: see the Index.
15. ὡς οὐδεὶς: in our idiom, 'more truly than any.'—To the Platonic Socrates, the religious instinct and the instinct of right-doing were one and the same thing.
36 A

Such an issue of the trial, the vote that has been announced, the verdict of Guilty,—many are the reasons, the condemned man avers, why it disturbs him not at all. Surely a larger majority for condemnation might have been expected. As it is, had only thirty votes changed sides, he would at this moment actually be free. Three accusers it has required, working together, to accomplish this result! Where would the little man who filed the indictment be now, if the other two had not given him their support?

1. ἂν μὴ ἄγανακτεῖν: 'that I should not be repining.' The grammatical connection of the phrase with what follows is very loose. Cp. το δι 23 A, and the note. The correlative of μή occurs below 36 B, τιμᾶται δ’ οὖν. Before passing to the business in hand (the ἀντιτίμωσις), Plato presents, in a brief preliminary para-

5. τὸν γεγονότα ἄριθμόν: 'the result of the count,' we should say.

6. εἰ τριάκοντα . . . μετέτησον . . . ἀποπεφεύηγη ἄν: 'had only thirty of the ballots changed sides, I should stand acquitted.' Note the meaning of the pluperfect tense here. For the numerical statement, see Index, δικαστής.
Méletou mén oíw, ós émoi dokw, kai níw ánótopéfenva, kai ou mónon ánótopéfenva, ãllâ panti déllon toutó ge, òti, eî µhē ánêbê 'Anútos kai Lúkaw kattgorgîsontes bêmû, kân ðîφlê xîlias drahmâs, ou metalaňhoun to pémp-5toun méros tôn ψîfôn.

Τµátaî δ' òbîn µoi ò ánêr thvánov. ἔλεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ
τίνος ὑµῶν ἀντιτµήσωµαι, δὲ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι; ἡ δῆλον
οτὶ τῆς ἀξίας; τί ὅν; τί ἀξίος εἴµι παθέω ἡ ἀποτείσαι,
δὲ τι µαθῶν εν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἤσυχιαν ἤγον, ἀλλ’ ἀµελήσας

1. Méletou mén: 'so far as Meletus is concerned.'

4. kâν ðîφlê xîlias drahmâs ktl.: Index, γραφὴ. The sugges-
tion that of the 280 votes against Socrates each of the ac-
cusers had earned only his third, so that any one of the men alone
would have secured less than 100,
is of course not serious, but sa-
tirical. It makes Meletus appear
rather small, while Anytus and
Lyco do not loom up very large.

36 B–E

Well then, for the death penalty
proposed he must name a counter-
penalty, that his judges may make
their choice between the two. What,
indeed, is a fair valuation (some
requital to be borne in body or
in money paid) of that offense
whereof he has been deemed guilty?
—he who would not attend to his
concerns, the common concerns of
money-making, office-holding, am-
bition, faction,—for what true
man would be suffered to help his
fellows in such ways?—but in
the way of private life brought
his benefactions home to all—ex-
horting each and every one to care
less for the body than for the soul,
less for the show than for the
reality. What, he asks, is a fair
reward for such a benefactor, who
is poor withal and needs leisure to
carry on his good work?—Even
the same reward as victors in the
chariot-race receive, less deserving
as they are than he, and nowise
needy,—to eat at the public table
in the Prytaneum.

6. Τµátaî δ' òbîn ktl.: 'now
then, he sets the value of my
offense at death'; i.e. proposes
for it the death penalty. Index,
tµáν, δίκη.

9. δ' τι µαθῶν ktl.: 'for that I
would not, etc.' For τι (δ' τι)
µαθῶν, 'therefore,' see Index,
µαθάνειν.
δινεί ό πολλοί, χρηματισμού τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ ἐμμυροσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγαντεύων, ἣ γεγονόσεμος ἡμαυτὸν τῷ ὑπὲρ ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἡ ὡστε εἰς ταύτ’ ἱόντα σάλοςθαι, ἐντευθέν μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ ἐδρῶν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε ἡμαυτῷ ἐμελλὼν μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἔπε δὲ τὸ ὅδι ἐκαστὸν ἐυργρητέων τὴν μεγίστην ἐυργραφίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐντευθέν ἦν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πέθεις μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἔαυτον μηδένος ἐπιμελείσθαι, πρὶν ἔαυτον ἐπιμεληθείη, ὡς ὅσ βέλτιστος καὶ φρονομάτατος ἐσοτερικό, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

1. δινεί οἱ πολλοὶ: ἐπιμελεύονται, the opposite of ἀμελήσας, must be mentally supplied here.

4. ἐπιεικέστερον . . . ὑπὲρ . . . σφισθαι: 'too fair a man to go into that sort of thing and still live.' Cp. 31 ε.

5. ἐντευθέν μὲν οὐκ ἦν: adapted to εἰς ταύτ’ ἱόντα. Altho' the sentence at this point acquires the form of a finite verb (passing from the participial form), yet the thought is still negative (resumptive of ἀμελήσας κτλ.) as far as μὲν extends its force. The positive thought, required by ἄλλα, after οὐ̃ς ἠθωκὰς ἠθον, enters with the δὲ clause, coming to view decisively in ἐντευθέν ἦν.

5. οἱ ἄλλων . . . ἐμελλὼν μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι: cp. δὲ . . . ἐμελλέν . . . ποιήσειν 20 λ, and the note. Here also the relative clause denotes finality (hence μή, μήτε): 'whither going I were sure to be of no use.' Index, μέλλεων.

8. ἐπιχειρῶν κτλ.: explanatory of τὴν μεγίστην ἐυργραφίαν, and a reminiscence and brief review of what he has already said 29 δ.

9. τῶν ἔαυτον: τὰ ἔαυτον, opposed to ἔαυτον; as, just below, τὰ τῆς πόλεως and αὐτὴ η τόλις are opposed to each other. In the earlier passage (29 δ–30 β), σώματα, χρήματα, δόξα, τιμὴ answer to τὰ ἔαυτον here; φρόνησις, ἀλήθεια, ἀρετὴ, ἡ φυσὶς answer to ἔαυτον.

12. τῶν . . . ἄλλων . . . κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων: i.e. in all things setting reality above appearance, the essential above the unessential, the spiritual above the material.
Δ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιούτος ἂν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ τοῦτα ἄγαθον τοιοῦτον ὃ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοὶ. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι εὐεργετή, 5 δεομένῳ ἄγεων σχολῆς ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακλείσει; οὐκ ἔστ' ὃ τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ συτείσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐὰν τῆς ὑμῶν ἤπει ἢ ἐνωρίῳ ἢ ζεύγει νενήκηκαν Ὀλυμ- 9 πίσιν. δὺ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖς ποιεῖ εὐθάμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐνεγώ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ δὲ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἴ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἄξιας τιμᾶ- 37 ἂνθαι, τοιοῦτον τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

1. τί οὖν ... τοιούτος ἂν: the question that ushered in this noteworthy paragraph is repeated (hence οὖν) at its close.

2. εἰ δεῖ γε κτλ.: ‘if I am indeed to set my reward at its true value’; referring to ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας, above B.

4. εὐεργέτη: this word, prepared for by εὐεργετεῖν, εὐεργεσίαν, has almost the force of a title. Index, πρυτανεῖον.

10. τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται: only the wealthy could afford to compete in the hippodrome. Cp. the designation of the horse by Aeschylus as ἄγαλμα τῆς ῥητορόπλοου χλωδῆς, Prom. 466. The winner in the horse-race had evinced no personal prowess; he need not have been present even at the contest.

37 A-D

Again, no contumacy is here, but the condemned man is one (tho' in so brief a space as Athens grants to questions of life and death the thing cannot be made clear to minds clouded by prejudice) — he is one whose convictions render it impossible for him deliberately to wrong a human being. To propose a counter-penalty now were to wrong HIMSELF, by pronouncing guilty one who is innocent. And what motive might there be for so doing? Surely no fear of death, which is to be feared not at all — while the substitutes therefor, imprisonment, for non-payment of fine or otherwise, and exile, are evils truly to be dreaded. Impris- onment: slavery to a fickle magis-
Δ' μον οὐχ οἶον τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμᾶς διατριβὰς, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτερα γεγονόσιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτερα, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῇν· ἀλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ρᾴδιως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι. 5 καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἶη, ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶς ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλην ἐξ ἀλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὦτι, ὅποι ἂν ἐλθὼ, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὀσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἀν μὲν τούτως Ἐαπελαύνω, οὕτω εἰμέ αὐτὲς ἐξελώσι, πειθόντες τοὺς πρε- 10 σβυτέρους· ἦν δὲ μὴ ἄπελαύνῳ, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

Ἱσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· Σιγὼν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἀγων, ὡς Σωκρατεσ, οὐχ οἶος τ' ἐσεῖ ἡμῖν ἐξελθῶν ζῆν; τοιτ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπότατον πείσαι τινας υμῶν. εὗρ 15 τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τούτ' ἑστίν καὶ διὰ τούτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρω-

The period assumes the form of a question with ironical tone (ἀρα, 'forsooth'). For the form of the period, cp. 28 E, 34 C.

5. καλὸς . . . ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰη: 'a fine life indeed would be mine'; defined by ἐξελθόντι . . . ζῆν.

37 E–38 B

Ay, the same misunderstanding in exile as at home. For his conversations cannot cease; the divine command must be obeyed; the questioning of souls shall continue, while life lasts, because the life unquestioned (he avers) is valueless. Nor, once more, is he capable of thus harming himself, by proposing exile. The payment of a fine, however, if it could be paid, were no harm—and here are friends who bid him name a goodly sum of money, on their word and bond.

12. Σιγών δὲ . . . ζῆν: 'but by keeping still and minding your business, Socrates, will you not be able, pray, to live in exile ?'

13. τοιτ . . . χαλεπότατον πεί-

σαι τινας υμῶν: cp. υμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω, above A.
38 Ανευόμενοι· εάν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν δὲ ἀνθρώπω τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἥμερας περὶ ἄρετῆς τούς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ύμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντο, ὦ δὲ ἀνεξέγερτος βίος οὗ βωστος ἀνθρώπω, ταῦτα δ' ἐτὶ ἦττον πείσεσθε μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φήμη, δ' ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐρ ὀφθαλμος. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμα οὐκ εἰθυσμεν ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον τοιούτοις κακὸν οὐκ σους. εἰ μὲν μίαν ἢ μοι χρήματα, ἐπιμησάμην ἄν χρημάτων οὕτω ἐμελλὼν εἰκείσεως· οἱ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐμελάβῃν· νῦν δὲ ὡς ἢ μὲν πρότερον ἢ μετά, ἐν ταῦτα δέῳ λέγοντι· 'when I say that, etc.'

1. εάν τ' αὖ κτλ.: the preceding sentence began somewhat as if the speaker were going to say, εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἄπειθεῖν τούτῳ· εὔτε κτλ., εάν τε ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθόν ἰν . . . τοῦτο, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι. But the conclusion οὐ πείσεσθε enters independently after the first εάν τε. Accordingly, to the second εάν τε is added αὖ, giving to the whole period a form similar to εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δέ. Cr. εἴτε . . . εἰ δὲ μή, 33 D.

5. δ' δὲ ἀνεξέγερτος βίος . . . ἀνθρώπω· 'while the unexamined life is no life for man to live.'

5. ταῦτα δέ . . . λέγοντι· 'when I say that, etc.' In δέ there is a virtual repetition of αὖ above. Cr. τοῦ δὲ . . . τοῦτον δὲ, 32 D.

6. τα δέ: cr. το δέ 38 A, 39 C.

7. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμα κτλ.: 'and, besides, I am not in the habit, etc.'; recurring to the sentiment expressed 37 B. The remark affords an easy transition to the proposal which follows. He says, in effect: 'Exile is an evil. The suggestion of a fine, however, I put aside just now, in view of the consequences of non-payment, not because I regard a fine as an evil in itself. For, if I had money, I would propose as large an amount as I were likely to pay off.'

8. εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἐμελάβῃν: the time implied, throughout the sentence, is present. Note that the conditionals are expressed by the imperfect, the conclusions by the aorist.

9. νῦν δέ . . . τιμήσαι: 't is impossible, however, for I have it not — unless, to be sure, I name the sum I could pay, and you will fine me in that amount.' — One μνα to θάνατος!
οὐ γὰρ ἔστων, εἰ μὴ ἢρα ὄσον ἄν ἔγιν δυναίμην ἐκτείσαι,
tοσοῦτον βουλεσθή μοι τιμήσαι. ὅσως δὲ ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτείσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίῳ·
tοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ οὗτος, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ
5 Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσι με τράκοντα
μνᾶς τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν
tοσοῦτον, ἐγγυηται δὲ ὑμῖν ἑσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὔτοι
ἀξιόχρεοι.

C Ὡ τολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὅνομα
10 ἔξετε καὶ αὐτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν,
ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ
με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδι-

38 C–39 B

The price to them of relief a
triple sooner gained (thus, tarry-
ing after his sentence, he speaks
to those who have confirmed it)
—the price paid for cutting
short an old man’s waning years,
shall be eternal reproach to
Athens, slayer of the philosopher
Socrates. Doubtless they still im-
agine that he could not find the
words to win from them the boon
of life — when, in truth, he could
not find it in himself to descend to
unworthy, slavish demeanor, like
one who on the field of battle flings
away his arms and begs the pur-
suing foe for quarter. Death the
coward may avoid, but Infamy he
may not avoid. Death, the slow
runner, has caught the slow and
aged Socrates. Infamy, the swift,
has overtaken his accusers, those
spry men. His sentence is to die;
theirs, to live the life of the wicked
and unjust. Thus was it bound
to be, that each might have his due
portion.

9. Ὡ τολλοῦ γ' ἐνεκα χρόνον: ‘for no long respite’s sake’; for the
sake of being rid of him but a few
years sooner than if they had
waited for his natural death (τὸν
αὐτόματον θάνατον).
10. ὅτε: ‘at the hands of.’ The
preceding phrase is passive in
sense.
11. ὤς . . . ἀπεκτόνατε: ‘of hav-
ing put to death, etc.’
7. ἀλωκέναι | τοιούτων: cp. δέομαι | δίκαιον 18 A, and the note. For the meaning of ἀλὼκεναι here, see Index, aieίν.

9. ἀπορία μέν...οὐ μέντοι λόγων: ‘while my conviction, to be sure, is due to a certain lack, it is nevertheless not a lack of words.’

12. θρηνούντος μου: the construction is not absolute, but the genitive is under the influence of ἄκοινων. Cp. below, οἷα...εἴθοσθε...τῶν ἀλλῶν ἄκοινων.


21. τὸ γε ἄποθανείν ἐν τις...ἀφέω: ‘mere death can be avoided by throwing away one’s arms.’
ἀν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὀπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἱκετείαν τραπό-
μενος τῶν διωκόντων. καὶ ἄλλα μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰς ἔν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὡστε διαφεύγειν θανάτον, ἐἀν τις τολμᾷ πάν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἄλλα μὴ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἥ ἤρεπον, ὃ ἄνδρες, θανάτον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλα πολὺ ἰχαλεπτέρον ποιηρίαν. θάττον γὰρ θανάτον θεί. καὶ
νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὕν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βρα-
dυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ἄξεῖς
ἀντε ὑπὸ τοῦ θάντονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν
10 ἀπειμὶ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών, ὄντοι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς
ἀληθείας ὀφληκτόκες μοχθηρίας καὶ ἀδίκιας. καὶ ἐγὼ
τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ ὄντοι. ταῦτα μὲν ποὺ ἱσως
οὕτω καὶ ἐδεί σχεῖν, καὶ οἴμαι αὐτά μετρίως ἔχειν.

4. μὴ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἤ ἰχαλεπόν: ‘maybe this is not the thing that’s
difficult.’ Index, μη.

6. ἰχαλεπτέρον: death outruns a man in the end, of course; but
infamy is apt to overtake him first. The keenest satire is concealed in
the rhetorical flavor of this whole passage. Note the alliteration,
θάττον γὰρ θανάτον θεί.

8. δεινοὶ καὶ ἄξεῖς: ‘clever and
speedy.’

10. ὀφλών ... ὀφληκτόκες: note
the aorist and the perfect: ‘sent-
tenced’ and ‘under sentence.’
So the respective penalties were ἀποθανεῖν and μοχθηροῖς καὶ
ἀδίκους εἶναι.

12. ταῦτα μὲν ποὺ κτλ. The sen-
tence is transitional. ταῦτα μὲν,
resumptive of the proceedings of the trial, as contrasted with its
sequel, ὅτε δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, at the beginning of the following para-
graph. ‘Thus far, doubtless, it
was quite inevitable that the issue
should be what it is, and I believe
the apportionment is about fair.’

13. μετρίως: as measured out
by even-handed Justice. Note
σχεῖν and ἔχειν.

39 C, D

It is at the hour of approach-
ing death that the spirit of prophecy
awakes. To those who by the fatal
ballot have sought to avenge them-
selves upon their victim he will
foretell the vengeance that shall
yet be wreaked on them in turn—
Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ ἐπιθυμῶ ύμῖν χρησμωδήσαι, ὡς καταψηφισάμενοι μού. καὶ γὰρ εἴμι ἡδή ἑνταῦθα ἓν ὁ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμωδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἄνδρες, οἵ εἰμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, ἵμαρτι ὑμῖν ἦςειν εἰθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νη Ἰδα ἢ οἶλαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τούτῳ εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοὺ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ύμῖν πολὺ ἑναντίον ἀποβήγησιν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλεῖοις ἔσονται ύμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ ὅκτο λαθέασθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὁσα νεώτεροι ἔσων, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσατε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτένοντες ἄνθρωπος ἐπικχήσεως του ὁνείδειων τινὰ ύμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς χάριτη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοούσθη. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὕτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὕτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ βέστη, μὴ τοὺς ἀλλούς κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἐσται ὁ σβέλτιστος. ταῦτα

more questioners and censors, and more alert than he, probing deeper and more painfully. For (he adds) accountability for wrong living is not to be evaded by cutting off him who calls for the account. The life itself must be looked to and made good.

1. Τὸ ... μετὰ τοῦτο: 'that which is to come hereafter.'

2. ἑνταῦθα ... ἐστὶν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι: the Iliad furnishes the earliest examples. The dying Patroclus prophesies the death of his slayer Hector, Π 851; and Hector, at the moment of fulfillment of that prophecy, foretells the fate of Achilles, X 358.

5. τιμωρίαν ... πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν ... η ὦλαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε: 'a vengeance ... far sterner, by Heaven, than such as ye have claimed by slaying me.'

6. οἶλαν: sc. τιμωρίαν, Cognate Accusative.


17. ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.: resumptive and transitional, as at the close of the preceding paragraph, b.
μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

Ε' Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις ἢδέως ἄν διαλεξθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότας τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ὧν ὦ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμεῖνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὔτε γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογησία πρὸς ἀλλήν Αλοὺς, ἐως ἐξεστίν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὕτως ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὁρθῶς ἄν

39 E-40 C

Turning now to his friends, to those who would not by their votes fasten guilt upon the innocent man — to them, the only judges rightly so named, ministers of right, he would fain address a word or two, in the few moments yet to spare. His way, forth from his house at daybreak, up to the court-room, from hence presently to the prison — it was, as now appears, the way to death. But lo! the divine monitor, ever prompt here-tofore, during a long life, to check the slightest movement toward evil, has to-day from first to last been silent. How, therefore, he asks, can it be other than a good thing that impends?

3. ὑπὲρ τοῦ . . . πράγματος: 'about the thing that has here occurred'; viz. the being sentenced to death. So below, vague general terms are mostly employed to designate the event.

4. ἐν ὦ . . . ἄγουσι: 'while the officials (the Eleven) are busy'; viz. with the formalities preliminary to conducting the condemned man to prison. A few remarks were doubtless often permitted during this interval — very likely to Socrates himself. At any rate, Plato finds here an adequate motive for the impressive sentences which conclude the Apology.

6. ἀλλὰ μοι κτλ.: 'nay, I pray you, gentlemen, tarry by me thus long.' Note the pathos in ἀλλὰ μοι; also the informal word διαμυθολογῆσαι. Index, ἀλλὰ.

9. τί ποτὲ νοεῖ: 'as to its possible significance.' The interrogation takes ποτὲ, because the inquiry must be purely speculative.

10. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: this, the
form of address proper to an Athenian court, occurs here for the first time in the Apology, as said by Socrates. It is attributed to Meletus 26 D. Socrates is represented as conceding the title of 'dicast' (δίκη, δικάζειν) to those judges solely who had voted for his acquittal. By means of this device (which could have been conceived only after the result of the trial was known) Plato effects more than merely to add a new stroke of satire to his writing. He gains, by avoiding the specific judicial phrase, a term of wider application (ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι), in fuller accord with these clear tones spoken out to the world at large and to posterity.

1. ἡ . . . μαντική: already designated as φωνὴ τις 31 D; below b, as ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον; in general, τὸ δαμόνον. The prophetic character attributed to the sign comes naturally by virtue of its negative function—here throv its silence.

2. ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόθεν κτλ.: μὲν, 'although.' While the formal antithesis enters with νυνὶ δὲ, the substantial contrast is conveyed rather by ἐμοὶ δὲ κτλ., b.

9. ἐπέσχεν: 'checked.'
οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἦναυτῶθη ἀν μοι τὸ ἐισθοῦς σημεῖον,
εἰ μὴ τι ἐμέλλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

'Εννοούσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆς, ὥς πολλῇ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγα-
θὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶν τὸ τεθνάναι.·
5 ἡ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι μὴδ' αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδε-

1. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς κτλ. : 'for
it cannot be that the usual sign
would have failed to oppose me,
were it not some good thing that
I am going to experience.' πρά-
τευ, 'fare,' often approaches closely
to πάσχευ in meaning. Cp. ὁρῶς
πράξειν above A; ταῦτα τὴν
πράξειν B; and see the Index.

40 C–41 C

And when we reflect upon the
matter, he goes on to say, strong is
the hope that the end of this being
is something beneficent and good.
The end of life, the sleep that
knows no waking—either it is
sleep unbroken by a dream (thus
the counterpart of those moments
which alone during human ex-
istence are all-painless and un-
wearying); or, as the poets teach,
it is the dream itself (for the just
man, a vision of the just), in that
region where he who has lived
aright shall dwell forever among
his fellows. There are no judges
forsworn; only the true and the
righteous; men who have died at
the hands of injustice; all the great
and good, women and men. There,
be the penalty for philosophizing
what it may, it certainly is not
death. For there, if the tale be
true, death and dissolution are
known no more.

3. Καὶ τῆς: 'this way, too';
viz. as follows—by the way of
speculation, guided by intuition.
Cp. 31 D, where he approves the
voice which had forbidden him to
enter public life (παγκάλως).

4. αὐτά: 'it'; the event (τὸ
ἐμμεθημέρις). Cp. αὐτά, 'them,'
39 B, end.

4. τὸ τεθνάναι: not ἀποθανεῖν.
Not the passage (aorist), but the
ensuing state (perfect).

5. ἡ γὰρ οἶον . . . τὸν τεθνέωτα,
ἡ . . . εἰς ἄλλον τόπον: the al-
ternatives are stated briefly and
succinctly in advance. 'T is
either to be as nothing and to
have no perception of anything at
all when you are dead, or, as we
are told, there is perchance a
change of some sort, and the
soul goes from hence to dwell in
another place.' Stated in hy-
pothetical form, the first alterna-
tive would stand, οἶον εἰ μηδὲν εἰη
μηδ' αἰσθησιν . . . ἐχοὶ δ' τεθνέως.
νος ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεωτὰ, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ
tis τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνθέντε eis
ἀλλον τόπον. καὶ εἰτε μηδεμία αἰσθησία ἑστιν, ἀλλ'
διὸν ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδὲ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὑπὲρ,
5 θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἃν εἰς ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἷμαι,
εἰ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἢ οὕτω
κατεδαρθεὶν ὡστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας
tε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα
ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἀμενον
10 καὶ ἡδον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβῶ-
κεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἀν μὴ ὃι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ
Ἐτὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἀν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας
πρὸς τὰς ἀλλὰς ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ
θάνατος ἑστιν, κέρδος ἐγώγε λέγω. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν
15 πλεῖον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μία νύς.
eἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημητεία ἑστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένει eis
ἀλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἑστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ

3. καὶ εἰτε κτλ.: consideration of the first alternative. This ex-
tends as far as μιὰ νύς ἐ.
6. εἰ τινα . . . δόι κτλ.: ‘sup-
posing one were to select, etc.’
In translating, the specific mean-
ing of δεό (‘had to select’)
hardly needs to be reproduced
here or when repeated below.
8. καὶ . . . ἀντιπαραθέντα . .
δεό σκεφάμενον εἰπείν: ‘and, com-
paring (offsetting), etc. . . . were
to consider the matter, and state.’
11. οἶμαι: ‘I believe’; re-
petition of ἐγὼ . . . οἶμαι, above.
12. μὴ δὴ: Index, μή.
12. τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα . . .
ἀστόν: ‘the Great King himself.’
Even he, popularly regarded as
the happiest of mortals, would
find a large balance in favor of
μηδὲν εἶναι over εἶναι.
14. κέρδος . . . λέγω: ‘I, for
one, account it a gain.’
15. οὐτοὶ δὴ: ‘under these
conditions.’
16. εἰ δ' αὖ κτλ.: consideration
of the second alternative.
16. ἀποδημητεία: adapted to
μετοίκησις, above c.
εἰσιν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθνεῖτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθῶν τούτου εἰς ἂν, ὦ ἁγιᾷς δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀιδοῦν, ἄπαλλαγεῖς τοῦτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἄλλης δικαστάς, οἴπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικαίως, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθος καὶ Ἁιάκος καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοτο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἃρα φαίλῃ ἂν εἰς ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ ἂν ὁ Ὀρφεῖς εὐγγενεῖσθαι καὶ Μουσαι καὶ Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος, ἐπὶ τὸσφ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ πολλάκις ἑδὲλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ ἐμοιγε καὶ Βασιλεὺς θαυμαστῇ ἂν εἰς ἡ διατριβή αὐτόθι, ὅποτε εὐτυχομεν Παλαμήδηι καὶ Άιαντι τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τῖς ἄλλοις τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρῖσιν ἀδικον τεθνηκέν ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνων, ὥς

2. εἰ... ἐφρήσει: lively realization (more imaginative than ὑπερ εἴρω) of the supposed future event.

4. τοὺς ἄλλους δικαστάς: it is not in their functional capacity as judges that Minos and company are to be encountered in the other world; they are named as foremost among the δικαίως, or righteous, generally.

7. ἃρα φαίλῃ ἂν εἰς: cf. φαίλοι γὰρ ἂν... ἐκεῖ 28 β. Here the tone of the question demands the contrary of φαίλῃ as reply. 'It would be great!' Cf. θαυμαστῇ... ἡ διατριβή, below.

8. ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις... ὑμῖν: 'how much, pray, would one of you give for that?' Index, δέχεσθαι.

10. ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ... ὅποτε ἐντυχοι κτλ.: 'for me most especially... what time I might fall in with Palamedes, etc.' See the names in the Index. For ἐπεί here, cp. 19 E, 20 A.

13. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι κτλ.: comparing his own experiences with those of his fellow-martyrs, he fancies, would be far from uninteresting. Both the asyndeton (omission of γάρ) and the participle (instead of the infinitive ἀντιπαραβάλλειν) are due to the explanatory character of the sentence. The dative (ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι), while not unsuited to ἐφρήσει, is primarily adapted to ἐμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ, above.
1. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον: 'and verily the greatest thing of all!' The ellipse of the verb is effective here where the jubilant tone of the passage culminates.

6. Ὄδυσσεα ... Σίσυφον: illustrious examples of σοφία, but not exactly of the Socratic sort.

8. ἀμήχανον ... εὐδαιμονίας: 'no end of happiness!' Cp. οὐδεμιὰ μηχανὴ (‘inconceivable’) 27 E.

9. πάντως οὖ δὴτοι κτλ.: 'at all events they don't of course put men to death there for doing this thing.' Whatever may be the way of suppressing philosophers in Heaven, he says, it must at any rate be different from the way they have at Athens. The irony of the passage loses nothing by its pleasantry and charm. For the dreamless sleep of the first alternative, the second offers a sleep filled with a delightful dream. The absence of all sinister features in this poetic view consists with the sublime confidence of the sage, in his unswerving conviction, ὃτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἄνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ξόντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι.

41 D—End

Ay, so should ALL the righteous abide firm in the conviction, that, living or dying, for the good man there can be naught but good. Under a divine care and guidance the action of such a man is ever for the best; — as now, the mystic monitor has not once diverted him from his course, because, as he clearly sees, 't was time at last to be free from labor and at rest. Thus the accusers and the
authors of the fatal ballot (nowise
to their praise) were the unwilling
instruments of a beneficent design.
Let them go on retaliating for the
 vexation of being roused from
their sleep of ignorance, till full
justice shall have been done. Even
as Socrates has vexed them, so
let them vex the sons of Socrates
(should they prove unworthy),
 thro' exhortation and reproach
and awakening to a better life.

1. Kal υμᾶς: i.e. not himself
only.

1. εὐδηθίας: cp. τολλη ἐλπὶ
κτλ. 40 C, where he had his own
case chiefly in view.

2. καὶ ἐν τι . . . ἄληθες: 'and
bear this one thing in mind as
just a piece of truth.'

5. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου: i.e.
without a beneficent design.

7. ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων: 'to
be rid of trouble,' or, as we say, to
be at rest.

13. τιμωρήσασθε . . . λυποῦντες:
said with the keenest irony, for
eνεργετήσατε . . . ἐγείροντες (πα-
ρακελευνόμενοι). 'Take your satis-
faction of them, gentlemen, by
wearying them even in the same
way as I was wont to weary you.'
τιμωρήσασθαι implies a selfish
motive on the part of the sub-
ject, never present in the mind of
Socrates.
λείωθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ εὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὁντες, οὐειδίζεστε αὐτοῖς, ὅσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῶν, ὥστιν ἐπιμελοῦνται ὅν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὁντες οὐδενὸς ἀξιοῦ. καὶ εὰν 42 ἀταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν.

5 αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ νεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανούμενος, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσόμενος· ὁποτεροὶ δὲ ἡμῶν ἐρχονται ἐπὶ ἀμενοῦ πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν εἰ τῷ θεῷ.

4. δίκαια πεπονθὼς . . . αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νεῖς: 'I shall have earned retribution at your hands — I and my sons.' The phrasing is equivocal and profoundly suggestive. — When Athens comes to direct her actions according to the principles of Socrates, then and not till then will she have atoned for the wrong done to him and his.
KRITΩΝ

TA TOT ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, KRITΩΝ

Τί τηνικάδε ἀφῆξαί, ὁ Κρίτων; ἢ οὗ πρὸ ἔστιν;
KR. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πηνίκα, μάλιστα;
KR. "Ορθρός βαθύς.

5 ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὡς ἡθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου
φίλας ὑπακούσαι.
KR. Ξυνήθησ ἦδη μοί ἔστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ
πολλάκις δεύτερο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ ἐνεργεῖται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ.
ΣΩ. "Αρτι δὲ ἦκεις ἡ πάλαι;

10 KR. 'Επιεικῶς πάλαι.

B ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπήγειρας με, ἀλλὰ συγῇ
παρακάθησαι;

43 A–D

Socrates, awaking at an early hour, finds his friend Crito seated
by his bedside in the prison.—Crito, after explaining why he
had refrained from disturbing the placid sleep of the prisoner, an-
nounces that the sacred galley has been sighted off Cape Sunium, on
its return voyage from Delos. Hence, apparently, the execution
of Socrates is close at hand.

5. Ἡθέλησε: 'came to be willing.' Ingressive aorist; cp. ἠδοξέ
μου Ἀρόλ. 21 c, and the note.

7. ἦδη: 'by this time.'

8. καὶ . . . ενεργεῖται: a mild
way of indicating where a part
of the money had been placed
which Crito was ready to expend
to secure the escape of Socrates.
Cp. οὐδέ πολὺ τάργύριον κτλ. 45 A.

11. πῶς: 'how comes it,' that
you did not awaken me at once?
KR. Οὖ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὖδ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς ἥθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἄγρυπνᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι βαθμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπιτηδές σε οὐκ ἥγερον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδίστα διάγης.· καὶ 5 πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ ἐξυμφόρᾳ, ὡς ραδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελείς εἰ πάνανακτοτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἰ δὲι ἡδή τελευτῶν.

C KR. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἐξυμφοραῖς ἀλλόσκονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παροῦσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἑστι ταῦτα. ἅλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸς ἀφίξαι;

15 KR. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπὴν, οὐ σοὶ, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπῇ καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἡν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα ἂν ἐνέγκαμι.

1. οὗ μᾶ τὸν Δία κτλ.: with strong feeling Crito asseverates that he has done by Socrates as he would himself be done by under similar circumstances — where ἄγρυπνία were neither more nor less than λύπη. But with ἀλλὰ καὶ he hastens to correct the implied suggestion that Socrates can be affected as an ordinary man would be affected in his situation.

2. σοῦ πάλαι βαθμάζω: 'I have been admiring you all the time.'

10. ἔδη: 'finally.' Cp. Apol. 41 D.

13. τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν: Index, μή.

15. οὗ σοὶ: sc. χαλεπὴν.

18. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα: much like πάντων βαρύτατα. Superlatives are idiomatically modified by prefixing ἐν τοῖς. The formula does not change with the gender of the adjective. Cp. ἐν τοῖς μᾶλιστα Αθηναίων ἐγώ 52 Α, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ ὥσ Thuc. 3. 17.
ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλοι, οὐ δὲι ἄφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὕτω δὴ ἀφίκται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἢξει τῆμερον, ἐξὶ δὲν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἢκοντες τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου 5 καὶ καταληπτόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον δὲν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἢξει τῆμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὡς Σωκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελεσέαι.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ', ὡς Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. ὦ μέντοι οἴμαι ἢξειν αὐτὸ 10 τῆμερον.

44 Α ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩ. 'Εγώ σοι ἐρώ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραίᾳ δεῖ με ἀποθνῄσκειν ἢ ἢ ἄν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ἢξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὡς

1. τίνα ταύτην: sc. φέρων ἢκεις. τίνα, predicate; ταύτην, object. See the note on ποιάν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην Ἁψ. 20 D.

2. τεθνάναι: 'to be a dead man.' The expression ἀποθανεῖν, 'to be put to death,' is here avoided. Index, θνησκευ and ἀποθνησκευ.

3. δοκεῖ μὲν μοι: 'I think.' For the Absolute Infinitive, cp. ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν ('so to speak') Ἁψ. 17 A, 22 B, D, ὀλόγου δὲν 22 A, ἐκών εἶναι 37 A.
έωρακα ὀλίγων πρότερον ταύτης τής νυκτός· καὶ κυδωνεύεις ἐν καρφί τινι οὐκ ἐγείραι με.

ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐθόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ Βευειδής, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὁ Σώκρατες, ἥματί κεν τριτάτῳ Θείν ἐρίβωλον ἰκοῖο.

ΚΡ. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὁς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἔσκευν. ἄλλα, ὁ δαιμόνιος Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ νῦν ἔμοι πυθοῦ καὶ σωθητί· ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ἕμφορὰ ἔσται, ἄλλα χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ

speaking being felt as night (δρ-θρος βαθίς 43 ι). So, τῆς ἐτέρας is equivalent to αὐφονιον.

2. ἐν καρφί τινι: Index, κυδωνεύειν.

5. ὁ Σώκρατες κτλ.: reminiscence from the Iliad. Achilles threatens to set sail for home on the morrow, adding: εἰ δὲ κεν εὐπλοίην δῶῃ κλυτὸς ἐννοείγαιος, ἥματι κεν τριτάτῳ Θείν ἐρίβωλον ἰκοῖν. I 363.

8. ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν: 'say rather, manifest.'

9. λιαν γε, ὡς ἔσκευν: 'its meaning is only too clear, apparently.' To Socrates the thought of 'going home' has been uppermost here; to Crito the thought of the predicted death, as such.— With the words ὡς ἔσκευν Crito dismisses the subject of the dream, to come to the matter in hand.

44 B-D

Crito now urges the true purpose of his errand: to gain, even at the eleventh hour, Socrates' consent to make good his escape and save his life by the means which his friends have provided. His refusal so to act will be neither believed nor comprehended. Popular opinion will hold Crito to have been too stingy to rescue Socrates.

—The philosopher rejoins that the popular opinion is of little account in the matter. Sensible people will view the event in its true light. Popular bodies, the vulgar masses, are, to be sure, agents of mischief often enough, as chance may dictate; but their views are of no value, for ability or capacity of working either good or evil they have not.

9. Ο δαιμόνιος: here said in a
έστερησθαί τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οίων ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐφήσω, εἰ δὴ καὶ πολλοὶς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἱσασίων, ὅσ οἶός τε ὄν σε σφέσειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίνων 5 εἰς ταύτης δόξα, ἣ δοκείν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς οὐ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθέντε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὃ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὗτῳ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἕπιεκέστατοι, ἃν μᾶλλον 10 ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξθαι, ὡσπερ ἂν πραξθῇ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὅρας δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῇ 15 τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νῦν, ὅτι οἶοι τ' εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν 19 κακών ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδὸν, ἐώς τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἤ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐχ οὗ, ὃ Κρίτων, οἷοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοί τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἶοι τ' ἡσαν καὶ ἀγαθὰ
tone of serious remonstrance. See the Index.

1. οὐδένα μή: Index, οὗ.
3. ὡς οἶος τ' ἄν κτλ.: 'as one who could have saved you, had I been willing to spend money, but did not care to do it.' οἶος τ' ὄν, i.e. although able. ὡς, prefixed to these words, makes clear that they express part of the view of outsiders and strangers (πολλοὶς δόξῳ... ἀμελήσαι).
5. τάττης: sc. τῆς δόξης; explained by ἤ δοκείν κτλ.

13. τὰ παρόντα νῦν: i.e. the present plight of Socrates, a prisoner awaiting his execution, condemned to death by a popular dicastery. These facts are said to be αὐτὰ... δῆλα, to contain in themselves the evidence, ὅτι κτλ.
16. ἐν αὐτοῖς· διαβεβλημένος: the Apology affords ample commentary on this expression, 19 B and elsewhere (διαβολή, διέβαλλον, οἱ διαβάλλοντες, etc.).
18. ἵνα... ἡσαν: 'that they might be able' (as in fact they
τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἰχέν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὕτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὕτε ἀφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τούτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι.

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατε, 5 εἰπὲ μοι· ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεύς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μη, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συναφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχοσων ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαι τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνά χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις pαθεῖν;

are not, νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε).
Index, ives.—There is a pointed significance here in oioi τε and δυνατοί. Socrates denies these predicates to persons whose actions are the result of mere chance and circumstance (παύοντες . . . ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι), not governed by sound reflection and reasoned principle.

2. οὕτε . . . φρόνιμον οὕτε ἀφρονα . . . ποιήσαι: 'they cannot make a man wise or foolish'; i.e. they cannot make one good or bad, are unable (of themselves) to do good or evil to any one. See the note on οὐ . . . θεμιτῶν Ἀπολ. 30 D.

44 E—45 C

To Crito’s inquiry, whether the attitude of Socrates is due to solicitude for his friends, in view of the pecuniary loss and the danger they are likely to incur in consequence of helping the prisoner to escape, the sage replies that he is moved by considerations of this sort and by a great many others also. But Crito urges that he is himself quite able to afford the outlay needed, including the expense of keeping the informers quiet; and that, even were his own ample means inadequate, other friends of Socrates, not citizens of Athens, are ready to supply the funds. He begs Socrates, accordingly, to dismiss such considerations; likewise to give himself no trouble about his remarks at the trial, as to the helpless condition in which he would be placed as an exile; Crito has friends in Thessaly, for example, who will make the fugitive perfectly safe and comfortable.

5. ἀρά γε μή: for the interrogative phrase, see Index, μή at end.

6. οἱ συναφάνται: See the Index, Κρίτων, and the passage there cited from Xenophon’s Memorabilia.
45 οἱ γὰρ τὰ τοιοῦτα φοβεῖ, ἐσον αὐτὸ χαίρειν. ἦμεις γὰρ τὸν δίκαιον ἐσμεν σώσαντες σε κωδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κύδωνον καὶ ἐὰν δὲ ἔτι τοῦτον μείζων. ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως πούει.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, διὰ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.

ΚΡ. Μήτη τοῖνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ · καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργυρίων ἔστω, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαι σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν εὐνθένθε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὅρα τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὃς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἄργυρίου; σοί δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὃς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἵκανᾶ · ἔπειτα καὶ εἰ τί ἐμὸν κηδόμενον οὐκ οἰεί δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμὰ, ἕνοι ἐνθάδε ἐτοιμοὶ ἀναλίσκειν · εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄργυριον ἰκάνον, Σωμίας ὁ Ὑθβάϊος · ἐτοιμοὶ δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνω. ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτη ταῦτα φοβοῦ.
κρίτων

βούμενος ἀποκάλητις σαυτόν σώσαι, μήτε ὁ ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθῶν ὁ τι χρώο σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ σάλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσι σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη 5 εἰς Θεσσαλίαν ἴεναι, εἰς ἔνοι έκεῖ ἄνευ, οἱ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιόσουται καὶ ἄσφαλεῖαν σοι παρέξονται, ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θεσσαλίαν.

'Ετι δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατης, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτόν προδοῦναι, ἔξον σωθῆναι· καὶ 10 τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτόν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἔχθροι σου σπεύσαιες τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σε διαφθειρα

1. (μη) ἀποκάλητις: ‘spare no effort.’

2. διελ. 105 ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ: see Apol. 37 D. Socrates must not allow himself to be disturbed by any little inconsistency that might be noted between his words at the trial and his actions now.

3. διελ. 105 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις κτλ.: ‘that you would be at a loss, as an exile, what to do with yourself.’

45 C–46 A

Continuing his plea, Crito ventures to express the opinion that Socrates even does wrong, in helping to consummate the machinations of his enemies by abandoning himself unnecessarily to death; by abandoning likewise his sons, gratuitously, to the sorry chances of orphanhood. Parents have duties toward their children, but Socrates, apparently, after all his lifelong professions of virtue, chooses the easy way, not the brave way, in regard to his own. Crito is ashamed of the whole history. People will attribute to the philosopher and his friends a lack of courage from first to last—from the preliminary scenes of the needless trial, down to the concluding farce in the prison. Therefore, if trouble is not to be crowned with disgrace, let Socrates wisely avail himself of this last opportunity for deliberation.


9. σαυτόν προδοῦναι: cp. what Socrates declares in the Apology, πεπαινόμενος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δεός ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδική-

τελεῖν 37 B.
βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ
δέμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὐς σοι ἔξων καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ
ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰκήσει καταληπτών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι
ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξοντος· τεύξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός,
τοιούτων οἰάπερ εἰσθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις
περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας,
ἡ ξυνιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺν
δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βασιλικάτα αἰρέσθαι· χρῆ δὲ, ἀπερ
ἀν ἀνὴρ ἁγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείως ἔλοιπο, ταῦτα αἰρέσθαι,
ιοφάσκοντα γε ὡς ἁρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεί-
σθαι· ὡς ἔγγυε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν
Ε ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ
σὲ ἀνανδρίαν τινι τῇ ἰμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσοδος
τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἔξων μὴ εἰσέλ-
ισθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἁγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ

1. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις: i.e. besides playing into the hands of his enemies by sacrificing himself.
2. τὸ σὸν μέρος: the phrase is nearly equivalent to σοῦ γε ἔνεκα (‘for aught you do to hinder’).
   So 50 B, 54 C.
3. ὃ τι ἄν τύχωσι: sc. πράξαντες. Cp. 44 D end. ὃ τι is thus in the same construction as its antecedent τὸ τοῦ (Cognate Accusative). Note the order of the clauses. ‘Mere chance will determine what is to be their fate.’ Index, πράττεν. 
4. τεύξονται...τοιούτων κτλ.: carries on the idea expressed in what immediately precedes, τεύ-
ξοντα being adapted to τύχωσι. ‘And their fate will in all probability be such as usually befalls.’
13. ἀνανδρία τινὶ: following the thought of ἀνὴρ...ἀνδρείως above. Crito feels that he is using rather severe language, hence τινὶ. So below, κακὰ τινὶ, ‘a kind of cowardice.’
13. καὶ...καὶ...καὶ: the correlatives mark the three stages of the πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ.
14. ἔξων μὴ εἰσέλθειν: it seems to be implied here that a private settlement with the prosecutors might have been arrived at, to prevent the case from being brought into court at all, if Soc-
rates would have consented to such a thing. For εἰσελθὼν, cp. 
Ἀπολ. 29 c, and the note.

2. κακὰ . . . καὶ ἄναλθρια: the repetition (see above ἄναλθρια 
τοῖ) is due to the length of the 
period. The thought of δόξη also 
reappears under the form δοκῇ, as 
the speaker dwells on the final 
matter (τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τοῦτί) 
about which he is so indignant. 
For διαπεφυγόναι, see the Index.

4. ὑφελοῦ: cp. Ἀπολ. 28 b.
6. ἀλλὰ: 'nay.'
6. μᾶλλον δὲ: 'or rather.'
7. ἱβεβουλεύσθαι: 'to have done 
with deliberation.' Here, as often, 
the perfect infinitive, by its idea 
of completion, affords a pointed 
and forcible mode of expression. 
So πεπρᾶξθαι, just below. Cp. 
Ἀπολ. 41 D.

9. εἰ . . . περιμενοῦμεν: see 
the note on εἰ τιμωρῆσεις Ἀπολ. 
28 c.

46 B-47 A

What value is to be set upon 
Crito's seal, that (says Socrates) is 
a question of right and wrong. 
It behooves the two friends, then, 
to consider by the light of reason 
(the only light by which the sage 
can allow himself to be guided) 
whether one ought, or ought not, 
to act as Crito here advises. Ar-
guments which Socrates has for-
merly advanced he cannot now 
rebudiate because death threatens 
him. Unless those arguments can 
be refuted, they must stand. A 
fair starting point for the pres-
ent consideration would be Crito's 
remark about the opinions of men 
—to consider whether in former 
conversations it was rightly af-
irmed, that some of those opinions
are to be heeded, and others not. Was that said in earnest? And does Crito, whose judgment there is no impending calamity to war, still concede that it was rightly said? — He does. — The opinions of the wise must be heeded; those of the foolish, not? — Yes.

1. Πολλοῦ ἄξια: sc. ἐστίν.
2. εἰ . . . εἰ: 'supposing it to consist with some degree of right.' For the non-committal form of the condition, cp. δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἷος τ’ εἶ ἔστι (supposing one to be able, si quis possit) παιδεύειν ἄνθρωπος, Ἀρ. 19 E.

5. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενί: 'nothing that is in me.' τὰ ἐμά, the collective ἐγὼ.

6. λογιζόμενος: adapted to τῷ λόγῳ.

8. ἑσυχή: temporal, and explanatory of νῦν.

9. σχεδὸν τί: see the Index.
10. οὐ μή: Index, οὐ.
11. ἀν πλεῖο . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται: 'though there be still more bugbears than are in evidence now whereby the power of the many may scare us, childlike.' πλεῖον, Cognate Accusative with μορμολύττῃται.
βομεν, δι' σοι λέγεις περί τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὖ, οτι ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσ- Δέχεις τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὖ. ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀπο- θνήσκειν καλῶς ἔλεγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἔγενετο, 5 οτι ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγου ἔλεγετο, ἢν δὲ παιδία καὶ φλυα- ρία ἡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμοῦ δὲ ἐγω' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὁ Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδή ᾧ δε ἐχω, ἢ ὅ αὐτός, καὶ ἔσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πε- σόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἔλεγετο δὲ πως, ὡς ἐγϑμαί, ἐκάστοτε 10 ᾧ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν σιγομένων τι λέγειν, ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγω ἔλεγον, ὡτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἀνθρωποι δοξάζουσιν, δεόι ἐτᾶς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τᾶς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς 14 θεῶν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὁσα γε τάνθρωπεα, ἐκ τῶν μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἄφριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούσῃ ἡ παρούσα ἐξιμφόρα.

1. δι' σοι λέγεις: above 44 c, d, 45 e.
2. ἐκάστοτε: i.e. on the various occasions when Crito had heard the subject discussed by Socrates.
4. κατάδηλος . . . δη . . . ἐλέγετο: sc. ὁ λόγος, in both clauses. ἄρα marks the ironical tone of the question. For ἄλλως, see the Index.
7. ἀλλοιότερος: the comparative degree is due to a feeling that the word (ἀλλωσ, ἄλλος, opposed to ὁ αὑτός) is inadequate to the thought. 'More different,' i.e. less convincing.
8. ἐπειδή: 'now that'; cp. above b.
8. ἐσομεν χαίρειν: cp. ἔσον αὑτὸ χαίρειν 45 Α.
10. ὑπὸ τῶν σιγομένων τι λέγειν: 'by those who fancied they spoke to some purpose.' λέγειν τι, the opposite of οὐδὲν λέγειν. Here in contrast with ἄλλως, ἐνεκα λόγου, above. Index, λέγειν.
14. ὅσα γε τάνθρωπεα: 'at least in all human probability.' There are no circumstances in Crito's own situation to warp his judgment; and surely he cannot allow the impending death of his friend to distort his views, while those of Socrates himself remain unclouded. An appeal at once to Crito's fairness and fortitude.
σκόπει δή· οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ σου λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ᾽ οὖ; τί φης; ταῦτα οὖν καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μὴ;

ΚΡ. Νάι.

ΣΩ. Χρηστάι δὲ οὖχ αἰ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἰ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

10 ΚΡ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τα τοιαύτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐπαινώ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει; ἢ ἐνὸς μόνον ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἄν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὡν;

15 ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνον.

47 B-D

It was further maintained that in matters pertaining to the body the opinion, the praise or blame, and the prescriptions, not of the many, but of the one expert or professional individual must be regarded by him who aims at bodily health and strength? — Yes, and truly so. — And he who disregards the opinion of the skilled adviser, and respects that of the ignorant multitude, will come to grief as to the body? — Assuredly he will. — Similarly, in questions of morals, of right and wrong, the opinion, not of the multitude, but of some one who possesses understanding, must be regarded by him who will not come to grief in matters pertaining to the soul — and the soul is a serious thing enough? — Indeed it is.

11. Ἀδ: marks a new step in the argumentation, still assumed as a reminiscence of former conversations (ἐλέγετο).

11. γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ κτλ.: the sentence is explanatory of τὰ τοιαύτα. Hence the asyndeton.

12. τοῦτο πράττων: ‘making a business thereof.’

13. ἐνὸς μόνον ἐκεῖνον δὲ ἄν κτλ.: thus to be divided in reading, and in translating. Cp. Ἀφολ. 18 A, 38 D.
ΣΩ. Οὐκόν φοβεῖσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἑπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἄλλα μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δῆ.

5 ΣΩ. Ταῦτα ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτεῖν καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἡ ἀν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῆ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπανοικηθεὶς μᾶλλον ἡ ἦ τιξίμπασι τοῖς άλλοις.

9 ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

C ΣΩ. Εἰπεῖ. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν, τιμῆσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαΐόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τούτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ 15 εἰς τὶ τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθῶντος;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διολλύει.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκόν καὶ τάλλα, ὡς Κρίτων, αὐτῶς, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν 20 καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὃν νῦν ἡ Βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεί ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν, ἡ τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἰ τὶς ἐστὶν ἑπαίνω, ὃν δεὶ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ξύμπαντας τοὺς άλλους; ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο

6. καὶ ἡξυπνών γε: 'ay, and eat too.' γε calls attention to a new class of things enumerated.

14. τοῖς τείνει: 'whither does it tend?'

15. τὶ τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθῶντος: 'what part of him who disobeys?' τὰ τοῦ ἀπειθῶντος, the collective ἀπειθῶν. Cp. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ 46 B, τῶν ἡμετέρων 47 Ε.
καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπάλλυτο. ἡ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτῳ;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιείου μὲν βέλτιον ὑγινόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διωλέσωμεν, πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντος δόξῃ, ἃρα ἑβιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστιν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δὲ ποὺ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἃρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, φι τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὑνύησιν;

15 ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σῶματος ἐκείνο, ὃ τι

1. βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο . . . ἀπάλλυτο: the past tense, still alluding to former discussions.

47 D–48 B

But with ruined bodily health life is not worth living? — Certainly not. — Then, still less is life worth living, with a ruined moral nature — at least if the soul be more precious than the body? — It is more precious, by far. — Apparently, then, in matters of right and wrong, the words of the one must be followed, the voice of Truth, not the opinions of the many. If, however, it be urged that the many possess the power of putting men to death, the question arises, whether we nevertheless still affirm that not mere living, but living a good life, is the thing of value? — We do still affirm it.

4. Φέρε δὴ: marks still another step in the argumentation.

6. μὴ τῇ . . . δόξῃ: the arrangement is as if ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν were to follow. The negative does not affect πειθόμενοι. ‘By listening to the opinion of the wrong persons.’

13. ἀλλὰ . . . ἃρα: ‘well then.’ An a fortiori argument is implied in the emphatic μετ' ἐκείνου and by the tone of the question.
48 Από τις τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δὲ ἡ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἔστώ;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλα τιμωτέρον;

ΚΡ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀριτ., δὲ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τι ἐρούσων οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὁ εἰς, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτη οὐκ ὅρθως εἰσήγητι, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἀν τις, οἷοὶ τέ εἰσον ἡμῖν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι.

6. οὐκ . . . πάνυ . . . οὕτω: ‘not so very much’; putting it mildly. οὐ πάνυ, often said with Attic reserve. Cr. Aφ. 41 D.

7. ὁ ἐπαίων . . . ὁ εἰς . . . αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια: cp. above 47 D, εἰς ἡς ἐστι ἐπαίων (περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων κτλ.). Index, ἐπαίων. In the case of γυμνάζοσθαι the “one” could be named (the ἱερέας or the πυθαγόραις); likewise in other arts, such as music, orchestics, etc. But in regard to matters of purely moral conduct (where sacred law or bloodguiltiness was not concerned) there could be named at Athens, in the time of Plato and Socrates, no professional or authoritative adviser—as the priest or pastor would be consulted by good people in more modern days. Practically, in the scene here represented, the expert in the case was Socrates himself—a genuine one indeed, with his well-reasoned and consistent principle. Ἐγώ . . . ἰδίον τοιοῦτος, οἷον τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ πείθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ ὅσ' ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται 46 B. The εἰς is thus virtually identical with αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια personified, in the passage before us. So long as the sage remains true to himself he is sure not to go wrong.

9. εἰσηγεῖ: εἰσηγεῖσθαι, of establishing the premises for argumentation (τὰ ὁμολογημένα, τὴν ἀρχήν).

12. φαίη γ' ἀν τις: as Crito urged 44 D.
KRITON

2. 

KR. Δήλα δή καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὡς θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, διν διελθόθαμεν, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτι ὁμοιο ἐίναι καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὕτη σκόπει, εἰ ἐτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ 5 οὗ, ὅτι οὔ τὸ ζήν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζήν.

KR. Ἅλλα μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτὸν ἔστων, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

10 KR. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὦμολογομένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρασθαί εξίεναι μὴ ἀφιέν- 15 τῶν ἄθναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐώμεν. ὡς δὲ σοῦ λέγεις tās σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ

48 8-

The premises, accordingly, have been agreed upon, and the way is clear to reason out the problem, whether it is right or wrong for Socrates to defy the laws of Athens and seek to escape from his prison. Considerations of pecuniary loss, popular criticism, family concerns, life and death, and so on, are not for men who reason, but for the unreasoning multitude. If it be proved wrong to try to escape, the attempt must not be made? — Ay; but what, then, is to be done? — The discussion will show; and, if so conducted as to convince a friend, its issue will be more satisfactory than if the well-meaning friend were to be left unconvinced.

15. Ἀς ... λέγει τὰς σκέψεις:
παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὡς Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινώντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἷοι τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ἔπειτ' ὑμῶν, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἦμιν δ' ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἴρει, μὴ οὐδὲν 5 ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ὡς ὑπερ νῦν ἢ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δ' καὶ πρᾶξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθέντε ἐξάξονσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἔχαγομεν, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες γὰρ φανώμηθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἑργαζόμενοι, μὴ 10 οὖν δέν ὑπολογίζομαι οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκων δεὶ παραμένοντας καὶ ἑσυχίαν ἀγοντας, οὐτ' εἰ ἄλλο ὤτοιν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικειν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὥρᾳ δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

15 ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὡς ἀγαθέ, κονή, καὶ εἰ πη ἔχεις ἀντι- ἐλέγεις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὡς μακάρε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθέντε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὥς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα

usually, when an antecedent is thus "incorporated" into the relative clause the article is omitted.

1. μή ... ταῦτα ... σκέμματα

2. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν: 'ay, and (who) would bring to life again.'

4. αἴρει: 'constrains.'

9. ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἑργαζόμενοι: ἄδικα, predicative; αὐτά ('them'), object.

13. ὥρᾳ δὲ τί δρῶμεν: a trace of impatience on Crito's part.

17. ἢδη: 'finally.'

19. πέμπας σε: 'with your approval'; opposed to ἀκοντος (sc. σου). Index, πέμπειν.

49 A–Ε

If in former conversations Crito and Socrates were not jesting, but in earnest, they should be ready to reaffirm now what they
have often affirmed before, without regard to popular sentiment, that all wrong-doing is unhandsome and base? — They do reaffirm it. — And doing wrong is to be defined as doing wrong, harm, or evil to somebody? — It is. — And wrong-doing by way of retaliation, rendering evil for evil, is under no circumstances whatever right, no matter how great may be the provocation? Let Crito be cautious in acknowledging a principle which few men are ready to admit — hence few there be with whom the present discussion were even possible. But this is Socrates’ principle. Is it also Crito’s? — It is.

3. ἦν κτλ.: ‘as nearly as possible as you believe.’

5. Ἐκόντας: ‘if we can help it.’ The adjective agrees with the “agent” of the verbal.

9. ἐν ταὐτῇ ταῖς ... ἡμέραις: viz. since the trial and condemnation of Socrates. Cp. ἔπειδή μοι ἢδε ἦ τὔχη γέγονεν, and the context, 46 B.

10. ἐκκεχυμένας: ‘spilled’; i.e. wasted, come to naught.

10. πάλαι ... ἄρα ... ἔλθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὖς παῖδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες: ‘were we all the time ... without knowing it no better than mere children, after all (ἄρα)?’

13. πάντως μᾶλλον: ‘above all,’ ‘more truly than ever.’
χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἶτε καὶ πραότερα, ὡμοὶ τὸ γε ἄδικεῖν τῷ ἄδικοντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὅν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὖ;  
ΚΡ. Φαμὲν.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅρα δεῖ ἄδικεῖν.
ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἄδικονμενον ὅρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἄδικεῖν.

C ΚΡ. Ὅφαίνεται.
10 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων, ἢ οὖ;  
ΚΡ. Ὅφει δῆ που, ὁ Σώκρατες.  
ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, δίκαιον ἢ οὖ δίκαιον;  
ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

15 ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ ποιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἄδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.  
ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.  
ΣΩ. Οὔτε ὅρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἄν ὁτιῶν πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὁρὰ, ὁ 
Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὀμολο-
γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὁλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ
dόξει. οἶς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τοῦτοις οὐκ ἦστι
κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἄλληλων καταφρονεῖν,
ὁρῶντας τὰ ἄλληλων βουλευματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ
5 εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινονεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἄρχω-
μεθα ἐνεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως ἔχοντος
οὔτε τοῦ ἄδικων οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικῶν οὔτε κακῶς πά-
σχοντα ἀμόνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς. ἡ ἀφίστασαι καὶ
10 εὖ κοινονεῖς τῆς ἁρχῆς; ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω
καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ. σοὶ έδε εἰ πὴ ἄλλη δεδοκται, λέγε καὶ
dίδασκε. εἰ δ' ἐμένεις τοὺς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
ἀκονε.

KR. Ἀλλ' ἐμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι. ἀλλὰ λέγε.

1. ὁλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ
καὶ δόξαι: perhaps there were fewer
persons in pre-Christian times than
now, who were ready to admit a
principle and profess a doctrine
which they never felt themselves
bound to observe in practice; but
there were doubtless some such
even anciently. Cp. έξαπατητῶν
below ε.

2. οἷς οὕτω δέδοκται: ' (they)
who have adopted this belief.'

Π. τὸ μετὰ τὸῦτο: i.e. the se-
quell, the logical outcome of the
affirmations premised.

49 Ε—50 Β

If, now, a man is to perform
and not to evade that which he
acknowledges to be the right thing
to do, then does Socrates, in at-
temptsing the proposed escape from
prison, stand by his acknowledg-
ments, or does he rather wrong
somebody? — injuring certain per-
sons, those in fact whom least of all
in the world he should injure? —
But who, pray, are they? — Well,
supposing the LAWS of Athens
were to present themselves in per-
son to Socrates, on the eve of his
abscording, and take him to task
in view of this fine enterprise? —
asking of him an opinion, what
were likely to become of a state
wherein the judgments of the
courts are defied and set at naught
by individuals? Conceivably he
might reply that in his case the
state was in error and the judg-
ment false? — He might indeed so
reply.
KRITON

50 [M]

5 Σ. Δέγχ δὴ αὐ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ: πότερον ἢ ἀν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ ὅτα ποιητέον ἤ ἐξαιπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

5 Σ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθέδε ἡμεῖς
50 Α μή πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἡκιστα δει, ἢ οὗ; καὶ ἐμμένουμεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίους οὕσιν ἢ οὗ;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὡ Σάκρατεσ, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὅ
10 ἐρωτάς· ὦ γὰρ ἐννοοῦ.

Σ. Ἀλλ’ ἐδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλονσι ήμῖν ἐνθέδε
ἐιτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ’ ὅπως δει ὁνομάζαι τοῦτο, ἐκλόντεσ οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτότο.

14 Εἰπέ μοι, ὡ Σάκρατεσ, τί ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλο τι ἡ
βιτούτω τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥ ἐπικεφείς, διανοεῖ τοὺς τε νόμους
ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ
dοκεῖ σοι οὖν τε ἐτὶ ἐκεῖνὴν τὴν πόλιν ἕναι καὶ μὴ

1. Μᾶλλον δι’: ‘or rather.’

3. ἔξαπατητέον: ‘evaded,’ we should naturally say. But the Greek word is stronger in its implication of falsehood.

6. μή πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν: cp. πείσας σε 48 ε.

10. ἐννοοῦ: ‘comprehend,’ Crito would like to be explicitly informed who these persons are. Plato’s famous and most impressive personification of the Commonwealth (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως) is thus dramatically introduced.

12. εἰθ’ ὅπως... τοῦτο: ‘or by whatever name we are to call this thing.’ He would gladly find a milder designation than ἀποδιδράσκειν for that which Crito asks him to do, if the language afforded a word at once appropriate and reputable. Cp. πράττεις ἄπερ ἀν δούλος φανλότατος πράξειν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν 53 D.

13. ἐπιστάντες: this word supplies a graphic touch helpful in realizing the imaginary scene. Cp. προσελθοῦσα in the account of the dream 44 Α.

17. ἐναί: ‘to stand,’ ‘exist.’
κρίτων

ἀνατεράφθαι, ἐν ἂι γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἴσχυσα τοιαύτα; ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροι τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἀν τις ἔχω, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὅς τὸς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτει κυρίας ἐλαῖ. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς ὅτι ἴδικε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνει; ταύτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

1. ἀνατεράφθαι: i.e. ἀνατεραμένην (‘subverted’) εἶναι, ‘to be as nothing.’

1. ἂι γενόμεναι δίκαι: ‘the judgments rendered.’ More explicitly below, τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας.

2. ἄκυροι... γίγνονται: ‘are foiled.’ For γίγνεσθαι in passive sense, see the Index.

4. ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ: an allusion to Athenian procedure in the presentation of a formal plea by an advocate (one of the σύνθικον or σύνήγγορον) upon the question of the abrogation of a law. A sort of apologetic reference by Plato, in view of the eloquent defense he is himself about to put into the mouth of laws personified.

5. ἀπολλυμένου: ‘threatened with ruin as it is.’ Note the effect of the imperfect stem, and cp. ἐπιχειρεῖς ἠμᾶς ἀπολλύεις. C.

6. ἢ ἐροῦμεν κτλ.: Socrates anticipates the objection that would naturally be raised by Crito, thus affording a quick transition to the next step in the argument. For the future indicative in this question, compare the following note on ἄν ἐστοιχεῖον οἱ νόμοι.

50 C–51 C

Standing before him now in his prison the Laws of the Commonwealth propound to Socrates the solemn and startling question, whether in the tacit agreement entered into by every citizen with his country it is really assumed that he will obey her ordinances only when he deems them justly administered, and not unexceptionally and always. This contract implies on the part of the citizen an approval of the regulation of marriage by the state, and involves a surrender of his individual rights to the welfare of the community, whose privileges he has thus by birth, rearing, and education been enabled to enjoy.
KR. Ταῦτα νη Δία, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοι, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αὐτοῖς ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν βανμᾶζομεν 5 λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἰποιεν ὅτι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδή καὶ εἰσοθας χρησθαι τῷ ἐρωταν τε καὶ ἀποκρίσεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν 10 ὑμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὔ πρῶτον

By the analogy of parentage, or of the relation between master and slave, if, as is admitted by common consent, powers are invested in the father or mother over the child, against which the child may not rebel or retaliate, even so, à fortiori, the citizen may not assert his individual will or judgment in defiance of the state, to which he owes his civil existence, and of which he forms an integral part. Is that the conceded view of the relation existing between the citizen and the city? — It is.

2. Ἄν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι: here the form of the conditional clause (Supposition of the Possible) assumes boldly that the reader (along with the writer) has entered completely into the illusion of the scene depicted. Cp. Arist. Birds 1642 (Peithetaerus to Heracles) ἦν γὰρ ἀποθάνῃ δ Ζεὺς . . . τενης ἐστι σοι: where the comic effect depends upon the form of the condition; hypothesizing as possible precisely that which by the hypothesis implied in the word ζεύς (that of deathless beings designated by certain names) is impossible. Anything like εἰ Ζεὺς ἀποθάνων would be feeble and witless here. The English subjunctive has the same effect as the Greek (‘If Zeus die,’ ‘If the Laws say’). On the other hand, above 50 Α, where the imaginary case is supposed for the first time, we naturally find the ideal form, εἰ οἱ νόμοι ἄρων. Cp. Cicero’s well-known haec si tecum patria loquatur (εἰ διαλέγοντο ἡ πατρίς) nomine impetrare debet Cat. 1. 8.

2. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο: ‘was this really (καὶ) the agreement?’ ταῦτα, i.e. that which is implied in the supposed objection, ἢ δικα γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις κτλ.

3. ἑμᾶς: said significantly, ‘to abide by’ (simply and unconditionally).
μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι’ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν 
μητέρα σου ὀ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; ὕφασον οὖν, 
tούτοις ἡμῶν, τοὺς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμψις τι ὡς οὐ 
cαλῶς ἔχουσιν; — Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην άν. — Ἄλλα 
τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν 
ἡ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἥ οὐ καλῶς προσέτατον ἡμῶν 
oi ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ 
σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδείᾳ; — Καλῶς, 
Εφαίην άν. — Εἰεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγενον τε καὶ ἐξετράφη 
καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἀν εἰπεῖων πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ 
ἡμέτερος ἡσθα καὶ ἐκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ

1. ἐγεννήσαμεν: cp. ἡμεῖς ... 
γεννήσαντες 51 c, γεννηταῖς οὖν 
ἡμῶν 51 e. Also ἐκγονος (ἡμέ 
teros) 50 e. Figuratively speak- 
ing, the citizen owed his being to 
the commonwealth, inasmuch as 
the privileges of citizenship ac-
quired to him only thro’ the legiti-
macy assured by the laws regulat-
ing marriage. At Athens he must be 
descended from Athenian citizens 
both on the father’s and the 
mother’s side.

5. τοῦ γενομένου: ‘of the child, 
once born’; marking the transition 
from γενέσθαι to τρέφεσθαι καὶ 
παιδεύσθαι.

6. ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦτοι τεταγμέ- 
νοι: ‘such of us as pertain (have 
been assigned) thereto’; i.e. to 
τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν.

9. ἐπειδή δὲ ἔγενον τε καὶ ... 
ἐπαιδεύθης: again naming γενέσθαι,

51 c end.

10. πρῶτον μὲν: ‘to begin with,’ 
the citizen belongs to the state; in 
the next place, if that is true (ἐi 
τούθ’ οὖν ἔχει), he must demean 
himself accordingly. There is no 
formal correlative to πρῶτον μὲν 
expressed.

11. δοῦλος: cp. πρὸς τὸν δεσπό-
τῃν, below. So far as personal 
liberty and equality before the law 
were concerned, Athenian speak-
ers were in the habit of contrast-
ing their own civil government 
with the condition of those living 
under Oriental despotism, whom 
they called δοῦλοι. In another 
way, however, as here, where mat-
ters of duty are in question, 
the analogy of master and slave may 
be fairly used in emphasizing the 
strong sense of absorption of the
individual by the body politic which the ancients felt.

1. ἐξ ἴσου ... εἶναι ... τὸ δίκαιον: the meaning is elucidated by what follows in the text. Parents and their children do not stand mutually upon an equal footing in the matter of right and wrong. The father, for example, has a right to chastise his son; but the son may not undertake to chastise his father in turn. If this be conceded, then still less (it is here argued) has the citizen a right to retaliate upon the state. For us, the analogy is less pertinent than it would have seemed to the ancient mind.

4. πρὸς μὲν ... τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἐπέ... πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα . . . έσται κτλ.: for the form and force of the period, see the note on Apol. 37 c, d and compare the other passages there cited. Observe that here ἀρα appears in both members of the period.

6. κακῶς ἀκούντα: Index, ἀκοῦ-ειν.

10. καὶ σὺ δὲ: ‘When in like manner you.’ Index, δὲ.

14. μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς . . . τιμιότερον . . . ἡ πατρίς . . . καὶ ἐγκάτερον: this forcible utterance, paradoxical as the doctrine inculcated may seem to us, could be addressed to and accepted by no man more consistently and properly than Socrates.
τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπαίτων τιμωτέρων ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς
β καὶ σεμινότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοῖρᾳ καὶ
παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νῦν ἔχουσιν, καὶ
σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκει καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα
καὶ καὶ πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάτη παθεῖν, ἥσυχών
ἀγοντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δεΙσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλε
μον ἀγίη τραβηγήσωμεν ἡ ἀποθανοῦμεν, ποιητέον ταῦτα,
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οἳ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀνα
χωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τῆς τάξει, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ
καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἁ ἀν κελεύ
πόλει καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθειν αὐτήν ἃ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε,

12. ἡ πείθειν αὐτήν: the infinitive construction follows very nat-
aturally after the verbal adjectives preceding (ποιητέον = ποιέων δεῖ).
For πείθειν, cp. above B, below 51
Ε, διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν Ἀρ. 35 C.
12. ἡ . . . πέφυκε: ‘where the
right lies,’ we should say. Here,
as often, πέφυκε is hardly more
than a weighty synonym of ἔστι.
πέφυκε occurs in its strict proper
sense Ἀρ. 34 D. — If there is
any fallacy or special pleading in
the present passage, it consists in
the assumption that juries repres-
senting the power of the state are
regularly open to persuasion by
truth and reason.

51 C–52 A

Such a view of the relation
between state and citizen being con-
ceded as the true one, it follows
that Socrates in considering the
plan of escape proposed to him
contemplates wronging that au-
thor of his civil existence and its
privileges which is his Country.
That there is nothing harsh or
arbitrary (the Laws contend) in
their way of enforcing the con-
tract, is witnessed by the fact that
every citizen is left free to emi-
grate and absolve himself from its
conditions by taking up his resi-
dence elsewhere. In remaining at
home he seals the compact by his
act, and in breaking it he is guilty
of violating a pledge as well as of
injuring his benefactors. Nor do
they, the Laws of Athens, fail to
grant him at the last moment, in
case of dispute, an opportunity of
proving himself free from error.
βιάζονται δὲ οὖχ ὁσιόν οὕτε μητέρα οὕτε πατέρα, πολὺ
dὲ τούτων ἐτὶ ἤτον τὴν πατρίδα; — Τί φήσομεν πρὸς
tαύτα, ὡς Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;
KR. Ἐμογε δοκεῖ.

5 Σ.Ω. Σκόπει τοῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, φαίνειν ἅν, ἵσως οἱ
νόμοι, εἰ ἡμὲις ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς
ἐπιχειρεῖσι δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖσ. ἡμὲις γὰρ σὲ γεννη-
σαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων
D ἃν οἶοι τε ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις,
10 ὀμος προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων
τῷ Βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ
πόλις πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὡς ἂν ἡ ἁρέσκω-
μεν ἡμὲις, ἔξειναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπειναὶ ὅποι ἂν
βούλῃται. καὶ οὔδεις ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστιν
15 οὕδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τίς βούλῃται ἡμῶν εἰς ἀποκιάν
ιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἁρέσκομεν ἡμὲις τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε

6. Εἰ... ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγο-
μαι: ‘whether what we here say
is true.’ The absence of
the article shows that ἀληθῆ is predi-
cative. See notes on Ἀθ. 18 A
and 20 D. Cp. also ἄδικα αὐτὰ
ἐργαλόμενοι above 48 D, and the
notes; where, however, the pres-
ence or absence of the article is
not a factor in the interpretation.

6. οὐ δίκαια: bears the same
grammatical relation to ἃ νῦν ἐπι-
χειρεῖς as ἀληθῆ above bears to
tαῦτα, or as ἄδικα in the passage
quoted bears to αὐτὰ.

10. τῷ... πεποιηκέναι: the da-
tive expresses the means whereby
the proclamation is virtually made.

11. δοκιμασθῇ: on the comple-
tion of his seventeenth year the
Athenian entered upon his full
rights as a citizen by being en-
rolled in his deme. At that time
he must undergo a ‘scrutiny’
(δοκιμασία) as to the genuineness
of his citizenship by descent.

13. ἔξειναι: object of προα-
γορεύομεν. ἔστιν σοι ἀπεινα
would be the substance of the
proclamation.

16. εἰ μὴ ἁρέσκομεν ἡμὲις: ‘sup-
posing him to be dissatisfied with
The Laws warn their prisoner, that by carrying into effect the contemplated design he will render himself liable in a surpassing degree to those charges which culminate in the reproach of breaking a solemn compact. His home-staying habit, his apparent preference for Athens over other cities, evinced by an extraordinary indisposition to sojourn elsewhere, renders Socrates' subscription to the civil contract unusually solemn and emphatical. Moreover, he has seen fit to rear children in Athens, that their lot may be in common with his own. Finally, of all men
Socrates could with the least grace evade by illegal means the execution of judgment, after deliberately and with an air of pride declining at the trial to allow the death penalty to be replaced by exile. Either then or at some earlier time in his long life might he have betaken himself elsewhere, perchance to one of those Dorian states which he has so often lauded. But now, in absconding, he will cover himself with disgrace and ridicule.

1. Καλ ἄτι: a specific instance of the general truth above stated. Cp. ἐγὼ οὖν Ἀρολ. 28 D.

3. ἐν τοῖς: cp. 43 C, and the note.

8. τῶν ἄλλων . . . διαφερόντως: the adverb governed the genitive as the verb διαφέρειν would.—For the habit here noted, see Index, Σωκράτης.


16. τὰ τι ἄλλα . . . καλ . . . ἐποιήσω: ‘particularly in that you had children in Athens.’ The sons would be born to Athenian citizenship, enjoy the same privi-
κρίτων

τε ἀλλα καὶ παιδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσαω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης
σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τούτων ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἔχθραν
σοι φυγής τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἔβοηλον, καὶ ὁπερ νῦν ἀκούσης
τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσῃς ποιήσαι.

οὐ δὲ 5 τούτω μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζον ὡς οὐκ ἁγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι
σε, ἀλλὰ ἥρω, ὡς ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον

νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν

διὰ τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι, πράττεις τε

ἀπερ ἀν δουλος φαυλώτατος πράξειν, ἀποδιδόμευσων

10 ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὀμολογίας,

καθ' ἂς ἡμῶν ἕννεθον πολιτεύσασθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν

ἡμῖν τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἄληθή λέγομεν φάσκοντές

σε ὀμολογηκέναι πολιτεύσασθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὖν

λόγῳ, ἡ οὐκ ἄληθή. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς Κρίτων;

15 ἄλλο τι ἡ ὀμολογῶμεν;

κρίτων

Ἀνάγκη, ὥς Σώκρατες.

les, and incur the same liabili-

ties as their father. — Socrates, in

fact, as we are amply informed by

Xenophon and Plato, found much

to criticise in the political con-

stitution of his native city. It

remains true, however, that the

circumstances of Athenian life en-

abled him to work out his mission

far more effectively then he could

have done elsewhere in Hellas.

1. ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ κτλ.: 'at

the trial itself,' finally. The ar-

gument of consistency here advanced

is in the highest degree pertinent

and cogent. It alone constrains

the modern reader to commend

unhesitatingly the decision of

Socrates in the Crito, however

strained some of the other plead-

ing may appear. His utterances

and his demeanor before the

court, as attested alike by Xeno-

phon and Plato, bound Socrates,

above all men, to spurn the sug-

gestion of an attempt to escape

execution of the judgment. Crito's

concession of this point we do not

feel as a device of the Platonic

dialogue.

2. ἔχθραν . . . τιμήσασθαι: see

Apol. 36 B-38 B.
53 A]  

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾿ τι οὖν ἂν φαίνῃ ἡ ἐνθήκας τὰς πρὸς
Εἲμας αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπαθεῖες οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς οὐκ ἑβολύσασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα,
5 ἐν οῖς ἔζην σοι ἁπέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιο καὶ ἑφαίνοντο σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. οὐ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδαίμονα προηγοῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἂς δὴ ἐκάστοτε

53 A πόλεως οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἑλάτω ἐξ αὐτῆς

10 ἀπεδήμησας ὃ ὁ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπτυκτοι ὃς ὁ θεός σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἡρεσκεὶν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι. νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῶν γε πείθη, ὁ

1. Ἀλλ᾿ τι οὖν ἂν φαίνῃ κτλ.: the position of ἂν shows how closely φαίνῃ ἂν is amalgamated with the sentence while still independent of its grammatical construction. Differently above 51 C, Ἀριστ. 30 B.

7. Δακεδαίμονα ... Κρήτην ... εὑρομένου: see the names in the Index.

53 A–54 B

Let Socrates reflect that by such a transgression, besides exposing his friends to peril, he will render himself an object of suspicion and distrust on the part of the law-abiding citizens of any reputable state in which he may take refuge; nor will there longer be room for doubting that the judgment of the Athenian court was sound. Further discourses by Socrates abroad, upon his favorite themes, will be unseemly enough! Better, doubtless, resort to such a community as would relish the tale of an aged convict's flight and would applaud its author—provided he could so conduct himself as to offend no man by independent speech or thought. As for his sons, if they are to enjoy the privilege of growing to man's estate in Athens, they still could not have the benefit of their father's presence. In his absence, his friends must provide for the children; and whether he be alive or dead they are incapable of neglecting them.
Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγελαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι 4 τούτων τι ἁγαθον ἐργάσει σαντὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ντοὺς σαντὸ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσι γε σου οἱ ἐπιτηδεῖοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τυν πόλεων ἔλθης, ἢ Ἐβαζε ἢ Μέγαραδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι — 10 τολέμιος ἤζεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτεία, καὶ ὅσουπερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεως, ὑποβλέπονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς 15 δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ἠστε δοκεῖν ὃρθως τὴν δίκην ἐκκα- σαι· ὅσις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύει ἐστι, σφόδρα που δόξευε ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεύς εἶναι. πότερον οὐν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς κοσμωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιον σου ζῆν ἐσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαιγούμενοι — τίνας λόγους, ὡς Σώκρα- 20 τες; ὡς οὖσον ἔνθαδε, ὡς ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείοτου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἷοι ἄσχημοι φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἷοσθαί γε χρῆ. ἀλλὰ ἐκ μὲν τούτων

5. Κινδυνεύσουσι γε . . . φεύ- γειν . . . ἢ ἀπολέσαι: 'will incur the risk at any rate of exile and banishment or of confiscation of their goods.'

8. πρῶτον μὲν: answered by ἀλλὰ below D.

13. τὴν δόξαν, ὡς τε δοκεῖν: In- 

dex, δόξα. By his act he will con- 

firm the popular belief that the 

Athenian judges were right in 

finding Socrates guilty.

23. οἷοσθαὶ γε χρῆ: see the In- 

dex.
τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ἔνοικους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολογία, καὶ ἵσως ἂν ἦδέως σου ἀκούσειν ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεισμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τέ τινα περὶ-5 θέμενος, ἢ διθέραν λαβῶν ἢ ἄλλα οία δὴ εἰσάδεου ἐνσκευάζοσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδόμενοι, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ σμικροῦ χρόνου ἐτῶ βίῳ λοιπὸν οὗτος, ως τὸ εἰκός, ἐτολμήσας ὥτως ἄισχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμοις τοὺς μεγίστους παρα-10 βᾶς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἔρει; ἵςως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπής· ἐι δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὥς Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερ-χόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος, ὁσπέρ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεθημένης εἰς Θετ-14 ταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς 54 άλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῶν ἐσοῦνται; ἄλλα δὴ τῶν παίδων ἐνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθήρεψῃς καὶ παντεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παν-15 τεύεσεις, ἔνοικος ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σου ζωτὸς βέλτιον

2. ἐκεῖ... ἀκολογία: Index, Θετταλία.
3. ἵσως: ‘perhaps not.’
11. ἀκούσει... ἀνάξια; Index, ἀκούσειν.
15. ποῖ ἡμῶν ἐσοῦνται: ‘where, pray, will they be?’ The answer to ποῖ, with similar tone, would be οὐδαμοῦ: they will be nowhere. ἡμῶν, Ethical Dative (‘the less we hear about them the better’).
15. ἄλλα δή: so ἄλλα, above 53 D. Cp. Apol. 37 C, and see the Index.—The words that follow here contain an unanswerable rejoinder to Crito’s reproaches 45 D.
18. ἵνα... ἀπολαύσωσιν: ‘that they may have this, too, to be thankful for.’ ἀπολαύσω, ironical.
19. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ: ‘or, not that, to be sure.’
19. αὐτοῦ: in Athens.
19. σοῦ... βάλλω: ‘any the better because you are living.’
θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, μη ξυνόντος σου αυτὸς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήθειοι οἱ σοὶ πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θεταλλὰν ἀποδημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἀδον ἀποδημήσῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἰπερ γε τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἔστι, βτῶν σοὶ φασκόντων ἐπιτήθειον εἶναι, οἰεσθαί γε χρή.

'Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, πειθομενος ἦμων τοις σοῖς τροφεύσι μήτε παιδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τό ζην μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς 'Ἄδον ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φανεῖ ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὑσιῶτερον, οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ τῶν σῶν οὐδένι, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικμένη ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένος ἀπελ, ἐὰν ἀπίης, οὐχ ύφ ήμων τῶν νόμων

1. θρέψονται . . . παιδεύονται: future middle as passive.

54 b–End

Wherefore, finally, it behooves Socrates not to be prevailed upon by his friend Crito, but to obey the Laws of his Country, which are to him as father and mother. Not by them, but at the hands of men, has he been wronged. And it were well, in appearing before the Laws of the Other World, to present himself, not as an ingrate and wrong-doer, but clean-handed, with just record and adequate defense.

In voices which thus ring in the ears, drowning all other words and thoughts, there is divine guidance. And if the voice of the Laws be unanswerable, its guidance must be followed.

9. Τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν: cp. Ἀφολ. 41 A.

9. οὔτε . . . οὔτε: 'as . . . not, . . . so . . . not.' Thus turn the correlatives. For οὐδὲ (three times), which is never a correlative word, see the Index.

13. ἡδικημένος . . . ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων: truly said, inasmuch as individuals are apt to fail in carrying into effect those principles of right which in their collective capacity they have been enabled to establish and embody in the law. The true philosopher, acting ever consistently, does not care to place himself on a level with defective individuals — as the
κάλλα ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἔαν δὲ ἔξελθης οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ἐξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακά ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὐς ἦκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε 5 καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανούμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ ὀἱ ἡμέτεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν Ἀιδον νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχειρήσας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σῦν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε ὑπείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

10 Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, εὑ ἢσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ἀστερ οἱ κορυβαντιώτες τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτή ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἢσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως 15 μέντοι εἶ τι οὐεὶ πλέον ποιήσεων, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε. ΣΩ. Ἕα τούνιν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταῦτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτῃ ὁ θεὸς υφηγεῖται.

prisoner would do were he to try to turn the tables on his unhappy judges.

8. ἀλλά: 'nay.'

11. κορυβαντιώτες: see the Index.
INDEX

N. B. The Index is not to the notes, but to the text of the Apology and Crito, and supplementary to the notes. All the proper names occurring in these two dialogues are registered, substantive and adjective; but as regards other words the Index is meant to be in no way exhaustive. Terms and phrases pertaining to Athenian law and other antiquities are recorded and briefly explained; likewise certain words characteristic of Plato’s mode of expression or of the simple Socratic doctrines enunciated in the dialogues and needing fuller elucidation than there would be room for in the commentary. Finally, the Index has been made to comprise a number of familiar Greek words which have given rise to idioms or of themselves demand close and repeated observation on the learner’s part. See, for example, ἀλλά, γιγνεσθαι, δοκεῖν, μῆλλεν, μὲν, μὴ, οὖδε, πᾶσχειν, ποιεῖν.

A

ἀγών, -ῶν, ὁ: struggle, contest; as γιγνεσθαι, ἔντικης, μουσικής, of war. Also the trial of a case at law, ὁ ἀγών τῆς δίκης Crit. 45 E. ἐλς ἀγώνα καθιστάναι πινάκα, ‘to be putting men on trial,’ i.e. summoning them before the courts, Apol. 24 C. ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμεθα, ‘to be undergoing a trial,’ 34 C. See δίκη.

Ἄδιμαντος: Adimantus, son of Aristoc and brother of Plato, present at the trial of Socrates, 34 A.

Ἄδης: Hades, god of the Lower World. ἐν ἅδεις, ἐλς ἅδεις, ‘in,’ ‘into (the realm of) Hades,’ 29 B, 40 E, Crit. 54 A, B, C.

Ἀλακός: Aeacus, son of Zeus and Aegina, after his death one of the judges in the Lower World, 41 A. See Ἀδάμαντος. Sons of Aeacus were Telamon and Peleus, the fathers respectively of Ajax and Achilles.

Ἀλαντόδωρος: Aenendoros, an Athenian, the brother of Apollodorus, present at the trial of Socrates, 34 A.

Ἀτάς, -άτος: Ajax, 41 B. Ajax the son of Telamon was called ὁ μείζων, ‘the greater,’ to distinguish him from ‘the lesser’ Ajax, son of Oileus. Telamonian Ajax is mentioned in the Apology as one of the ancients who perished in consequence of an unjust judgment. Thetis had proposed the arms of Achilles as a prize for that one of the Greeks who should be deemed to have done best in the battle over the body of her son on the plain of Troy. The arms were awarded to Ulysses, and the cha-
grin and resentment of Ajax at this decision led to his suicide. See the *Odyssey* 543 ff.

ἀλητέω: to seize, take. ὁ λύγος αλητέω, 'the argument constrains,' 'convinces,' *Crito* 48 B. Mid. 'to choose.' Aor. act. and mid., ἔλειν, ἐλέσθαι 28 E. The passive, in the meaning take (or 'convict'), is expressed by ἀλητευθαι, ἀληθαι 38 D, 39 B. In the language of the Athenian courts αλητειν is 'to convict,' 28 A. For the figure, cp. διώκειν (pursue), 'to prosecute, διώκων, 'the plaintiff'; φευγεῖν (flee), 'to be defendant,' δ φευγων; ἀφοφυγεῖν (escape), 'to be acquitted,' 38 D. See φευγεῖν.

Ἀσχίνη: Aeschines, an Athenian, son of Lysanias, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 E. He became a writer of dialogues, and is known as Aeschines "the Socratic," to distinguish him from Aeschines the orator.

ἀκούειν: to hear, 17 B, 19 D. ἐν, κακῶς ἀκούέιν (equivalent to a passive of ἐν, κακῶς λέγειν), Lat. bene, male audire, 'to be well' or 'ill spoken of,' *Crito* 51 A. See HA. 820, G. 1241, B. 513. A cognate accusative may take the place of the adverb, ἀκούειν ἀδίκως αὐτοῦ, 53 E.

ἀλλά: but, regularly after a negative idea, 17 C. Often, with hortative or imperative constructions, in a tone of appeal or depreciation, 'nay.' See note on *Apol.* 39 E. ἀλλ' ἐ Σῦκρατεσ, 'nay, Socrates,' *Crito* 54 8; ἀλλ' βουλεύουν 46 A. In setting aside some proposal, as when one after the other of a series of suggestions is dismissed as not feasible, 'well.' ἀλλ' χρημάτων, 'well, a fine then?' (after negating the proposed penalty of imprisonment); ἀλλ' δ' φυγῆς (setting aside the suggestion of a fine) *Apol.* 37 C. Sometimes, in the same usage, 'or.' ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τοῖς τῶν τόπων ἀπάρεις *Crito* 53 D. ἀλλ' δ' ἂν τῶν παϊδῶν ἦκε 54 A. ἀλλ' γάρ, 'but in truth,' 'in fact, however,' 'in fine,' is a condensed phrase leaving some part of the thought to be mentally supplied, *Apol.* 19 C, D, 25 C, 20 A, 28 A. Sometimes the phrase is divided by a word or two, ἀλλ' οὖ γάρ 20 C. ἀλλ' γάρ is apt to occur when a lengthy discourse or argument is drawing near to its conclusion, 'but (enough) for,' etc. *Apol.* 42. ἀλλ' ἢ, 'except,' 'than,' after a negative idea. τίνα ἄλλον ἔχωσι λύγον ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν ... δίκαιον 54 B. *Cp* μη χρησθαι ἔλαυρ ἄλλ' ἢ δι' σμυκροτάτῳ *Prota* 334 C. The unaccented ἄλλ' in this phrase is by some referred to ἄλλον (ἄλλο). ἄλλ' οὖν ... γε, 'well then at any rate,' 'yet at any rate,' after some sort of a conditional statement, 27 C, 34 E.

ἄλλο τι ἢ: see ἄλλος.

ἄλλος, ἄλλη, ἄλλο: other, else. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, 'now some things and now others,' 'first this and then that,' 27 B. οἷ τ άλλοι καὶ δ τῆς Ἡθίδος υἱό, 'and above all the son of Thetis,' 28 C. ἄλλα τε μοι πολλά ἐμπάλλεται καὶ, 'many things contribute to this result, but especially the fact,' etc. 36 A. *Cp* *Crito* 52 C. The phrase is most common in its adverbial form, ἄλλως τε καὶ, 'especially,' *Apol.* 26 E, 35 D. ἄλλο τι ἢ, interrogative phrase, expecting an affirmative answer. ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιή, 'do you not
regard it as highly important?’ 24 C, Crit. 50 A, 52 D.

ἄλλως: otherwise, ‘inconsiderately,’ ‘vainly,’ Crit. 46 D. In the passage cited ἄλλως is specifically interpreted by the phrase ἐνεκὰ λόγου, ‘mere talk.’ For ἄλλως τε καὶ, see ἄλλος.

ἀμάθεα (μαθαινὼν): ignorance, 25 E. But as specific opposite of σοφία the meaning is ‘unwisdom,’ ‘folly,’ 22 E, 29 B. See σοφία, εἰθέα, φράσματα.

Ἀμφίπολις, ἄως, ἥ: Amphipolis, a town in Thrace, on the Strymon, named from its position with the river encompassing it on three sides, 28 E. An important dependency of Athens, Amphipolis fell into the hands of the Lacedaemonian commander Brasidas in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, 424 B.C. Two years later, in an unsuccessful attempt on the part of Athens to recover the place, both Brasidas and Cleon, the Athenian general, were killed. Thuc. 5. 10. The allusion in the Apology indicates that Socrates was present in the ranks at the Battle of Amphipolis.

ἀνασαλβινών: to go up. Frequently of ascending to the Pnyx, where the Popular Assembly (ἐκκλησία) was held, on the slope of a hill near the Areopagus, 31 C. Also of coming up before a court of justice, ἐκ δικασθήρων 17 D, 33 D, 36 D, 36 A, 40 B.

ἀναθείσταται: the causative of ἀνασαλβινών. Of bringing persons into court or into the court-room, ἀναθείστασθαί τινα 19 D, 34 C.

Ἀναγαύρως: Anaxagoras, Ionic philosopher, 26 D. Born in Clazomænae about 500 B.C., he dwelt many years at Athens, upon terms of intimate friendship with eminent citizens such as Euripides and Pericles. His inquiries into the nature of things, substituting scientific theories in place of the personal agency of divine beings, led to a charge of blasphemy, in consequence of which he was compelled to leave Athens. Anaxagoras taught that νοῦς, mind, introduces order and symmetry into nature by initiating a rotatory movement, “the grand cosmical rotation.” See Grote’s Plato, vol. i. c. 1. Only brief fragments remain of Anaxagoras’ treatise On Nature (περὶ φύσεως).

ἀντιγραφή: see γραφή.

ἀντιμισθοῦσα: see τιμᾶν.

Ἀντιφῶν, ἄρτος: Antiphon, of the deme of Cephisia, the father of Epigenes, who was one of the followers of Socrates, present at the trial, 33 E. This Antiphon must be distinguished from Antiphon of the deme of Rhamous, the celebrated orator.

ἀντωμοσύνη: see γραφή.

Ἄρτος: Anytus, son of Anthemion, the most influential of the three accusers of Socrates, 18 B, 23 E, 29 C, 30 C, 31 A, 34 A, 36 A. He had been strategus and had held other important offices, and in the time of the Thirty Tyrants he was one of the exiles who returned with Thrasybulus (see φυγή), standing high thereafter in the councils of the Restored Democracy. We learn from Plato Men. 90 A that the father of Anytus had given his son an excellent education. Side by side with his political activity Anytus car-
ried on the trade of a tanner. Thus in the *Apology* he is represented as acting on behalf of the artisans of the community in the prosecution of Socrates, 23 E. Anytos trained his own son to the tanner's business, but Socrates, who had observed signs of intellectual ambition in the youth, advised the father against such a course. The young man, he averred, would not abide by a slavish pursuit; and the consequence would be his moral ruin—a prediction that was shortly fulfilled. Thus Xen. *Apol.* 29 ff.

ἀξία: worth, value, 36 B, D.

ἀξίας (ἀγεν) 3: worth, worthy, 23 A, B; properly of that which is equal to something else in weight, hence in value. τὰ πλεονα κείμ, 'the most precious things,' 29 E. τι κέιθαι εἰμι παθέων, 'what do I deserve to suffer?' 36 B. ἄξιον, 'worth while,' *Crit.* 53 C.

ἀξιόν: to deem worth or worthy, 38 A; 'to think right,' 'see fit,' 'deign,' 'ask,' 19 D. ἀξιόσαρε ('concede,' 'regard' the assumption 'as pertinent' to the case) διητοῦ μοι τοῖς κατηγοροῖς γεγονόταρα 18 D. ἐκαρτο ἡλίου ('claimed') σοφότατος εἰμαι 22 D. οὐκ ἄξιόν μεν ἐγὼ γωγε, 'I do not indeed expect it of you,' 34 D, 35 C.

ἀπάγω: to lead away. In Attic law, 'to bring before the magistrate,' by the process termed ἀπαγωγή, in cases of summary jurisdiction, as when an offender was taken in the act. Hence, 'to arrest and commit to prison,' 32 B. See ἄρεικτον.

ἀποθνῄσκων: to die, to be killed or put to death; regularly employed as passive to ἀποκτεῖναι 32 C. See ΗΑ. 820, G. 1241, B. 513. ἀποκτεῖναι 29 C, 39 C, ἄρεικτον 32 D. These forms of fut. and aor. always in prose. See θυσίακες.

Ἀπολλόδωρος: *Apollodorus*, a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, 34 A. He is named as one of those who were ready to be sureties for Socrates if he would propose a fine as counterpenalty, 38 B. He was known as μάντος ('madman'), thus famous for his enthusiastic partiality for the master, *Symp.* 173 D. At the death scene in the prison by his lamentations he broke down every one present except Socrates himself, *Phaed.* 117 D.

ἀποφεύγων: to escape; θάνατον 39 A. In Attic law, 'to be acquitted,' ἀποφεύγειν τὴν δίκην 38 D, 36 A. δεξιομεν ἀποφεύγειν, 'to try to gain acquittal by entreaty,' 35 C. See φεύγειν, διαφεύγειν.

Ἀριστοφάνης, -ον: *Aristophanes*, chief poet of the Old Comedy, and the only one of whom an entire play has been preserved, 19 C. Eleven comedies of Aristophanes are extant, including the *Clouds*, which is directed against the Sophists, and offers the familiar figure of Socrates as representative of the class. The *Clouds* failed to receive a prize when exhibited 423 B.C., and in its present form shows considerable alterations of the original text, made apparently with a view to a second representation. Aristophanes' attack upon Socrates in this play was not personal but typical, and the caricature of the sage is free from malice. Other comedies contain
jesting allusions to the philosopher, *Av. 1555, Ram. 1491*. In the *Symposium* of Plato Socrates and Aristophanes appear as friendly interlocutors at the banquet in the house of Agatho, the tragic poet. See especially the conclusion of the Dialogue.

Ἀρίστων, ἀν: Aristotle, an Athenian, the father of Adimantus and Plato, 34 A. See Πλάτων.

ἀρχαίον: to be first, to rule, tods, 28 E; to begin (for others to follow). Mid. ἀρχεσθαί, to begin (for oneself to continue), 31 D. ἀρχη ἀρχαίον, 'to come to hold an office,' 32 B. Idiomatic phrase, ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμενον (τύπο), 'from earliest childhood,' 31 D. Cp. ἐκ παιδών συμφέρων ἀρξάμενον διδάκτον: Prot. 325 C.

ἀτεχνὸς (ἀτεχνος, τέχνη): simply, wholly, quite, exactly, 17 D, 18 C. Often in Plato to excuse or soften a figurative expression, especially in conjunction with ὀσπερ or τίς (Cicero, quasi quidam). ἀτεχνὸς ὀσπερ σκιαμαχείν ἀπολογούμενος 18 D. ἀτεχνὸς . . . ὁμαλαί τίς, 'in a sort of downright wantonness,' 26 E, cp. 30 E. ἀτεχνὸς (literally) ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἄν εμαυτοῦ 35 D: an oxfordor.

Β

βουλεύων: to advise. Mid. βουλεύεσθαι, to deliberate, take counsel, 32 C, Crit. 46 A, 52 E. At Athens, βουλέω, 'to be a member of the bouλή.' See βουλή. βουλεύεσθαι = βουλευτὴς γενέσθαι 32 B.

βουλευτῆς: councillor, senator, a member of the Athenian bouλή, 25 A. βουλή: counsel, deliberation, Crit. 46 A. ἡ βουλή, the Athenian "Senate" or "Council of the Five Hundred," ἡ βουλὴ ὁ πεντακόσιοι. Five hundred βουλευταὶ were chosen annually by lot, from citizens over thirty years of age, fifty from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί). Each section of fifty exercised executive functions during one tenth of the year, the order in which the tribes should succeed each other being determined by lot. The presiding committee of fifty for the time being were termed πρυτανεῖς, πρυτανεῖς, the tribe was said πρυτανεῖν (32 B), and the period of thirty-five or thirty-six days of its presidency was called a πρυτανεία, πρυτανεία, One duty of the Senate was to present measures for consideration to the Popular Assembly (ἐκκλησία), over which the πρυτανεῖς presided. Each day the πρυτανεῖς chose by lot from their number an ἐπιστάτης or chairman, and it was he who put questions to the vote (ἐπιψηφίζω) in the Assembly. Socrates happened to be ἐπιστάτης on the day when the generals concerned in the Battle of the Arginusae Islands were to be tried by the Assembly. The law required each man to be tried separately; hence, when a motion was made to dispose of the generals collectively (by a single ballot), Socrates refused to put the question to vote, *Apol. 32 B*. The circumstance is recorded also by Xenophon: βουλέσας γάρ ποτε καὶ τὸν βουλευτικὸν δροκὸν ὁμόσας, ἐν ὑπὸ κατὰ τῶν νόμων βουλεύσειν, ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ γενεμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τῶν νόμων μετὰ ψήφων τοῦ ἄμφι Θράσυλλον
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καὶ ἔρασινθεν ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας, οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἐπιφυσοῦσαν, ὁριζόμενοι τοῦ δήμου, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ δυνατῶν ἀπειλοῦντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ πλεονοῦ ἐποιήσατο εὐφανεῖς ἡ χαράσσαντι τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ φυλαχόσαν τούτῳ ἀπειλοῦντας. Ἔπο. i. i. 18. See παναχλία.

Γ

γλύνοσαι: to come into being, be born Crit. 50 D, E, 'arise,' Apol. 23 A; to become, 'be made,' 23 D. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὄλιγαρχία ἐγένετο (sc. ἡ πόλις), 'after it had come to be an oligarchy,' 32 C. μὲν ἐνὸς γενέσθαι, 'to take sides with you,' 32 C. δὴ μοι δεῖν τι καὶ δαμόνιον γλύνεσαι ('comes') . . . φωνὴ τις γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ γένεσθαι κτλ. 31 D. τὸ γεγονός τούτῳ, 'this event,' 36 A. τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν 'the number that has resulted,' 36 A. In periphrases γλύνοσαι is regularly employed as a passive to mid. ποιεῖσθαι; as λόγοι ποιεῖσθαι, 'to talk,' passive λόγοι γλύνονται. See ποιεῖν. κατά- δηλοὶ γλύνονται, 'are exposed,' 23 D. al γενέμα τοῦ, 'the judgments that are pronounced' (al ἀν γένοσται), Crit. 50 B. ὅτῳ λόγῳ ἄκουσι γλύ- νονται ('are rendered invalid,' 'set at naught') 50 B.

γιγνώσκειν: to see with the mind, form judgments, recognise, 19 D. ἔγνω, 'I came to see,' 'perceived,' 22 B. οἴητο ... σοφότατος ἐστιν, ὄρισε ... ἔγνωκεν ('has come to see,' 'known') ὅτι οὸδεν ἄξιὸς ἐστι ... πρὸς σοφίαν 23 B. γιγνώσκειν sometimes governs the genitive, following the analogy of ἀλοθάνεσθαι, to perceive. γιγνώσκει ... ἐμοὶ χαρετήσαμένον κτλ. 27 A. See the synonyms, εἶδομαι, ἐκτοιασθαί.

Γοργίας: Gorgias, of Leontini in Sicily, one of the most distinguished of the Sophists, 19 E. He lived to be more than a hundred years of age, surviving Socrates, whose death occurred 399 B.C. Gorgias made the art of "rhetoric" to include his whole doctrine, called himself ῥητωρ, and achieved great fame as an orator. His mode of expression caused a profound sensation at Athens, whither he came 427 B.C. as an ambassador from his native city, and gave a strong impulse to the study of eloquence as an art, besides attracting many pupils and winning for him large sums of money in fees for instruction. Xenophon's friend, Proxenus the Boeotian, had put himself under the instruction of Gorgias, Anab. 2. 6. 16. The curiously ornate and artificial style of Gorgias is illustrated by the extant specimens of his oratory, an Encomium of Helen and a Defense of Palamedes. Plato's Gorgias deals in a caustic way with the subject of "rhetoric" (ἡ ῥητορική τέχνη) taken in a very wide sense.

γραφή: a writing. In Attic law, a public action, criminal prosecution, an ἄγων δημοσίως as distinguished from an ἄγων τις or δηκ. Thus Εὐθυρήρ. 2 A Socrates says of the indictment for impiety that has been filed against him, οὐδεὶς ἢ Ῥαθραῖον γε δεικνύναι αὐτὴν καλοῦ- σιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν γράφα- σθαι, 'to file an indictment,' Apol. 19 B, 26 B, 27 E. Here the mid. voice means 'to get written,' 'have written' for oneself, throu' the γράμματα or official
scribe. Cp. 31 D. The term ἀντι-γραφή, properly the writing put in by the defendant, is used of the writing filed by the accuser 27 C. Similarly, ἀντιωμόσια comes to denote the bill and affidavit of either party. Cp. 19 B, 24 B. In public causes, if the accuser failed to receive at least one fifth of the votes of the judges, he had to pay a fine of one thousand drachmae, and forfeited the right of ever bringing a similar action again. See 36 B. For further details of procedure, see δίκη, δικαστή.

Δ

δαμόνος 3: pertaining to a daemon (δαίμων) or daemons; δαμόνα πράγματα 27 C. When applied to persons, δαμόνος properly means ‘under the influence of a supernatural power,’ in good or bad sense, and is apt as a form of address to convey a mild reproach, as δ δαμόν (‘thou strange being’) Σωκράτες Crit. 44 B. Cp. the words of Andromache to Hector: δαμόνε, φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένω, Ξ 407. Cp. the similar δ θαυμάσω Crit. 48 B, Apol. 26 D. In the Symposium Alcibiades points to Socrates as τούτω τῷ δαμονίῳ ὡς ἄληθῶς καὶ θαυμαστῷ 219 C. As substantive, δαμόνοι, a divine being, a divinity; thus, in the plural, in the indictment of Socrates, Apol. 24 B, 26 B. In 27 C δαμόνα is at first purely adjectival with πράγματα, then approaches a substantive meaning in allusion to the terms of the indictment. τὸ δαμόνον, in especial sense, ‘the divine sign’ of Socrates, frequently mentioned by both Xenophon and Plato, 40 A. In Plato more usual are the fuller expressions τὸ δαμόνον σημεῖον, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον 40 B, τὸ ελευθός σημεῖον 40 C. In 31 D the sign is described as ‘a sort of voice,’ which had been wont to come to Socrates ever since he could remember, never to impel him but always to deter him from something he was going to do: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τίς γιγαντική, ἢ σταχυγένεται, δει ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ἢ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτω. Thus it had opposed his engaging in public life (31 D), and from its silence on the occasion of his trial he infers that the event would be for the best (40 A–C). But while, according to Plato, the function of Socrates’ δαμόνον was a negative one, Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as a disapproving force, φάσκοντο αὐτὸ τὸ δαμόνον ἐαυτῷ προσημαίνει δὲ δεδομέν ἀς μὴ δεδομένοι Mem. 4. 8. 1. Neither Plato nor Xenophon explains the δαμόνον as a divine being, but only as an agency; while the accusers of Socrates wrested the sign into the sense of a being, and charged him accordingly with introducing ‘new deities’ into the state. See Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 2: διεστερύλητο ὡς φαίν Σωκράτης τὸ δαμόνον αὐτῷ σημαίνει δὲ δὲν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν αἰτιάσασθαι κακῶς δαμόνα εἰσέρχεται. This representation is termed by Plato a caricature, δὴ ἐντὸ γραφή ἐπ ἰκωμὺς ὃ ἐν Μέλητος ἐγράφα τοῦ 31 D. Since the mission of Socrates, who refused to apply the term ‘knowledge’ to anything but reasoned truth, was to en-
large the sphere of consciousness in his fellow-men, those instinctive promptings, which belong to the Unconscious and which he could not rationally explain, were naturally and very properly referred by him to divine agency. But where other men sought help externally in the traditional art of divination (μαντική), Socrates found a guide within himself. Cp. ἡ εἰλευθερία μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμόνιον 40 A. Plato's restriction of the sign to a negative function probably means that when the divine influence coincided with the positive will and conscious resolve of the sage its voice would be superfluous and hardly noticeable. See Riddell, The Apology of Plato, Appendix A.

Δαίμων, -ονος, ὁ, ἡ: a daemon, a divine being, properly a god viewed in his relation to man. The daemones were popularly believed to be either gods or the offspring of gods, 27 D. The divine sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον) of Socrates is called τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον 40 B. Cp. θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον 31 D.

δὲ: a postpositive particle of contrast, tho' its adversative force is often very slight. See μὲν. There is no equivalent word in English for δὲ (‘on the other hand’); it must often be translated 'but,' 'and,' or 'while.' The fact that δὲ is not the same as 'and' or 'but,' since it only offsets things, renders its occasional use "in apodosis" less paradoxical than the learner is at first prone to regard it. See Crat. 51 A, εἶναι εἰπειρώμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι. . . καὶ οὐ δὲ ἡμᾶς . . . εἰπειρήσεις ἀναπολλύναι. Here, in-
submitted to the inquirer, mostly in metrical form. The oracle reputed to have been given to Chaerephon has been preserved by Diogenes Laertius as one iambic trimer, ἄνδρῳ ἀκάντων Σωκράτης σοφότατος; by Suidas (s.v. σοφός) as an iambic distich, σοφός Σοφοκλῆς, σοφότερος Ἔρυττίδης, ἄνδρῳ δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφότατος. Upon the walls of the temple of Delphi were inscribed brief maxims attributed to the Seven Sages of Greece. The most famous of these was γνώθι σεαυτόν, κατά τίνα τέχνην, a sentiment precisely in accord with the spirit of the Socratic philosophy.

δέχονται: to receive, accept. Followed by ἂ (with or without μᾶλλον), 'to prefer,' 22 E. Similarly, with a phrase denoting the price or terms of acceptance, Ὀρφεί· συγγενέσθαι ... ἐν πόσῳ δὲ τίς δέχετο ('on condition of how large a sum would one accept'), i.e. how much would one give to have a meeting with Orpheus? 41 A. Again, B. Thus, where our idiom regards the paying of the price, the Greek regards the receiving of that for which the price is paid.

Δήλων: Delium, a temple and precinct of Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra in Boeotia, on the coast of the Eubocean strait, 28 E. Properly the Delium, τὸ Δήλων, Thuc. 4. 89. Hence, of the battle, ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, not ἐν, there being no town here. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War, 424 B.C., the place was seized and fortified by a large force from Athens under Hippocrates. On their return march the Athenians were attacked and disastrously defeated by an army of Thebans and other Boeotians who had assembled at Tanagra. Socrates served as a hoplite at the Battle of Delium, and his courageous and even formidable demeanor in the retreat was celebrated by his friends Laches and Alcibiades, who were present. Cp. Lach. 181 b, Symp. 221.

Δήλων, ṃ: Delos, one of the Cyclades Islands, sacred as the birth-place of Apollo and Artemis, Crit. 43 c. Delos was the center of an amphictyony of the Ionians, and a great festival was celebrated there every fifth year. There was also a lesser festival celebrated every year, when the Athenians sent to the island the sacred vessel mentioned by Plato in connection with the death of Socrates. The Delian galley was believed to be the same as that wherein Theseus had once conveyed the seven youths and seven maidens to Crete to be offered up to the Minotaur, when by the aid of Ariadne he threaded the mazes of the labyrinth, slew the monster, and brought back the victims safe and sound. During its absence on the holy mission (θεωρία) to Delos no public execution could take place at Athens. It thus happened that the execution of Socrates came to be deferred during the whole time occupied by the voyage of the sacred vessel to and from Delos. ἐνυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς διήνε (i.e. on the day before the trial of Socrates) ἡ πρῶμα ἐστεμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὡς εἰς Δήλων Ἀθηναίοι πέμποντοι ... τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ψευδαίοι ποτε.
elis Κρήςις τodus δις ἐπτὰ ἐκεῖνοι ἄγιον καὶ ὑμεῖς τέ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀνδόν. τῷ οὖν Ἀρδύλιον εἶκατο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖν, ἐκάστου ὅτι θεωρίαν ἀνάξιον εἰς Δῆλον. ἂν δὴ δει καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡς ἐκεῖνο κατ' ἐπιαντὸν τῷ θεῷ κέμπουσιν. ἑκείναι οὖν ἄρξομαι τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἕτερον αὐτούς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τῷ πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἄν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύτερο . . . διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγέρντο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξῇ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ δικαίου Phaed. 58.

Δημόδοκος: Democritus, an Athenian, the father of Phalarus and Theagis, 33 Ε.

διαφέρων: to flee through or between, escape by contrivance, elude, 29 C. Cr. 39 A, ἀποφείεσθαι, 'get off'; έκφυγόν, ἐκφυγέων, 'come out alive'; while διαφεύχων implies effort and contrivance (cp. μνημον in the same sentence). μὴ . . . τοῦτο . . . κακίᾳ τῷ ἡμέρᾳ διαφεύχων νυκτὶ δοκῇ ('may seem thro' some cowardice on our part to have baffled us completely') Cril. 45 Ε. Cr. τοῦτο αὖτιν τοῦ διαφεύχων τῶν . . . λατρεία τὰ πολλὰ νοοτρίσκα (‘why most ailments baffle the skill of the Greek physicians’) Charm. 156 Ε.

Here again there is a virtual personification of the subject, νοοτρίσκα.

δίκαιος 3: righteous, just, 18 A. τὰ δίκαιον, 'the right,' 'right,' 32 A, C. τὰ δίκαια, 'the matters of right' (pertaining to the case), 'justice,' 35 C. δίκαια περιοςφόων, 'fairly treated,' 'recompensed,' 41 E. With an infini-
tive the personal construction of δικαίως is usually preferred to the impersonal in Attic. δικαίως εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, 'it is fair for me to make a defense,' 18 A, Cril. 45 A. See HA. 944 a, G. 1527, B. 634.

δικάζειν: to be a δικαστής or juror, to judge, 35 C, 41 A; 'to decide a case at law,' 'render judgments,' δικαίως, Cril. 50 C, 51 E, 53 C. Passive 50 B. Mid. δικάζεσθαι, 'to be at law,' 'go to law'; said of the parties to a suit.

δικαστήριον: a court of justice, dicastery; indicating both the aggregate judges (δικαστά) who sat in court and the place where they held their sittings, 17 D, 29 A. Of the latter there were at one time ten in Athens, most of them probably situated near the ἄγορα. See δικαστής.

δικαστής: a judge, juror, dicast, 18 A, 35 C, 40 A, 41 A, C. The largest body of judges or jurors at Athens was called the ἕλιαλα, its members were ἕλιατα. Socrates was tried before a Helastic court. Six thousand dicas (helias) were chosen by lot every year from those who had made application for the office. To be eligible the juror must be a free citizen, in the enjoyment of his full franchise, and not less than thirty years of age. The 6000 were divided into sections of 500 each, probably ten, with 1000 reserves. Each section was designated by a letter of the alphabet, and a small tablet was delivered to each dicast, inscribed with his name, his father's name, that of his Deem, and the letter of his section. Similarly, upon entering a
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particular court to which he was appointed, the dicast received a staff (βακτηρία or ράβδος), and upon leaving he was paid his fee of three obols (τριώβολον). Before proceeding to the exercise of his functions the dicast was obliged to swear the official oath (Ἀπολ. 35 c). It ran about as follows: ψηφοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῆς πεντακοσίων, περὶ δὲ ἄν νόμοι μὴ θεί, γνώμη τῇ δικαίωτῇ καὶ οὕτω χάριτος ἐνεῖ' οὗτ' ἔχοιμαι. καὶ ψηφοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν ('precisely') δὲ ἄν ἡ διώξεις ἡ καὶ ἀκροάσμαι τῶν τε κατηγοροῦντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων ὁμολογία ἀμφοῖν. διὰμιμὸ τὸν Δία, τῇ τῶν Ἀπόλλων, τῇ τῆν Δημητρία, καὶ εἰπὸ μὲν μοι ἐνθριμοῦσι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, ἐπιφρονοῦσι δὲ ἐξόλεια αὐτῷ τε καὶ γένει. The oath being taken, the courts in which they were to sit were assigned by lot to the several sections every time that it was necessary to impanel a number of dicasts. According to the nature and importance of the case to be tried one or more sections of 500, or fractions of sections, made up the number of any particular dicastery. The voting was by ballot, with shells, either real or artificial. There were two urns, or boxes, one for condemnation, the other for acquittal; and the juror dropped his ballot (ψήφοις) into the one or the other of them, in some way so as to secure secrecy of voting. A tie vote was accounted as acquittal. At the trial of Socrates the dicastery consisted apparently, of 500. Had only 30 votes changed sides, he would have been acquitted (Ἀπολ. 36 A). That is to say, 250 votes being needed for acquittal, there must have been 280 for guilty and 220 for not guilty on the first ballot. In an Athenian dicastery unwelcome remarks were apt to be received by the judges with many noisy demonstrations of disapproval, pounding with their staves and vociferation, θρυμμας καὶ βοήθημα. Hence numerous passages in the Attic Orators where such interruptions are deprecated by the speaker. Plato has availed himself of this habit to heighten the lifelike effect of many scenes in the Ἀπολογία. Cp. 17 D, 20 E, 21 A, 30 C.

δίκη: right, justice; in law, a suit, case, trial, judgment, Cris. 45 E, 50 B; penalty, Ἀπολ. 39 B. The suits which came before the Athenian jurors were private or public, according as the offense charged was against an individual or against the state. A private suit was termed δίκη ἰδία or simply δίκη; a public suit was δίκη δημοσία or, usually, γραφή. See γραφή. Proceedings were begun by a summons to the defendant to appear before the proper magistrate and answer the charges preferred against him. Thus Socrates, at the beginning of the Εὐθύφρων 2 A, is encountered at the porch of the ἄρχων βασιλέως, where he has come to answer to the charge of impiety entered by Meletus. There a preliminary examination was held, beginning with the affidavit of the plaintiff or accuser (προομοσία), answered by that of the defendant (ἀντωμοσία, ἀντι-γραφή). But the latter terms were sometimes applied also to the writing of the accuser (Ἀπολ. 19 B, 27 C).
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These documents were then sealed and finally produced and opened at the trial. The president of the court was the magistrate to whose province the subject of the charge belonged, as for example at the trial of Socrates the King Archon, the second of the nine archons. The parties pleaded their own cases before the judges, the speech of the accuser being followed by that of the defendant. The time allowed to each speaker was measured by the flow of water from the κλεψυδρα or water clock. Either party during the course of his speech had the right to put questions to the other party (ἐρώτησιν), and these questions the person interrogated was obliged by law to answer. See Lysias 12. 25. Plato avails himself of this custom in the Apology, 24 c–27 e, with telling effect, since he is thus enabled to throw the defense into the form of dialectic, the regular Socratic method of refutation. If one of the parties to a suit failed to appear, the case was called δίκη ἐρήμη (ἐρήμη κατηγορούντες, sc. δίκην, 18 c) and went against the absent party by default. For the method of voting by the jury, see δικασθῆς. For expressions denoting conviction, acquittal, etc., see αἰρεῖν, ὕφλοκάνειν, φένγειν. For some offenses the penalty was fixed by law, and the verdict of guilty carried with it the sentence; for others the penalty had to be determined at the trial, after an unfavorable verdict had been announced. Trials of the latter sort were called διψωσ τιμητοι (‘to be assessed’); the former were ἀγώνες ἀτίμητοι. See τιμᾶν. In an ἀγών τιμητός (such was the γραφή ἀσφελίας preferred against Socrates) the accuser named a penalty (τιμημα, valuation) which he called upon the court to inflict as suited to the gravity of the offense. Cp. τιμᾶτα μοι δὲ ἀνήρ θανάτου 36 B. The convicted party then named a counter-penalty (ἀντι-τιμημα) of milder character, and without discussion or modification of the two penalties proposed the court decided by a majority vote which one of them should be inflicted.

δοκεῖν: to seem, to the mind; verb of opinion, imagination, belief. δὲ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐθαλμώς δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι, 36 D. ἦδοξα μοι ὅτι διδεῖν . . . δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς . . . εἶναι δὲ οὐ, ‘I came to believe that he seemed to be wise, but was not,’ 21 C. καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἦδοξε, ‘I came to exactly the same opinion as before,’ 21 D. ὦς εἰ τῷ υστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἦδοξεν, ‘as subsequently you all came to think,’ 32 B. ὦς δὲ ἄδαβαι 34 C. Here we say ‘as it might seem.’ Cp. ὦς ἦμω ν δοκῶ (videor mihi) 36 A. But, except usually with ὦς or ὡστερ, or when it means ‘to seem best,’ the verb must not be used impersonally, i.e. without a substantive or a pronoun as its subject. Sometimes δοκῶ means I think, but no example of this usage is afforded by the Apology or Cris. ὄλγοιος τοι ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἔδειξει, ‘tis but few either hold or will hold these views,’ Cris. 49 D. ὦς ὡστε συντάξαται, ‘they, who have this fixed resolve,’ id. σοι δὲ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἔδειξαται, ‘if your mind is made up some other
way,' 49 E. δεδομένον γέ εστι, 'it is at any rate a settled opinion' (people have made up their minds) Apol. 35 A. Idiomatic phrase, δοκειν μοι, 'as I believe,' Crit. 43 B. Absolute Infinitive. See HA. 956, G. 1534, B. 642, 1, Gl. 569. The nearest synonym of δοκειν is οἶδα. Cp. δοκειν εαυτῷ ελναι σοφός, then εναντι ελναι σοφός Apol. 21 C. But δοκειν by its construction is seen to indicate that the thought comes to the mind thro’ an impulse from without. Cp. also ἢ γνῶθι (ἡγήσουται, after δόθη, Crit. 44 C), and νομίζειν. See δόξα.

δόξα (δοκειν): an opinion, view, belief, ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δόξα Crit. 44 C, 46 C, D; also the opinion others hold of one, fame, name, reputation, Apol. 34 E, 35 B, Crit. 53 B. The relation of δόξα to δοκειν is clearly brought to view in the passages above cited. Crit. 44 B–D affords illustration of both the subjective and the objective meaning of the substantive: πολλοὶς δόξω... ἀμέλησα. καὶ τὸς ἄν αλοχίων ἐν ταύτῃ δόξα ἢ (reputation) ἢ δοκειν χρήματα περὶ πλεονος ποιεῖθαι ἢ φιλουν; ... ἀλλὰ τὶ ἤμιν... οὕτω τὴς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης (‘opinion’) μελεῖ;

Ε

εἰδέναι (εἰδ-, ἱδεῖν): to know; οἶδα, ἦδη 22 D, εἴσομαι. ἰ δι υμῖν πεποίθητε, οὐκ οἶδα 17 A. ἰ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ εἴσομαι εἰδέναι, 21 D. ἀνθρώπος δότις... τοῦτο οἶδαι, τοῖς νόμοις, 24 E. When a person is the object of εἰδέναι the verb does not mean merely to know who he is (γνωσκεῖν), but significantly to know him, have a knowledge of him (alive or dead), know ‘all about him’ as we say. Χαρέφων γὰρ ἵπ τε που (tho’ Chaerephon was then no longer living) 20 E. Cp. καὶ ἵπ τε ὁ λος ἴο Χαρέφων 21 A. πολλοίς δόξω, ὃ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἰ σασίν, ... ἀμέλησαι, Crit. 44 B. Since εἰδέναι properly applies to a knowledge of facts (first-hand knowledge) it became naturally the word for Socrates to employ in his philosophical way to denote knowledge of (reasoned) truth. See sophia, ἐπιστήμη, also ἐλεγχος. To those persons who have no claim to be called σοφοῖ in the Socratic sense, τὸ εἰδέναι τί is denied. οὗτος μὲν οὐκεταὶ τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς 21 D. ἀπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦται εἰδέναι 21 E. πολλὴν ἀφοθίσιν ὀλομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδώτων δὲ ὄλγας δὲ οὐδὲν, 23 C. προσποκομενοι μὲν εἰδέναι τι, εἴδοτες δὲ οὐδέν, 23 D. The works of poets and other inspired persons do not proceed from (conscious, reasoned) knowledge. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουν μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσαι δὲ οὐδὲν δὲ λέγουσι, 21 C. The skill of artisans (handicraftsmen, χειροτέχναι) seemed to Socrates a little nearer to wisdom than that of statesmen and artists, because they really knew how they made things. Yet even their knowledge was not τὸ εἰδέναι τί, for the reason given 22 D. See ἐπιστασθαί.

εἰσάγειν: to lead into. In law, ‘to bring into court,’ ‘prosecute.’ ἐμὲ εἰσάγειν εἰς τούτοις καὶ κατηγορεῖτις 24 D. περὶ δὲ ἐμὲ εἰσάγειν 25 C, 25 D,
26 a. τῶν ἐν με δικαίωμα ἐλάγχει τις εἰς δικαιστήρων 29 a. See ἐλαγχεῖν.

ἐλαγχεῖν: to come into. Equivalent to a passive of ἐλαγχαγεῖν, 'to prosecute,' 29 c. See ἐλάγχειν. Of the trial itself, ἢ ἔλεγον τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαιστήρων, ἢ ἐσὴλθεν ἔξω μὴ ἐλελθεῖν, Crit. 45 ε. Cp. ἔσεσθαι (ἐς τὸν δικαστά, 'into the presence of the judges,' 'into their assemblage,' 'into court') Apol. 17 c.

ἐκλήσια (καλείν): the general assembly of the citizens of Athens, the ecclesia, 25 a. In it the affairs of the commonwealth were discussed and voted upon. In certain cases it exercised judicial functions, especially where serious offenses were concerned which required immediate condemnation and were not provided for specifically by law. Such was the trial of the generals alluded to Apol. 32 b. See ναυμαχία. Regular meetings of the ecclesia were held four times in each prytany (see βουλή), the prytanes presided over them, and any measure presented for discussion must first have been prepared and considered by the senate. Extraordinary meetings were also called when occasion required. The usual place of assembling was the Pnyx, a slope connected with Mt. Lyceabettus, to the west of the Areopagus. Cp. ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ υμέτερον 31 c. The right of attending and voting was enjoyed by all legitimate male citizens who were of the proper age, probably twenty years. Thus Apol. 25 a ὁ ἐν τῇ ἐκλήσιᾳ, ὁ ἐκλησιασταί, is meant merely to designate typically a more numerous class of persons than was implied in ὁ βουλευταί previously suggested. In the allusion 32 b ὑμεῖς applies to the judges of Socrates as representatives of the whole body of Athenians who met in the Pnyx.

'Εκτώρ, ὁρὸς: Hector, son of king Priam and Hecuba, and foremost champion of the Trojans in the Trojan War, 28 c. See Πάροςκολος.

ἐλέγχων: to prove by questioning, test, consult, 18 D, 21 C, 39 D. Cp. ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω 29 ε. See ἐλέγχος. A strengthened form of the verb is the compound ἐκλέγχειν, 17 b, 23 a.

ἐλέγχος: a proof by questioning, test. Apol. 39 C ἐλέγχος διδόμαι τοῦ βιοῦ, viz. by submitting to cross-questioning as the touchstone of knowledge. ἐλέγχειν and ἐλέγχος are so strictly characteristic of the method of the Platonic Socrates that elenchus has been adopted as an English word by some writers. Speaking of the way in which Plato tests the efficacy of any expository process, Grote says, Plato vol. I, c. 6: "the standard which he applies is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, and himself to endure from others, a Socratic Elenchus or cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up the detective questions—unless he can also answer them, when put to himself, pertinent and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to confusion or contradiction." — Plato
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will not allow that he has attained true knowledge.”

ἐνδεικνύω: to point out, show, in or in regard to any matter. Mid. ἐν-
dεικνυόμασθαι, to show, demonstrate, prove one’s contention, 23 B, 29 D. τότε...
. αὐτ ἐνδεικνύμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτον μὲν μέλει...οὐδ’ ὄσιβον 32 D. As Attic law term, act. ἐνδεικνύομαι, ‘to report’ one before the magistrate, ‘inform against,’ in cases of summary jurisdiction, by the process termed ἐνδείξεις, 32 B. In the passage cited ἐνδεικνύομαι με καὶ ἀπάγεις is merely a forcible expression for summary procedure in general, not implying that both ἐνδείξεις and ἀπαγωγή would be technically applicable to the case in hand. See ἀπάγεις.

ἐνδέκα: eleven. ὁ ἐνδέκα, the Eleven, a board of magistrates at Athens, chosen annually, one from each of the ten tribes, with a clerk (γραμματέας) who formed one of their number, Ἀρ. 37 C. The Eleven had the care and management of the public prisons and carried into effect the death sentences pronounced by the courts of law and the public assemblies.

ἐξετάζειν: to inquire into, scrutinize, examine thoroughly, 23 C, 28 E. The word is characteristic of the Socratic method, cp. ἐρήσομαι ἀπὸν καὶ ἐξετάζω καὶ ἐλέγξω 29 E. χαλ-
rουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοὺς οἰκομένωι μὲν ἔλαινα σοφοῖς, ὦ, ὦ, 33 C. The famous saying ὅ ἐντελῶντος βίου ὑπὸ βωτὸς ἀνθρώπων 38 A means that life is a failure when a man fails to apply to his mind that scrutiny which alone enables him to know himself and to govern himself by principles consciously reasoned out.

ἐπιλέγω: to understand as an expert, to be specially versed in something, πελ-
tυνος, 19 C. Σρ. τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπιλειτοῦντι Κρίτ. 47 B. ὁ ἐπιλέγω... ὁ εἰς 48 A. The simple verb ἀδείν is poetic and means to perceive, especially to hear. ἐπιλέγω is of frequent occurrence in Plato, the imperfect stem only.

Ἐπιγένεσις, -ους: Epigenes, a follower of Socrates, son of Antiphon of Cephasia, 33 E. Epigenes appears in the Memorabilia of Xenophon 3.12.1; and in the Phaedo of Plato 59 B he is named among those present at the death of Socrates in the prison.

ἐπικής, -ῆς (eikès): fair, reasonable. Neut. plur., ἐπικής λέγειν, 34 D. As applied to persons ἐπικής is a refined synonym of ἄγαθος, ἐπικείμενος ("sweet reasonableness") a characteristic of one who deserves the appellation καλὸς κάγαθος. The ἐπικής ἄνηρ can see both sides of a question and has sufficient imagination to put himself when need be in another man's place. The ἐπικείταται are opposed to the πολλοὶ Κρίτ. 44 C, tovs ἐπικείμενον ἄνδρας ἰν οὐκ ἡμεῖς Arist., Ptax. 13. ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ δυντὶ ἐπικεί-
kέτατον ἔλαιν ἡ δοσε... σφιγχεῖν (‘in truth too good a man to survive’) Ἀρ. 36 B. ἐπικείτατον ἄνδρας πρὸ τοῦ θρόνων ἔχειν, ‘better men as to wisdom,’ 22 A. The adv. ἐπικῶς betrays the familiar use of the word.

ἐπικος: fairly, tolerably. ἐπικων τάλαι, 'pretty long,' Crit. 43 A.

ἐπιστάται (στα-) : to understand,
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20 C, E, 22 D; with inf., to know how to do something. Of the class of artis-sans (χειροτέχνης), to whom Socrates concedes a certain sort of wisdom, the verb ἐπισταθαι is used with strict appropriateness, 22 D. See εἰδέμαι and ἐπιστήμη.

ἐπιστήμη: knowledge, properly of the sort answering to ἐπισταθαι as denoting skill, 19 C. Cp. the adj. ἐπιστήμων 20 B. But Plato uses ἐπιστήμη also to denote ‘knowledge’ in a sense answering to εἰδέμαι, just as σοφία answers to εἰδέμαι in the sense of ‘wisdom.’ In the Theaetetus, 201, the suggestion that ἐπιστήμη is δόξα δήθη μετὰ λόγου, “true opinion coupled with rational explanation,” is set aside as not affording an adequate definition.

ἔρωται: to ask, inquire; ἔρθωμαι. Apol. 21 A, 29 E, Crit. 50 A. Cp. the compound ἔρωται 20 A. The want of an imperfect stem is supplied by ἔρωται.

ἔρωτέαν: to ask questions, interrogate, 23 D, 24 D, 33 B. The verb is regular, but the fut. and aor. act. occur less frequently than ἔρθωμαι, ἔρθωμη.

Εὔνους: Εὔνους, a sophist, a native of the isle of Paros, 20 B. Evenus was both rhetor and poet. Plato mentions him also Phaed. 60 D, Phaedr. 267 A; there, as in the Apology, in a tone of irony and disparagement.

Ζ

Ζεὺς (διεφελ.), Δίς: Zeus, the supreme god in the Greek religion; Roman Diespiter, Jupiter. The name occurs in the Apology and the Crito only in the phrases μὰ (τὸν) Δία (negative) Apol. 17 B, 26 D, E, Crit. 43 B; ὑπὸ Δία (affirmative), Apol. 35 D, 39 C, Crit. 50 C; πρὸς Δίος, ‘in Heaven’s name,’ Apol. 25 C, 26 E. Originally employed in the taking of an oath, μὰ Δία and ὑπὸ Δία became colloquially weakened to mere formulas of asseveration. Thoughtful minds tended to avoid too frequent and familiar use of these phrases. See the note on ἐπὶ τὸν κόσμον 21 E.

H

ἡγεμόνας (ἄγεων) : to be leader, lead the way, τινὸς; to hold an opinion (Lat. dūcere) 35 C, 36 B, Crit. 44 C, 47 E. τὸν δαίμονας θεῶς ἡγείρεω: ('deem them gods') Apol. 27 D. But θεῶς ἡγεῖται, ‘to believe in gods,’ ib. In this sense νομίζειν is usual, cp. 27 C. See the synonyms νομίζειν, δοκεῖν, olympa.

Ἡλίος (Ὑλίς) 3: of Elis, 19 E. Elis was in the northwest angle of the Peloponnese. The most important place in the country was Olympia, in the valley of the Alpheus, the scene of the great national festival.

Ἦ: ἥν δ' ἐγώ, said I, 20 A, E; ἥ δ', said he, 20 B. These forms of ἥν (poetic) occur in prose (often in Plato’s dialogues) only in the phrases here quoted.

Ἡρα: Hera, the goddess, consort of Zeus; Roman Juno. ἦρας θύην "Ἡραν λέγεις, ‘well said, by Hera!’ 24 E. The tone of the exclamation is strongly ironical.

Ἡρωδός: Hesiod, the epic and didactic poet, 41 A. The names of
Homer and Hesiod are often coupled, as in the passage cited, as representatives of the old epos. Except, however, in the metrical form and the dialect employed, there is little or no resemblance between the Iliad and Odyssey and the poems of later date ascribed to Hesiod. Hesiod's *Works and Days* ('Εργα καὶ Ημέραι) is a sort of Old Farmer's Almanac in verse, the most ancient Greek example of a didactic poem. The name of Hesiod stands for a school of minstrelsly developed at the foot of Mt. Helicon in Boeotia. The poet himself is believed to have lived in the eighth century B.C., a native of the Boeotian town of Aspra. Hence the line of Virgil, who took the *Works and Days* as model for his Georgics, *Asca eumque cano Romana per oppida carmen Georg. 2. 176*.

*Φωνίλια: quiet. Φωνίλια ἄγετι, 'to keep quiet,' 'mind one's business,' 36 B, 37 E, Crit. 48 D, 51 B. See πολυπραγμονέων.

Θ

*Θέας, -ος: Theages, an Athenian, son of Democritus and brother of Paralus, 33 E. One of the Platonic dialogues bears his name. From the *Republic*, 496 B, we learn that Theages would have entered political life, but ill health detained him in the service of philosophy.

*Θεόδωρος: Theodorus, an Athenian, son of Theozotides and brother of Nicostratus. He had been a follower of Socrates, but is mentioned as deceased at the time of the trial, 33 E.*

*Θεοζωτίδης: Theozotides, an Athenian, the father of Theodotus and Nicostratus, 33 E.*

*Θέτις, -ίδος: Thetis, a Nereid who became the wife of Peleus and the mother of Achilles, 28 C. See especially Catullus 64, Epithalamium of Peleus and Thetis. Thetis is an important figure in several of the most dramatic situations of the Iliad of Homer. She obtains for her son the promise from Zeus to turn the tide of war against the Greeks until Agamemnon shall be humbled, A 414, 495. Again, when Achilles is bent upon going forth to slay Hector, to avenge the death of his friend Patroclus, his mother, while not disapproving of her son's resolve, reminds him of the alternatives of his destiny, either to live long and ingloriously, or to meet an early death and achieve imperishable renown, Σ 95. Cp. I 410: μὴ γηρά τέ με φησιν, θεί Θετίς ἄργυρωσζα, χθεῖ ἐρᾶς φέρεμεν τανάτου τέλος. | εἰ μὲν ε' ἀθάν τινος Τρόων τέλιν ἀμφιμάχω, ὥσις μὲν μοι νόσος, ἀτρ κλέος ἄφθινον ἔσται. | εἰ δὲ κεν οἰκαδ' ἱκώμι φίλην ἐπὶ πατρίδα γαίαι, ὥσις μὲν κλέος ἐσθηλῶν, ἐπὶ δηρὰν δὲ μοι αἰὼν ἔσται, ὁδὴ κε' μ' ὀξα τέλος τανάτου κιχείη*.

*Θεσσαλία: Thessaly, a district of Northern Greece, Crit. 45 C, 53 D, E, 54 A. Thessaly is surrounded by well-defined mountain chains, Pindus on the west, Othrys on the south, Ossa and Pelion on the east, and the Cambunian mountains on the north. At the northeast angle stands Mt. Olympus, and between Olympus and Ossa*
the river Penēus carries out the gathered waters of this great basin thro' the romantic Vale of Tempe. Thessaly figures conspicuously in the legendary history of Hellas. The district of Phthiotis in the south was the native land of Achilles, and from it the Argonauts had set out on their adventurous voyage. The plains of Thessaly were wide and suited to horse-breeding. The soil was rich, and in historical times was possessed by a few wealthy families, such as the Aleuadæ of Larissa and the Scopadæ of Crammon, and tilled by a serf population. The Aleuadæ displayed the utmost zeal in forwarding the plans of Xerxes when that monarch invaded Greece, Herod. 7. 6. Political development under these circumstances was backward, cp. Crit. 53 B. The name of the Thessalians became proverbial for faithlessness, del τα θετα-
λωνάσσω, cp. Dem. 1. 22. A typical Thessalian, apparently, was Menon the general, whose character is sketched by Xenophon, Anab. 2. 6. 21.

Θηβαίος (Θήβαι): of Thebes, a Theban, Crit. 45 B. Thebes, the capital city of Boeotia, lay halfway between the eastern and the western sea, about thirty-five miles northwest of Athens.

Θησευς: to be dying, to die; τεθναίναι to be dead, 30 C, 38 E, 40 C, E, 41 A, Crit. 43 C, τέθνηκεν Apol. 41 B. In prose the simple verb occurs only in the imperfect and the perfect stem, the prosaic future and aorist being always ἄποθανομαι, ἄπεθανον. See ἄποθησαν.

Θόλος, ἦ: a round building with dome-like roof. At Athens, ἦ θόλος, the Rotunda, adjoining the βουλήσωρ or senate-house, in the ἀγορά. The Prytanes (see βουλή) took their common meals and offered their sacrifices in the Rotunda, and it was similarly used by the Thirty Tyrants, Apol. 32 C, D.

Ἰνα: where; with clauses of finality, that, in order that. The subjunctive is the regular mode to denote finality of purpose, but a past tense of the indicative may be used with ἵνα, to show that the purpose is unattained or unattainable. See HA. 884, G. 1371, B. 590, N. 4, Gl. 642 C. Here there is usually assimilation of mode, to a past wish or unreal condition. εἰ γὰρ ὁφελον οἷοι τ' ἵνα οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἔργαζονται, ἵνα οἷοι τ' ἡσαν καὶ ἄγαθα τὰ μέ-
γιστα, Crit. 44 D. An elliptical idiomatic phrase is the interrogative ἵνα τί (in full, ἵνα τί γένησαι) to what end? ἵνα τί ταύτα λέγεις Apol. 26 C.

Ἱππιαῖος: Hippias, of Elis, a sophist, 19 E. He was distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments, being a poet, a musician, an expositor of the poets, able to teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic, and giving lectures on subjects moral and political. Xenophon Mem. 4. 4. 5 ff. reports a conversation between Hippias and Socrates, in which the sophist mocks the sage for talking eternally about the same things, averring that he himself always endeavors to say something new. Two of the
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Platonic dialogues bear his name, the *Hippias Major* and the *Hippias Minor*. He figures also in the *Protagoras*.

᾿Ιππόνικος: *Hippiicus*, the father of *Callias*, 20 A. See *Callias*.

Κ

*Callias*: *Callias*, the son of *Hippiicus*, an Athenian, 20 A. He came of an old and distinguished family, and his father, *Hippiicus*, was reputed to be the richest Greek of his day. The large fortune which *Callias* inherited he squandered by extravagant habits, and died poor. In the *Protagoras* of Plato we are introduced to the sophists *Protagoras*, *Hippias of Elis*, and *Prodicus of Ceos* in the house of *Callias*, where they are stopping as guests. The scene of Xenophon’s *Symposium* is also laid at the house of *Callias*. He appears several times in political history.

καλὸς 3: beautiful, ‘fine’, 19 E, ironically 37 D. The neuter often in moral sense, ‘honorable’, 34 E; thus opposed to *ἀλοχός*, ugly, ‘base’, cp. 35 A. Lat. *puerum* and *turus*. καλὸς κάθισας, or καλὸς τε κάθισας, ‘fair and good’, 25 A. A highly complimentary phrase at Athens, to express the combination of all noble and admirable qualities in a man. See Xenophon’s highly instructive and entertaining account of the Athenian *Ischomachus* who bore this title, *Occ. 6. 12* ff. The phrase is applicable to things as well as persons, 21 D. Of animals, 20 B. See *epieikon*.

κατάλθειν: to come down. In a political sense, of an exile, ‘to return,’ 21 A. The imperfect is *κατάλθεια*. The preposition has the same force in *κατάγειν*; ‘to restore’ an exile to his home. *Κήθης, Κήθητος*: *Cebe*, a Theban, a friend and companion of Socrates, *Crit. 45* B. *Cebe* and *Simias* were young men devoted to philosophy who at *Thebes* had come under the influence of *Philolaus*, an eminent *Pythagorean*. A cardinal doctrine of the *Pythagorean* sect was the *metempsychosis* or *transmigration* of souls; and their leaning to this belief rendered *Cebe* and *Simias* appropriate interlocutors with Socrates in the *Phaedo* of Plato, where the subject of the conversation is the immortality of the soul.

Κλῖος (Κλώς): of *Ceos*, the nearest of the *Cyclades Islands* to *Attica*, between the promontory of *Suniun* and the isle of *Cythnus*, 19 E. *Prodicus* the sophist and *Simonides* the poet were natives of *Iulis* in *Ceos*. The name of *Ceas* was proverbial for temperance and integrity, cp. Plato *Prot. 341* E.

*Κηφίσιον*, ἡμίς: a native of *Cephisia*, an Attic deme of the tribe *Erechtheis*, northeast of *Athens*, 33 E.

κινδυνεῖν (κινδύνος): to run risks, to be in danger, 25 E, 28 B, D, E, *Crit. 45* A. But the verb also has a special use in Plato, to soften confident abruptness of speech, conveying a plain fact with *Attic* reserve, as it were not to seem too sure about it. τῷ δεν τι κινδυνεῖν ταφήν εἶναι σοφός, ‘in truth I do stand some chance of being wise in this wisdom,’ 20 D. κινδυνεῖτε ἡμῶν οδέτεροι οδὴν καλὸν κάγαθν εἰδεναι,
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'tis likely that neither of us possesses any knowledge beautiful and good,' 21 D. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεῖ τῷ ἄντι ὅ ἑστι σοφὸς εἶναι, 'the real probability, however, is that God is wise,' 23 A. κινδυ

νεῖς ἐν καρὼ τείν ὄλῳ ἑγεῖται με, 'you seem to have acted quite opportunely in not waking me,' Crit. 44 A.

Κλαζομένη: of Clazomenae, an Ionian city of Asia Minor, on the Gulf of Smyrna, noted as the birthplace of the philosopher Anaxagoras, 26 D.

κορυβαντιάν (Κορόβας): to be possessed by Corybantic frenzy, Crit. 54 D. οἱ κορυβαντιῶνες οὐκ ἐμφέρουσε ὅστε δρχοῦνται Ion 534 A, cp. Symp. 215 E. The Corybantes were priests of Rhea Cybele, the Great Mother or Mountain Mother (μητρὶ δρεία), an Asiatic deity whose rites were attended with wild music and dancing. In the Ion 536 c, the rhapsode capable of listening to the verses of Homer alone, is compared to the frenzied worshipers of Cybele who had ears only for the music of their own deity: δομερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶνες ἐκεῖνοι μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους δίκεις, δ λυ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅνων δὲ κατέχουσιν.

Κρήτη: the island of Crete, Crit. 52 E. Crete and Lacedaemon are often coupled, as in the passage cited, as conspicuous examples of the Dorian polity. The aristocratic institutions of the Dorian race were admired by Socrates and Plato for their stability, dignity, and apparent moral purpose, in contrast with the turbulence and laxity characteristic of the democratic states. See Λακεδαίμων.

Κριτοβούλως: Critobulus, son of Crito, a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, and one of those ready to be sureties for the payment of a fine, 33 D, 38 B. He was also present, with his father, at the death of Socrates, Phaed. 59 B. Critobulus is the interlocutor with Socrates in Xenophon's Oeconomicus and he appears also in the Memorabilia.

Κρίτων, -ῶν: Crito, an Athenian of the deme of Alopece, to which Socrates also belonged, and a devoted friend of the philosopher, 33 D, 38 B, Crit. passim. Crito was rich, and his wealth was ever at the service of his friend. He went bail for the appearance of Socrates before the dicastery, Phaed. 115 D; offered to be surety for a fine if the sentence of death were commuted, Apol. 38 B; and in the dialogue which bears his name is ready to bribe the jailer and make arrangements for the escape of Socrates from the prison. After the fatal draught of hemlock it is Crito who closes the eyes of his departed friend, Phaed. 118 A. Crito had two sons, Critobulus and another much younger. His principal occupation seems to have been the care of his estates. Xenophon Mem. 2. 9 reports a conversation between Crito and Socrates, in which the latter gives his friend some good advice about protecting himself against the syncophants or common informers, by keeping an honest man in his service to act as a sort of watch-dog in matters of law. Crito had a leaning toward philosophy, but in the dialogue which bears his name we note that he rises
with difficulty to the moral heights, whither he is led by Socrates.

Λ

Δακίδαλυν, -ονος, ἡ: Lacedaemon (or, Sparta) in Laconia of the Peloponnese, Crit. 52 E. In the Odyssey, δ 1, the valley of Sparta is called 'hollow Lacedaemon' (κολῆρα Λακε-δαλυνα), from the character of the land, a deep depression between Mts. Taygetus and Parnon, intersected by the river Eurotas. Protected by its rampart of mountains, Sparta needed no walls, and was itself rather an agglutination of villages than a city. The government of Lacedaemon was a military oligarchy, the few Spartan citizens or 'peers' (δυσοι), descendants of the Dorian invaders, holding in check the large conquered native population of Laconia and sometime of Messenia. The Laws of Lycurgus, the rigid and permanent system of the Spartan state, excited the admiration of Plato and other thoughtful Athenians who were repelled by the unstable and turbulent character of the democratic institutions under which they lived. For a highly instructive account of Lacedaemon, by a sympathetic hand, see Walter Pater's Plato and Platonism, c. 8.

λέγειν: to tell, recount; then, to speak, say. εἰ... ἀληθή ἐστιν τὰ λέγειν, 'if the tale is true,' 40 E. κατὰ τὰ λέγειν ('tradition, 'folklore') 40 C. δεινὸς λέγειν, 'a clever speaker,' 17 B. In particular λέγειν denotes the content of what is said (cp. λόγος), while φάνει (φάσκει) is rather of opinion. τί λέγει φάσκει ἐμὸν σοφῶτατον εἶναι, 'what does he mean by affirming, etc.' 21 B, cp. 21 E, 22 B, εἰ τούτο λέγουσιν 17 B. εἰ, κακὸς λέγειν τινα, 'to speak well' or 'ill of one'; cp. note on 23 λ, and see ἀκολούθει. μέγα λέγειν, 'to speak boastfully,' 'to boast,' 20 E. οὐδὲν λέγειν, 'to speak to no purpose,' 'to utter nonsense,' 30 B. λέγειν τι, 'to speak to some purpose,' 'to talk sense,' τὰων όλομένων τι λέγειν Crit. 46 D.

Δεοντίνος (Δεοντίνοι): of Leontini, an Ionian city in Sicily, to the north-west and not far from Syracuse, 19 E. It was to seek aid for his native city, Leontini, against her powerful Dorian neighbor, that Gorgias the sophist visited Athens, 427 B. C.

Δύοι, -οντος: Leon, an Athenian of the deme of Salamis, put to death without a trial by the Thirty Tyrants, 32 C. He was one of those who owed their death to the possession of wealth which excited the cupidity of the Thirty. Xenophon Hell. 2. 3. 39 mentions the execution of Leon, with vindication of his character; and records Mem. 4. 4. 3 the refusal of Socrates to obey the mandate of the Thirty when ordered to assist in arresting illegally an innocent person.

λόγος (λέγειν): tale, account; then, a speech, talk, discourse, the substance of anything spoken. τῶν θεῶν ὑπὶ τῶν ὀ λόγων ἐστὶν ('of whom we are now speaking') 26 B. Often in the plural, of any sort of speech-making or conversation. ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοῦ λόγου ποιεῖται, 'to be discoursing (talking) about virtue every day,'
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38 A. ἅπερ μεραικὸς λόγος πλήττοται (‘inventing,’ ‘making up stories’) 17 C. κεκαληπτείμενος, ‘a speech ornately composed,’ 17 D. λόγος is a generic word, covering ground where in English various specific terms are needed for purposes of translation, as in the celebrated phrase condemnatory of the sophists, τὸν ἢττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, ‘to make the worse appear the better reason (argument),’ 23 D, 18 B, 19 B. Cp. Ar. Nuh. 112, ἐλειν παρ’ αὐτὸς (the sophists) φασιν ἀμφω τῷ λόγῳ, τὸν κρείττον, ἀστις ἀστι, καὶ τὸν ἢττον. 88a. Elsewhere in the play the terms δίκαιος λόγος and ἀδίκος λόγος are employed. Also Cic. Bruc. 8, docere se profitebantur (the sophists), ἀδραγαντίβως sane verbis, quemadmodum causa inferior dicendo fieri superior posset. The truth was called ἀπὸ κρείττων λόγων because the natural superiority (in power) of truth over falsehood is instinctively recognized by the moral sense. λόγον ἑξειρ, ‘to have reason,’ ‘to have an explanation to offer’ for anything, have something to say, be able to account for it naturally or rationally. εἰ μὲν... μισθὸν λαμβάνων τάτα παρεκελεύσῃ, ἐξον ἐπὶ τίνα λόγον, ‘if I took pay for these exhortations there would be some explanation of them for me to give’ (I should seem to be acting in a way that could be accounted for by ordinary human motives), 31 B. Cp. oλ λαμβάνοντι... τίνα ἄλλον ἑξευτελισμένον βοηθώντως ἐμοί ἅλλη ἡ τῶν... δίκαιον (‘what other reason can they have for aiding me than the right one’). 34 B. λόγον ἀξιόν, ‘worthy of mention,’ 23 B. λόγον ἐκέκα, ‘just for talk,’ Crit. 46 D. λόγος ‘in word,’ often opposed to ἐργα, ‘in deed,’ Apol. 40 B, Crit. 52 D.

Δύκανος, -ονος: Lycon, an Athenian, one of the accusers of Socrates, 23 ε, 36 A. Plato makes him represent the rhetors (public speakers) in the prosecution, and assigns to him more influence than to Meletus. Lycon therefore must have held some prominence in the political life of the time. Whether the Lycon introduced in Xenophon’s Symposium is identical with the accuser of Socrates is uncertain.

Δυσανάλος: Lysanias, an Athenian of the deme of Sphettus, the father of Aeschines the Socratic, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 ε.

M

μάλιστα (μαλα): most, chiefly, 18 C, 22 B, 23 C. μάλιστα πλησιον, ‘nearest,’ 25 D. As an affirmative answer, ‘certainly,’ 24 E. To denote an approximate statement of time or number. πινικα μάλιστα, ‘about what time,’ Crit. 43 A. μάλιστα μὲν (followed by εἰ δὲ μὴ or some similar correlative phrase), ‘if possible,’ ‘preferably,’ Apol. 34 A.

μάλλον (μαλα): more, rather, 18 B, 28 D. μάλλον δέ, ‘or rather,’ Crit. 46 A, 49 E.

μαθήματιν: to learn, 22 B, 26 A. Idiomatic phrase, τί (δ’ τί) μαθών, ‘why in the world?’ in a tone of surprise or severity, 36 B. See H. 968 c, G. 1566, B. 653, N. 4. Some scholars,
however, deny the genuineness of this usage, as inconsistent with the meaning of μαθαίνω, and restore τι παθών in those passages of Plato, Aristophanes, etc., where τι μαθάω seems to be used in the same sense. See πάσχειν.

Μέγαρας: to Megara (Μέγαρα, τὸ)
Crit. 53 B. The Megarid lay west of Attica and south of Boeotia, from which it is separated by Mt. Cithaeron. The town of Megara was situated about a mile from the sea and had two ports, Nisaea on the Saronic and Pegae on the Corinthian Gulf.

μάλλων: μέλει μοι τίπος, or with infinitive, I care for, am interested in something, or to do something, 24 C, 32 D. The thing cared for may be the subject of the verb, 24 C. Cp. οὐσία μέλον γέ σοι (object of οὐσία) 24 D. See Μέλητος.

Μέλητος: Meletus, an Athenian, one of the accusers of Socrates, 19 B, C, 23 E, 30 C, 31 D, 34 A, 35 D, 37 B. The indictment was filed in Meletus’ name, tho’ in fact the other two accusers were more influential men. A tragic poet of inferior merit, Meletus was a butt of the ridicule of comedy; see the commentators on Ar. Frogs 1302. In the Apology he is conceived as standing for the poets as a class, and is treated everywhere by Plato with contemptuous satire. See especially the plays upon his name (Μέλητος, εμέλησε, μέλον, ἀμέλεια, μεμέλησε) 24 C, D, 25 C, 26 B. In the Euthyphro 2 B he is named as of the deme of Pitthus and described as a young man (at the time of Socrates’ trial) with long straight hair, none too good a beard, and a Roman nose.

μάλλων: forms with the infinitive future or imperfect (rarely the aorist) a periphrastic expression of futurity. See HA. 846, G. 1254, B. 533, Gl. 570 B. μέλλω ὅμως διδάσκω, ‘I am going to instruct you,’ 21 B. Cp. 31 D, where πράττειν is to be taken with ἀποτέλει and mentally supplied with μέλλω. καὶ εἰ μέλει ὀλυγον χρόνον σωθῆσον, ‘if he is to survive (‘expects to survive, as we say) even for a little while,’ 32 A. μέλλοντες ἢμω .. ἀποδιδάσκειν ‘when on the point of ascending’)

Crit. 50 A. Very convenient is the past imperfect εμέλλων with future infinitive when for any reason a future idea is not absolute but relative to a past action. εἶχομεν αὖ .. ἀπιστάτην λαβεῖν .. δι εμέλλειν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθω τοι θείειν (‘who should make them fair and good’) Apol. 20 A. Here the thought is of purpose; absolutely, ἀπιστάτην λαμβάνομεν δι ποιήσει, but in the passage quoted this thought adapts itself in form to the Past Potential εἰχομεν αὖ κτλ. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖκ ἦν, οἶ δὴν μήτε διὰ μῆτε ἐρματῶ εμέλλον μηδὲν βάφοις εἶναι (‘where, had I gone thither, I could have made myself of no use at all, etc.’) 36 C. Here again there is a notion of purpose with the relative οἶ (note the form of the negative). εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτυμπανίμην αὖ χρημάτων δοσα εμέλλον ἐκτείσειν, ‘if I had money I would name a fine as large as I could pay,’ 38 B. Here the fact that the payment would be subsequent to the naming of the fine
is neatly expressed by the periphrasis which is at the same time adapted in form to the Unreal Condition.

μέν: a postpositive particle of emphasis, never a connective, but always looking forward to some antitheton or contrasted member that is to follow, expressed or implied. The word or phrase, therefore, to which μέν is appended has always the emphatic position and is preceded by a greater or less pause in reading: e.g. ἀλλὰ | σὺν | μέν μοι | τὴν τῆμερον Crít. 43 D, σολ δὲ | ἦπταχει μέν τὰ ἔρα χρηματα 45 B. The correlative particle to μέν is regularly δέ, often μέντοι 20 D, 38 D, sometimes other words, as ἔπειτα 21 B, Crít. 45 B, ἀλλὰ δέμως Apol. 34 D. Sometimes there is no single word answering to μέν preceding, cp. Μήλητος μέν 36 A, Crít. 43 D. Θο’ for the most part hardly translatable, μέν finds in some connections precise English equivalents, ‘to be sure,’ ‘indeed’ (Lat. quidem), etc. ἑρω | μεγάλῳ μέν καὶ γενναῖῳ, ὑπὸ μεγάθους δὲ νομοθετέρῳ, 30 E, cp. 38 D. Clauses introduced by μέν and δέ are always coordinate in Greek, but in translating it is sometimes advisable to treat the μέν clause as if it were subordinate to what follows it, ‘though,’ ‘while,’ etc. οἶδε μέν γὰρ αὐθείς τὸν θάνατον . . . δεδιψὰς δὲ κτλ., ‘tho’ no man knows what death is, yet all men fear it,’ etc. 29 A, cp. 20 D, 29 D, 40 A, Crít. 50 E end. See note on Apol. 37 C. The perspicuity of many a rhetorical period depends upon the distinct marking of antitheses by means of μέν and δέ; and this clearness of contrast may be maintained if necessary in a long passage by repeating the particles in appropriate positions. See Apol. 28 E.

μέντοι: indeed, however; a postpositive asseverative particle. καί μέντοι (‘verily’!') καὶ πάν τοῦτο ὅμων δέομαι 17 C, cp. 32 D. οὗ μέντοι, ‘no indeed,’ 26 E. Thus μέντοι is often clearly seen to be a strengthened μέν (+ τοι), cp. ἀποκτησμει μέντοι (‘to be sure’) δὲ 30 D, cp. 37 C. But, on the other hand, μέντοι has acquired a certain adversative force (41 E, Crít. 43 D) and thus frequently appears as the correlative to μέν, instead of δέ, 20 D, 38 D. In crisis μεντὰν = μέντοι άν.

μὴ: not; as final particle, lest, that not. μὴ expresses negation as conceived, while οὗ expresses absolute negation. Thus μὴ not, with its compounds, is the appropriate negative for clauses of finality, for conditional clauses and participles with conditional force, and, ordinarily, for the infinitive (for exceptions see οὗ). μὴ ὑπὲρκυρὲ δὲ δίκα πᾶν ἄνθρωπον, ‘but, never yielding (a case merely conceived of), I would even perish thereby,’ 32 A.

μὲν δὲν χεπάδι τῇ δίκαια δικαιομένων, ‘to side with you engaged in unrighteous deliberations,’ 32 C. Here μὴ δίκαια denotes injustice viewed in a general way, as characteristic of the action of the people, while οὗ would have marked simply those particular deliberations as not tending to justice. μὴ δὲ, ‘not only,’ ‘not merely,’ 40 D; an elliptical phrase, originally ‘do not say that,’ etc. See HA. 1035 A, G. 1504, B. 442 n. μὴ οὗ, with infinitive (with or without
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the article). οὖθεν αὐτὸς ἐπιλαβέται ἡ ἰλίκα τὸ μὴ ὁχόλαι ἀγανακτεῖν Crit. 43 C. Κρ. ὁδὲ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὖθεν τάν ἁριστεῖς... ἀποδεδείκται Phaed. 87 A. Thus μὴ with the infinitive after verbs of negation (denying, hindering, preventing, etc.) repeats the negative idea contained in the meaning of the main verb (ἐπιλαβεῖν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν). If that verb is itself negated, as above by οὖθεν, a second negative regularly appears with the infinitive. Both negatives are idiomatic and untranslatable. See HA. 1034 A, G. 1616, B. 434, Gl. 572 A. For οὖθεν μὴ, see οὖθε. μὴ is sometimes used with the subjunctive in cautious assertions or negations (μὴ... οὖθεν μὴ... ταῦτα... σκέψιμα... τῶν... βασίλειων ἐποιητών, 'I suspect these are considerations characteristic of those who lightly put men to death,' Crit. 48 C. μὴ οὖθεν ἄλλο σκέπτεσθαι... μὴ δὲ... ἐξελέγον, 'I am inclined to think we ought to take nothing else into consideration than what we were just now saying,' ib. cp. μὴ οὖθεν, 48 D, Apol. 39 A. See HA. 867, G. 1350. μὴ introduces questions which expect a negative answer (Lat. num). μὴ αὐτῶν ὁ(ν) φαντασθῶν θανάτου, 'do you suppose he took thought of death,' 28 D. Similarly ἥπα μὴ Crit. 44 E. (But ἀρὸ οὖθεν = nonne.)

μὴδὲ: and not, nor, not even, not at all, 17 B. For the difference between μὴδὲ and μὴτε, see οὖθε and οὔθε. The difference there explained is illustrated 30 A, B: τεῖς[φων ὡ]μ[ῶ]ν καὶ νεοφθέρων καὶ πρεβατεύσεν μὴτε σωματῶν ἐπιμελεῖ-

σοβι μὴτε χρημάτων πρὸτερον μὴτε δὲ οὖθεν σφόδρα ὡς τό ipsis ψυχής, 'urging both the younger and the older among you to care for neither the body nor goods sooner or (μὴδὲ) so sorely as for the soul.' Here μὴτε... μὴτε might have been preceded by μὴ to introduce the whole negative idea of which the two correlatives denote a subdivision (cp. the passage quoted under μητε); but μηδε adds a new negation, οὖθεν σφόδρα, to that already stated in (μὴ) πρὐτερον.

μητε: subdivides (with its correlatives or correlatives) a negative statement introduced by μὴ expressed or implied. μὴ πρverty τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖται μητε τῶν τῆς πόλεως (neither... nor) 36 C. See οὔθε, also μηδέ.

Μίνως, -ωος: Minois, an ancient king of Crete, who upon his death became one of the judges of the shades in Hades, 41 A. See the Odyssey λ 568: οὔθ' ἦτοι Μίνωα Ίδον, Δίας ἀγαπών ἵλον, | χρόνον σκυτόρον ἔχοντα, βεμβηστοτά νέκυσαν, | ημερον... οὐ δέ μην | μαφί δικας εἰρήνοτο ἀκτα, | ἡμερον... ἔστατες τε κατ' εὐφυιτελεῖς 'Αδός δίδ. Μουσαπος: Musaeus, an ancient bard popularly believed to have lived before the time of Homer, 41 A. The names of Musaeus and Orpheus are often found coupled in literary allusions. See Ὀρφέας.

μοιχηρα: wickedness, 39 B. μοιχηρὸς (μοίχως) 3: miserable, wretched, Crit. 47 E; then, wicked, Apol. 25 E. μοιχηρὸς and τονυρὸς are current synonyms of κακὸς. Compare χρηστός, a frequent synonym of ἀγαθόν.
They were put to death by the draught of hemlock, and their property was confiscated to the state. At the tribal festival of the Apaturia, which happened to occur between the two meetings of the assembly at which the case of the generals was considered, the popular excitement, the sentiment of grief and indignation against the accused, was raised to the highest pitch. Thus it could happen that an unconstitutional proposal to vote upon the guilt and punishment of the six generals by one collective ballot (the law requiring each man’s case to be considered separately) was entertained and acted upon. It was this illegality, not any question as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, which caused Socrates, who as ἐκπατάτης τῶν προτάτων was chairman of the Assembly on the day of the trial, resolutely to refuse to put the question to vote. See βουλή. His protest was overruled and the vote taken by some more complaisant member of the board. See Xen. Hell. i. 7. Grote, History of Greece, vol. 8, c. 64.

Νικόσπατρος: Nicostratus, an Athenian, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus, who had been a follower of Socrates, present at the trial, 33 E.

νομίζειν (νόμος): to own as custom or usage (τὰ νομίζομεν, ‘the customary rites,’ Symp. 176 A); to regard, believe, think. δὲ ... σωφροσύνη λέοματο (‘was in vogue’) Ar. Clouds 962. θεοὶ νομίζειν, ‘to believe in gods,’ Apol. 18 C, 23 D, 24 B, 26 B. The transition to the current meaning
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\textit{think} is illustrated 26 C νομίζω εἶναι \textit{theos}, \textit{θεός}, \textit{θεοῦ}. \textit{δὲ} \textit{θλίβω} . . . \textit{σελήνη} νομίζω \textit{theos} \textit{εἶναι}. Cp. 27 B, C, \textit{αἶου} . . . \textit{οἱδεῖ} \textit{dun} \textit{τίς} \textit{καὶ} νομίζεται \textit{δοξάτα} \textit{kaków} \textit{εἶναι} 40 A. \textit{νομίζεις} regularly takes accusative and infinitive, but the omission of \textit{εἶναι} with this verb is far more frequent, as might be expected from its meaning, than with any of its synonyms, \textit{ηγείωθαι, δοκεῖν, οἴσθαι.}

\textit{νόμος}: \textit{custom, law.} τῶν \textit{τοιούτων} \textit{ἀμαρτημάτων} οὐ \textit{δεῦρο} νόμος \textit{εἰσάγει} \textit{eos tiv} ("it is not usual, i.e. not right or reasonable") 26 A. \textit{δὲ} \textit{νόμος} 25 D, \textit{οἴσθαι} 24 E, \textit{Crit.} 50 A.

O

\textit{Ὀδυσσέας, ὁ}: \textit{Odysseus} (Lat. \textit{Ulysses} or \textit{Ulyxes}), king of Ithaca, whose wanderings after the capture of Troy and return to his home in the twentieth year form the theme of the \textit{Odyssey} of Homer, 41 B. Odysseus is named in the \textit{Apology} as one of those whose rich experience of life would render them worthy subjects of examination by Socrates in the Lower World.

\textit{οἴσθαι}: \textit{to think, surmise, fancy}; \textit{οἰσίμαι} or \textit{οἶμαι}, \textit{φῦμαι} or \textit{ψῦμῃ}; in crisis, \textit{ἐγὼν} \textit{οἶμαι} = \textit{ἐγὼ} \textit{οἰσίμαι}, 37 A. \textit{οἴσθαι} \textit{βλάπτειν}, "fancying that they did harm," 41 D. \textit{οἶόμηστε} \textit{δεῖν} \textit{πρὸς} \textit{ἐκεῖνον} \textit{πρῶτον} \textit{μὲ} \textit{ἀπολογήσασθαι}, "conceive that I must first make a defense to them," 18 E, cp. 32 C. \textit{δὲ} \textit{οὗτοι} \textit{μὲν} \textit{εἶναι} \textit{σοφὸς, εἶπ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{οὗ}, "that he fancied himself wise, but was not," 21 C. \textit{αὶ} \textit{μὴ} \textit{οἶδα} \textit{oū̂} \textit{oἶμαι} \textit{εἶδέναι}, "what I don't know I do not think I know," 21 D. Often with an infinitive of the future, where we say 'expect,' 35 A, 36 A, 39 D, \textit{Crit.} 44 A, 53 C, 54 D. ὡς \textit{εἶγο} \textit{οἰμαῖ, 'as I remember it,' Apol. 28 C. \textit{οἴσθαι} \textit{γε χρῆ, 'we must certainly suppose so,' Crit.} 53 C, 54 B. See the synonyms, \textit{δοκεῖν, ηγείωθαι, νομίζειν.}

\textit{Ὀρφής, ὁ}: \textit{Orpheus}, an ancient bard popularly believed to have lived before the time of Homer, 41 A. The names of Orpheus and Musaeus are often coupled to represent a body of ancient minstrelsy, chiefly of a priestly or religious character, — oracles, hymns, theogonies, and the like, — which has now disappeared with the exception of a few inconsiderable fragments. Certain poetical works now extant under the name of Orpheus are known to have had a late origin, and probably much that passed as Orphic in the time of Plato was of no great antiquity. Plato mentions Orpheus and Musaeus here and there in his dialogues, and gives several brief quota-
tions from the poetry of Orpheus, as
Crat. 462 b, Phil. 66 c.

δραχτρα (δραχισθαι to dance): orchestra, usually the central space of
the Greek theater, in which the dra-
matic chorus had its position. But
Apol. 26 η δραχτρα is named as
a place where books could be pur-
chased, the reference being probably
to an 'orchestra' in Athens other than
that of the theater, a public place of
which brief mention has been pre-
served in the Lexicon to Plato of
Timaeus the Sophist.

οὐ, οὐκ(χ), οὔχ, in final position
οὐ: not, no. οὐ differs from μὴ in ex-
pressing negation absolutely. See μὴ.
Thou' the usual negative with the infinitive
is μὴ, yet it may be οὐ when an
infinitive conveys a fact of negation.
θοδοξεῖ μοι οὔτος . . . δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι
σοφός . . . εἶναι δ' οὖ, 21 c, d. Here
what Socrates came to believe was
dοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι σοφός, ἐστι δ' οὖ; in
effect the same as οὐκ θοδοξεῖ μοι σοφός
εἶναι. Cp. 26 c παράκασι με φής
οὕτω αὐτῶν νομίζειν θέος κτλ.; like
οὐ φής με νομίζειν. In cases like those
above quoted we may say that the
negative is retained in the form proper
to the thought. Again, altho' the
regular negative in a conditional clause
is μὴ, yet sometimes οὐ is united so
closely to a single word with which it
forms a sort of phrase that it is
retained even in a condition. ἐάν
tε σο καλ ἄντος οὐ φήτε ἐάν τε
φήτε (phrase, οὐ φημ I deny) 25 b.
See φάναι. Similarly, οὔτε οὐκ εἴδεναι,
'so as to be ignorant,' 26 d. Forcible
negation may be expressed by οὐ μὴ
with the subjunctive, 29 d, Crit. 46 c;
or with the future indicative, Crit.
44 b. See HA. 1032, G. 1360, Gl.
489. The negative is doubled for
the sake of emphasis and, to avoid
cacophony, not by repeating the same
word. See B. 432. οὐ πάνω, not very
(much), said mildly (Attic) for 'not
at all,' Crit. 48 a, cp. Apol. 41 d.

οὐδὲ: and not, nor, not even, not at
all,' 17 c. οὐδὲ (the same is true of
μηδὲ) is never a correlative word, but
always adds a new negation to one
already expressed or implied. Thus
Crit. 54 c οὐδὲ occurs three times to
enlarge successively the negative mem-
ber introduced by the former οὔτε of
two correlative: (οὔτε . . . ἐκλάδε) 
σοι . . . ἀμεινο . . . οὐδὲ δικαίωτερον
οὔτε δικαιοτερον οὐδὲ ἀλλὰ
. . . (οὔτε ἐκεῖον ἄφικενον ἀμεινο),
' (neither here) better or more just or
more holy for you or for another (nor
better there, etc.).' Οὐδὲ (μηδὲ) in
negation corresponds to καὶ (and, also,
even) in affirmative use. ἐγὼ διὸ
οὐκ οῦτα, οὐδὲ οὐλοματ ('so also I do
not think so') Apol. 21 d. οὐδὲ γ' εἰ
d. . . ἀκηκαστε . . . οὐδὲ ὑπότο ἀληθες,
'no, nor if, . . . this is not true either'
(this also is false), 19 d. Cp. οὐδὲ
dικαιόν 35 c, and the note. Thus οὐδὲ
(μηδὲ) is essentially different from
οὔτε (μὴτε), which is always correlative.
See οὔτε. In cases where οὐδὲ
seems to answer to a preceding οὔτε
there is anacolouthon, the speaker shift-
ning his point of view ungrammatically
and not ending his sentence as the
beginning of it required. Apol. 19 d.

οὔτε: always in correlation, οὔτε . . .
οὔτε, neither . . . nor. The same is true of μήτε . . . μήτε. Thus these words divide one negation, whether that negation be (1) indicated as a whole at the outset by οὐκ, οὖδεις (μή, μηδεις), or be (2) merely implied by the correlative themselves. (1) ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐδεὶς εἰς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρα ἐπαινεῖν 19 C. (So with μή 36 C, twice.) (2) ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἔννοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὦν 21 B. Often οὔτε and τέ are correlative, a combination easy in Greek but awkward for purposes of translation. παντάξιοι με φιλέει οὔτε αὕτων νουμένων θεοῦ νόμος τέ άλλου ταύτα διδάσκουν, 'you assert that I am both myself a total disbeliever in gods and teach this unbelief to other men,' 26 C. See οὐδε. 

οὐλοκάνειν: to owe, incur debt. In law, δικήν οὐλεῖν, 'to be cast in a suit;' 'to be fined' or 'condemned to' undergo some punishment. δικαίων δικήν οὐλεῖν 39 B. καὶ οὐλεῖν χίλια δραχμὰς, 'he would even have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmas,' 36 A, cp. 39 B and the note.

Παλαμήθης: Palamedes, son of Nauplius, of Nauplia in Argos, one of the Greeks warring against Troy, 41 B. Palamedes was a sort of counterpart of Odysseus, distinguished for his wise counsels and his stratagems. In the post-Homeric legends the two heroes are involved in mutual enmity and conflict. Being in favor of a peace, Palamedes was falsely accused of treason and collusion with King Priam, condemned therefor, and stoned to death. 

Πάραλος, Paralus, an Athenian, son of Demodocus and brother of Theàges, present at the trial of Socrates, 33 E. 

πάσχειν: means to be a subject of experience, as acted upon from without or inwardly affected in some way, to suffer good or ill, 35 A, 36 B, 42, Cris. 47 C. εὖ, κακῶς πάσχειν, 'to be well' or 'ill treated,' 49 D. μην ἐγὼ ἠπάθοι τι τοιοῦτον, 'I declare to you I was affected in some such way' as I shall describe, Apol. 22 A. The explanation of this experience (πάθος) on the part of Socrates, this impression that he gained, is given in ἐδοξάσαν κτλ. Cp. 22 C, where the state of mind of the men themselves whom Socrates examined is described, τοιοῦτον τι ἐφάνησαν πάθος πεπονθής. See πάθος. Thus πάσχειν is a verb essentially passive in its signification, hence its frequent connection with a genitive and ὧν. διε τί μεν ὑμεῖς πεπονθήσατε ὧν τῶν ἐμὸν κατηγορῶν οὐκ ὑδα, 'how you have been affected by my accusers (i.e. by their harangues) I know not,' 17 A. (In the next clause ὧν· αὕτων can be joined with ἐνελαθο-
\(\mu\nu\) because ‘I forgot’ is a sort of 
\(\epsilon\tau\alpha\delta\omega\nu\) — forgetting is a πάθος.) Never-
theless, since πάθεια implies feeling 
it may be joined with πρὸς and an 
accusative denoting the person toward 
whom the feeling goes out (after being 
excited by that person).  
\[\pi\rho\nu\ \dot{\epsilon}\gamma\omega\]
\[\ldots \ \tau\iota\omega\iota\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\iota\ \eta\tau\alpha\delta\omicron\nu \ 21 \ C. \ Cp. \]
\[\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\ \sigma\nu\ \eta\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon\tau\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron\ i\ 
\rho\omicron\ \tau\iota\omicron\upsilon\theta\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsi
lated to the family of Solon, the
lawgiver. He had two brothers, Adi-
mantus (Apol. 34 A) and Glauco. See
the Republic, and, for Glauco, also
Xen. Mem. 3. 6. On the mother's
side Plato was related to Charmides
and Critias, the interlocutors with
Socrates in the dialogue entitled Char-
mides, and known to history in con-
nection with the oligarchy of the Thirty
and the Ten. Charmides was the
brother of Plato's mother, and Critias
the cousin of Charmides. By tempera-
ment a poet, Plato, it is said, at first
devoted himself to the arts of poetry
and music, but renounced poetic com-
position for philosophy when he at-
tached himself to Socrates at about
the age of twenty. After the death
of Socrates in 399 B.C., we are told
that Plato, with other companions of
the sage, withdrew to Megara. Then
follow his reputed travels in foreign
lands, Cyrene, Egypt, and Italy. He
is said to have made three journeys to
Syracuse in Sicily, the first in 387 B.C.
At the court of Dionysius the Younger,
Plato and Dion, mentor of the youth-
ful despot, finally failed, if the story be
a true one, in their efforts to bring into
being an ideal king and state. It was
shortly after the first visit to Sicily that
Plato began to teach or lecture at
Athens in a garden adjoining the pre-
cinct sacred to the Hero Acadēmus,
about a mile from the city on the road
to Eleusis. The Academy of Plato,
the earliest of the schools of philoso-
phy in Greece, was attended by many
afterward eminent in philosophy or
letters, and the fame of the founder be-
came world-wide. Until his death, at
the age of eighty, in 347 B.C., Plato was
engaged in teaching and in the com-
oposition of his written works. Forty-
two dialogues have been preserved
under his name, about one third of
the number being regarded as spurious
or of doubtful authenticity. There are
also thirteen letters attributed to Plato
that are probably not genuine. Plato
is the foremost and greatest of the Att-
tic prose writers. The dialogue admits
the characteristics of every literary
form, and the Platonic writing is free
from the conventional trammels to
which historical and oratorical com-
position were subjected. Philosophy
had not yet learned to disguise her
thoughts under a phraseology calcu-
lated to repel the unprofessional
reader. The poetic flavor that enters
upon occasion into Plato's prose is a
further source of freedom and power.
With all the wide dramatic range of
the dialogues (in which the author
never appears in propriis persona),
with all the variety of philosophic
speculation probed or outlined, the
Platonic style carries with it a pervad-
ing sense of original force, of a
consistent dominating personality.

ποιέω: to make, cause, do. ἐγνω... περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν... δι' οὐ σοφία
ποιεῖν & ποιεῖν ('what they made,'
viz. their poems) 22 B. Ср. ἐπεστοιχ-
κεσαν ἢ. τούτο δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τὸ τε
δύσμα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν 20 D. ἐὰν τιμα
μοιχθηρὸν ποιῆσαι τῶν ἡμῶν, 'if I
make any of my companions bad,'
25 E. ταῦτα καὶ νωτέρω καὶ προσβυ-
tέρω ποιῆσον, 'this I shall do both for
INDEX

young and for old,' 30 A. But the usual construction is the double accusative, ποιεῖται τινά τι. Cp. οἱ ποιηταὶ κακοὶ τι ἐργάζονται τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω ἐκτὸς ὅταν 25 C. So often with adverb, τὰ κακὰς ποιεῖν ἀθρόω- του τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ὃδεν διαφέρει Crit. 49 C. πλέον ποιεῖν, 'to profit,' 'gain advantage.' εἰ τι ὄτε πλέον ποιήσειν, 'if you expect to accomplish something thereby,' Crit. 54 D, Apol. 19 A. Mid. ποιεῖται, to make or get made for oneself, Apol. 23 A, Crit. 52 C; then, to make out;' regard,' 'deem.' Thus in phrases with peri. ἀλλο τι ἐρέπι τολλοῦ ποιεῖν ('deem it very important') ἐξω ὦ βελτιστοῖ κ... ἐσον- ταί Apol. 24 C. τὰ πλεονεκτοῦ ἐξεῖ περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, 'the things that are of most worth he treats as of least value,' 30 A. χρήματα περὶ πλεονεκτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἐρέπον 'to hold property in higher esteem than friends,' Crit. 44 C, 48 B, 54 B. With substantives as object ποιεῖσθαι forms a periphrasis for a middle voice of the verb allied to the substantive. λέγουσα ποιεῖσθαι (i.e. λέγειν, but mid.) Apol. 27 B, 38 A. ἀποθηματο ποιη- σάσθαι Crit. 52 B. See γλυκεῖσθαι. Synonyms, δραμ., ἐργάζεσθαι, πράττειν.

πολιμα, -ατος, τὸ: a poem, poetical work, 22 B.

πολιστείς, -εως, ἡ: a making of poetry, 22 C.

ποιής: maker, poet, 22 A.

πολυπραγμόνει: (πολυπράγμων, πράττειν): to be a busybody, to be office-
cious, meddlesome, 31 C. A common fault of the Athenian character was πολυπραγμοσύνη. The opposite idea to πολυπραγμοσύνη is expressed by ἰσχίαν ἔγκειν, 'to mind one's business.' See ἰσχία. Plato makes Socrates apply the derogatory term to himself Apol. 31 C, adopting the language of his enemies and detrac-
tors. What from Socrates' point of view was λέγειν καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττεν ('attending to my own affair'), 33 A, was to them πολυπραγ-
μονεῖν, 'attending to other people's business.'

πονηρία: wickedness, 39 A.

πονηρός (πῶνος): bad, wicked. ἐν πολίταις χρηστοί ἢ πονηροί (i.e. ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοὶ) 25 C, cp. Crit. 47 A. πονηρός and μοχθηρός are current syn-
onyms of κακός.

Ποτίδαια: Potidaea, a Dorian town on the isthmus of Pallène in Chalcidice, 28 E. Originally colonized from Corinth, it was later one of the tributary allies of Athens, Thuc. 1. 56. In the year 432 B.C., shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Potidaea at the instigation of Corin-
thus revolted. It was immediately invested by the Athenians, and capitulated after a blockade of two years. The siege had been a costly one and the hardships of the blockading army severe, especially during the winter
season. Socrates served as a hoplite in the Athenian army and was present in the battle fought with the Corin-
thians and Potidaeans immediately before the siege. Here he saved the life of Alcibiades who had been wounded, and declined the prize of valor in the fight, when Alcibiades, to whom the generals awarded it, wished to turn it
over to Socrates. The passage cited below bears testimony also to the extraordinary powers of endurance exhibited by Socrates, wearing no more than his usual garments during the coldest weather, and going bare-footed with ease thro' the ice and snow. It was at Potidaea, too, that his fellow soldiers once saw the philosopher stand wrapt in meditation all day from sunrise and thro' the following night until the sun rose again. See *Symp.* 219 ε, 220.

πράττειν: to act, proceed, do, 31 D, 33 A, *Crit.* 44 C, 47 B. πράττειν answers to *Lat agere, ποιεῖν to facere, ἔκεινο μὸνον σκοτεῖν, διὰν πράττῃ, πάντα δικαία ἡ δίκαι πράττει, 'to look to this alone, when engaged in any course of action, whether what he is doing is right or wrong,' *Apol.* 28 B. Often εἰ, κακῶς πράττειν, of good or ill success. διὰ τοῦ τύχους (sc. πράττατοι) τοῦτο πράζουσι, 'the merest chance will determine what shall be their fate' (they will fare only as they happen to fare), *Crit.* 45 D. πράττειν thus verges closely on the meaning of πάσχειν. Cf. *Apol.* 40 A, C. Mid. χρήματα, μισθὸν πράττεσθαι, 'to make money,' 'exact pay,' 19 E. With acc. of the person made to pay, ὦ ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινὰ ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἐπτησα 31 C. Synonyms, ὀργάζεσθαι, ποιεῖν.

Πρόδικος: *Prodicus*, of Ithia in the isle of Ceos, a sophist, 19 E. He was one of the most renowned of the professional teachers. A subject to which he paid especial attention was the doctrine of synonyms. This specialty of Prodicus is mildly satirized by Plato in the *Protagoras* 337, 340 ff, 358. But the most popular lecture of Prodicus, for which he obtained the largest audience, was based upon the well-known fable called "The Choice of Hercules" or "The Parting of the Ways." The substance of this discourse is given by Xenophon, *Mem.* 2 i. 21–34. The youthful hero is approached at a critical point in his career by two female forms, Vice and Virtue, each of whom pleads eloquently to make him her own.

πρωτανεῖον: *Prytanéum*, strictly the place of the prytanes (see θυσία), 36 D. The Prytanum of a Greek city bore the same relation to the community at large as the private house bore to the family. It was the "hearth-stone of the state" (ἐστία πόλεως), and a fire was kept continually burning on the public altar of the city in the Prytanum, just as in private homes a fire was kept up on the domestic altar in the inner court. The Prytanum of Athens was situated north of the acropolis, near the agora. The city of Athens exercised in its Prytanum the duties of hospitality both toward its own citizens and toward strangers. Foreign ambassadors were entertained here, as well as Athenian envoys on their return from a successful mission. Moreover, the state conferred upon citizens who in consequence of personal or ancestral services to the community were regarded as its benefactors (εὐεργάται) the privilege of taking their meals in the Prytanum at the public cost (σίτησι ς ἐν πρωτανεῖῳ).
This honor was also conferred upon victors in the Olympic Games, as mentioned by Plato in the passage where Socrates is made to propose to his judges that he should be maintained at the public expense as a benefactor to the state, Apol. 36 D, E.

πρυτάνεις, πρυτανεύειν: see βουλή.

Πυθία: the Pythia or Pythoness, priestess of Apollo at the temple of Delphi. See Δελφοί.

Ρ

Ῥαδάμανθυς, -ος: Rhadamanthus, brother of Minos, made after his death one of the judges in the Lower World, as a reward for his virtues in life, 41 A. In the Gorgias 524 Rhadamanthus is represented as judging those from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe, while Minos exercises the final decision in doubtful cases. In the Odyssey Rhadamanthus is ruler of the Elysian Plain (Ἡλύσιον πεδίον), 5 564.

Σ

Σαλαμίνος 3: of Salamis, 32 C.

Σαλαμίς, -ήνος, ἡ: Salamis, an island off the western coast of Attica, forming the southern boundary of the Bay of Eleusis, 32 C, D. Its greatest length, from north to south, is about ten miles; its width, in the broadest part, from east to west, a little more. Salamis was an independent state until about 620 B.C., when, a dispute for its possession arising between Megara and Athens, it first fell into the hands of the Megarians, and then thro' a stratagem of Solon was taken possession of by the Athenians and became one of the Attic demes. Cp. Solon fr. 3: ομον εἰς Σαλαμίνα, μαχηθήμενοι κερί νήσου ἵνα εἰς νῆσον ψηλήν, χαλεπῶν τ' αλχος ἀποστράμησον. Salamis is finally memorable for the great battle fought off its coast, when the Persian fleet of Xerxes was defeated by the Greeks, 480 B.C.

Σίμπλας: Simias, a Theban, a friend of Socrates, Crit. 45 B. See Κέβης.

Σίσυφος: Sisyphus, founder and king of Ephyra, afterward Corinth, 41 C. See the Iliad Ζ 152. The name of Sisyphus became proverbial for fraud and trickery, and famous for the punishment which he had to undergo in the Lower World—rolling a huge stone up hill that continually rolled back just before attaining the summit, Odyssey λ 593. Cp. Gorg. 525 E. But in the Apology Plato mentions him, along with Odysseus the fertile-minded, without derogatory suggestion of any sort. And in the passage cited above from the Iliad nothing worse is said of Sisyphus, grandfather of the 'blameless Bellerophon,' than κέρδωτος γένετ' ἀνδρών.

Σύνιον: Sünium, a promontory forming the southeast corner of the Athenian territory, Crit. 43 D. Ships bound for Athens could be sighted early from the heights of Sunium.

σοφία: wisdom. Ordinarily the word signified the possession of positive knowledge and the skill pertaining to learned or artistic accomplishments. See σοφία. Thus of Athens, τὸλως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμώτατης εἰς σοφίαν 29 D. And of the artisans, ἐκεῖνη τὴν σοφίαν 22 D.
Socrates, however, in the Apology is made to give a higher and profound signification, of negative import, to σοφία, which he deduces from the suggestions of an oracle that had pronounced him the wisest of men. οὖν οὖν, οὖν οὖν, ὁ ἄθρωτος, σοφῶτατος ἐστιν, διότι ἄσπερ Σωκράτης θυγατέρι τῇ ὁδεγείται πρὸς σοφίαι, 23 B. This is ἀθρωτήτης, the only wisdom of which man is capable, 20 D. For God alone is truly wise, τὸ δὲ κεννεύει τῷ ἄθρωτος θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι 23 A. Man, by accepting only reasoned truth as his own possession, arrives at a sense of his limitations in regard to knowledge. Wisdom consists in the fullness of this sense of what one does not know. For Socrates, σοφία thus comes to be the substantive answering to εἰδέναι τι and to φωνήσαι ξείνα 22 A. See εἰδέναι.

σοφιστής: sophist, properly one who has made himself "wise" (σοφισμάτων ἄθρο) 20 A. Then, a teacher, dealing with the higher education, giving instruction especially in rhetoric and dialectic, as did Protagoras, the greatest of the sophists, and others. See θόρυβα, Πολιάμ, Πρώτικος. No disparaging sense attaches to the word σοφιστής in itself considered, but a popular prejudice against the sophists arose early, and later was especially fostered by the Platonic writings. The stock reproach against them was, τὸν ἡττῳ λόγον κριττὼν ποιεῖν, "making the worse appear the better reason," 18 B. See λόγος. This accusation, however, they bore in common with all who were given to philosophizing, 23 D. From philosopher in general the sophists were distinguished as (itinerant) teachers. The sophists are contrasted with Socrates by Plato particularly with reference to their arrogation of positive knowledge and their custom of taking pay for the instruction which they imparted. Socrates, on the other hand, declined to receive pay from those who listened to his conversations, and disclaimed the ability to "teach" men anything, 33 A, B. See σοφία. The strongly condemnatory view of the sophists as a class that has prevailed among modern scholars, especially the Germans, — due mainly to the satirical irony of Plato, — was combated vigorously by Grote in his History of Greece, vol. 8, c. 67, as well as in his Plato, passim. The truth of the matter has been clearly set forth and the final word perhaps said in Sidgwick's reasoned discussion of Grote's view of the sophists, in the (English) Journal of Philology, vol. 4, no. 8 (1872).

σοφός 3: skillful, clever, accomplished, learned, wise. Thus Socrates found that the handicraftsmen of Athens were in their way σοφότεροι (possessed of greater skill and knowledge) than he was, 22 D. But the word early came to be used in a sense of disparagement (see σοφιστής). Thus in the indictment of Socrates, σοφὸς ἄθρο... τὸν ἡττῳ λόγον κριττὼν ποιεῖν 18 B. ἄθρο σοφὸς, said with irony by Plato of the sophist Evenus, 20 A. In attempting to interpret the oracle which had pronounced him the
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wisest of men Socrates is made to give a new, negative, turn to the word οὐκος, 'wise in recognizing one's own limitations as to knowledge.' Cp. Apol. 21 D. See οὐκος. He contrasts the sophists sharply with himself in this regard: οὐκος δὲ τὰς ἀν... μεισὶ ἣ καὶ ἀνθρώπων σωφιᾶν σωφοί εἶναι 20 D. A kind of superhuman presumption.

Σφῆττος 3: of Sphettus, an Attic deme lying toward Cape Sunium, of the tribe of Acamantis, 33 E.

σχεδόν (ἐχεῖν, σχεῖν): nearly, pretty near, about. Often in Plato, with a tone of Attic reserve, to prevent a statement from sounding harsh or too positive. οὔδα σχεδόν, 'I'm pretty sure,' 24 A. Cp. 34 B. With τί, Crit. 46 B. σχεδόν τί δῆλον, 'tolerably evident,' 53 B.

Σωκράτης, -ον: Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, the Athenian philosopher, 18 B, 19 B, C, 23 B, D, 24 B, E, 26 E, 27 A, 28 B, 29 C, 34 E, 38 C, Crit. 43 A, etc. His death, by the draught of hemlock, occurred 399 B.C., when he was seventy years of age (Apol. 17 D, see also Crit. 52 E). The year of his birth would accordingly be 469 B.C. His mother, Phaenarete, was a midwife, and Plato makes Socrates compare his process of delivering men's minds of the ideas with which they are pregnant to the naiëtic art, Theaet. 149. His father was a statuary, cp. the allusion Euthyphr. 11. Socrates himself began by following the profession of his father, and is said to have executed a work deemed worthy of preservation, Paus. 1. 22. 8, 9. 35. 7. The name of Xanthippe, the wife of Socrates, has become proverbial for a termagent. See Xen. Symp. 2. 10, Mem. 2. 2, and cp. Plato, Phaed. 60 A. There were three sons, two of them were children at the time of their father's death, Apol. 34 D. Socrates had the satyr-like physiognomy — flat nose, thick lips, and projecting eyes, Xen. Symp. 5, Plato, Symp. 215, cp. Ar. Nub. 362. His powers of physical endurance were extraordinary (see Πορείδαλα), and his self-control is celebrated in the Symposium of Plato and elsewhere. His courage in battle was conspicuous (see Δῆλον), while of the moral courage of Socrates memorable examples are preserved, apart from the culminating scenes of his trial and his death. See βουλή, νομαξία, λέων. As philosopher his position was unique. Other men had asserted and practiced the ethical truths for which Socrates stood; but no man before Socrates had reasoned them out exhaustively and shown the identity of the intellectual and the moral. His was the first conscious elaboration of the scientific definition — arriving at a general notion thro' elimination of false or unessential accessories. Between what a man knows and what he does not know Socrates was thus enabled to draw a distinct line, relegating the unknown to the sphere of divine intelligence (see τὸ δαιμόνιον, under δαιμόνιος). See ἐλθεῖν, σωφία. Thus his mission came to be clearing the minds of men of the conceit of knowledge without its reality, hence the famous
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paradox Ἀρ. 23 A, B. The enthusiasm of Socrates in his great work of testing his own mind and the minds of other men in search of reasoned truth is celebrated by Plato in the Ἀπολογία as an inspiration due to a divine command.

T

Τελαμών, -όνος: Telamon, king of Salamis, the father of Ajax, 41 B. Telamon was the son of Aeacus and brother of Peleus. Thus Ajax and Achilles were cousins.

τιμᾶν (τιμή): to estimate, to value, prize, honor, 32 A, Crit. 47 A. As Attic law-terms, the mid. τιμᾶσθαι, to propose a penalty, is said of either prosecutor or defendant, τιμᾶται μοι ὁ ἄγων θανάτου 36 B, ἔχειν σοι φυγῆι τιμήσασθαι Crit. 52 c; while the act. τιμήσαι, to decide upon a penalty, is said of the judges, in an ἄγων τιμητός. Also ἀντιτιμῆσαι Ἀρ. 36 B. The active and middle occur side by side 37 c, 38 B. See δίκη.

τιμῆ, -ης, τῷ: a valuation, a penalty, punishment, 39 B.

τίς, τὶ, gen. τίνος or τοῦ, dat. τίνι or τῷ, enclitic; plur. neut. nom. and acc. τινὰ encl., ὅτι not encl., 30 c: some one, one, something; any one, any, anything. Idiomatic phrase, εἶτα τὶ, 'to be something,' i.e. to be of some account or importance, 'to be superior' in any respect, 41 B. δοκοῦσας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δ' ἐγκατέλειψιν, 35 A. τοὺς δοκοῦσας καὶ ἐπηρεάσας τι εἶπα, 35 B. Ср. οἱ δοκοῦσες διαφε- ρεῖν σοφία, εἰς ἀρετήν, τῷ. Similar is λέγειν τὶ, 'to speak to some purpose,' Crit. 46 b. See λέγειν. ὃ τι ἡ οἰδὴν 'little or nothing,' Ἀρ. 17 B. So ἀλήγου τινὸς καὶ οἰδῆν 23 A.

τριάκοντα: thirty. οἱ τριάκοντα, 'the Thirty' (tyrants, so-called), 32 c. Upon the surrender of Athens to Lysander the Lacedaemonian, at the close of the Peloponnesian War, 404 b.c., a committee of thirty citizens of anti-democratic views was appointed; ostensibly, 'to write up the ancestral laws for the conduct of the commonwealth,' Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 2. Practically, the Thirty assumed control of the government, securing a senate and magistrates subservient to their designs. Some wholesome measures were adopted at first, but the Thirty, with a Spartan garrison to back them, soon became genuine tyrants. Inoffensive persons, not aliens only, but even citizens, if possessed of wealth, were liable to be arrested and put to death without form of law, while their property was seized and appropriated. See Δέων. A schism presently showed itself in the board. Theramenes, who counseled moderation, stood against Critias, leader of the extremists. Its immediate result was the enrolling of a list of 3000 citizens, who might not be proscribed without a trial, and were nominally to share by their suffrages in the governing power. This led to increased severity toward those citizens whose names were not on the list of the 3000. Thus the faction grew hotter, until the death of Theramenes was compassed by the machinations of Critias. A veritable "reign of terror"
followed this event, and such patriotic men as were not counted in the 3000 were driven from the city. See Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 1. The régime of the Thirty is termed διλγαρχία Apol. 32 c. It lasted eight months (April to December, 404 B.C.), ἡ ἄρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελθη, 32 d. See φυγή.

Τριπτόλημος: Triptolemus, an Attic legendary hero who hospitably entertained the goddess Demeter at Eleusis, and received from her the gifts of agriculture, 41 Α. Plato in this passage associates Triptolemus with the judges of the Lower World.

Τροία: Troy, or Ilium, in Asia Minor, scene of the ten-years war described in the Homeric poems, 41 B.

Φ

φάνει: to say, afferm, aver; ἐφι, ἐφι (Lat. inquit), 20 B. Cp. φάσκειν, 21 B. φίς ἡ οὖ, 'do you say yes or no,' 27 D, Crit. 49 B.  οὖ φημι, Lat. ego. (The arrangement 26 C is not the usual one.) διὸ τε οὗ καὶ "Ἀντρος οὖ φήτε διὰ τε φήτε, 'whether you deny it or not, Apol. 25 B. See οὖ.

φαγαίνω: to flee, shun, avoid, 26 A, 29 B, Crit. 53 C; in civil sense, to be in exile, Crit. 53 B. In Attic law, φαγαίνω, 'to be on trial,' 'to be defendant' in a suit; ὁ φαγαίνω, 'the defendant.' See αἰρεῖν. With gen. of the offense charged, διεβέλας φαγαίνα ἀπὸ Μελήτου, Apol. 35 D. With Cognate Accusative, μὴ τινι ἐγὼ ... τοσαυτὰς δίκαις φαγαίνω, 'may I ne'er come to be prosecuted on such grave charges,' 19 C.

φιλοσοφεῖν: to be φιλόσοφος or wisdom-loving, to philosophize, 23 D, 28 E, 29 D. Of learned study in general, πάντες οἱ φιλοσοφοῦσαι, 23 D. Of the special activity of Socrates, 28 E, 29 D.

Φθη: epic form of Phthia, name of an ancient city in Thessaly, on the river Spercheios, the realm of Peleus, father of Achilles, and the Myrmidons, Crit. 44 B (quoted from Iliad I 363). See Iliad B 683. The name likewise designates the district, the later Phthiotis, Iliad I 395. See Θητελα.

φρόνησις, -eis, ἡ (φρονίς, φήν): a thinking, reasoning, wisdom. φρόνησις καὶ ἀληθεία καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 29 E. φρόνησις is opposed to ἀμαθία (folly) in the same way as σοφία, cp. μεταξύ ἀμαθίας καὶ φρόνησις Symp. 202 A. Cp. φρονίμως ἔχειν 22 A, and see σοφία, ἀμαθία.

φρονίμως (φρονίμος, φήν): thoughtfully, wisely. φρονίμως ἔχειν, like φρονίς, 'to be wise' (in the Socratic sense of testing the truth by rational scrutiny) 22 A. The adjective occurs Crit. 44 D.

φρονίζειν (φρονίς, φήν): to be thoughtful, take thought of, τιθέν, 28 D. Coupled with ἐπιμελείται, 29 E. The verbal, φρονιστέον, Crit. 48 A.

φυγή: flight; in civil sense, exile, 37 C, Crit. 52 C. Particularly, Apol. 21 A τὴν φυγήν ταιρν, 'the recent banishment,' of patriotic Athenians in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, 404 B.C. See ταράκτων. The exiles took refuge mostly in Thebes and Megara. Starting from Thebes, Thrasybulus, with seventy friends, took possession.
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of Phyle, a little stronghold in Attica, on the road to Boeotia. An attack thereon by the Thirty proved a failure, who accordingly ensconced themselves at Eleusis. From Phyle Thrasybulus, whose force had swelled to upwards of 1000 men, entered the Piraeus. The Thirty were forced to rally with their adherents. In the conflict that ensued they were defeated, and their leader Critias was slain. After some complications, the Thirty being succeeded by a board of Ten, who with assistance from Sparta carried on the war against Thrasybulus, the final result was the overthrow of oligarchy and the permanent restoration of the Democracy of Athens in September, 403 B.C. See Xen. Hell. 2. 4.

X

Χαερέφων, ἄρτος: Chaerephon, an Athenian of the deme of Sphettus, a companion of Socrates, 20 E, 21 A. Xenophon says that Chaerephon was one of those who listened to Socrates, not to become influential in public speaking or at law, but to make themselves “fair and good” in all social relations, Mem. 1. 2. 48. He was a butt of the ridicule of comedy, figuring side by side with Socrates in some of the ludicrous scenes of the Clouds, see vv. 140, 144, 156. In the Birds he is called the bat (νυκτερίς), on account of his cadaverous and sallow look, Ar. Av. 1564. Chaerephon had attached himself to Socrates from early youth, and was enthusiastically devoted to the master. Plato characterizes him as σφοδρός and μακάς (Charm. 153 B). He was thus well suited to the fiction of the oracle, capable of asking the god at Delphi whether any man was wiser than Socrates. And as he had been one of the exiles who returned with Thrasybulus (see φιγή), a reference to Chaerephon at the trial would presumably not be unacceptable to a dicastery impaneled under the Restored Democracy of Athens. See the note on Apol. 21 A.

χρηστός (χρησθαι) 3: good, 33 B. A synonym of ἀγαθός, as πονηρός and μοιχητήριος are synonyms of κακός. Opposed to πονηρός 25 C, Crit. 47 A.
APPENDIX

TABLE OF VARIOUS READINGS

[The readings of the present edition are shown in the left-hand column of the Table, and when followed by no indication to the contrary, have the authority of the best Ms. (B), as far as they go. The words inclosed in brackets in the right-hand column have been rejected as spurious on the authority (originally) of the critic first named.

The readings of Schanz in his annotated edition of the Apology are followed by the date (1893) when they differ from those of his text edition of 1875.

B = Codex Bodleianus (Oxford).
C = Codex Crusianus (Tübingen).
D = Codex Venetus 185.
E = Codex Venetus 184.
F = Codex Vaticanus 1029.

The small letters b, c, d, e, f, indicate corrections by later hands in the above-named Mss. respectively.]

Apology

17 A χρῆ f. χρῆ BDEF, ν erased in B.
B οὖν.
D ἐβδομηκοντα.

18 A κατηγορημένα.
B οὐδὲν.
κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ.

μετέωρα.

χρῆ BDEF, ν erased in B.
γοῦν Fβ.
πλεῖω ἐβδομηκοντα E.

[ψευδή] κατηγορημένα Hirschig.
[kαί] οὐδὲν Schanz 1893.
κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ [μᾶλλον οὐδὲν
ἀληθεῖς] Hermann.

μετέωρα [φροντιστής] Schanz
1893.

18 C οἱ ταύτην Heindorf.
ακούοντες BD.

19 D αὐτῶν ὑμῶν πολλοὺς Schanz
1893.
ἐκ τούτων EF.
οὐδέν.

ταύτην BDEF.
ακούοντες EF.

αὐτῶν (or ἀ) ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς.

ἐκ τούτων Bd. ἐν τούτω D.
οὐδέν [ἐστὶν] Schanz.
19 Ε ἵων. [ὁ ὁς τ’ ἐστὶν] ἵων Schanz.
20 Α ἐνθάδε [Πάρος] ἐνθάδε Schanz 1893.
     β διδάσκαι F.
     γ γέγονεν. διδάσκει.
     Σ γέγονεν [εἰ μὴ τι ἐπραττες ἄλλοιν
              ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ] Schanz.
21 Α ἐμὸς ἑταῖρος τε Schanz ἐμὸς τε ἑταῖρος.
     1893.
          πληθεὶς Schanz.
          κ σκοτῶν καὶ διαλεγόμενος
               αὐτῷ. In the Mss. the last three words
               follow Ἀθηναίος below.
22 Α ἵνα μὴ Stephanus.
     β αὐτῶν οἴόμενος anonym.
     γ λέγομαι Schanz 1893.
          τοῦτο οὐ F. A. Wolf.
          ὁσπερ ἢν εἰ Stephanus.
     δ εἰδέναι τι Schanz 1893.
     ε εὐντεταγμένως E.
23 Α δημιουργῶν.
     τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις Schanz τοῖς αὐτοῖς.
     1893.
     D εἰς τουτοὺς Cobet.
24 Α τοιοῦτων.
     β οὔ γε Schanz.
     C Σωκράτους οἴει Bailer.
25 Ε οἰδένα νομίζειν Edf.
26 Ε καὶ ὄνων.
     οἶπος οὖ.
     ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
     καὶ αὐ.
     θεοῦς.
     27 Α καὶ ἄλλους ἄγαθοὺς Cobet.
     D τάξη.
     τοιοῦτων [καὶ ἄκουσίων] Cobet.
     お互. οὔ.
     ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ E, Stephanus.
     καὶ αὐ [τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Hirschig.
     θεοῦς [μὴτε ἦρως] Prammer.
     καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἄγαθοὺς.
29 B καίτοι Eusebius.  
καὶ ἐνταῦθα.

C ἦδη.
πειθόμεθα Schanz 1893.
30 B ἀφιέτε ἡ μὴ E, Hirschig.
E πάλι.
31 C δαμόνιον γίγνεται.
D εἰ ἐγὼ.
32 A μαχούμενον Schanz 1893.
ἀμα καὶ Riddell.
B φυλή.
νόμον.
33 A ἐπιθυμοῦ Ἑ.
B οἱ ἄλλοι Ed.
D μεμήσθαι.
E ἔτι ὡ Ἑ.
34 B ἄλλα.
35 B ἡμᾶς χρῆ E.
ποιοῦντος.
35 C ἡγοῦμαι μήτε Schanz 1893.
D νὴ Δία.
πολλοῦ δὲw Schanz 1893.
36 B ἀντιτιμήσωμαι Hirschig, 
Cobet.
C ἐκαστον.
D καὶ ταῦτα.
οὐκ ἔσθ' ὦ τι.
37 B τοῦ τιμησάμενος Meiser.
C ἔστι μοι.

καίτοι τούτο.
[τούτῳ] καὶ ἐναῖθα Schanz 1893.
ἦδη [ἄν] Schanz 1893.
πειθόμεθα.
ἀφιέτε ἡ μὴ ἀφιέτε.
πάλι [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ] Hirschig.
δαμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνῇ] Forster, 
F. A. Wolf.
eἰ ἐγὼ [πάλαι] Cobet.
μαχούμενον.
ἀμα καὶ ἀμα ἄν BD.
φυλή ['Ἀντιχίς] Hirschig, Cobet.
νόμον [καὶ ἕαντα ἐφημοσάμην] 
Hermann.
ἐπιθυμεῖ BDF.
ἄλλοι BDF.
μεμήσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] Bek-
ker.
ἔτι BDF.
ἄλλα [ἰσως] Schanz 1893.
ὁμᾶς χρῆ BDF.
ποιοῦντος [ἡ τοῦ ἱσω迎接 αγωνισ] 
Cobet.
μήτε ἡγοῦμαι.
νὴ Δία [πάντως] Schanz.
πολλοῦ δεὶ.

ἐκαστον [ἴων] Schanz.
καὶ ταῦτα [γε] Baumann.
οὐκ ἔσθ' ὦ τι [μᾶλλον] Mudge.
τούτου τιμησάμενος.
ἔστι μοι [χρήματα] Hirschig.
37 D διατριβάς. διατριβάς [καὶ τοὺς λόγους] Schanz 1893. 
ēmē a' Schanz 1893. ēmē autoi.
39 C δῆ με DE. δῆ B.
40 A μαντική. μαντική [ἡ τοῦ δαίμονιον] Schleiermacher.
οἰηθείη ἄν τις. οἰηθείη ἄν τις [καὶ νομίζεται] Schanz 1893. 
B ἐνταυθότι. ἐνταυθότι [ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον] Hirschig.
C ψυχη. ψυχη [τοῦ τόπου τοῦ] Hirschig. 
D ἑγὼ γὰρ δῆ Schanz. ἑγὼ γὰρ ἄν.
41 B τίς ἀρ Stallbaum. τίς ἄν BDF. τίς E. 
ἐπὶ τόσοι δῆ ἄν Schanz 1893. ἐπὶ τόσοι δ' ἄν. 
ἄγαγόντα E. ἄγαγοντα BDF. 
D τοῦτο δ' Schanz 1893. τοῦτο.
μένων αὐτῶν δίομαι DEFb. δίομαι μένων αὑτῶν B. 
42 πλὴν el D. πλὴν . . . B. πλὴν ἡ EFb. 

Crito

43 A πρῶ. πρῶ CD. πρῶ ἐτι BE. 
D τοιτων. τοιτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων] Hirschig. 
44 B πιθοῦ Burges. πειθοῦ. 
ἐσται Hirschig. ἐστιν. 
ἐτί δῆ Schanz. ἐτί δὲ. 
Σίμιας inscriptions, Cobet, Σιμίας. 
Schanz. 
46 A δοκὴ Mudge. δοκεῖν. 
δ' ἐτί B. δὲ τι CD. δὲ E. 
47 A ὁδὲ καλῶς Hirschig. οὐχ ἰκανῶς. 
C δόξαν. δόξαν [καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους] Burges.
APPENDIX

47 C δισάλλοις CD.
48 D άγοντας ουτε ei Forster.
49 A ὁμολογήθη.

ἀνδρες.
50 D τούτους ἡμῶν.

tetagménoi.
52 A καὶ σὲ.

B ἔξηλθε BCD.
53 A οἱ νόμοι.

ἐμμενεῖς B.
C φανεῖσθαι.
E ἀνθρώπους καὶ.

εἰσχούμενοι.
54 A οἱ σοὶ.

D ἐταίρε.

τῶν αὐλῶν.

diállov Ecb.
άγοντας ουτε.
ὁμολογήθη [ὁπερ καὶ ἀρτι ἔλεγετο]
Burges, Hirschig.
tούτους ἡμῶν [τοῖς νόμοις]
Hirschig.
tetagménov [νόμοι] Hirschig.
καὶ σὲ [Σώκρατες] Schanz.
ἔξηλθες ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς ἰσθμὸν E.
οἱ νόμοι [ὅθεν ὅτι τίνι γὰρ δὲν
tόλις ἀρέσκοι ἀνευ νόμων]
Schanz.
ἐμμ.νεις.
[ἀν] φανείσθαι Schanz.
ἀνθρώπους καὶ [δουλεύων] Schleier-
macher.
εἰσχ.μενος [ἐν Θεταλῷ] Schanz.
oi σοὶ [ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν]
Schanz.
ἐταίρε [Κρίτων] Cobet.
tῶν αὐλῶν [δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν]
Burges.
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