IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS
IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS
IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

A SHORT HISTORY OF EGYPT
FROM THE FALL OF ISMAIL
TO THE ASSASSINATION OF BOUTROS PASHA

BY

DUSE MOHAMED

ILLUSTRATED

LONDON
STANLEY PAUL & CO.
First Edition, 1911

12-26892

"IMPEX OF CALIFORNIA"
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTORY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>&quot;ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>TEFIK—POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>TUNIS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>NINTH SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE JOINT NOTE</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>ARABI PASHA</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>&quot;FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY&quot;</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>TEL-EL-KEBIR</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>&quot;ICHABOD&quot;</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII.</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII.</td>
<td>THE HICKS EXPEDITION—AND AFTER</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV.</td>
<td>ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV.</td>
<td>THE WOLFF MISSION</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI.</td>
<td>&quot;THORNS AND THISTLES OF DIPLOMACY&quot;</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII.</td>
<td>&quot;LE ROI EST MORT&quot;</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX: ENGLAND’S PLEDGES</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII.</td>
<td>THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XIX.</td>
<td>Fashoda</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX.</td>
<td>The People of Egypt</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI.</td>
<td>Mustapha Pasha Kamil</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII.</td>
<td>Lord Cromer</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII.</td>
<td>&quot;Take Courage!&quot;</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV.</td>
<td>A Modern Rehoboam</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix: Full Text of Resolution in Legislative Council, 1 December, 1908; etc.</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXV.</td>
<td>Roosevelt—Imperial Democrat</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXVI.</td>
<td>Balfour's Little Band</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix I: More Pledges</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix II: Law of Liquidation</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td></td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duse Mohamed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians at Prayer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. H. Ismail Pasha</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. H. Tewfik Pasha</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Fellaheen Café</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance to El-Azhar University Mosque, Cairo</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Street in Cairo</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehemet Ali</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. H. Abbas Hilmi</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustapha Pasha Kamil</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Home of a Bey. (By kind permission of Mohamed Tewfik Soliman Bey)</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Egyptian Peasant Woman</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist School founded by Mustapha Pasha Kamil</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Farid Bey</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ex-Sultan of Turkey</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Kamil</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
"I will a round unvarnish'd tale deliver"

Othello, SHAKESPEARE
THE DYNASTY OF MEHEMET ALI OF EGYPT

MEHEMET ALI

Ibrahim

ISMAIL (4)  Toussoun  ABBAS (2)

MEHEMET TEWFIK (5)  Tewhida  SAID (3)  Mehemet Ali  Ali and Zeniab

ABBAS HILMI (6)  El Hami  Amina

I


Ibrahim, eldest son of Mehemet Ali (1789–1848). Was regent for a few months during his father's final illness. Died 10 November, 1848.

Toussoun (1796–1816). Distinguished himself during the Wahhábi war, 1811–1815.

Ismail (1798–1822) conquered the Soudan in 1820. Burnt alive with his staff in the palace at Shendy by the Nimr for his cruelties to the inhabitants.

Tewhida, married Moharrem Bey, who commanded the Egyptian squadron at Navarino in 1827.

Nazli, married Mohamed Bey Defterdar.

SAID (1823–1863), Pasha of Egypt (1854–1863).
Abdul-Halim (Prince Halim Pasha), 1831–1894.

Mehemet Ali the younger, 1836.

ABBAS I (1813–1854) commanded a division in Syria, 1831–32. On death of Ibrahim, became regent, succeeding to the Pashalik on the death of Mehemet Ali, 2 August, 1849. Being the eldest male of the family, he took precedence of his uncle SAID.


MEHMET TEFIK (1853–1892), succeeded his father, Ismail, 1879. Married his cousin, Princess Amina, granddaughter of ABBAS.

ABBAS HILMI II, born 1874. Succeeded his father, Tewfik, 7 January, 1892.

The children of Ibrahim Pasha, eldest son of Mehemet Ali, are:

Ahmed, ISMAIL KHEDIVE, and Mustapha Fazil.

Of these, Ahmed, the eldest, while heir to the Pashalik, was accidentally drowned at the ferry of Kafr-el-Zayat, 1858, consequently his younger brother, ISMAIL, succeeded SAID PASHA in 1863.

III

The children of ISMAIL KHEDIVE are: Mehmet Tewfik Khedive.

Hussein Kamil Pasha, who married Princess Ain-el-Hayat, daughter of his uncle Ahmed.

Hassan Pasha, married Khadija, daughter of Mehmet Ali, the younger.

Mahmoud Hamdi Pasha, married Princess Zeinab, daughter of El-Hami Pasha.

Princess Tewhida, married Mansour Pasha.

Princess Fatma, married Toussoun, son of Said Pasha.

Princess Jareel, married Ahmed Pasha, son of Ahmed (II).

IV

The children of MEHEMET TEWFIK KHEDIVE, by Princess Amina, are:

ABBAS HILMI PASHA, KHEDIVE, married Ikbal Hanum 1894, by whom he has issue—

Prince Mohamed Ali Pasha.

Princess Khadija, married Said Pasha, son of Abdul-Halim Pasha.

Princess Niamet-ullah, married Jameel Pasha, son of Toussoun.
BRITISH AGENTS AND CONSULS-GENERAL IN EGYPT, DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIR FRANK LASCELLES</td>
<td>20 March, 1879</td>
<td>10 October, 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR EDWARD MALET</td>
<td>10 October, 1879</td>
<td>11 September, 1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARL OF CROMER</td>
<td>11 September, 1883</td>
<td>6 May, 1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIR ELDON GORST</td>
<td>6 May, 1907</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHERIF PASHA</td>
<td>July, 1879</td>
<td>August, 1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIAZ PASHA</td>
<td>September, 1879</td>
<td>September, 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHERIF PASHA</td>
<td>September, 1881</td>
<td>February, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* MAHMUD SAMI PASHA</td>
<td>February, 1882</td>
<td>September, 1882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHERIF PASHA</td>
<td>October, 1882</td>
<td>December, 1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUBAR PASHA</td>
<td>January, 1884</td>
<td>June, 1888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIAZ PASHA</td>
<td>June, 1888</td>
<td>May, 1891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSTAPHA PASHA FEHMI</td>
<td>May, 1891</td>
<td>January, 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** RIAZ PASHA</td>
<td>January, 1893</td>
<td>April, 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUBAR PASHA</td>
<td>April, 1894</td>
<td>November, 1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSTAPHA PASHA FEHMI</td>
<td>November, 1895</td>
<td>March, 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUTROS PASHA GHALI</td>
<td>March, 1909</td>
<td>February, 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHAMED SAID PASHA</td>
<td>February, 1910</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ragheb Pasha was Prime Minister from July 12, 1882, but he was only a figurehead of Tewfik's, there being no government but that of the National Council.

** Fakhri Pasha was appointed Prime Minister by the Khedive in January, 1893, in place of Mustapha Fehmi, whom he dismissed; but Lord Cromer compelled the Khedive to dismiss Fakhri and appoint Riaz.
IN THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

In attempting to write a history, I am quite aware of the difficulties which beset my path, inasmuch as there are so many "histories" of Egypt. Many of these histories are wise, and not a few, otherwise; but each and every one for the most part is prejudicial to Home Rule in Egypt, and is wanting in that chief historical element—impartiality.

For upwards of a quarter of a century I have noted the continual growth of misrepresentation in the English Press touching Egyptian affairs, and the Roosevelt Guildhall peroration has proved the last straw of a most weighty bundle.

That I am qualified to deal adequately with the period under consideration, there need be little doubt. In the first place, I am a native Egyptian with a full knowledge of the aims of my fellow-countrymen, and consequently in sympathy with their sufferings—socially and politically. In the second place, not only was I in the city of Alexandria during its bombardment, but the fact that my father was an officer
in the Egyptian army and an ardent supporter of Ahmed Arabi—laying down his life gladly for the cause of Egyptian independence in the trenches of Tel-el-Kebir—gave me ample opportunities not only of coming into contact with many of the leaders of Egyptian reform, but of obtaining a first-hand knowledge of their views; a knowledge not imparted to any European then resident in Egypt, excepting of course Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and Sir William Gregory, and I believe Dr. John Ninet.

Since 1884 I have practically resided in England, where my education began in 1876. Notwithstanding this fact, I have kept in touch with the intellectual and political advancement of Egypt, and I therefore feel that in delivering this message I do so in some measure "as one having authority".

I have no "axe to grind", nor am I identified with any political party; the reader may therefore count upon an honest and impartial statement of facts. I might say in this connection that of late years Orientals, when conversing with Europeans—and especially is this the case with regard to Egypt—have been rather reticent regarding their political views; and this because Europeans have used information imparted by the natives for native destruction. Hence the complexity of Egyptian opinion, which is so very rarely what it seems, that no true estimate of it can be formed from superficial observation. Candour was a characteristic of the old Arab, until the coming of the "Frank", among whom candour was honoured more in the breach than in the observance. If, therefore, the European finds the modern Egyptian difficult to understand, that difficulty has been produced by the Europeans themselves. Egyptian faith in Europeans was very great; especially did this apply to
the English, prior to the events of 1882. Since that date the Egyptians have become sadder and wiser men, and this quickening process of intellectual enlightenment has effectually closed their lips. Let me hasten to add that we are not unmindful of, nor ungrateful for, the benefits which have been conferred by England. We also admit that Ismail's legacy of debt and political chaos required exceptional administrative capacity to extricate the country from its impending ruin.

But it must not be forgotten that Arabi Pasha and his co-reformers were men of unquestionable ability, notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary; and that these men, although recklessly accused of the usual "Oriental incapacity", had outlined many of the reforms and improvements which were introduced by Lord Cromer with such conspicuous success.¹ Herbert Paul says, "Bigotry dies hard and slowly, but it dies". Colour prejudice, on the other hand, is not infrequently shifted from one ship of state to another, but never by any chance is it cast overboard. Colour prejudice is at the root of most of the "Oriental incapacity" which bulks so largely in English literature. I have patiently awaited the death of colour prejudice for many years, and I have a rather large spade in readiness wherewith to expedite its interment; but I greatly fear its tale of years is likely to wrest the laurels from the hoary brow of Methusaleh, establishing for itself a long-distance record which no human agency will ever take away. Anglo-Saxon educational achievement is accounted erudition, while Oriental educational attainments are indiscriminately labelled "educational veneer", or "a veneer of Western

THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

culture"; and this applies not only to Orientals, but to all the coloured races of the world.

Thus a university degree is either a valuable asset in the march of social and political progress, or it is not. If it is valuable only to the Anglo-Saxon, the European would be well advised to close his educational portals immediately, and forthwith throw overboard the nauseating cant about "fitting the Oriental for self-government"; "giving the native a share in the government when he is qualified"; (?) and the remainder of the sentimental nonsense complacently digested by the superficial British reader: nonsense helps to salve the official consciences of a reactionary British bureaucracy, but does not hoodwink the Oriental of even average intelligence. I have yet to learn that an English university degree may be obtained by an Oriental without mental effort—the "veneer of European culture" notwithstanding.

A British soldier in India, fresh from the East End of London, will apply the opprobrious epithet "nigger" with equal impartiality to a Maharajah or a Hindoo priest; and the "gentlemanly" snob from the London suburbs will not be outdone by the soldier in his expressed contempt for the native. Fortunately, British policy is not shaped in Whitechapel, nor is it usual to select statesmen in Tooting. In like manner an Oriental bazaar may be a place for the interchange of views, but it is hardly the abiding habitation of Oriental thought.

Touching this vexed question of Oriental inferiority which seems to have taken so firm a hold on the Anglo-Saxon mind, do not the edifices of India, sacred and otherwise, bear witness to a civilisation whose antiquity is lost in the mists of chronological computa-
"God is present to Mohammedans in a sense in which He is rarely present to us amidst the hurry and confusion of the West."—Dean Stanley.
tion, whilst its religions cause the Western mind to be uprooted from its foundations in its vain endeavours to fathom the intricacies of a complex dogma? Yet these men of India are semi-civilised nullities, forsooth!

Those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of Moorish architecture, wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the Delta, must perforce admit that these edifices were the results of Oriental intellect unaided by the "veneer of European culture or Western civilisation". The mirth not infrequently provoked in the breast of the Anglo-Saxon tourist, by reason of the visible signs of Mohammedan worship, which are daily observed in the streets of Cairo, is another of the many evidences of insular prejudice and limited understanding.

It must not be forgotten that in Egypt religion enters largely into the social fabric, whereas in Europe religion takes a secondary place, in practice if not in theory. Islam is positive; Christianity—especially Protestantism—is negative. There can be little doubt that irreligion among the Mohammedans, and even the Coptic Christians of Egypt, has been the result of French and British occupation and the attendant evils of the "Capitulations".

All these matters shall be dealt with in their proper places.

I would add that it is because I believe the people of Great Britain to be, not only a freedom-loving race, but possessed of a genuine desire to see other nations as free as themselves, that I am emboldened to pen these pages.
CHAPTER II

"ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT"

JUST after midnight, on the morning of 25 June, 1879, the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, was aroused from the amorous embraces of his harem by a summons to his audience chamber, there to meet Sir Frank Lascelles, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, M. Tricou and Baron De Saurma—Consuls-General of France and Germany respectively—who, accompanied by Cherif Pasha, called at that unusual hour to inform him that they had just received a communication from the Sultan of Turkey, deposing His Highness and appointing Prince Halim as his successor in the government of Egypt.¹

Hardly had he recovered from the shock occasioned by this intelligence, when the succeeding day found him in possession of that famous telegram, "From the Sultan of Turkey to the ex-Khedive Ismail Pasha".² Thus, after eighteen years of misrule, the princely seat that he had bought with borrowed gold from Europe was, by the irony of an inexorable fate,

² The following passage of the telegram taken from Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, p. 140, reads: "Il est prouvé que votre maintien au poste de Khedive ne pouvait avoir d'autre résultat que de multiplier et d'aggraver les difficultés présents. Par conséquent Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, à la suite de la décision de son Conseil des Ministres, a décidé de nommer au poste de Khedive Son Excellence Mehemet Tewfik Pasha, et l'Irdade Imperial concernant ce sujet vient d'être promulgué. Cette haute décision est communiquée à Son Excellence par une autre dépêche, et je vous invite à vous retirer des affaires gouvernementales, conformément à l'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan".
wrested from him by the very agency which had contributed to his vanity and ambition. His reign had begun during a period of unexampled prosperity, for the peasantry had named the reign of Said, his predecessor, "The Age of Gold". On his accession in 1863, he found Egypt with a revenue of four millions, and a national debt of only three millions. In 1879 the debt stood at over ninety millions, with a possible revenue of £8,500,000! Said Pasha had abandoned the Viceroy's claim to be sole landlord of the Nile, and had recognised a proprietary right in the existing occupiers of the soil, fixing the land tax at the low figure of forty piastres to the feddan.¹ In 1879 not only had the land tax risen to one hundred and sixty piastres, but Ismail, returning to the old order, seized the lands of the people, with or without valid pretexts, or so squeezed the landowners by his cruel methods of taxation that they were forced to sell their lands in self-defence. Whipping was even resorted to, in order to extract the last piastre from a starving peasantry. Mehemet Ali had brought his cruel method of extracting taxes to a fine art; but the Viceroy's methods were mere child's play compared with the system introduced by Ismail Sadyk the "Muffetish", and Financial Minister of Ismail Khedive; and this pernicious system was successfully continued under Sir Rivers Wilson, Sadyk's English successor.

While on the one hand the notorious Ismail Sadyk was devising means for the spoliation of the peasantry, the no less notorious Nubar Pasha was scouring Europe for the purpose of negotiating loans—a goodly commission passing into his own pockets—wherewith to aid his princely master in building palaces, enrich-

¹ Roughly speaking, a feddan is about or equal to an acre.
ing European women of easy virtue, lavishly entertain- ing European visitors, conquering the Upper Nile, and fitting out an expensive but abortive expedition to subdue the kingdom of Abyssinia. On every side Ismail was surrounded by sycophants. The European speculator indulged his passion for speculation, promising to make him the most rich and successful of financiers; while his Oriental flatterers promised him a reign of dazzling magnificence and Eastern conquest, with an African Empire which, divested of Turkish suzerainty, would not only stretch from the Mediterranean to the Equator, but would surpass in its magnitude any previous achievement mentioned in Mohammedan annals. From a mere landlord he had been suddenly and unexpectedly raised to the Viceregal throne, owing to the accidental drowning of his elder brother, Ahmed. By reason of the administrative and acquisitive ability of his grandfather, Mehemet Ali, he found himself master of the most prosperous of Mohammedan states and the most progressive agricultural province, not only of the Ottoman Egypt, but of the Eastern World.

Said, his predecessor, had introduced the railways and other public works, necessitating the negotiation of the first State Loan; this, with his undiplomatic Suez Canal concession to de Lesseps, were the indirect causes of the subsequent bankruptcy of the country. Nevertheless, the national debt was counterbalanced by the sudden demand for Egyptian cotton caused by the shortage in America resulting from the Civil War. This demand for Egyptian cotton raised the export revenue from four millions in 1862 to fourteen millions in 1864. It will therefore be seen that had Ismail possessed one tittle of the administrative ability of his grandfather, the national debt might
very easily have been liquidated during the first years of his reign. Even the impolitic construction of the Suez Canal, and the reduced cotton export brought about by the conclusion of the American War, would not necessarily have retarded the onward march of Egyptian prosperity.

But Ismail aimed at being the "Grand Monarque" of the East. Did he not once exclaim, "My country is no longer in Africa, we now form part of Europe"? But that financial juggler, de Lesseps—Ismail's evil genius—was by no means a Colbert, nor was Nubar Pasha a Mazarin; and although Ismail for a time at least carried into effect Louis's famous saying, "L'état c'est moi," he did not possess that strength of character, remarkable energy, and indomitable perseverance which made the Grand Monarque admired by his people, and feared by the nations of Europe; and a bitter experience taught Ismail that trickery was not statecraft, neither was fraud finance. Mehemet Ali with all his cleverness had been outwitted by Admiral Sir Charles Napier; how, then, could he—a mere trickster—hope to outwit the united European creditors clamouring at his gate? Lord Beaconsfield bought Ismail's shares in the Canal. This gave England a preponderating interest in Egypt, but it neither nullified his obligations to the French bondholders nor prevented the Dual Control. He spent upwards of three millions in presents to the Sultan and in bribing the palace officials at Stamboul, that he might obtain the Porte's permission to negotiate loans; also that he might become hereditary

---

1 See Cameron's "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century", p. 194.
2 Ismail possessed about 176,602 original founder's shares in the Canal; being in his usual condition of impecuniosity he offered these as security for a loan; Lord Beaconsfield purchased them on 26 November, 1875, for £4,000,000 in cash.
ruler, thereby diverting the succession from the rightful heirs to his own immediate descendants.\(^1\) At the opening of the Suez Canal, when upwards of four thousand guests were invited from every clime to grace his fantastic Cairo fêtes, champagne flowed in palace and hotel for weeks, even as the waters of an inundating Nile; and banquets, balls, gala performances, fireworks, operas, were arranged to do honour to a distinguished company, which included the Empress Eugénie, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia. Hotels, railways, steamers, carriages, were gratuitously placed at the disposal of this invading army of pleasure-seekers. For this magnificent orgy of an incredible prodigality the Minister of Finance dipped his hands into the National Chest, paying the demands of hotel proprietors and others without question. The loans he negotiated were the cause of his undoing; and it was only because the European Governments knew that his son Tewfik would be as clay in their hands, that this prince was permitted to succeed to the Khediviate. He increased the tribute by £30,000, in order to acquire Suakin and Massowah. England now holds Suakin with the balance of the Soudan, and Italy at a subsequent date occupied Massowah; but Egypt was saddled with the additional tribute. He finally professed to bow to the will of his people, and tried to hoodwink Europe by introducing constitutional government; but inasmuch as he could not simultaneously become a despot and a constitutional ruler, he surreptitiously engineered the famous

\(^1\) Prince Halim, born in 1831, was the eldest surviving male of the family of Mehemet Ali, and according to the Mohammedan law of succession should have succeeded Ismail in the Viceregal Chair. Ismail, however, on 27 May, 1866, obtained a Firman from the Sultan altering the succession and diverting it to his eldest son and the eldest sons of his successors, in other words, by right of primogeniture.
mutiny of 18 February, 1879. He then attempted to return to the old order by dismissing the Controllers and issuing his own financial decrees, which decrees were promptly repudiated by Bismarck, who was instrumental to his deposition.1 But craft being Ismail’s chief weapon, he cleverly depleted the treasury of its current account, fleeced his friends of their valuables, and gracefully retired to his yacht on 30 June, 1879, with a final spoil of some three millions sterling.

Now that mutiny of 1879 was destined to have far-reaching results, not only in its bearing on the eventual reduction of the army, but also because it led to the absolute extinction of free and independent government in Egypt. By the Sultan’s Firman of 1873, the fourth clause gave Ismail and his successors “the right to fix the strength of the army” without reference to Constantinople. Ismail being deposed by the Sultan, this clause was rescinded in 1879, and the peace strength of the Egyptian army was limited to 18,000 men.

The Sultan was fearful lest his suzerain rights should be endangered, and the mutiny of 1879 had proved that the will of the army could, by a little diplomacy, be made the will of the people. He knew that France favoured an independent Egypt, whereas successive British Governments had shown a decided disinclination to favour any tendency towards the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Here, then, was the desired opportunity to forestall any reform movement in Egypt by limiting the army. That a reform movement was on foot was well known to the

1 Mr. Wilfrid Blunt says that Bismarck was instigated by the Rothschilds on the information of Sir Rivers Wilson, who thereby revenged himself on Ismail for his dismissal by informing the Rothschilds of the true state of the finances of Egypt.
Porte. Sheykh Jemal-ed-din, the great leader of thought at El-Azhar University, had, with his school—which included such constitutionalists as Ali Pasha Maburak and Mahmud Bey Sami-el-Barodi—maintained that “the growing absolutism of Mohammedan princes in modern times was contrary to the spirit of Islam, which in its essence was a Republic, where every Moslem had the right of free speech in its assemblies, and where the authority of the ruler rested on his conformity to the law, and on popular approval.” Here were the elements not only of reform but of revolution, and Ismail’s little coup d’état had abundantly proved what a really strong man could do at the head of a well-disciplined Egyptian army. Nor was this all; the Sheykh-al-Berki, the Nekib-el-Ashraf, or representative of all the descendants of the Prophet in Egypt, was carrying on a most strenuous agitation with the aid of the Notables and Ulemas, not only “against Riaz Pasha and the European Ministers”, as Sir Frank Lascelles’ report to Lord Salisbury under date of 1 April suggests, but against the House of Othman. This House caring very little about religion, had for two hundred years sunk the spiritual side of the Caliphate in the temporal; and although the most powerful of Mohammedan princes, unless they could be induced to take a more serious view of the spiritual aspect of their position, a new Emir-el-Memenin, or head of the Moslem faith, would not have been considered a remote possibility by the Egyptian reformers of the El-Azhar. It was this knowledge that was in part responsible for Abdul Hamid’s Pan-Islamic propaganda which had so alarmed the British authorities at Calcutta, as tending to undermine the loyalty of the Mohammedans of India.
"ISMAIL, THE MAGNIFICENT"

Notwithstanding the Sultan's decree convoking a constitutional assembly five years previously, he was a rank reactionary and opportunist rather than a constitutionalist. This is abundantly proved by his subsequent treatment of Midhat Pasha. He well knew that Ismail was also of his mind as regards representative assemblies; this accounts for his reluctance to depose Ismail until he found the pressure of the Powers too strong for him. It must also be borne in mind that the Sultan had in his first communication, when deposing the Khedive Ismail, named Halim as his successor, until the Powers, in their own financial interests, insisted on the succession of Tewfik according to the Firman of 1873. Tewfik had been under the influence of the reformers of the El-Azhar, but Prince Halim belonged to the old Turkish reactionary party. The appointment of the former, from the Sultan's point of view at least, meant Egyptian constitutional reform, and very probably, should England be won over to the French view of the situation, the eventual independence of Egypt both civil and religious, and the absolute extinction of the Sultan's suzerainty. Whereas, with Halim Pasha as Khedive, "the good old" Turkish regime would be reintroduced, with its tyranny, bribery, and corruption, and its wanton cruelty to the unfortunate fellaheen. The Porte knew well that with England's approval his Empire was safe; and as long as the financial harpies of Europe obtained from Egypt "the due fulfilment of the bond," little they cared about the abject conditions of the people groaning under the iniquitous system of taxation, in their efforts to liquidate a liability they had not contracted, and from which they had derived no benefit whatever. The sequel proves, however, that the
Sultan's anxiety was quite unnecessary, so far as it affected the political sentiments of Tewfik.

In bringing this chapter to a close, I must revert once more to Ismail's debt, and must examine, as far as may be, the claims of the Powers to saddle Egypt with financial encumbrances which were the results of an irresponsible individual's reckless expenditure. That this individual was the ruler of Egypt was no excuse for the gigantic financial conspiracy which involved an innocent people in ruin, and fastened a foreign yoke about their necks.

The various financiers of Europe, when they wantonly advanced large sums to Ismail must have been aware, that although he handled the taxes, the revenue of the country resulting from taxations was insufficient to meet the current expenses of the Government, and at the same time liquidate the interest on the various loans. It was this condition of affairs that compelled Ismail to sell his Suez Canal shares to Lord Beaconsfield, the coupons having previously disappeared into the insatiable pockets of one of Ismail's many creditors. All Europe knew of this sale of shares in 1876, and that the sale was necessitated by the Khedive's extravagances and imprudent condition; yet, though to all appearances insolvent, he was permitted to go on for another two years before the Decree was issued appointing a Commission of Inquiry. This Commission found that not only was a very large proportion of the debt due to tradespeople, but that the Khedive and Ismail Sadyk, his Financial Minister, had indulged in the expensive luxury of "bearing" the Khedivial stock on 'Change. There was an account, for instance, among other like items, of £150,000 due to a French dressmaker, contracted by an Egyptian princess. It will there-
fore be observed from these few wild transactions that they were, as Lord Cromer avers, "the most astounding financial operations in which any Government in the world ever engaged". These operations were, however, "the astounding financial operations" of an individual—not of the Egyptian Government—which were made possible by the modern greed of gold, and the universal desire in Europe to be quickly rich, however risky the "gamble".

I will now turn to a parallel example in modern English history. George IV was the Western counterpart of Ismail. I have it on the authority of every writer on his time, that he was a spendthrift, a profligate, and a comparative despot; all of which Ismail was, with this difference: George's debts, principally contracted during his Regency, were neither liquidated by himself nor were they added to the national debt. George, however, was "the first gentleman in Europe", while Ismail was but an Oriental ruler. The speculators in Egyptian ventures were backed by the legions of their several countries, and a man with many armies can always have his claims respected. George's creditors were Britons, therefore there could be no threat of foreign legions and an armed debt collector. Nor can I find that George, when Prince of Wales and Regent of the United Kingdom, surrendered any part of the enormous revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall to his clamouring creditors. On the other hand, Ismail did eventually surrender his Egyptian estates to his creditors. And let it not be forgotten that his huge properties, the State railways, the telegraphs, the sugar works, his palaces, the State lands, Gherzireh Park, represented a sum not far short of the £100,000,000 which he owed; and as Ismail's private
debts were made the liabilities of the State, the enormous sums he spent on public works must be taken into account. These, which were begun during his reign, constitute a very large portion of the present wealth of Egypt. Besides, England paid £4,000,000 for the Suez Canal shares: worth about £40,000,000 to-day, this is by no means a bad investment. The affairs of the Daira, once Ismail's private property, were wound up in 1905 with a surplus of £6,400,000.¹ Ismail's heirs had abandoned their rights in favour of the creditors, but Lord Cromer did not permit the Princes to share in this surplus. Yet the engagements, entered into with the Princes when they renounced their rights, have not always been kept. For instance, Prince Hassin Kamil Pasha should have received £24,000 per annum for land which he surrendered to the State, in lieu of an income of £40,000 per annum, which the estate would have brought him. Shortly after this arrangement the sum was reduced to £18,000, when it was alleged that the claim was too high; about a year later, this time on the plea of Egyptian poverty, the sum was again reduced to £12,000.

It was the duty of the Commission of Inquiry to separate the liabilities of State from those which were purely personal; charging the latter to the private estates of the Khedive, which, as I have shown, they were well able to bear, and the former to the revenue of the country.

I am aware that the task both of the Commission and the Controllers was of Herculean proportions, but this does not absolve them from a question of equity. Europe was, however, financially in the

¹ A full account of the Daira and Domains estates will be found in Chapter xvi.
H.H. ISMAIL PASHA
EX-KHEDIVE OF EGYPT
hands of the Rothschilds. The Rothschilds were Ismail's chief creditors. Europeans could not make war on each other or on weak Orientals, without gold wherewith to purchase the sinews of war; the bankers of Europe possessed this gold. The money interest has been abundantly proved in recent times to be the controlling element in war. Conquest is no longer the battle-cry of monarchs. Modern warfare is conducted in the interest of trade and dividends. As long, therefore, as mankind shall continue to worship at the shrine of Mammon, bestowing its most liberal applause on the seekers after riches, the lust of gold will ever be the vice of the most exalted characters: all of which pertinently calls up the sage lines of Omár Kháyyám:

"And those who husbanded the Golden Grain,
And those who flung it to the winds like Rain,
Alike to no such aureate Earth are turn'd
As, buried once, Men want dug up again."
CHAPTER III

TEWFIK—POLITICAL SHUTTLECOCK

ISMAIL having retired from Egypt—for the everlasting good of Egypt—to his Neapolitan asylum, there to indulge in "plots, excursions, and alarums", Tewfik, his son, by the grace of Allah and the Powers, reigned in his stead. It is a fact that the Sultan, fearing Tewfik's indulgence in such dangerous amusements as political reforms and constitutionalism—for reasons fully set forth in the preceding chapter—did withhold, or at any rate delay, the Firman ordering Tewfik's investiture; but these little difficulties were soon overcome by Tewfik's patrons—the Powers. After a few trifling hitches, he duly became ruler of all the Egyptians by kind permission of the Dual Control—and the Sultan.

Now in the early days of Tewfik's gentle dalliance with political reform, he came under the influence of the Sheykh Jemal-ed-din and his school of constitutional reformers at the El-Azhar University; and when Ismail conferred that short-lived constitution on Egypt, Tewfik became President of the Council, and was thus brought into direct contact with the Notables, who considered him "Egypt's Hope". Moreover, just prior to the promulgation of Ismail's constitution—by reason of the evil he had wrought—there was a movement on foot at the El-Azhar to demand his deposition at the hands of the Sultan; or, failing that, his timely removal in the
same manner as he had removed his Financial Minister, Ismail Sadyk, that is to say, by a bowstring, an iron box, and a grave beneath the still mysterious waters of the Nile—Tewfik being privily named as his successor. The more aggressive reformers had really become disgusted with the entire stock of Mehemet Ali and their brood of Turkish-speaking Circassians: a crowd of political vampires, who, like their predecessors the Mamalukes, lorded it over the country, extracting all the good things from the land, and leaving only the husks to the poor Arab-speaking fellah. On the other hand the reformers, possessing more temperate views, counselled patience inasmuch as Ismail could not live for ever, and they looked to Tewfik as their ultimate deliverer—Tewfik with his hypocritical professions of conversion, and fulsome promises of reform, "when he should 'rule' Egypt". By reason of these professions, when Ismail's Constitution was introduced, they very naturally believed that Tewfik had influenced it; and during the three short months of its operation the people of Egypt were happier, more hopeful and contented than they had ever been in the whole history of the country.

When Nubar Pasha fell and the constitution came to an abrupt conclusion, the reformers knew that Ismail's political end was in sight; for, should the Powers and the Sultan be unable or unwilling to remove him, they of the El-Azhar intended to make the order of his going their especial duty. The Powers, however, by their timely intervention, shouldered the responsibility and relieved the situation. And now that Tewfik ruled, the constitutionalists were destined to test the value of his promises; nor had they long to wait, for the Khedive, after charging
Cherif Pasha with the formation of a ministry, promised the Minister that he would grant a Decree authorising a constitution; on that document being presented he refused to sign the Decree and Cherif Pasha resigned. This liberal-minded Minister had experienced absolute rule in Ismail's time and knew all its attendant evils; and being a man "of exceeding honesty"—a very rare quality in an official of those corrupt times—it was only upon Tewfik's guarantee of a constitution that he accepted office. The Consuls were, however, unwilling that Constitutional Government should be introduced into Egypt; at any rate, not until the finances of the country were put upon a basis favourable to themselves. Cherif being therefore unable to introduce a form of Government which experience had taught him was the best in the circumstances, tendered his resignation; and the Khedive forthwith became his own Prime Minister, instantly blighting the hopes of all those in favour of free institutions, and betraying his friends at the El-Azhar, under the transparent pretext, that "liberal institutions were quite unsuited to the country at present". Truly has the Psalmist said, "Put not your trust in princes".

In the meantime the European Consuls had other views. Riaz Pasha was summoned to Egypt, and on 22 September, 1879, was entrusted with the formation of a ministry, the old Rescript of Ismail of 28 August, 1878, being resuscitated. Riaz, taking Tewfik's place as President of the Council and being the nominee of the Consulates, was very naturally expected to carry into effect their ideas of financial reform; at the same time he was granted full powers to carry on the internal administration in the Khedive's name, independently of any Council or
Assembly. "The Khedive, however, reserved to himself the right to preside whenever he thought it desirable to do so". In other words, should the Council fail to show due appreciation for the will of the Consulates, Tewfik would preside that he might overawe them into obedience. It need hardly be stated now that the old order had been reintroduced; the Kurbash reasserted its dominion over the land. The courts of justice increased their powers: those international tribunals introduced by that self-seeking Armenian, Nubar Pasha, where European crimes committed in Egypt were tried in Egypt under the law of the foreigner, and where native evidence for the most part was discredited, or held in such contempt that there was little chance of justice for the native litigant. The alien caste of Turks and Circassians continued to lord it over the people; and the landed classes found themselves throttled by debt, whilst the poor fellaheen groaned under the extortions of Greek moneylenders.

One would have thought that Tewfik's intimate experience of personal rule, and also that of liberal institutions, would have caused him to choose the latter in the interests of his people. But his culpable neglect and betrayal of his friends in this, the first important decision of his reign, not only made him the dummy prince of the Consulates, but was the cause of all his subsequent troubles; for, like a shuttlecock, he was banged first by the battledore of the Powers, then by that of the Sultan, and again by the Nationalists and the army. Had he remained firm to his plighted word to Cherif Pasha and the reform party, summoning a Council of Notables, he would unquestionably have been spared all the intrigues and counter-intrigues of the next two years.
of his reign. He would have obtained the good-will and unconditional obedience of his subjects also; for it must be distinctly understood that Riaz Pasha's appointment was in direct opposition of the popular will. He was known throughout Europe to be of the old Turkish regime, with its deportations, police rule, espionage, and illegal arrests. Notwithstanding these facts, I have it on undisputable authority that his object in taking office was to assist, as expeditiously as possible, in extricating the country from its financial misfortunes, thereby ridding Egypt of foreign intervention. Much has been written against this man, but there is this to his credit: during his first year of office he did succeed in relieving the fellaheen from many of his most pressing financial burdens. Nevertheless, however sincere his intentions, it was quite impossible for him to effect anything in the nature of popular reform when it is remembered that his ministry was mainly composed of Turkish reactionaries of the old school. Of these, Osman Rifky, War Minister, was by no means the least disturbing element; and his subsequent fall was destined to be brought about through Rifky's autocratic and reactionary methods.

It was during these early months of Tewfik's rule that Sir Edward Malet — having succeeded Sir Frank Lascelles as Consul-General — visited Constantinople, and declared on his return to Egypt, that "the Sultan Abdul Hamid would never agree to real constitutional government in Egypt". This statement in a measure strengthened the weak-willed Khedive, inciting him to adopt more stringent methods in his rather fatuous opposition to reform; for he thought that he could now rely on support from Constantinople, in addition to that of his masters,
the Powers. He had, however, only succeeded in fanning into flame those smouldering embers of Nationalist bitterness against himself and his house, which were burning so furiously in Ismail's time. The native Press meanwhile freely attacked the unjust taxation that existed, which, being under European financial control, favoured Europeans at the expense of the native population. It attacked not only the multiplying of offices in the interests of foreigners, and the French and English control of the railway administration, but also the existing brothels, wine shops, and disreputable café chantants which were fostered under the protecting mantle of the capitulations, and were abhorred by all pious Moslems, because of their uncontrolled depravity. "We, who call ourselves Christians", writes Cameron, "cannot but feel ashamed when we learn how, during that thirty years, Christian adventurers victimised the Moslems of Egypt, not shooting them down, it is true, but nevertheless cruelly wronging them by the abuses of privilege and capitulations, by mysterious processes of European law to which Orientals were quite unaccustomed. Whatever may be the point of view, a high or low standard of morality, a love of truth, or a pleasant cynicism in politics, there must be one weight and one measure. We cannot condemn the Egyptians and acquit the Europeans, and if we palliate our own offences we must condone those of Abbas and Said, and even Ismail."  

During the period under consideration, Arab and Coptic girls were being frequently abducted from their homes to be offered up as a sacrifice at the shrine of lust and immorality, and to promote the evil traffic of the brothel; whilst the youthful and

---

1 Cameron's "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century", p. 226.
hitherto temperate Moslem was initiated into the depraved mysteries of drunkenness, debauchery, and a whole catalogue of unprintable vices. This agitation, which began in a small way, gradually grew in proportions until it culminated in the mutiny of 1 February, 1881. Now in order to fully understand the underlying reasons of this mutiny, it is necessary to return once more to the time of Said Pasha. This Viceroy was imbued with a sincere desire to advance Egyptian commercial prosperity and at the same time raise the Arab-speaking fellah to that condition of class equality which previously had been denied him by his Turco-Circassian masters, and to which Said considered him justly entitled, inasmuch as he was the preponderating element in Egyptian nationality; Said, among other efforts for the amelioration of the fellah, brought into being a scheme whereby the sons of village Sheykhs were trained as officers of the Egyptian army. This innovation gave them every opportunity of rising to the highest rank by merit alone, and not by the old system of patronage which had elevated the Turco-Circassians to the higher posts. Among these young men was Ahmed Bey Arabi, who was quickly pushed on through the lower ranks, becoming a lieutenant-colonel at the tender age of twenty; and being favoured by Said, became his A.D.C., accompanying him to Medina just prior to his death.

On Ismail’s succession, being as it were, “a king that knew not Joseph”, he withdrew the favour shown to the fellah officers in the preceding reign. Arabi and the other Arab-speaking officers were treated with contumely by the Turco-Circassians, to whom promotions were now being apportioned. The monopoly of the higher army and official posts
remained entirely in their hands, whilst the Arab-speaking element almost exclusively composed the army, from the common soldier up to the captain. The unsuccessful Abyssinian campaign not only destroyed Khedivial prestige, but threw up in bold relief the ignorance and incompetence of the Turco-Circassian generals, whom the returning men no longer respected; and the resultant financial difficulties, while in no way diminishing the salaries of the Circassians, caused the pay of the Arab officers to be both precarious and irregular; besides this the men were frequently subjected to iniquitous fines and forfeitures. These events naturally aroused discontent in the breasts of those who had been taught to expect better things; and this dissatisfaction existing among the fellah officers and the rank and file, was fully shared by the country, where the Circassian official possessed both the will and the opportunity of making his presence a most hateful adjunct to Egyptian oppression.

There had been previous conspiracies among the lower officers, who had at this time made common cause with the men. These conspiracies were never publicly known, but my father informed me they came perilously near to a violent eruption. Ahmed Arabi, because of his fellah origin and his unusual rank, became a recognised leader of this class as early as 1877.

As the non-payment and irregularity of the fellah officers' salaries continued after Tewfik's succession, notwithstanding the regularity with which payment was made to the Circassians, this prompted the fellah officers to petition Riaz Pasha on 20 May, 1880, demanding an inquiry into the whole system. This petition, which was non-political, was signed by all
the senior Arab officers, including Arabi and Abdul Aal Helmy. The inquiry was duly held; and Baron de Ring, the French Consul, not only supported the just claims of the officers, granting them his protection as far as was prudent, but had a rather stormy scene with Riaz Pasha in consequence, during the sitting of the inquiry. The officers gained a victory, but Osman Rifky never forgave them, subsequently revenging himself on the soldiers by subjecting them to a kind of corvée of hard labour, such as agricultural work on the Khedivial estates, and the digging of canals. The men very naturally objected and their officers protested; but they were compelled to continue the work, until Arabi refused to permit the men of his regiment to be ordered away for manual labour on the Towfikiyeh Canal. This refusal brought him for the first time into direct conflict with Rifky. Meanwhile, although half-hearted efforts were being made to improve the civil administration, nothing was done for the army, which Riaz did not understand, and Rifky, although War Minister, cared nothing about. Besides, many officers had been dismissed the service without legal inquiry, whilst numerous promotions with increased pay had been made amongst the Circassians. The Khedive had become jealous of Riaz because of the free hand the Consulates had granted him in the administration, in return for his non-interference with their financial juggling. Tewfik, therefore, by underhand methods instructed his A.D.C., Colonel Ali Bey Fehmy—a fellah officer commanding the 1st Regiment of Khedivial Guards, who was attached to the Palace, because of his union with a Circassian woman—to inform Arabi and Abdul Aal Helmy, the fellah Colonel of the Black Regiment, that he, Tewfik, was with the
army in their quarrel with the Ministry. These three therefore drew up and signed a petition which they presented in person to Riaz on 15 January, 1881, demanding an inquiry into the promotion of the Circassians, and the removal of their "friend," the Minister of War. Riaz requested the officers to withdraw the petition, promising them an immediate inquiry. They waited a fortnight, making further efforts in the interim in the same direction, and at the end of that period they were decoyed to the Ministry and put on their trial. The fellah officers and men being privily informed of the conspiracy, marched to the Ministry of War, forced an entrance, released their commanders, and wrecked the office. The Colonels then marched to the Palace at the head of their regiments, and demanded the instant dismissal of Rifky. The Khedive ordered Osman Rifky's dismissal, and, at the instance of the Colonels, appointed Mahmud Bey Sami-el-Barodi, a recognised liberal reformer, as his successor. Thus ended the mutiny of 1881: Arabi and the other Colonels returning to their military duties. But this mutiny, although forced upon its leaders by the injustice of the War Minister on the one hand, and secretly instigated by the Khedive on the other, proved the undoubted strength of the army, and revived hope in the breasts of the much-oppressed fellahin, who were quick to observe that their sons and brothers, who could compel the dismissal of a Minister approved by the Powers, were a political force to be reckoned with, and might, with the fellah population behind them, eventually bring into being that much desired consummation, an

"EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS"!
CHAPTER IV

TUNIS

PRECEDED by paeans of Press adulation and theatrical display that might have done credit to the most exacting of Eastern potentates, the Rt. Honourable Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, and the Most Noble the Marquis of Salisbury went forth in the summer of 1878 as befitted Her Britannic Majesty’s plenipotentiaries, on their triumphal progress towards the city of Berlin, where at that famous Congress of the 13 June they were to determine the fate of European Turkey, and of the Christian subjects of His Sublime Majesty the Sultan. At the same time they were to revise the treaty of San Stefano, which by a British naval demonstration in the Dardanelles had been previously wrung from the persistent Muscovite, whose armed force stood without the gates of Constantinople.

Now, Sir Henry Layard, Britain’s Ambassador at Constantinople, a man well versed in Eastern knowledge and diplomacy, some two months after the signing of the treaty of San Stefano, by reason of his great influence and his ascendancy over the youthful Sultan, Abdul Hamid, negotiated a secret Convention with the Porte in which a lease of the island of Cyprus was granted to England. In lieu of promises of reform in His Majesty’s Dominions on the part of the Sultan, this was to be brought about through
the agency of certain travelling English military Consuls, who were to advise and report grievances, supervise the civil administration in the provinces, see that the recruiting grounds of the Ottoman Army were not depopulated by mismanagement, and that the farmers of taxes did not unduly squeeze the peasantry. On these conditions, Disraeli and Salisbury established for Great Britain a sort of informal but effectual protectorate over Asiatic Turkey—guaranteeing the Sultan the integrity of his Asiatic provinces. Disraeli was, in the first place, actuated by the interested representations of a Consul as to the possible wealth of the island; and in the second, the really important object of acquiring Cyprus was the strategic control of Asia Minor through the previously mentioned ambulant Consuls, whose chief duty was intended to check the advance of Russia in the Mediterranean, even as her progress had been checked at San Stefano. Had this Convention been carried to a successful issue, the British capitalist would have made a commercial banquet of Turkey, eventually trussing her up with the swords of an invading army in the same way as Egypt has been treated. With the Russian Army at his gates, the Sultan had no choice. It was a case of Russian aggression or English tutelage. The Sultan feared the former; while, on the other hand, the prestige of England’s name in the Asiatic provinces, and the evidence he had of her previous disinterested friendship, were in themselves a sufficient inducement for him to accept English tutelage by signing the secret Convention. Besides, the youthful monarch, even at that early stage of his eventful career, was not wanting in that cunning which distinguished him in after years; and he well knew that were a third Power
cognisant of England’s duplicity, not only would she lose her prestige for probity in European Chancellories, but she would stand revealed in all her nakedness as a self-seeking hypocrite.

It was about a month after the signing of this secret Convention that, principally on Disraeli’s initiative, the European Congress met at Berlin. It being the most important Congress since that of Paris, which was convened for a like object, all the plenipotentiaries were suspicious of one another, and of the part each was likely to play in the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire. It therefore naturally followed that the proceedings should open with a declaration that each Ambassador came to the Congress with clean hands, and that his Government possessed no secret engagement regarding the questions in dispute. Disraeli and Salisbury being taken by surprise, notwithstanding their secret understanding with the Sultan, formally gave their word to that effect, and thereby unwittingly fell headlong into their own snare; for on 9 July the text of the Cyprus secret Convention was published by the “Globe”. It fell like a bolt from the blue upon the deliberations of the Congress. Although Marvin, a translator employed by the Foreign Office, had sold the document to the newspaper, its authenticity was denied in London; but in spite of this denial, Disraeli and Salisbury found themselves convicted of deliberate and recorded falsehood. The Congress was nearly broken up. Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Ambassador, and M. Waddington, representing France, gave warning that they would immediately retire from the Congress. M. Waddington even went so far as to pack his trunks. Now, as the San Stefano treaty was one of the principal acts in this
diplomatic travesty, the resignation of Gortschakoff may be likened to "Hamlet" without the "Prince"; and M. Waddington, by reason of the adjacency of Algeria to one of the Sultan's provinces, might be fittingly described as the "Ghost". "Prince" and "Ghost" having therefore resigned their parts, and Bismarck realising that the play could not proceed without the principal characters, boldly rescued the "peace with honour" diplomats by patching up the trouble with their aggrieved colleagues, effecting the following compromise between the French and English Ambassadors:

1. "That as compensation to France for England's acquisition of Cyprus, France should be allowed on the first convenient opportunity, and without opposition from England, to occupy Tunis.

2. "That in the financial arrangements being made in Egypt, France should march pari passu with England.

3. "That England should recognise in a special manner the old French claim of protecting the Latin Christians in Syria".¹

Thus at one fell swoop, in order to cover up a political act of double-dealing and disgrace, two of England's foremost statesmen had bartered their honour. The Sultan was wantonly denuded of a province by his most trusted ally, and confidence in the good faith and integrity of Christian statesmen was for ever banished from the breasts of all thinking Moslems.

The heel of France was thereby set upon Tunis; and not only was the way paved for the partition of

¹ See Blunt's "Secret History", p. 36.
Africa among the European Powers with its attendant miseries to the native populations, but England's influence for good in the Ottoman Empire was destroyed, her name being made a byword among Moslem peoples, and the eyes of the Sultan were opened to the danger of English co-operation in the internal administration of his empire. This disgraceful Cyprus intrigue was also responsible for Abdul Hamid's subsequent persecution of the Liberal party at Constantinople, and for his settled dislike to Western constitutionalism in Egypt; thus giving an impetus to the idea of that Pan-Islamism which was primarily intended as a defensive weapon against the aggressive encroachments of Christendom.

France's ambitions with regard to her conquest of the East may be much better understood when it is remembered that the "Great" Napoleon, in his desire to surpass all the generals of antiquity, from Alexander to Caesar, had invaded Egypt as early as 1799; and the Bourbon Charles X, not to be outdone by the Corsican adventurer, ordered the conquest and subjugation of Algeria in 1830; a conquest and subjugation which required seventeen years for its ultimate accomplishment; and this notwithstanding France's "friendly" attitude towards the Sultan. Little wonder, therefore, that we find the dream of Eastern conquest again asserting itself in 1857, at which time Napoleon III was making overtures to the British Government with a view to the partition of the northern portions of Africa. According to that scheme France was to have Morocco, Tunis was to fall to Sardinia, and Egypt to England. Lord Palmerston, however, desiring to uphold the good old traditions of British statesmen in their policy of maintaining the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire, threw cold water upon the intended conspiracy in the following characteristic letter to Lord Clarendon: "It is very possible that many parts of the world would be better governed by France, England, and Sardinia than they are now. We do not want to have Egypt. What we want about Egypt is that it should continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power. But we do not want the burden of governing Egypt. Let us try to improve all those countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon us the condemnation of all other civilised nations".1 This letter suggests that either Lord Palmerston was utterly wrong in regard to his implied estimate of "the condemnation of all other civilised nations", or by inverse ratio, the latter-day aggressions of European nations on "uncivilised" races suggests not only a lack of that high moral and political standard which is essential to those who would assume a judicial position in regard to the political morals of their kind, but by placing a premium on aggressions debases the moral standard, thereby taking the reactionary path which leads back to primeval man, whose motto was, "might, not right".

France, however, was not slow to take advantage of concessions so easily obtained from "Perfidious Albion", for Sir Rivers Wilson, the English Financial Controller in Egypt, was immediately advised by telegram to share equally with France all financial appointments connected with the Administration. As will be shown hereafter, this move was destined to pave the way for the Joint Note and the subsequent

1 Ashley's "Life of Lord Palmerston", Vol. II, p. 125.
occupation of Egypt. Bonaparte having created a precedent in aggression by invading Egypt, it was no difficult matter for France, in May, 1881, to seize upon Tunis under the pretext of protecting the Bey from the threatening attitude of his subjects; and by means of this highly imaginary device, to occupy the western portion of that Regency, and proclaim a French Protectorate. General Bréart seized the person of the Bey, and, at the point of the sword, forced him to sign a treaty surrendering the independence of Tunis. The Western Tunisians were unable to fire a shot in defence of their ruler; but the tribes of the Eastern Provinces took up arms against the invaders, and "before the middle of the summer the revolt had spread to the Algerian Sahara, and a wave of anger against Christendom was rolling eastward; which, as will be seen, had begun to affect Egypt dangerously; and remains, in truth to this day, responsible for precipitating the action of the Liberal reformers there, and of the army in demanding self-government". The Bey of Tunis had neither forfeited the good-will of his people, nor was there any danger to the Europeans, nor were there financial embarrassments; yet this illegal usurpation of authority in the dominions of a mild and inoffensive neighbour, without parallel in modern European aggression, was calmly accepted by Lord Granville on the assurances of the French Government that "the occupation of the Regency was only for the restoration of order", and that "it would not be continued a day longer than might be necessary to secure the safety of the Bey's Government". Political fictions of this nature were duly plagiarised by the noble lord himself a year later in Egypt, when the positions of the two Powers were reversed. Silence
reigned in the European Chancelleries with regard to this aggressive incident. The Italian people felt aggrieved, it was said; and the British Parliament made a great noise, but obtained no satisfactory explanation. The Marquis of Salisbury, then in opposition, maintained a sphinx-like silence which contagiously affected Berlin, and the Sultan's public protest was like an accusing voice crying in a wilderness of European iniquity. But as the truth slowly filtered through, it lit a flame throughout the Mohammedan world, which neither the sophistry of historians, the repression of Ministers, nor the platitudes of statesmen have ever been able to effectually quench.

In Egypt, meanwhile, the Khedive was being tormented by doubts, ambitions, fears, and jealousies. The Anglo-French harness chafed him badly, and he was disposed to kick over the traces. The enemies of Riaz Pasha were suggesting that with the support of the Powers, to whom he owed his position, the Minister was secretly plotting against the Khedive. Arabi's growing power aroused his jealousy and suspicions. The Circassians who formed his Court, being violently opposed to the fellah officers, were untiring in their efforts to induce Tewfik to adopt drastic measures against them. At the same time Cherif Pasha and the constitutionalists were making use of them, by engineering another military demonstration, in order to rid the country of Riaz, and the European Consular subjection in which he found himself enmeshed. For this very reason Tewfik knew himself to be cordially hated and despised by the majority of his subjects. Thus stood the unsettled condition of Egyptian affairs in August, 1881, when the universal ferment throughout the Moslem world, created by the French
invasion of Tunis, having reached Egypt, fanned the smouldering ember of discontent at Cairo into a definite conflagration of revolt, and led up to the Nationalists' Mutiny of 9 September.

It will be remembered that the three Colonels were arrested by Osman Rifky at the Ministry for their share in the military disturbance at the Kasr-el-Nil on 1 February. It will also have been noted that Rifky had been relieved of his portfolio by the Khedive through the efforts of Baron de Ring, and also because he feared to take the consequence of a trial along with the Colonels. That dismissal was contrary to the wishes of the Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha; and the fact that the new War Minister, Mahmud Sami-el-Barodi, was a constitutionalist and a friend of the rebellious officers, whose ultimate aim was to restore his late chief, Cherif Pasha, to power, influenced Riaz to pursue a system of persecution and intrigue against the fellah officers which tended towards their final destruction. When, therefore, Mahmud Sami accepted office under Riaz, he assured Arabi, through their mutual friend, Ali Bey Roubi, a fellah officer, that as his position in the Ministry gave him the opportunity of helping them actively, he would give them notice of any designs against them. This he considered could be more effectually accomplished if he did not see Arabi personally, but conveyed any intelligence he might possess through the medium of Ali Roubi. He, moreover, made the officers a general promise that, should the Khedive become actively engaged with Riaz against them, they would either be warned directly of their danger, or they would know indirectly by his retirement from the Ministry. Meanwhile, Arabi's popularity continued to increase; and Riaz, working on the Khe-
dive’s jealousy of Arabi, obtained his consent to the banishment of the two leading Colonels with their regiments from Cairo, giving the order to Mahmud Sami, who, on raising objections, was summarily dismissed; the Khedive’s Circassian brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha Yeghen, being named as his successor. Mahmud Sami, having been ordered by letter to retire to his village, where it was hoped he would cease from troubling the Government by aiding the reformers, had no opportunity of communicating with his military friends; but they, having accepted warning through his sudden retirement, were prepared for the worst; so that when the Court returned to Cairo early in September, Arabi had already taken counsel with Sultan Pasha and the other civilian reformers as to their subsequent course of action. Riaz, having removed Mahmud Sami, and Baron de Ring having been recalled by his Government for interfering in the internal administration of the Khedive’s Government by encouraging the officers to rebel, the Prime Minister began to take a rather optimistic view of the situation. That his colleague at the War Office was Daoud Pasha, the Khedive’s brother-in-law, a Circassian general of the worst possible type, who, like those of his class, held the fellah officers in supreme contempt, was certainly calculated to put Riaz on good terms with himself, and delude him into the belief that he was really master of the situation. Unfortunately for himself he never properly estimated the strength of the military element and its adherents, or he would hardly have pursued the system of espionage and intrigue against the officers that obtained at this time. There was also an unfounded rumour with regard to the existence of a secret *Fetwa*, condemning the Colonels to death for
high treason. The existence of this decree may have been credited by the fellah officers of minor rank; but I do not think much importance was attached to it by Arabi at the time, because Ali Fehmy was still engaged as Tewfik's go-between. Ali Fehmy encouraged the officers to overthrow Riaz in the interest of the Khedive, who wanted to rid himself of the Prime Minister and the European control, and with the aid of the military restore Cherif Pasha to power, in order that he, Tewfik, might regain his lost prestige with reformers and people.

It will therefore be observed that from the Egyptian point of view, at least, military revolt was the one and only solution of the problem produced by these contending elements. The European tutelage disturbed the peace of the reformers, both military and civil. The invasion of Tunis, the profanation of mosques, and outraging of Moslem women by the French soldiery, stirred up religious feeling against the Europeans; and the "ruler" of the country was actively engaged with his army in an intrigue against his Prime Minister, whilst the Prime Minister was secretly plotting the destruction of the leaders of the army. Here was a tangled skein of circumstances, surpassing in magnitude and complexity the wildest flights of imagination that have ever engrossed the minds of dramatist or novelist.
H.H. TEWFIK PASHA
LATE KHEDIVE OF EGYPT
CHAPTER V

NINTH SEPTEMBER

It was on the night of 8 September, 1881, that Arabi Pasha was quietly seated in his house at Cairo, when he was startled by a loud and persistent knocking at the outer door. The would-be intruder being unable to give a satisfactory account of himself or his business, was refused admission. On his reluctant departure, Arabi caused him to be followed and he was seen to enter the Prefecture of Police. Arabi then cautiously proceeded to the residence of the other Colonels, from whom he learned that a similar incident had just occurred. The Colonels thereupon decided to take action on the following day. That there was genuine cause for alarm there can be little doubt, and that immediate action was necessary for their self-protection cannot be gainsaid: for they well knew that all sorts of plots had been put in motion for their destruction, and Arabi, the recognised leader, went in fear of his life. As I have previously pointed out, all other schemes having proved unavailing, Riaz decided to banish Arabi and his regiment to Alexandria, and Abdul Aal's with its commander to Damietta. Ali Bey Fehmy, the Khedive's A.D.C., was alone permitted to remain with his regiment in Cairo, which being a Guards' Regiment did duty at the Palace. By reason of his marriage, Tewfik counted on this colonel's attach-
ment to the Court as being sufficiently strong to guarantee his faithfulness. Daoud Pasha, therefore, on the evening of 8 September issued the order which was intended to separate the Colonels on the day following; but they, having carefully laid their plans, caused Arabi to send a letter to the Khedive on the morning of the ninth, in which he demanded the dismissal of the Riaz Ministry and the introduction of a constitution. This letter was sent to Ismailiyeh Palace, where the Khedive was in residence. Arabi further stated in his communication that he should march to the Abdin Palace in the afternoon to receive His Highness's answer. Arabi's reason for going to the Abdin Palace, the Khedive's official residence, was to avoid giving alarm to the ladies of the household. Tewfik, on receiving the letter, sent for Sir Auckland Colvin, the English Financial Controller, an old and experienced Indian Civil servant. Riaz Pasha and Stone Pasha—an American officer in the Egyptian Army—were also sent for. Colvin suggested that the Khedive should summon the two loyal regiments in Cairo with all the available police, and personally arrest Arabi on his arrival at the Abdin Square. The Khedive demurred, pointing out to Colvin that Arabi had the artillery and cavalry with him, and might fire. They then drove over from Ismailiyeh to the Abdin barracks, where Ali Fehmy and his guards' regiment turned out. The Khedive and Riaz spoke to the soldiers, who warmly protested their loyalty. Orders were then given to Colonel Ali Fehmy that he should immediately occupy the Abdin Palace with his regiment. Ali Fehmy having assented, posted his men in the upper rooms. From thence they drove to the Citadel, where there were further expressions of loyalty; but the
Khedive, having learnt that the regiment had been signalling to Arabi's regiment in the Abbassiyeh barracks, began to scold and threaten their commander, Fuda Bey; whereupon the soldiers, fearing that danger threatened their commander, surrounded the Khedive's carriage. He being afraid, at once drove away to the Abbassiyeh barracks, and found on his arrival that Arabi had already marched to Cairo with his regiment. Tewfik then returned to the Abdin Palace, entering through a side door. Arabi, meanwhile, on his arrival, having conversed with Ali Fehmy, that officer and his regiment joined Arabi in the square, so that when the Khedive entered the Abdin Square with Sir Auckland Colvin, he found that his regiment of guards was occupying the square along with Arabi's, the cavalry and artillery. Tewfik called upon Arabi to dismount, which he did. He ordered him to sheath his sword; this order was also obeyed; but to prevent treachery the officers, to the number of about fifty, placed themselves between the Khedive and the Palace. His Highness, after consulting with the generals and aides-de-camp by whom he was surrounded, demanded of Arabi the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied that he came to demand:

1. That the Ministers should be dismissed.
2. That a Parliament or Council of Notables be convoked, and a constitution introduced.
3. That the strength of the army should be raised to 18,000, as set forth in the Sultan's Firman.

He added that the army had come on the part of the Egyptian people to enforce these demands, and that he would not retire until they were conceded.
"I am Khedive of the country and shall do as I please!" exclaimed Tewfik.

To which Arabi answered, "We are not slaves, and from this day forth shall not submit ourselves to be bequeathed from one master to another". Thereupon the Khedive turned and went into the Palace. Sir Charles Cookson, British Consul at Alexandria, acting for Sir Edward Malet, away on leave, was then sent to negotiate with the mutineers with the aid of an interpreter. In order to adjust the terms, there was much going to and from the Palace, Tewfik finally consenting to the full demands of Arabi, even to Cherif Pasha's appointment as Prime Minister in place of Riaz Pasha.

When the soldiers and people who occupied the square heard the announcement of Cherif's selection, the shouts that greeted this announcement, "Long live the Khedive!" were loud and universal, and the troops were drawn off in perfect quiet to their respective barracks. That evening the Khedive sent for Arabi to meet him at the Ismailiyeh Palace, where the Colonel made his submission and offered his thanks to the Khedive for the concessions he had made. The Khedive dismissed Arabi with the injunction that he should "go and occupy Abdin", adding, "but let it be without music in the streets".

The part Tewfik played in the events of the day was hardly heroic. He was exposed to no danger whatever at the hands of the soldiers; and what appeared to the unenlightened minds of Cookson and Colvin to be vacillation on the part of the Khedive in his treatment of the army and his ready agreement to their demands, "in order to save public security",
was really part of a deeply laid plan to rid himself of Riaz by appearing to yield to force, whilst that very force was encouraged by the Khedive himself. Colvin, being quite in ignorance of the semi-understanding existing between the Khedive and his officers, was most anxious that violent methods should be adopted against the officers, going so far as to suggest that they should be shot—an attitude quite unsuited to the time and the circumstances. On the other hand, Cookson, who was better acquainted with Tewfik's timid character, though also in ignorance in regard to the Khedive's partial understanding with his officers, suggested compromise. This was the precise solution Tewfik had schemed to attain, so that he might bring about the fall of Riaz and the recall of Cherif Pasha. Riaz prudently took no part in the discussion, remaining inside the Palace until matters were adjusted. On that very evening he received his dismissal; and Cherif Pasha, on being offered the Premiership, as was natural, raised objections to becoming the nominee of a mutinous army; but being pressed by Sir Charles Cookson, M. Sienkiewicz, the French Consul-General, and Sir Auckland Colvin, and, like Macbeth, having no mind to let "I dare not" wait upon "I would", after a respectable show of resistance finally consented. But this was after the Chamber of Notables, which had been previously summoned to Cairo by Arabi, with Sultan Pasha at their head, had arrived on 13 September. When the Notables added their solicitations to those of the European officials, Cherif Pasha gracefully capitulated and was duly installed. The new Minister was nominated on 14 September, Cherif Pasha being assured that "in case the army should show itself submissive and
obedient, the Governments of England and France would interpose their good offices with the Sublime Porte, in order to avert from Egypt an occupation by an Ottoman Army”.

This statement was quite unnecessary. Abdul Hamid was no fool; he well knew, through his spies in Cairo, that apart from the constitutional aspect of the revolt, and the element of fear on the part of the officers, its main object was to rid Egypt of a Minister who, as nominee of France and England, was most likely to favour further encroachments by his patrons on the political independence of Egypt. Moreover, as I have previously pointed out, the fate of Tunis had convinced the Egyptians, as no other event could have done, that their strength and safety from European aggression lay in drawing closer bonds of unity between themselves and the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the people of Egypt were naturally overjoyed at the new turn events had taken: even the doubters and waverers were compelled to acknowledge that the appeal to force, with its bloodless victory, had been amply justified by results. The soldiers were relieved of the fears and dangers which had so long encompassed them; for this movement, although countenanced by the Khedive, was unquestionably evolved from and by the very human desire of self-preservation. This is proved in part by the statement of Arabi at a later period, when he said that a party of Circassians had agreed together to kill him and every native Egyptian holding a high appointment. “We heard”, he said, “that three iron boxes had been prepared into which to put us (we three colonels), so that we might be dropped into the Nile”. It must be remembered that the system was mainly to blame for the existing
conditions; and although fear was at the root of the military side of the agitation, the civil reformers were actuated by the much more exalted desire for free and untrammelled political institutions. That the people were in a condition to appreciate their new-found liberty cannot be disputed. For the second time in the memory of those living had the people of Egypt been accorded an opportunity of exercising the rights of citizenship, with the prospect of being ruled according to the laws of justice and equity administered by their own representatives. It is, therefore, not surprising that they should have devoted these days to rejoicing. The Press, under Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's able censorship, being released from its old trammels, spread the news rapidly. There was a unity among the masses that had never previously existed. The Coptic Christians, the Armenian, the Jew, and the Arab fellah were all united in one bond of brotherhood. All strife of faction or religion was sunk in this new-found joy of political freedom and free speech. Men openly gave tongue to political sentiments in the bazaars and cafés; sentiments which a very few days previously they would scarcely have dared whisper to themselves. Strong men fell upon each other's necks:

And the Sun of Hope, thawing the frozen
Miseries of three hundred years, unleashed
A surging flood of gladsome tears, that found
A new-made channel wrought by smiles of joy.

If Said's reign was named the "Age of Gold", surely this was indeed the long-expected "Dawn of Hope"!

Tewfik not only saw, but undoubtedly understood these visible manifestations of a nation's joy; but
it is rather questionable if he gave a moment's thought to the desires of the nation. His delight, now that the crisis had passed, was over the magical success of his plot to rid himself of Riaz, and with him the most irksome features of the Dual Control, and he counted on Cherif Pasha to remove Arabi from the scene of the conflict. Had not the Chamber of Notables, at the suggestion of Sultan Pasha, guaranteed that "as a condition of Cherif accepting the Premiership, they, the Notables, should see that the army pledged itself to absolute submission to his orders and authority as the Khedive's Minister"? Mahmoud Pasha Sami, being once more War Minister, the army could now set its mind at rest as regarded further intrigues against it.

Arabi's relations with the Khedive remained on a satisfactory basis. His attitude towards Cherif was at once dignified and devoid of arrogance. Egyptians of all classes deluged him with petitions, or bombarded his house with requests that he might redress their grievances, or obtain them preferment with "the great ones" of the land. On every side he was acclaimed by the populace as el Wahid, the only one, receiving from them such fulsome adoration, that I question whether the rather "superior" Turco-Circassian, who heartily despised the fellah Colonel, could have maintained his mental equilibrium under similar conditions. Arabi, however, preserved a calm exterior, attending to his military duties without showing the slightest consciousness that he had, by his indomitable perseverance, changed the whole trend of political conditions built up by centuries of Mameluke and Turkish rapacity and oppression. Now that he had brought about the revolution and his work was, so far, complete, he stood aside to permit
his more capable civilian colleagues to carry forward its development; and on 2 October, he marched from Cairo at the head of his regiment towards Ras-el-Wady, amidst the enthusiastic acclamations of a grateful people.
CHAPTER VI

THE JOINT NOTE

TEWFIK PASHA had "bowed to the will of the army" and of the people, and had granted a constitution to Egypt; but now that the dispatch of Riaz Pasha had been accomplished and Arabi had removed himself from the vicinity of the Court, the Khedive, with his accustomed treacherous adaptability, began to shuffle. Having taken to himself the weapon used by his father in 1879,\(^1\) wherewith to outwit the European Consuls and Controllers by a semi-countenanced military demonstration, which had effectively removed their ministerial nominee, he failed to take into account the very important fact that the weapon he had chosen was two-edged, and had become sharp by frequent use. Egypt having at length shaken off the sackcloth and ashes of arbitrary rule and oppression, and clothed herself in the radiant armour of liberty and progress, went forth to battle against a reactionary and treacherous ruler. Observing the lowering clouds of unrest constantly marshalling themselves across the political horizon, he conveyed the impression to Sir Edward Malet that the "general tone of His Highness with regard to the future was despondent, for he could no longer believe in the professions of fidelity made by the officers of his army". The breach between the three opposing forces, the Khedive, the army, and the Nationalist

\(^1\) Vide ante, p. 12.
party, was appreciably widening. Cherif's intrigue with the army, through his intermediary, Sultan Pasha, had now placed him at the head of a Ministry pledged to reform, and a National Constitution. Notwithstanding Arabi's "continued confidence in Cherif Pasha, in whose hands he intended leaving the matter", Cherif told Sir Edward Malet on 21 September that it was his intention later on to convoke the Chamber of Notables, which he hoped by degrees would become the legitimate exponent of the internal wants of the country, and by this means deprive the army of the character which it had arrogated to itself in the late movement. . . . The Notables would be a representative body, on which the Khedive and his Government would be able to lean for support against military dictation". I am aware that Lord Cromer and other writers on this particular phase of the revolution, would have it appear that Arabi was at this time not only the "arbiter of the destinies of the country", but that he was "inveighing against the employment of Europeans in Egypt". This is true only in a general sense. Arabi, by the firm stand he made on 9 September at the Abdin, proved beyond question that in spite of the Khedive's semi-understanding with the army, Arabi was not only master of the situation, but had the nation behind him; and that he should stand aside and permit Cherif Pasha to carry on the work did not necessarily mean that he would also lay down his weapons. Arabi well knew the evils Europeans had introduced; he was also aware that they had done much good in the way of introducing Western progress into the country; but it must be distinctly understood that he was better informed as to Cherif Pasha's real character and the class to which he
belonged than any European could possibly have been. And having been the chief sponsor for the revolution, he had no desire to see Egypt slip gradually back into the hands of that arbitrary Turco-Circassian party, whose methods of government were quite as oppressive to the Arab population as that of their predecessors, the Mamelukes.

His experience in the army had taught him that "a liberated slave of Turkish extraction was freer than a freeborn Arab, and that the most ignorant Turk was preferred and honoured before the best of the Egyptians". Law and justice were practically non-existent under Circassian rule: the army, having proved itself not only a military force, but a political lever, had successfully contended for law and justice, and meant to justify its acquired reputation. This is proved by a conversation Arabi had about this time with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. "We soldiers", said Arabi, "are for the moment in the position of those Arabs who answered the Caliph Omar when, in old age, he asked the people whether they were satisfied with his rule, and whether he had walked straightly in the path of justice. 'O son of El Khattab', said they, 'thou hast indeed walked straightly, and we love thee. But thou knowest that we were at hand and ready, if thou hadst walked crookedly, to straighten thee with our swords'. I trust that no such violence will be needed. As Egyptians we do not love blood, and hope to shed none; and when our Parliament has learned to speak, our duty will be over. But until such time we are resolved to maintain the rights of the people at any cost, and we do not fear, with God's help, to justify our guardianship if need be against all who would silence them".1

1 Blunt's "Secret History", p. 171.
With regard to his attitude towards Europeans, far from inveighing against them, in the course of an interview with Sir Auckland Colvin on 1 November, we find him saying that "he himself and his two officers—Ali Bey Fehmy and Toulba Bey Ismet, who were present on that occasion—had never been to school. Intercourse with Europeans had been their school. He, and all, felt the need of it. They had no wish to question the need of Europeans in the administration; on the contrary, if more were required let them come".1

Meanwhile the Sultan, in order to maintain his rather shadowy authority in the Delta, dispatched Ali Pasha Nizami, and Ahmed Pasha Ratib as his commissioners to Egypt. There was no real necessity for their presence in Egypt; consequently they were without apparent instructions as to what they should do when they did arrive. Abdul Hamid, however, was awaiting a convenient opportunity to get in touch with Arabi; not only that he might learn his views, but that he might set him up as a check upon Tewfik and the European Control, should he be found sympathetically inclined towards the Porte. This was most important, inasmuch as Abdul knew that the reform party at the El-Azhar University were in constant communication with the Liberal party at Mecca, who were agitating for an Arabian Caliph to supplant him in the Caliphate. When, therefore, he was informed that French and English gunboats had been dispatched to Alexandria, he first made a mild protest, and then signified his intention of sending envoys; because without arousing suspicion, the commissioners, by appearing on the scene for the ostensible purpose of upholding his suzerain rights

and maintaining his prestige in the eyes of Europe, could at the same time get at Arabi, whom he knew through his spies to be at Ras-el-Wady. In order to veil his real intentions, a well-arranged diplomatic skirmish was carried on with France and England as to who should leave Egypt first—the gunboats or the commissioners. Ali Nizami Pasha, the chief envoy, reviewed the Egyptian troops at Cairo, treating them to a lengthy dissertation on loyalty to Khedive and Sultan, of which the commissioners had already been assured by Cherif Pasha. Gunboats and envoys left Alexandria simultaneously. But the second commissioner, Ahmed Pasha Ratib, so arranged it that the train he took to Suez and Mecca should be the one by which Arabi would travel from Zagazig to Ras-el-Wady. They greeted each other as strangers, exchanging names; Ratib speaking of his pilgrimage to Mecca and not of his mission to Egypt. Arabi being drawn, told of the mutiny, of which he was rather full at the time; declared his loyalty to the Sultan, and was highly commended by Ahmed Pasha Ratib for his behaviour. They parted at Ras-el-Wady on terms of friendship. The envoy subsequently sent Arabi a Koran from Jeddah; and on his return to Constantinople he spoke favourably of Arabi to His Sublime Majesty, who in due course caused a letter of encouragement to be written to the colonel. Thus was the real object of the mission accomplished. I have devoted some space to this incident, not only because the complete facts do not appear elsewhere, but owing to its bearing on the subsequent attitude of the Sultan towards Arabi. The champion of the fellaheen having been fêted at Zagazig, where upwards of one thousand people turned out to do him honour and to give him a most enthusiastic welcome, he duly
THE JOINT NOTE

returned to Cairo on 6 December, 1881. Shortly after the mutiny, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, the French Prime Minister, proposed to Lord Granville, that in order to preserve the peace in Egypt, and to obviate the repetition of the rather frequent military demonstrations, and also with the avowed object of maintaining the Khedive’s authority, a joint military control representing the two countries should be established in Egypt, for the purpose of introducing order and discipline into the Egyptian Army. Both Cherif Pasha and Sir Auckland Colvin strongly disapproved. They condemned such action on the part of the Powers, for the very cogent reason that the Egyptian Army would not be disposed to receive the proposed military mentors in a spirit of kindly cordiality; and instead of introducing discipline, their presence would be merely looked upon as a fresh act of European aggression; thereby not only provoking more disorder, but indubitably producing a more serious outbreak than that of 9 September. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, however, being rather anxious to obtain a military hold on Egypt, which might have resulted in the loss to Turkey of another limb, on the one hand, and an addition to the North African Empire of the French Republic on the other, further suggested that should the Egyptian Army fail to accord due recognition to the generals, the two countries should resort to a joint naval demonstration which would make it “unmistakably manifest that the generals had the support of England and France”. Lord Granville did not wax enthusiastic over the diplomatic overtures of the French Premier, and further action remained in abeyance. On 5 December the Sheykh-el-Islam, who from the days of the Sultan Selim had been appointed
by the usurpation of the Court to the supreme re-
ligious office in Egypt, was deposed by the students of
the El-Azhar University. They substituted their own
nominee, Sheykh-el-Embaber, because they feared
that Sheykh-el-Abbasi, as nominee of the Khedive,
could not be depended on to give an unbiased legal
opinion (fetwa) regarding the constitution; and in-
asmuch as in the old days, before Selim’s time, the
Sheykh-el-Islam had always been nominated by
general election and not by patronage, the students,
by returning to the older and more liberal order, took
a weapon from the Khedive’s grasp which they knew
him to be quite capable of using for the destruction
of the promised constitution. The Chamber of
Notables had been convoked on 23 December by a
decree issued on 8 October. The Nationalist Ministry
was busy preparing its draft of the Organic Law,
which was intended to confer civil liberties upon the
country at large. Sir Edward Malet was in a position
to write to Lord Granville on the second day of the
New Year: “I found His Highness, for the first time
since my return in September, cheerful in mood, and
taking a hopeful view of the situation. The change
was very noticeable. His Highness appears to have
frankly accepted the situation”. Sheykh Mohammed
Abdu, the censor, having suppressed one rather
violent paper, the others remained moderate. The
army was quiescent; and Arabi having duly returned,
his acknowledged political position was “regularised”
early in January by his taking office as Under Secre-
tary for War, with the full approval of the English
and French Consuls, who at the time began to believe
not only in his sincerity of purpose, but in the genuineness of the Nationalist movement, as apart from army
tutelage or dictation. Matters were thus gradually
righting themselves when the ambitious and energetic Gambetta came into office—a change of ministry having taken place in France about the middle of December. By a colossal act of diplomatic indiscretion, in which Lord Granville permitted himself to be weakly led, Gambetta changed the whole trend of political events in Egypt, setting the hitherto quiescent factions at each other's throats; thrusting Arabi into the arms of the Sultan; pitting Tewfik against the will of his subjects; and forcing the regrettable events which produced the bombardment of Alexandria, the rout at Tel-el-Kebir, and the subsequent British occupation, with its repression of Egyptian aspirations and liberty.

One of Gambetta's first acts on coming into office was to inform Lord Lyons, on 15 December, that "he considered it extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and infuse into him firmness and energy. On the other hand, the enemies of the present system, the adherents of Ismail Pasha and of Halim Pasha, and the Egyptians generally, should be made to understand that France and England, by whose influence Tewfik had been placed on the throne, would not acquiesce in his being deposed from it . . . any interposition on the part of the Porte, M. Gambetta declaring emphatically to be in his opinion wholly inadmissible. He thought that the time had come when the two Governments should consider the matter in common, in order to be prepared for united and immediate action, in case of need ". Even allowing for the fact that Tewfik had been placed on the throne by the influence of France and England,
there was no need for this mischievous interference with the Khedive’s Government on the part of France, M. Gambetta being wholly ignorant with regard to local aims and conditions. Neither Ismail nor Halim possessed the smallest vestige of influence with the reformers; and all would have been well had the matter been confined to an interchange of diplomatic suggestion. But unfortunately, Lord Granville was quite as badly informed as to the true situation as Gambetta himself; for it is certain that neither Sir Edward Malet nor M. Sienkiewicz, his new French colleague, fully understood the trend of events, nor the real aims of the Nationalists; and when some light was shed on the situation the facts were either discredited, or their belated reports to their respective Governments so distorted that an altogether false impression was conveyed. The two Consuls-General depended largely upon Cherif Pasha for what information he thought fit to impart; whilst Sir Edward, in his quest of native opinion, was forced to rely upon such stray crumbs of worthless or haphazard information as his Greek dragoman was able to gather at the cafés in the European quarter; these, to say the least, were hardly material from which Egyptian policy could be shaped.

Lord Granville, who, Micawber-like, was waiting for something to turn up, and was consequently rather wobbly in purpose, ambiguously replied to Gambetta, on 19 December. Her Majesty’s Government quite agree in thinking that the time has come when the two Governments should consider what course had better be adopted by both Governments. Her Majesty’s Government also thinks that it is desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding; but that it requires careful con-
sideration what steps should be taken in case of disorder again reappearing”. Both statesmen believed that “something” should be done in the joint interests of their respective Governments; but their ideas of that “something” were totally divergent. On the one hand, Lord Granville, if he possessed any settled opinion, and of that there is grave doubt, approved a Turkish rather than a European occupation as a choice of two evils. On the other hand, Gambetta, anxious for distinction, favoured an Anglo-French occupation, which in course of time, and by reason of England’s “traditional” disinclination to “protect” Egypt, might very reasonably have left France mistress of the field. With the usual sagacity which characterizes the race from which he sprung, he seized upon the date coincident with the Assembly of Notables at Cairo to advance his plot a step further; and on 24 December, he expressed the obvious opinion that their meeting “would produce a considerable change in the political situation in Egypt”. But the masterly stroke of dividing the house against itself followed, in his proposal, that “the two Governments should instruct their representatives at Cairo to convey collectively to Tewfik Pasha assurances of the sympathy and support of France and England, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and assert his proper authority. . . . This seemed to him a simple and practical measure to be adopted without delay, and the two Governments might make it a starting-point for considering in concert what further steps they should be ready to take in case of need”. This, on being communicated to Sir Edward Malet on 26 December, provoked the following reply on the day following: “I see no objection to M. Gambetta’s
The support the Khedive is most likely to require is towards the maintenance of the independence of the Chamber against the jealousies and suspicions of the Porte”. Now, it will be observed that notwithstanding Sir Edward Malet’s limited information, for once in a way, he placed his finger unerringly upon the one and only weak spot, “The maintenance of the independence of the Chamber”. And Sir Auckland Colvin—in spite of his Anglo-Indian prejudices against Oriental adaptability to Western forms of constitutional government—contributed a memorandum about this time, in which this rather pertinent passage occurs: “The movement—though in its origin Anti-Turk—is in itself an Egyptian Nationalist Movement. For the moment it is careful in its attitude towards the Europeans because it has need of them in its duel with its immediate opponents; but it cannot look on them with favour or be animated au fond by any other desire than that of eventually getting rid of them”.

The desire to be eventually rid of the Europeans could hardly be accounted criminal in the circumstances, inasmuch as the Europeans had not only been thrust unbidden upon the Egyptians, but had brought untold evil in their train. But the point I would have the reader clearly understand is that the movement was absolutely Nationalist, and the Chamber of Notables undeniably representative; and, on Sir Edward Malet’s showing, its aim was the “maintenance of its independence against the jealousies and suspicions” not of the Porte alone, but of Europeans, “towards whom its attitude was careful”. Notwithstanding these communications, Lord Granville advised Lord Lyons to inform Gambetta that the British Government agreed to his
quite unnecessary proposal; and that statesman forthwith proceeded to prepare a draft of his "famous" note for the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Yet Sir Edward, whilst awaiting further instructions, informed his Government that "the reply of the Chamber to the Khedive's speech was extremely moderate and satisfactory; and that Cherif Pasha, who looked to it for success and support, considered that to discountenance it would be to play into the hands of the Porte, increase the influence of the military, and diminish that which they were now obtaining as befriending moderate reform". That the constitutionalists were content with moderate reform is proved by the remark of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who said, "We have waited so many hundred years for our freedom that we can well afford now to wait some months". These opinions, however, being contrary to the forward policy which Gambetta had introduced at the Quai d'Orsay, on 6 January, 1882, the following instructions were telegraphed to the British and French Consuls-General at Cairo. You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his Government of the determination of England and France to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with the course of public affairs in Egypt. The two Powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and recent circumstances, especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them an opportunity for a further exchange of views. I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to the Khedive, that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down by the Sultan's Firmans, and officially
recognised by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and future, the good order and development of general prosperity in Egypt, in which France and Great Britain are equally interested—the two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and his people.

Lord Granville, in agreeing to the above diplomatic indiscretion, did so with the rather lame and imbecile reservation, "That Her Majesty's Government must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary" (!). As though Gambetta, having once obtained the British Foreign Minister's signature, was likely to be curbed in his ambitious efforts by a "reservation" so weak and undefined. The reception of the Joint Note by the Egyptians was, however, adequately described in 1882 by Lord (then Mr. John) Morley. "At Cairo," said Mr. Morley, "the note fell like a bombshell. Nobody had expected such a declaration, and nobody there was aware of any reason why it should have been launched. What was felt was that so serious a step on such delicate ground could not have been taken without deliberate calculation nor without some grave inten-
tion. The note was therefore taken to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still further in the back-
ground; that the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and France; and that Egypt would, sooner or later, in some shape or other, be made to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. The general effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of the Chamber, the military, national, and popular party was alarmed. The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers were made uneasy. Every element of dis-
turbance was roused into activity.¹

That there was a National party in Egypt I have already shown. That the Khedive was "very hopeful of the future" is also herein set forth. That Mr. Gladstone's widely advertised principles of liberty were proved to be a sham by this premeditated act of unprovoked interference with the liberties of a people, who had vainly struggled to release their necks from the yoke of oppression, which they had practically borne for upwards of three hundred years, is unfortunate for the memory of that statesman. Gambetta, the arch-conspirator, and his weak-
spirited accomplice, with all their vain and transitory ambitions, have long since mingled with the dust. The evil they did in Egypt lives after them. And Gambetta? Methinks when his proud spirit winged its flight into the presence of its Maker, the sky was rent with one long requiem wail wrung from the anguished souls of Egypt's myriad sons.

CHAPTER VII

ARABI PASHA

"And the children of Israel did according to the word of Moses, and they borrowed of the Egyptians, jewels of silver and jewels of gold and raiment.\(^1\)
"... And they spoiled the Egyptians."\(^2\)

NOW Israel having an old account to settle with Egypt, the Rothschilds patriotically took up the spoliation that had remained in desuetude since the exodus. By advancing large sums to Ismail Pasha, which they knew his reckless extravagance would preclude him from repaying, their plans were well laid for the great conspiracy of spoliation. Disraeli, another of the tribe, subsequently took up the chase, buying the Suez Canal shares with money advanced by the Rothschilds, thereby paving the way for the Dual Control, the JOINT NOTE, and the Occupation. And Gambetta, a descendant of like forebears, completed the work with his JOINT NOTE. For now that the Egyptians were in the toils of financial Israel, nothing was left to them but liberty. They were already spoiled of their wealth, past,

1 The modern Egyptians were so greatly crushed by the burden of taxation brought about by the debts of Ismail, that the tax-ridden fellaheen, squeezed on the one hand by the demands of the State and on the other hand by the Greek moneylenders, who advanced sums at 50 per cent, in order that he might meet the national obligations, had his crops mortgaged before they were planted. There being no money to purchase raiment, he was forced to till the soil in a ragged state of semi-nudity.
2 Exodus XIII. 35-6.
present, and to come; then Gambetta, by spoiling them of their projected independence—their sole remaining asset—consummated the spoliation begun by Moses. And thus, in causing history to repeat itself, the sons of Jacob were adequately revenged for their four hundred and thirty years of bondage in the land of Egypt. What between national debt and abrogated liberty, the old order being inverted, the sons of Israel's task-masters became enslaved by "the children of the bondage".

Gambetta, however, after inoculating Downing Street with the pernicious Foreign Policy of the Quai d'Orsay, upsetting Egyptian tranquillity, and blighting the hopes of enfranchisement in that unfortunate country, went to his political doom on 31 January. In the course of seven short weeks he had demolished the superstructure of Egyptian independence, which had been evolved from the patient toil of three hundred years.

As Sir Edward Malet said on 9 January in his reference to the joint note, "the communication had at all events temporarily alienated the English from all confidence". For the natives, both civil and military, felt that the message contained a direct hint, if not a command, to antagonise the Khedive to reform.

Its mischievous wording, connecting as it did the events of September with the opening of the Chamber, was decidedly unfavourable to the latter. There was also an obvious desire to loosen Egyptian allegiance to the Porte, and its menacing attitude regarding intervention was not justified by the tranquillity of the country. Besides, the military who had retired, leaving to the civil reformers the adjustment of the internal affairs, for which purpose the Chamber had
been convoked, was once again upon the lips of every one. The unpreparedness of the Bey of Tunis to resist French usurpation had been a warning, and the menacing tone of the note suggested to the Egyptian that the time had arrived for him to set his house in order. Sir Auckland Colvin was loud in his condemnation of this piece of diplomatic indiscretion. Cherif Pasha appealed in vain for a peaceful explanation that would obliterate the shadow of the sword-gripped gauntlet which seemed suspended over Egypt. The British and French Consuls-General—especially the former—were in despair. Gambetta haughtily rejected Lord Granville's humble solicitations for a joint explanation to the people of Egypt. Even the Circassians resented the threat of foreign intervention. The Khedive was nearly frightened out of his wits, and the Nationalists were enraged. The Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and the cautious reformers of the El-Azhar University, at once joined the ranks of the advanced party. Once again Egyptians of every class, religion, or shade of opinion found themselves united under one flag, in one phalanx, against the common foe, and Arabi, leaning on the Sultan, stood in the forefront to lead them—whither?

Now, Arabi possessed none of that alertness which is considered an essential characteristic of the soldier or the political leader; nor was he endowed with those rare qualities of quick decision, executive ability, and practical common sense so indispensable to the individual who would successfully lead great movements, thrusting from life's pathway those opposing forces that are weak, parrying the blows of the strong, but ever moving onward, upward to the high pinnacle of glorious achievement. He was slow in his movements, deliberate in gesture, dull of
countenance, with the abstracted expression of the dreamer; but behind the heavy countenance there burned a soul pregnant with intelligence. His smile caused his face to become illumined; he was symbolic of that grave dignity usually identified in the person of the village Sheykh; and his towering height, massive proportions, and evident strength identified him with the industrious fellah typical of Lower Egypt. His was the type that Mameluke and Turco-Circassian Pasha had held in bondage for centuries, subjecting them to a system of enforced labour without pay. It therefore followed that Arabi and his class would be utterly despised by the dominant Circassians; for, as Sir John Bowring said in 1840, "the situation of the Osmanlis in Egypt is remarkable, they exercise extraordinary influence, possess most of the high offices of State, and, indeed, are depositories of power throughout the country. They are few, but they tyrannise; the Arabs are many, but obey". Riaz always despised Arabi; and the intellectual reformers of the El-Azhar were the last party amongst the native Egyptians to take him into serious account as a political force.

The peasant class to which he belonged were not only the first to recognise and acclaim him as leader, but remained loyal, singing his praises long after his exile. They recognised in him one of themselves, yet glorified above themselves, by virtue of the Azhur semi-religious culture which he possessed. For upward of three hundred years no fellah had been known to breathe a word of possible revolt, nor had one of their class previously risen to a position of political eminence. The negative qualities possessed by Arabi would have been insufficient to bring him to the front, but for Riaz Pasha's insane persecution
during those months which followed the Kasr-el-Nil mutiny. Arabi possessed settled convictions in regard to patriotism which he had learned in the school of experience. He was observant, sincere in his opinions, tolerant, humane; a faithful follower of the Prophet, but no fanatic, believing in the universal brotherhood of man based on that broad and comprehensive liberty which takes no account of race, creed, or condition. These predilections caused him to entertain those early proposals of Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami during the summer of 1881. These two were both patriots and reformers; but they belonged to the Circassian class of which Arabi had had such unsatisfactory experience, after the death of Said Pasha, and whom he knew to be as greatly opposed to fellah liberty as Riaz himself, because they considered themselves the only ones capable of governing the country. Both Arabi and Sultan Pasha, being of Arab stock, were used to whip up the fellah population in the interests of reform, which they meant to use as far as possible to their own advantage. The position was to all intents and purposes on all fours with English domination in Ireland, and presumed Irish inferiority. The English repressed the Irish because of the erroneous assumption that the Irish were incapable of self-government, and this chiefly because the majority in Ireland were a peasant, agricultural class. In like manner the "cultivated" Circassian looked upon the fellaheen as an uncouth boor who did not possess the requisite intelligence to appreciate reform, nor the strength to demand it. There was, however, this difference in the case of Mahmud Sami: although of Circassian extraction, his family had long been established in Egypt. Of a highly cultivated intel-
lect, fully conversant with Arabic and Turkish history, and a poet of no mean order, he was a loyal supporter of the Nationalists; and being richer than any other individual identified with the movement he paid more dearly for his fidelity than any other concerned in the "rebellion". Whilst recognising the Circassian intellectual superiority, which Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami possessed, there was no doubt that these were regarded with some measure of suspicion by the Notables; especially did this apply to Cherif Pasha. The drafting of the Organic Law and the meeting of the Chamber of Notables to approve the measure, coincided, as I have previously pointed out, with the publication of the JOINT NOTE. Now, inasmuch as the Organic Law was intended to define the powers of the proposed Egyptian Parliament, the Financial Controllers had insisted that the Ministry should not interfere with the powers they had exercised in economic matters during the preceding two years; also that they should be permitted to continue to exercise their acquired right to prepare the annual Budget, which should not be subject to discussion or vote in the Representative Chamber. Cherif Pasha, having fallen in with the view of the Controllers, omitted in his draft of the projected law to assign to the Chamber any right of voting on the Budget. A majority of the delegates very naturally objected to this procedure, pointing out that the sole raison d'être of the Foreign Financial Control lay in the fact that it was guarding the interests of the foreign bondholders; and as the interest of the debt was being met by one-half the revenue, the Chamber was quite within its rights in its demand to control the remaining portion on behalf of the nation. During December, 1881, Mahmud Sami, the War Minister,
desiring to bring the army up to its full strength of eighteen thousand men, as granted by the Firman of 1879, and promised by the Khedive with the other concessions on 9 September, demanded £600,000 from the Controllers as the amount of the year's (1882) estimates for his department. As this meant an increase of about £280,000 on the previous year's War Office estimates, Sir Auckland Colvin, finding it impossible to go beyond £522,000, commissioned Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, whose influence with Arabi and the reformers was well known, to approach Arabi with a view to his obtaining the consent of Mahmud Sami to accept the £522,000, a reduction on the original demand of £78,000. Mr. Blunt not only successfully performed his mission, but at the same time extracted a promise from Arabi that there would be no further demonstrations, "a promise which to him they faithfully fulfilled". It is therefore quite evident that the Nationalists, having conceded to the Controllers a most vital point—that of limiting the army which they considered necessary to their independence—they would have been quite ready to meet Cherif Pasha and the Controllers in a conciliatory spirit with regard to the entire foreign financial control, including the preparation of the annual Budget, which had been established by two years of precedent.

Now, however, that the Joint Note had done its work by creating unrest where there had been previous tranquillity, replacing confidence with suspicion, the Notables, believing their very existence to be threatened, took the bit between their teeth and bolted. They met Cherif's draft-law with a counter-draft, in which their powers were largely extended in a number of new articles, subjecting the

1 Blunt's "Secret History", pp. 177-8.
half of the Budget not affected by the interest on the debt to vote by the Chamber. The Controllers were immediately up in arms; especially was this the case with M. de Blignières, who doubtless felt his position strengthened by the attitude of his Government—Gambetta being still in office. Cherif Pasha, having unwittingly thrown himself into the camp of the Controllers by accepting and incorporating into his draft their views of the foreign financial control, was importuned by them to show a bold front and resist the innovations of the Notables. Sir Auckland Colvin stood shoulder to shoulder with his French colleague, thinking the Notables could be overawed by firmness. Sir Edward Malet considered the trouble very serious and telegraphed to his Government on 10 January: "There was a chance of arriving at an understanding, but this apparently is now passed; the Chamber may exercise its right with moderation and good sense, but it is a sanguine presumption. On the other hand, it is impossible now to suppress the Chamber without intervention which I earnestly deprecate. In fact, intervention could only be justified on the violation of the Law of Liquidation, not on the apprehension of its violation, and it is right to say that as yet I have heard of no such intention on the part of any one to infringe it".

The Khedive's attitude was extremely uncertain, and no doubt a rupture between him and the Chamber of Notables over the financial clause in the Organic Law would have been the very excuse that Gambetta desired to veil his sinister scheme of armed intervention. Sir Auckland Colvin, notwithstanding his prejudices, being perhaps the most astute European official then in Egypt, had at this time a full grasp of the trend of events, and once more enlisted the
services of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, that he might use his influence with "the extreme part among the Notables to induce them to yield something of their pretensions". Thus on 17 January he met the Notables at Sheykh Mohammed Abdu's house; but despite his arguments and the support Sheykh Abdu had given him, whilst "agreeing to modify three or four of the articles which the Controllers had principally objected to as giving the Chamber the powers of a 'Conven- tion', on the articles of the Budget they were quite obdurate".

It was very clear to them that the menace of intervention was no idle threat; but at the same time, if they were to have a Parliament worthy of the name, they could not be expected to accept a constitution which even Sultan Pasha, the most flabby of the reformers, declared to be "like a drum; it made a great noise but was hollow inside". It therefore followed that a rupture between Cherif and the Notables could not be long delayed. Sir Edward Malet had every confidence in the Prime Minister, and he was evidently flattered by the Consul-General's patronage, even to the extent of treating with contempt the very people to whom he owed his political existence. For, said he to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, "the Egyptians are children and must be treated like children. I have offered them a constitution which is good enough for them, and if they are not content with it they must do without one. It was I who created the National party, and they will find that they cannot go on without me. These peasants want guidance". The peasants did indeed require a guidance that would be sincerely used in their own

1 Blunt's "Secret History", p. 193.
interests, and not in the interests of the foreign element to the detriment of the natives. The trouble in Egypt, and in the entire Orient for that matter, has been, and is to-day, this ingrained disposition on the part of the European or Circassian to treat the native as an unenlightened child of limited mental capacity. We never have refused to accept guidance of the correct brand; but notwithstanding our presumed mental weakness, we can distinguish between well-intentioned guidance and arrogant and repressive tutelage. We accept the former with childlike gratitude; but we resist the latter, even if in so doing we forfeit our lives. Cherif Pasha therefore, by leaning on the Consular officials and Controllers and despising the peasants, was only seeking retaliation at the hands of those who had placed him in power. I have endeavoured to show how Gambetta's insensate ambition led him to launch his note on the people of Egypt. In fairness to the British Government I must also record the fact that Lord Granville, having permitted himself to be led beyond his depth by Gambetta, on realising the fearful muddle he had made of things, did eventually try to patch up the difficulty; but matters had been allowed to go too far. Although laudably seconded in his efforts at a subsequent date by M. de Freycinet, the new French Premier, they could not possibly "set back the universe to obtain a yesterday", neither could they restore the conditions in Egypt as they had obtained prior to the baleful advent of Gambetta. For whereas the Egyptians had reposed the fullest confidence in the honourable intentions of both Governments before the Gambetta succession, on his fall both Governments were not only mistrusted, but France was most cordially
hated, for Tunis was ever present to the Egyptian mind. As a natural result there was no possible means of patching up the difficulties; especially as Cherif Pasha, in place of pouring oil upon the troubled waters by correctly representing the case to the French and English Consuls-General from the Egyptian standpoint, was rather siding with them against native aspirations. Neither Arabi nor Sultan Pasha spoke French, and the Anglo-French Combine possessed no Arabic between them; so that the representatives of the Circassian "Statesman", who believed himself to be the Gambetta of Egypt because he spoke French fluently, was all the guidance at the command of the Consuls. It therefore followed that on 1 February, whilst awaiting the result of the diplomatic argument then proceeding between their respective Governments, Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz wrote informing Cherif Pasha "that the Chamber of Notables would not be allowed to vote the Budget without infringing the Decrees establishing the Control, and that an innovation proposed by the Chamber could not be introduced without the consent of the English and French Governments. If the Government of the Khedive deemed it fit to open negotiations on the subject, they were prepared to transmit its proposals to their respective Governments; but they considered that such negotiations should be on the understanding that the Governments and the Chamber were agreed with regard to the rest of the Organic Law". In other words, Cherif's friends, the Consuls, desired the Egyptians to accept Cherif's draft of the Organic Law, inasmuch as Cherif had embodied the desires of the Control in that document. The communication, evidently inspired by Cherif, who in his conversation with Mr. Blunt had
said that, "if the Nationalists were not content with his constitution they must do without one", could have only one result. When, therefore, he wrote to the Chamber informing them of the above Consular communication, advising them to "formulate a basis of negotiation with the Powers", a deputation was dispatched from the Chamber to the Khedive, requesting him to change his Ministers. His Highness requested them to return, and he would consider the matter in the interim. On their return he inquired whether they had chosen the new Ministry. The deputation politely informed the Khedive that the selection of a Ministry was his prerogative, which they had no desire to infringe. They were again dismissed. They returned later in the day, when they suggested that Mahmud Pasha Sami, who was then Minister of War, should be President of the Council. The wishes of the Chamber were duly fulfilled, Mahmud Pasha Sami being appointed on 5 February. Arabi Bey was also sent up to the Ministry of War. Sir Auckland Colvin, now that Cherif Pasha and his draft had been set aside, threw the weight of his great influence into the scale against the Nationalists, using every means in his power to bring about the very intervention he had previously condemned. The British Government made some further belated proposals regarding the revision of the Organic Law, which would considerably curtail the powers of the Chamber; but as I have already shown, matters had gone too far. The Nationalists, having covered half their self-imposed journey, were in no mood for retreat. Meanwhile, they had become cognisant of Sir Auckland Colvin's attitude, and the army was being strengthened; for in addition to the prospect of European intervention there was also the threat of a Turkish army of occupa-
tion, which was quite as abhorrent to the Nationalists as European intervention.

They had struggled against Turco-Circassian rule, and had succeeded in gaining the mastery so far: a Turkish occupation would have meant the revival of the corrupt Turkish regime which they were quite determined to resist, even as they meant to resist European intervention. But whilst Cherif Pasha was smarting under his deposition, and intriguing for Turkish intervention, they had unfortunately taken another viper to their breasts in the person of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, although a constitutionalist and an adherent of Cherif Pasha, was also a Circassian, holding the same views as Cherif, Riaz, and the rest of that stock with regard to the inferiority of the fellah. It therefore followed that while he was with the Nationalists, he was not of them; and as none of the fellah Ministry possessed a knowledge of any European language, not even of French, which was most essential in dealing with the Consulates, they were placed at a disadvantage and were forced to leave diplomatic matters entirely to Mustapha Pasha Fehmi. Two months later, when their condition was really precarious, he betrayed their confidence by either maintaining a hostile attitude, or so weakly presenting their case in the official correspondence that they were unaware of his perfidy until it was too late to remedy the evil he had wrought. About this time the Circassian plot against Arabi's life was betrayed by Raschid Effendi Anwar—a plot Lord Cromer is disposed to attribute to "the imagination of the ignorant Arabi", but it was really brought about by the machinations of the ex-Khedive Ismail.

It appears that one of the followers of the ex-Khedive, Ratib Pasha, suddenly left him at Naples, and arrived at Cairo, during Cherif's Ministry, where he joined his brother, Mahmud Effendi Talaat Beg-bashi. These two secured the co-operation of Yussuf Bey Najati, Mahmud Bey Fouad, and Osman Rifki Pasha, the ex-War Minister, whose deposition had been brought about by Arabi. Their plan was the restoration of Ismail by destroying the fellah Ministers and killing the superior officers of the army, beginning with Arabi. Success did not at first attend their efforts; but they were joined eventually by forty officers of inferior rank, and upon learning that nine Circassian officers had objected to being drafted for service in the Soudan, the plotters suggested that the officers should not go without promotion. They agreed to this, but not feeling strong enough to carry their plot into execution they tried to convert a Circassian officer, Raschid Effendi Anwar, to their views. He refused to be a party to the conspiracy, and straightway disclosing the plot to Arabi, they were arrested and court-martialled. The plot being frustrated the incident would have died a natural death but for the wanton interference of Sir Edward Malet on behalf of the conspirators. These men had merely been banished to the White Nile, a not infrequent penalty; but Sir Edward's interference only tended to bring the Khedive into conflict with his Ministry, for he took the case out of their hands and reduced the sentence to simple exile. According to the constitution, his act was illegal. This procedure was due to the influence of the British and French Governments. They feared Osman Rifki, bearing as he did the Turkish title of Ferik-General—conferred by the Sultan—would result in Turkish intervention. The
Sultan had desired that the matter should be referred to him, and to this Tewfik assented. The two Governments feared Turkish interference, therefore M. de Freycinet immediately stated that "he was strongly of the opinion that the Khedive should himself grant the pardon immediately by virtue of his prerogative, without waiting for action on the part of the Porte". Lord Granville agreed, and the British and French representatives at Cairo were instructed to inform the Khedive of the advice of their respective Governments. The Khedive bowed to the will of the two protecting Powers and obeyed. In the meantime, Arabi was encompassed by his enemies and detractors. The British and French Ministers and Controllers were against him. M. de Blignières had resigned his appointment; and Sir Auckland Colvin, who wrote that Arabi had warned him that "he was like a man trying to balance himself on a plank", was carrying on an active campaign against him and the Nationalist Ministry in the pages of the "Pall Mall Gazette". Sabit Pasha, the Khedive's Turkish Secretary, reported to the Sultan everything he could find out against Arabi, insomuch that the Sultan, had the Powers not objected, meant to send troops to Egypt and hang Arabi. Ahmed Pasha Ratib, the commissioner whom the Sultan had sent to Egypt in the autumn of 1881, had returned to Constantinople from his pilgrimage to Mecca. Upon relating his conversation with Arabi to the Sultan, His Sublime Majesty at once commanded two letters to be written to the Egyptian War Minister. In one of them a charge was given Arabi to uphold the Sultan's sovereign rights in Egypt, as set forth in the following extract: "As His Majesty places the greatest confidence in Ahmed Pasha (Ratib), His
Majesty desires me again for this to express his trust in you, and to say that, as he considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness, he requires of you, above all things, to prevent Egypt from passing into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no pretext for intervention there. . . .

And in a special secret manner, I tell you that the Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik. But the man who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind her to the Caliphate; who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives free course to his Firmans; who assures his independent authority in Constantinople and elsewhere; who does not give bribes to a swarm of treacherous sub-officials; who does not deviate one hair-breadth from his line of duty; who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies, who will watch against them and ever preserve his country and his Faith intact, a man who does this will be pleasing and grateful and accepted by our Great Lord the Sultan”.

1 Vide Blunt’s “Secret History”, pp. 259–60.
CHAPTER VIII

“FICTITIOUS DIPLOMACY”

The situation in Egypt had by this time become not only unsettled, but extremely grave. The Khedive, first by assenting to the request of the Sultan that the matter of the Circassian conspiracy should be referred to him, and then by commuting the sentences to ordinary exile on the advice of England and France, succeeded in irritating the Sultan on the one hand, and widened the breach between himself and his Ministers on the other. He thereby provoked Mahmud Sami to inform Sir Edward Malet “that if the Porte should send an order to cancel the sentence of the court martial on the Circassian prisoners, the order would not be obeyed, and that if the Porte sent Commissioners they would not be allowed to land, but would be repulsed by force if necessary”.

Of course, the President of the Council was unaware of Arabi’s position at Constantinople; and he, the other Ministers, and Notables, having struggled to free themselves from Turco-Circassian domination, naturally objected to Turkish intervention of any kind—intervention which would only result in a re-introduction of the evil tutelage they had successfully overthrown. Besides, they also believed that inasmuch as France, both under Gambetta and now under M. de Freycinet, had pursued a policy of non-Turkish
intervention, they counted on the support of that Power to back them up in any resistance they might show to the Porte. In the meanwhile, relations having been broken off between Tewfik and his Ministers, the Chamber was convoked without his authority, the Ministry being of the opinion that the Khedive, by commuting the sentences without consulting his Ministers, was acting in a way to diminish the autonomy of Egypt. In consequence they resolved to depose the Khedive, exile the entire stock of Mehemet Ali, and with national approval, appoint Mahmud Pasha Sami Governor-General of a provisional Government.

Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber, at the instigation of Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet, began to sow discord in the ranks of the Nationalists, under the pretext that Arabi had deceived him regarding the causes that led up to the overthrow of Cherif. This was chiefly because he was annoyed at being overlooked in the formation of the Ministry: he considered that his efforts in the reform movement had entitled him to a place in it; and also because of the promise of Sir Edward that, should Arabi be thrown over by the Nationalists, the Chamber, with its powers intact, would have the full support of Great Britain.

Meanwhile the President of the Council had resigned, because the Khedive refused to be reconciled to his Ministers.

The British and French Consuls-General proposed to the Khedive that Mustapha Fehmi Pasha be appointed; failing him, they “agreed to the nomination of any one except Arabi”. The military party then informed the Khedive that they would not be responsible for order were the Ministry changed. The
British and French Governments instructed their Consuls at Cairo "to send for Arabi and inform him, that if there was any disturbance of order he will find Europe and Turkey as well as England and France against him, and he will be held responsible”.

The Ministers informed the Consuls-General that they would only resign on the demand of the Chamber. Sultan Pasha, for reasons previously stated, also informed the British and French representatives that it was quite impossible to change the Ministry while the military power continued to be vested in Arabi. The Consul-General then told the Khedive that as he found it impossible to form a new Ministry he must enter into negotiations with the existing one, and all “personal questions must be set aside”.

It would be idle and mischievous to say that the British Government was treating the Egyptian situation with contempt at this period, or that it was neglecting to carry out its share of the Dual Compact. Both the French and English Governments knew that matters could not continue in such an unsettled state for a much longer period; and unfortunately their respective Consuls-General were not only misrepresenting matters, but they were so opposed to Arabi that by allowing prejudice to blind them, they were actively engaged in ruining the whole movement. Their pernicious device was to sow discord in the ranks of the Nationalist, by supporting the civil element against the military, thereby weakening the power of the entire movement. For it must be understood that the one could not work without the other. The Khedive, acting on the advice of the Anglo-French Control, had become recalcitrant; and it was only because he knew the military to be with
the reformers that he consented to the deposition of either Riaz Pasha or Cherif. On the other hand, although Gambetta had fallen, and French policy in regard to Egyptian affairs had become more liberal under M. de Freycinet, the French Minister objected to Turkish intervention, even as Gambetta had done; and as England was still hampered by France, notwithstanding the fact that Lord Granville had long since awakened to the regrettable situation he had helped to create, he was unwilling to take the initiative. At a later period France’s defection forced England into a position which compelled her to act alone, thereby bringing a storm of European criticism about her ears. The best that can be said is that Lord Granville was not the man for the emergency. A strong man was needed, who could think and act for himself. The noble Lord’s advanced age and impaired intellect quite unfitted him for the part. Although we expected more liberal treatment than we received at the hands of a Liberal Government, with Gladstone at its head and the peace-loving John Bright in its Cabinet, it must be admitted that not only were there troubles nearer home—for the troubles in Ireland during this stirring month, with the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, were certainly calculated to unnerve any Government—but the English and Consular Press misrepresentations of Egyptian affairs could not possibly aid in the solution of a problem at once tortuous and difficult.

Meanwhile, the pernicious system of misrepresentation had at length brought M. de Freycinet to believe in the advisability of armed Turkish intervention, and on 21 May he submitted the following proposals to the British Government for its approval:
1. "An Anglo-French squadron to be dispatched to Alexandria.

2. "The British and French Governments to suggest to the Porte to abstain for the present from all interference in Egypt.

3. "The Cabinets of Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy to be informed of the dispatch of the Anglo-French squadron to Alexandria, and to be requested to send to their representatives at Constantinople: similar instructions to those sent to the British and French Ambassadors.

4. "The French Government agree to abandon the idea of deposing the Khedive: 'a plan which, if adopted in time, might, in their opinion, have prevented serious complications'.

5. "The French Government opposed to Turkish intervention, but would not regard as intervention a case in which Turkish forces were sent to Egypt, operating under Anglo-French Control, on lines to be defined by both Governments. If, after the arrival of the squadron, they should deem it necessary to land troops, which would be neither French nor British, but Turkish, on the above conditions.

6. "The Consuls-General at Cairo to be instructed to recognise as legal no other authority than that of Tewfik Pasha, and not to enter into relation with any other de facto Government, except for the purpose of securing the safety of their countrymen".¹

Lord Granville, in assenting to the above, suggested that a guarded communication should be sent to the Sultan informing him that "it was not improbable that further proposals might be made to him hereafter, and that the Powers should have their flags represented at the naval demonstration at Alexandria, including Turkey".

M. de Freycinet objected to the latter part of the proposal inasmuch as he considered it would annul the initiative character of the demonstration, and deprive the Anglo-French Control of the directive position assigned to it by Europe. It will thus be observed that the French Premier did not desire the interference of the other Powers, because he knew them to be, for the most part, not only in sympathy, but Switzerland and Belgium to be strongly in favour of the Nationalist movement. In Italy enthusiasm had taken concrete shape in the form of a volunteer corps, which was being enrolled, under Menotti Garibaldi, to assist Arabi against the invader; and this despite the fact that the Italian Government was at that time a supporter of English policy. There was also that bugbear of Turkish intervention which he feared would be the precursor of European complications, should Turkey on occupying Egypt attempt the usurpation of her sovereign rights by remaining in the country, to the disadvantage of the European bondholders.

Sultan Pasha, having been captured by Sir Edward Malet, deserted his party on 17 May, and thereafter supported the English Consul-General's policy. Being therefore backed up by Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, on 19 May, he, Sir Edward, with the co-operation of his French colleague, advised the Khedive "to take advantage of the arrival of
THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

the fleet to dismiss the Ministry, and form a Cabinet under Cherif Pasha or any other person inspiring the same confidence”.

The Anglo-French squadron arrived on 20 May. The Khedive asserted his inability to form a Cabinet; and on 25 May Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz stated that Sultan Pasha, having become dissatisfied with the Ministry, had suggested that they should issue the following ultimatum, which the Anglo-French Consuls served on the President of the Council:

1. “Temporary retirement from Egypt of Arabi Pasha, with the maintenance of his rank and pay.

2. “The retirement into the interior of Egypt of Ali Pasha Fehmi and Abdul Aal Pasha, who will retain their rank and pay.

3. “The resignation of the present Ministry”.

As a consequence, the Ministry resigned on 26 May. On the following day Cherif Pasha was requested to form a Ministry, but declined on the grounds that “no Government was possible so long as the military chiefs remained in the country”. The Police of Alexandria refused to accept the resignation of Arabi, declaring that they would not be responsible for public safety. Toulba Pasha also informed the Khedive that “the army absolutely rejected the JOINT NOTE, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only authority they recognised”. On 28 May Cairo rose in its thousands. Headed by the chiefs of religion, which included the Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, all the Deputies and the Ulema, they insisted upon the reappointment of Arabi as Minister of War. The Khedive, finding the nation united
against him and his Anglo-French advisers, re-appointed Arabi and made a formal demand to the Sultan for Commissioners to Egypt; the Grand Vizier having previously intimated to Tewfik that Turkish Commissioners would be sent if official request were made. Lord Granville said that "it was never proposed to land troops or resort to a military occupation of the country. Her Majesty's Government", he continued, "intend, when once calm has been restored and the future secured, to leave Egypt to herself (!) and recall the squadron. If, contrary to their expectations, a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which shall have appeared to them, and the French Government, to be the best".

I shall now proceed to a brief résumé of the facts that led up to the arrival of the English and French squadrons, and examine, as far as may be, Lord Granville's desire "to leave Egypt to itself and recall the squadron".

It will be remembered that in December, 1881, the Nationalist party formulated a programme with the aid of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, which was duly published in the English Press. Up to this time, and until just after the publication of the JOINT NOTE of 8 January, the Egyptians were on the most cordial terms with England. Their relations with Khedive and Control were most correct and dignified, because they believed these to be sincere in their intentions to permit them to peacefully pursue their constitutional endeavours towards self-government; and thereby assist Egypt to once more take her place among the nations, redeem her debt, and reform a corrupt system of jurisprudence. The army, having made it
possible for them to advance in the direction of liberal government, they depended upon that institution to maintain the security of these rights, and on their Parliament to aid them to obtain these ends, gradually and moderately. The joint note and its anti-Islamic threat, which, to all intents and purposes, found its counterpart in French action in Tunis, created distrust in the minds of the Egyptians as to the bona fide intentions of England. Instead of being awe-inspiring, it created irritation and alarm, precipitating action, in the form of a national demand for the resignation of Cherif Pasha, whom they knew to be quite capable of betraying them into the hands of the Anglo-French Control.

Doubtless, Gambetta's rather sudden and unexpected exit from the councils of the mighty prevented the threat of armed intervention from being carried into immediate execution. But a plan of intervention was steadily pursued; and the vexatious methods of the Anglo-French Consuls-General and Sir Auckland Colvin were abundantly fruitful in those disturbing elements of aggression calculated to provoke a resistance which could be construed into "anarchy", "rebellion against Khedivial authority", or any of the deceptive scare-phrases current at the time in the English Press and in diplomatic circles, to bring about intervention. The English and French Controllers-General protested against the constitution granted by the Khedive on 6 February; and their respective Governments withheld their assent to the document, because there was an Article which granted powers to the Egyptian Parliament to vote the half of the Budget which was not affected by the debt. The English representatives at Cairo, from the time of the promulgation of the constitution and the overthrow of
Cherif, had persistently tried to bring about a revolution contrary to the will of the Egyptian people, in order that the liberties granted them by their ruler might be utterly annihilated. The British Minister and Controller-General—the latter a paid servant of the Egyptian Government—carried on a most strenuous series of intrigues, with the purpose of creating a rupture between the Khedive and his Ministers. The English Press correspondents, having been unmuzzled by their Consul-General, opened a pertinacious campaign of injurious falsehood and misrepresentation against the Ministry. When these subjects were exhausted, they drew upon the fertile sources of an almost limitless imagination, in order to produce such sensational fictions as "Banditti in the Delta", "Rising of the Bedouins", "Revolt in the Soudan", "War between Egypt and Abyssinia", "Enormous Egyptian Army Expenditure". Included among their scares were the general refusal of the Egyptians to pay taxes and the resignation of the provincial Governors; (?) the neglect of irrigation works, and the danger to the Suez Canal; and that Arabi had become, by progressive stages, the paid tool of Ismail Pasha, then of Halim Pasha; and then, as there were no other Oriental princes interested in Egypt who were prepared to enrich a venal agent, and the sources of journalistic imagination having at length dried up, Arabi, according to their showing, finally became the paid agent of the Sultan.

The Anglo-French Consuls took advantage of the Circassian plot against Arabi to induce the Khedive to withhold his signature from the ratification of the sentences, and thereby create a rupture between Tewfik and his Ministers. Mahmud Sami called the
Notables to Cairo to decide between Ministry and ruler. The Deputies arrived, and Sultan Pasha's jealousy prompted him to refuse to preside at any formal sitting. The Consuls-General made use of this incident to encourage all anti-Nationalists to support the Khedive against his Ministry, and thus by creating dissension split up the party. A few rich but timid Egyptians, being more greatly enamoured of their wealth than of their country's weal, joined hands with the Turco-Circassian party; the Consuls-General were deluded; they launched their ultimatum, insisting on the resignation of the Ministry and the exile of Arabi. The Ministry resigned. The Consulates were jubilant, having scored a victory—for one day! For the nation, by demanding the return of Arabi on the day following the resignation of the Nationalist Ministry, proved beyond question how flabby and misdirected were the efforts of these tinkering diplomats. And this system of unsuccessful intrigue against the liberties of a people who were struggling to throw off the yoke of oppression, was carried to its most reprehensible conclusion by the accredited representatives of a Liberal Government. This precious "Liberal" Government, despite its denials of intended intervention, had, for months prior to the dispatch of the Anglo-French squadrons, been holding consultations with Sir Garnet Wolseley on the question of an immediate occupation. At the request of Tewfik, and on the urgent suggestions of the English and French Governments, the notorious Dervish Pasha was sent as Commissioner to Egypt. The Sultan was quite as unprepared, as was the British Government, for the universality of Nationalist feeling obtaining in Egypt. These evidences of Egyptian aims and determination were sufficient to
convince the Porte that the methods used by Dervish Pasha to suppress Albanian political progress were quite inadequate to Egyptian conditions. In the meanwhile, although threatened with a hostile fleet, and the offers of bribes to quit Egypt and abandon the Nationalists, Arabi remained at his post, determined to carry out his programme of independence with peace, and reform with economy. Had the olive branch of peace been extended to Egypt in place of the sword of repression, the Egyptians, who had neither the desire nor the intention to repudiate their obligations, would have rewarded England with a boundless gratitude which neither change nor chance could corrupt—a gratitude which would have remained eternally engraved upon the hearts of an unforgetful people.
CHAPTER IX

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

POPULAR will having overridden Khedivial obstinacy and English intrigue in the re-instatement of Arabi as Minister of War, the acknowledged National Chief may be said at this time to have reached the highest point in his fortunes. As will have been gathered from the previous chapter, the Khedive, on assenting to the will of the people, at the same time requested the Porte to send a Commissioner to Egypt. The British and French Governments, with the aid of their tool, the Khedive, having lamentably failed either to suppress Arabi or stamp out Egyptian patriotism, now lent their support, with a little pressure from the other Powers, to the advent of the Turkish Commissioner; they hoped he would make straight the path and ready the way that would lead to the extinction of Arabi and his peasant patriots.

The Sultan, however, being already for the most part assured that the Egyptian movement in no wise tended to diminish his sacerdotal authority or his sovereign rights, was rather loth to appoint a Commissioner, who in suppressing a loyal servant, might at the same time be aiding the Christian to ultimately subjugate the Moslem.

Now all through the negotiations, even from the Kasr-el-Nil mutiny of February, 1881, the Sultan had been treated with a contempt by France and
England—especially was this the case with France—which would have led the superficial observer to believe, that not only were these two Powers holding joint sovereignty in Egypt, but that there was no such document in existence as the Firman of 1841, by which Mehemet Ali and his successors were granted perpetual vicerogality in Egypt under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey, to whom they successively paid tribute.\(^1\) Without going into the undisputed merits of the Sultan’s claim, or even the rather fatuous statements regarding the necessity of armed intervention, he was undoubtedly recognised by the Powers of Europe to be Egypt’s overlord. Now whatever the ultimate object of Anglo-French policy might be, these two Powers, from October, 1881, did everything they could to irritate and humiliate the Sultan, and to set him in opposition to their schemes. It must be remembered that he was not likely to forget how his most trusted ally had betrayed him at the Berlin Congress. As Lord Salisbury said in 1882, just after the bombardment:

“There were two modes of going to work with the Government of Egypt. You might have used moral force as you have made use of material force. Your only mode of acting by moral force is by means of the hearty co-operation of the Sultan of Turkey. But you took the best means of alienating that hearty co-operation. If you had gone to him from the first, taken him into your counsels, and made him the instrument of what you desired, and indicated from the first that you wished to take no steps without his concurrence and co-operation, there might have been

\(^1\) In the Sultan’s Firman of 1841, the expression “Ma connaissance souveraine” appeared. The Powers have however disputed this sovereignty which was used by them to depose Ismail.
objections to the plan; but at least you would have had him heartily with you". Whether the noble Lord spoke in a repentant mood over the matter of Berlin, or because he was in opposition, the Blue Book sayeth not; but the statement was not only just: it was a faithful exposition of the Sultan's feeling in the matter. The fleet was already at Alexandria. Abdul Hamid knew that anything he might do at this late hour could only be regarded as a humorous after-piece. He therefore suggested that the fleet should leave Egyptian waters before his Commissioners were dispatched. The Dual Powers objected. The squadron was there "to protect European interests and to restore order, if necessary, in the name of the Khedive," who was the lieutenant of the Sultan; but with which the Khedive's Lord, the Sultan, by whose consent he held the throne, should not interfere, unless authorised by the friends of his own servant! Truly a most diplomatically farcical situation, were it not for the grim tragedy which lay beneath this thin veneer of farce, whereby some ten thousand hapless peasants were ruthlessly butchered.

The Sultan therefore introduced his comic interlude by dispatching, on 4 June, two Commissioners from Constantinople, whose instructions were diametrically opposed to each other; and the Porte "confidently hoped that the mission of Dervish Pasha would suffice to restore the normal situation in Egypt to the general satisfaction!" Dervish Pasha was instructed by his master to make himself guide, counsellor, and friend to Tewfik, and to attach himself to the German, Austrian, and Italian Consuls, soliciting their advice, and so create rivalry in their ranks. He was also directed to discourage Arabi and oppose him in every possible way that the circumstances permitted or
warranted; whilst his colleague, the Sheykh Assad of Medina, was ordered to take the Arabist party to his bosom; but at the same time he was also expected to sow the seed of discord among the foreign officials. It therefore followed that on its arrival, the Mission was welcomed according to its leanings by the two opposing forces. The Egyptians were delighted with the venerable Sheykh of Medina, who honoured them by taking their side of the argument, whilst Court and Circassian welcomed Dervish Pasha with outstretched arms as their political saviour. "The Khedive as head of the State, and Arabi as head of the Ministry, sent their delegates to Alexandria to receive the Mission: Zulfikar Pasha on the part of the Khedive, Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under Secretary for War, on that of the Minister, and both were well received".¹

The wily Abdul Hamid, by sending two Commissioners to Egypt, whose views in each case should coincide with the party to whom they were respectively attached, was not only preparing himself for all contingencies, but was also obtaining first-hand information in regard to the real aims and intentions of the contending factions. Tewfik, he did not trust; and it was quite on the cards that had Arabi proved himself another Mehemet Ali, there was the by no means remote possibility of the Minister for War being selected by the Sultan to replace Tewfik on the vice-regal throne. It was quite immaterial to the Porte what political views Arabi held, always provided those views did not obstruct or tend to annul the religious and sovereign rights of His Sublime Majesty in the land of Egypt; for "the Sultan had no confidence in Ismail Halim or Tewfik", runs Mohammed

¹ Vide Blunt's "Secret History", p. 305.
Zafir’s letter to Arabi on 22 February, 1882. “But the man who thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind her to the Caliphate, who pays due respect to His Majesty . . . who assures his independence in Constantinople and elsewhere . . . who is versed in the intrigues and machinations of our European enemies; . . . who will ever preserve his country and his faith intact—a man who does this will be pleasing and grateful, and accepted to our great Lord the Sultan.” I have quoted the above letter a second time because of its important bearing on the Sultan’s attitude, not only at this moment, but at that subsequent date when Arabi was in the hands of the enemy; and for the reason that European writers, for the most part, when dealing with this phase of Egyptian history, have been unmindful of the existence of this document, and arguing as they have from Western premises, have never determined the real cause of the failure of the Dervish Mission.

The Mission was, to all intents and purposes, a farce from beginning to end; and the only service the Sultan considered it would render him was that of dividing the forces of the European Powers by playing upon their cupidity, and by pitting envy against envy. I question whether even the Anglo-French Control expected success to attend the labours of the Mission; otherwise the Conference of the Powers hastily convened at Constantinople on 23 June to deal with the Egyptian situation, at a time when the Commissioners were in Egypt, would have been accounted a diplomatic superfluity by the Powers. At an early period the Porte was so convinced of the vanity of the whole undertaking, that he declined to be represented at the Conference; and Lord
Alcester, by precipitately knocking over the fortification at Alexandria, simultaneously knocked the bottom out of the deliberations of the Conference; which assembly was thought by Bismarck to be "a very good expedient for covering the change of policy on the part of the French Government in regard to the advisability of Turkish intervention".

Now, when the Commissioners arrived at Alexandria on 8 June, the condition of affairs was somewhat as follows: Arabi having been reinstated by the Khedive, and being a man of peace, although Minister of War, had, after making his peace with the Khedive, promised that ruler to protect his life, even to the extent of forfeiting his own. The German and Austrian Consuls, being convinced that Arabi was the only man in Egypt who could effectively preserve order, added the weight of their influence to the demand of the nation for the restoration of Arabi to his former Ministerial post. The Khedive, having been thwarted in his efforts to overthrow the War Minister, determined to falsify Arabi's boast to the Consulates of being able to maintain public tranquillity; and in encompassing the ruin of his Minister he would also convince the Germans of their erroneous estimate of Arabi's authority. The Khedive therefore permitted Omar Lutfi, the Circassian Governor of Alexandria, to engineer the unfortunate Alexandria riot of 11 June.1 It is, indeed, true that the outbreak occurred earlier than was intended; but once started the Governor found it impossible to check it, and

---

1 Notwithstanding Lord Cromer's contention that Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's statement with regard to the implication of the Khedive is unworthy of evidence, it is my opinion that Mr. Blunt's story is correct. I would therefore advise the interested reader to see both Lord Cromer's "History", Vol. I, p. 286–7, and the "Secret History", p. 497.
was compelled, much against his will, to call in the military to quell the disturbance, and thereby proved that "the best laid scheme of mice and men gang aft agley". The Khedive, in the meantime, had got together some £75,000, which was handed over to Dervish Pasha in the form of presents and backsheesh. Dervish, on his arrival, consoled the Turco-Circassians with the information that Arabi would be immediately sent to Constantinople to render an account of his actions to the Sultan. The Egyptians were promised the instantaneous exit of the fleet; and to all he said, "the Sultan will do justice". On 10 June he had an interview with Arabi and Mahmud Sami, when Arabi was requested to resign his command and go to Constantinople. Arabi replied that he could not do that until the country was in a settled state, inasmuch as he had given his word that he would be responsible for tranquillity; and even were he disposed to obey the Commissioner, "ten thousand bayonets stood between him and the sea". Dervish Pasha therefore made a virtue of necessity, informing the Consuls that, "under the urgent circumstances of the case, he would assume joint responsibility with Arabi Pasha for the execution of the orders of the Khedive". The Europeans had meanwhile become alarmed for their safety, and "by 17 June, 14,000 Christians had left the country, and some 6000 more were anxiously awaiting the arrival of ships to take them away". Arabi was once again invited to visit Constantinople, but he again declined the Porte's invitation. On 23 June the Conference met at Constantinople; on the 30th of the same month Lord Dufferin reported that "the Conference had done absolutely nothing". Seven days were subsequently used by the members in watching each other. On
2 July "the object to be obtained by armed Turkish intervention" was reached; as was also the high State pronouncement by the Ambassadors that "if the Sultan declined to send troops to Egypt the Conference reserved the right to express an opinion as to what should be done at the opportune moment". After this high and mighty pronouncement of diplomatic fudge, who dare blame the Sultan for absenting himself from a Council composed of such an assembly of Solomons?

On 6 July the Conference invited the Sultan to send troops to Egypt; but the conditions were buried beneath such a weight of bureaucratic "wisdom" that it is rather doubtful whether the Conference understood the trend of its own desires. Whilst these diplomatic wits wrestled with "high policy" at Constantinople, a gentleman named Cartwright was holding the Consular fort at Cairo, during the enforced absence, through illness, of Sir Edward Malet. This individual wrote very good dispatches, but was hardly a fitting substitute, even for Sir Edward Malet. He, however, did all he could in the way of misrepresentation of the Arabists, which may be excused on the ground of inexperience and an endeavour to show the authoritativeness of his inaccurate vapourings. It was, therefore, no matter for surprise to find him writing on 26 June: "The influence of Arabi Pasha is best shown by the unbroken ascendancy, the intolerable pretensions, and the threatening attitude of the army". Fine phrases, no doubt, but one would have thought, inasmuch as "The German and Austrian representatives in Egypt urged the formation of a Ministry approved by the military party", that the budding English diplomatist would have had the common sense to permit the army to set its house
in order without being interrupted by his critical bleatings. On 7 June the Khedive, acting on the advice of the German and Austrian Consuls-General, who had by this time taken a decided hand in the game, nominated Ragheb Pasha, a political derelict of Circassian rule, to be President of the Council with Arabi as War Minister. This move provoked a further crop of literature from the English representative.

The English Government, in the meanwhile, having their fleet lying idle in Egyptian waters and their bluejackets spoiling for a fight, a desire shared by their fire-eating admiral, Lord Alcester (Sir Beau-champ Seymour), found an excuse for the desired "scrap" in the preparations being made in the Alexandrian forts, which they declared were being armed "with the intentions of using them against the fleet". The Sultan, on being approached, "ordered that the construction of the batteries should cease". The army, seeing a hostile fleet at its gates recommenced the works, and the garrison of Alexandria was reinforced. On 3 July Lord Alcester "was instructed to prevent the continuance of the works. If they were not immediately discontinued, he was to destroy the earthworks and silence the batteries if they opened fire". The French Government was informed of these instructions, and requested to co-operate. The other Powers were also advised of England's intention; but on 5 July M. de Freycinet informed Lord Lyons that "the French Government could not instruct Admiral Conrad to associate himself with the English admiral in stopping by force the erection of the batteries or the placing of guns at Alexandria. The French Government considered that this would be an act of offensive hostility against Egypt; and they could not take part in it without
violating the constitution, which prohibits their making war without the consent of the Chamber".

On 6 July M. de Freycinet, in the French Chamber, "repeated emphatically the assurance that the Arms of France would not be used without the express consent of the Chamber". And on the same date Lord Alcester "sent a note to the commandant of the garrison demanding that the work of fortification and the erection of earthworks should be discontinued". The commandant replied that neither guns had been recently added to the fort, nor military preparations made. This statement was confirmed by Dervish Pasha. Bombardment, however, being hourly expected, to which the threatening attitude of the English admiral undoubtedly gave colour, work was recommenced on the fortification on 9 July, and guns were mounted on Fort Silsileh. Early on the following morning their fears were amply justified by Lord Alcester's notice to the European Consuls at Alexandria, in which he stated that he would "commence action within twenty-four hours after, unless the forts on the isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered".¹

The Cabinets of Europe were immediately informed of the English admiral's intention. Austria upheld the legitimacy of this intended act of unprovoked aggression; and Baron de Ring, who was then at Constantinople, and who had supported the colonels in Riaz Pasha's time at the Egyptian army inquiry of the previous year, induced the Porte to send a representative to the Conference then being held in Constantinople; and on 10 July, the Sultan informed

¹ When the British admiral cleared for action, the French fleet weighed anchor and retired to Port Said, taking no part in the bombardment.
the German Chargé d’Affaires at Constantinople that “a Turkish Commissioner would join the Conference the next day but one”. On the same date (10 July), in reply to Lord Dufferin’s information regarding the intended bombardment, the Sultan also told his Lordship that “he would send a categorical answer to his communication by five o’clock to-morrow”. He further requested that the bombardment might be delayed; and having appointed a new Prime Minister, this functionary waited upon Lord Dufferin on 11 July, and informed him that “to-morrow he would be able to propose a satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question”. The Sultan’s request was forwarded to London and Alexandria by Lord Dufferin, who, however, “held out no hope that the line of action determined upon would be modified”. This was no more than the Porte expected. The entire European diplomatic action over the Egyptian question had been conducted without the merest shadow of respect or consideration for the authority of the Sultan. It was not the first time he had fallen among thieves; and as he possessed neither a fleet nor an army, which could successfully stand up against that of either France or England, he was compelled by force of circumstances to remain a passive resister, hoping to solve the question by vexatious delays, during which the Europeans might become embroiled with one another by reason of their many jealousies, and so relieve the situation.

On the morning of 11 July, at 7 a.m., Lord Alcester “signalled from the ‘Invincible’ to the ‘Alexandria’ to fire a shell into the recently armed earthworks of the Hospital Battery, and followed this by the general signal to the fleet, ‘Attack the enemy’s batteries’, when immediate action ensued between
all the ships in the positions commanding the entrance to the harbour of Alexandria”. Shells fell fast and furious, not only in the forts, but about the city—especially in the native quarter. The engines of war reaped a rich reward in carnage, death, and conflagration. All through that day until 5.30 p.m., when the batteries were silenced, and extending far into the night, there was one long procession of maimed and mangled, dead and dying, passing from the forts, and the groans of the dying were punctured by the staccato service of the artillery. Hell with all its furies seemed let loose upon us. The inaccurately aimed shells from the ships and the rapacity of the Bedouins fired the town; and the rearguard of a disordered army, under the command of Suliman Pasha Sami, vengefully completed the destructive work of conflagration and plunder. When the army had evacuated the city, the uncontrolled mob went mad. The carnage begun by the Christians was continued by the natives. Pillage and murder were added to the horrors of the burning city, which but a few short days before sat in all her pride, with minaret and fane gracefully projected to the cloudless azure canopy of heaven, the all-beholding sun enfolding her in a brilliant mantle of resplendent light, whilst the surrounding air was cooled by the surf that musically played about her feet. Peace had now given place to license: fire, sword, death, devastation, gloom, wrought by the ruthless hand of perverse humanity. Such is war.
All sorts of wild theories have been advanced, and still wilder statements made, with regard to Arabi's culpability in the matter of the bombardment, and the subsequent English campaign in Egypt. I have already shown that Arabi was not a strong man—I have also endeavoured to prove that he was by no means an intellectual giant. His chief claim on the notice of posterity rests on his sincere patriotism, a certain dogged determination, and his humanitarian principles. He was first and foremost a theorist and a dreamer of dreams; he was neither a military tactician, nor was he a diplomatist. Notwithstanding his rather negative qualities, his well-known patriotism and his dogged determination caused the people of Egypt to believe in him, which belief enabled him to hold Egypt in the hollow of his hand just prior to the bombardment. His humanitarian principles, and the fact that the tenets of his faith, of which he was a sincere upholder, forbade him firing the first shot or taking a mean advantage of an enemy, however strong, also prevented him from attacking the British ships when they were within range of the forts, and at the mercy of the guns of the Alexandrian batteries. The British were allowed to get their ships in position; from whence the maximum carnage of death and destruction
could be dealt out to the enemy, with a minimum of danger to themselves.

Whatever excuse England has seen fit to make in order to cover up this page of dishonourable history, the fact remains that the Egyptians were on the defensive and the English were the aggressors. As early as 6 January, when Gambetta's joint note was published, Arabi began to advocate preparedness for the armed intervention which the note fore-shadowed; and on 6 July the determined and aggressive attitude of the English admiral proved beyond dispute that the long-expected crisis had arrived, and that there was no other way but to face the difficulty manfully.

There was no state of anarchy existing in any part of Egypt, either before the arrival of the fleet, or after that event. The riot and massacres of 11 June were neither more nor less than "the natural outcome of the political effervescence of the time", as Sir Edward Malet has it, with a little dash of Khedivial complicity; for directly the military were called in, the riot magically ceased.

Now, when he demanded the surrender of the Alexandrian land batteries, Lord Alcester must have known that neither Arabi nor the Khedive were in a position to surrender them. They formed a part of the Egyptian dominions of the Sultan of Turkey; and, according to the Sultan's firman of 1879, by which the Khedive held his throne, they could not be legally delivered up to a foreign Power without express instructions from the Sultan to that effect, or, at any rate, not without striking a blow in their defence. At the General Council held on 10 July to discuss the admiral's demands, the Khedive, Dervish Pasha, Arabi, and even Sultan Pasha, who had long
since gone over to the English, but who was present at the Council, were loud in their patriotic view that the forts should be defended; and Arabi received precise orders from Tewfik to "prepare the forts for action and to reply with artillery as soon as the English fleet should have opened fire". The Khedive having given explicit orders to his Minister of War to defend Egypt against the English fleet, it only proves the elasticity of the English diplomatic imagination, when it is claimed that "the Government intervened to restore order and good government in the interests of the Khedive"—the Sultan's hapless Viceroy!

I maintain that if disorder existed, which I most emphatically deny, that disorder was created by the English. Political matters were automatically adjusting themselves when the joint note arrived to disturb men's minds. Then there was the joint ultimatum, which, by its intended banishment of the leaders of the Nationalist party, made for that party's destruction; and, lastly, there was the arrival of the squadron which menaced both life and liberty.

Is it at all likely that any body of patriotic Englishmen would have sat contentedly at home whilst a hostile fleet was anchored in the Thames? During the late Boer War, for instance, the mere mention of Kruger's name in any theatre throughout Great Britain was sufficient to set the house in an uproar of loud hostility; and not a few pro-Boer meetings were wrecked by a hostile mob of patriotic Britons. Yet Kruger and the Boers were thousands of miles away from "British hearth and home", which were in no danger of being devastated. A black pugilist defeated his white opponent in the United States of
America, and on the night of the victory two inoffensive coloured men were assaulted by Englishmen in Leicester Square—and this in the twentieth century and in the most enlightened City of the world! These are only a few of many instances I could cite of some of the militant forms of British patriotism which, in the case of the Egyptian natives, would have been accounted "a fanatic rising", or any of the numerous stock scare-phrases which are ever on tap in the editorial sanctum of English journalism.

When, therefore, the Egyptians found themselves deserted by their treacherous ruler, surrounded by European hostility, and faced by armed aggression, they rose to a man in defence of their rights and liberties.

"How can a man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods?"

Sir Garnet Wolseley was dispatched to Egypt with an army, so reads the official statement, "in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements, to suppress a military revolt in that country"; which revolt, I would add, His Highness the Khedive had himself put in motion and then deserted, when he found himself, in vulgar parlance, on the wrong horse. In other words, two horses were entered for the Egyptian Ascendancy Stakes: Tewfik backed both and stood to win in any event. And this is the man whom English historians and statesmen would have the English people believe to have been an unfortunate, but "upright and loyal Prince". The people of Egypt were in a better position to know his real character than any European
could possibly have been; and it yet remains for an impartial native to declare that he was either "upright", "loyal", or patriotic. Grateful to the English he undoubtedly was; but he did not love even them, notwithstanding their "benefactions".  

The national defence of Egypt was conducted on a perfectly legal basis, in spite of Tewfik's defection. At the Egyptian National Council of 10 July, the Khedive, by signing the orders for the defence of Alexandria, made the subsequent action of the Egyptians not only legal, but robbed it of the title "revolt", which the Blue Books have bestowed upon it.

According to Mohammedan views in relation to war, when the chief of a State publicly announces the existence of a state of war and signs his name to the declaration, and the troops of the State have gone into action, it is the duty of the people to continue the fight until they have been victorious or have sustained a serious reverse. During operations, should the Mohammedan ruler be captured by the enemy, this fact invalidates any orders he might issue whilst in captivity. A prince who, by going over to the enemy, has turned traitor, is thereby incapacitated from giving valid orders. It was this view of the case that prompted the Nationalists to convocate a General Council, when they found their ruler had deserted to the enemy.

When it became certain that Alexandria would be bombarded, the Khedive returned to his country

1 "His Highness", said Dr. Comanos Pasha to M. de Guerville, "has often said to me in speaking of them (the English), 'Certainly I do not love them; but I am deeply grateful, for it is to them that I owe the fact that, to-day, I am Khedive of Egypt.' . . . Therefore far from wishing his removal the English, who knew they could count on him, desired that his reign should continue". ("New Egypt", p. 107.)
Palace of Ramleh, where he would be out of range of Lord Alcester's guns. Arabi, who took no active part in the bombardment, remained at the Ministry of Marine, near the Ras-el-Tin, to give such instructions as were necessary, and to receive reports. On the morning after the bombardment, Arabi, suspecting the Khedive of treachery, sent a strong guard to him with the message, that, "as there was a likelihood of the English admiral renewing the bombardment, he would evacuate Alexandria, and invited the Khedive to retire with the garrison to Cairo, out of range of the English guns". Arabi, being busy with the evacuation of the artillery, did not revisit Ramleh; so the Khedive, by a liberal distribution of orders and backsheesh, evaded his guards, and boarding the train which was sent to convey him to Cairo, slipped off to Alexandria and placed himself under Lord Alcester's protection. Dervish Pasha and the Ministers of State, being on the same train, were unwittingly made partners of his treachery. Five days later, Dervish Pasha received urgent letters recalling him to Constantinople, and his own steam-yacht being handy, he escaped, notwithstanding the vigilance of the English fleet which tried to stop him. Old Ragheb, the Prime Minister, and his colleagues being practically prisoners under a guard of seventy British bluejackets, were compelled by force of circumstances to accept the inevitable situation and remain the Khedive's slaves at Ras-el-Tin; and thus, by reason of their presence, lending to Tewfik's administration the appearance of legality.

Arabi, meanwhile, remained in ignorance of the Khedive's treachery. He was actively engaged in withdrawing his troops from the danger zone of
Alexandria to the strong line of defence at Kafr Dawar, which had been carefully placed by Mahmud Fehmi; and where for upwards of five weeks it successfully held out against the enemy under General Alison, repulsing their attacks and harassing them in turn to within a few miles or so of Alexandria.

Arabi, having taken up his quarters with the army at Kafr Dawar, neither visited Cairo during the war, nor was present at the meeting of the General Council himself; nor was he represented by any deputy, military or otherwise. The General Council was assembled because the people found their ruler a willing prisoner in the hands of the English; therefore incapable of free and independent action either in the interests of the country, or in the conduct of the war. "It was accordingly resolved by the Council, without a dissentient voice, that the Khedive was no longer in a position legally to command, and that his decrees, while he remained in English hands, were from that very fact invalid". It cannot be too strongly insisted on that this Council was not a military council, neither was it a civil council under military dictation. It was brought into existence by the Khedive's proclamation depriving Arabi of his Ministerial functions, and on the initiative of the highest dignitaries then in Egypt, both religious and civil; this made it at once National, and representative in the broadest possible sense.

2 On 14 July the Khedive sent Arabi a letter inviting him to return to Ras-el-Tin to confer with his colleagues of the Ministry regarding the proposed evacuation of Alexandria by the English, the terms of which the Ministers were to discuss. Cartwright, the English representative, however, telegraphed Lord Granville on 15 July, "The Khedive has summoned him (Arabi) here. If he comes he will be arrested, if not declared an outlaw". All of which Arabi instinctively knew. Vide "Secret History", p. 384.
The Council was not only well attended on its inception; but in addition to the religious Sheykh of the El-Azhar University, the Turkish Grand Cadi, the Grand Mufti, the Sheykh el-Islam, and the heads of the four orthodox sects were also present. Also among the overwhelming number of representative Moslems in attendance were four Princes of the reigning House, who had publicly avowed their nationalistic principles; a goodly number of the provincial Governors, and the chief country Notables. Among the non-Mohammedan representatives of the population were the Coptic Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi. "The Council was, therefore, fully entitled to any claim of validity in its decisions which universality can give, for it comprised all sections of political opinion and class divergency. Many of the chief men were of Circassian origin, but endowed with sufficient patriotism as Moslems to see that now it had come to fighting against a European invader, no honest choice was left but to defend Egypt against him, irrespective of party feuds". Disregarding the Khedivial decree of dismissal, the Council unanimously resolved that Arabi should remain in his position of Minister of War, and should continue to defend the country. Under the presidency of Yakub Pasha Sami, the Under Secretary for War, a permanent "Committee of Defence" was appointed, to assist Arabi in his work; such as recruiting, supplying military material, and victualling the army. The Council also resolved to carry on the civil business of Government in its various departments, which was most efficiently conducted during the two months of the campaign. The Ministry of the Interior was placed in the capable hands of Ibrahim Bey Mawsi, Under Secretary in the Ragheb Ministry,
and the Police in those of the no less efficient Ismail Effendi Jawdat. These two saw to it that there were no disturbances throughout Egypt, notwithstanding Lord Dufferin's exaggerations at the Constantinople Conference, where he stated that "during the last few months absolute anarchy has reigned in Egypt". And "the fellaheen . . . are unable to pay the land tax". The taxes during the war were regularly and gladly paid: the Egyptian taxpayer believed that in so doing, should the war be successful, he would not only for ever rid himself of the Europeans, but also of his ancient enemy, the Greek moneylender.

Arabi's great influence with the country Sheykhs and the fellaheen population made recruiting quite easy; and gratuitous supplies poured in upon the army, partly owing to national enthusiasm, and partly because trade was at a standstill.

In the meanwhile, Arabi had become the recognised ruler of the country, although only holding his old title of War Minister. In a tent of huge proportions, once the property of the Viceroy, Said Pasha, and given to Arabi by Said's widow as a national offering, Arabi held an almost regal Court, where Ulema of the El-Azhar and the important merchants and dignitaries of Egypt called to do honour to the national hero. It is therefore not surprising that he should have lost his mental equilibrium by these vain flatteries, which he tried to equalise by

1 "Two or three Circassian Mudirs, who had sought to ingratiate themselves with Tewfik by imitating Omar Lutfi and inciting to disturbance, were by them (Ibrahim Bey Mawsir and Ismail Jawdat) arrested and detained in prison to the end of the war, and after this no further rioting occurred. Such Europeans as remained at Cairo were carefully protected and all who wished to leave were forwarded under police escort to Port Said". ("Secret History", p. 384.)
surrounding himself with holy men, when hours were wasted in useless intercession which might have been serviceably applied to the organisation of the army, and the construction of the important defences at Tel-el-Kebir.

The Conference at Constantinople was still progressing backwards; in fact, it was not until 14 August that "the Representatives of the Powers unanimously expressed their opinion that the moment had come to suspend the labours (?) of the Conference". The Turkish delegates objected to the untimely demise of this institution of Western wisdom, reserving to themselves the right to fix a date for the next meeting. But although it was never formally closed, it never met again, passing peacefully away, "unwept, unhonoured, and unsung".

Nevertheless, the Sultan carried on some rather desultory negotiations regarding the terms of the Ottoman occupation of Egypt, as to how, where, and when the troops should land. Beyond a proclamation published in the Constantinople papers, in which the Sultan declared Arabi to be in "rebellion", these negotiations came to nothing. But throughout there was a disinclination on the part of the Sultan to adopt drastic measures in his treatment of Arabi; and there can be little doubt, that had the Egyptian Minister of War been anything of a soldier, he must have won the Sultan absolutely to his cause. A victory against the English would have meant much to him, and would certainly have raised him immeasurably in the Sultan's estimation; for it must be admitted that the Porte gave him every opportunity to rehabilitate himself, by indefinitely prolonging the negotiations with Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, to the utter disgust of his Lordship.
Nor must the fact be overlooked, that notwithstanding Arabi's honesty of purpose, he failed lamentably as a strategist at Kassassin, where he lost the opportunity of his life by indecision. Nor can there be any possible doubt but that a little dash and nerve would have won the battle, and placed the Duke of Connaught a prisoner in his hands—an undoubted asset in making terms. But what between treachery and indecision, and the absence of Arabi himself from the field, where he might have given his men that element of moral stamina which they so sorely needed, the engagement with its enormous possibilities was recklessly thrown away.

Arabi also listened to the bombast of de Lesseps, and did not block the Canal, although the Council was in favour of such a blockade. By this omission Arabi practically handed Egypt over to the British general. At a later date Sir Garnet Wolseley himself said, "If Arabi had blocked the Canal, as he intended to do, we should be still at the present moment on the high seas blockading Egypt. Twenty-four hours' delay saved us". Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Alexandria on 13 August. He decided to move on Cairo by way of Ismailia. The Canal was seized, and the Egyptian Army totally routed on the morning of 13 September. As Napoleon found his Waterloo, so Arabi found his Tel-el-Kebir. Major Watson, R.E., with two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards and a detachment of mounted infantry, having occupied the Citadel of Cairo on the evening of 14 September, Arabi, like the "Great" Napoleon, surrendered his sword to the English.

The negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey regarding the Egyptian Question were broken off on 18 September. For "the Englishman, straining for
over to hold his loved India, had planted a firm foot on the banks of the Nile and sat in the seats of the Faithful”.

1 Kinglake’s “Eothen”, p. 286. I have altered three words of the original, making “will plant” to read had planted and substituted sat for “sit”.
CHAPTER XI

"ICHABOD"

"POPULARITY", said Dr. Chalmers, "robs home of its sweets, and by raising a man above his fellows places him in a region of detraction. With his head among storms and his feet upon the treacherous quicksands, he stands a conspicuous mark for the shafts of envy, malice, and detraction, and has nothing to lull the agonies of a tottering existence but the hosannahs of a drivelling generation".

Arabi Pasha's popularity contributed in no small measure to his fall. His European detractors, armed with malice aforethought, misrepresented his mission throughout the Western world; and his Oriental detractors, armed with the shafts of envy, not only injured him among Moslems, but finally alienated the Sultan, and the hosannahs of the Egyptian multitude were quite inadequate to lull the agonies of his tottering existence. The causes which led to his defeat at Tel-el-Kebir and his subsequent surrender were many and varied, and, of course, the most weighty cause was English interference. As Lord Cromer says, "had he been left alone, there cannot be a doubt that he would have been successful. His want of success was due to British interference". British interference began prior to the bombardment, and did not end at Tel-el-Kebir. The arms of Britain were mighty, and it was might, not right, that over-

1 I quote from memory and therefore do not vouch for the strict accuracy of Dr. Chalmers' statement.
threw Arabi. It is to be regretted that the methods adopted by England, whether in diplomacy or in armed intervention, were not of the cleanest. There was Professor Edward Palmer, for instance, Professor of Oriental languages at Cambridge University, who was employed at the instance of Lord Northbrook to ascertain the briable possibilities of the Bedouins of the desert east of the Suez Canal. That Palmer was a distinguished Arabic scholar, and had some personal acquaintance with the district whilst working with the Palestine Exploration Society, made him eminently fitted for the task, which, according to the official reports, was the purchase of camels. From Suez to Gaza, this interesting individual travelled among the tribes, sapping their loyalty to Egypt by the promise of liberal bribes. On the other hand, Captain Gill, R.E., of the Intelligence Department, and his assistant, Charrington, the flag-lieutenant, upon making a junction with Palmer at Suez, after his return from the Teyyaha country, placed £20,000 to the latter's credit to "buy camels".

These three, with a very large sum in gold, set out for Nakhl on their way to the Teyyaha and Terrabin warriors—"camels". The two officers were supplied with dynamite with which to destroy the telegraphic communication between Egypt and Syria, and so isolate Arabi and cut off his connection with Turkey. Their escort comprised men of the Haiwat and Howeytat Bedouins, who, on discovering that they were freighted with gold which might be had for the taking, stripped and bound the three Englishmen, secured the gold, and shot their victims by the side of a ravine.1 Palmer himself accomplished very

1 A detailed account of this mission will be found in Mr. Blunt's "Secret History", pp 410–11.
little beyond putting the Sheykh Saoud-el-Tihawi in touch with the British. The Sheykh's name had been supplied by Tewfik; and the Bedouin Sheykh remained a spy in Arabi's camp, from the date of the removal of the head-quarters from Kafr Dawar till the rout at Tel-el-Kebir. He found this comparatively easy, inasmuch as he was scouting for Arabi, and his men could easily pass from camp to camp without raising the suspicions of the injured party.

The Bedouin of the desert, especially east of the Nile, may be fittingly termed the "free lance" of the Orient. He possesses no religion to speak of, and his moral standard is hardly shaped on European lines. He is courteous and hospitable to the stranger, when the stranger appeals to his hospitality and solicits his protection; but he never permits sentiment to override self-interest, for his services are always at the disposal of the highest bidder. European, Turk, Arab-fellah, all are to him common prey to be indiscriminately fleeced with or without provocation, and he considers all of them beyond the sphere of his allegiance.

It was this feeling that caused them to assist at the Alexandrian conflagration, in order that the spoliation of the "Franks" might be made less difficult.

The Egyptian troops had not disgraced themselves at the bombardment of Alexandria; but the Egyptian officers certainly anticipated a victory, and were disappointed at the failure of their arms. Even the Khedive would not board an English ship before the bombardment, for fear of its being sunk by the forts.1

1 "Shortly after the war I had a curious confirmation of Tewfik's indecision from no less authoritative a source than Lord Charles Beresford ... who told me that in a moment of unusual frankness,
the officers that made it a comparatively easy matter for Tewfik's agents to spread disaffection in their ranks by means of a liberal supply of money, and more liberal promises of promotion with a free pardon on the conclusion of the "rebellion". The Khedive's A.D.C., Osman Bey Rifaat, who possessed a full knowledge of the officers and their jealousies, worked upon these to some purpose. The war had not been conducted to the satisfaction of the officers, whether native or Circassian. There was the same cause for discontent as there had been during Ismail's unsuccessful Abyssinian campaign. The accusation of incompetence brought against the Circassian generals by the fellah officers at that time was now levelled at Arabi by both fellah and Circassian. Men who knew themselves to be more capable soldiers than Arabi looked askance at—

"A fellow—that never set a squadron in the field
Nor the division of a battle knows
More than a spinster";¹

who, if successful, would be raised to the dizzy height of Dictator, perhaps of King: an elevation he would owe to them and not to his own superior intelligence. On the other hand, Arabi's outlawry by the Sultan had by this time reached their ears; and as Sir Garnet Wolseley was acting as the servant of the Khedive, with the Sultan in "hearty" co-operation, they very naturally argued that defeat might be delayed, but would assuredly overtake them eventually, and it behoved them to make peace with the strong party while there was time. There was not even the

the Khedive had one day explained to him the reason of his remaining ashore during the fight, as being nothing else than his extreme perplexity as to which of the combatants would prove the better fighter. (Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's "Secret History of Egypt", pp. 380-1.)

¹ Shakespeare's "Othello", Act I, Scene 1.
chance of dragging matters on and on by instituting a system of guerilla warfare with the enemy, until favourable terms of surrender could be arranged. Surrender was imminent, for Sir Garnet Wolseley had landed at Ismailia; and notwithstanding the majority in favour of it, blockade of the Canal had been neglected by Arabi because of the promise of a French protection—a protection only existing in the imagination of the bombastic de Lesseps. Whilst Osman Bey Rifaat was actively engaged sowing discord in an already disaffected army, Sultan Pasha was dealing with the civilian chiefs. His great wealth and position—he was called the “King” in Upper Egypt—lent weight to his arguments in favour of England and the Khedive; and the fact of his having taken Arabi by the hand in the early stages of the movement made his defection appear genuine, and his arguments against his former protégé convincing. The secession of the prime mover in the party’s formation lent undoubted colour to the rumour that there was “something rotten in the State of Denmark”.

Jealousy was at the root of Sultan Pasha’s hostility. As a man of advanced age, matured experience, and undeniable position, he felt that he had received an unqualified indignity at the hands of both Cherif Pasha and Mahmud Sami, when they excluded him from a place in their respective Cabinets. In addition to this, his pride would not admit of his giving priority of place to the younger and more fortunate Arabi. He permitted personal pique to outweigh his patriotism, and for an empty English title he bartered the political emancipation of his country.  

1 Vide Appendix VII, pp. 570–74, Blunt’s “Secret History”.
2 He addressed letters to his numerous former friends at Cairo, putting forward the explanation that the alliance between the Khedive and the English was a merely temporary necessity, as the English
It seems probable that Yakub Pasha Sami, the President of the Military Committee at Cairo, had been tampered with by the Khedive's agents. For Mahmud Fehmi, the General, who was not only a good soldier, but upon whom Arabi depended for engineering his lines of defence, was taken prisoner by a small party of Life Guards not far from Wady Tumeylat; and Ali Fehmy Pasha, with Raschid Pasha, being both wounded at Kassassin and put hors de combat for the rest of the campaign, there was but one efficient general left, in the person of Abdul Aal Pasha—one of the three colonels—who could be relied upon for forward action at Tel-el-Kebir. This commander was allowed to remain in idleness at Damietta with his dashing and spirited Black Regiment, whilst Ali Pasha Roubi was appointed by Yakub Pasha Sami as Ali Fehmy's successor to the important command at Tel-el-Kebir. Roubi was one of Arabi's old colleagues in the early days of the movement; but it was a widely known fact that, although in other respects a very worthy man, he was by no means a competent military leader, especially of an engagement on which rested the entire fate of Egyptian independence. Arabi himself placed too great a reliance on the integrity of Sheykh Saoud-el-Tihawi, who treacherously lured him into a false and disastrous security; first by misleading Mahmud Sami on troops would not stay in Egypt when once the Khedive's authority had been re-established; that Arabi had lost the confidence of the Sultan; and that the continued resistance at Cairo was generally condemned by Moslems. These letters, distributed carefully, were not without their influence, and money again played its powerful part. Sultan, indeed, seems to have advanced the money out of his own pocket, for the very first financial act of the restored Khedivial Government after Tel-el-Kebir was to make him a public present of £10,000, under the title of an indemnity, for losses sustained by him during the war, while he also received a title of English knighthood. ... There is no question that with the Khedive's help Wolseley's path of victory was made a very easy one. ("Secret History," pp. 414-15.)
the morning of Kassassin, and then by leading Arabi
to certain destruction through withholding the news
of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s advance on Tel-el-Kebir.

In addition to these misfortunes and betrayals,
the crowning treachery was reached on the morning
of the final stand, by the defection of Abd-el-Rahman
Bey Hassan, commander of the advance guard of
cavalry, and Ali Bey Yussuf, in command of a portion
of the central lines, who, by accepting the liberal
bribes of the Khedive, evacuated two important posi-
tions, abandoning them to the enemy, and thereby
facilitating the victory of the English Commander-
in-Chief.¹

It will therefore be observed that from first to last
Arabi found himself beset by insuperable difficulties.
Had he, during the early stages of the campaign,
lopped off a few heads, beginning with Tewfik, as
Mehemet Ali would have done, or as the Khedive
himself desired to do when the conditions were
reversed and Arabi was in the power of that Prince,
“he might”, as the Princess Nazli said, “have been
reigning happily to-day”.²

¹ “Two of Arabi’s minor officers, both holding responsible positions,
had accepted a few days before the bribes offered by the Khedive’s
agents... The first was Abd-el-Rahman Bey Hassan, commander of
the advance guard of the cavalry, who was placed with his regiment
outside the lines in a position commanding the desert road from the
east, but who on the night in question shifted his men some consider-
able distance to the left, so as to leave the English advance unobstructed.
The second, Ali Bey Yusuf, in command of the central lines, where the
trenches were so little formidable that they could be surmounted by an
active artillery. By the account generally given, and Arabi’s own, he
not only left the point that night unguarded, but put out a lantern
for the guidance of the assailants.” (“Secret History”, p. 420.)

² Mr. Blunt says that on visiting the Princess Nazli on 31 January,
1887: “She told us a great deal that interested us about Arabi, for
whom she had, and I am glad to see still has, a great culte, talking of
his singleness of mind, and lamenting his overthrow. ‘He was not
good enough a soldier,’ she said, ‘and has too good a heart. These were
his faults. If he had been a violent man like my grandfather, Mehemet
Ali, he would have taken Tewfik and all of us to the Citadel and cut
our heads off—and he would have been now happily reigning, or if he
Notwithstanding the claim made by English writers that Arabi's success would have meant anarchy or the rise of a Turkish Dictator, the real circumstances, however, proved such claim to have been arrant humbug, and quite foreign to the acknowledged facts of the conditions prevailing in Egypt during the government by the General Council at Cairo. Take, for instance, that great bugbear, finance, which was at the root of all the Egyptian difficulties. The accounts which were handed over by the Council to the Khedive's Ministers on the return of the Court to Cairo, were found to be in perfect condition; every piastre spent during the war was accurately accounted for, and the machinery of the various departments was running as smoothly as could have been expected under the warlike conditions that obtained, and the unrest which the Khedive's agents successfully created in the minds of those in authority.

The movement being primarily against the corrupt rule of the Turks, the leader did take care, and would have continued to take care that they should not again be allowed to reintroduce their system of peculation, which had thrown the country into a state of bankruptcy. Nor must it be assumed that the reformers, being for the most part a peasant class, were incapable of appreciating the necessity for modern innovations in connection with the essentially Western political system which they had introduced. That they were untried and untutored in the arts could have got the Khedive to go on honestly with him he would have made a great king of him. Arabi was the first Egyptian Minister who made the Europeans obey him. In his time, at least, the Mohammedans held up their heads, and the Greeks and Italians did not dare transgress the law. I have told Tewfik this more than once. Now there is nobody to keep order. The Egyptians alone are kept under by the police, and the Europeans do as they like". (Note to p. 394, "Secret History".)
of government according to European ideals does not necessarily lead to the assumption that their efforts would have been attended by shipwreck. I am quite aware that there is no short cut to learning, and that it is generally considered that advanced political institutions on liberal lines are the result of evolution. Such ideas and arguments are not only highly conventional, but essentially European; and it is quite impossible to gauge Oriental thought by European standards. The great difficulty, east, west, north or south, wherever the white race has held the coloured race in subjection, is the inability on the part of the white man to realise that the coloured man may be, and oftentimes is, his intellectual equal, if not his superior. It is, therefore, quite impossible for the European to arrive at a satisfactory study of Oriental persons or conditions unless the obscuring cobwebs of prejudice are swept aside, and these subjects are approached with an open mind.

The most rabid Egyptian Constitutionalist of 1882 would never have claimed universal political intellectuality for the mass of his countrymen. It must be borne in mind that good government is carried on by the intellectual few in the interests of the un-intellectual many. Take England, France, the United States. What do the people of these countries know of the high questions of State? And it is extremely questionable whether the boasted liberal political institutions of these countries are worked in the interests of the people.

The Egyptian fellah Notables, and Ministers of Arabist proclivities, who desired to rule Egypt in 1882, were neither better nor worse than the Europeans holding the same positions and possessing the same aims and desires. But it will be claimed that
these European statesmen had gained experience and had been properly trained in the arts of government, by reason of the before-mentioned political evolutionary process through which they had passed. This is true only in a limited sense. There is no system of political economy extant which is so perfect in construction that it may be universally applied to all communities of the human race. Take the Socialist-Labour party in the English House of Commons. Take Mr. John Burns, the foremost of them all. Are any of these gentlemen qualified, notwithstanding their undoubted intellectuality, because of mere bookish learning and experience in the arts of government? The powers that had been, did not realise that there was a party of workers who would become a power in the State, until some forty Socialist-Labour members marched into the House of Commons. Mr. Keir Hardie, upon first taking his seat in the House of Commons, was regarded by superior English statesmen as a sort of political freak; but when the rearguard subsequently filed into Westminster Palace, it was very soon realised that the political freak had blossomed forth into a political force.

In Egypt the conditions were almost identical. The ruling class of Turks and Circassians could not reconcile themselves to the fact that their heritage of misrule and oppression could be wrested from them by those they had oppressed, nor did they believe that legislators were being evolved from the downtrodden masses. It is indeed true that they were the largest landowners; but it cannot be truthfully stated that the fellah reformers intended to confiscate the possessions of the Turks, neither did the Constitutionalists attempt to repudiate their
European obligations; a fact which is attested by no less an authority than Sir Edward Malet.¹

It has also been asserted by Arabist critics that the Ulema, who represented Arab erudition in Egypt, were a narrow class, of limited intellect, and that the Mohammedan religious system, being stationary and conservative, does not admit of liberal thought, expansion, or political progress; inasmuch as Islam, to which the Moslem is bound hand and foot, incorporating as it does a civil dispensation, "would regulate not only the government but the social life of the country upon these principles of faith which are most antiquated, obsolete, and opposed to the commonplace ideas of modern civilisation".² These statements are absolutely opposed to the known opinions held by the Ulema, the accepted traditions of Islam, or the liberal principles of reform on a theological basis, that had been previously taught at the El-Azhar by Sheykh Jemal-ed-din, the Afghan leader of religious and political thought at Cairo; a leader whose teaching was taken up and continued by his worthy successor, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the recently deceased Grand Mufti of Egypt.

This school of thought was effectively teaching the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position; and by leaving the past behind, was marching intellectually forward in harmony with modern knowledge and progress. It is also proved that the Koran and its traditions, when rightly interpreted, Islamic law being in its essence republican, were capable of a most liberal development by no means opposed to beneficial change.

Now touching the matter of anti-European feeling

¹ Vide ante, p. 69.
in Egypt. At no period, whether during the early Nationalist agitations, or at a later date, when constitutional government had become an accomplished fact, were either Arabi or his colleagues aggressively opposed to Europeans. On the contrary, they were sufficiently intelligent to understand that if they were to keep pace with modern progress it was essential that they should keep in touch with those persons who were closely identified with liberal institutions; and, what is most important, not only did they disclaim any desire to get rid of the Europeans, but they were extremely anxious to be taught by this very body.\(^1\) The individual who is sincerely desirous of obtaining enlightenment cannot be considered to be in a very parlous intellectual condition. And that they saw the need for social reform is proved by their very comprehensive programme, which included the abolition of the slave trade and the corvée system of forced labour, and the establishment of agricultural banks, through which agency they hoped to relieve the farmer from the incubus of the Greek usurer. These reforms, having commended themselves to the English, were subsequently introduced by Lord Cromer. It will therefore be observed that the aims and intentions of the Nationalists in the direction of intellectual improvement and constitutional reform were being arranged on highly

\(^1\) "In an interview with Sir Auckland Colvin on 1 November, 1881, Arabi disclaimed in the plainest words the desire to get rid of Europeans, whether as employés or residents; he spoke of them as necessary instructors of the people. He himself and the two officers (pointing to them) had never been to school. Intercourse with Europeans had been their school. He, and all, felt the need of it; they had no need to question the need of Europeans in the administration. On the contrary, if more were required let them come. . . . The impression left on my mind was that Arabi, who spoke with great moderation, calmness, and conciliation, is sincere and resolute, but is not a practical man". (Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. I, pp. 209–10.)
commendable lines. They were none of them political giants, nor could they boast a Solomon amongst them. They were plain men, of good average common sense, knowing their own requirements and the requirements of their fellows; and had they been left to work out their own political salvation there is no possible doubt that they would have eventually obtained their desires. That these men made mistakes is quite true. But we are all fallible mortals: we all blunder. There never was, nor will there ever be, a perfect statesman or political system—East or West. That European intervention was in any case inevitable I do not admit; because so long as the Egyptians kept their financial obligations, and there was public tranquillity, the sons of Israel, being only troubled about their bond and their ducats, would have left the fellah to his own political devices. As Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace says, "there can be no longer any reasonable doubt that the English Government totally misconceived the real nature of the Egyptian revolutionary movement".1 And I would add, that misconception was the result of misrepresentation and diplomatic incapacity. A movement which had for its ultimate object the emancipation of an enslaved race should have been after the heart of a British Liberal Government, whose leader was wont to bellow so loudly over the conditions in Bulgaria; and who, but for the efforts of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and his friends, would have permitted Arabi Pasha and his co-reformers to be left at the mercy of the Khedive, when he well knew

1 Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace was Lord Dufferin's lieutenant, that nobleman having been appointed by the British Government (October 31) to inquire into the Egyptian situation and to lay down a basis upon which self-government might be established in Egypt. It was his presence in Egypt that aided Arabi and his principal associates in obtaining a fair trial.
that such a course meant the degrading death of a rebel, with all those refinements of bodily torture with which Tewfik's origin and traditions had made him familiar.

Arabi and his principal associates were tried on 13 December, 1882. On the advice of his friends Arabi pleaded guilty to the charge of rebellion. He was sentenced to death, which was immediately after commuted into perpetual exile. After many places of exile had been suggested, Ceylon was finally selected, to which place Arabi and his principal associates sailed on 26 December, by a specially chartered ship. The Englishman having planted himself firmly in the Nile Valley, the Kinglake prophecy was abundantly fulfilled.

All liberal hopes and political aspirations were—for the time—crushed out of the Egyptian people at Tel-el-Kebir, and Tewfik was set firmly upon the Khedivial throne with the support of British bayonets.

The word "Ichabod" might be said to have replaced the name of "Liberty" in Egypt. With the political domination of the English, the glory—such as it was—had indeed departed.

1 Arabi Pasha was allowed to return to Egypt in 1901.
2 "I shall use my influence to maintain the rights already established, whether by firmans of the Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its institutions." (Queen Victoria's speech to Parliament, 7 February, 1882.)
CHAPTER XII

GOVERNMENT BY PHILANTHROPY

England had entered Egypt with an armed force, with the philanthropic intention of restoring order in the Khedive’s Government out of the chaos which her representatives had assisted to create.¹ Now that order was restored, fearing that the masses might once more rise against an unpopular ruler whom she had re-established on the viceregal seat in defiance of the popular will, to satisfy certain inquisitive European neighbours, it became necessary for England to find some valid excuse for a prolonged sojourn in the home of her protégé. On 20 September, M. Duclerc, M. de Freycinet’s successor, had informed the British Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, “that he thought it would be in the interests of England to give at an early date some notion of what her future intentions were with regard to Egypt”. A hint of which there was no mistaking the nature and intention.

In the meanwhile the new Khedivial Government,—with Cherif Pasha once more Prime Minister, and Arabi’s old enemy, Riaz Pasha, as Minister of the

¹ “In talking to the various persons who have made inquiries as to my views on the Egyptian Question, I have stated that we have not the least intention of preserving the authority which has thus reverted to us. . . . It was our intention so to conduct our relations with the Egyptian people that they should naturally regard us as their best friends and counsellors, but that we did not propose upon that account arbitrarily to impose our views upon them, or to hold them in irritating tutelage”. (Lord Dufferin’s Dispatch, 19 December, 1882. Egypt No. 2 (1883), p 30.)
Interior—had resigned as a protest against the non-execution of Arabi and the principal Nationalists; which execution they considered would have been not only an act of justice, but was a State necessity. This view was shared, as was natural in the circumstances, by the Pashas and the Europeans resident in Egypt; but the mass of the people did not agree with it, inasmuch as the commutation of the sentences met with their unqualified approval.¹

Cherif Pasha, however, was induced to retain the Premiership; and a Cabinet was constructed on lines more liberal than those of its immediate predecessor, although its composition was of a less national character than that which existed prior to the return of the Court to Cairo.

Lord Dufferin, who arrived in Cairo on 7 November, on a special mission to Egypt, after having expedited and concluded the proceedings against Arabi and his principal associates, then turned his attention to the real object of his mission, that of laying down a basis upon which "self-government" might be established in Egypt. This was no easy matter, as the prisons were filled to overflowing with thousands of minor individuals charged with murder, arson, and pillage. A Commission was duly "appointed to make preliminary inquiries, and to send accused persons, against whom a prima facie case had been established, for trial before a Court Martial". Some of the prisoners were executed, others were condemned to various terms of penal servitude; a few individuals, against whom no charges could be

¹ In addition to the leaders of the movement, some one hundred and fifty individuals were condemned to exile from Egypt, many to exile in the provinces under police supervision. On 1 January, 1883, a Decree was issued granting an amnesty to all other political prisoners. Suliman Sami was, however, executed for his complicity in the burning of Alexandria.
established, were released; and the special Commission and the Court Martial, having between them completed a very busy session, were eventually abolished by decree on 9 October, 1883.

On 3 January, 1883, Lord Granville addressed to the expectant Powers a circular note, which had been previously submitted to and approved by the Porte. In it his Lordship pointed out "that the course of events had thrown upon England the task, which Her Majesty's Government would willingly have shared with other Powers, of suppressing the military rebellion in Egypt, and restoring peace and order in that country. The work had been happily accomplished, and although for the present a British force remained in Egypt, the Government were desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the necessity for its presence was superseded by the organisation of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority". As to his future policy, Lord Granville then proposed: In the first place, "that the freest possible navigation of the Suez Canal, its strict neutrality in time of war, and equal rights therein, be granted to all nations. In the second place, the attainment of greater economy in the management of the Daira estates. In the third place, the treatment of foreigners on the same footing as natives with regard to taxation. In the fourth place, the continuance of the present system of mixed tribunals for civil suits between natives and foreigners. In the fifth place, the formation of a small Egyptian army, with British officers, lent for a time to fill the higher posts, and a separate force of gendarmerie and police. In the sixth place, some new arrangement

1 The remnant of the Egyptian Army after Tel-el-Kebir was dispatched for service in the Soudan.
in lieu of the Dual Control, such as the appointment of a single European financial adviser, without authority to interfere in the direct administration of the country. In the seventh place, the prudent introduction of representative institutions in some form adapted to the present political intelligence of the people, and calculated to aid in their progress”.

Now inasmuch as the Egyptian Government was anxious for the abolition of the Dual Control, “on the ground that its dual nature and semi-political character had caused great inconvenience”, Sir Auckland Colvin, whose status was affected by Clause 6, on the publication of Lord Granville’s circular, resigned his office, and the Control was abolished by Khedivial Decree a few days later. France had been invited to consider the impossibility of carrying on, what was originally considered a provisional arrangement, after two out of the three parties to the agreement, for serious reasons, desired to withdraw from it. But France insisted that the Control could only be abolished by the consent of all the parties to it, and refused to accept the presidency of the Commission of the Debt. It was declined on the ground that it was not “consistent with the dignity of France to accept as an equivalent for the abolition of the Control, a position which was simply that of cashier”, and, like Achilles, she retired to her political tent in a fit of sulks, determined to “resume her liberty of action in Egypt”. The position of Controller was, however, subsequently revived, under the more euphemistic title of Financial “Adviser”, in favour of Mr. (Sir) Edgar Vincent.

The Egyptian decks being at length cleared for action, and the Powers having assented to Lord Granville’s Egyptian policy, Lord Dufferin im-
iedimately proceeded to formulate his plans for the social and political regeneration of Egypt, according to the pledges laid down by Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone's Liberal Ministry. These may be roughly summarised as follows:

That Egypt will be reorganised in such a way as to secure permanent order in the future. That there will be a prudent development of popular institutions; and that the occupation is temporary, and will not be unnecessarily prolonged.

With regard to the first of these pledges: inasmuch as the Bedouin tribes occasionally gave trouble, and might be tempted to make an inroad upon the richer Egyptian towns—perhaps the capital itself—if they imagined they would find them destitute of troops, Lord Dufferin proposed "that an Egyptian Army of six thousand men, which should be a latent force, be recruited by conscription. The composition of this body should be native Egyptians".

A semi-military constabulary, and an urban police for large towns in the Nile Valley, under the Minister of the Interior, and not, as heretofore, under the Minister for War. The combined force to total 7,390 men.

In the case of the army and semi-military constabulary, to be organised by Sir Evelyn Wood and Baker Pasha respectively, Turco-Circassian and fellah officers were to be reintroduced, military efficiency was to be the sole advancement, patronage, as in former times, being discounted, and inefficient were to be put on half-pay. Twenty-seven English officers were to be introduced into the services to assist in their organisation. The rations were to be of good quality according to regulation. The pay of the men to be one piastre (2½d.) a day for privates,
MEHMET ALI
VICEROY AND FOUNDER OF THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN KHEDIVIAL DYNASTY
with proportionately larger sums to higher grades, to be paid regularly on the last day of the month under the personal supervision of English officers.

Now, inasmuch as the fellaheen had never taken kindly to soldiering, Sir Evelyn Wood proposed to replace long service by terms of four years with the colours, and the same terms in the reserve, with leave of absence of fourteen to thirty days, according to distance from home; arrangements to be made with the railway administration for reduced rates; and when away from home with the colours, facilities were to be given the men to communicate with their relatives. All of which was not only a move in the right direction, but made for a popularity of the services which did not obtain during the old regime.

Mehemet Ali was the first to introduce conscription into Egypt, when he desired to raise cheap battalions to replace the more expensive and rather turbulent Albanian bands which had enabled him to exterminate the Mamelukes. He, however, found the fellaheen so greatly opposed to martial pursuits, that, rather than be pressed into the Viceroy's service, they not infrequently resorted to the extreme expedient of mutilating their bodies. Mehemet Ali was equal to the emergency, for he forthwith formed companies of one-eyed fellaheen; and those who had mutilated their right hands were made to use the left, or pull the trigger with such fingers as remained.

The reason for this repugnance to military service on the part of the fellaheen was to be found, for the most part, in his devotion to the soil; and the fact that at a later period they were brought to Cairo from the rural districts in chains, with an iron collar about their necks, and the loud lamentations of their female relatives ringing in their ears, was not cal-
culated to endear to them a service possessing such cruel and harrowing adjuncts. Besides, it must also be borne in mind that these conscripts left home, family, and friends, fine upstanding youths of sixteen or eighteen, to be tied to a service where the rations were bad, the pay irregular, the “discipline” iniquitous and oppressive, and only to be terminated by death, injury, or decrepit age. On returning to their native village without pension or honours, they would find their relatives dead, and in many cases their own names forgotten. They were as strangers among their own people. Too old and infirm to work, without even the poor consolation of “shouldering a crutch to show how fields were won”, they passed a wretched existence, to be eventually terminated by the wayside, or in the mud-hovel of some poor but sympathetic villager. There can be little wonder, therefore, that the fellaheen regarded the conscript call with greater horror than the call of the Eternal Reaper.

A project of judicial reform, discovered in the archives of the Ministry of Justice, was modified by a Commission working nominally under the presidency of the responsible Minister, but really under the guidance of the notorious Nubar Pasha, who, it will be remembered, was responsible for the “famous” International Tribunals.

With a view to redeeming Lord Granville’s pledge relating to “the prudent development of popular liberties”, Lord Dufferin elaborated the political institutions, which were to grant Village Constituency, Provincial Councils, Legislative Councils, and a General Assembly of eight Ministers responsible to the Khedive. All of these were to be in a large measure under the supervision of an advisory body of Europeans. “I cannot conceive”, said Lord
Dufferin in his report, "anything which would be more fatal to the prosperity and good administration of the country, than the hasty and inconsiderate extrusion of any large portion of the Europeans in the service of the Government, in deference to the somewhat unreasonable clamour which has been raised against them. For some time to come Europeans in the various departments of Egyptian administration will be absolutely necessary. . . . It is frightful to contemplate the misery and misfortune which would be entailed on the population were the finances, the public works, and the analogous departments to be left unorganised by a few high-minded European officials. The Egyptian Government would quickly become a prey to dishonest speculators, ruinous contracts, and delusive engineering operations, from which they are now protected by the intelligent and capable men who are at hand to advise them in reference to these subjects. This is especially true in regard to financial matters. The maintenance of Egypt's financial equilibrium is the guarantee of her independence." . . . "If", he continued, "I had been commissioned to place affairs on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of the Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will". . . . After enumerating the various advantages to be derived from such a system, he concluded: "The Egyptians would have justly considered the advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, Her Majesty's Government, and the public opinion in England, have pronounced against any such alternative".¹

¹ Vide Lord Dufferin's Dispatch, Egypt No. 6 (1883), pp. 41-83, and Appendix to chapter xvii.
But, inasmuch as it is averred that “the title deeds of all political authority are elastic”, the time was to arrive when English public opinion would become something more than elastic in regard to political authority in Egypt. The lust of conquest, and the expansion of empire, would so effectively blind the eyes of English public opinion to truth and justice, that the cry of the Egyptians for autonomy would be lost on the wings of the wind, and “the mailed fist” of the British representative would become more masterful than the will of the most arrogant Indian Resident.

It is very questionable whether Lord Dufferin himself foresaw that in time to come “the Egyptians would have justly considered the advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence”; for it must be remembered that the cost of the army of occupation, indemnity to the sufferers by the burning of Alexandria, and the expedition to the Soudan, added an additional £5,000,000 to the public debt. But it was a case of “J’y suis, et j’y reste!”

In the meanwhile, Sir Edward Malet was promoted to the position of Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister at Brussels; and Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer); then in India, being offered the succession through Lord Dufferin, accepted the post, and arrived in Cairo 11 September, 1883.

“Dance before the monkey in the days of his power”, runs the Egyptian adage. It was in this manner that the Egyptians accepted British occupation and authority. There were, of course, the Turco-Circassians, who had not quite made up their minds whether they appreciated English tutelage in the affairs of the country; but it is also evident that the presence of the British was less objectionable
to them than that of any other European power. Also, England having pledged herself to evacuate the country "when order and good government were restored", they looked forward to that time when they, being the ruling caste, would have the power once more within their grasp. They knew that English public opinion was opposed to handing the government over to them; but they hoped that when the English had departed they would find some means of coming into their own again, especially as all fellah leaders possessing any political pretensions were now safely out of the way.

The Copts, for the most part, were jubilant at the turn events had taken; they looked to the dominant fellow Christian to accord them that preferment which their undoubted abilities abundantly warranted; a preferment, they feared, would be withheld by the Nationalists, notwithstanding the Arabist professions of granting equal civil and political privileges to all natives of the Delta. And the Europeans were influenced in proportion to the material advantages likely to accrue to them from English domination.

Now it has frequently been asserted that England, on occupying Egypt, should have proclaimed a protectorate immediately after the surrender of Arabi. Had England done so, she would have violated all those traditions of political probity which had gained for her an international respect. At the same time, it must be conceded that the withdrawal of the French from active participation in the Egyptian campaign, and the rather precipitate action of Lord Alcester at Alexandria, undoubtedly placed England in a position from which there was no retreat. Having, therefore, committed a grave political error, by
reason of a mistaken policy, and an incorrect conception of the Egyptian Nationalist movement, it must be admitted by all impartial observers, that England set about repairing the evil she had wrought in a manner which compelled admiration for the evident sincerity of her intentions. The appointment of Lord Dufferin was unquestionably a most happy selection, and the best obtainable at the time; for it is extremely doubtful whether any European Power—England included—could have produced such another. That his work was well done is beyond dispute; but at the same time, it is greatly to be feared that the unavoidable introduction and retention of Europeans in prominent Government positions, although with the best possible intentions, has contributed in no small measure towards the indefinite extension of the occupation; and the fact of its being unusual to undertake the administration of a foreign country without hope of financial or commercial reward—England's Egyptian policy, as advanced at this time—caused both Egyptian and European to be rather suspicious of a programme that practically amounted to government by philanthropy!

In bringing this chapter to a close, I cannot refrain from recording the undying debt of gratitude which the people of Egypt owe to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and Sir William Gregory; and this notwithstanding Lord Cromer's rather cheap sneers at the expense of the former gentleman. The fact is incontrovertible, that it was due to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's uncompromising propaganda and unremitting zeal, that the British public were made aware of the true condition of affairs in Egypt. Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin having done their utmost in
the way of misrepresentation, it was only because of Mr. Blunt’s efforts that the Foreign Office bureaucrats were brought to see the error of their ways, thereby contributing in no small measure to the appointment of the efficient Dufferin. There can be but little doubt that Mr. Blunt’s blind sympathy and belief in the aims and intentions of the Nationalists led him into occasional indiscretions; but it is quite easy to find valid excuses in his well-known humanitarian principles, and his poetic temperament. And it cannot be too greatly insisted on that he was instrumental in bringing about a fair trial for Arabi Pasha and his chief associates; and at the same time, by preventing his execution by the treacherous and revengeful Khedive, he also stayed the hands of Britain from the acquiescence in, if not the commission of, a political crime which would have stained the none too clean pages of Britain’s Egyptian policy in 1882.
CHAPTER XIII
THE HICKS EXPEDITION—AND AFTER

THE Egyptian Soudan,¹ in 1883, over which the Khedive was presumed to rule, covered an area of about twice the dimensions of France and Germany. It extended from Wadi Halfa to the Equator, and from Massowah, on the Red Sea, to the western limits of Darfur—a territory of 1650 miles long by 1200 miles broad. To the north was a population mainly Mohammedan Arabs; to the south, Negro tribes were scattered rather densely, and they were periodically raided by the Arabs to supply the slave markets of Cairo, Constantinople, and Damascus. Mehemet Ali first extended Egyptian rule to these districts; and, under him, Ibrahim Pasha carried the banner of Egyptian conquest as far south as Kordofan and Senaar, avowedly determined to suppress the chronic anarchy which had previously existed as a standing menace to Egyptian frontiers, and to ensure tranquillity by the establishment of permanent government throughout this vast area. The Arabs sullenly accepted the invasion as long as they were permitted to continue the traffic in human flesh undisturbed by the conqueror.

Ismail, however, on issuing his proclamation against slavery, informed the Europeans who had influenced his action, that in order to effectively stamp out the traffic, it was necessary for him to extend his rule to those regions from whence the

¹ The word Soudan signifies "a country of blacks".

140
traders drew their supplies. Thus, in 1870, Sir Samuel White Baker led an expedition which conquered the Equatorial provinces, of which, in 1874, Colonel (afterwards General) Gordon was appointed Governor-General. Darfur was added to Egyptian territory in the following year. Ismail then welded the Central African province into one huge Government, which he entrusted to Colonel Gordon with the most absolute dictatorial powers. The English pro-Consul ruled at Gondakoro with ability and justice in the best interests of Khedive and people; and in due course, because of its high standard, the Government of the Soudan surpassed the system then obtaining in the Nile Valley.

When Ismail fell, Gordon was recalled on economic grounds, notwithstanding the general excellence and economy of his administration, and the fact that he had successfully prevented the Soudan from burdening the Exchequer at Cairo. His policy was then reversed, and a horde of ravenous Turks, Circassians, and Bashi-Bazouks were forthwith unleashed to harass the Soudanese and devour the land. Sir Samuel White Baker, on his return to the Soudan in 1870, had found that "industry had vanished, and that oppression had driven the inhabitants from the soil"; and Colonel Stewart, who, in the winter of 1882–3, was commissioned to report on the state of the Soudan, described the agents of the Government as "swaggering bullies, robbing, plundering, and ill-treating the people with impunity".

Egyptian government had therefore become intolerable. Chiefly owing to the vastness of the country, administrative incompetence was the rule, Gordon's benevolent despotism being the exception; and his system of economy was succeeded by annual loss
to the Cairo Exchequer. Egypt meanwhile was passing through the Arabist crisis; and the reformers being too busy with local matters of greater urgency, the Mahdi, who, like the Egyptian Nationalists, was the product of Turco-Circassian misrule and oppression, not only found the moment opportune to arise, but also to make converts and consolidate his growing power.

Of course, he was never accepted by orthodox Mohammedans, whether in the Soudan or in Egypt, with anything approaching the respect or recognition due to an individual who was supposed to be "conducted in the right path",¹ or to one who should have, but did not possess, those qualifications which no less an authority than a learned Sherif of Mecca declared to be essential. "The greatest signs", said the learned Sherif, "shall be that he shall be of the line of Fatma."² That he shall be proclaimed Mahdi against his will, not seeking such proclamation for himself, and not causing strife amongst the Faithful to obtain it, nor even yielding to it till threatened with death by them. He shall be proclaimed in the Mosque of Mecca, not elsewhere; he shall not appear save when there is strife after the death of a Calipha; he shall neither come nor be proclaimed until such time as shall be coincident with that of Anti-Christ, after whom Jesus will descend and join Himself to the Mahdi. These are the great signs of his coming. . . . Whosoever shall of his own will declare himself by force, is a pretender such as have already appeared many times."³

¹ "Conducted in the right path", literal meaning of "Mahdi".
² A Sherif or descendant of the Prophet. Fatma was the daughter of Mohammed.
³ Extract from a work published in 1883, entitled "The Conquests of Islam", by a Sherif of Mecca.
Now the Soudanese Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed of Dongola, although a religious enthusiast and doubtless a good Mohammedan, did not possess any of the above qualifications; and it is extremely doubtful, on proclaiming himself in August, 1881, whether he could have influenced even the ignorant tribes of the Soudan had the Government been conducted on anything like equitable lines. Reouf Pasha, sent to report on his plans and intentions, found him residing on a small island of the White Nile, with a guard of chosen followers who stood before him with drawn swords. He respectfully, but none the less firmly, declined to accede to the demand of the Egyptian official that they should visit Khartoum in company. Subsequently he ignominiously repulsed a small force sent by water to effect his capture. Between August and December he was left to his own devices, which time he employed in winning the neighbouring tribes over to his banner, making Gebel Gedir his base of operations. In December, 1881, he once more defeated a force under Raschid Bey. During the early months of 1882 a third expedition of greater proportions, under the command of Yussuf Pasha, was fitted out by the Governor-General of the Soudan, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, against the rebellious "deliverer of his people"; but in June the Mahdi utterly annihilated Yussuf Pasha, his officers and the 6000 Egyptian soldiers comprising the force, thereby supplying his followers with a cheap consignment of sorely needed firearms, though the majority of the rebels were still only armed with sword and spear. Feeling his strength increase, the Mahdi cast aside his defensive tactics, and made an offensive assault on El Obeid, where he was repulsed with a loss of 6000 men. Never despairing, he
once more laid siege to El Obeid on 16 January, 1883; he captured it without any great show of resistance on the part of the defenders, and the best part of its garrison, headed by Iscander Bey, their commander, took service under the Mahdi.

In the meanwhile the Government at Cairo, realising the gravity of the situation, made elaborate preparations for an expedition under Hicks Pasha, which would at once test the value of the new Egyptian Army, and the loyalty of the Arabist soldiers then in the Soudan. A camp was accordingly formed at Omdurman on the west of the Nile, opposite Khartoum, where by the end of August Colonel Hicks—a retired Indian officer now in the Egyptian service—collected an army of 10,000 men, with thirty guns, rockets, and howitzers. The camels were collected under the personal direction of Alla-ed-Deen, the Governor-General of the Soudan.

On 9 September Hicks Pasha began his disastrous march up the Nile. His officers were satisfied with the men, who were in excellent spirits, and they therefore determined to march through the desert on El Obeid, trusting to find enough surface pools of water to supply their needs. The troops, though insufficient to hold communications with their base of operations, were absolutely frittered away in this vain attempt to accomplish the impossible. For weeks nothing was heard of Hicks Pasha, whose force, marching in square formation with luggage and camels in the centre, could only travel ten miles a day. The heat was excessive, and when they found the highly prized and long-expected wells of water, these were either filled with stones, earth, or rotting bodies of men and camels.

Hicks, realising the difficulties of his unfortunate
position, determined to push on to El Obeid, hoping to strike a decisive blow at the Mahdi, who had made that town his head-quarters, supported by a force of 3000 men.

On 1 November a guide, in the pay of the Mahdi, led the force to a rocky wooden defile without water, where they were held in ambush by the enemy, who were armed with rifles and artillery. Hicks's force, unable to use their guns, gallantly defended themselves for three days. On the fourth day, their cartridges being expended, they were ordered to fix bayonets, and Hicks Pasha placed himself at the head of the force. It was utterly annihilated, with the Governor-General of the Soudan, O'Donovan, the "Daily News" correspondent, Pashas, Beys, and two hundred officers; thirty-six guns, all war material and camels falling into the hands of the enemy. This overwhelming victory set the Soudan ablaze, and gave confirmation to the "divine" mission of the Mahdi in the eyes of an ignorant and superstitious Soudan.

At Cairo, when the news duly arrived, the consternation it produced was absolutely paralysing.

A glance at the map will prove that the Soudan is the key to Egypt, inasmuch as it commands the valley of the Nile.

Now it will be remembered that England's melodramatic declaration with regard to the restoration of the Khedivial power was absolutely contradicted by her overt actions. The Khedive, having placed himself in the hands of England, was compelled to submit to her absolute control; the Egyptian troops were not to be relied upon for the reasons set forth in the previous chapter, and these were officered by Englishmen quite independent of the desires of the
Khedive, Cabinet, or people. The Khedive was himself powerless to stop the Soudanese Rebellion with the 6000 troops allotted him by England; and notwithstanding the fact that his protectress had at that time a force of 8000 idle men in Egypt, the dangerous insurrection was allowed to spread in the dominions of the ruler whose power England had pledged herself to protect and firmly establish. But mark the subtleties of British policy. The Soudan, although part of the Khedive's dominions, was not Egypt in the proper sense of the term. Therefore, while she permitted British officers to command Egyptian troops against the Soudanese rebels, she refused to employ her men for the same purpose. The English Government had entered Egypt to restore order; and when the real work came they tried to shirk the responsibility, which would lead one to conclude that, were it not for their crass stupidity, they were playing a political game of subterfuge, Machiavellian in its complexity. This stupidity is proved, however, by the hasty determination of the British Government to withdraw the troops before learning the result of the Hicks expedition. The orders had actually been given for retirement. Sir Evelyn Wood had expressed his entire satisfaction with his new Egyptian army, which he declared to be sufficient to ensure security, when the news arrived "that General Hicks was massacred, together with his force of 10,000 men, in the desert of Kordofan". The panic that ensued is indescribable. Had the Egyptian Ministers been untrammelled there is no doubt that they would at once have recruited a Turkish army to crush the rebellion, immediately marching on Khartoum. In place of this the British Government, which had previously proclaimed its
policy of Soudanese non-intervention, now that Egypt was imperilled by this new danger, did not act as an ally and a friend, but forthwith proceeded to obstruct; and aggressively interfered to prevent help being sent from Egypt to the Soudan garrisons, including Khartoum, where defensive measures were being adopted by Colonel Coetlogon, the British officer in command, who had called in, as far as was practicable, the outlying garrisons. Thus the friend and ally, whose profuse protestations of philanthropy on behalf of her Egyptian protégé had turned from redressing imaginary grievances to securely bind him up, prevented him from acting, and refused that support which would have extricated him from his difficulties. Truly, Tewfik's retribution had quickly overtaken him; for his English friends considered that the best means of re-establishing his authority was to reduce his empire to a province, where the masterful British "Resident", arriving in the guise of a Consul, proceeded "to quickly bend everything to his will"! Khedive and Ministers protested, but England enforced her order that "the Soudan in toto, including Khartoum, the capital, should be immediately abandoned". Cherif Pasha and his Ministry tendered their resignation.

No sooner did it become known that the Soudan was to be abandoned than the whole country broke forth in a rebellious conflagration. A detachment dispatched for the relief of Tokar was surrounded by a force under Osman Digná, and cut to pieces, Captain Moncrieff, English Consul at Suakin, being among those slain. A month later an attempt to relieve the garrison at Sinkat met with an equally disastrous fate, only forty men out of a force of eight hundred surviving the furious onslaught of the conquering Arabs.
From the Red Sea to the distant provinces of Darfur, the English order that the Soudan was to be abandoned had armed every man and sharpened every spear against the Egyptian Government. A pitiless enemy closely invested every garrison; Sinkat and Tokar were starving within five days' march of 8000 British in Cairo; and 6000 of the Egyptian Army, under Sir Evelyn Wood, were living in idleness and plenty, whilst 600 faithful troops, under Tewfik Bey, at Sinkat had already consumed every horse and camel they possessed, and now that the last dog had been ravenously devoured, were eking out a hopeless existence on such stray bits of leather as they could lay hands on. Yet the supporting British Army remained unperturbed in Cairo; and the Egyptian troops, having been recruited with the distinct understanding that they should not be sent to the Soudan, remained quietly in the capital under their English leaders, gathering confidence; and the wretched Tewfik, well knowing that all Egyptian calamities would be attributed to him by his faithful subjects, in an agony of despair solicited Baker Pasha's\(^1\) aid in the relief of Sinkat. That leader, with his newly formed crew of ragged *gendarmerie*, marched forth on Suakin: this rabble, pressed into service from the slums of Cairo, was marshalled forth on a forlorn hope. This horde of ragged humanity was expected to retrieve the fortunes of the well-drilled, well-disciplined, and well-equipped Government army, which the Mahdists had cleverly decoyed and utterly exterminated.

The disinclination of the British Government to

---

\(^1\) General Valentine Baker; not to be confused with Sir Samuel White Baker, who conducted operations in the Soudan for the ex-Khedive Ismail.
interfere in the Soudan is only one more illustration of Lord Granville's halting policy—if policy it may be termed; and the arguments adduced to uphold that policy are quite untenable. England's position in Egypt, and her military operations of 1882 on behalf of the Khedive, were purely financial. Had there been no debt there would have been no Dual Control, and consequently no intervention to uphold that Control—because it really amounts to that, and all arguments to the contrary are vain. The Arabists wanted to vote the half of the Budget not affected by the debt. France and England objected. The French Controller resigned; the Englishman, Sir Auckland Colvin, sat tight, until Lord Dufferin's programme made his position untenable. A large proportion of the loans Ismail obtained were sunk in the conquest of the Soudan. The Soudan was therefore a very large share of the assets of the Egyptian debtor. The army of occupation and the Hicks expedition added another £5,000,000 to the existing debt. The army was sent to restore Khedivial authority. That authority extended to the Soudan. England refused to permit her army to go into the Soudan—the army that had been sent to Egypt to restore order, and for which, and through its actions for the most part, £5,000,000 was added to the Egyptian National Debt.

The Soudan was "subdued" by Ismail with the ostensible object of suppressing slavery, which trade was repudiated and condemned by England. The success of the Soudanese rebellion meant an impetus to the slave-trader; and Mr. Gladstone, the custodian of the British Nonconformist conscience, officially stated that the Arabs of the Soudan were "rightly fighting for their freedom!" And the request for aid, not alone of the British Government,
but of Baker Pasha and other English officers in the Egyptian service, who were on the spot and thoroughly understood the conditions—that request for aid, I say, was refused; and Englishmen and Egyptians were allowed to go to the certain death that awaited them, whilst the British troops in Egypt, for which the Government of the Khedive was financially responsible, remained in idleness and ease at Cairo. In the meantime Hicks and his army had been wiped out. The Sinkat and Tokar garrisons were starving, and Sir Evelyn Baring had "not telegraphed for fresh instructions as he thought it useless to do so until events had developed somewhat!"  

Nubar Pasha had meanwhile formed a Ministry in succession to Cherif Pasha. Colonel Coetlogon, finding himself in a condition of extreme peril at Khartoum, implored the Khedive's Government to issue instructions for his immediate retreat, now that there was no possibility of his being relieved. One-third of his soldiers were disaffected, and the population of the town was at enmity with the troops. The Egyptian Government telegraphed to the Colonel ordering the collection of all the troops in the Soudan, the evacuation of Khartoum, and the destruction of its stores. The difficulties attendant upon the fulfilment of these plans were great; the journey had to be made by river, and the removal of the 11,000 persons comprising the Christian and civil population, could only be effected after months of careful preparation. English public opinion having by this time become thoroughly aroused, General Gordon was dispatched in hot haste by the British Government to Khartoum to assist in the evacuation; on his arrival in Cairo he was joined by Colonel Stewart,

who had been previously sent to the Soudan in 1882-3. These two took camels across the Korosko desert without escort, on a mission of cowardly evacuation after the sacrifice of 20,000 lives!

Baker Pasha's force having been cut to pieces, orders were suddenly given for the British Army to advance from Cairo to rescue the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat. General Graham assumed the command of the 4000 to 5000 British troops and started for Suakin. General Graham arrived too late for the object of the expedition. Sinkat had fallen, and Tewfik Bey, who sallied forth in the hope of being able to cut his way through to the coast, had been surrounded and destroyed; and the garrison of Tokar made terms and surrendered to Osman Digna, subsequently using their guns against the British troops at the smartly contested engagement of Teb. The British force advanced on Tokar, burnt the village, and returned to Suakin. The Arabs refused General Graham's offer of terms, and he advanced upon their encampment at Tamai where they were defeated with a loss of 3000 men, the British losses being 130 killed. Having burnt a few villages, a small force was left in the garrison at Suakin, and the victorious British Army was recalled to Cairo, leaving the Arabs to take possession of the road to Berber, and so cut off the retreat of the Khartoum garrison.

Now, all this was diametrically opposed to the British policy of non-intervention in the Soudan, and fully illustrates the wobbly policy of the British Government. If the Arabs were "rightly struggling for their freedom", as Mr. Gladstone said, why were British troops sent to slaughter some 5000 of them?

On the other hand, if the policy of non-intervention
in the Soudan was to be modified, why did the British Government remain inactive until after the Egyptian Army in the Soudan had been practically exterminated? If a British force could be dispatched after the Arabs had done their worst, without deranging British "policy", could it not have been dispatched while there was yet time for that force to be of service, and before the Arabs had exterminated the Egyptian Army? Naturally, the Egyptians felt that the intentions of England were either absolutely insincere and hypocritical, or it was the policy of the British Government to permit the destruction of the Egyptian troops, in order to more effectively counteract and nullify any armed resistance to a prolonged occupation of the country. The effect of this cowardly retreat was to give the Arabs an entirely erroneous idea of British strength and courage, thereby imperilling Berber and Khartoum. The Arabs concluded that England had become overpowered with fear by reason of her losses, and General Gordon was consequently deserted by the tribes who had previously been friendly, and upon whom he relied. There is considerable excuse for the action of these tribes. They were in a hostile country, with their brothers in armed rebellion against the Government they were supporting. The ally of this Government had won two engagements and left the remaining garrisons to perish. They would soon be in the same plight. Berber was attacked and taken by assault, and the greater portion of the garrison massacred. This fate awaited the friendly tribes did they not join the triumphant rebels while there was yet time.

Berber having fallen, Khartoum was quickly invested; Berber being the base of operations, should
reinforcements be sent across from Suakin to relieve beleaguered Khartoum. And General Gordon, the British representative, who had thrown up an appointment to serve the King of the Belgians in the Congo, in order to heroically obey the call of his Government in its hour of need, was by that Government heartlessly abandoned and ruthlessly sacrificed. He telegraphed to Cairo for Zobier Pasha,¹ the only man capable of co-operating with him and uniting the local tribes against the Mahdi. This request, in spite of the support given by Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), was declined by the British Government. Subsequently, when Zobier Pasha was about to start on his own account, the British Government instructed the Egyptian authorities to detain him! Yet British policy was opposed to intervention in the Soudan! But the English Government had permitted Hicks Pasha, whom they had the authority to stop, to march to destruction. They employed General Graham to slaughter some 5000 Arabs; and having themselves dispatched General Gordon and Colonel Stewart to Khartoum to enforce its evacuation, with an illogical reasoning, peculiar to the Solomon-like intelligences that inhabit Downing Street, they abandoned their own Envoy to his fate.

English public opinion being once more in eruption, the non-intervening Government of Paradox dispatched Lord Wolseley with a force of 6000 men; and simultaneously Lord Northbrook was sent to inquire into Egyptian finance. The Nile was falling

¹ Zobier Pasha had been actively engaged in the slave trade of Equatorial Africa, consequently the Anti-Slavery Society, because of his antecedents, brought pressure to bear upon the Government to refuse his services, notwithstanding the fact that Gordon's life depended upon his exertions, owing to his influence with the tribes throughout the Soudan.
before the British force could reach Dongola, and Major Kitchener telegraphed, "that the unfortunate Colonel Stewart had perished—massacred with all his party, including the French and English Consuls—after the wreck of their steamer in the cataract north of Berber ".

Khartoum was being closely invested by the Mahdi's troops. General Stewart was dispatched with a strong flying column across the desert from Korti to Metemmeh, whence he hoped to reach Khartoum by the Nile. They reached Abu Klea on 17 January, 1885, where the Arabs were defeated. On the following day the General resumed his march towards Metemmeh; they were attacked, and General Stewart was severely wounded. Sir Charles Wilson, then in command, made a reconnaissance; he found Metemmeh strongly fortified and his progress barred.

Omdurman had fallen in the meantime, and the advance of the successful British column having become known to the Mahdi, he immediately brought all his available force to bear upon the town; a determined assault was made after midnight, 26 January, on the Boori gate on the east, and the Mesalamieh gate on the west side, and the Dervishes, filling the ditches with bundles of straw, penetrated the fortifications. After a siege of 317 days, Khartoum was at length in the grasp of the Mahdi, and General Charles George Gordon, R.E., C.B., was ruthlessly murdered by the conquerors, a martyr to duty, and the call of an ungrateful and cowardly Government!

The following is an extract from General Gordon's journal, under date of 23 September, 1884, in which he refers to the attitude of Gladstone and company,
and their exactitude regarding "non-intervention" in the affairs of the Soudan.

"It is as if a man on the bank, having his friend in the river already bobbed down two or three times, hails: 'I say, old fellow, let us know when we are to throw you the lifebuoy. I know you have bobbed down two or three times, but it is a pity to throw you the lifebuoy until you are really in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a man brought up in the school of exactitude ".

Was it exactitude that influenced this action on the part of the British Government, or was it a carefully laid plan to acquire the Soudan? I wonder!
CHAPTER XIV

ENGLAND IN THE SOUDAN

It is neither within the scope, nor is it the intention of this work to deal extensively with military operations in the Soudan. Such operations have been already described elsewhere by military writers and others, with a fullness of detail beyond my poor mental capacity. I therefore hope that I may be excused for confining myself to the political aspect of the case, and to a simple chronicle of the principal events, with such comment as I may think advisable.

Now, General Gordon, whilst accepting the position thrust upon him by the British Government to evacuate the garrisons of Khartoum and other places, from the outset declared the impossibility of carrying through this forlorn hope in the face of the hostile attitude of the intervening tribes. He had urged that the only feasible plan was to abandon the Western Soudan and the provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but to hold Khartoum with the provinces lying between the White Nile and the Red Sea, north of Senaar. Sir Samuel White Baker, who had previously operated in the Soudan under Ismail, and was an admitted authority on Central Africa, expressed very similar views; but the warnings and advice of these experts were at first received with considerable impatience, not only by the party wire-
pullers, but even by such organs as “The Times” and “The Daily News”, which preferred to rely upon the insight of Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Granville. Public opinion having changed in the meantime, and the British Government having availed itself of General Gordon’s services on his own terms, he was permitted to act quite independently of the Khedive, receiving his orders from the British Government alone. The Conservative journals were especially unanimous in congratulating the Government on the decision it had made; and this feeling of approbation found a general echo in the organs of both parties throughout the country. It cannot be said that the Egyptians concurred with the views of the British Government regarding General Gordon’s appointment. They very naturally felt that if the English Envoy was employed by the British Government to withdraw its troops from the Soudan, notwithstanding their unwillingness to concur in that withdrawal, the British Government should not only be responsible for the cost of the evacuation, but that the British troops quartered in Cairo should aid in carrying out the intentions of the British Envoy. At the same time, although Cherif Pasha and his Ministry were anxious to carry out the Dufferin programme, the Egyptian Prime Minister was forced to resign owing to the vacillating policy of the British Government: for although disorder prevailed in the Soudan, and they had avowedly set themselves the task of restoring order in the Khedive’s Government, they not only refused the aid at their disposal to remedy the evil, but also prevented the Khedive’s Government from obtaining Turkish assistance, which was the only effective means within reach; and Nubar Pasha’s acceptance of office, and his apparent
acquiescence in England's contradictory policy, was not supported by Egyptian feeling, or such public opinion as existed.

The English Parliament had met much earlier than was anticipated, owing to the rough handling it had received in the country at the hands of the opposition. It was not long before a vote of censure was won in the House of Lords, which found its immediate echo in the Commons, where it was soon seen that the critics of the Gladstonian Egyptian policy were by no means confined to the opposition; for not only did Sir Wilfrid Lawson "attribute all the present troubles in Egypt to England's unjust and high-handed proceedings in that country", but Mr. W. E. Forster, a staunch supporter of the Government, said: "I must confess that I think there was some reason for the charge that the Government did not quickly enough realise the true policy. I think that they did not quickly enough realise the meaning of what happened more than a year ago—that they did not realise what the battle of Tel-el-Kebir meant. Now I think that that battle of Tel-el-Kebir ought not to have been fought. That battle put us in the position that after it there was no Power in Egypt except that of the English Government. The Prime Minister said, 'We have taken the responsibility of military operations which reduced the country, and the army was entirely broken up, and the institutions of the country were gone. We have before us the work of reconstruction'. Well, how are we to deal with that work? By giving advice? Advice is a good thing, but I cannot conceive anything less likely to succeed than the attempt of a Western nation to govern an Oriental country by advice to Oriental administrators".

In the meantime the policy of inactivity pursued
by the Government had provoked further votes of censure; and finding itself in a condition closely bordering on disruption, it seized the opportunity of the conclusion of the sittings of the Indemnity Commission,\(^1\) to order a report to be drawn up on the arrangement of the finances of Egypt, with a statement of the results of the administration, subsequent to the settlement by the Commission of Liquidation in 1880. This financial statement was sent on 22 April to the "Great Powers", with a circular dispatch inviting them to a Conference in London for the purpose of arranging the financial system of Egypt, and making the necessary provision for present and future needs. The proposed Conference served the purpose of the Government: its assemblage disarmed criticism in the House, and France took this occasion to step once more into the arena of Egyptian politics; and in order to show its good-will towards England, sagely announced the fact that "the abolition of the Dual Control could no longer be contested". This being an established fact, they invited the British Government to give an explanation of its plans concerning the pacification and future government of Egypt.

The Conference of the Powers duly met in London and elected Lord Granville its President. Talk being the positive quantity of Conferences and Royal Commissions, and achievement traditionally negative among such bodies, they manifested a touching devotion to tradition: they talked much, accomplished nothing, and went the way of all Conferences. The Downing Street ilk, however, obtained breathing

---

\(^1\) The Indemnity Commission was appointed to investigate the claims to property destroyed in the burning of Alexandria. It dealt with something like 10,000 claims, and the admitted liability amounted to £4,350,000.
time, and thinking time, during the deliberations of the Conference; and when it dispersed the Government had found a plan! For now that "they had recovered their freedom of action", they resolved upon sending Lord Northbrook to Egypt as High Commissioner to inquire into its finances and conditions, and to report to his colleagues.

Lord Wolseley, having received news of the fall of Khartoum, General Earle was ordered to arrest the forward movement of the river column on Abu Hamed. General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been sent to take command of the desert column, on account of General Sir Herbert Stewart being placed hors de combat at the battle of Abu Klea, was given discretionary power to act according to local circumstances, until instructions were received from London as to the new policy and intentions of the British Government with regard to Soudanese operations.

General Earle halted at Berti, and Sir Redvers Buller arrived at Gubat on 11 February, 1885. There he found about twelve days' supplies, with an additional twelve days' supplies at Abu Klea. The camels were unfit for service; therefore, on hearing that a Dervish force of about 4000 men was on the march from Khartoum to Gubat, he decided to fall back on Jackdul, and reached that place on 26 February.

Meanwhile, the avowed object of the expedition being the rescue of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, that object was nullified by their respective deaths, and the British Government fell back upon its original plan of non-intervention in Soudanese affairs. The Mahdi had, however, "repeatedly declared his intention of driving the infidels into the sea"; and General Gordon had advised a policy of
"smashing up the Mahdi", which was strongly supported by Lord Wolseley, who contended that defensive operations, while they might stave off the final trouble for a few years, would not bring about a quiet state of affairs in Egypt. He therefore advised his Government to immediately face the difficulty, which might be delayed but could not be avoided, and by adopting a "smash the Mahdi" policy, pursue that which was "most befitting our national dignity and honour".

The British Government therefore instructed Lord Wolseley to "check the advance of the Mahdi in districts now undisturbed". But "whether it will be ultimately necessary to advance on Khartoum or not cannot now be decided". Lord Cromer\(^1\) was also told to give the Khedive general assurances of support.

Lord Wolseley, meanwhile, pressed the British Government for a declaration of policy in the Soudan. On 9 February Lord Hartington telegraphed, "Your military policy to be based on the necessity, which we recognise on the statement of facts now before us, that the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum must be overthrown". Whereupon Lord Wolseley, having determined to capture Berber and Abu Hamed, ordered a combined movement by Sir Redvers Buller and General Earle on those places, with a force cooperating from Suakin to open the Berber road, preparatory to an advance on Khartoum at the end of the summer. Sir Redvers Buller was instructed to take Metemmeh, and afterwards to combine with General Earle in an attack on Berber; but the conditions of transport not being in accordance with his

\(^1\) Throughout the remainder of this work I shall substitute the name Lord Cromer for Sir Evelyn Baring, as the former name is now more familiar to the public.
requirements, he continued to fall back on Abu Klea, thereby nullifying Lord Wolseley's original plan with regard to the taking of Berber. General Earle had left Berti, and finding the enemy in force at Jebel Kerbekan, he routed them with heavy loss and was himself killed; and General (Colonel) Brackenbury, who assumed command of the river column, was ordered to withdraw his force to Merowi, as the desert column was in retreat.

Preparations were being made for the construction of a light railway from Suakin to Berber, the workmen advancing day by day under the protection of the troops, and completed the work as they went along. General Graham, who was in chief command of the Suakin district with a force of 13,000 men—British, Indian, and Australian troops—was trying to "destroy the power of Osman Digna," who, having received a considerable acquisition to his force, was opposing the British advance into the surrounding country. The Dervishes were driven out of Haslim; but Sir John McNeill, who was engaged in establishing a post between Suakin and Tamai, with a view to moving on the latter place, where Osman Digna was encamped with 7000 men, was surprised by the Dervishes, who rushed from the surrounding brushwood, and fought their way into the half-formed stockade, killing and wounding 283 officers and men. They were driven off with a loss of 1500 killed, which caused Osman Digna to evacuate Tamai. This place was subsequently occupied by Sir Gerald Graham on 3 April. Orders were issued from London to "hold Suakin for the present"; the railway plant was reloaded on the transport, and the troops, originally intended for Egypt, were dispatched for India, where the Indian frontier was
giving English statesmen new cause for anxiety. The other troops not required in India were dispatched to England. Suakin was now defended on the land side by a series of field works; and, although subjected to Dervish night attacks, was not seriously attacked by them until very nearly the close of the year.

Owing to the heat at and about Dongola, which affected the health of the troops stationed there, orders were issued at the end of May that the army should withdraw within the frontier of Upper Egypt. The capture of Khartoum, which was regarded throughout England as a severe blow to British policy in the East, proved to be a rather barren victory for the Mahdi. His followers, who had endured hardships and faced dangers during the siege, in anticipation of the rich booty which they would obtain on taking the city, were grievously disappointed. Farag Pasha himself, who had deserted to the Mahdi, was butchered by the Dervishes because he was unable to indicate the position of a supposed buried treasure; and great dissatisfaction prevailed among the besiegers, which was aggravated by the accounts of the fighting received by them from the survivors of the conflicts at Abu Klea and Gubal. These influences contributed in no small measure to lessen the Mahdi's already waning popularity, resulting in the daily defection of his troops. The appearance of a rival prophet in Kordofan increased his difficulties and filled the cup of his bitterness; for, in order to maintain his title, he was compelled to send a large force of those who remained faithful against his rival in Kordofan. He was consequently forced by a combination of unforeseen circumstances to abandon his intended invasion of Egypt until some more con-
venient period. This made the evacuation of Dongola comparatively easy, and it was therefore decided by the British Government to fix the Egyptian frontier at Wadi Halfa and Assouan. The Gladstonian Government¹ having been succeeded by the Ministry of Lord Salisbury, on 24 June, 1885, Lord Wolseley urged the new Government to adopt an offensive policy. The new Government, however, decided to adhere to the decision of their predecessors, and continue to retreat.

"On 5 July the British troops evacuated Dongola. The Mahdi died suddenly on 20 June, which was a great blow to his followers, damping their enthusiasm and alienating a large number from the Calipha Abdulla-el-Taashi, his successor, who, nevertheless, boldly attempted to carry out his predecessor's intention of invading Egypt. He did not make an aggressive movement until 30 December, 1885, when a mixed British and Egyptian force, commanded by Sir Frederick Stephenson, met and defeated the Dervishes at Ginniss, between Wadi Haifa and Dongola. The British and Egyptian loss was 41 killed and wounded; the Dervish loss being 800 killed and wounded. This defeat of the Dervishes was not only a severe blow to the Calipha, but put to rest all apprehension of a serious Dervish invasion of Egypt; and the action at Ginniss completed for a time British intervention in the Soudan. Early in April, 1886, the British and Egyptian forces were concentrated at Wadi Halfa. That place being left

¹ Lord Cromer, who was "connected ... by general sympathy with a Liberal Government, and by ties of longstanding friendship and relationship with some members of Mr. Gladstone’s Cabinet" ("Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 368), was at this time "pursuing a phantom", for the vacillation of the Government, etc. etc., were "simply heart-breaking".

Gladstone, on his retirement, conferred a peerage on the great financier, Sir Nathaniel de Rothschild.
in charge of Egyptian troops, the British force retired to Assouan on 7 May of the same year. Thus, from August, 1884, to December 30, 1885, a British force was wandering up and down the Soudan "smashing the Dervishes" with great slaughter. Not, however, for the recovery of the Soudan to the Khedive, and restoring order and good government in his dominions, but as an act of revenge for the deaths of General Gordon and Colonel Stewart; an action which Lord Wolseley declared to be "most befitting our (English) national dignity and honour", and the only policy "worthy of the English nation".

Now that England had temporarily retired from the Soudan leaving Ismail's huge African Empire to its fate, the hungry European land-grabbers were let loose to stake out their African claims.

On 29 May, 1884, Lord Granville instructed Lord Dufferin to inform the Porte that "with regard to the coast eastward of Zeyla, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government, on the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to make such arrangements as they might think desirable for the preservation of order and the security of British interests, especially at Berbera, from which Aden drew its chief supplies". The Porte remonstrated, but in October, 1884, a British official was appointed to administer Berbera; sepoys and police were placed at the disposal of the British administrator, and in the following year Lord Lyons was instructed to notify the French Government that Berbera and the neighbouring port of Bulhar were protectorally absorbed into the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty.¹

¹ "The occupation of the Port of Berbera" (Somaliland), wrote Sir Richard Burton in 1856, "has been advised for many reasons. In the first place, Berbera is the true key to the Red Sea, the centre of East African traffic, and the only place for shipping upon the western
There was also Zeyla, a recognised portion of the Ottoman dominions on the Red Sea, regarding which, on 1 August, 1884, Lord Dufferin was instructed to "inform the Porte that unless the Turkish Government"—which had been previously notified to the same effect in May and July respectively, 1884—"were prepared to take immediate steps for the occupation of Zeyla, it would be necessary for Her Majesty's Government to send a force to preserve order." On 24 August, 1884, Major Hunter briefly telegraphed Lord Cromer: "Force landed at Zeyla. Somalis impressed. Governor obliging". "It is now British territory," Lord Cromer laconically declares.

France, in the meanwhile, was not idle, and just by way of taking a hand at the game which England was playing with such conspicuous success, in May, 1884, she sent a ship to Richal, a port near Tarjourrah. Ten French sailors, with the Vizier of Tarjourrah, their prisoner, landed and coolly informed the local Sheykhs who ruled the province that the place belonged to the French and that they would return to take possession! No official at Cairo knew anything about France's action, not even the French representative. The Sultan protested. But Tarjourrah still flies the tricolour.

It will be remembered that, in the second chapter of this work, I stated the fact that Ismail Pasha had caused £37,000 a year to be added to the tribute in Erythraean shore from Suez to Guardafui. Backed by lands capable of cultivation, and by hills covered with pines and other valuable trees, enjoying a comparatively temperate climate, with a regular, although thin, monsoon, this harbour has been coveted by many a foreign conqueror. Circumstances have thrown it, as it were, into our arms, and, if we refuse the chance, another and a rival nation will not be so blind". Burton, "First Footsteps in East Africa," p. xxxiv.

1 The reader will observe the lack of originality in regard to British official documents when annexing territory.

order to acquire Suakin and Massowah. The Italian Government, having enviously observed the acquisitive tendencies of France and England regarding the Sultan's and Khedive's territory on the African littoral of the Red Sea, now bestirred itself. It approached the British Government with a view to ascertaining its feeling in the matter of the Italians obtaining a strip of free African territory; and found Lord Granville in a friendly and benevolent condition of mind, in which "he was able to inform him (M. Mancini, Minister for Foreign Affairs) that Her Majesty's Government, for their part, had no objection to raise against the Italian occupation of Zulla, Beilul, or Massowah". Some Italian travellers having been opportunely murdered in the neighbourhood of Massowah, a plausible occupation excuse was found ready to hand. A squadron both formidable and strong therefore bore down upon Massowah early in February, 1885, and seized the province; and notwithstanding the indignation of the Sultan, and his angry protests in the Chanceries of those Powers who had guaranteed the integrity of his dominions, the flag of Italy still waves bravely over the battlements of Massowah!

The news of the annihilation of General Hicks's army reached Emin Pasha \(^1\) early in 1884, in the province of Equatoria. His position became difficult, inasmuch as "the magazines were quite empty of clothes, soap, coffee, and other necessaries". "In Lado", he said, "there was a rabble of drunkards and gamblers, most of them fellow-countrymen of the

---

\(^1\) Emin Pasha (Edward Schnitzler, a native of Prussian Silesia) was appointed by General Gordon in 1879 to be Governor of the province of Equatoria, which was created for Ismail by Sir Samuel White Baker. Rebellion and mutiny made his position precarious until Stanley cut his way through the dense forests of Central Africa to rescue him. See Stanley's "In Darkest Africa."
rebels, the clerks of his divan. The prospect was not brilliant”. Shortly after the Hicks disaster Karam-Allah summoned him to surrender, but notwithstanding his difficult position he did not submit, but held on until rescued by Stanley. Equatoria, known now as Lado Enclave, was leased to Leopold II as sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo, by an agreement signed at Brussels, 12 May, 1894, and was the subsequent cause of considerable friction between England and Leopold.1

In the latter part of 1883, England having adopted the policy of forcing the Khedivial evacuation of the Soudan, and being on friendly terms with King John of Abyssinia, the British Government decided to solicit his assistance in order to facilitate the retreat of the garrisons from the Egyptian posts adjoining the frontier of his kingdom. Admiral Sir William Hewitt was therefore entrusted with a mission to King John on behalf of the British Government, Mason Bey, an American officer in the Egyptian service, accompanying him to act on behalf of the Egyptian Government, as the American was well acquainted with affairs in the Soudan. As a result of their combined efforts a treaty was signed at Adowa on 3 June, 1884; in which it was set forth that the province of Bogos, on which the King had set longing eyes, was to be ceded to him, and that in return he was to aid in the withdrawal of the frontier garrisons, permitting them to retreat through Abyssinian territory.

In the spring of 1885 the Egyptian garrisons of Amadib and Senhit, with the aid of the Abyssinians, were safely brought to Massowah; and during September a large army, composed of friendly Arabs

1 Vide “Egypt”, No. 1, 1906; “Egypt”, No. 1, 1907.
England in the Sudan

169

and Abyssinians, under the command of the Abyssinian general, Ras Alula, advanced against the Arab tribe of the Hadendowas, under the command of Osman Digna. An engagement took place at Kafel; but although strongly entrenched, Osman Digna's force was defeated with great slaughter. Galabat, a most important garrison, was besieged by Dervishes. Colonel Chermside, Governor-General of the Red Sea littoral, dispatched Said Rifat to Abyssinia for assistance. In January, 1885, Major Said Rifat left Adowa with a large force of Abyssinians, attacked and defeated the enemy, and brought the garrison and population of Galabat, numbering about 5000 souls, who were afterwards brought down to Massowah and dispatched to Cairo.

The Abyssinians also extricated the garrison of Gera from a like position; the King subsequently clothing and feeding the soldiers and population, numbered about 5000 souls, who were afterwards brought down to Massowah and dispatched to Abyssinia in safety.

The Abyssinians, however, are African natives, and but half-civilised. Where on earth did they acquire these humanitarian qualities with which the European alone is supposed to be endowed? It will therefore be observed that England, under the pretext of "restoring order and good government in the Khedive's dominions", not only forcibly

In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the province of Bogos was handed over to King John, who was the only Christian Power to earn any portion of the Ismailian Empire, treating the Egyptians with a fraternal sympathy which was denied to them by even the "ally" who had helped to involve them in a sea of troubles. The Abyssinians, however, are African natives, and but half-civilised. Where on earth did they acquire these humanitarian qualities with which the European alone is supposed to be endowed? It will therefore be observed that England, under the pretext of "restoring order and good government in the Khedive's dominions", not only forcibly
advised" that weak ruler to abandon valuable territory which was not his to abandon, it being that of his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey; but also, with the assistance of other Powers, divided that territory between them, eventually acquiring the lion's share for herself by the "re-conquest" of the Soudan, which in order to advance her own commercial interests, Cromer, Kitchener and company, considered to be a "State necessity". It is remarkable that what was considered a State necessity in 1898-9, was not so considered by the very administrator who had so strenuously insisted on evacuation in 1883.

In December, 1888, the Dervishes were defeated before Suakin, with the object of relieving the pressure brought to bear by them on that place, owing to their frequent incursions into the district, and the utter extermination of any natives who dared wander beyond the fortifications.

The defeat of Nejumi's 1 force at Toski on 3 August, 1889, broke the aggressive power of the Dervishes, thereby restoring tranquillity to the Nile Valley; and on 19 February, 1891, Osman Digna, having suffered a severe reverse with great loss near Tokar, permitted the re-occupation of that province, thus adding

---

1 Wad-el-Nejumi was in early life a Fiki, like the Mahdi. A thin, dark man, stern, hard, and ascetic. He planned the Hicks extermination, and it was he who crept silently into Khartoum to the confusion of General Gordon. He was the incarnation of an uncompromising Mahdi-Mohammedanism, leading the Mahdist to death and "paradise" after the Mahdi had passed away. This brave man was killed at Toski by a force under Sir Francis Grenfell. On the morning of that battle he said to his followers, "We must all stand prepared to meet our Maker to-day."

In the summer of 1903 another Mahdi, in the person of Mohamed-el-Amin, a Tunisian, forty years of age, of great intelligence and remarkable energy, who had previously made two pilgrimages to Mecca, established himself at El-Obeid. He took the original Mahdi for his model, and proceeding to the Taggalla mountains to consolidate his strength, was followed by Colonel Mahon, Deputy-Governor of the Soudan, who by forced marches surprised the new prophet, captured and brought him back to El-Obeid, and hung him out of hand.
tranquillity to the greater portion of the Eastern Soudan.

Khartoum fell to Lord Kitchener on 2 September, 1898, owing to his success at Omdurman; and Sir Reginald Wingate's victory of 24 November, 1899, near Kordofan, over the Calipha, with the death of that leader and his principal Emirs during a fiercely contested battle, completed the "re-conquest" of the Soudan. And at what a cost! To safeguard a country which the British "advised" the Khedive to abandon as being "a useless expense and encumbrance upon the finances of Egypt", bridges were built, barracks erected, also dwellings for Soudan officials. This country has been "re-conquered" by Egyptian troops with Egyptian money, and turned into a British colony, under the farcically euphemistic title of the "Anglo-Egyptian Soudan", in order to develop it, not only as a market for British goods, but as a fruitful source of cotton supply, at an admitted cost of £4,200,000 to the Egyptian Treasury during the ten years ending 1908. These figures the Legislative Council absolutely repudiated as inaccurate, Yehia Pasha estimating the expenditure of the Soudan at £18,700,000! 

1 To be correct, the battle was fought at Kerreri.
2 Vide "Egyptian Gazette", 30 November, 1909, in which a speech by Yehia Pasha appears on this subject.
CHAPTER XV

THE WOLFF MISSION

THREE years of English bureaucratic muddle and financial juggling in Egypt at length brought matters to a standstill. We find Lord Cromer writing to the British Ministry early in 1885 to the effect that "intrigues of all descriptions were rife; the suffering caused by the non-payment of the Alexandria indemnities was very great; trade was slack; and commercial transactions, as far as they were based upon credit, were almost at a standstill".¹

In the previous year, it will be remembered that Lord Northbrook had been appointed as Special Commissioner to Egypt, that he might extricate the British Government from the financial dilemma in which their administrative policy in Egypt had landed that country: Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy. Lord Northbrook was to "report and advise Her Majesty's Government on the present situation of affairs in Egypt, and as to the measures which should be taken in connection with them", especially with regard to "present exigencies of Egyptian finance". On the face of it the idea of this Commission was extremely absurd. Lord Dufferin had, during the previous year, compiled a most ex-

¹ Compare "Egypt", No. 1-4 (1885). They will be found very enlightening.
haustive Report on the condition of Egypt. Subsequently a committee of experts sitting in London had produced a detailed Report of the financial situation; which Report the International Conference had thoroughly discussed—and sat upon. Lord Northbrook had been Viceroy of India, and was considered both a good administrator and a friend of Lord Cromer's,¹ but there was really nothing that he could do except report and advise; and Egypt had been reported upon, and advised upon, and commissioned upon, until at length her "Advisers", "Reporters", and "Commissioners" had landed her a financial wreck upon the rocks of bankruptcy.² Lord Northbrook arrived in Egypt 9 September, 1884; and he presented his Reports (there were two of them!) on 20 November, 1884. They included the provision of an improved and extended system of irrigation; the abolition of the corvée; the abolition of the Dual Administration of the Daira Domains, and railways; greater powers on the part of the Egyptian Government of imposing taxes on Europeans; a reduction both of the land tax and of the taxes on the export transit of produce; and the issue of a loan for about £9,000,000, the interest to be guaranteed by the British Government. He also recommended that the British garrison should con-

¹ There is a rather amusing passage in Lord Cromer's work regarding Lord Northbrook's appointment. "The relationship", he says, "between Lord Northbrook and myself, and the mutual esteem and affection which we entertained for each other, were of themselves sufficient guarantee that we would work cordially together. It was, without doubt, the knowledge that the appointment would not be displeasing to me which to some extent led Lord Granville, . . . to nominate Lord Northbrook". "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 367.

² At two distinct periods during 1884 Sir Edgar Vincent confessed that the Egyptian Treasury was within £5000 of suspending payment. "Egypt", No. 17 (1885), pp. 51–2.
tinue to occupy the country. Like all previous Gladstonian Missions and Conferences on Egypt, it was buried after the fashion of Sir John Moore, "without a drum being heard or a funeral note". With regard to the loan of £9,000,000, the French Government suggested that it should be issued at the rate of 3½ per cent under a collective guarantee of the Powers, the amount required for the service of the debt being at the same time made a first charge on the Egyptian revenue. The proposal to tax foreigners, equally with natives, was assented to; but objection was made to the British proposals for a re-administration of the Daira,¹ and Domains Lands, and the merging of the Domain Loan in the Privilege Debt, and the Daira Loan in the Unified Stocks. France, meanwhile, had busied herself with winning over Germany, Austria, and Russia to her views, which embodied a counter-proposal. It was found that the Egyptian revenues were sufficient to cover the normal expenditure, but the appointment of a Commission was requested by France to examine the subject. Lord Granville, who had no desire to be thrown out of Egypt by the Powers, whilst declining to consent to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, suggesting that the new arrangements should have two years' trial before anything of the kind was attempted, accepted an international guarantee for the new loan, and relinquished his proposal as to the Daira and Domains Lands and Loans. The counter-proposal was accepted by the French and other Governments on 28 January, 1885, and after a little wrangling a Convention was signed in London, 18 March, by the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,

¹ Vide p. 190 and on.
Italy, Russia, and Turkey, settling the terms of the loan, with the exception of the price of issue.

Lord Salisbury, who, while in Opposition, did not have a policy of his own regarding Egypt, on his accession at once adopted the policy of his predecessors, which he had been wont to criticise most severely. Having first adopted Lord Granville's policy of retreat in the Soudan, he now decided to further follow the policy of the worthless Gladstonian Government by appointing a Special Commissioner in the person of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. When making his general examination of Egyptian affairs, he was to invite the co-operation of the Sultan in the settlement of the Egyptian Question, with the rather belated opinion that it was "in His Majesty's power to contribute materially to the establishment of settled order and good government" (!) in the Soudan. Province after province had been lopped off the Soudanese dominions of both Sultan and Khedive—notwithstanding the protests of the former; and now that the Arabs, who, in the language of Mr. Gladstone, were "rightly struggling for their freedom", had retaken possession of their lands and freedom; and such choice bits of land on the Red Sea littoral as were worth taking had been added to the dominions of England and France and Italy, a British statesman was requested to invite "His Majesty to contribute to settled order and good government"! What superlative effrontery!

Sir H. Drummond Wolff arrived in Constantinople on 22 August, 1885; but it was not until 24 October that the Convention was signed with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. This delay was caused not only by the intricacies of the negotiations, but on account of the very natural suspicion in the mind
of the Sultan, who had doubtless learned ere this to "beware of the Greeks when they bring presents"; for was it not Lord Salisbury who helped at the spoliation of Tunis? "The conclusion of any arrangement", said Sir H. Drummond Wolff, in his Report dated 24 October, "of any kind has done much to allay the irritation that has existed for some time in the minds of the Turks towards England. . . . It must doubtless have been very difficult", he continued, "for an English gentleman, however able and conciliatory, to come to terms with races who had suffered so severely at our hands".

Sir H. Drummond Wolff arrived in Cairo 29 October; but although the Convention had been signed, the Sultan was still smarting under the burden of recent wrongs; and the dispatch of Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner, was delayed until 27 December, on which date he arrived in Cairo. It required eighteen months of discussion and negotiation before the Convention was finally signed at Constantinople on 22 May, 1887, between the two Turkish Plenipotentiaries on behalf of the Sultan, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff on behalf of England.

Now, inasmuch as the Mahdi considered himself to be "conducted in the right path", and also to be the true representative of the Prophet, it was not at all likely that either he or his followers would be brought to accept the Sultan of Turkey as their spiritual head. When, therefore, the British Government, which was well informed, instructed Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to indicate that it was "in His Majesty's power to contribute materially to the establishment of settled order and good government in the Soudan", it is greatly to be feared that, to use a vulgarism, Lord Salisbury was only "pulling the Imperial leg"
of His Sublime Majesty; besides, the Mahdi and his supporters classified both Turks and Europeans as infidels, who were to be swept into the sea. In addition to this the Sultan was absolutely powerless to "restore order" unless he were permitted to land troops; and neither the English Government, which was in possession, nor the French, who were enviously awaiting an opportunity to get a foothold in the country, were prepared to permit Turkey to assume the merest shadow of authority in Egypt. The true explanation of the so-called "usual Turkish diplomatic delays" may be found in the fact that the Sultan well knew from previous experience, bought in the rather expensive markets of European diplomacy, that whenever the Christian Powers approached him in a "friendly" spirit, he was assured of being the poorer for their visit: they never bade him good-bye after a "friendly visit" without taking a souvenir of some kind by way of remembrance.

There is a mass of official documentary evidence extant which conclusively proves that there was no honest intention on the part of the British Government to evacuate Egypt. Lord Cromer was riding his famous "race against bankruptcy": in the interests of the English bondholders he decided to discard some of his weight, and there was no means of doing so without diverting the attention of the Powers to some more exciting object. As regards Egyptian affairs, Turkey had been practically ignored by England for three years. The British Government was in a fix. France had called upon it to "obtain some explanation concerning the pacification and future government of Egypt".¹

¹ Vide p. 159.
THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

A Conference had been convened in London, but no satisfactory results had been arrived at. Lord Northbrook's recommendations were not in accord with French desires. There was nothing for it now but Turkish intervention. Turn out the lights! Produce the bogey! Then the attention of all Europe will forthwith be turned from the "race against bankruptcy" to watch the new antics of the old bogey! Truly Lord Salisbury was taught political stage-management under a clever craftsman.

It will be remembered that early in the year 1885, Lord Cromer had said that "suffering was great . . . and commercial transactions based upon credit were almost at a standstill". He further records in his work on Egypt, that "up to 1888, either a deficit was annually incurred or else financial equilibrium was preserved with the utmost difficulty".\(^1\) At the end of 1886 he reports that great progress had been made in the financial administration, but he adds, "The work, however, is only begun, its continuance is dependent on the predominant influence of the British Government being preserved; this influence being for the time dependent on the presence of a British force in Egypt. Undue haste in withdrawal would undo everything that has been done.\(^2\)

Taking into consideration the difficult preservation of the financial equilibrium which was maintained until 1888, and the "great suffering" and commercial stagnation during the early part of 1885, and the sudden prosperity of Egypt at the end of 1886, when the "undue haste in withdrawal (of the British troops) would undo everything that has been done ", and taking these in their true order and

\(^1\) Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 449.
\(^2\) "Egypt", No. 11 (1887), p. 7.
at their true value, it will be discovered that either the Report of 1886 lied, or this was a carefully laid plan to make the Wolff Mission ineffective.

During the early part of 1886 Moukhtar Pasha expressed a very natural anxiety for information as to the nature of the reforms the British Commissioner wished to introduce. The English Envoy expressed his satisfaction with the internal administration of the country, the Soudan excepted; he there thought initiative action should be left to the Turkish and Egyptian Governments. In due course the Turkish Commissioner submitted a scheme for the reorganisation of the Egyptian Army, according to which he proposed to raise the numbers from 8000 to 16,800 men, in addition to 6700 gendarmerie and police. He also proposed that the increased expenditure be met by a reduction in pay; and indicated certain economies, which included the substitution of Turkish officers for English in the Egyptian Army, and the relinquishment on the part of England of the sum of £200,000, charged to the Egyptian revenue, as a contribution towards the maintenance of the army of Occupation. The army was to find its counterpart in Turkey, and it was to be utilised for the recovery of a part at least of the Soudan.

These proposals, on being submitted to the British Government, were rejected on the grounds that (1) The suggested re-conquest of the Soudan or any portion of it was a course entirely opposed to the policy of Great Britain; (2) that the number of men proposed was far in excess of the requirements of the country; (3) that it was absolutely necessary for the maintenance of order that British officers should be associated with the Egyptian troops; and (4) that the Egyptian contribution to the expenses
of the army of Occupation could not be abandoned. The Turkish Envoy, on being requested to modify his proposals, applied to the Porte for instructions. Then a diplomatic skirmish began, which all the parties concerned knew in advance would end in smoke. However, England, in order to save her face, during January, 1887, caused the army of occupation to be reduced, by the departure of one regiment to India, and two batteries of artillery to England.

In the following month Sir Henry Drummond Wolff went to Constantinople and submitted the following proposals to the Ministers of the Sultan: (1) That the autonomy of Egypt should be acknowledged while the sovereignty of the Sultan remained unimpaired; (2) that the capitulations should be so far modified as to put an end to the mischievous privilege hitherto enjoyed by foreigners in Egypt of being judged by their own Consuls; 1 (3) that Egyptian territory should be neutralised under the guarantee of the Powers, and that the guaranteeing Powers should retain the right of transporting troops through Egyptian territory either by land or by the Canal; (4) that England should exercise the right of appointing the majority of the officers in the Egyptian Army, and should further retain the right of re-occupying the country in case necessity arose; (5) and that the English Army should evacuate the country when all the European Powers had given their consent to the terms of the Convention.

It must be admitted that the first glance at this cleverly drawn Convention would lead the superficial observer to conclude that inasmuch as England

1 Rather quaint that England should not be included amongst the foreigners!
had a stake in Egypt, chiefly because of those Suez Canal shares and the liabilities to the Rothschilds and other "English" bondholders, and the fact that she was now in possession of Egypt, where she was endeavouring to adjust the affairs of the country according to her ideas of order and good government, that she could not view the prospect of evacuation with equanimity, unless she might be permitted to intervene and re-occupy the country should "necessity arise". Experience had, however, proved that it was no difficult matter to create a diplomatic necessity. She had already done so when she illegally bombarded Alexandria and landed a force at Ismailia. It was well known in European Chancelleries that neither France nor Russia would consent to the terms of the Convention; it therefore followed that, because the English Army of occupation would not evacuate Egypt until "all the European Powers had given their consent to the terms of the Convention", there was every prospect of the English remaining for ever in Egypt when once the Sultan had ratified that rather elusive document.¹

The Sultan therefore wisely protested that no time had been fixed for the evacuation, and that it would be necessary that a definite time be stated. There was more diplomatic fencing, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff at length gave way, setting the period at three years after the signing of the Convention. There was also considerable bitterness regarding Clause 4. The Sultan observed that any European Power could first occupy provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and

¹ I would not have it understood that Sir H. Drummond Wolff knew in advance that his appointment was a farce. I believe his personal efforts to have been quite honourable, but the subsequent behaviour of England proves that there was no genuine desire to leave Egypt.
then negotiate for a Convention which would give the occupying Power the right of re-entry. France not only upheld the Sultan's contention, but also declared that Clause 4 made England at once co-sovereign of Egypt, sanctioning her domination in that country for ever. Any opposition to her will could be made to appear "internal unrest", bringing back re-occupation "to restore order"; which subsequent re-entry would be permanent—its very necessity proving the validity of its claim to remain in a country which proved itself unable to stand alone.

"The title deeds of all political authority are elastic", and they are made to stretch most infernally by Empire-lusting politicians. Both France and Russia persuaded the Sultan to withhold his signature, the French Ambassador making all kinds of visionary promises on behalf of his Government. The Sultan was undoubtedly overwhelmed by this sudden burst of solicitude on the part of France, who had not hesitated to take Tunis and that other strip of the Red Sea littoral; but he wisely held his peace, and as the rogues had fallen out, he hoped in time to come by his right. He therefore refused to sign, and Sir Henry Drummond Wolff returned to London, as other Special Commissioners before him had done, without accomplishing anything.

It was without doubt very disappointing to the British Government to have this pet scheme bowled over; but I question whether they really wanted anything to happen. I was in London at the time; and the general opinion prevalent amongst those capable of venturing an opinion was, that nothing

1 Vide "Egypt", No. 11 (1887), p. 7; Ibid. No. 7, p. 5; Ibid. No. 8, p. 5.
would come of the Convention; and these views were amply borne out by the editorial expressions of contemporary newspapers.

The only visible thing that the Commission accomplished was to soften native bitterness against the English; for the presence of the Turkish Commissioner with the Englishman, both trying to adjust the affairs of Egypt on terms of friendliness, did much in the way of healing old sores.

On the other hand, Lord Cromer, in his celebrated "race against bankruptcy", under cover of the Mission was granted the desired opportunity to throw away a bit of his weight; and the British Government salved its hypocritical conscience with the reflection that it had used every reasonable means to come to an understanding with Turkey over the vexed Egyptian Question, and now that Turkey had declined to negotiate there was no more to be said. England would perform her self-imposed task honourably, come what may! And she would remain in Egypt. Henceforth there would be no more talk of leaving. The task before her was too great to be lightly set aside. It would be costly, and it would be necessary to bring enlightened and highly civilised Englishmen to carry on the good work—but hang the expense! Egypt is "the land of paradox". The peasantry might starve—they were accustomed to that ill-bred, "barbarous" style of living—but they would pay up. Good men must be had for the work, and Egypt must understand that good men are expensive. She paid high salaries to foreigners in Ismail's time. It is now the turn of the Englishman.

Egypt pays the piper, but henceforth England calls the tune.
HAVING attempted a general outline of British policy in Egypt, it is now necessary to take a general browse along the highways and byways of Internationalism and legislation by Diplomacy in Egypt, digesting such thorns or thistles as may be found in our pathway.

Lord Granville, as stated in a previous chapter, declared in his circular to the Powers, immediately after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir, that "freedom of navigation" should be granted to all European Powers through the Suez Canal; and in Article V of the Wolff Convention, the great Powers "were to be invited to sign an Act, recognising and guaranteeing the inviolability of Egyptian territory", which was in direct contradiction to Lord Granville's pronouncement in 1882. The Powers, however, had never lost sight of the Suez Canal clause in Lord Granville's Circular, and it came up for discussion once more in 1885, when a Commission was appointed to prepare a treaty for guaranteeing the free use of the Suez Canal by all Powers at all times. The negotiations having ended without result, the matter was left unsettled for two years. After the failure of Sir Henry Drummond's negotiation at Constantinople, M. Flourens, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, issued a Circular to the French representa-
tives at the Courts of the Powers, couched in conciliatory language, in which it was intended to show that French action with regard to the Anglo-Turkish Convention had not been dictated by malice, but in the consciousness of the high duties which she owed to herself and to Europe at large. Lord Salisbury accepted France's Circular as indicative of the French Minister's desire to facilitate political co-operation between the two countries, and expressed a desire to bring to a close, under favourable conditions, the British occupation of the Valley of the Nile. It therefore followed that on 24 October, 1887, two Conventions were signed at Paris, providing for an arrangement between the two countries on all the points at issue. The one relating to the Suez Canal may be briefly summarised as follows: The two signatory Powers agreed to guarantee, and to invite the co-operation of the other Powers in securing the neutralisation of the Canal, which was to remain at all times free to the ships of every nation. Even in war-time the freedom of the Canal as a waterway was to be recognised; but in time of war the belligerent parties were forbidden to embark or disembark in the Canal and its "ports of access" troops, or munitions, or war material. The duty of superintending the execution of the treaty was to belong to the representatives in Egypt of the two signatory Powers, who were to meet at least once a year, and oftener should circumstances necessitate such meeting, and to represent to the Government of the Khedive the measures they deemed advisable and necessary for the preservation of the freedom of the Canal. The obligation of carrying out the necessary measures was, however, to rest primarily with the Government of the Kedive; and in the event of
the Egyptian Government finding itself unable, with
the means at its disposal, to adequately secure the
freedom of the Canal, the matter was to be referred
to the Porte, who would arrange with the Powers the
proper means of responding to the appeal. This Con-
vention, which was subject to the consent of the
Powers, was finally signed, after the usual inordinately
lengthy negotiations, on 29 April, 1888.¹

The British Government, however, stipulated that
the Convention was not to come into force as long
as the British Occupation lasted. On 8 April, 1904,
the Anglo-French Agreement was signed, and the
British Government at once put the Suez Canal Con-
vention of 29 April, 1888, into force. The clauses
providing for an International Board at Cairo to
watch over the execution of the Convention were,
however, omitted.

Now, the Anglo-French Agreement, for which
England had striven for twenty years, was destined
to have far-reaching consequences in the way of re-
tarding Egyptian autonomy. For, as Lord Cromer
says, "Frenchmen gradually recognised two facts.
One was that the British occupation of Egypt was
beneficial rather than hurtful to the material in-
terests of France, whilst general French political
interests suffered from the prolonged estrangement
of the two countries which was caused by the Egyp-
tian Question. The other was that unless the evacua-
tion of Egypt was to be made a casus belli with
England, the British view of the facts had to be
accepted".²

The late King Edward VII and the President of
the French Republic having exchanged visits in 1904,

¹ "Egypt", No. 2 (1889).
there can be little doubt that the International Peacemaker brought the French President to see that “general French political interests were suffering from a prolonged estrangement of the two countries”. Besides, the affairs of Morocco, which were looming large upon the political horizon about this time, and which were considered by the Powers to require the services of a European doctor, was a prospect not only after France’s own heart, but one which she had looked forward to for a fair tale of years. There were three nations who could claim the “right” to perform a surgical operation on Morocco—England, France, or Spain. England already possessed a rather large handful of African responsibilities. Spain was hardly convalescent; in fact, having herself but recently undergone a surgical operation, she was still busy nursing wounds inflicted upon her by a none too tender American surgeon, and therefore had no time to operate upon others. To France, therefore, fell the duty of attending to the African patient, and to this end England’s kindly offices were required. Hence Britain, with the most cordial intentions, supported French aggression in Morocco, whilst France granted England a free hand in Egypt, in which the British Government acquired financial liberty in the Nile Valley, recognising the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. The French and English Governments respectively made the following important Declarations on 8 April, 1904:

“The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other matter.” “His Britannic Majesty’s Government
THE LAND OF THE PHARAOHS

declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt”.

Verily, “The title deeds of political authority are elastic”.

There is no getting away from the fact that the French Declaration, by giving England a free hand, while it set back autonomy and made the occupying army a permanent institution,1 also made for the clearance of international abuses and inept administration. For instance, the Commission of the Public Debt originally consisted of an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Austrian, and an Italian; a German and Russian were added in 1885. Until 1904 the officials collecting the revenues, pledged to the service of the debt, were both to hand over all collected monies to the Commissioners, and to furnish the necessary information which would guarantee the effectiveness of the financial control. Their consent was necessary to the negotiation of a loan; and the Commissioners, being the legal representatives of the bondholders, were empowered to sue the Egyptian Government in the mixed courts in the event of any infringement of the Law of Liquidation.

The Decrees of 1876 apportioned and pledged certain revenues to the service of the Debt; the other revenues being left to the Egyptian Government for administrative purposes.

On 27 July, 1885, a Decree was promulgated on the issue of the Egyptian Loan of £9,000,000, which

1 The statement in the British Declaration, “His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt”, has more than one interpretation, for, as Lord Milner says, “The fulfilment of the professions made by a nation in the act of going to war is not, in common human practice, whatever ought to be the case in the ideal world, apt to be rigidly exacted of the same nation at the moment of victory.” “England in Egypt”, p. 26 (ed. 1904).
was guaranteed by the Powers.¹ "When this loan was contracted the distribution of the affected and the non-affected revenues had to be reconsidered. Care was taken to increase the relative amount of the former, so that the bondholders should not run any risk, with the result that the latter was relatively diminished. The administrative expenditure was fixed at a certain figure.² If the non-affected revenues did not yield the sum at which the administrative expenditure was fixed, the deficit had to be made good from the affected revenues".³ When this was accomplished the surplus on the whole account in the hands of the Commissioners was divided into two portions: one remained with the Commissioners, and the other was paid to the Egyptian Government. Therefore, to solve this international financial puzzle, the Egyptian Government, in order to spend £1 in excess of the limits prescribed by internationalism, was forced to collect £2, in order to meet its increased obligations; consequently, as the country progressed, and added to its administrative staff of expensive English "advisers" and other improved methods of civilisation, by the carefully planned system of 1885, the Government was compelled to pay double for everything that involved fresh expenditure. This administrative financial machine, evolved from the

¹ "Egypt", No. 7 (1885), No. 17 (1885), p. 121 and on.
² The administrative expenditure was permanently fixed at £5,237,000; this related to what was known as the non-assigned revenue, and the expenditure was fixed to avoid administrative abuses.
³ Cromer's "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 307. "In 1892", says Lord Cromer, "the revenue of the Egyptian Government amounted to £10,364,000, and the expenditure to £9,595,000. It would be naturally supposed by any one not acquainted with the intricacies of Egyptian finance that a surplus remained at the disposal of the Government amounting to the difference between these two sums, namely £769,000. . . . The real surplus in the hands of the Egyptian Treasury was only £179,000". *Ibid.*
superior civilisation of the West, cost the Egyptian Treasury £E40,000 per annum to maintain. In 1904 the Commissioners of the Debt became merely the receivers on behalf of the bondholders. Negotiation and diplomacy curtailed their administrative prerogatives.

It is possible that the Commissioners may entirely disappear from the face of Egypt in 1912, should the Egyptian Government decide to convert the whole of the Debt, which can be accomplished in that year.

Under the Decree of 18 November, 1876, a Board was constituted to administer the railways, the telegraphs, and the Port of Alexandria. It was originally composed of two Englishmen, two Egyptians, and a Frenchman, with one of the Englishmen as its President. The number was subsequently reduced to one only of each of the nationalities mentioned.

Their respective Governments proposed the European representatives, and the Board appointed its own administrative staff. The Board proposed, and the Khedive nominated, the superior officials. Tariffs were arranged by the Board with the sanction of the Egyptian Government.

The functions of these three individuals were undefined, and their efforts quite irresponsible. Having no responsible head, the administration left much to be desired, internationalism having almost legislated the railways off the face of Egypt.

In 1904 the Egyptian Government was at length allowed—by arrangement—to fully deal with the administration of its railways.

Ismail Pasha owned huge estates in Egypt, to which allusion has already been made in these
pages, of which the Daira formed the most considerable part, extending as they did over an area of upwards of half a million acres. Ismail's chronic impecuniosity necessitated his negotiating a loan of £9,500,000 on the security of these properties. These estates were administered by a Board of Directors, consisting of an Egyptian Director-General, who was the executive officer, and two Controllers, English and French respectively, who, being the sole legally accredited representatives of the European bondholders, exercised the fullest possible powers of supervision. These estates, notwithstanding the supervision and inspection of the European Controllers, were so badly managed that they did not show a profit until 1891.¹

The Daira Estates were sold to a Company in 1898, which split them into lots and re-sold them; the Government share in the net profits of the liquidation being £E3,200,000.

The Domains, ceded to the State by Ismail Pasha by Khedivial Decree, dated 29 October, 1878, were handed over to the Rothschilds in that year as security for a loan of £8,500,000. These properties were administered in a similar manner to the Daira estates,² a Commission of three being also appointed: an Egyptian, a Frenchman, and an Englishman, the two Europeans being selected by their respective Governments.

The administration of the Domains found its

¹ "Until the year 1891 the Daira expenditure was always in excess of the revenue. On several occasions the deficits exceeded £200,000, with the exception of the year 1895, when there was a deficit amounting to £102,000; the accounts of the year subsequent to 1890 showed a surplus. In the two years 1904-5 the revenue exceeded the expenditure by no less than £817,000". "Modern Egypt", Vol. II, p. 314.

² The Daira and Domain estates were considered the best lands in Egypt and were 1,000,000 acres in extent.
counterpart in the administration of the Daira—incompetence and failure. The greater portion of these lands were also gradually sold, for the most part in lots, netting about £E12,000,000, and making a total of £15,200,000 netted for the two estates. Competent native authorities consider the sale of these lands as being unwarranted by the financial circumstances: for instance, in the case of the Domains, after 1900 an annual surplus varying from £25,000 to £150,000 was always realised; and in that of the Daira, after the year 1891 the surplus was very often as much as £400,000, but rarely less than £100,000. It is also contended that the value of the lands sold was really £E130,000,000—almost twice the sum they realised—and that their sale deprived the Egyptian Government of an abundant source of permanent wealth.

I cannot close this chapter without saying a few words with regard to the composition of those International Tribunals for whose establishment the great Nubar Pasha has been lauded by Europeans.

Doubtless the original motives of Nubar Pasha regarding the establishment of these courts were patriotic; but at the same time it is impossible to rid oneself of the conviction that this patriotism was not disinterested. It is, indeed, true that prior to their establishment the European was a law unto himself; and as the class of adventurer who found Egypt a happy hunting-ground was not endowed with irreproachable morals, he was invariably aided—it is to be hoped unconsciously—by his diplomatic representative in the spoliation of either the State or the native.

It will therefore be understood that an institution which would effectively curb such diplomatic abuses
would be a blessing conferred upon Egypt. Unfortunately the sequel proves that in place of removing the evil, the Mixed Courts of Nubar Pasha systematised and legalised European injustice and spoliation. Even the State was subjected to its tyranny. Take, for instance, the action of the French and Russian Commissioners of the Debt.

At the time of the Dongola Expedition, in order to defray the cost of it, application was made by the Egyptian Government to the Commissioners of the Debt for a grant of £E500,000 from the General Revenue fund, which had been gradually accumulating for years. By a majority of four to two the request was granted. The French and Russian Commissioners, being the unrelenting minority, at once took action in the Mixed Tribunal at Cairo, and obtained judgment against the Government. This small portion of the surplus, the property of the Egyptian Government, was to be returned to the Commissioners of the Debt, who were foreigners.

The Government took the case to the Appeal Court—also mixed; the judgment against the Government was sustained, and Egypt was forced to repay her own money to the Commissioners, for which purpose a loan of £800,000 was obtained from the British Treasury at an interest of $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.¹

If the Government could fare so badly in a contest with the Mixed Tribunal, what chance had the native litigant against a European?

These tribunals are formed on a French model, with a procedure badly copied from the French Code, with judges who are not the mere interpreters of the law, but who make the law as they "process",

possessing little ability themselves, and no knowledge whatever of the manners and customs of the people. This is the judicial system for which Europeans would have Egyptians offer burnt offerings at the shrine of Nubar Pasha.¹

The Court of Appeal sits at Alexandria. There are also three Courts of First Instance, at Alexandria, Cairo, and Mansourah, respectively. Egyptian judges sit in these courts, and it is to be feared that that is the extent of their judicial utility. The European judges of all the Powers are, of course, represented in the four courts; especially is this the case in the Courts of First Instance, where all the Powers are represented without distinction. The jurisdiction of these courts covers all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians; they also have jurisdiction over civil cases between Europeans of different nationalities. The judges, until quite recently, were nominated by their respective Governments. The European judges of these tribunals are not only unhampered by such fetters as legislative control, but there is none to restrain them in the autocratic display of discretionary powers.

The powers of these Mixed Courts do not extend to criminal cases; these for the most part are tried by the Consul according to the laws of his country.

The introduction of a new law into these courts must receive the sanction of all the Powers. As this required assent is very rarely obtained from all the Powers, the Mixed Tribunals muddle along pretty much as they did on their establishment in 1876.

"Legislation by diplomacy", says Lord Cromer,

¹ It must be admitted that these courts have greatly improved during the later days of the occupation.
in referring to these courts, "is probably the worst and most cumbersome form of legislation in the world. Under these representatives, it is easy to understand that the judges of the Mixed Courts are practically a law unto themselves". ¹

CHAPTER XVII

"LE ROI EST MORT"

It may be truly stated that from the year 1887 the financial condition of Egypt was showing marked signs of improvement. There was much financial juggling on the part of Sir Edgar Vincent, the Financial Adviser, who it will be remembered succeeded Sir Auckland Colvin, in order to bring about this result; but whatever the means, the desired end was obtained.

On the other hand the army of Occupation had been reduced in accordance with the scheme formulated to limit its numbers to five thousand men.

The civil administration, however, was not working on those harmonious lines which the pro-Consul desired, as some differences of opinion arose between him and Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister, over the reorganisation of the gendarmerie and police. While both agreed that it was desirable to render more effective the supervision of these bodies by the Ministry of the Interior, they differed as to the lines on which the desired reforms should be effected. As they were unable to arrive at an amicable understanding, the matter was referred to the English Government towards the end of the year 1887.

The trouble really was the unsatisfactory organisation which, by centralising the police in Cairo, made them to a large extent independent of the Mudirs,
thereby decreasing the responsibility of the provincial Governors in their efforts to repress crime.

Nubar Pasha laid stress on the necessity of increasing the authority of the Mudirs; but Lord Cromer objected to arming the Governors with a semi-military force, which, being under the absolute control of the native Governors, might have resulted in fanning into flame those smouldering embers of Nationalist revolt that were still floating about the country; for it must be distinctly understood that the Arabi revolution, although scotched for a period, was by no means killed. The British representative therefore suggested that the Mudirs themselves should be supervised.

Nubar at length concluded that the English administrators had failed to appreciate the real needs of the country, which was amply proved by their "struggle for a policy"; and this struggle caused them to resort to all sorts of inept rough-and-ready methods of extirpating abuses. He was of the opinion that in order to hastily introduce reforms, the English administrators had not counted the cost, nor were they in sympathy with local conditions. He also found it impossible to govern Egypt independently in accordance with the advice of foreign controllers, who would not permit their advice to be overlooked, notwithstanding their limited knowledge of the country and the needs of the people; and to govern a country on independent lines was quite impossible where perfect freedom was not allowed to its Ministers.

There is much to be said both for this view and also the view of the English administrator.

In regard to Nubar's claim, there could certainly be no independence of action when his methods of
government were not only supervised, but criticised in a manner not calculated to enhance his self-respect.

On the other hand, the English contention was that "the protection of the native from the Turco-Circassian aggressor" was to be their first consideration. They very justly claimed that the rotten government introduced by the Turks had brought bankruptcy and rebellion in its trail, and in consequence "the Circassians were on no account to be entrusted with full administrative powers over the native". Of course, the English were "struggling for a policy", and this blinded them to all else, or they might have found, notwithstanding the banishment of the leaders of the Arabist movement, that there were still a few intelligent fellahs who, on being brought under a British administration, and being as it were virgin soil, could have been moulded into the required administrative article. But the great difficulty was that the then administrators knew no Arabic—in fact, Lord Cromer himself never did master it—and were compelled to depend upon the "polished", but for the most part incompetent Circassians, who, because they had held office under the old regime, and were now entrusted with administrative powers of a rather negative quality, considered themselves the only capable governors of Egypt.

It therefore followed that Nubar Pasha's political scalp was in great danger; and as strained relations continued to obtain during the early spring, it was no matter for surprise when Tewfik, on 9 June, 1888, suddenly dismissed Nubar Pasha and summoned Riaz Pasha to carry on the government.

Because Lord Cromer had not been consulted with
regard to the Prime Minister's dismissal by the Khedive, the pro-English accused Ghazi Moukhtar Pasha, the Turkish Envoy, who still remained in Egypt, of bringing about the fall of Nubar; but this statement had no foundation in fact. Nubar was at that time very much opposed to British domination rather than that of Turkey, which fact was undoubtedly pleasing to the Sultan's Envoy. But suspicion ever haunts the guilty mind.

Riaz, although of Jewish extraction, was a very good Mohammedan; and there is every reason to believe that his appointment, if it did not meet with special or universal favour, was at any rate tolerable. He was at least honest, they said.

The notorious Omar Lutfi Pasha, the incompetent Governor of Alexandria, who was the arch-conspirator in the Alexandrian massacres of 1882, was named for the War Office; but the British officials, who had by this time found him out, mainly through the incriminating disclosures at the Arabi trial, vetoed his appointment.

When the Ministry was completed it was found that Riaz held the two most important appointments of the State—Finance and the Interior—together with the Presidency of the Council.

Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was made Minister of War; Fakri Pasha, Minister of Justice; Zeki Pasha was sent to the Department of Public Works in place of an individual to whom Sir Colin Moncrieff had taken exception; and the rather stodgy reactionary, Ali Moubarek Pasha, became Minister of Public Instruction.

They were not by any means a brilliant lot; but when it is considered that they were merely the Oriental decorations of the British official system—the English
"Adviser" running the administration in their respective names—and being the "Land of Paradox", a change of Pashas meant the same "policy" of the previous bunch of "administrators". Poor Pashas! If they possessed any real talent for the arts of government they were not allowed to show it.

There was one appointment, however, which requires special mention: that of Ali Moubarek, Minister of Public Instruction.

Now, from the fall of Ismail, Egyptian education, as will be seen hereafter, had fallen into a very parlous condition. The Arabist reformers were too busy combating Franco-British aggression and misrepresentation, and constructing programmes of reform, to devote much time to the execution of their very praiseworthy intentions, which, of course, included educational reform. On the other hand, when the British took possession of Egypt, although they were pledged to restore order and good government, they were too deeply engrossed in their exciting occupation of wringing the last piastre from the starving peasantry so as to win that celebrated "race against bankruptcy" in the interest of the bondholders, to trouble themselves about Egyptian education. When the enlightened and progressive Yacoub Pasha Artin was made Secretary to the Ministry of Education, he at once proceeded to formulate large schemes for the development of his department, and had made preliminary arrangements in London for the State education of young Egyptians in England. Ali Moubarek Pasha, however, had no sympathy with such advanced ideas of intellectual development; and the sudden death of the very capable Takwor Pasha Agopian having created a
vacancy in the Railway Board, Ali Moubarek, in order to remove his progressive Secretary, secured the promotion of Artin to the vacant post. Yacoub Artin Pasha benefited by the promotion, but the loss which Egyptian education then sustained, in spite of British promises, has never been made good.

The year 1888 should be memorable in Egyptian annals as that in which the misguided ex-Khedive Ismail ceased from troubling the land and people he had so deeply wronged.

For some considerable time previous to this date he had advanced claims against the Egyptian Government to the extent of some five millions sterling. These claims, notwithstanding Ismail’s shortcomings, undoubtedly bore the stamp of justice if not of legality. Although apportioned a civil list by his European enemies prior to his deposition by their agency, in consideration of his having ceded the Daira and Domains Estates to the State, after his exile this civil list was neglected, and he very naturally considered himself entitled to the arrears. As a question of title, there was none. As a question of morals, the obligation could not be well overlooked. It is, indeed, true that he brought ruin upon the country by “a soaring ambition that o’erleapt itself”, and by trying to accomplish Aladdin-like, in one night, if I may be permitted the metaphor, what had required hundreds of years of achievement in the case of other nations. At the same time, notwithstanding his shortcomings, Ismail’s claims to a civil list, or a pension on his deposition, was quite as valid as, for instance, Arabi’s.

Ismail’s claims, which had never been withdrawn, in addition to arrears of his civil list, included palaces at Constantinople and Cairo, and other claims for
standing crops. Sir William Marriott, being on friendly and confidential terms with Ismail, not only succeeded in bringing negotiations into line between the ex-Khedive and the Egyptian Government, but persuaded Ismail not to press for a larger sum than he was likely to get, and it must be remembered that Sir Edgar Vincent, who acted on behalf of the Egyptian Government, was neither lacking in tact nor moderation, and to Lord Cromer's credit, be it said, that he lent his diplomatic aid to smooth the difficulties away. As the result of these negotiations, towards the end of January an arrangement was concluded, by which Ismail received his palaces, a fair compensation for his crops, and a grant of Domains lands to the value of upwards of £1,200,000. In consideration of this settlement, the ex-Khedive surrendered all claims to his civil list. The family breach was thereby healed and he appeared quite satisfied with the financial arrangement. During the remainder of his life Ismail was not permitted to return again to Egypt, not even when it was conclusively proved that his days were numbered.¹

Meanwhile those Government departments from whence the revenues were obtained were being

¹ Ismail Pasha died at Constantinople 2 March, 1895, and his remains were brought to Egypt a week later. M. de Guerville says: "When he (Ismail) felt the end drawing near, he had but one desire, one thought, to die on the banks of the wondrous Nile, where he had known joy and sorrow, triumph and humiliation. He wrote to his grandson (Abbas II) asking humbly for a corner in his native land, a corner distant and solitary, where he could render up his soul to God. Abbas Hilmi would willingly have consented; but, from high political reasons, the request was refused by England. The days drew on. The old Khedive wrote once more. He was dying. The most celebrated physicians had placed it on record, and to their written word was attached a photograph, showing, alas, that he was at the gates of death. He begged that he might be carried to his beloved land. But policy, which knows no sentiment, gives way not even to death: the refusal was curt and brief, and Ismail died in exile—far, as they said, from the country which he had ruined". "New Egypt", p. 104.
improved. The Customs and the Public Works were receiving especial attention.

The Nile, having mysteriously fluctuated during 1888—reaching a lower level than was ever recorded in living memory, thus diminishing the cultivable area, making as it did for a decreased wheat supply and severely injuring the maize crops—was being attacked with vigour by the Public Works Department. A Decree was also issued partially abolishing the corvée (?) ¹; but this was to a very large extent a diplomatic fiction.

The Mudirs, now that the Department of Public Security had been "reorganised," were encouraged to report with candour and freedom on the conditions of their provinces. The reforming hand of England was even extended to the International Tribunals and native courts; and the inclusion of Europeans in the new scheme of taxation was proving the value of its introduction by reason of the increased revenue. Schemes for the improvement of the harbour of Alexandria were also put into operation. Active slave operations in the Soudan were, however, evidently filling the pockets of the Dervish Emirs, thereby enabling them to carry forward their campaign against the Egyptian Government. Domestic slavery in Egypt was abolished; but, as will be seen hereafter,

¹ A quarter of a million was set aside for this purpose, but it depended upon the Egyptian Government being allowed to convert its 5 per cent Privilege Debt into a new stock bearing interest at 4 per cent, in the hope of effecting a saving of £170,000 a year. A loan was arranged in London, and in May, 1889, a decree was issued sanctioning the issue of a 4 per cent preference stock in accordance with the conversion scheme. France refused her consent until Britain evacuated Egypt. As a result the land tax was increased. France, however, put forward a scheme of her own whereby, not the Privilege Debt alone, but the whole Egyptian Debt was converted. The Preference Loan, the 4½ per cent loan of 1888, and a new loan of £1,300,000 formed the new Privileged Debt, converted into 4 per cents. The Egyptian Government finally accepted the French arrangement. See also Chapter XXII.
it is very questionable whether the manumitted slaves have been benefited by the change, notwithstanding the introduction of "Slaves' Homes".

France still remained in opposition, pressing home her old demands for the speedy reduction and evacuation of the British army of Occupation: a task which experience should have shown was quite hopeless, for, in spite of the fact that the British position remained undefined, either by Great Britain or any one else, it was quite evident that diplomatic protests were nothing short of wasted effort.

The Prince of Wales (Edward VII) meanwhile had "shed the light of his countenance" upon Egypt in 1889; but although his welcome was enthusiastic, he was unable to dispel the gloom of European jealousies or to "grant them peace".

The power of making by-laws applicable to Europeans was also conferred on the Egyptian Government during this year; and most important of all, Lord Cromer was able to report on 18 February, 1889, "that the 'Race against Bankruptcy' was practically won!" (Hats off, please!)

For Egypt at this time—so it is recorded—enjoyed better credit than Russia, Austria, or Italy.

Notwithstanding the excellent credit of Egypt, the internal administration at this period left much to be desired. As I have frequently pointed out, the so-called reforms were in the interests of trade development and agricultural efficiency, whereby that race against bankruptcy would be won; and also to prove to the Powers that England was the only country capable of developing the resources of Egypt, so that Egyptian credit might be firmly established. In accomplishing this result England well knew that by pointing to her "Marvellous financial achieve-
ment,” the Grateful Powers, having recovered what they all considered a bad debt, were not likely to kick the bailiff out of the house of the creditor, nor were they likely to put a period upon the order of his going.

The Mudirs were still using torture to extort evidence, or confessions, so as to establish convictions against prisoners. Brigandage was rife; and the local officials were not co-operating with the native tribunal to bring justice within reach of the poor. It therefore followed that, bribery and corruption being as rampant as ever they were prior to the advent of the British, the poor suitor found it much cheaper to put up with his wrongs than to seek his remedy in the local courts. The village police did not trouble about their work overmuch, as they were not being paid. Vagabonds and suspicious characters not only carried abundant firearms, but were using them to the great terror of the harmless and industrious fellaheen.

Meanwhile, the great outcry which was raised in the provinces led to the appointment of Mr. Justice (afterwards Sir John) Scott, of Bombay, to inquire into the whole judicial system. This appointment was by no means pleasing to Riaz Pasha, who resigned in May, 1891, on the ground of ill-health,1 and Mustapha Pasha Fehmi was straightway appointed his successor. Only one of the old Cabinet remained in the person of Fakri Pasha, the Minister of Justice, but as he was only interested in the regularity with which his salary was paid, caring little or nothing about such trifles as Justice (which by this time, he had evidently learned from

1 Riaz Pasha always made “ill-health” his excuse for resigning office.
his association with Europeans, was as blind as himself), he was shortly afterwards relieved of his portfolio, Ibrahim Fuad being named as his successor.

With the exception of Artin Pasha, who was made Minister of Education, they were much the same as other Pashas before them. Tigrane Pasha, an Armenian, who, like Nubar Pasha, knew no Arabic, was once more at the Foreign Office; and the Khedive, having at length realised—or did Lord Cromer give him a gentle hint?—that the Turco-Circassian Pashas and "hereditary rulers" of the Egyptians were a rather brainless herd, he, for the second time, became his own Prime Minister.

In the meantime the Porte was still anxious about Egypt, and at the end of July His Sublime Majesty's representatives waited upon Lord Salisbury, with a view to reopening negotiations for the evacuation of Egypt. Lord Salisbury was polite, as befitted Her Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister; but the only reopening the Sultan's representatives obtained was the reopening of the street door, when they were shown off the premises.

Evacuation rumours were floating about Paris, Constantinople, and Cairo during the early part of the year. These greatly increased in the autumn, on account of what appeared to be a significant speech of Mr. Gladstone's in Newcastle, and another by M. Ribot, in Paris, wherein a demand was made for evacuation, and the gauntlet was thrown down for Lord Salisbury to pick up—which he did.

In November he made his famous declaration that "our work in Egypt was not yet done, and that it was our duty to remain there and do it." This was a decided "crib" from Sir W. S. Gilbert. For although
the speech was paraphrased from "Patience", "Pinafore," or "Captain Reece of the Mantelpiece"—it really does not matter which—it did not end at the speech. The whole Egyptian question had been elevated from the region of farce to that of comic opera of the true Gilbertian flavour.

If the reader will turn to the various pledges, Commissioners, Envoys, withdrawals of pledges, super-pledges, evasions, and the whole bag of political tricks whereby England has firmly planted her feet on the banks of the Nile (they are recorded in this volume), it will be found that Lord Salisbury's handling of the Egyptian Question lifted it from the hollow farce of Granvillian flaccidity to the Olympian heights of Gilbertian fecundity. The great Statesman, however, was quickly moving towards the wilderness of Opposition from whence he could wail in critical language at the policy of "the other fellow." But before he departed he made Sir Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer.

His Highness Mehemet Tewfik having been gathered to his fathers 7 January, 1892, the youthful Abbas Hilmi was called from his studies at Vienna at the tender age of seventeen to assume the heritage of Mehemet Ali and the title of Khedive of Egypt. But he had yet to learn that the belted Earl, like proud king-making Warwick, was the king's real master. Tewfik was dead, and Abbas II, by the grace of the Sultan and Lord Cromer, was sovereign of the land of the Pharaohs.

Le Roi est Mort, vive le Roi!
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII

ENGLAND'S PLEDGES

"T\nHE policy of H.M.'s Government towards Egypt has no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained under successive firmans of the Sultan. . . . It cannot be too clearly understood that England desires no partisan Ministry in Egypt. In the opinion of H.M.'s Government a partisan Ministry founded on the support of a foreign Power, or upon the personal influence of a foreign diplomatic agent, is neither calculated to be of service to the country it administers, nor to that in whose interest it is supposed to be maintained." (Lord Granville's dispatch, 4 November, 1881; "Egypt," No. 1 (1882), pp. 2, 3.)

"I shall use my influence to maintain the rights already established, whether by the firmans of the Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its institutions". (Queen Victoria's Speech to Parliament, 7 February, 1882.)

"The Government represented by the undersigned engage themselves, in any arrangement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the regulation of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor any concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial advantage for their subjects other than those which any other nation can equally obtain". (Self-denying protocol signed by Lord Dufferin, together with the representatives of the five other Great Powers, 25 June, 1882; "Egypt", No. 17 (1882), p. 33.)
ENGLAND'S PLEDGES

"I, admiral commanding the British fleet, think it opportune to confirm without delay once more to your Highness that the Government of Great Britain has no intention of making the conquest of Egypt, nor of injuring in any way the religion and liberties of the Egyptians. It has for its sole object to protect your Highness and the Egyptian people against rebels". (Sir Beauchamp Seymour to Khedive Tewfik, Alexandria, 26 July, 1882, published in the "Official Journal" of 28 July.)

"It is the desire of H.M.'s Government, after relieving Egypt from military tyranny, to leave the people to manage their own affairs. ... We believe that it is better for the interests of their country, as well as for the interests of Egypt, that Egypt should be governed by Liberal institutions rather than by a despotic rule. ... We do not wish to impose on Egypt institutions of our own choice, but rather to leave the choice of Egypt free. ... It is our desire that not only should existing institutions in Egypt be respected, but that no obstacle should be placed in the way of a prudent development of these institutions. We do not desire to interfere beyond the strict necessities of the case in the internal administration of the country, or to prevent the Government of Egypt by Egyptians. ... It is the honourable duty of this country to be true to the principles of free institutions which are our glory". (Sir Charles Dilke, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, 25 July, 1882.)

"I can go so far as to answer the honourable gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of H.M.'s Government, and the pledges they have given to Europe itself". (The Rt. Honble. W. E. Gladstone, in House of Commons, 10 August, 1882.)

"In talking to the various persons who have made in-
quiries as to my views of the Egyptian question, I have stated that we have not the least intention of preserving the authority which has thus reverted to us. . . . It was our intention so to conduct our relations with the Egyptian people that they should naturally regard us as their best friends and counsellors, but that we did not propose upon that account arbitrarily to impose our views upon them or to hold them in an irritating tutelage”. (Lord Dufferin’s despatch, 19 December, 1882; “Egypt”, No. 2 (1883), p. 30.)

“You should intimate to the Egyptian Government that it is the desire of H.M.’s Government to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon as circumstances permit, that such withdrawal will probably be effected from time to time as the security of the country will allow it, and that H.M.’s Government hope that the time will be very short during which the full number of the present force will be maintained”. (Lord Granville, 29 December, 1882; “Egypt”, No. 2 (1883), p. 33.)

“The territory of the Khedive has been recognised as lying outside the sphere of European warfare and international jealousies”. (Lord Dufferin’s dispatch, 6 February, 1883; “Egypt”, No. 6 (1883), p. 41.)

“The Valley of the Nile could not be administered from London. An attempt upon our part to engage in such an undertaking would at once render us objects of hatred and suspicion to its inhabitants. Cairo would become a focus of foreign intrigue and conspiracy against us, and we should soon find ourselves forced either to abandon our pretensions under discreditable conditions, or embark upon the experiment of a complete acquisition of the country. If, however, we content ourselves with a more moderate rôle, and make the Egyptians comprehend that, instead of desiring to impose upon them an indirect but rather arbitrary rule, we are sincerely desirous of enabling them to govern themselves, under the uncompromising ægis of our friendship, they will
not fail to understand that, while on the one hand we are the European nation most vitally interested in their peace and well-being, on the other we are the least inclined to allow the influence which the progress of events has required us to exercise, to degenerate into an irritating and exasperating display of authority which would be fatal to those instincts of patriotism and freedom which it has been our boast to foster in every country where we have set our foot”. (Ib., p. 43.)

“One further institution, however, will be still necessary to render vital and effective these already described, namely, a free Press”. (Ib., p. 50.)

“Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country by the extension of its cultured area and the consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial if not the total abolition of the corvée and slavery; the establishment of justice and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, H.M.’s Government have pronounced against such an alternative”. (Ib., p. 83.)

“The very fact of our having endowed the country with representative institutions is a proof of our disinterestedness. It is the last thing we should have done had we desired to retain its government in leading-strings; for however irresistible may be the control of a protecting Power when brought to bear on a feeble autocracy, its imperative character disappears in the presence of a popular assembly”. (Ib., p. 83.)

“The other Powers of Europe . . . are well aware of the general intentions entertained by the British Government, intentions which may be subject, of course, to due considera-
tion of the state of circumstances, but conceived and held to be in the nature not only of information, but of a pledge or engagement”. (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 6 August, 1883.)

"The uncertainty there may be in some portion of the public mind has reference to those desires which tend towards the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorporation in this Empire. That is a consummation to which we are resolutely opposed, and which we will have nothing to do with bringing about. We are against this doctrine of annexation; we are against everything that resembles or approaches it; and we are against all language that tends to bring about its expectation. We are against it on the ground of our duty to Egypt; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. We are also sensible that occupation prolonged beyond a certain point may tend to annexation, and consequently it is our object to take the greatest care that the occupation does not gradually take a permanent character. . . . We cannot name a day, and do not undertake to name a day, for our final withdrawal, but no effort shall be wanting on our part to bring about that withdrawal as early as possible. The conditions which will enable us to withdraw are those described by Lord Granville—restored order in the state of the country and the organisation of the proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority.

". . . The Right Honourable gentleman (Sir S. Northcote) has treated us as if we intended to stay in Egypt until we had brought about institutions which would do credit to Utopia. We have no such views. . . . In popular language we mean to give Egypt a fair start, and if we secure it order, supply a civil and military force adequate to the maintenance
of order, and with a man on the throne in whose benevolence and justice we have confidence, with institutions for the administration of justice under enlightened supervision and in fairly competent hands—if we have made a reasonable beginning towards legislative institutions into which is incorporated some seed of freedom, our duty may be supposed to be complete”. (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 9 August, 1883.)

“H.M.'s Government . . . are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk to peace and order”. (Lord Granville’s dispatch, 16 June, 1884; “Egypt”, No. 23 (1884), p. 13.)

“From the first we have steadily kept in view the fact that our occupation was temporary and provisional only. . . . We do not propose to occupy Egypt permanently. . . . On that point we are pledged to Europe; and if a contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us”. (Lord Derby, in the House of Lords, 26 February, 1885.)

“It was not open to assume the protectorate of Egypt, because H.M.’s Government have again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so. . . . My noble friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his opinion that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds. . . . It was undoubtedly the fact that our presence in Egypt, unrecognised by a convention . . . gave the subjects of the Sultan cause for a suspicion which we did not deserve”. (Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, 10 June, 1887.)

“When my noble friend . . . asks us to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors . . . and to declare our stay in Egypt permanent . . . I must say I think my noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the
obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken, and by which they are bound to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the most profitable course; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European law". (Lord Salisbury, in the House of Lords, 12 August, 1889.)
THE NATIONALIST REVIVAL

The modern disposition to subordinate intellectual interests to material advantages is the most alarming evil of a super-materialistic age.

Men no longer inquire about the morals or intellect of an individual. The question which agitates the public mind is: "What is he worth—how much money has he got?"

Intellect, by which I mean love, truth, honesty, justice, and all those high and godlike attributes, are the only things that really matter.

The material civilisation of ancient Egypt crumbled to nothingness, but her intellectual massivity has left its impress upon the ages, laying the foundations and planting the seeds of subsequent religious and political systems.

Take ancient Greece, the recognised seat of Western culture. Directly she permitted her intellectual ideals to be overshadowed by the mantle of materialistic conquests, and allowed herself to revel in the resultant spoils, her ultimate dissolution was but a question of time.

Thus England, in the multiplication of her conquests, whereby trade is advanced, plutocrats wax rich and opulent, and in the interests of "civilisation" and "Christianisation" of primitive races, and races that are not primitive, who are held in tutelage and subjection "for their moral welfare", so that
there may be diamond princes, and cotton kings, and other grades of a most ignoble band of financial aristocrats, is only paving the path of materialism with the agonised groans of human subjugation, at the end of which lies her utter dissolution.

It therefore follows that notwithstanding the frequently urged claim that England’s business in Egypt was, and is, in the best interests of the Egyptian people, these statements are not borne out by the facts. Had England’s actions in Egypt proved her disinterestedness, there would neither be “unrest” nor would there be a genuine desire for political change.

Until the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, successive French Foreign Ministers were continually “maintaining the cause of the Egyptian people”. I do not claim that the motives of France were disinterested. All European nations with commodities to sell, and for which the markets of the earth are daily narrowing, are ever on the alert in their quest of new clients. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the French bondholder was regularly receiving his interest at the hands of the British, who were responsible for the financial administration of Egypt. Inasmuch as it has been urged by British writers that the French bondholder was not concerned with the welfare of the native Egyptian, why this interference on the part of France?

The explanation is not difficult to discover. England had pledged herself, time and time again, to evacuate the country, and although there was no valid excuse in fact, excuses were being continually manufactured to maintain an untenable position. If England really wanted Egypt she should have boldly established a Protectorate, or annexed the
country, and there was no one to say her nay. France had invaded and annexed Tunis with as little claim to legality as England possessed in Egypt. My own impression is that annexation would have been un-welcome as much to the Egyptian as to the Powers; but "possession", the homely adage runs, "is nine points of law". For twenty-eight years the English have remained in Egypt without the consent of the Egyptian nation, and in spite of the protests of the Sultan and the Powers. There surely was no difficulty in going a step further. Hypocrisy is perhaps the most irritating of vices, and England has acted a lie during all these years of the Occupation.

I am of the opinion that in the early days of the Occupation—and I mean days—there was a genuine disposition on the part of Lord Granville to evacuate the country, because at that early period the resources of the country were practically unknown; but as time went on and the English "Adviser" began to see the marvellously recuperative powers of the country and its great trade possibilities, it was found that England had unwittingly stumbled upon a regular commercial Golconda, which it would be the essence of folly to surrender to the Egyptians in order that some other Power might step in and exploit it in its own interests and to the exclusion of Great Britain. A country that, by virtue of its natural resources, could reduce a debt of some ninety millions to reasonable proportions within the short space of a quarter of a century, was not the country to be lightly abandoned to—according to the English view—a pack of "semi-barbarous natives". But are these Egyptians the semi-barbarous stock which English writers, Statesmen, Administrators, and "Advisers" have declared them to be? And how has England
kept her pledges of administrative education? Lord Cromer has asserted that the only class possessing administrative capacity are the Turco-Circassian class.\textsuperscript{1} The reason for this wild statement is chiefly owing to the fact that this class was the only one with which he came in direct contact. Nubar Pasha, Cherif Pasha, Riaz Pasha, Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, all of these have at one time or another formed ministries and held the chief positions in the State. Their well-known aversion to the fellah would not unnaturally lead them to underrate his qualities. These men being mainly of Circassian extraction believed themselves the hereditary rulers of the country, with a monopoly of all the brains in Egypt worthy the name. The British official, on the other hand, could not be expected to undertake the tuition of the native who might in time supplant him. There are few men to-day who are so overweighted with self-abnegation that they would be prepared to step down and out to make way for the native official.

The Englishman in the Egyptian Civil Service is for the most part an arrogant, self-seeking individual, who looks after his own interest and the interests of his class. As a general rule he is either a scion of an impoverished noble house who has been pitchforked into some position of trust, for which neither previous training nor intellectual endowments have adequately equipped him; or, he is some obscure nondescript who by a judicious system of fawning has worked his way up from the lowest round of the official ladder to at length become “a terrible big pot”. And this is the most terrible reptile with which the Egyptian has to contend. I will cite a case.

\textsuperscript{1} “Modern Egypt”, Vol I, pp. 324-5.
Mr. T. Swellibus, a British individual of humble parentage and surroundings, has an ambitious father who desires that his son and heir should be "somebody", and make his mark in the world. Young Swellibus is therefore trained for the Civil Service. He passes his examinations, and is awaiting a vacancy. He learns that a junior clerkship is going in the Egyptian Civil Service. He makes application, is accepted and goes out. On arrival he meets those of his class who malign the climate, the native, and everything in "Beastly Egypt, don't you know". At home Young Swellibus cleaned his own boots, and no doubt assisted to cook the humble bloater for his tea, what time his mother was at the "first house" of some music-hall or on a visit to a neighbour.

Mark the transformation of Mr. T. Swellibus. In Egypt he has a "nigger" to look after his "togs", clean his boots, and dress him! In a month or two he dons a monocle, exchanges his cockney accent for the regular West End drawl, joins an English club, and despises the "niggers", whose existence have made his lordly progress towards being "somebody" with a pension at the end possible. Whereas the penny tram or a long walk were the only things possible to him at home, he must now have a vehicle of some sort. "Too hot to walk, deah boy, and too many beastly 'niggers' on the trams".

He returns home on leave, when he has saved up enough for the purpose, where he awes the neighbourhood by assuming the airs of the Consul-General on leave. If he has grown ashamed of his home connections, as is not infrequent, he pays a short visit to the Continent. If he has an attractive sister, or sweetheart, he causes her to go out to him—by a Cook's excursion.
The sister, female relative, or fiancée, goes out and is greatly impressed. "Everything is so delightful in dear, wonderful Egypt!"

In course of time he obtains a house in the swell European suburban quarter, and he marries the girl of his heart from dear old England.

There are servants on every side and abundant salaams whenever he appears among the natives; for is he not the great effendi! A kick or so to a mere native increases the respect due to an Englishman, and helps to maintain British prestige. For the menacing British Army of Occupation is in the City of the Caliphs, and the power of Britain is behind her humblest sons.

He may also bask in the reflected glory of real aristocratic winter society at Cairo, and be on bowing acquaintance with English Princes of the blood.

Mr. T. Swellibus has grown in greatness beyond even the recognition of his humble parents, to whom by this time he is but a memory. But the poor old souls are satisfied. Their boy is doing well.

Now, is it within the compass of erring human nature that T. Swellibus, Effendi, should descend from the honourable and glorious position of an exalted Egyptian official, where every one beneath him falls down and worships, and his lightest behest is implicitly obeyed? Is it likely that this "great man" will voluntarily leave his acquired comforts, luxuries, with the added dignity of being "somebody", which he has acquired by rubbing shoulders with swell society at Shepherd's Hotel, to return home and be swallowed up among the teeming millions and chimney-pots of smoky London: his identity gone, and at the very best, a jerry-built, semi-detached architectural monstrosity in Suburbia in
which to wind up a career of brilliance and achievement? It is unthinkable. When such things can be accomplished, the lion will lie down with the lamb, for men will then be angels.

Yet, this is the very thing the British Government would have the Egyptians believe to be possible of accomplishment. It is the duty of T. Swellibus, Effendi, to keep as much knowledge as is possible away from the Egyptian; and should the natives whom he controls show any signs of intellectual activity, such signs must be nipped in the bud, or if the natives persist in understanding too much about their department they must be removed to another department, where they will be compelled to begin their studies anew, and should there be no other means of suppressing this unheard-of precocity—throw them out of the service! Such things have happened.

As for the native official in high places, T. Swellibus, Effendi, holds him in supreme contempt, to be tolerated as a necessary evil. Social intercourse? Well, T. Swellibus, Effendi, would rather be excused.

Put a beggar on horseback and he will ride to Hades. And the Anglo-Egyptian service is overrun with "the beggar on horseback" fraternity—and the cad.

Fortunately there is another side to the picture. There are some respectable and worthy Englishmen in the Anglo-Egyptian service; but these are unfortunately among a very small and un'influential minority, whose protests against the prevailing supercilious aggressions of the snob-cad class are quite unavailing, and only make for their unpopularity in the service. Therefore, though worthy and well-intentioned, they hold their tongues.
As a result, the Egyptian official is only permitted to see the most objectionable side of a race whose external reserve and social exclusiveness do not make for the appreciation of any good qualities they may possess; nor does it add to the efficiency or effectiveness of a service in which the presence of harmony and the absence of bitterness are necessary and important elements to success.

Matters of this kind were going from bad to worse, and the Egyptian minor officials found themselves subordinate to incompetent English officials for the most part, whilst their brothers who had acquired that Western education, either in Syria or in Europe, which the English had claimed to be a necessary qualification to a post in the services, were walking about Cairo without occupation of any kind, and were not infrequently a burden on the slender resources of these very minor native officials.

Now, arguing from the very fatuous premises that the Egyptian is either devoid of intellect or incapable of mature reflection, the Anglo-Egyptian administrator—and by this term I mean the British official—concluded that the Egyptian could be put off with vague promises, and being a mere native he would be unable to see that the English administrator had no serious intention of availing himself of native assistance to any material extent.

On the other hand, the educated native went to the cafés, where he met other educated unemployed natives. They compared notes and discussed the situation. At first it was like the dropping of a pebble in a very large lake; although circles were made by the pebble-dropping, the circles that reached the remotest edge of the pool were imperceptible to the naked eye. But the pebble-dropping con-
tinued, and in course of time a big stone was found and this made a very big splash, and then it was observed that circlets not only reached the edge of the pool, but they were perceptible to the unaided vision. Then larger, and still larger stones were found which were also thrown into the pool, and they began to splash the English official, and his clothes being wet he took a little notice. He inquired the meaning of the wetting, and the educated young men of Egypt said they wanted work. Now, having become a nuisance—and the British official despises anything that tends to ruffle the calm superiority of his official dignity—the British official sent some of the noble band of English incompetents to higher and newly created posts at increased salaries, and thus made room for a few Egyptians in order to stop their stone-throwing. But unfortunately there was still a fearful vacuum in the budding official stomach of the native, and, like Oliver Twist, he cried for more. "But", said the British official, between 1896 and 1906 we have increased your numbers 8444 to 12,207—what more would you have?

"Ah", replied the native, "I quite agree with the Pasha, but will the Pasha be pleased to remember that whilst you have increased our official numbers from 8444 to 12,207 in the ten years under consideration, the number of foreigners has increased during those ten years from 690 to 1252, almost 100 per cent, whilst our increase has only been about 50 per cent. Moreover, O Pasha, you of the English race have looked well to yourselves during these ten years, for whereas in 1896 only 286 of the 690 foreign officials were British, in the year 1906 your countrymen in the Egyptian Civil Service reached the respectable
total of 662, more than 50 per cent of the 1252 foreigners now employed by the Government”.

“What can you expect more?” inquired the British Administrator. “On your own showing, we have treated you with fairness and consideration, and although it is natural we should look after our people” (hem!), “you see we have made Egypt what she is to-day—to the victor the spoils. I say, although it is natural we should look after our own people; ah, well—you see, you don’t quite understand the position—the fact is, you have the majority of the appointments and there is really no possible foundation for your grumble”.

“I trust that the Pasha will be patient with me”, rejoined the native; “but the Pasha has overlooked one very important point—”

“Well, what point is that? You must be brief, I am very busy”.

“The point you have passed over is the question of salary”.

“Well?”

“Take any of the services, the Railway, for instance. Of the lower grades of railway servants whose salaries are below £11 monthly there are 5428, of these 5230 are natives and only 198 foreigners”.

“My dear man” (and the Pasha smiled), “you are producing incontestable proof—my own figures, mark you!—that we are treating you fairly—198 of the 5428!”

‘Quite so”, replied the native; “but we shall find a slight change as we work our way up to the top. There are 276 sub-inspectors receiving salaries from £16 to £25 per month, of whom 147 are Euro-

1 “Egypt”, No. 1 (1907), p. 36. Between 1896 and 1906 the total number of officials was increased from 9134 to 13,279.
peans and 129 Egyptians. Of 93 inspectors on salaries ranging from £26 to £48, monthly, there are 74 Europeans and only 19 Egyptians. Of the 36 superintendents receiving £600 per annum or over, there are 32 Europeans and 4 Egyptians!" ¹

"There is some mistake, my good man!" cried the British Administrator. "Evidently a misprint—"

"No, Great One, there is no mistake. Will you see the report? Your own figures, O, Pasha—"

"You must really excuse me—appointment. Good morning!" On reaching the other side of the door he remarked, "The education of these natives must be curtailed. The money will be more beneficially employed on irrigation works so's to get more cotton". And ringing the bell, which brought a meek Egyptian to the office, he ordered, "Put me on to Dunlop!" ²

As the budding native official moved off to a neighbouring café, he was heard to murmur, "A chiel's amang you taking notes, and, faith, he'll prent it"

Having got over a few statistics, which I loathe quite as much as the reader, we will now return to the Nationalist revival.

Now, the few cases and statistics cited above were the undoubted causes that led up to the revival of the movement, coupled of course with the ever-present menace, reproach, and insult of the British Army of Occupation. There was a rumbling among the dry bones of Constitutionalism, and the very evils that produced the Arabi revolt were apparent on every side. Fat offices and high salaries to Europeans: husks and starvation wages to the poor Egyptian, who was expected to keep up an official appearance and a large family on one-half to two-

¹ "Egypt", No. 2 (1907), p. 40.
² Dunlop, "Adviser" on Education.
thirds the salary paid to his European confrère of identical social standing.

"We charge him" (Charles I), said Macaulay, "with having broken his coronation oath; and we are told he kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having given up his people to the merciless inflictions of the most hot-headed and the most hard-hearted of prelates; and the defence is that he took his little son on his knee and kissed him! We censure him for having violated the Petition of Rights, after having, for good valuable considerations, promised to observe them; and we are informed that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock in the morning!" Similarly, we charge England with having broken her evacuation pledges; and we are told she abolished the Kurbash! We accuse her of cruel and repressive measures and unjust punishment to the natives, as in the Denshawi and Kaffra atrocities; and the defence is, she won the "Race Against Bankruptcy"! We censure her for having kept the natives in ignorance for twenty-eight years, spending only about 1 per cent on education of the £258,000,000, revenue obtained during the first twenty-five years of the Occupation (the numbers attending the primary schools amounting to but 16 in 1000),¹ and we are informed that she made a reduction in the Salt Tax!

¹ In 1873 the number of those attending primary schools was 17 per 1000. Thirty years of British financial rule has reduced it by one. The population was 5,250,000 in 1873. To-day the population stands at 12,000,000; and in spite of the repeated claims of Sir Edward Grey that the people were being educated and advanced, we find the great ex-proconsul, the Right Honourable the Earl of Cromer, saying at the Eighty Club, 16 December, 1908: "The mass of the Egyptian population is still sunk in the deepest ignorance, and this ignorance must necessarily continue until a new generation has grown up". Not bad for a British Administrator who prides himself on his Egyptian reforms.
The delusive evacuation rumours of 1891 were again revived in 1892, when in September Mr. Gladstone’s Government came into office. In Egypt the young Khedive, who had opened his reign by taking a greater interest in the affairs of his country than his father had done, caused quite a little commotion in the English political dovecot, by the inclination he showed to intervene actively in supervising the work of his Ministers, and at the same time the impression gained currency that he was not quite satisfied with his English “Advisers.” Although young, the Khedive unquestionably possessed more strength of purpose and stability of character than his father could boast. Moreover, he could not shut his eyes to the lack of domestic and social reform in the country, inasmuch as he saw that all other considerations were subordinated to finance-getting and finance-producing. Nothing was attempted that did not “pay.” There was also quite an agitation against English tutelage, with which Fakhri Pasha had much to do, and his opinions were echoed in the native Press; and native opinion on the policy and action of the English, whether in the Press or in the bazaars and cafés, was reflected in the French papers. It was therefore no surprise to the initiated when, on 15 January, 1893, the Premier, Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, who was always known to possess English sympathies, was summarily dismissed by the Khedive, and simultaneously the Ministers of Finance and of Justice were required to surrender their portfolios. These officials were replaced by Fakhri Pasha as Prime Minister, Boutros Pasha in the Finance Department, and Mazloum Pasha in the Department of Justice. The Khedive also intimated that for the future he would claim the right to ap-
point whatever Minister he pleased. His action was instantly interpreted as a blow to the authority of the British, and the Press and native party loudly applauded the bold and independent attitude of their Prince. As might be imagined, Her Majesty’s Consul-General lost no time in intimating to Abbas that such conduct would not be permitted! Lord Cromer further protested against the appointments and refused to recognise the Khedive’s nominees. The English Cabinet authorised Lord Cromer to make it plain to the Khedive that, so long as England occupied Egypt, she claimed a decisive voice in Egyptian politics, and could not allow her “advice” to be set aside. The Khedive hesitated. The modern Warwick was insistent, and the Khedive gave way. The Government was remodelled according to the high and mighty will and pleasure of the Right Honourable Consul-General, with Riaz Pasha, the pet of the European Consulates, once more Prime Minister. Riaz was moderate and amenable; Fakhri was neither. The former had the interests of his class and the English to consider; the latter placed Egypt before all other considerations.

Boutros Pasha and Mazloum Pasha, the nominees of the Khedive, were, however, permitted to retain their portfolios, with the other members of Mustapha Fehmi’s Cabinet; but both Fehmi and Fakhri were sacrificed—Fakhri on the altar of Patriotism and Fehmi to the dignity of the Prince.

This high-handed proceeding on the part of the English representative, and the advice he received from the English Cabinet, conclusively proved that all previous evacuation rumours were mere moonshine, and all England’s professions about permitting the Egyptians to govern themselves mere political humbug.
As a natural result the Press—French and Mohammedan—was up in arms, so were the natives; the friction between English and Egyptian was increased; for now that Lord Cromer, backed by his Government and supported by the bayonets of an occupying army, had set his foot firmly upon Khedive and Ministry, you may be sure that the "English resident", whether commercial or official, did not forget that it was due to every Briton to show the Egyptian "semi-barbarian" who were the masters of the Nile Valley.

The result was a protest on the part of the medical students against English instruction; and these having struck work were only induced to return to their studies after Riaz had spoken rather strongly to them with regard to the duty they owed to Egypt. The Nationalist Party, meanwhile, showed marked hostility to the English. Abuses were still rampant in the various departments, and Riaz believing himself indispensable to the English, tightened the reins on the native officials, causing great discontent within their ranks, and at the same time increasing and consolidating his personal authority.

In the meantime, the British Government decided to increase the British force in Egypt, and fresh troops arrived from Malta and Gibraltar early in February. Instead of allaying bitterness this new impertinence on the part of Great Britain only fomented discord, and the dictatorial attitude of Lord Cromer only served the purpose of throwing the youthful sovereign into the arms of the Nationalist Party.

The "Mokattam", a periodical founded by two Syrian Christians first as a literary monthly magazine
at Beirout, where it acquired a wide circulation, was transferred to Cairo by its founders not long after the Occupation. The well-known energy of the Syrian caused this paper to instantly succeed to that popularity which it had enjoyed at home. Unfortunately, the editors, observing that the English were the real rulers of the country, forthwith proceeded to support everything British and discredit everything that emanated from the country of their adoption; and as the paper was printed in Arabic and was at the same time supposed to contain the views of the occupying English, it did more to stir up strife and ill-feeling than any other agency then employed by the English. As a result, when the army was increased the "Mokattam" went out of its way to prove that Great Britain had increased her force in Egypt with a view to crushing out any germs of Nationalism that might be found floating about Egypt. The Egyptians, knowing that this journal possessed the confidence of Lord Cromer and the English, were unable to arrive at any other conclusion than that their absolute destruction was intended. Consequently, in May, August, and November, excitement rose to fever heat, and so great was the friction, that not only did a Ministerial crisis seem imminent, but in December the Legislative Council which was assembled to discuss the political situation expressed in unmeasured terms its hostility to England and censured two of its own members for calling upon Lord Cromer, as a matter of courtesy, at Cairo. It then attacked the Budget, especially the estimates of the War Department, and the expenses of the Army of Occupation. It proposed to abolish the Prisons Department, the Municipality of Alexandria, and the department for repressing the
slave trade. It proposed to largely reduce the grants made for public works, *to cut down the salaries of the European officials!* to lessen the subvention given to the European theatre, and subsidise a native theatre instead. It appointed a committee to inquire into the unsatisfactory management of the Domains Administration; demanded a reduction in the secret service money; denounced the extravagance of the Government, and *the rapidly increasing poverty and distress of the Egyptians and the universal poverty in the country.*

This pronouncement of the Legislative Council offended, as was natural in the circumstances, both the English "Advisers" and the Egyptian Cabinet. Riaz Pasha replied to the objections of the Council, and Sir Elwin Palmer contradicted their accusations regarding the financial condition of the country. Riaz Pasha induced his Government to reject the majority of the Council's proposals; but it must not be forgotten that the Council, not the Government, expressed the feelings of the masses; and to judge from the delight expressed in Cairo at the Council's action, there need be little doubt that the strictures and criticisms of that body were amply justified.

The criticisms of the Council were undoubtedly reflected in the Khedive's attitude; for now that he found himself supported by the Legislative body, he felt that his position was enhanced, and being young and ambitious, he had no desire to fall into the same hopeless groove of European tutelage and inactivity which had characterised the colourless "reign" of his weak and vacillating father. It therefore came to pass that his attitude towards the English was lacking in those elements of yield and cling, which the British administrators had come to
regard as qualities necessary to a successful Khedive. When he made his tour of inspection during the early part of 1894, on his arrival at Assuan he commented in terms of great severity on the bearing and discipline of some of the Egyptian troops.

These strictures were very badly received by the English; Lord Kitchener, the then Sirdar, offered to resign; and there were representations from the Consul-General regarding the Prince's action. Maher Pasha, the Under Secretary for War, who was supposed to have suggested the criticism, was transferred to another department, and Sir E. H. Zohrab Pasha, an officer of Armenian birth and a Christian by religion, who had served on the staff of Lord Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, was appointed to succeed Maher Pasha at the Ministry of War. The Sirdar was honoured by the British Government; and on 14 April the Riaz Pasha Ministry, of which the English had by this time become tired, ceased to exist, and Nubar Pasha once more accepted office, with Mustapha Pasha Fehmi as Minister of War, and Fakhri Pasha Minister of Public Works and Instruction. Boutros Pasha was made Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ibrahim Fuad Pasha Minister of Justice, Mazloum Pasha being appointed Finance Minister.

Thus matters were smoothed over for the time being; Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, who had been sacrificed in the interest of Khedivial prestige, was now reinstated by the English to please themselves. Fakhri Pasha, who had been deposed from the Premiership by the British in defiance of the wishes of the Khedive, was now reinstated to please the Prince; and Boutros Pasha, the Coptic Christian whom the Prince assumed to be a Nationalist, having allied himself to the real rulers of Egypt during the
short existence of the Riaz Ministry, was rewarded with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs as the price of his allegiance. Honours being therefore easy, a truce was proclaimed between the English rulers and their desired vassal, the Khedive.

In the meanwhile the English Press and the "Mokattam" began their pro-English crusade with the maximum of violence, and the minimum of discretion, indiscriminately traducing the Khedive, Riaz, and the Legislative Council; whilst the native Press led by "Moayyad" took the opposite view, defending those whom the pro-English Press attacked. The "Journal Egyptien", representing the Court, took up the cudgels on behalf of the Khedive, showing up the inconsistency of British policy and the arrogance of Lord Cromer and the English Administration.

There can be no possible question that the youthful Khedive was, in the matter of intelligence, far and away beyond his years. The political discussions of the Khedivial family could not fail to turn upon Tewfik's betrayal of his country into the hands of the English and his greater betrayal of Arabi Pasha. Princess Nazli, an observant lady of broad views and sincere patriotism, was ever rating Tewfik soundly for his weak and cowardly conduct. These discussions one can well believe sank deeply into the heart of the young Abbas Hilmi; and when he went to Vienna to be educated and saw that wider field of social progress and political advancement, it can readily be imagined that he fully made up his mind to be the ruler of Egypt in very truth. On his sudden recall to take up the reins of government, he tried to do too much, and in his youthful enthusiasm and immature judgment, he failed to accurately estimate

1 Vide ante, p. 120, note 2.
the strength and pertinacity of those with whom he hoped to cope successfully. On the other hand, Lord Cromer, who had ruled Tewfik so effectively, was evidently unable to believe that there might be some merit in the stripling Khedive; and had the British intentions, pledges, promises, and what not, been of any real value, it would have been realised at a very early date that the young sovereign was no ordinary youth, but one who took his surroundings and responsibilities seriously.

Unfortunately, the British proconsul was blind to the merits of Abbas, and from the time of his arrival in Egypt to sit on the throne of his fathers, Lord Cromer treated the Prince as though he were a mere child unworthy of any special consideration, whom he thought could be ordered to do this or that thing, and who must needs obey.

That he got into the hands of older and, it is to be feared, designing men, there need be little doubt, and had Lord Cromer been faithfully fulfilling his trust, he should have made it his duty to guard the Prince against evil influences whilst encouraging him in all laudable ambitions; taking, as far as was politic and consistent, a fatherly interest in the son of the deceased sovereign whom he professed to hold in such high esteem. It must be admitted that this was a task of great difficulty and considerable delicacy, but at the same time it would surely have been the lesser evil had Lord Cromer been accused by his detractors of trying to isolate the Khedive, than that he should have been convicted of obstructive and repressive measures—"kind hearts", they say, "are more than coronets". As long as the noble Lord was fully exonerated of evil intentions at the bar of his own conscience, the opinions of men for which he had
previously shown, and continued to show, during his term of office, such utter disregard could, or should, have had very little weight with him. It is not the office or occupation that dignifies the man, but it is the man that dignifies the office.

But that stodgy British bureaucratic blindness was for the most part at the bottom of Lord Cromer's early treatment of Abbas Hilmi, and his inability to discover any good thing in the stock of Ismail, or the Egyptians, for that matter; and there was that apparent hankering after contemporary plaudits, which caused the Consul-General to be so engrossed in material advantages whereby that celebrated financial handicap might be won, that seemingly it became a passion to the exclusion or subordination of all other considerations.

But away in far-off Toulouse, in September, 1895, a sweet-smelling plant of patriotism had sprung up in a night. It had blossomed and had shed its tiny firstfruit into the fostering arms of Madame Juliette Adam. "It wished in the old Egypt to wake up the new".

That plant was named The Egyptian Peril, and the gardener's name was Mustapha Kamil.

Mustapha Kamil, who not only wished his plant to grow and bear fruit abundantly, but who one day hoped to be the Tribune of the Egyptians.
CHAPTER XIX

FASHODA

The Anglo-Egyptian force was resting within the confines of Omdurman on the day following the strenuously contested Battle of Kereri,¹ when suddenly a steamer—one of General Gordon's which had fallen into the hands of the Dervishes at the fall of Khartoum—mysteriously appeared upon the White Nile. The strange craft stopped. The attention of the British gunboats and the garrison was arrested by the apparition. It was then observed that the steamer had put about, full steam up, and was in hasty retreat. A gunboat was immediately dispatched in pursuit of this mysterious craft; it was overtaken and fetched back to Omdurman, and her Arab captain was brought before Lord Kitchener.

The captain, who had served under Gordon, informed the hero of Omdurman that the Caliph had sent him against a White Pasha, who had taken up his position at Fashoda, with an armed force. This Pasha, said the captain, who held a strong fortified position, had successfully repulsed the first attack of the Dervish Army sent against him; and the Arab captain, having returned to procure a strong reinforcement from the Caliph, was making his way unsuspiciously to Omdurman, when on looking up he suddenly espied the English and Egyptian

¹ The Battle of Kereri, fought 2 September, 1898.
flags floating above the city. He said the flag of the strange Pasha was black, white, and red. That the stranger possessed arms of greater range than those possessed by the Dervishes, and that his own return journey had been greatly accelerated by the bullets of the strangers.

Consternation possessed the English officers when they realised that a European had reached the goal of the Upper Valley before them. A consultation was held. They extracted a few bullets from General Gordon’s gunboat, and discovered that these were of French manufacture. By a species of deduction they arrived at the conclusion that the Arab had mixed his colours; that the flag of the strangers was blue, white, and red, and that France had arrived and held command of the sources of the Nile.

Meanwhile, the wires of the civilised world were busy with news of the Battle of Omdurman and the re-conquest of the Soudan. Newspaper correspondents, still at the front, were embellishing the tale of the blood-lust, and the triumph of modern arms and superior discipline over reckless bravery, antiquated weapons, and the blood-feud of fanaticism. Egyptian mothers, and English mothers, were being held within the vice-like grip of agonised suspense; the fevered pulse with maddening deliberation doled out the devout wish, the question born of hope to which the Infinite makes no reply—“ DOES my son live?” Nervously the banker or financier fingered his Egyptian script, while he awaited details, which would increase his wealth or land him on the shoals of bankruptcy. All the emotions—joy, hope, fear, despair, and cupidity—all were in a state of acute activity; when suddenly, with an effect which
paralysed all thought and effort, the news flashed over the telegraph from Orient to Occident, and from Occident to Orient—"Marchand is at Fashoda"!

Why should this commonplace announcement put the European Chancelleries in a flutter, cause financiers to hold their breaths, Englishman and Egyptian to cease from the joyful celebrations of the victory of Omdurman, and not a few people ask, "Where on earth is Fashoda?"

If you are really interested in knowing where Fashoda is, or was, to be more accurate, because out of courtesy to France the name has been removed from the map; I say, if you are really interested, take up the map of Africa, put your finger on Lake Albert Nyanza, and trace it along the Nile in the direction of Egypt; you turn the bend of the river at Bahr-el-Ghazal, and at the next turn you come to Kodok, which is Fashoda under its Shillouk name. Do not put the map away. Looking towards Egypt you will find Abyssinia on your right, and what is termed the "French sphere" on your left. This will be sufficient to enlighten you, it is to be hoped, not only as regards the location of Fashoda, but why France wanted to get there. It will be remembered that I pointed out in this narrative (Chapters XIII-XIV) how the Egyptian troops had met with reverse after reverse, and how the British had demanded the Egyptian evacuation of the Soudan. England would not help Egypt in the re-conquest of the Soudan, when it could have been accomplished with little expense to either of the two Governments concerned; and France, watching her opportunity, determined to steal a march on England and Egypt by sending Marchand across the African Continent
to occupy Fashoda, and the Bahr-el-Ghazal country south of Omdurman.

Eight days after the capture of Gordon's gunboat and its Arab captain, Lord Kitchener arrived before Fashoda with a flotilla of several gunboats, three thousand men, and two batteries of artillery. Four of these gunboats were armed with quick-firing guns.

Commandant Marchand immediately boarded Lord Kitchener's steamer, and informed the English General that he was commissioned by the Government of France to take possession of Fashoda and the surrounding country, south of Omdurman. Lord Kitchener courteously replied to the French Commandant that he would not be allowed to remain in the Soudan which was the property of the Egyptian Government, and, although abandoned for a time owing to the Dervish revolt, had now, with England's aid, been re-conquered in the name of the Khedive, and that the Commandant would not be allowed to settle in the province over which so much English and Egyptian blood and treasure had been expended, in order to retake it. He further informed the French officer that his orders to plant the flags of England and Egypt at Fashoda were explicit. Lord Kitchener concluded by asking after the health of the Mission, and offered to convey the Commandant and his party back to Cairo via Khartoum. Marchand smiled, thanked Lord Kitchener for his solicitude, but declined to leave without instructions from his Government.

Lord Kitchener had by this time lost all patience with the intrepid Frenchman. "What can you do against these?" inquired his Lordship, as he rose and pointed to his armed force and threatening guns.
“Die at my post!” calmly replied Commandant Marchand.

Lord Kitchener instantly realised that he had to deal with one equal in bravery to himself. He, therefore, did the only thing possible to cover up the awkward situation by extending the usual liquid courtesies known to Western culture—"A whisky and soda". "There is no need for fighting or dying at your post", declared Lord Kitchener; "your Government sent you here and your Government will call you back; wait and see".¹

The matter was left to the diplomatic arrangement of the two countries, England and France; and the officers decided upon remaining "as they were", until instructions should arrive from their respective Governments.

Lord Kitchener left Fashoda, but the majority of his soldiers remained before the place till news should come.

Now, Marchand's force comprised two hundred Senegalese soldiers and four French officers, therefore his idea of resisting or "dying at his post" was, to say the least, quixotic. It was true that he was well supplied with provisions; but only he himself knew the extent and capacity of his ammunition.

In any case, his force, whether assuming a defensive or aggressive attitude, was an absolute negative quantity.

The Calipha had declared war upon all "infidels", and neither the Turk nor the abstruse problems of Western diplomacy possessed any attractions for him. Marchand was an "infidel", and the Calipha had sent a force to exterminate him. Had he not been defeated by Lord Kitchener, it is indisputable

¹ "New Egypt", p. 332.
that the Calipha would have sent another and
stronger body to exterminate the French Mission.
The Dervishes asked no quarter and gave none.
Their fighting resolved itself into a short shriff, a
speedy death, and no questions. Doubtless, and this
theory has not to my knowledge been previously
advanced, when Delcassé dispatched Marchand, if
he did not intend that the Soudan should be quietly
annexed, even as Tajourrah had been absorbed by
ten sailors of France, early in May, 1884, the French
Minister who knew the conditions in the Soudan,
must have entertained the sinister intention of
having the Mission exterminated by the Dervishes,
so as to have a "valid" excuse for sending a French
army into the Soudan. I do not claim accuracy for
this statement. It is mere speculation. But looking
at all the facts it seems mightily like that

"... imputation and strong circumstances,
Which lead directly to the door of truth." 1

French Ministers of State do not usually suffer
from softening of the brain. Marchand was there-
fore saved from destruction by the Anglo-Egyptian
victory of Omdurman. Had the Battle of Kereri
been won by the Dervishes, their whole force would
have borne down upon the insignificant Mission, and
swept it into the Nile; and this notwithstanding
the modern armaments of the French. These very
Dervishes had exterminated Hicks and his ten thou-
sand men, and captured the well-defended El-Obeid;
they had taken Khartoum despite General Gordon's
bravery, his gunboats and his artillery; and this
all-conquering force was only beaten by an Anglo-
Egyptian force of twenty thousand men, aided by
powerful guns and several gunboats.

1 Shakespeare's "Othello," Act III, Sc. 3.
Marchand's hope was either in a union with the Dervishes, or in a revolt of the Egyptian troops, both of which hypotheses are absolutely untenable; the former for reasons previously stated, and the latter because the loyalty of the Egyptian troops during the English regime has never been questioned.\(^1\) There was, however, some absurd suggestion that the Egyptian officers informed Marchand when he was being fêted at Cairo, that had he held on they were with him; but this assertion may be dismissed with contempt. The Egyptian officers were fighting in the Soudan for a principle just as much as the English were. If the English had lost Gordon, Hicks, and Stewart, the Egyptians had lost tens of thousands of their countrymen. There were sons, brothers, cousins, whose blood had soaked the arid wastes of Kordofan, and cried aloud for vengeance.

The diplomatists of France and England were in the meanwhile having rather heated arguments about their "rights". They waxed so wroth that they nearly came to blows over a desolate strip of land which nobody really wanted, and for the capture of which a handful of men had tramped wearily across Central Africa, with its untold dangers and privations.

Fortunately, peaceful counsels prevailed; and as M. de Freycinet said when writing at a subsequent date on "La Question d'Egypte":

"After the capture of Khartoum we could no longer delude ourselves. It was evident that the entire squadron was open to the Anglo-Egyptian

\(^1\) Marchand himself was responsible for the statement that Egyptian officers had told him "had he held out they would have been with him." But this was after the event; and if the statement was made it was proof that those responsible for the statement had supped "not wisely but too well." French vintage had produced Egyptian fiction for French consumption.
army. The Marchand Mission had lost its raison d'être as far as taking possession was concerned. We had no valid arguments against its restoration to the Khedivial authority. . . . M. Delcassé has only abandoned what he could not have retained, for it was not ours to keep”.

Sir Reginald Wingate calls the Fashoda incident “a nightmare which is better forgotten”, and Lord Cromer, in his history, dismisses the subject with a footnote.¹ For my part I have given it prominence, partly because of its being the key to the aggressive Nationalist agitation that followed, and also because of the unjust accusations of disloyalty brought against the Egyptian officers; and, finally, by reason of its effect upon native opinion with regard to the subsequent intentions of Great Britain in Egypt. No agitation would have been possible or worthy the name unless it had had the support of the people; and although this phase of the question has been glossed over by the English "historian" and political leader writer on the one hand, or utterly ignored on the other, I shall endeavour to show that its bearing on the question was not only important, but it indicated a parting of the ways. Henceforth the relations between England and Egypt could never be the same, by which I mean educated Egypt. England, who had previously played a game of bluff, had at length shown her hand.

In the earlier portion of this chapter I endeavoured to show that the Fashoda incident had temporarily suspended thought and paralysed action. During the progress of the negotiations the Press of the two countries precipitately availed itself of the abundant supply of ready-made "copy", and its

sensational statements and war-scares were not provocative of level-headedness on the part of the public of either France or England.

The names of either Sultan or Khedive were very rarely mentioned by the contending scaremongers. It was a question of English versus French "honour" (!) and prestige first; and Turkey or Egypt nowhere. Of course, they were squabbling over a worthless plot of "no man's land"; but England was responsible for the squabble, because of her insistence that the Khedive should abandon the country; and England, France, and Italy having each procured a slice of the Ismailian Empire without European protest, it is not surprising that the entire Soudan, south of Wadi Halfa and Suakin, should have been considered "no man's land".

When, therefore, the matter was finally settled, and Major Marchand was repudiated by his Government as a mere "emissary of civilisation", and English "honour" had been vindicated, the people of Egypt were divided into two camps. The one which included the Copt, the Circassian, the Syrian Christians, and the Europeans, who had for years awaited a definite pronouncement of policy on the part of England, not only breathed freely, but was for the most part jubilant. The other and larger class, which represented the majority of the educated, as well as the unlettered, but nevertheless thinking class of the Moslem population, was very naturally indignant. Because the recognition on the part of France of what England pleased to term her "honour", prestige, and "rights" only meant that an untenable position in Egypt had been made secure, and the foot that had been "firmly planted on the banks of the Nile" had now been carefully
buried in the Soudan, where it would take root and grow. The British pronouncement also foreshadowed the Anglo-French agreement of 1904; and this, in spite of Gladstone's statement to Mustapha Kamil in 1896, two years prior to Fashoda, that "so far as he knew, the time for evacuation had arrived some years ago".¹ When the Houses met in February, 1898, to discuss the Queen's speech, we find Lord Kimberley saying that "it had been clear from the first that the Egyptian Army would be required to be stiffened by British troops; and he did not consider it was for the interest of this country to embark in the re-conquest of the Soudan. . . . He was not adverse to the extension of our empire, but thought it should be regulated by prudence and a due regard to the limits of our resources". This staunch Liberal Peer, therefore, recognised the fact that "England had embarked on the re-conquest of the Soudan, and the extension of her empire". Sir William Harcourt, in the Commons, also held similar views; for, said he, "in the Soudan we were actually at war in spite of the fact that our settled 'policy' in Egypt was founded on a determination to abandon the Soudan". Lord Rosebery, at Perth, 22 October, 1898, had used the phrase, "the Nile is Egypt, and Egypt is the Nile"; and Sir Edward Grey took up the parable at Huddersfield on the 27th of the same month, declaring that England, as the "trustee" of Egypt, had the obligation of that trusteeship resting upon her, and that made

¹ Mr. Gladstone, writing from Biarritz to Mustapha Kamil, under date 14 January, 1896, said, "I sympathise with what I understand to be your feelings as an Egyptian, but I am wholly devoid of power. My opinions have always been the same—that we ought to quit Egypt after fulfilling our work for which we went there, with honour and profit to that country. So far as I know, that time arrived some years ago."
"it imperative for the Government to take the position they occupy and make it impossible for them to recede from it". And, finally, at the Guildhall banquet to Lord Kitchener on 4 November, 1898, his Lordship of Khartoum concluded his speech with the following pertinent remarks: "During the last two and a half years they (the English) had spent £2,500,000 as a military special grant (including the grant recently made for the extension of the railway from the Atbara to Khartoum). Well, my Lords and gentlemen", said the Sirdar, "against this large expenditure we have some assets to show; we have, or shall have, 760 miles of railway, properly equipped with engines, rolling stock, and a track with bridges in good order. Well, for this running concern, I do not think that £3000 a mile will be considered too high a price. This gives us £2,250,000 out of the money granted, and for the other £250,000 we have 2000 miles of telegraph line, six new and superior gunboats, besides barges, sailing craft, and —The Soudan. . . . We have hoisted the Egyptian and British flags at Khartoum—never again, I hope, to be hauled down".

And Lord Salisbury had authorised Sir Edmund Monson, the British Ambassador at Paris, as far back as 10 December, 1897, to inform M. Hanotaux, the then Foreign Minister of the French Republic, that Her Majesty's Government "must not be understood to admit that any other Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile".

It will therefore be observed that both political party leaders, having recognised the conquest of the Soudan for England, notwithstanding the comic relief of the "senior partner", when she courteously
hoisted the Egyptian flag by the side of the British over Khartoum, and Lord Salisbury having made it quite clear that no other Power nor political Ishmael had any right or claim to occupy any part of the Soudan, there could now be no possible doubt in the minds of the Egyptians as to their future political status.

The Anglo-Egyptian Press at once jumped into the arena to defend British prestige; the French smarting under an imaginary indignity took up the cause of the Egyptian, and the Egyptian native organs were by no means backward in speaking for themselves.

In a very short time the poorest class of fellaheen, who did not understand what all the bother was about, upon being made aware that England had practically taken possession of the country averred that it did not much matter; but at any rate he was rather glad, because he would now have a supply of water "in his turn", and would not be done out of it by the Pasha or "great ones" of his district. But deep down in his heart there was an unspoken malediction of appalling magnitude and unprintable virulence which he levelled at the British, and which extended to a long and forgotten line of English ancestry. Things are not what they seem in Egypt. The calm and smiling exterior may, and very often does, cover up a very volcano of bitterness, which might break forth at any moment in eruptive devastation.

Centuries of oppression have taught the people of the soil to cover up the inward tempest of their minds. And so the British go blundering blindly on, until they are suddenly pulled up by the act of a Wardani.
The Moslem effendi, or petty official, accepted the situation with the same external calm which characterised the attitude of the peasant. He knew the English to be in authority; and prior to the Fashoda settlement, such vague longings as he possessed in the direction of political emancipation were in a rather chaotic condition, because all that the English had previously ordered had been in the name of the Khedive; this meant that the Khedive, being the lieutenant of the Sultan, it was to His Sublime Majesty that he believed he should look for future political amelioration. At the same time, although the appearance of Moukhtar Pasha, the Sultan's Envoy, in Egypt, lent some colour to this opinion, he observed that the English administrators paid no attention to the desires of the Turkish Envoy, treating him as a sort of political cipher, whose interference in the administration of Egypt was not to be tolerated. Here, then, was a puzzle which he could not solve: a puzzle that most highly trained European intelligences were unable to solve. As a result it was no matter for surprise, that after all his intellectual effort, he returned by a circuitous route to the original starting-point of his reasoning. When he learned that the British Government had put its foot down, declaring that no other Power had any right in Egypt other than itself, he was by no means satisfied; but in the true Moslem spirit he accepted the inevitable and returned to his desk. He knew now to whom he should look for political advancement. England had declared herself the responsible authority in Egypt; henceforth England would be asked for those liberal institutions which she had so glibly promised in the early days of the Occupation. England would also be reminded that the
“Government would be handed over to the Egyptians when they were capable of governing themselves”; and in order that there might be no excuse for the non-fulfilment of these pledges, the Egyptian official determined thenceforth to assiduously apply himself to his allotted task; and the richer well-to-do fathers—families of the effendi class—seconded the efforts of the native officials, by sending their sons to the colleges of Europe and Syria to qualify for that higher responsibility which was eventually to be theirs; whilst the poorer parents who possessed like ambitions, made the best of the rather inadequate Egyptian educational institutions.

The Turco-Circassian “party”, on the other hand, who had always considered themselves the hereditary rulers of Egypt and possessed great landed interests, whilst assuming an attitude of utter indifference towards the Egyptians, were strong in their hatred of English domination, because they felt that England had wrested the power of ruling from them; and as they for the most part had been educated in French establishments, their sympathies were wholly with France, inasmuch as they hoped that should France once more gain the ascendancy in Egyptian affairs, there would be a chance of their regaining at least some of their lost prestige and power, and the hated British would be humbled in the dust.

When they discovered the unexpected turn events had taken they at once dissembled, and commenced to drift with the tide of English mastery.

Meanwhile, the Copts, who for generations had been held in comparative subjugation by respective Mohammedan and Turkish masters, were overjoyed at England’s diplomatic success, because they had
for some considerable period arrived at the conclusion that political advancement and official preferment were only to be obtained through and by English aid. Their unquestioned industry and intimate knowledge of clerical work, which they had shared with the Syrians for centuries in the various administrative departments of Egypt, had made them valuable to the English, who largely adopted their services in the early days of the Occupation. As time went on the demand for Coptic assistance increased, and this led them to believe that England was not only well-disposed towards them, but that by upholding British rule they would be supporting a tolerant Christian power, who would not overlook the matter of identical faith when the time arrived for the distribution of important posts.

The Syrian Christians were of the same mind, and they, without in any way undervaluing the undoubted qualifications of the Copts, were the most enlightened and progressive of these two elements; and this for the most part because of the exalted character of their schools, and the high standard of Syrian education which was above and beyond anything obtaining in Egypt.

The Latin Europeans—well, any one having experience of these people is aware that they are at once emotional and mercurial. They knew that they had their own laws, which England had left alone with the rotten International Tribunals—a judicial system by this time being slightly improved by the English administrators. These would have preferred French ascendancy in Egypt, and did not hesitate to proclaim their desires to the world; but when once British diplomacy had effected what they thought could not be accomplished without bloodshed, they
shrugged their shoulders, lit the inevitable cigarette, and returned to their accustomed avocations.

The less representative section of the Greeks, who had from time immemorial periodically bled the fellaheen, were by no means pleased with the altered condition. The English being masters of the country meant for them a considerable reduction in their usurious profits. In passing, I would mention that there is a large and influential class of Greeks in Egypt who are quite as disgusted with, and ashamed of, the conduct of their rapacious brethren as are the other representative foreigners in Egypt; and it would be the height of injustice to put it on record that all the Greeks of Egypt are dishonest money-lenders. The reputable Greeks of Egypt are among the most respected class of residents; and fortunately of late years, owing to a combination of circumstances which have operated against their unholy trade, these human vampires have been greatly reduced in numbers, although it is very questionable whether they will ever be entirely stamped out. As long as there are borrowers there will be usurers; and the much-advertised Agricultural Banks are so swaddled in red-tape, that their vexatious administrative delays have for the most part compelled the fellaheen, whom they were supposed to relieve, to fall back upon the ever-present Greek and Syrian of the hypocritical smile, and the ever-open purse.

And last, but by no means least, the Ulema, as a body, were with the people; and the opinions of the effendis, and the masses, were but a reflex of El-Azhar sentiments.

Fashoda, therefore, stands out in bold relief as the true starting-point of aggressive Egyptian Nationalist agitation.
Prior to Fashoda nobody in Egypt knew politically where they were, or what might happen next. They suspected that England was not there on a philanthropic mission of self-aggrandisement; and as a choice of evils if European rule were absolutely indispensable, there was hardly an individual, whether native or European—exclusive of the "Turks" and the French—who would not have preferred English domination to that of any other European Power.

What irritated the native and provoked distrust in his mind was the hypocrisy of the English, and the non-fulfilment of their pledges. They performed their self-imposed tasks in the name of the Khedive. If success attended their efforts they got the credit; but when they blundered, as they oft-times did and do even to this day, the Khedive was blamed for permitting them to make a mess of things.

But subsequent to Fashoda, praise or blame was put upon the right shoulders. Therefore, Fashoda, in its relation to Modern Egyptian history, can neither be dispatched with a phrase, nor be dismissed with a footnote.
THE HOME OF A BEY

(By kind permission of Mohamed Tewlik Solhmon Bey,)
CHAPTER XX

THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT

BEFORE returning to the new political development in Egypt, it would be as well to enlighten the reader as to what manner of people these Egyptians are. I will at once state, that neither the exigencies of space nor the scope of this work admits of a detailed account of a people, whose varied and complex social and religious system would require the assignment of a complete volume, in which to treat each of the many existing phases. This chapter, therefore, can only be a mere sketch. I would, however, state for the reader's information, that for all practical purposes "Lane's Modern Egyptians", although old-fashioned and failing to give a clear and well-defined idea of the Egyptian in his daily life, is a fair picture of the Egyptian to-day, as far as it applies to the fellaheen, his mode of life, and religious observances. Lane's work only requires to be brought up-to-date; by which I mean the intellectual change which has been wrought among the people during the last half a century or so has broadened their views to a very large extent. This has been mainly due to the presence of the English and other Western nations, and this notwithstanding the low standard of education. What I wish to convey is this: if you place a quantity of gold coins in a rough bag and they are being continually shaken,
it will be found, that while they will wear a hole in the bag in the course of time, on examination a goodly quantity of the precious metal will be discovered adhering to the fabric. Similarly, although the Englishman’s domineering and exclusive manner has worn a hole in Egyptian patience, particles of his golden qualities, whether administrative or otherwise, have clung to Egyptian character, which an acute observer will soon discover is by no means devoid of receptiveness.

The entire Egyptian population of some twelve million souls may be roughly divided into five classes.

First, the Ulema, those natural leaders of the people, who, drawn as they are from among the body of the people, hold a position analogous to that of the Roman priesthood, and who, as Macaulay says of that body, "invert the relations between oppressor and oppressed, and force the hereditary Prince to kneel before the spiritual tribunal of the hereditary serf".

In the second place, the wealthy landowners, and those of independent means.

In the third place, the educated and intellectual class: professional men, such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, journalists, and other writers, and Government servants.

In the fourth place, the great middle class of minor Government officials, merchants, and small land- and house-owners.

In the fifth place, all those who work with their hands: such as artisans, craftsmen, and labourers.

These, for the most part, do not differ materially from the same classes in England.

The Bedouin, whether a hybrid between fellah and Bedouin, or the true sons of the desert, known
as the Nomad Bedouin, although included in the twelve million, is practically a class apart.

A stranger visiting Egypt would be quite unable to classify the homogeneous mass that kaleidoscope-like pass and repass before his bewildered gaze.

The Turco-Egyptian in his brougham, the swaggering Circassian, the Syrian or Greek traders and moneylenders, the Hebrew merchant with his stock of curios and embroideries from Asia Minor, the individual who masquerades under the elusive national cognomen of Levantine; Nubians, Armenians, Sudanese, Maltese, and half-breeds of every conceivable description: all these go to swell the populations of cities and towns of the Nile Valley, and contribute their quota of good or ill to the community.

I shall now proceed to pick my way through this social labyrinth, working up from the bottom of the five classes enumerated above, concluding with the Ulema. Each of these five classes, although perhaps unconsciously, is passing through an evolutionary process.

The artisan, craftsman, or labourer, who is being educated through and by the Press, is as different an individual from the same person of Lane's History, as is the British working man of to-day, when compared with the man of the same class who, during the early part of the last century, indulged in a saturnalian debauch while awaiting a Newgate hanging.

A man of this class, whether residing in a mud-hut in the provinces, or in the more comfortable native quarters of the towns, is remarkable for his thrift, industry, sobriety, and his devotion to God; for, as an English divine has truly said, "God is present to Mohammedans in a sense in which He is
rarely present to us amidst the hurry and confusion of the West". And even as his religious convictions are as immovable as the decrees of the Medes and Persians, even so are his political opinions. He may be long in making up his mind, owing to the conflicting ideas of the native Press from whence he draws his information; but having once arrived in his slow, measured way at a clearly defined conclusion, he may bend like a storm-tossed reed to an opposing force, but when the gale has passed, he will be found in the same position. England has done little for him in the way of education, but the Nationalist Press has mainly supplied that deficiency. As, for the most part, the fellah is unable to read, when the labours of the day are over, an educated individual will be found in the bazaar or café, to read and expound the latest news to those legions who thirst after knowledge. The "Moayyad", edited by Sheykh Ali Yousseff, was the first to begin the education of the people through the Press, and that work was greatly improved by Mustapha Kamil in the pages of "El Lewa" and later by Sheykh Shawish in "El Alam". As a result, even the most unlettered are enabled to think clearly and well; but their characteristic reticence in the presence of strangers, has caused the superficial observer of Egyptian character to presume that this impassive product of centuries of oppression "is still sunk in the deepest ignorance which must necessarily continue until a new generation has grown up". A new generation has grown up and is growing up, but unfortunately the great Western Financial Jockey was too busy with that famous race to see it.

1 Dean Stanley's "Lectures on the Eastern Church", p. 334.
2 Lord Cromer, 6 December, 1908 (Speech at the Eighty Club).
The middle-class man is imbued with much the same aims and desires as his English prototype: His main idea on completing the day's work is to return to the domestic hearth. On his way to business by tram or train, he extends the courtesies of the day to his acquaintances, cracks his jokes, laughs at the jests of others, discusses the latest political events, East or West, growls over the cost of living, his limited resources, and the almost hopeless struggle to make ends meet, and criticises the shortcomings of the Government; if an official, he compares notes with other officials of his acquaintance, and criticises the methods of some of the English heads of departments in a manner which would greatly astonish these "terrible big pots". Returning home to his easy chair, slippers and newspaper, he is bombarded with the measles of the eldest boy, or the intractability of the baby-girl, and other harem troubles, including the inevitable servant problem, household expenses, the reception of visitors, and all those minor topics inseparable from a well-conducted, middle-class English household. After a few hours at home, he spends an hour or two reading the latest newspapers, Christian and Mohammedan, at his favourite café. Possibly a game of backgammon follows with one of his many cronies, whilst quip and crank are bandied about amidst the buzz of general conversation. Home once again to that ease and comfort which home alone can give. Perhaps there are visitors to entertain, and this he does with that free and open-handed hospitality characteristic of his race, and for which the Orient is famed. Then bed succeeds supper, and the day of the Egyptian middle-class man is ended. He differs in no essential points from the Englishman of the same class in
England. He laughs, he grumbles, he jests, he desires to be agreeable, is not difficult to please, and is readily conciliated. French influences have contributed to make him freer than the Englishman in his friendships, for he does not think it beneath his dignity to enter into friendly conversation with his tradespeople, to jest with them or sympathise with their difficulties; but as is the manner of the Briton, his delights or enjoyments are centred in those of his own particular circle. Of course, this class may be divided and sub-divided into an almost limitless number of particles; I have merely given a broad outline, which although general, is none the less accurate and reliable.

The third class is largely recruited from the fourth: sons of merchants and minor officials in the Government services, and small land- and house-owners, being educated with a view to their taking higher official posts than their fathers, or to qualifying for the professions of law, medicine, journalism, and what not. Of this class, the journalist and other writers are perhaps the most important, as owing to the low standard of education, upon them devolves the education of the masses for good or ill.

It would be misleading to state that this body of well-intentioned individuals are paragons of journalistic and educational virtue. They are neither better nor worse than their brothers of the same ilk in England. It is true that their journalese is for the most part tinged with "yellow", which causes them at times to indulge in glowing periods of ornate exaggeration; but this is mainly due to French influence. The modern Egyptian is more Frenchified than Anglicised. About 75 per cent of the educated Egyptians speak French alone, and that fluently,
against a resultant 25 per cent who speak either English and French fluently, or English imperfectly; and as all European diplomatic and executive matters are conducted in French and Franco-Arabic, respectively, there is little incentive to the study of English.¹ At the same time, such evil as these journalists sow is no more harm-promoting than the fulminations of a certain widely read English republican journal, or those of the more widely circulated anti-“Cant and Humbug” High-priest.

The suppression of these native journals, instead of exterminating a rather negative evil, only helps to stir up bitterness by the senseless manufacture of cheap martyrs.

The fellah is too sensible to be carried away by frothy utterances; and although mainly illiterate, he is quite capable of separating the wheat from the chaff. He wants to learn, but he does not want to be lectured. Nevertheless, these journalists have had good cause for complaint. They may have overstated their case and used language which was not quite parliamentary; but has the British administrative system in England escaped journalistic censure? And as far as the evils or shortcomings of an English bureaucratic system in Egypt are concerned, I need only point to the case in England of young Archer-Shee. If this youth, with his father's wealth behind him and the best legal aid at his disposal, whiled away two years helplessly and hopelessly trying to establish his innocence, with an informed and healthy public opinion at his service, what chance, may I ask, has the misrepresented Egyptian, separated by thousands of miles from the seat of

¹ Mr. Dunlop's appointment as Adviser to the Department of Public Instruction, March, 1906, was the beginning of the Anglicising of the schools, which shall be dealt with in its proper place.
the governing power that holds him in unjust sub-
jugation?

Now, as I have already discussed the Turco-
Egyptian-Circassian, who may be said to represent
the second of the five representative classes, I think
I may be pardoned for passing him over in this place.
I will merely state for the reader’s information,
that the pure fellah in this class is a disappearing
quantity.

The men of the second, third, and fourth grades
of Egyptian society do not, as is generally understood,
possess unlimited wives, whose perfumed forms of
tempting loveliness remain unclothed, or are so thinly
veiled beneath a gauze of fairy gossamer that the
carnal palate is whetted by peerless beauty trans-
parently disguised. Nor is such bewitching loveli-
ness set off in halls of alabaster hung with brilliant
fabrics of the East, whilst perfumed fountains music-
ally waft attar of roses across the silken rugs, blend-
ing its essence with the perfumed cigarette, creating
an earthly paradise for the jaded Pasha.

Even as the fellaheen is the only real Egyptian, in
like manner the only genuine Egyptian woman is the
fellaheen peasant woman.¹

The word “harem” is of Turkish derivation, and
means woman. The Mohammedan household is
divided into two parts, the “harem lik” and the
“salem lik”. The “harem lik” is severely confined
to the family and is strictly private, no male except
the master of the house or doctors being allowed to
enter. The European doctor is frequently permitted
to enter the female establishment unattended, but
the native doctor is rarely granted the same privilege,

¹ Vide subsequent chapter for further remarks on the genuine
Egyptian.
a eunuch being usually in attendance during his professional visits.

On the other hand, the “salem lik” comprises the apartments exclusively devoted to the master for the reception of his friends.

This division of the household is a recognised Mohammedan institution, existing as it does in all ranks of the Moslem social system, from the highest to the lowest. The poor man possessing one room, assigns that apartment to his wife and children, thereby making it the “harem lik”, meeting and entertaining his friends outside at some café.

The Princesses of the Khedivial house are, of course, at the top of the scale. These with their allied ties, the wives of Pashas, Beys, and professional men, are highly educated; speak several European languages; are surrounded with the comforts of the West, and are not only fully acquainted with European civilisation, but travel Europe even as other women; frequent Monte Carlo, Baden Baden, and the various European fashionable resorts and watering-places; but on returning to Egypt they retire to the recognised Moslem seclusion, and, in the majority of cases, to the veil.

The Mohammedan custom of seclusion and the veil is by no means a religious rite, but an ancient Eastern custom, dating anterior to the advent of Islam, at a time when a man was forced to defend life and property with the sword; and as women have ever been considered among warrior races to be the richest spoils of war, it followed that the women of the Orient were either secluded or their beauty veiled; and the law which says, “If thy beauty cause strife among men, inspiring them to love or jealousy in others, then were it better for thee that
it should be hid”, is merely a moral safeguard which recognised an existing institution.

The middle-class woman differs entirely from either the women of the upper classes or the woman of the West; for not only is the marriage tie insecure, but because of her secluded life, the utter absence of education, and absolute ignorance of the outer world, she is naturally of an extremely low mental calibre. As a consequence the man, having no mental or moral stimulus at home, is driven to seek the company of his fellows, or that of the European woman whose combination of intellect and physical charm, coupled with the greater freedom of the West, at once attracts and binds the Moslem captive to her will.

It will therefore be observed that whilst the intellectual advancement of men has progressed by leaps and bounds, the conditions under which Egyptian women live, move, and have their being, has not been materially altered. The enlightened Moslem, however, is by no means satisfied with this state of affairs; expanding intelligence has produced a desire for wider social intercourse and an altered mental standard in the home. Young Egyptians no longer regard women as their fathers did: a mere chattel of passion to be repudiated and cast aside at the whim of the master. They not alone recognise the mental and moral stimulus that is only to be obtained from a wife of equal mental capacity, but they are also aware that intelligent mothers are required to train good citizens. To this end the marriageable age has been raised from fourteen to sixteen, and in many individual cases even higher; and whereas there were only 2050 girls attending schools in 1900, last year, 1909, there were no less than 12,000, and this number
AN EGYPTIAN PEASANT WOMAN
has been appreciably increased during the current year.

The Moslem, however, whilst moving in the direction of female emancipation through and by the aid of education, clearly sees that violent change in this direction only makes for disaster. The women having been secluded and kept in ignorance for centuries, were they immediately emancipated would only become the prey of the first plausible adventurer who crossed their paths. The Moslem has before his eyes the case of the manumitted female domestic slaves. These poor defenceless creatures, who were loved and petted by their mistresses, were suddenly turned out upon a merciless world to supply the evil traffic of the brothel, and satisfy the lusts of their European emancipators. Were the Moslem woman of Egypt to be at once let loose upon society, she would pay the same price for her freedom as her slave has done.

I am no believer in human slavery, but upon the matter of Egyptian domestic slavery I feel most strongly. The Anti-Slavery Society could not bring its influence to bear upon the British Government to support the Egyptian Government in holding the Soudan, where Dervish rule was maintained by the revenue from the slave-trade, and was the source of this inhuman traffic; but they must needs upset the entire Egyptian domestic fabric by their impertinent interference with the domestic slave. The secluded women of Egypt were dependent upon their female slaves for the society and comfort denied them by their lords; in this way they became in the course of time, not only the companions and servants of their mistresses, but in many cases their closest friends. These women, without warning or preparation, were ruthlessly torn from the only home and
friends they knew, to be huddled together in a Slaves' Home among strangers. Their innocence utterly incapacitated them for the battle of life, and their ignorance of the world made them a ready prey to the European despoiler. That the majority of these women have become harlots must not be attributed to their vicious tendencies. They were taught obedience, and it cannot be a matter for wonder that they should have surrendered their honour to the men of the West, whom they were wont to regard as demi-gods. I have met discharged soldiers of the Occupation who boasted openly to me, with great gusto, of their amorous conquests and animal indulgences with native women whilst in Egypt; and the "Tommy" only followed the example of his superior. I am understating rather than overstating the case; and should there be any doubt in the mind of the reader, I need only say that the number of half-castes—European and native—have increased by no less than 1000 per cent since the Occupation, and the subsequent manumission of the domestic slave. This emancipation, by freeing these women from the Mohammedan law, put a premium upon vice, of which the more loose-living Moslem readily availed himself. The Englishman was master in Egypt, and what the master did the servant emulated.¹ The servant cannot rise above his master; water does not rise above its level. During domestic slavery, if a master committed himself with a slave, he was forced by the Mohammedan law to

¹ Despite the much-advertised chivalry of the West, it is absolutely impossible, if not unsafe, for any respectable and prepossessing woman to walk through any thoroughfare after dark in the Western cities; for unless she is attended the woman is certain to be molested by the unwelcome importunities of some "Lothario", who is invariably married and matured. English cities are by no means behind Continental or American cities in this matter.
marry her. Ismail himself, Khedive though he was, was not above the law. Once when he had "supped not wisely but too well", he was overcome by the charms of a female slave who brought in his bed. . . . He was compelled by the law of Islam to make her his wife, and supply her with a separate establishment and an adequate income. The law says, "The rich shall give according to his riches, and the man who has only what he requires according to that which God hath given him".

Now, in regard to Moslem marriages. The Mohammedan is permitted by his religion to have four legal wives, and no limit is set upon his concubines. Notwithstanding this fact, very few of the wealthy avail themselves of their legal privilege. For instance, the late Khedive, Tewfik, was a monogamist; so is Abbas II, the present ruler of Egypt.

There are, however, many causes which have contributed to the reduction. In the first place: education and contact with Europeans. In the second place, the enormous increase in the cost of living in Egypt since the Occupation; several wives means several establishments, inasmuch as I have already stated that the religion commands that each wife shall be treated with equal generosity. The abolition of slavery has also contributed in no small measure to the reduction.

I would also add that, although I neither adhere to nor uphold polygamy, a religious system which equalises the status of several wives and which specially insists on the husband treating each wife with the same kindness and consideration, by placing each wife on a basis of equality, makes for a higher standard of morality than the evidently galling monogamy of the West. I am quite aware that there
are many loyal husbands in Europe; but judging from the weight of evidence given at the recent Divorce Commission, in England, in favour of cheap divorces, it would appear that monogamy leaves much to be desired, and abundantly proves that the system drives many a man to become a libertine and many a woman to adopt prostitution as a means of living. Besides, the thing that is easily acquired is devoid of zest.

Men strive for riches because the quest is difficult of achievement; were everyone rich or were riches easily obtained, the incentive to their acquirement would be gone. The rich man does not appreciate a sumptuous repast, his appetite in due course becomes sated. Similarly, the modern Egyptian, being in a position to legally satisfy his passions, the very ease of the thing robs it of charm or novelty.

On the other hand, the number of divorces, scandals in high life, applications for maintenance of illegitimate offspring, and other like sexual matters which engage the English Courts, proves beyond question that monogamy is either not the success which its champions claim, or the boasted high civilisation of the West in its relations to the sexes does not possess any superior advantages over Oriental systems.

Before concluding these remarks on Mohammedan marriages, I must say a few words about divorce.

The law says, “If a husband repudiates his wife thrice, he is not permitted to take her back until after she shall have married another man, who, in his turn, has repudiated her.” Thus, it is sufficient for a man to say, “Thou are divorced,” to repudiate his wife, and the repudiation becomes absolutely final on his repeating the formula three times.
He must, however, return her the dowry which she brought him, and pay her a pension according to his position for three months. Should she be enceinte, he must support her until the child is weaned.

Of course, many men in order to avoid repayment of the dowry not infrequently ill-treat their wives, because should the wife desert her husband he is not compelled to refund the dowry. In the case of ill-treatment, the wife lodges a complaint with the Kadi, or Moslem judge, who tries to patch up the difficulty, admonition effecting in many cases a reconciliation. But a husband bent on ridding himself of his wife in order to retain her dowry, will continue to pursue a system of cruelty which ends in the precipitate flight of his wife, who would naturally relinquish her rights rather than submit to persistent corporeal abuse.

If, however, "repudiation takes place twice, after which the wife be kept, she must be treated honestly, or, if sent away, treated generously ".

Notwithstanding the laxity of the marriage tie, unmarried women of any class are rare in Egypt, and although their position in the home has been for the most part a rather negative quantity, Moslem women have not only inspired real affection, but have fired the imagination of Arabian poets of the Nile Valley and elsewhere.

I will now conclude this chapter with a few remarks about the Ulema.

These men are the leaders of religious and secular thought at the El-Azhar University, or collegiate mosque at Cairo.

This mosque, which was built A.D. 972, is devoted to the higher branches of Mohammedan erudition,
and because of the unrivalled fame of its professors continues to attract innumerable students from every quarter of the Moslem world. The declaration of the Moslem faith is fittingly expressed in the language of the Koran.

"Say, God is One; God is eternal: He begetteth not, neither is He begotten; neither is there any like Him".¹

And again, the grand and sublime pleading of those early disciples of the Prophet, who prostrated themselves before the Christian King of Abyssinia imploring his protection against the persecution of the Koreish Arabs, if it has been equalled has never been surpassed by anything as yet recorded in the annals of Christendom:

"O King!" they cried, "we lived in ignorance, idolatry, and unchastity; the strong oppressed the weak; we spoke untruth; we violated the duties of hospitality. Then a Prophet arose, one whom we knew from our youth, with whose descent and conduct and good faith and truth we are all well acquainted. He told us to worship one God, to speak the truth, to keep faith, to assist our relations, and to abstain from things impure, ungodly, and unrighteous. And he ordered us to say prayers, give alms, and to fast. We believed in him, we followed him".

These are the broad lines on which the main tenets of Mohammedanism is built.

There is nothing of aggression, nothing suggesting fanaticism. The Moslem religion is, as I have pointed out elsewhere, "peace-promoting, not war-provoking".

Moreover, being in its essence a republic, it makes

¹ Surah CXII.
for progression, not reaction. Instruction is en-
joined in the sacred writings of the faith, and know-
ledge is to be sought even in heathen lands. The
"Hadith"\(^1\) says, "To be instructed is the chief
duty of every Moslem. Whosoever seeks knowledge
is more loved by God than one who fights in a holy
war. The one who instructs the ignorant is like
unto a living man among the dead. It is sacrilege
to prohibit science. Science is the life of Islam, the
column of the faith. Study is preferable to worship.
Go and seek instruction, even if you have to go as
far as China".

It is quite impossible to go fully into the religious
and political system of Islam. I have only en-
deavoured to give a broad but none the less accurate
outline of the men and women of Egypt, with a side-
light on their religion, in order that the European
reader might understand that the people of Egypt
who are struggling for self-government, are not
"semi-barbarous", but are a people not so far
behind the Europeans in what is termed Western
civilisation.

\(^1\) The Hadith is the sacred legal book of Islam.
CHAPTER XXI

MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMIL

THE Firman of the Sultan of Turkey, 27 March, 1892, confirming the succession of Abbas II in the Khediviate, declares that:

"All Egyptians are Ottoman subjects".
"All Taxes to be levied in the Sultan's name".
"The Khedive possesses no right to make political treaties with Foreign States. Commercial Conventions may be made. Any matters relating to the internal administration are in the hands of the Khedive".
"The Khedive cannot abandon the territorial rights of the Sultan".
"The Army shall not exceed 18,000 men. But the Egyptian Army may be ordered to fight for the Sultan and be increased at his pleasure".
"The Khedive cannot construct warships".
"The Turkish flag to be the Egyptian flag".
"The Khedive may grant the rank of Colonel and that of Sanieh (second class Bey) to civil officials, but cannot confer any higher titles".
"The coinage of Egypt to be issued in the Sultan's name".

This Firman conclusively proves that Egypt is the property of the Sultan. England's stay in Egypt is therefore by force of arms, and not by established right; and although the Fashoda declaration fore-
MUSTAPHA PASHA KAMIL
FOUNDER OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST PARTY
shadowed her subsequent intentions, for that reason the agitation in the interests of autonomy has been directed against England by the Nationalist party: that party has never lost sight of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. In other words, whilst an anti-English agitation was being carried on in Egypt, the Nationalist leaders were making their peace with the Sultan, as they knew there could be no separate nationality or autonomous Government without his aid. They have never disputed his authority, and although they would not countenance Turkish occupation as a substitute for that of England, they have never suggested the repudiation of the Sultan’s suzerain rights.

I have set forth in a previous chapter a few of the main causes which led up to the revival of Nationalism, but a leader was wanted who not only knew Europe, but also possessed the capacity for organising. The reason which made a specially qualified individual of this kind necessary is to be found in the fact that there was a lack of unity amongst the various elements of Egyptian disaffection. The Sheykh Ali Yousseff of the El-Azhar, at the head of a small body of Constitutionalists, was educating the people through the pages of his journal, “El Moayyad”, which at that time had a large circulation throughout the Moslem world; but although a Nationalist he was rather moderate in his views. In those early days of bitterness, when there was an incessant duel between “El Moayyad” and the pro-English “Mokkatom”, he not infrequently came in conflict with Lord Cromer; but after the advent of Mustapha Kamil, the Sheykh gradually retired into his shell, and history seemed to be repeating itself; for even as Sultan Pasha had
turned on Arabi, Ali Yousseff for the most part turned on Kamil, and the motive was identical—jealousy. There was also a bunch of political dreamers who called themselves the Liberal party: this party talked learnedly and considered its pronouncements oracular, but did nothing, and the English political element encouraged that body to continue inactive, by convincing it that Egypt was not yet ripe for self-government. The Britishers also sowed discord by taking the Copts under their official wing, and thus by separating the various elements of Egyptian society disunion was created, even as the English had done in India; yet it is quite certain, that when the day arrives that Indians of all classes shall sink their religious differences in the interests of the common weal of a united India, that day will be England's last in Asia.

Now the leader for whom Egypt waited at length arrived in the person of Mustapha Kamil. This young man was educated at Toulouse, where he won his licentiate in law in 1895, at the age of twenty-one.

He had previously written a pamphlet on "The Egyptian Peril", in which the arguments against British rule were both lucid and convincing. This pamphlet supplied the medium for an introduction to Madame Juliette Adam, the editress of the "Nouvelle Revue", who was well known to be in sympathy, not alone with Egyptian independence, but also with the universal freedom of mankind.

Through Madame Adam's kindly offices, Kamil was introduced to Pierre Loti, and later to Colonel Marchand, Ernest Judet, and others well known to the political and literary world of France. He was also brought into contact by her influence with the French Press "which", in her own words, "he has
very cleverly known how to interest in his noble cause. He has been able, moreover, later, marvelously to utilise the situation he made for himself in Paris to gain influence in Austria, in Germany, and even in England". She further states of him that "Mustapha Kamil had in his intelligence nothing chimerical. His practical sense was, sometimes overwhelming, for he mixed with it the clearest perception of the future".¹

We find him in June, 1897, at the age of twenty-three, holding a monster demonstration at Cairo, which delegates to the number of two thousand attended, arriving from all parts of the provinces. Political events were moving quickly now that Kamil had put his shoulder to the wheel. In 1898 the British Fashoda pronouncement had given him an opportunity to make his presence felt. Observing the condition of Egyptian education he founded the Nationalist School, which was supported entirely by voluntary subscriptions, and had an attendance of three hundred pupils within twelve months of its foundation. Of course, there were more demonstrations, and by this time his following became so great that the Government organs began to sing Kamil’s praises.

"El Lewa" was launched in 1900, and jumped into instantaneous popularity.

Several conversations subsequently took place between Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and himself at Constantinople; and Abdul Hamid, seeing in Mustapha a staunch upholder of Islam and Turkish

¹ This was written after Mustapha Kamil’s death, and Madame Adam had met too many brilliant men in her time to rhapsodise over mediocrity. I mention this fact because the English official conspirator would have the British public believe that Kamil was a superficial, empty-headed agitator.
suzerainty in Egypt, made him a Pasha in 1904, when Kamil was but thirty years of age. This was a great honour for one so young, who was largely dependent upon his own energies to be allowed to make patriotic bricks without the needful financial straw. Subscriptions, however, poured in, and many influential Egyptians, including Princes of the Khe-divial house, Mohammed Farid Bey and Omar Bey Sultan, undoubtedly contributed largely to the war-chest; moreover, in due course, Mustapha Kamil became actively connected with the Court, and success seemed to attend his every effort. Unfortunately during the early days of his propaganda, his brother Ali,¹ who had been an officer in the Egyptian army, was reduced to the ranks, being compelled to go through the entire Soudan campaign as a common soldier. This punishment was not only due to his own Nationalist opinions, which it is to be feared were too freely expressed to suit the British officers, but it would appear from the evidence I hold, that Kamil’s success with the work he had in hand resulted in further indignity and insult to Ali at the hands of the British military authorities, in the interests of “discipline”.

At this point it may be as well to comment upon the frequently circulated question, “Who are the Egyptians?” ²

In the preceding chapter I endeavoured to set forth who and what are the inhabitants of the Nile Valley. I omitted, however, to state that according to the claims of European writers, the Copts are the

¹ Ali Kamil is the present Vice-President of the Egyptian Nationalist party.
² I am, myself, a cross between Arab and Ethiopian, my mother being a Nubian or full-blooded Negress—the two human elements most despised and underrated by European ethnologists.
only real Gypts or Egyptians. It is further stated that the Nationalist leaders are neither the real article, nor have they a stake in the country.

I am quite ready to grant that the Copts are the legitimate descendants of the subjects of the Pharaohs, and that the fellaheen for the most part migrated from the Arabian country; but both Copt and Arab are from the same original stock. It were as idiotic to argue, that because the people of Britain have at one time or another been conquered by Pict, Scot, Dane, Roman, Saxon, and Norman, who being warriors brought no women with them, which resulted in the production of hybrid stock, that there are no real Britons but the Welsh. This is the class of argument adduced by these great thinkers, who, finding themselves beaten at every turn, fall back upon such inane contentions wherewith to uphold a system of obvious injustice. These writers who bring forward such arguments were the very people to laud such "Egyptian" statesmen as Nubar Pasha and Riaz Pasha, the one an Armenian and the other of Jewish origin. It is also claimed that Mohammed Farid Bey, Mustapha Kamil's successor, is a Jew and not an Egyptian, and that the Sheykh Shawish Abdul Aziz is a Tunisian. But of the two Syrian Christians who run the "Mokkatam" in the interest and support of the Occupation, we hear never a word. Have these English writers so soon forgotten that Disraeli was a Jew, and that the members of the ancient Tory Aristocracy of England did not consider it beneath their dignity to serve under his banner? And even in England to-day, are there not German administrators and German financiers holding British titles and doing British work? But why pursue the subject? These facts
are obvious to any one who troubles to look into the subject. The great difficulty is to be found in the rush and hurry of modern life. Men are too busy to investigate. They accept the garbled statements of "half-baked" literary (?) individuals who write "history" or supply "copy" to the sensational section of the English Press; they build up a reputation for "authoritativeness", and the superficial reader is egregiously fooled into the acceptance of their valueless and totally misleading vapourings.

It was because Mustapha Kamil took the measure of these gentry that he has been vilified. He knew them for what they were, and they feared him for his knowledge and ability, and envied him his success. They knew he could take good care of himself and the cause he represented, and that he had the ear of the European Press; therefore during his lifetime they were rather careful of their attacks, for one or two of the biggest of them have received a severe trouncing at his hands.

He attracted and attached the Student class to him because he favoured educational advancement. In this way he was to Egypt what Ferrer was to Spain; for he knew that for Egypt there could be no political advancement where there was a lack of education. For instance, here is an example of the knowledge required of candidates for the post of teachers in the village primary schools (Kuttabs), copied from the "Official Journal" as late as September last:—

"The candidate must be between seventeen and twenty-two years of age. The examination will consist of:—First papers: Dictation of an easy passage. Caligraphy. *Naskh* and *Rikaa*, Arithmetic, up to ordinary and decimal fractions and the coinage and weights of Egypt. Second: *Viva voce*. Recitation
and Tagwid of the Koran. Religious principles of Islam. Reading and commentary of one of the books used in the fourth year in the Kuttabs.

The teacher is therefore not expected to know history of any kind, geography, geometry, natural sciences, not even sanitation. It must not be forgotten, however, that there is an expensive English "Adviser" to the Ministry of Public Instruction. And what is true of the village primary school also applies to higher (!) education.

There is not at present a highly qualified European tutor in Egypt. Mr. Dunlop was appointed Adviser to the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1906, and he at once took in hand the schools of law, medicine, and engineering, introducing a whole herd of British incompetents. M. Lambert, the Director of the Khedivial Law School, whom Mr. Dunlop found in office, was thrust forth to make room for a Mr. Hill, who was transferred from teaching history at the Khedivial School to the Professorship of Roman Law. This appointee of Mr. Dunlop's had not yet obtained his degree, and although holding office, was forced to continue his studies at the École de Droit, Paris, where he subsequently passed his examination—after a second try! The deposed M. Lambert, on the other hand, was offered the vacant chair of Law at the University of Lyons by the French Government, which is sufficient evidence of his ability; his English successor, on the other hand, was quite unacquainted with the Egyptian legal code. 1 A Mr. Young, the proud possessor of a literary certificate, was appointed by Mr. Dunlop to teach chemistry, but was subsequently transferred to the Survey Department!

1 The whole of the scheme adopted to get rid of M. Lambert will be found in the "Temps," 17 July, 1907.
One more of these very capable "Professors" held a diploma in science which "qualified" him to teach English literature. He was also transferred to try his 'prentice, but none the less competent hand, at Finance in the Financial Ministry. Arabic has been excluded from the Khedivial and other high schools, English being substituted, and in some instances French. Scientific subjects are, however, taught in Arabic at Beirut; and the Arab science and culture of the Middle Ages gives the lie to the excuse that there are no text-books in the language. The fact is the teachers are incompetent, and the standard is lowered to meet their mental incapacity.¹

Since 1897 teachers for higher educational institutions have been called upon to pass three examinations, in Arabic—(1) the elementary examination; (2) the honours, carrying a prize of £50; and (3) the advanced with a £100 prize attached. A record covering the period of thirteen years, 1897-1910, shows that 154 Europeans (mainly British) have passed the elementary; thirteen the advanced; and one the honours! And Sir Edward Grey blandly tells us that the British Government are training the Egyptians in the arts of government. If the blind lead the blind there is no doubt about them both ultimately arriving at the bottom of the ditch.

The monumental incapacity existing in the Ministry of Public Instruction is characteristic of the entire Anglicised Egyptian bureaucratic system. Thorough reorganisation is required in every department if the English intend prolonging their stay; for it is quite impossible for English teachers or officials to instruct Egyptians, either in education or in the arts.

¹ See reply of Sir Edward Grey to Mr. J. M. Robertson in the House of Commons, 21 February, 1907.
of government, unless they possess a full knowledge of the vernacular.

It is as absurd to expect efficiency from such sources as it would be for a Frenchman, with no knowledge of English, to endeavour to teach an untutored Englishman French literature.

These grievances are real and long-standing, and it was surely no matter for surprise that they should be attacked by Mustapha Kamil and the Nationalist Press.

Of course, the average individual will say that it is quite easy to attack and criticise evils; but as I have already pointed out, Kamil not only attacked the evil, but he tried to remedy it by establishing a school, which by taking the matter at the root and building a sure foundation, made for the advancement of educational conditions.

Early in January, 1905, on the anniversary of the Khedive's accession to the throne of Egypt, Mustapha Kamil announced in the "Journal du Caire" his desire to found a National University which should bear the name of Mehemet Ali. Prince Haidar not only offered to assist the idea financially, but also wrote an article in its support to the same journal. The Princes Halim also took an active interest, and Hussein Wassif Pasha wrote offering to subscribe £E1000 on the day a committee was formed to open the national subscription list. Omar Bey Sultan also promised a similar sum, £8000 being subscribed by the end of May. This laudable undertaking did not receive the support of Lord Cromer, who was of the opinion that "manifestly some little time must elapse before the scheme can be realised". After diverting the national subscription for a University by a counter-agitation in favour of the Kuttab, he
further advised them to study the history of Universities of other countries, and that they "should also endeavour to educate the Egyptians generally towards an intellectual grasp of what are the real objects which they have in view".1 This is the kind of official encouragement the Egyptians have obtained from England. Lots of good "advice".

The Nationalists, however, proceeded to obtain subscriptions notwithstanding Lord Cromer's cold douche of "sympathetic" platitudes; and when it was found that they were really going to succeed in the face of English opposition and discouragement, Sir Eldon Gorst, by granting the necessary sums for the University, took it out of the hands of the Nationalists, and opened it under the control of the Government at the end of 1908.

The Adviser to the Department of Public Instruction was therefore granted another opportunity of degrading what the Nationalists intended to be a high-class University, worthy of the educational traditions of Egypt, into a second-rate high school; even as the once famous Khedivial School of Law has been debased, where French Jurists of eminence have been replaced by degreeless English substitutes. The young Egyptians, to the number of six hundred, who require the higher education must needs go to Europe or to Syria to obtain it; and the Kuttabs, for which Lord Cromer showed such a touching solicitude in 1907, have been turned into mangers and agricultural storehouses by the village Omdehs.

In November, 1906, a National Limited Company was formed by Kamil with a capital of £E20,000, for the purpose of founding two journals, "L'Etendard Egyptien", written entirely in French, which made

1 "Egypt, No. 1" (1907), p. 95.
its initial appearance as an evening paper on 3 March, 1907, and "The Egyptian Standard", printed entirely in English, appearing on the morning of the same day. Thus the energetic Mustapha Kamil, although constitutionally weak, had undertaken the control of three journals in three different languages—a work even that brilliant orator and journalist, Abdullah Nadim of the "Taif" newspaper, which existed during the regime of the Arabists, would scarcely have undertaken.

It will be observed that Kamil was carrying all before him; Madame Adam, Pierre Loti, and a host of others well known to French literature, had written articles for "L'Etendard Egyptien", and these papers from their inception seemed to go extremely well. Speaking of Madame Adam reminds me of an incident which followed her visit to Egypt in January, 1904, at the pressing invitation of both the Khedive and Mustapha Kamil. Madame Adam, as a distinguished Frenchwoman and a friend of the Khedive's, was naturally fêted by the Egyptians. She had written an article, "France and Egypt", which was translated by Kamil and published in "El Lewa" early in March, 1904; this was followed by "Young Egypt", another article from her pen which had previously appeared in the "Gaulois" of 1 March, and had been translated by Mustapha and published in his paper. These articles being anti-English immediately set Egypt in an uproar, and irritated the Occupationists. The British, therefore, first instigated the Greek editor of an Anglophile journal written in French, called "Le Progrès", to write a scurrilous article against Madame Adam, the Khedive and Kamil, in which it was claimed that the Khedive had always been influenced by his
entourage, and that he was quite ignorant of the international complications which might issue from his too flattering reception of the Anglophile writer, Madame Adam. It further threatened the Khedive with an English Adviser at the Court to direct him in the way that became his exalted station. On the day following the appearance of this article, the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon His Highness at the Abdin Palace and informed the Khedive that Lord Cromer was in a towering rage over his late indiscretion. They had barely completed the statement when his Lordship put in an appearance. He forthwith began to complain of the Khedive's lack of tact and bad taste in receiving Madame Adam, and declared it to be a direct provocation to England; he also indulged in the usual diplomatic twaddle specially reserved for such occasions.

The Khedive, with admirable coolness, informed the Earl that he had known Madame Adam for about eight years, that he had been invited to her house in Paris, that such hospitality as he extended to the Frenchwoman was a duty on his part towards a friend of his grandfather's, and that he was astonished to see an act of courtesy and politeness so badly understood by the English. His Lordship could not well reply; so he turned to the ever-burning question of Mustapha Kamil, informing the Khedive that his connection with Kamil was most injurious to the Occupation, and that it was inexplicable why His Highness should extend such friendship to the greatest enemy of England in Egypt.

The Khedive answered, that owing to the attacks of the Anglophile Press he would always have need of not one, but several Mustapha Kamics, and that it was
perfectly ridiculous on the part of the newspapers attached to the Occupation to treat him as a youth after twelve years of reign, thirty years of age, and six children.

Lord Cromer having no answer to this, the incident was closed—for the time being. There was, however, an official communication from the British Foreign Office admonishing the Khedive and requesting him not to do it again, as such receptions to eminent and avowed enemies of England were most displeasing to the powers at Downing Street.

Subsequent to the above incident the "Pet of the Consulates", Riaz Pasha, rather put his foot in it.

The foundation-stone of the Mehemet Ali Industrial School was being laid in Alexandria during May, and old Riaz was put up to make a speech, which, to say the least, was by no means happy. Imagine an unprepossessing, thin, short, delicate-looking individual with a rasping voice, devoid of dignity, being thrust forward as the spokesman on behalf of the Occupation. He eulogised Lord Cromer and everything English before Khedive and people.

The occasion was a national fête, inasmuch as the people had subscribed the money for the foundation of the school, and this occasion of all others was selected for poor old Riaz to deliver his paean on English rule and native subjugation.

The English Press, whilst mildly defending him, bewailed his clumsiness, and the entire Native Press were, of course, on his trail; on 8 June, also at Alexandria, before some four thousand people, Kamil delivered his counterblast to Riaz's speech.

It could not be expected that matters should continue in this way. Kamil's connection with the Palace was doing the Khedive incalculable injury
with the English administration. It therefore followed that one of two things was bound to happen: either Kamil would have to abandon his agitation, or he would be forced to sever his relations with the Palace. The former he would not do, because he saw that he had succeeded in stirring up the entire European Press in the interests of his cause, the columns of the best journals being opened to him; and the last straw laid on the Occupation was a rather lengthy interview with Mustapha Kamil in the "Berliner Tageblatt" of 4 October, 1904, in which the entire Mussulman question from the Egyptian standpoint was discussed, and Kamil declared that "the liberty of the Egyptians would remain their delenda Carthago". From Berlin he went on to Budapest, and thence to Constantinople, where the Grand Vizier granted him an interview, and the highest state personages accorded him a most flattering welcome. Meanwhile, the anti-Nationalist Press were inventing all kinds of wild stories, the most important of which was the statement that Kamil was using the Khedivial authority, not only to serve his own ends, but also to eventually supplant Abbas in the Khediviate. In order to establish this calumny his frequent visits to Constantinople were pointed out, and also his statements in the European Press, which they claimed to be sufficient evidence that he was consolidating his power by letting it be understood that he was the first man in Egypt.

There was no doubt that history was repeating itself—with a difference. Arabi was considered the master of the situation in 1882; and twenty years after Mustapha Kamil had established for himself a similar position in Egyptian affairs. There was, however, this difference: whilst Arabi was un-
educated and devoid of administrative ability, Kamil possessed both of these characteristics in a marked degree; and whereas Tewfik was jealous of Arabi, Abbas Hilmi treated Kamil’s efforts on behalf of an autonomous Egypt with consideration, and there can be little doubt that Hilmi had no intention of making the same mistake his father had made in 1882; for notwithstanding the fact that Lord Cromer "had to write telegrams and dispatches about the most miscellaneous subjects—about the dismissal of the Khedive’s English coachman . . ."; and "had to interfere . . . in order to prevent a female member of the Khedivial family from striking her husband over the mouth with a slipper";— he certainly treated the Khedive Hilmi to a few rather nasty and seemingly unnecessary doses of humiliation, and gave him little encouragement in the direction of autonomous government. What manner of man is this Khedive? you ask. A studious but none the less energetic man, representing to Egypt what the late King Edward meant to England. A country gentleman in his Palace at Kubbeh, even as the late King when at Sandringham. He found the estate, which dates from the time of Ibrahim Pasha, with a rather small building. He erected a huge palace on the property, with extensive out-buildings and a magnificent garden constructed by M. Andre, France’s famous landscape gardener. The Khedive has founded his own private school on the estate, where all his servants and employees are given a course of study extending over a period of five years, after which they are distributed over the Khedive’s extensive properties. The teachers being specially

selected by the Khedive himself, the highest possible degree of efficiency is maintained; and for the purpose the instruction is intended to serve, it is far in advance of any of the Egyptian educational establishments of the same class.

The Palace at Montazah is the Palace where the Khedive retires into strict privacy. This place, at one time a veritable wilderness of sand-dunes, has been transformed by the Khedive into a perfect Aladdin's garden. On this estate is an extensive joiner's shop and sawmill, where all the woodwork, whether doors, windows, or Arabic carvings, for the Palaces and properties are made. He has proved himself an excellent example to the Egyptians in point of religion and industry. He neither drinks, smokes, nor gambles. His Mariout Railway between Alexandria and Tripoli is a purely private enterprise: it joins up Alexandria with the Bedouin caravan route to Tripoli, little known to travellers, but dotted during the time of the Romans with important villages and townships. The construction of this railway is in itself a sufficient monument to the industry and enterprise of the Khedive.

But to return to Mustapha Kamil; upon his arrival at Cairo from Constantinople on 24 October, 1904, he at once dispatched a letter to the Khedive severing his relations with the Palace. The Press was divided in opinion as regarded the cause of the rupture. But there need be little doubt that Kamil made an irreparable personal sacrifice, when he surrendered the patronage of Hilmi in the best interests of the Prince and the cause he, Kamil, represented. Thenceforward Mustapha Pasha stood alone; the sole champion of the rights and liberties of the people of Egypt.
CHAPTER XXII

LORD CROMER

Whether because he was conscious of the existence of a rather artificial claim to Fame's chaplet, or whether having built for himself a monument of somewhat spurious greatness, which he feared some Oriental possessing the requisite ability might one day demolish, I cannot say; but suffice it, Lord Cromer in stating that "an Oriental arguing from the same premises as a European will arrive at an opposite conclusion," and "his reasoning is of the most slip-shod description," not only disarms Oriental criticism but, to put it mildly, considerably disconcerts one who, "in a merry sport", would fain examine the somewhat widely advertised pretensions of the Norfolk noble.

I do not pretend to possess either those qualifications essential to him who would destroy that halo of glory which surrounds the great ex-proconsul, or the requisite ability to demolish the before-mentioned administrative superstructure of greatness. At the same time I must admit that his Lordship's strictures have placed me at a disadvantage in the attempt to pass his regime in review which I intend to make; because I shall be compelled to "arrive at an opposite conclusion" with regard to his claim to be the regenerator of Egypt,


287
which everyone,¹ including himself,² has considered so superlatively extraordinary. Should I succeed, I shall help to prove his contention by arriving at an opposite conclusion.

I am quite aware that it is no very difficult operation to criticise—critics being ready-made. I also admit that it is much easier to demolish than to construct; but it is because this nobleman has been considered by his contemporaries to be the Alpha and Omega of administrative reform in Egypt that I attempt the examination of his claims, in spite of having arrived at an opposite conclusion to those who have argued from the same premises.

Now, the literary mill of England has been turning out all manner of statements with regard to the hopeless financial condition of Egypt, at, and just prior to the advent of the English; and in order to enhance his Lordship’s marvellous financial and administrative achievements, comparisons have been drawn between the results of his efforts and the state of the country during the late years of Ismail’s reign. Thus, in 1885, we find him saying, “The degree of success which has so far attended the efforts to reform the Egyptian administration will be differently judged, according to the standard of comparison which is adopted. The only fair standard to my mind is to compare the state of things now with that which existed only a few years ago in Egypt”.³ These comparisons were subsequently copied by his subordinates; for Mr. F. S. Clarke afterwards wrote, “In order to trace what improvement has taken place, I propose to examine the conditions of the peasants during the last years of Ismail’s reign”.⁴

These comparisons, like many other official statements which latter-day historians accept without challenge, and publish without examination, lend a superficial appearance of fairness to their arguments, but are not borne out by the facts. Ismail's reign, although by no means ideal, when judged by Western standards, was certainly better than any then existing in the Mohammedan East; and the last years of his reign subsequent to 1876 were not his reign at all; at any rate as far as the administration of the finances of the country was concerned; because Mr. Cave had not only made his report on the finances of Egypt at this date, but Sir Rivers Wilson had already been "'recommended' to the Khedive for the reorganisation of the financial department".\(^1\) Besides, "The Times" correspondent wrote as late as 6 January, 1876, "Egypt is a marvellous instance of progress. She has advanced as much in seventy years as many other countries have done in five hundred";\(^2\) and a recognised authority on Egypt also said, "The truth is, that the improvements in public works begun and completed in Egypt during the past twelve years have been marvellous, unequalled by any other country".\(^3\)

Therefore, inasmuch as the Goschen-Joubert decree established the Dual Control in 1876, which was consolidated by the formation of the European Ministry in August, 1878, it can hardly be considered fair to compare this period with that of 1885.\(^4\)

---

4. While this work was passing through the press, a volume by Theodore Rothstein, entitled "Egypt's Ruin," has made its appearance. The entire financial situation of Egypt is dealt with in that work in a lucid and concise manner, and deserves the attention of those interested in the subject.
Then there was the short period between 1880 and 1882 when the coupon, dominating the administration as it did, had engendered sacrifices beneficial to the administration, and financial instability had been greatly reduced by the Law of Liquidation. The Controllers had succeeded in restoring financial equilibrium as early as 1881, because they were enabled to show a surplus of £800,000; and the Cherif Ministry of 1882 approved a Budget which was also estimated to yield a surplus; for, whilst the revenue was estimated at £8,746,000, the expenditure was not to exceed £8,463,000; 1 Lord Cromer, therefore, only continued what the Dual Control began. That he did this work efficiently there can be little doubt; but the man who successfully works a mine discovered, and previously worked by some one else, cannot well be entitled to all the credit. An examination of Lord Dufferin's report 2 conclusively proves that the financial outlook was neither gloomy nor desperate; because he clearly showed that the land-tax, varying as it did from 16s. to £1 12s. the feddan, did not cripple the resources of the land in the Nile Valley, as it yielded an income ranging from £15 to £30. Nevertheless the Arabi "revolt", like any other military upheaval, entailed additional expenditure, and necessitated sacrifices calculated to upset the financial equilibrium of Egypt, as it would equally have done that of any country dependent upon agriculture for its maintenance; yet like other agricultural countries—and in this matter Egypt is specially favoured by its fertility—it possessed undeniable powers of speedy recuperation. Nor was this all: England herself

1 "Egypt," No. 5 (1883), p. 78.
2 Ibid., No. 6 (1883), p. 62.
helped to upset Egyptian financial equilibrium by loading the already overtaxed Exchequer of Egypt with her own military expenditure, in accordance with her programme of restoring order in the Khedive's dominions; by the vain attempt to recover the Soudan from the Dervishes, who, in the words of Mr. Gladstone, were "rightly struggling for their freedom"; and by the payment of indemnities, to the tune of £4,250,000, to those who had suffered loss through the burning of Alexandria. Small wonder, therefore, that the Budget of 1883 showed a deficit of £600,000. English Consular misrepresentation brought about English intervention, and the expenses entailed by reason of this intervention produced financial instability. Yet, although this intervention was in the interests of the European bondholders, the Egyptian taxpayer was the sufferer; consequently at the end of 1884, the cost of the British Provost-Marshal, in Egypt, amounted to £7,800,000, which, on Lord Cromer's showing, meant the formation of a new floating debt. It is in this wise that the subsequent financial achievements of Lord Cromer have acquired such immense value; and he himself has carefully nursed the idea that his reforming began when the finances of the country were hopelessly complicated; and the public, blindly accepting this erroneous view, have thrown up their hats and shouted themselves hoarse in honour of this heaven-sent financial genius. "It would be difficult", he wrote in 1899, "to exaggerate the ruin which would have overtaken, not only the population of Egypt, but all who are interested in Egyptian affairs, if the regime of the pre-reforming

1 Vide ante, Chap. IX.
2 "Egypt," No. 28 (1884), p. 53.
days had been allowed to continue but a few years longer. Improvements in the system of irrigation"—I think we will pause at irrigation for a moment. Has irrigation done all that Lord Cromer and his subordinates have claimed for it? In the pre-reforming days—although "semi-barbarous" as he calls them, there was practically no cotton-worm to destroy the crops, there were also better crops than those obtained in these reforming days. Not only is this the case, but the present cotton, although whiter than the bamia cotton of the pre-reforming days, is not so productive; the bamia cotton crops were enormous, inasmuch as twelve Kantars 1 could easily be taken from a feddan. At that time the fellahaen made the best of the limited water supply at his disposal, the land was ploughed up twice or thrice, and was properly baked through by the sun, thus killing the cotton-worm. On the other hand, in these reforming days, irrigation works having given the fellahaen abundance of water, he floods the land, which becomes water-logged; and in his haste to take three or even four crops off the land, it is ploughed up twice or thrice as of yore; but all in eight to fourteen days, so that the land has no time to get baked, and the cotton-worm increases and multiplies. 2 This is what Lord Cromer calls "giving Nature a chance". 3 Under the excellent modern conditions the cotton-worm destroys the crops, and an average of only two Kantars is the present yield to the feddan, against the twelve of the "semi-barbarous pre-reforming days".

"The appreciable fiscal relief", he continues... "and generally the substitution of a civilised in place

---

1 One Kantar is equal to 99'05 lb.
2 See further remarks on this subject in the next chapter.
of a repressive and semi-barbarous administrative policy have conjointly enabled Egypt to bear the strain. I have no hesitation in saying that, but for these changes, the Egyptian Treasury would before now have been hopelessly insolvent, and that the condition of the people would have been in all respects deplorable". All this in spite of the Budget surplus standing at £800,000 in 1881, under a "semi-barbarous" Government, and Lord Dufferin declaring that although the land-tax varied from 16s. to £1 12s. the feddan, the income ranged from £15 to £30.

The Egyptian, says Lord Cromer, "will contradict himself half a dozen times before he has finished a story". It would appear that the Egyptian does not possess a monopoly in contradiction, as will be gathered from the following passage:

"The financial success", he said, just prior to his departure from Egypt, "is, indeed, mainly due to the remarkable recuperative power of the country and the industry of the inhabitants. The only merit the Government can claim is that, in contradistinction to the former rulers, they have given Nature a chance, and hence in some degree aided her efforts". It therefore follows that "the substitution of a civilised in place of an oppressive and semi-barbarous administrative policy", which "conjointly enabled Egypt to bear the strain", in 1884, resolved itself into the stupendous effort of having "given Nature a chance" in 1907. It is greatly to be feared that, as we are told a man is known by his company, his Lordship's contradiction of himself must have resulted from his frequent intercourse with the contradictory Egyptian. I have, however, previously shown that

2 "Egypt," No. 1 (1907), p. 58. (Italics mine.)
Nature has not had a chance; hence the cotton-worm, and the reduction in the enormous cotton yield of the "semi-barbarous" days.

But how does Lord Cromer explain the chance that was given to Nature? "By striking off the shackles which formerly fettered the action of the whole population" Nature was given a chance. "A high degree of prosperity was attained", and behold! The touch of the whip of the financial jockey has suddenly transformed the circus performance into one of those beautiful volumes constructed by Hans Andersen to quicken juvenile understanding.

This is how Nature was given a chance. The Budget of 1884 promised a surplus of £400,000, which had to be devoted to the redemption of stock according to the Law of Liquidation. It will be remembered I pointed out in these pages that a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the finances of the country, and the British Government ordered a report to be drawn up on the results of the administration subsequent to the settlement by the Commission of Liquidation in 1880. Lord Cromer sat on this Commission. This financial statement was sent to the Great Powers on 22 April, 1884, with a circular dispatch inviting them to a Conference in London. The report received by Lord Granville contained some most elaborate proposals, in which a loan of £8,000,000 at 4½ per cent was to be negotiated for the purpose of settling the floating debt, and at the same time add another £350,000 to the already overburdened Egyptian Treasury. As this is not a Blue Book, it is quite unnecessary to perplex the reader with a whole string of financial details; suffice it to

1 "Egypt," No. 1 (1906).  2 Vide Appendix 2, at the end of this volume.  3 Vide ante, pp. 158-60.
say, that at that period the most rigid economic administration resulted in a permanent Budget deficit of £376,000, with no distinction between the "assigned" and "non-assigned" revenue. The report, however, set forth that "we have assumed that the surplus on the assigned revenues will be devoted to administrative expenditure, and not as heretofore to the purchase of Unified Stock on the market. If this be not assumed the result would be to increase heavily the normal deficit, and also the floating debt at the end of 1884". They therefore proposed that no such distinction ought to be made; and in accordance with this surprising proposal, Lord Cromer, with the consent of the British Government, took the important step of suspending the funding of the public debt; applying the money to the pressing needs of the administration, which raised a storm of diplomatic protests from the representatives of Germany, France, Austria, and Russia.

Therefore, the Law of 1880, which the English considered most vital to the bondholders, the special provisions of that Law, which had aroused a protesting Egyptian nation, were now to be set aside by the very people who had instituted it; because they now found the Law opposed to the interests of their administrators, and not because of the Egyptians' protests of 1880. Even by altering the Law, they could not rid themselves of that deficit of £375,000, so the expedient of reducing all former debt by \( \frac{1}{2} \) per cent was suggested. A similar proposal was made by the floundering Ismail, which the British Government would not consider, because it was not in the interests of the financial harpies who had already received, in usurious interest, at

1 "Egypt," No. 28 (1884).
least 75 per cent of the original loan; and Ismail's request led to intervention in the finances of the country, which proved the thin edge of the subsequent Occupation wedge. In 1880 a reduction of $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent of the interest of the whole debt would have saved the Egyptians from subsequent suffering; but Britain was not then responsible for the financial administration of the country. Lord Dufferin did not consider the outlook by any means gloomy in 1883. The Powers, who were called to the London Conference in 1884 to revise the Law of Liquidation, by which the new scheme proposed the reduction of $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent interest, had to be "sentimentally" impressed. The honour of the British administration in Egypt was at stake. France, on receiving the invitation, took the opportunity of no longer contesting the abolition of the Dual Control, but she also wanted "an explanation as to Great Britain's plans concerning pacification and future government in Egypt."

What was to be done? Some extraordinary effort must be made. The poor down-trodden fellah!—"poor fellah"; he was, indeed, in more ways than one! Sir Edgar Vincent journeyed to Upper Egypt, and returned to paint in lurid colours "the wretchedness of the peasantry there... surpassing anything he had seen in other countries". The land-tax "must be reduced if it is to be collected regularly".¹

But France wanted to know something about the future government of Egypt. So the great Sultan Pasha, who had helped to betray his country into the hands of England, was approached, and he said, "the state of the country has never been so bad... it would be impossible to expect much more

¹ "Egypt," No. 31 (1884), p. 20.
than half the produce in the land-tax in the ensuing year".¹ Nubar Pasha, who had lent his little help to intervention by negotiating loans for his master Ismail in Europe, spoke in the same strain,² not forgetting to mention "the peasantry were still in the grip of the money-lenders". He had helped to bring the thing to pass. Sir Scott Moncrieff of the Public Works reported "that the state of the country was sufficient to arouse great anxiety", and that some of the most costly branches of the administration existed³ in the interests of the bondholders and not of the country. Notwithstanding this mass of evidence on behalf of the "poor fellah," who had suddenly become the centre of interest to British officialdom because they hoped he would extricate them from their financial dilemma, France would have none of it, and pointed out that only a few months previously England and her officials had drawn a totally different picture. There was also that wonderful dispatch of Lord Granville's dated 23 July, 1882,⁴ when the invasion of Egypt was the only thing the British Foreign Office could see; and wherein his Lordship informed M. de Freycinet, that first-hand and authoritative information led him to the conclusion that, "if order could be restored before the end of August the recovery of prosperity in Egypt would be surprising; but that if anarchy was allowed to continue during October and November, the ruin of the country would probably be complete." The battle of Tel-el-Kebir was fought on 13 September. The anarchy of 1882 showed a Budget surplus of £400,000. "The restoration of order" produced a permanent deficit of £376,000.

¹ "Egypt," No. 25 (1884), pp. 73-4. ² Ibid., No. 31 (1884), p. 6. ³ Ibid., No. 31 (1884), p. 5. ⁴ Ibid., No. 17 (1882), p. 199.
Because of the unhappy state of the peasantry, Ismail had vainly pleaded for a few months' grace to pay off the coupon. On similar grounds civilised British administration in Egypt took a leaf from the book of the "semi-barbarous Ismail", laying violent hands upon the money which was intended to discharge Egypt's financial obligations. The result of this depredation has been recorded in this work. Lord Cromer himself states that he meant to seize the Tribute, but that being already pledged to British holders of the Ottoman bonds, Lord Northbrook rejected the proposal.

The Northbrook mission is described elsewhere. He however did not take such a pessimistic view of the situation as did Lord Cromer.

The Powers, with the active interposition of France, having withheld their consent to the new financial scheme, | Lord Cromer, finding both the political and financial aspect of the British administration in Egypt in jeopardy, once again, proceeded to inundate the British Foreign Office with more pathetic consular evidences of the condition of the peasant. He also proceeded to squeeze the peasant in the interests of "civilisation" and taxation, in the same manner as the fellah had been squeezed under the "semi-barbarous and oppressive regime of his former rulers", for although the debts contracted before the war of 1882 had been recovered, considerable pressure had been required to collect the instalments.

Not one word was said about the condition of the peasantry, and the low state of the Egyptian Treasury.

2 Ibid., No. 1 (1885), p. 48.
3 Vide Chap. XV.
4 "Egypt," No. 1 (1885), p. 49.
5 Ibid., No. 15 (1884), p. 94.
being the results of English burdens brought about by intervention, and the cost of the maintenance of the army of Occupation.

At two distinct periods during 1884, Sir Edgar Vincent confessed that the Egyptian Government was within a few thousand pounds of suspending payment.¹

Lord Northbrook’s optimism not being in accord with Lord Cromer’s pessimism, the great pro-consul set out to rectify the mistake in a lengthy dispatch, in which he was able to “repeat that I only speak with this degree of confidence on the assumption that a prompt and satisfactory solution of the financial difficulties which have been so long pending will shortly be found.”² That relief was found neither by England, Lord Cromer, nor Lord Northbrook, but by the Powers acting in concert with France,³ who advanced the necessary £9,000,000, which was to cover the deficits of the two preceding years, and that of the current year. A tax of five per cent was to be levied on the coupons for a period of two years, and the sinking fund on the greater part of the debt was to be suspended for the same period. The administrative expenditure was permanently fixed at £5,237,000; foreigners were to be taxed equally with natives; and the Lord Northbrook proposal to reduce the land-tax was granted by this international Convention. In 1884 the land-tax was estimated at £5,118,000. It was reduced by the Convention to £4,668,000. The difference between these two sums, £450,000, the Convention empowered the Egyptian Government to remit to the peasantry. But, bless you, the peasantry never knew nor obtained any remission!

² Ibid., No. 15 (1885), p. 45.
³ Vide ante, p. 174.
The Khedivial decree was published, it is true, granting that remission; but the balance sheets relating to the Budget, which always show unrecoverable arrears of taxes in the poorer districts, were suddenly produced. These irrecoverable arrears annually averaged about £200,000. Lord Cromer retained this sum against these non-recoverable taxes, by way of a "margin". So by remitting the £200,000 unrecoverable taxes, the actual taxation remained the same! It was all very simple, but it required exceptional financial administrative capacity to conceive it. I hope the reader has discovered how under Lord Cromer the land-tax was "reduced".

But there was still another quarter of a million. How was this to be spent? Arabi Pasha had outlined, among other reforms, the abolition of the corvée. England and the Anti-Slavery Society had cried out against this barbarous system of forced labour. Arabi and his projected reforms had by this time been forgotten; another leaf was therefore taken from the book of the "semi-barbarians", and Lord Cromer proceeded to abolish the corvée!

This £250,000 was specially intended to relieve the taxpayer whose woes had been painted by Lord Cromer had adopted as his own; such as the abolition of the corvées which the rich Turkish Pashas levied on the villagers, their monopoly of the water at the time of the high Nile, the protection of the Fellahin from the Greek usurers, who had them in their clutches through the iniquitous abuses of the International Tribunals, and even that latest remedy for agricultural distress on which Lord Cromer specially prides himself, an Agricultural Bank under Government direction." (Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's Secret History, p. 210). It would appear that the "semi-barbarous regime" were capable of outlining reforms which they were prevented from instituting by the civilised administrators, but which the civilised administrators were not above subsequently adopting without giving credit to the "semi-barbarous" for the idea.

1 "He (Arabi) also talked," says Mr. Blunt, "at great length of the practical reforms Mahmud Sami and the other Ministers were contemplating, most of which have since been included in the list of benefits conferred on the country under British occupation, and which Lord Cromer had adopted as his own; such as the abolition of the corvées which the rich Turkish Pashas levied on the villagers, their monopoly of the water at the time of the high Nile, the protection of the Fellahin from the Greek usurers, who had them in their clutches through the iniquitous abuses of the International Tribunals, and even that latest remedy for agricultural distress on which Lord Cromer specially prides himself, an Agricultural Bank under Government direction." (Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's Secret History, p. 210). It would appear that the "semi-barbarous regime" were capable of outlining reforms which they were prevented from instituting by the civilised administrators, but which the civilised administrators were not above subsequently adopting without giving credit to the "semi-barbarous" for the idea.
Cromer and his subordinates in such lurid colours. Taxation having been fixed by Convention, no tax could be levied for this reform. Therefore, the money that should have gone to relieve the taxpayer, was being repaid to him in wages for services rendered. The work for which the fellaheen should have been paid by the State, was paid for with the money remitted from his own taxes. The wages received by him were really no wages at all. He did the corvée work as of yore, for which he was paid with his own money; and these sums duly returned to the Exchequer in the form of taxation; and Lord Cromer proudly announces ("Modern Egypt," Vol. II, p. 579), "Issue of Decree partially abolishing the corvée", 2 April (1885).

The British Government sanctioned the spoliation of the poor fellaheen of this quarter of a million.¹ France protested that the money was not being used as stipulated by the Convention. Russia stepped in and made peace, and the matter was allowed to drop; ² even for the most part from the pages of Lord Cromer's history, where the whole of this financial arrangement was relegated to four lines and a footnote! ³

As corvée and Kurbash go hand-in-hand, I shall leave the matter for a moment until I have thrown some further light on those wonderful financial methods we read about. The Daira and Domains lands were gradually sold to meet the Budget and make it balance, £437,000 of these lands being sold in the first year. Then there was discovered another fruitful source of revenue whereby exemption from military service could be bought. A Khedivial decree was issued June, 1886, which set forth that persons

¹ "Egypt," No. 4 (1886), pp. 40–2. ² Ibid., No. 11 (1887), pp. 60–71. ³ "Modern Egypt," Vol. II, p. 366. A whole chapter is, however, devoted to the corvée. I, of course, refer to the Convention and Loan of £9,000,000.
liable to military service could be exempted on payment of sums from £40, before drawing conscripts, and £100 after having been with the colours. It does not require a Solomon to discover the trend of this measure. Money had to be obtained, never mind the methods. 1 October, 1886, saw the payment of £159,000 as rachat by 3141 persons who were passed as fit for service and desired exemption, and were in a position to pay: £28,100 was paid for the same purpose in 1887. Of this sum the poor suffering fellaheen of 1884 were mercilessly bled, and in very many cases ruined; something like £60,000 being netted from them in the first year in order to release their sons from this hateful system. Yet his Lordship moralises on the shortcomings of Mohammedans and the disregard they have for the rights of Christians. He certainly showed little regard or respect for the rights of the Egyptians. His excuse for this measure was, that no less than £95,000 had been paid in 1886 by the sons of Sheykhs and rich landowners; 2 "robbing hen-roosts", I believe to be the phrase. Even in 1885, when the Budget closed with a surplus of not less than £500,000, Lord Cromer confessed that he had resorted to the measures of the "oppressive and semi-barbarous"; for "the land-tax", he reports to Lord Rosebery, "was collected with great stringency". 3

But why weary the reader with these sordid details of a civilised administration wherein Nature was given a chance? The half of the methods used to obtain the money wherewith to win that famous

1 "Egypt", No. 2 (1887), p. 26. "The decree will not only be popular", says Lord Cromer, "throughout the country, but a considerable sum will thereby be added to the revenues".
2 Ibid., No. 3 (1887), p. 108.
3 Ibid., No. 4 (1886), p. 179.
race will perhaps never be told. The evidence herein set out will, however, give the reader a fair idea not only of how the thing was done, but whether that halo of glory still deserves to shine so brightly.

But the reader having been told of the horrors of the corvée and the Kurbash, will very naturally say, “The abolition of these iniquitous systems was a great work”. It will also be claimed that Mr. Villiers Stuart¹ and others flooded the English Press with statements regarding the evils of these systems. This is quite true on the surface. But it must be remembered that whilst Mr. Villiers Stuart was holding forth so brilliantly there were evils of equal magnitude nearer home. For instance, the sweating-dens of the East End of London, the condition of labour in the Lancashire cotton-mills, and in the Staffordshire potteries. There was no record of these horrors in Egypt until Ismail began to get into difficulties. When he failed to meet his financial engagements, some valid excuse had to be found for readjusting a “rotten administrative system”—in the interest of the bondholder. Whilst the financial liabilities were being met, no questions were asked about the source of supply.

The abuse of the corvée made it hateful, and the Kurbash was requisitioned to uphold it as well as to extort taxes. Egypt was not on the same economic and industrial plane as the countries of Europe; money was scarce, and there was no regularised system of paid labour; and as the country was just emerging from a state of “semi-barbarism” it had not as yet arrived at European perfection, because social conditions were passing through an evolutionary process, from the primitive, from the patriarchal,

¹ Also in “Egypt”, No. 7 (1883).
and from absolutism, to the advanced systematised methods of the West. As a natural result, as each man had to serve the State either by paying money to sustain the State, or in the absence of money, render personal service in lieu thereof; and "when it is considered", as the British Consul at Alexandria wrote in 1871, "that the maintenance of canals at their proper level is the great desideratum here, without which the country would become a desert, it does not seem to me that there is injustice in making all contribute their share of what is so essential for the welfare of the country ".

The corvée therefore was a necessity under the primitive system of government; but viceroys, officials, and rich pashas abused it by forcing the villagers to perform work on their private estates and on industrial establishments, and the Kurbash was the instrument used to compel obedience. It therefore follows that, as the two systems worked mainly together, the abolition of the corvée would sap the foundation on which the Kurbash was largely based. The Dual Control had tried to abolish it, and Lord Dufferin said "it is one of those evils which it is impossible altogether to abolish ".

Lord Cromer, however, "abolished" the corvée of forced labour by paying the peasant for his labour with the money which should have been remitted from his taxes. A method so simple that Lord Dufferin, great statesman though he was, was unable to conceive it. It need only be added that Arabi Pasha, or Ismail himself, "semi-barbarous" as they were, would have had little difficulty in abolishing the corvée with an annual sum of £250,000 at

1 C. 563 (1872), p. 379.
2 "Egypt", No. 6 (1883), p. 68.
their disposal. Besides, what detracts from the merit of this great reform was the fact that the corvée was automatically abolishing itself; for we find as early as 1883 that Roussot Bey, the Minister of Public Works, reported that "the recruiting of corvée labourers was becoming more difficult every day with the growth of ideas which condemned the use of coercive means, and had deprived the administrative authorities of means of action unfortunately still indispensable". Sir Scott Moncrieff also said, in 1885, "it is impossible to do all the necessary work with the corvée, and the district officials say it is impossible to increase the corvée without the courbash". The total abolition of forced labour has, however, never been fully accomplished, notwithstanding the flourish of trumpets. Lord Cromer himself admits it in his report of 1892. In the text will be found a beautiful dissertation on the magnitude of this reform, and you are lost in admiration at the benevolence of England's benevolent despot. But the eye is suddenly arrested by a footnote. You say this is a little titbit of modesty which the great man has hid in a corner; some wonderful achievement in reforming statesmanship—a sort of light which he would rather hide under a bushel—but no: it cannot be! You rub your eyes and you read, "In order to avoid any misapprehension, I wish to explain that when I speak of the abolition of the corvée, I mean the substitution of free labour for forced labour, in the annual work of cleansing out the canals. It was this which in former years weighed most hardly on the people. Forced labour still

1 "Egypt", No. 4 (1886), p. 135. See also Mr. Roswell's article (November, 1881), in the "Nineteenth Century", "Administrative Machinery in Egypt".

2 Ibid., No. 4, p. 135 and on.
exists in order to prevent inundation when the Nile is exceptionally high"; and under Sir Eldon Gorst 110,000 children were "pressed", under the revised decree of 1887, to pick the leaves and stay the ravages of the cotton-worm. So that after all the fuss a "form of slavery", masquerading under the title of "forced labour", still exists, notwithstanding the reforming hand of the great pro-consul.

Now as to the Kurbash. Lord Dufferin declared, in 1883, when through his instrumentality the Kurbash had been abolished by Khedivial Circular, "I cannot", he said, "but regard such an act as significant of the introduction of a more humane and civilised spirit into the civil administration of the country".

In the following year Lord Cromer directed his agents to report on the effect produced by this "reform"; and in forwarding these reports he said an immense change has already been effected, the nature of which can only be fully appreciated by those who, like myself, are able to compare the Egypt of the present day with the Egypt of but a few years ago. Always these unreliable comparisons, it will be observed. Yet Mr. MacCoan said that under Ismail Pasha an attempt had been made to suppress the Kurbash. Mr. Rowsell wrote, in 1882, "Deprived of his Kurbash and of his power to imprison, the Governor of an Eastern Province can do little with a population accustomed for centuries to strong personal direct government".

1 "Egypt", No. 3 (1893), p. 4.
3 Ibid., No. 7 (1883), p. 36.
4 "Egypt As It Is", p. 117.
5 "Egypt", No. 7 (1882), p. 42. (Mr. Rowsell was connected with the Domains Administration. He spoke of the Arabist Administration.)
Let us see how this compares with the continuation of Lord Cromer's report. "The old arbitrary system of government," he proceeds, "is not moribund. It is actually defunct; and I venture to doubt the possibility of its revival. Its death, moreover, has been compassed with a rapidity which I can honestly say I never anticipated. A new system of government is growing up with quite as great a degree of success, and with quite as much rapidity as any but the most Utopian reformer could expect".¹

"The new era" of Lord Dufferin, and "the old arbitrary system of government" of Lord Cromer, although Homeric in its diction, must be assigned to that large batch of diplomatic and consular fiction which has been the bane of modern Egypt. For Mr. Rowsell, in 1879, wrote, "The bastinado has been put under a ban which no European probably wishes to raise. To Riaz Pasha is due the honour [italics mine] of sweeping away with many other oppressions the wholesale and savage use of the Kurbash and bastinado".²

"Want of accuracy", says Lord Cromer, "which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is, in fact, the main characteristic of the Oriental mind".³

Of such stuff are England's great administrators made. Lord Cromer also said in his report, 1885, "the debts contracted before the war of 1882 had been recovered, considerable pressure had been required to collect the instalments".⁴

Pressure? There was only one pressure known to the tax-collectors of Egypt—the Kurbash!

¹ "Egypt", No. 1 (1885), p. 40.
² Ibid.
⁴ "Egypt", No. 15 (1885), p. 53.
In 1886 he reports to Lord Rosebery "the land-tax was collected with great stringency".  

In 1891, he says, "I am not prepared to state confidently that the use of the Kurbash and other forms of torture have altogether disappeared".  

In his History he tells us "The implement was plentifully used for some years after the issue of his (Lord Dufferin's) epoch-making Circular. In the early days of the British Occupation crime increased to such an extent that Nubar Pasha thought it necessary to create . . . Commissions of Brigandage . . . the Commissions virtually took the place of the ordinary Tribunals. Recourse was had to the old system of torture".  

Nubar Pasha resigned in June, 1888, because Lord Cromer would not permit him to run the Government according to his ideas of administration. Therefore, inasmuch as the strong hand of the British Resident was there to guide the destinies of Egypt, it was Lord Cromer who empowered Nubar Pasha to institute the Commissions of Brigandage with "the old system of torture". All things were done in order by Khedivial decree—but Tewfik was only a cipher.  

I think we have had enough of the reforming hand of the impartial historian and great pro-consul. I have more evidence of his own to produce, but I presume that the reader will agree that "enough is as good as a feast". My only hope, therefore, is that I have proved that "want of accuracy which degenerates into untruthfulness" is not monopolised by "the Oriental mind"; and notwithstanding the fact that the noble lord says that "in political
matters, as well as in the affairs of everyday life, the Egyptian will, without inquiry, accept as true the most absurd rumours".¹ I decline to accept as true the rumours of Lord Cromer's great reforms in Egypt, until more satisfactory evidences of his greatness are produced than those recorded above.

CHAPTER XXIII

"TAKE COURAGE!"

In the preceding chapter I endeavoured to give a brief outline, not only of the "financial achievements of the great reformer", but I also tried to point out on his own evidence and the evidence of his subordinates, that the two chief "reforms" on which this nobleman's fame rests resolve themselves into a hollow mockery, and a sham of the most glaring description.

When Ismail, with Nubar Pasha's aid, introduced the native and International Tribunals, the power of the local Sheykh was broken, as the fellaheen were brought into direct contact with the law, and this as early as 1875.

It is, indeed, true that Pashadom was not dead, but it had received a blow under which it staggered until the reformers of 1882 gave it its quietus. The English on their advent only maintained the state of things as they were. Social evolution had also, in its natural course, by broadening the ideas of the people, reduced the primitive methods of compulsory service for the most part to an impossibility. The Kurbash had proved itself to be an almost obsolete institution not alone under Ismail, but later, under the reforming hand of the Nationalists; it was reintroduced by the English themselves to enforce the collection of those taxes which they considered essential to the success of that race against bankruptcy. Every
other system of social regeneration has been subordinated to finance; and as the defenders of the Occupation are, or have been for the most part, British officials, beginning with Lord Cromer himself, their statements being one-sided and biassed must be taken *cum grano salis* until their methods have been inquired into, and reported upon by some more independent authority; for on their own showing, their greatest achievements have completely broken down when minutely examined.

Nor is this all: the much-advertised woes of the peasantry of Egypt, taking all the circumstances into consideration, were neither so dire prior to the Occupation, nor any worse than those existing in Ireland and England about the same time; for, said Mr. Cave in the House of Commons, "the state of the peasantry is highly unsatisfactory, though I doubt their being as wretched as many writers imagine. Those, however, among us who have studied the reports of the various Commissions on the state of women and children in mines and factories, and agricultural labour in this country, will acknowledge that we are not justified in being too severe on a nation just emerging from barbarism".¹ Mr. Cave also declared that "the general condition of the fellahen will compare favourably with that of almost any other peasantry in the East",² and this in spite of the fact that England had then been "ruling" India for the best part of a century. I do not mean to imply that the wretchedness of the fellah was either imagined or assumed. He was wretched, and the tax-collector who went forth to gather the shekels for the satisfaction of the bond-

---

² MacCoan, "Egypt As It Is", p. 25.
holder contributed in a marked degree to that wretchedness. But when his woes were so realistically limned by the British reformer in order that his taxes should be "reduced", we very naturally looked for a marked improvement in his miserable social condition—an improvement which is not apparent after twenty-eight years of English administration. There is some slight improvement under English rule; but that improvement is due rather to the partial absence of the corvée, and to the reduction of interest on the public debt, and not to any special effort for fellah amelioration on the part of the English administrators. This improvement is, in a large measure, counterbalanced by the increased cost of living. Notwithstanding the greatly lauded Agricultural Banks, he is still in the grip of the money-lender; for Mr. Villiers Stuart tells us that, "a couple of generations would be needed to enable the reforms already effected to take root... money was still being borrowed", and that the fellahaen "would still regard 12 per cent as a fabulously low rate of interest!".  

Yet we were told seven years previously by Mr. Clarke that, "the lot of the fellahen has been greatly ameliorated in the last few years. He is... better fed and better clothed. He no longer has to dread the courbash, nor has he much reason to fear the corvée or the military conscription. (!) He has been enabled, to a great extent, to free himself from the usurer. He is, in fact, gradually emerging from the oppression and misery in which he had been plunged from time immemorial".  

There was no doubt that some of the peasantry had been,

1 "Egypt", No. 2 (1895), p. 4. Mr. Villiers Stuart was an "independent witness".

2 Ibid., (1897), p. 10. Mr. Clark was secretary of the Agency.
to "a great extent, free from the usurer": usurers are not philanthropists, they lend money on security, and as the small fellah-proprietor had lost his land he therefore possessed no security, and could not well be in the hand of the usurer. Mr. Portal wrote in the following year: "There is an actual diminution of peasant proprietors. Land has been absorbed more and more into large estates. The former owner of one or two acres now works for daily wages on the estate of the landlord".1 Once more we emphasise the statement, "Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is the main characteristic of the Oriental mind!" 2

People in England are unfamiliar with the true facts; and owing to the amount of lying which has been systematically carried on in these inaccurate reports about Egypt, the British Public have been led to suppose that Lord Cromer and his minions have done nothing but good to Egypt. As a matter of fact, their administration has been a gigantic deception; and when a mere native dare lift up his voice against a muddling and inept bureaucratic system, he is either accused of being a "charlatan agitator" or "a fanatic" "wanting in accuracy which degenerates into untruthfulness"; and to bolster up administrative fraud and falsehood, editors are put in prison, and their aims underrated in the Press of a free England, in order to maintain the greatness of an individual who, under the cloak of ill-health, has retired from a position which had become untenable, and was held by the same fraudulent tenure of trickery which characterised that of the much-vilified Ismail. Now this highly advertised

1 "Egypt", No. 2 (1885), p. 83.
"regenerator of Egypt" has at length found the level of his massive intellectuality in heading a movement for the suppression and repression of the laudable aims of his own countrywomen!

He stands convicted of being indirectly responsible for the bad feeling created in Egypt between Moslem and Christian, and of being the instigator of that anti-English feeling among the natives, brought into being by his repressive measures.

The Oriental, with all his "want of accuracy", was able to see through him. In order that the people might be deceived no longer as to the true condition of affairs, and to make them familiar with the lying Consular reports, at an executive meeting of the Nationalist party in January, 1908, whilst Mustapha Kamil lay on his death-bed, it was resolved that in future a special fund should be raised by subscription to reprint and circulate the pro-consul's reports in French and Arabic.

The reader may think that I speak strongly. I say no more than I can substantiate with facts—that is to say, if Lord Cromer's own statements may be considered facts. For instance, at Sheffield, 17 December, 1909, he spoke at great length on his own pet scheme, the Agricultural Bank, founded in 1902 by Sir Ernest Cassel, which it was presumed would create a new small peasant class of proprietors in Egypt. With an effort of imagination that would have done credit to Jules Vernes, Lord Cromer told his auditors of the enormous increase in the operations of the Bank. "What has been the result?" he asked. "The result", said he, "has been in ten years the number of small proprietors . . . increased by no less than 400,000; and now out of a population of little more than 11,000,000 men, women, and
children, there are no less than 1,200,000 small proprietors of this description. The policy was therefore a brilliant success”.

“'The Bank’, says Sir Eldon Gorst, ‘does not lend to any one not already possessed of land, so that it cannot create new individual holdings... the recent apparent increase in the number of small holdings is due to the effect of the survey operations in dividing up properties between the real owners, and also perhaps in some measure to the fact that the holders par indivis, when in pecuniary straits, divide up their property with a view to raising money on it’.”¹ Thus that “want of accuracy”, etc., is not by any means monopolised by the Oriental mind. Notwithstanding all this, because Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, the only Englishman familiar with the events of 1882, dared to stand up and defend the Egyptian claim to independence, endeavouring at the same time to help the English public to a clear understanding of the facts, so that they might redeem their reputation for honesty and justice, this noble repressionist of Egyptian liberty, and would-be suppressor of the liberties of Englishwomen, indulges in such cheap sneers as, “This shows what reliance can be placed upon Mr. Wilfrid Blunt’s History”, and such “amateur politicians as Mr. Wilfrid Blunt”. We are told the devil can cite Scripture for his purpose, so the noble lord did not disdain to quote Mr. Blunt when he desired to substantiate a statement of which he knew nothing whatever. As regards his own History, although “impartial” and extensively used as a work of reference, it is only valuable in so far as official documents are concerned, and to those documents

I am myself indebted. The picture he draws of native aims, thought, condition, and religion, are however, not only absolutely inaccurate, but his conclusions with regard to Mohammedanism is farcical in the extreme.

"Pride goeth before destruction, and a haughty spirit before a fall".

I spoke in the previous chapter about the decrease in the cotton yield. This decrease is due directly to the reforming hand of the great Proconsul. The engineers in Egypt have no knowledge of, nor regard for, agriculture, although, I presume, these are the individuals whom Lord Cromer had invited to "give Nature a chance". "The Egyptian Gazette", a British journal, and staunch supporter of the Occupation, informs us that, "However eminent the irrigation engineers may be in their own professions, they are not agriculturists, and are naturally pursuing their own policy without proper regard to agricultural considerations. An example of this may be given in connection with which complaints are frequently made. Owing to their ignorance of agriculture, irrigation officials frequently order the clearing of the canals and drains at a moment when their closing, which is necessary for clearing purposes, must have a disastrous effect upon the crops. An irrigation engineer will light-heartedly close a canal in March and a drain in June, to the enormous detriment of the surrounding country". ¹ Even this great irrigation reform, with its great Assouan Dam, opened with such "pomp and circumstance of glorious state" by the Khedive, the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, on 10 December, 1902, and at which ceremony Sir E. Cassel was decorated with

¹ "Egyptian Gazette", 29 December, 1909.
the Grand Cordon of the Osmanieh, Sir J. Aird, the contractor, with the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh; and Hassan Fakhri Pasha was handed a K.C.M.G., is not the blessing to Egypt which its promoters claim. People who know nothing about Egyptian history are unaware that, prior to the coming of the English, Mehemet Ali, Said Pasha, and even extravagant Ismail, had covered the country with a network of canals, introducing steam-pumps and other machinery, constructing many of the much-lauded irrigation works which the English have only elaborated. These works had greatly fallen on evil times in the latter days of Ismail's reign, when he was forced to scrape together every piastre he could lay hands upon to meet the ever-present creditors. Lord Cromer, however, who by "investing" some two millions of borrowed money in irrigation works, built up a superstructure of glory on Ismail's foundations, coolly informs us that "the seed from which the present material prosperity of Egypt has grown may indeed be said to have been planted in 1884" (!).

The seeds of ruin and destruction would perhaps be a more appropriate description. The irrigation of Egypt has been constructed or improved upon without foresight. The water-table has risen to an alarming extent without corresponding drainage; the water being held up, because of the unnecessarily high barrages, by water-logging the land, affects the roots of the plant adversely and counteracts its development. This means that the time is not far distant when the fertility of the soil will be affected to such an extent that the land will become unproductive; for already the soil is deteriorating; and whereas

1 Vide MacCoan's "Egypt As It Is", p. 250.
2 "Egypt", No. 1 (1901) p. 20.
the Nile deposits and natural manures supplied nutriment to the land in "semi-barbarous" times, under a civilising system artificial manures have been requisitioned to "give Nature a chance". The fellaheen, by no means in a state of opulence, notwithstanding Lord Cromer's fictitious "1,200,000 small proprietors, who have been increased in ten years", and the Agricultural Banks, can ill-afford to pay 20s. to 25s. the feddan for artificial manure.1

Nor is that all. In "semi-barbarous" times, wheat, tobacco, and sugar were cultivated to a large extent; the latter industry has been killed in the interests of Lancashire and King Cotton; for whereas the sugar exports show a return of £338,425 in 1890, in 1908 it had dropped to £50,106. As for tobacco, Lord Cromer being determined to win the race, and observing that "a very important portion of customs revenue was slipping away from the Exchequer, for the increase of native tobacco naturally checked the import of foreign tobacco",2 the tax on tobacco-land was raised from £2 10s. to £30 in 1888; the import duties on tobacco brought £333,000 to the Exchequer in the following year.3 As tobacco cultivation still continued in spite of the heavy tax, he first limited the cultivation to fifteen hundred feddans, and not satisfied with his work, he shortly afterwards prohibited the cultivation altogether, under penalty of a heavy fine and confiscation of the crops!4 He also killed the cotton-spinning industry, which had an undoubted future. With cheap labour, and raw material to hand, the prospects were good. But no, the great Proconsul could not see an industry, which

1 Vide "Egypt", No. 1 (1909), pp. 21-22.
3 Ibid., No. 4 (1889), p. 23.
would injure Lancashire's Cotton Kings, grow up in the interests of a people just emerging from barbarism. Imported manufactured cotton goods pay a duty of 8 per cent; so in the interests of Free Trade—oh, yes, Lord Cromer is a Free Trader, he says so in his History—he claps on an excise duty of 8 per cent on native cotton goods so as to equalise things, and—well, the expensive machinery has gone to the scrap heap! Egyptians, therefore, love Lord Cromer—especially his friends the Copts—for does not Christianity say, "Love your enemies and do good to those who despitefully use you"? Seeing that our great ex-Proconsul was so great a benefactor to humanity at large, and the Egyptians in particular, there is nothing for it but "a love that passeth all understanding!"

I think I have brought forward sufficient evidence to prove that the British Occupation has not been an unmixed blessing. I have refrained from quoting native authorities, because the British public have been led to believe that "want of accuracy which easily degenerates into untruthfulness" is the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.

If I have exhibited bitterness in these pages, my apology must be found in the mass of documentary misrepresentation herein set forth. Nor is it at all surprising that Egyptian Nationalists should be carried away by feelings of resentment against British administration. Burke says, "The temper of the people amongst whom he presides ought to be the first study of the statesman". The British Administrator in Egypt has never tried to understand the temper of the people. Lord Cromer never troubled, or was unable, to master Arabic; and as the mass of the people speak no other language, it was quite
impossible for him to understand them, and it is extremely doubtful whether he ever tried to do so. He professed to show a tender solicitude for the fellaheen, but that solicitude only operated so far as it was productive of financial results. For instance, Prince Hussein, the Khedive's uncle, who was for some time President of the Legislative Council, said, in the course of an interview, in which he bewails the lot of the fellah: "He passes his life burdened with debts, his wages do not exceed the amount of taxes and the interests on his debts. He is continually obliged to run into debt at an exorbitant interest, in order to meet his agricultural needs at the proper moment; and as a consequence of this situation, of his lack of money, and the large number who depend upon him, the peasant remains in a sea of trouble, from which he can find no means of saving himself . . . nobody lends a helping hand to enable him to rise from the state of misery and need in which he finds himself. Nobody does anything to improve his lot or enlighten his mind or form his education; no one gives him any counsel. He is abandoned, and no effort is made by the Government for the advancement of the fellah in the way of progress." 1 As the British Administrator would not undertake the work which he claimed to be part of his Egyptian Mission, the Nationalist leaders took the matter in hand. Not only did Mustapha Kamil found a school at Cairo, but the leaders have established night schools for the fellah workers on the University Extension plan; and as debt has been the bane of the fellah, finding that the Agricultural Bank was not the beneficent institution which its founders claimed, they have formed a loan syndicate at Cairo and

1 "Egyptian Standard" (reproduction), 20 October, 1908.
Boulak, where the poorer agriculturist may obtain financial assistance without the vexatious delays of the Agricultural Bank, or the exorbitant interest of not less than fifty per cent charged by the Greek and Syrian money-lenders. It was with this work of development that the strenuous Kamil was engaged when he was seized with his last illness. He had come to London directly after the Denshawai 1 incident to lay the case of the Egyptians and Lord Cromer's injustice before the British public. His strength was then failing, yet he delivered a few addresses in London which undoubtedly made for the advance of the cause he so ably represented. He went on to Vichy from London, from whence he wrote to Madame Adam, on 13 August, 1906, "To-morrow, my birthday, I will be just thirty-two.

1 As I shall refer to this incident again in the course of these pages, it would be as well to record the facts.

In June, 1906, five British officers, while pigeon-shooting, accidentally wounded the wife of a fellaheen villager. The husband and other villagers interfered, handling the officers rather roughly. The offending officer thereupon struck one of the excited natives. The blows were resisted by the natives, and the officer escaped with a few bruises. Being a characteristically hot day, after running several miles from the village, he succumbed to fatigue, sunstroke, and the rough handling. The post-mortem, however, proved beyond question that the officer's death was primarily due to sunstroke. Captain Bostock (medical officer), deposed at the trial that he had "made a superficial post-mortem examination of Captain Bull's body (the deceased officer), and concluded that death was due to concussion of the brain and sunstroke". Dr. Nolan, by Lord Cromer's order, made a subsequent post-mortem examination, and he also deposed that Captain Bull's wounds "were caused by violent blows with a blunt instrument, but the direct cause of death was heat apoplexy", and "after hearing the evidence he concluded that death was due to heat apoplexy, aggravated by concussion of the brain". The pro-English Press at once seized the incident, and cried for immediate "justice" and a "moral example in the interests of threatened British prestige".

A tribunal was hastily formed, comprising three British officials and two Egyptians, over whom the late Boutros Pasha presided. Four Egyptian villagers were condemned to death, and several others to long periods of hard labour. A petition containing thirteen thousand signatures was presented to the Khedive, requesting that the document should be forwarded to the British Government, but no notice was taken of the petition until two years after the hangings, when the prisoners were released.
How long will remain to me to serve my dear Egypt? In any case I shall not lose a minute of my life without sowing its love in the hearts of my compatriots, and I will accomplish my task to the end.”

Throughout his life Kamil had shown a touching regard for the unfortunate condition of his country, and his efforts on behalf of Egypt can never be too highly estimated. On 14 September, 1907, we find him writing Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman; and he also wrote a leading article to the “Temps” on the subject of that letter which dealt with the evacuation of Egypt; the article also treated of the inducements which were being held out by the English in Egypt to natives to cause them to say that they accepted the Occupation.

On his return to Cairo an enthusiastic crowd of more than three thousand representative Egyptians turned out to do him honour. But this was more than the British could stand, so the Occupation journals promulgated the yarn that Kamil intended to make himself Khedive. He could not permit this accusation to go unanswered, so during the latter part of October, 1907, before an audience of some seven thousand persons, he disclaimed any designs or encroachments on the prerogative of the Khedive. “The articles of my programme”, he declared, “is to obtain the autonomy of Egypt with the dynasty of Mehemet Ali. All my previous work proves that I am the best friend of the Khedive and of his throne.”

On 17 November he was seriously affected in health and had to take to his bed; he however delivered his speech, 27 December, 1907, to the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party. In this speech,

which was destined to be his last, he said, "A little while and I shall soon disappear!" Illness, brought on by overwork in the cause of Egyptian independence, had wrecked a frail constitution, and on Monday, 10 February, 1908, Mustapha Pasha Kamil breathed his last, to the everlasting regret of his compatriots, and the universal grief of the Egyptian nation. Before he passed unto that bourne whence no traveller has returned, to his sorrowing brother he gave this final counsel:

"Take courage, work with perseverance and assiduity so as to arrive easily at our end."
CHAPTER XXIV
THE MODERN REHOBOAM

NEVER before in the history of Egypt had there been such universal regret for the death of a private individual.

Mustapha Pasha Kamil was followed to his final resting-place by half a million of all grades of his sorrowing countrymen; young men and maidens mourned him forty days. His brother Ali Fehmi received 13,334 telegrams and 8430 letters of condolence.

Four days after Mustapha’s death the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party met and elected Mohammed Bey Farid, who had been previously nominated by Kamil as his successor, as President of the Egyptian Nationalist Party, Ali Fehmi Kamil, Mustapha’s brother, being elected Vice-President.

On Tuesday, 11 February, 1908, “The Egyptian Gazette” announced the death of Mustapha Pasha Kamil with a joy chastened by the event; it also promised to publish an appreciation of the young leader on the following day; but evidently this being too much to grant a fallen enemy, the matter was quietly dropped. The anti-Nationalist Press was, however, unable to contain its joy, and it averred that inasmuch as Kamil had ceased from troubling, Nationalism would be at rest. The universal native demonstrations of popular grief on the occasion of the funeral, and the Commemoration Ceremony forty
MOHAMED FARID BEY
PRESIDENT OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST PARTY
days after the leader’s death, had a somewhat damp-
ing effect upon their rather precipitate joy; proving
to them, as nothing else could have done, the whole-
hearted love of the people for their leader, and their
apparent determination to respect his memory by
carrying on his work.

In January, 1908, whilst Mustapha Kamil lay ill,
Sheykh Ali Yousseff, editor of “El Moayyad” and
Alim of El-Azhar, was elected to the Legislative
Council, doubtless as a reward for his surrender to
the Occupationists. On the 18th of the same month,
Dr. Rutherford, who had arrived in Cairo, was
entertained at dinner by the “Reform Party”, Ali
Yousseff, the leader of that party, presiding. The
Doctor’s political views being well known in Egypt,
the fact of his having been received by those who
had now become anti-Nationalist, and who had killed
the fatted calf in honour of the Doctor, caused the
British Press, led by the “Egyptian Gazette”, to
wax sarcastic at the expense of the Nationalists;
and this, no doubt, led the Alim of the El-Azhar,
and Editor of “El Moayyad,” to believe that he had
scored a point against the Nationalists by entertain-
ing an English leader of much weight and influence.
As a consequence, in his efforts to out-Herod Herod,
he not only proceeded to speak of the Occupation
in terms of marked respect, but went so far as to
advise its maintenance, subsequently stating that he
wanted a constitution for Egypt with the Khedive
as independent ruler, with a hint that an Arab
Caliphate might be instituted and thus be transferred
from Turkey to Egypt; for this reason it would
appear that his journal, which had a wide circulation
in Turkey, has been forbidden in that country.

There was no doubt about Nationalism making
headway in Egypt under Mustapha Kamil, notwithstanding Lord Cromer’s declaration that it was a “wholly spurious and manufactured movement”; and that he should have advocated repressive measures to Orientals struggling for freedom, at a time when he himself was in the act of receiving the Freedom of the City of London, is not only grotesque, but proves the great Proconsul to be lacking in both a sense of humour and proportion. Of course, this was only natural. In 1904 he was so seriously convinced of his popularity and that he had successfully built up native “confidence in the intentions of the rulers”, that he even contemplated withdrawing the Army of Occupation, but there was such a British outcry in Egypt against this action, that the order, which I understand had been given, was very speedily withdrawn. As Mr. Portal said in 1887, the English resident knew that “it must not be supposed that the fellah is grateful to the existing administration. . . . The fellah looks upon the English as a national misfortune”; therefore his Lordship, on finding that for a quarter of a century he had pursued a chimera, of which there was abundant evidence in the Kamil demonstrations, not only experienced chagrin, but became revengeful when he saw the “spurious” agitator taking true soundings of the sentiments of the people.

There were unmistakable signs of restiveness among the people long before the advent of Kamil—the

1 “Egyptian Standard”, 6 May, 1907.
2 “For my own part, I say, I see no method of dealing with this unrest and disturbance in Egypt and in India. . . . It is to continue steadily to do our duty towards the people of those two countries, and to come down with a heavy hand upon extremists, should they overstep the limits of the law”.—“The Times”, 1 October, 1907.
4 Ibid., No. 2 (1888), p. 3.
Kaffra incident, for example, which occurred on Sunday, 27 March, 1887, near the Ghizeh Pyramids. He merely imparted impetus to the quickening process which had set in. The dry bones had assumed flesh; he merely breathed the breath of life upon them, and they stood forth at his bidding, living and sentient beings.

Fashoda, by causing England to come into the open and declare a policy, gave him the first peg on which he could hang tangible aggression on the part of England; and the Tabah incident, with its direct challenge to the sovereign rights of the Sultan, was not calculated to improve good feeling. Tabah, which lies near the northern end of the west coast of the Gulf of Akabah, was occupied by the troops of the Sultan early in January, 1906. The Egyptian soldiers, who had been dispatched to take up posts in the Sinai Peninsula and to occupy Tabah itself, found Turkish troops in possession, and the Turkish flag flying over Tabah. An ultimatum was sent to the Sultan to evacuate within ten days, and on 13 May of the same year, the Sultan, by agreeing to evacuate the Peninsula, ended the matter. It was during these negotiations, lasting from February to May, that Egypt was in a state of ferment. The pro-English Press did the very opposite to what wisdom should have dictated. There were two views held by the people: the prospect of war between Turkey and England which they did not want, on the one hand, and on the other, the opinion which had got abroad that England wanted to get possession of the Damascus-Bagdad railway, and so seize upon the Holy Places, thus making her stay in Egypt permanent. All previous conquerors of Egypt had sought to conquer Syria and the Hejaz; of
course, England had no such intention. In the first place, the railway was a German enterprise; and, secondly, the Holy Places on the way to El Medina were not possessed of that commercial value which would attract the British. There was, however, no getting away from the fact that the Sultan had been made to climb down; and being humiliated, the people of Egypt felt that, right or wrong, their religious head had received a gratuitous indignity at the hands of England. Negotiations were conducted in the Khedive's name, but the "trustees" of Egypt were the prime movers in the matter; and the pro-English Press, assuming as it did an aggressive attitude, provoked the "unrest" by unsettling the minds of the people. There need be little doubt that the actions of the pro-English Press threw many waverers into the ranks of the Nationalists; because Lord Cromer having but recently—that is, just prior to the incident—given his promise to remove at least a part of the British troops, this new act, which bore the hall-mark of aggression, was intended to remove any confidence which the native might have had in the promises of the English. Just one month after this incident was settled it was followed by the Denshawai "outrage"; and this, because of its transparent injustice, could not fail to discredit the name of England for all time, and was the indirect cause of the assassination of Boutros Pasha three and a half years afterwards. Lord Cromer having left for England, a Mr. Finlay, acting as British Agent and Consul-General, described the trial in his dispatches as "conducted with dignity and in strict accordance with the law—there has not been the slightest trace of panic or vindictiveness"; and Lord Cromer's comment in his memo-
randa appended to Mr. Finlay’s dispatch declared that, “It may, indeed, be said that the judicial system is, perhaps, half a century in advance of the ideas and standard of civilisation of the people” of Egypt. This, after a quarter of a century of mess and muddle, but described in the noble Lord’s glowing reports of earlier days as his “civilising influence”.

The trial took place before a “Special Tribunal”, a sort of modern Star Chamber, which suspended all laws—one of Lord Cromer’s pet schemes for oppressing natives when suspected of offences against the British Army. The proceedings lasted three days, and a bare fortnight had elapsed between the “incident” and the execution of the unfortunate villagers. The court remarked “that the officers could have shot the villagers as they did the pigeons”.

The Omdeh of Denshawai was deposed, and a posse of Cairo police were installed as rulers. This was called English justice, and was brought into bold relief by another incident which occurred but a few days prior to the affair of the Ghizeh Pyramids, when an Italian doctor, shooting in a cornfield at Shoubrah, had been attacked by the fellaheen, and a struggle ensued for the possession of the gun, which went off, accidentally killing the doctor. The fellaheen were acquitted in this case.

1 The gallows were ordered to be erected at Denshawai four days before the trial, and the following remarkable telegram was published in the “Daily Chronicle” on 21 June, three clear days before the trial:

“SHORT SHRIFT.

“The preliminary inquiry into the attack on British officers . . . has been concluded. Everything indicates that the outrage was much more serious than at first supposed, and that it was prearranged (?) Fortunately this time Lord Cromer is convinced of the bad faith of the natives. They will be severely dealt with, and the sentences will be carried out immediately, those condemned to death being shot in public. There will be no appeal.”

But in the incident of the Ghizeh Pyramids, when two British officers shooting near the Pyramids accidentally wounded four Arabs, the usual struggle for the possession of the gun took place with the usual result: the peasant was accidentally killed. The villagers assembled and assaulted the officers for killing the fellah. They were brought, by no means tenderly, before a "Military Commission". Twelve of them were sentenced to a severe flogging in the presence of the other villagers, and were subsequently imprisoned for a period of six months.¹

In neither of these cases was justice done. The fellah should have been tried for manslaughter in the case of the Italian doctor, for he deserved punishment, notwithstanding the accident.

Similarly the English officers in the Kaffra affair were guilty of manslaughter, for which they should have been tried. And in the case of the Denshawai incident, it was conclusively proved that Captain Bull had run a distance of two miles in the direction of his camp when he was overcome by the heat and fell by the roadside; and, finally, a native who saw him fall went to his assistance, and when the soldiers turned out to "rescue" their captain, they found him in charge of the young fellah. Supposing him to have injured the captain, they clubbed the good Samaritan to death with the butts of their rifles. Nothing, however, was heard of the killing of this native at the trial; but "exemplary punishment" was meted out to the impertinent and presumption native who desired to protect his own in his own country, from the English aggressor.

There was that famous case of the Khedive's

¹ The chief persons of several surrounding villages were also flogged as a wholesome lesson, and three Sheykhs were fined and imprisoned. Vide "Standard", 10 April, 1887.
prize bull. The bull, recently imported from Europe, was stolen, and the thief was known locally. The Parquet, representing the Procureur-General, were unable to find the miscreant, and the police were no more successful, because they thought their experience and position superior to that of the Mudir, and never troubled to consult him in the matter. Both Parquet and police having given proof of their incapacity, the Mudir took the matter into his own hands at the instigation of a large landed proprietor in the district. The landowner, Minshawi Pasha, successfully persuaded the Mudir to send the suspected men, whom he had arrested, from the gaol to his ezbeh, where they were bastinadoed into confession, and were then sent back to prison to await the ordinary course of justice, via police and Parquet. Of course, the capable British Administrator was unable to discover the thieves; but he discovered the high-handed action of the Mudir and the landlord, who were both imprisoned on 25 April, 1902, for three and two months respectively. The action of both these personages was quite illegal; unless the law is respected it were as well to abolish it altogether. But notwithstanding the theory that even-handed justice was being meted out to these "high ones," it is a moot point whether an Englishman in authority, or even a mere English "resident" committing a similar act of violence, would have been treated with the same "even-handed" justice. There is one law for rich and poor in Egypt, but such law only applies to natives; this is proved by the Kaffra and Denshawai incidents. The words of an English "Resident", who boldly stated that, "several times I have come upon a ridiculous street row between two Arabs" (italics mine) "which, owing to the supine-
ness of the police, might go on indefinitely and drag in others on each side, and *by a few blows to each with a thick stick,* I have calmed the trouble like magic, and all was peace and quiet again,"\(^1\) only proves what a sham this "even-handed" justice is. This same sort of thing has been going on in India for the most part during the past sixty or seventy years, and, in fact, wherever the English lord it over coloured races. Take, for instance, the "Gordon (?) riots" in Jamaica, where Mr. Gordon, the coloured landed proprietor and member of the House of Assembly, was illegally taken from his bed at dead of night to answer an imaginary charge of sedition, "tried" by a sham court martial, sentenced to death and executed out of hand by the order of Governor Eyre.\(^2\) "Although Governor Eyre approved of his execution", says Herbert Paul, "history must pronounce it to have been murder without even the forms of law". The Governor was tried in England, owing to the storm raised at the time by the justice-loving members of the British public; but even he was acquitted, "in the interests of British official authority and prestige". Yet this act of "even-handed English justice" was not confined to the execution of Gordon; the ring-leaders of the rioters, including women, were taken out and whipped with telegraph wire so that justice should be established! English aggression and repression in Egypt is therefore not wanting in precedent to maintain a system of brutality. It is very questionable whether the Khedive's bull incident impressed the natives with British impartiality.\(^3\) If the "great one" basti-

---


\(^2\) "Modern England" (Herbert Paul), Vol. III, pp. 3-7, 9.

\(^3\) The late Minshawi Pashi, who was tried in his own native town of Tautah, was an influential and wealthy native Pasha; he was
nadoed a thief without a formal trial, the British, after a sham trial, had whipped them for offences they had not committed, or only committed under great provocation, as in the Kaffra and Denshawai affairs; and as Lord Cromer himself declares, "that the judicial system is perhaps half a century in advance of the ideas and standard of civilisation of the people"; it is a rather remarkable fact that the system should be carried out to the letter between native and native, and should be devoid of even its spirit when operating between English and native. Besides, the degradation of a Mudir or other native dignitary for a technical breach of the law, does not enhance peasant respect for that law which permits an Englishman of lesser esteem to go unpunished for a much greater offence against a native.

When Sir Eldon Gorst returned to Egypt as Consul-General in 1907, the people of Egypt looked forward to his coming as a possible saviour. Lord Cromer's final pronouncement against the Nationalists at the Opera House, Cairo, on the eve of his departure, had left a rather bitter taste in the mouths of all the inhabitants of Egypt, except the most rabid Occupationists; but when you are bidding farewell to a sworn foe, knowing that you will shortly see the last of him, you pay little attention to his parting diatribes. The old Jeroboam was passing away with his whippings, and "Special Tribunals", and other civilising influences, and a little talk more or less was after all not very harmful. The Egyptians had been compelled to bear worse things than talk actively identified with the Arabi "rebellion" of 1882. He had saved the lives of a large number of Europeans during the troubles of 1882, and for this act was allowed to return to Egypt.

1 "Egypt", No. 3-4 (1906).
during his rule of a quarter of a century. Having at length got rid of him, they hoped for a "new era" of better promise from the new ruler who had served amongst them so long,¹ and who, knowing their language thoroughly, was likely to be in greater sympathy by being able to personally listen to and understand their complaints: as regards his predecessor this was impossible. He was familiar with the people owing to his connection with the Interior Ministry, and he had a full grasp of the finances of the country of which he was Adviser. It therefore seemed that the choice of Sir Eldon Gorst was the most happy that England could have made; and what was more pleasing, it was understood that he was the bearer of the olive branch from England to the Egyptians, and that the new policy being inaugurated was intended to draft competent natives into higher official posts.

This was most pleasing to the Egyptians, for they felt that after years of waiting and tribulation hope had come at last.

Unfortunately, Sir Eldon Gorst was not a diplomatist, although he had been an Attaché and Secretary of Legation. One of his first official acts was to sow discontent by summoning the British officials to his presence, telling them with brutal candour that in a short time their services would no longer be required, inasmuch as he had come to give Egyptians a larger share in the administration by at once admitting them to the higher posts, and that it was better to have the work performed according to the view of the British Government, less satisfactorily

¹ Sir Eldon Gorst was appointed to Cairo September, 1886. He was made Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt (1894) and Financial Adviser (1898).
by the Egyptian natives, than by the more competent English officials. It was not his own policy, but the policy with which he was charged, and which he intended carrying out.

Here was a statesman-like pronouncement which seemed to have been specially designed to defeat its own ends. I have already pointed out what manner of man the English official for the most part is like. Is it within the compass of human nature to expect hearty co-operation from officials who were thus brutally told that their occupation was gone, especially the younger men, and that their pensions, which would not materialise until they had completed fifteen years’ service, would be ruthlessly wrested from them? Were they likely to advance native efficiency to their own material detriment? An Englishman who had been deputed by a London Daily to inquire into the Egyptian situation, although showing, unwittingly perhaps, how inept the whole system has proved, when dealing with this phase of the situation informs us that, “amongst a section of the British public there seems to exist a rooted belief that Egypt is partially retained by England as a convenient dumping-ground for officials belonging by family or other ties to those in high places at home, and that most of the British officials in Egypt are there, not because of any special capacity, but by reason of personal favour”. He then tries to prove what an overworked, much-to-be-pitied individual the British official in Egypt is; and by implication endeavours to show that the “section of the British public” is mistaken in its “rooted belief.” Perhaps this well-intentioned individual will inform us how it turns out that one, other than a member of a high-placed family, could afford to “spend in
five years £1500 more than he had earned, merely in carrying out his duties’’?¹

I regret that the law of libel is so elastic as to bring it within the compass of “highly placed families”, or I could supply this gentleman with the names of a few scions of nobility operating in Egypt, “belonging by family and other ties to those in high places”. The arguments of some of the authorities (!) on poor old Egypt are indeed comic.

In fulfilment of the new “policy”, Sir Eldon Gorst, on the retirement of Mustapha Pasha Fehmi, early in 1909 appointed Boutros Pasha Ghali as Prime Minister, with Mohammed Said Pasha as Minister of the Interior.

These appointments were by no means satisfactory to the majority of thinking Egyptians.

Boutros Pasha was a Copt in the first place, and therefore could not well be considered a representative minister, any more than his predecessor, who may be termed a Turco-Egyptian. In the second place, Boutros Pasha had for years been regarded as an adherent of the Occupation; and his official record, extending as it did from 1875 when he was Secretary to Ismail Sadyk, Ismail Khedive’s Moufettish, whom he served at the period of his assassination, was by no means savoury to the main body of the Egyptian people. He had first been connected with the International Commission, under Lord Cromer, and was subsequently elevated to the Ministry of Finance, then to that for Foreign Affairs. He had also presided at the famous Denshawai trial, the finding of which Egyptians were not likely to so soon forget; and on his appointment the Nationalist Press did not fail to publish his record. This

being displeasing to him, he forthwith induced Sir Eldon Gorst to re-enact the Press Laws, which brought about the suppression of several Nationalist journals and the imprisonment of their editors, including that of the Sheykh Shawish, which provoked a demonstration of three thousand students against the Press Laws on 31 March, 1909. They demonstrated again on 1 April, when they were charged by the police and several arrests made. Prosecution and persecution rained upon the Nationalists from every side, and his crowning treachery to his country was the launching of the Suez Canal concession scheme. During the ten years ending 1908, £4,200,000 was supposed to have been the expenditure by the Egyptian Government on the Soudan. In 1904, by the Anglo-French agreement, the Reserve Funds, established in 1888 for the accumulation of Budget surpluses, and the Casse of the debt were merged into one; and the British management undertook to pay the coupon, the Casse being abolished. This brought £13,000,000 to the Egyptian Treasury; another £13,000,000 should have been added to the fund from further surpluses accruing during the succeeding five years, making a total of about £26,000,000 at least in the Egyptian Treasury. According to the official statement the Fund only amounts to about £6,000,000; therefore it is estimated that no less than £20,000,000 has taken itself off since 1904. In presenting the annual Budget to the Legislative Council the Government never estimates what it means to spend out of the Fund, it merely gives an outline of the working expenses of the past year. The Government refused to give any account of the money spent from the Reserve, not-

1 "Egypt", No. 1 (1910).
withstanding the repeated request of the Council. Yehia Pasha attacked the financial policy of the Government with regard to their reckless use of the Reserve Fund as recently as November, 1909; and Ismail Abaz Pasha, in the Legislative Council, 3 January, 1910, exposed the wild speculations of the Government without proper account being rendered to the Council.

It would appear that while the Government claim only to have spent £4,200,000 on the Soudan, Yehia Pasha estimated it at not less than £18,700,000! As a consequence the Egyptian Treasury, not being in that healthy state which should have resulted from twenty-eight years of reform and civilisation, not to mention that frequently cited "race," in casting about for a new source of revenue turned to the Suez Canal, which the Egyptian Government offered to the present Suez Canal Company for forty years for £4,000,000, to be paid in four annual instalments. Thus the original Concession, which does not expire until 1968, would have been presented to the Company by the Egyptian Government until the year 2008, free, gratis, and for nothing; or for £4,000,000 and percentage, ranging from 4 to 12 per cent, of the net revenue, which is practically a gift.¹

The Nationalist Press got wind of the scheme and demanded that the General Assembly be immediately convoked, and also that the Government be bound by the vote of the Assembly.

This prolongation of the Concession was being operated secretly; and it looks rather suspicious that this concession, which was an undoubted gain to British interests, and does not expire until 1968, should

have been engineered at a period coincident with the introduction of a Native Ministry. I wonder?

The Assembly by sixty-six votes to one rejected the scheme.

In the Ministry, Mohammed Said Pasha, who had spoken rather plainly to Boutros about his underhanded and traitorous methods, was coolly informed that "no one was indispensable": on 20 February, 1910, as the Prime Minister was leaving the Ministry of the Interior, Ibrahim Wardani shot him as a protest against the betrayal of his country. Boutros Pasha was taken to the hospital, where he died shortly after a necessary operation to extract the bullet.

There were wholesale arrests, searches, and no small amount of espionage. Wardani was tried on 21 April. The medical authorities called at the trial, whether foreign or native, deposed for the most part that the Prime Minister died from the necessary operation and not from the bullet wounds. Mr. Bond, a member of the Court who had officiated at the Denshawai trial, was objected to by the defence; but the objection was overruled.

A commission of three medical men, two English and one Egyptian, were ordered by the prosecution to inquire into the cause of death. They disagreed. The English doctors held that the wounds inflicted by Wardani were mortal, while the Egyptian practitioner's opinion was that the operation had caused the Prime Minister's death, and but for the operation, Boutros Pasha would have lived.

The Court sentenced Wardani to death. The chief counsel for the defence, Helbawi Bey—who had prosecuted on behalf of the Government at the Denshawai trial, and had earned thereby the male-
dictions of the entire Mohammedan population of Egypt, and had subsequently thrown up his official appointment to advance the cause of the Nationalists—having made a public avowal of his convictions at the Egyptian Geneva Congress of 1909, now that Wardani had been condemned, turned to the prisoner, and after blessing him, concluded his address in the following remarkable language:

"Go to your death with a brave heart and a firm step. For death will come to you to-morrow, if not to-day, and will not be denied. Go, my child, go to your God, Who holds the scales of sublime equity untramelled by the necessities of circumstances. Go, our hearts go with you, our eyes will weep with you for ever. Go, your death-sentence pronounced by human justice may prove more than your life, a great lesson to your people and your country. Go. If man has no pity for you, Divine mercy is fathomless. Farewell, my child. Farewell, farewell!" ¹

There was yet another surprise in this extraordinary affair. The Grand Mufti, owing to a technicality in Koranic Law, refused to grant a "fetwa" ordering the execution. This refusal had nothing whatever to do with the Faith of the dead Prime Minister, although great excitement was caused at the time, owing to the misrepresentations of the Egyptian pro-English papers, who seized upon the incident to misrepresent the interpretation of the Grand Mufti's finding, in order to make it appear as though this was an act of anti-Christian fanaticism and aggression, borne out by Islamic doctrine. ²

¹ The trial was held in camera, but Helbawi Bey's speech was printed and circulated in pamphlet form by the Nationalists.

² The Grand Mufti's document sets forth that inasmuch as Wardani had been tried by the Civil Authority and condemned without regard to Islamic jurisprudence, this proceeding according to Koranic law being irregular, it was not in his power to grant a Fetwa.
THE EX-SULTAN OF TURKEY

ABDUL HAMID
Sir Eldon Gorst's efforts in the direction of constitutional reform, which the Egyptians were led to expect him to inaugurate, merely amounted to an enlargement of the scope of the Provincial Councils without freedom of action, and devoid of initiative; this was nothing but a bastard reform. The Committee of the Legislative Council who had the matter under consideration, were by no means pleased with it, inasmuch as it was a rehash of the Organic Law of 1883. The Legislative Council was accorded the "privilege" of admitting the press and public to its sittings, and to question the Ministry; but all questions were to be submitted five days in advance, and then the Ministers were not compelled to answer unless they so desired; no supplementary questions were to be put, and the President of the Council was to have the right of disallowing or censoring any and all questions. Needless to say, the Legislative Council has never availed itself of these rather negative "reform" concessions.

The ferment in Turkey over the Revolution and deposition of Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks brought matters to a climax in Egypt, and on 1 December, 1908, the Legislative Council passed a resolution demanding representative government.¹

The General Assembly had passed a similar resolution eighteen months earlier, and on this occasion the debate lasted three months.²

The Nationalist Press, notwithstanding the death of Kamil, had gathered strength and volume. It made its strength felt in the remotest corners of Egypt.

¹ Vide Appendix at the end of this chapter. Abdul Hamid was formally deposed by a vote of the Turkish National Assembly, 27 April, 1909, his brother, Reshad Effendi, being proclaimed Sultan as Mohammed V, and was invested with the sword of Osman, 10 May, 1909.

Meetings and demonstrations were being organised everywhere, and these demonstrations found a responsive echo in the active participation of the now thoroughly aroused fellaheen. The Nationalist spirit was assuming such huge proportions that an effort was made by the Government to encroach upon the rights and liberties of the El-Azhar University.¹ Twelve thousand students once more struck, and the Rector resigned. His successor was installed by the police; but this only resulted in the Ulema and students of the University throwing in their lot with the Nationalists, and street demonstrations were made against the Khedive and the British Administration.²

Sir Eldon Gorst then re-introduced the Press Laws of 1881, and increased the Army of Occupation. The Press Laws required that printers and publishers should obtain a licence from the Ministry of the Interior; a heavy sum was to be deposited, and the licence could be refused or cancelled at the discretion of the Minister, whose mere order may suppress a newspaper after two warnings.

The Council of Ministers had the right to suppress any paper, without warning, which was tantamount to absolute annihilation; there being no guarantee, the whim of a Minister was sufficient to terminate the existence of the most expensive journalistic production.

On 4 July, 1909, the law “for placing certain persons under police supervision” was instituted. These persons, or dangerous characters “well known to be in the habit of making attempts on the life or property

² See Appendix at the end of this chapter.
of another person, or threatening the person and property”, can be hauled before a Special Commission under suspicion, and condemned by that body to police supervision at their place of residence for a period of five years, or be deported to places selected on Egyptian territory, during such term of supervision, if unable to give financial or personal security for good behaviour. Similarly as a “precautionary” measure, a person acquitted by the Court of Assize, owing to “insufficient evidence”, may be treated in a like manner. The Law having left the amount of the security for a “suspect” to the discretion of the Minister, it ranges from £100 to £1000, or even more. The Government, therefore, has no difficulty in disposing of, or deporting, inconvenient persons. The net was cast, and the first draw landed 12,000 suspects within six months. The Minister having gradually revised the lists, by 1 March over 250 persons were deported to the Dakhla Oasis. ¹

It is not difficult to determine the trend of these two repressive weapons, and that they will be used for political purposes is as certain as that the night follows day. Though the Egyptian people well knew that the British Agency had done this abominable work as an advance effort of “reform” and “education” of the natives, so that they would be qualified to undertake the burthens of Government and suffrage; they were also aware that Boutros Pasha, as a native Egyptian Minister, held the alternative of resigning were he not in sympathy with these reforming measures. There can be little doubt that he was only too glad of these repressive schemes, because they gave him the mastery over the mass of the people who had not forgotten his covenant with

¹ “Egypt”, No. 1 (1910).
the English at Denshawai. It might therefore be concluded that the Press Laws were to throttle a Press which would not fail to make itself heard against an unsatisfactory Ministry, and a still more unpopular and inept Proconsul. The Special Commissions, though aiming at the ordinary criminal, were intended to be a sort of sword of Damocles suspended over the head of the Nationalist leaders. The assassination of Boutros Pasha is a proof that the people have been thoroughly aroused; and that regrettable incident was a protest against a form of repression which may spread itself over the face of the country, reappearing like a thief in the night.

The people of Egypt are not a revengeful people; but even the worm has been known to turn, and the Administrator who was commissioned to bring peace and goodwill may be likened unto Rehoboam of old, for he has abundantly demonstrated that his little finger is thicker than Lord Cromer's loins; for whereas the ex-Proconsul chastised the Egyptians with whips, the modern Rehoboam has chastised them with scorpions. According to the words of Mohammed Farid Bey, "In order to taste the water you must first uncork the bottle".

The Egyptians have not only uncorked the Occupation bottle but have drunk deeply of the bitter waters of British Administration, until they have become sick, even unto death.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XXIV

FULL TEXT OF RESOLUTION IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1 DECEMBER, 1908

"The Legislative Council solicits from the Government of H.H. the Khedive the preparation of a project of law conferring on the nation the right of effective participation in the internal administration of the country and in the direction of local affairs. The project of law asked for ought to confer on the new Assembly to be created the right of voting law without appeal, on condition that the laws so voted may be applicable only to natives in what concerns the levying of taxes and direct or indirect contributions. The law asked for shall have no influence on international treaties, and there shall be excluded from it everything that concerns the capitulations, the Law of Liquidation, the relations with Europeans, and the rights recognised by the treaties with different Powers. This law ought not to touch the question of tribute paid to the Ottoman Government, nor the rights acquired by the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of treaties with foreign Governments."

ARTICLE III OF NATIONALIST PARTY PROGRAMME

"The respect of treaties and financial conventions which bind the Egyptian Government to pay its debts and to accept a financial control like the Anglo-French condominium, so long as Egypt remains the debtor of Europe and Europe demands control." (In a speech by late Mustapha Pasha Kamil at Alexandria, 22 October, 1907.)

"Egypt would be disposed to grant of its own will free passage through the Canal at the expiration of the present concession, except for a minimum right of administration and control, if Europe would guarantee to her from now all freedom from interference or foreign occupation, and would ask
the English to withdraw from the Nile Valley. Egypt would sacrifice all her benefits from the Canal in exchange for her liberty and independence.

"This is a personal idea of mine, which I submit to those who are interested in the freedom of the Canal, and to my compatriots who are not less interested in the freedom of their country". (Mohammed Farid Bey at a "Conférence" in Paris, 13 June, 1910. "Campagne de Mohammed Farid Bey", pp. 37-8.)

THE LATE GRAND VIZIER HILMI PASHA OF TURKEY, AND MOHAMMED FARID BEY, LEADER OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST PARTY

[Hilmi Pasha authorised the "Temps" correspondent at Constantinople to state that the Turkish Government had had no relations with the Egyptian Nationalist Party, and had no intention nor desire to have any such relations, inasmuch as the Ottoman Government regarded the condition of Egypt as satisfactory—"Temps", 5 October, 1909.]

In the "Nouvelles", 6 October, 1909, Mohammed Farid Bey made the following reply:

"The words of Hilmi Pasha have surprised me, the more as he declared to me—yes, to me, as he received me, as leader of the Nationalist Party, together with a delegation of the party which came to Constantinople in July last year to take part in the constitution festivities—that the Ottoman Government would never forget Egypt, and would do nothing either to recognise the existing state of things or to render it worse. Only, he said, the Government was not sufficiently strong to open the Egyptian question, but it would certainly open it when it was strong. If His Highness Hilmi Pasha should presume to repudiate his own words, I shall only remark that the delegation at whose head I was consisted of ten members, all of whom are still alive. For the rest, the same assurances were given to me by Ahmed Riza, President of the Chamber; by Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha, Vice-President of the Senate, who had received us in the absence of the President, Said Pasha,
and by a number of other high Ottoman personages. A few weeks previously my friend, Dr. Osman Ghaleb Bey, had asked of the Sultan himself for the application of the constitution to Egypt, in the course of an audience which was granted to the first delegation sent by our party with that object to Constantinople. On the following day a number of Ottoman politicians declared their desire that the Sultan should pay a visit to Egypt, as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.

[Hilmi Pasha was severely censured by the "Tanin" for his untruthful and indiscreet pronouncement in the "Temps", this censure making his ultimate resignation absolutely imperative.]

"To all men of ordinary intelligence, it must seem obvious that the experiment now being tried in Turkey is apparently conducted under less favourable conditions than would be the case if it were carried out in Egypt". (Mr. Edward Dicey, in September "Nineteenth Century", 1908.)
CHAPTER XXV

ROOSEVELT—IMPERIAL DEMOCRAT

On the morrow of the Roosevelt Guildhall peroration, the Egyptian Special Correspondent of a well-known halfpenny purveyor of sensationalism, who had been deputed by his employers to meet the great Imperial "Democrat" on his return to Egypt and civilisation, informed a wondering and expectant British public, that, judging from the ex-President's condemnatory speech levelled at the people of Egypt regarding Boutros Pasha's assassination, and the subsequent demonstration of the students outside Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo, he "felt sure that Mr. Roosevelt would break out in England on the subject of Egypt ever since he gave in Cairo the speech which so inflamed the young Egyptians against him". Amongst other inconsiderate trifles, he averred, from a superlatively sublime eminence of insularly superficial superiority, that when "the procession of young Egyptians marched round to hoot Mr. Roosevelt at 'Shepherd's', it was noticed that they were mostly boys"; and therefore by implication, being a movement operated by a howling crowd of youngsters, it was quite unworthy of the serious consideration of a British Government or People.

Permit me to state that I have no intention of crossing swords, metaphorically or otherwise, with this evidently well-intentioned, but none the less badly informed, Special Correspondent. He was there earning his bread and butter, and no doubt did his best
according to his lights, but as Burke says, "Men little think how immorally they act in rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their delusive good intentions are no sort of excuse for their presumption. Those who mean well must be fearful of acting ill".

This statement of Burke's should be painted above the entrance of all public buildings in letters of gold, and printed on the notebooks of all special and other correspondents, not to mention ex-Presidents of American Republics making royal progresses in Europe and elsewhere.

I have merely instanced this correspondent as one of the many other evidences of misrepresentation, in addition to those set forth in this narrative.

I would add in passing, that an Oxford University "rag", for instance, on a visiting German Professor, who had adversely criticised England's "Dreadnought" policy, while an evidence of British patriotic feeling, would hardly be considered to represent the conduct of the thinking Britisher, who, while approving the views underlying the "rag", would very naturally consider it derogatory to his dignity to "demonstrate". Were the German Professor, therefore, a superficial observer even as Mr. Roosevelt, and more especially our Correspondent, he might reasonably declare on returning to the Fatherland, that the English movement in favour of "Dreadnought" building was confined to a few hundred mad undergraduates. The German would be quite in error, as every one is well aware. This Professor, therefore, arguing from such premises, would find himself standing—according to Roosevelitian diction—on "a real live wire". Similarly, the Britisher who imagines that the Egyptian Nationalist move-
ment is confined to a few hundred students, "mostly boys", is not only playing with a "very live wire", but one of high voltage and extremely light casing. And what is true with regard to Egypt applies to the entire European "protected" Orient—recent developments in India fully bearing out my statement.

Meanwhile, Press telegrams inform, but do not enlighten; Press correspondents and globe-trotting ex-Presidents continue to mislead, because of their superficiality or prejudice; and in spite of repeated warnings, the British bureaucrat goes blundering blindly to the precipice of "another native rising", at the bottom of which is a beach littered with lost opportunities, while the rising tide of "war taxes" draws the helpless British taxpayer into the fathomless depths of impecuniosity.

Human nature being what it is—East or West—men of thought and leaders of political movements rely upon argument to have the justice of their claims allowed, and like Æsop's "Old Man And The Boy In The Apple Tree", first use words, then tufts of grass, resorting to stones only after the virtue of lighter missiles has proved ineffective.

"The most unpleasant truth", said Mr. Roosevelt at Cairo, "is a far safer companion in the long run than the pleasantest of falsehoods". This by no means original platitude is the very thing Mr. Roosevelt lost sight of as soon as, or before, he had uttered it.

The Egyptians, ever since the year 1898, have been telling the English that they want them to evacuate the country according to pledges made,¹ and this is the acme of truth, however unpleasant or distasteful to England it may be. And on Mr. Roosevelt's declaration, this "safe companion" of his has been ignored

¹ Vide Appendices to Chapters XVII and XXVI.
by the British Foreign Office; and in place of Sir Eldon Gorst's claim that, "I have no hesitation in saying that the leaders of the Nationalist Party are morally responsible for the murder of Boutros Pasha", it is the British regime at Cairo that is morally responsible for the murder of the Coptic Prime Minister.¹

Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, 15 June, 1910, admitted that Mr. Roosevelt's speech was shown to him before it was delivered. He also trotted out that old formula about "trusteeship" which he had previously used at the Huddersfield Junior Liberal Association on 27 October, 1898; and further, "that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to maintain our Occupation of Egypt, because we cannot abandon without disgrace our responsibilities which have grown up around us". In order to "maintain British Occupation", within a month from this declaration, a Khedivial Decree was issued legalising three measures of the most reckless repression, which measures had been previously rejected by the Legislative Council.

The first of these measures intended to "maintain the Occupation without disgrace", was the graceless act by which the pressman of Egypt may be handed over like an ordinary felon directly to the Assize Courts, where there is no jury, and from whence there is there no appeal.

The second graceless act was levelled against students who should participate in demonstrations, in or out of school, write for, or give news to newspapers—great pains and penalties being attached to such misdemeanour, including expulsion.

But the most sublime act of diplomatic gracelessness to "maintain the Occupation without disgrace", was that by which all criminal agreements between two or more persons—this to include any kind of "concerted action" or "conspiracy", or determination to act jointly in a "criminal" way—was to be punished with various terms of imprisonment. This was, in the language of Mr. Roosevelt, "tidying up" with a vengeance "in the welfare of mankind and in the future of civilisation".

Now in the first place, I would say that Mr. Roosevelt with all his platitudes did not know what he was talking about, especially when we are informed that, "sentimentality is the most broken reed on which righteousness can lean". Ever since Mr. Roosevelt's speech I have been examining British official reports about Egypt and elsewhere, but I have been quite unable to discover either "sentimentality" or special evidences of "righteousness" in the official acts of Great Britain towards subject races.

But the remarkable part about the bombastic puerility of the ex-President, which is also a "most unpleasant truth", is the fact that the great Democratic Imperialist has so many little matters of his own at home which would benefit by that "tidying brush" he so strenuously suggests should be used in Egypt. For instance, the lynching of innocent Negroes without trial, and the lawlessness existing South of "Mason and Dixon's" line. I believe "Mason and Dixon" to be the correct term; at any rate, Americans know where I mean, and I hope they will enlighten the ex-President. Crispus Attacus and other Negroes fought in the cause of American Independence at the Battle of Bunker's Hill; simi-
larly, they fought for the "Union", but they have been treated neither with "sentimentality" nor "righteousness". Yet, they shed their blood and gave their lives for American Independence and "Union", assisting to make a Roosevelt possible.

There were those famous Chicago riots, when Mr. Roosevelt's white fellow-citizens made that city a hell, even as some of them have done for the coloured people, South of the above-mentioned line. Does this represent a state of high civilisation to the "real—not mock—democrat, a man who feels that his first thought is bound to be the welfare of the masses of mankind, and his first duty to war against violence and injustice and wrong-doing"?

"Charity", it is said, "begins at home".

The number of strikes in the United States of America for eight years, ending December, 1886, were 5453, involving 1,879,292 persons, at a time when Lord Cromer's "new system of government was growing up with quite a great degree of success", in Egypt.

Between 1876 and 1886, 206,595 divorces were granted in the United States of America. The divorce courts have been reformed since then, but divorce has meanwhile increased 75 per cent. Surely these are "grave menaces" both to America "and to civilisation".

Then there is that giddy exclusive New-York-cum-Newport 400, founded by the late Ward Macalister, who, as Juvenal said of the Roman matrons:

"All glowing, all athirst
For wine, whole flasks of wine, and swallows first
Two quarts to clear her stomach and excite
A ravenous, an unbounded appetite",—

1 From official statistics by Broadstreet and Carrol D. Wright, 1888, United States Commission for Labour, for eight years ending December. I regret I have no later statistics, but American strikes have not decreased. 2 Sat. VI. (Gifford's Trans.).
an idle rich group whose frequent matrimonial and other sexual adventures surely deserve the attention of Mr. Roosevelt in his "War against . . . wrong-doing".

Then there are those Sybaritic orgies of New York City, which even the efforts of Dr. Comstock and his "Society for the Suppression of Vice" have been unable to stamp out, which presents subjects in plenty for the "unwritten law", and the law that is written. Surely these are "a menace to civilisation".

The assassination of Presidents Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and the recent attempt on the life of the Mayor of New York—are these evidences of an "anarchical condition of murderous chaos" in the United States of America, or are they proofs that the ex-President of the American Republic and those in authority are "neither desirous nor capable of guaranteeing even that primary justice, the failure to supply which makes self-government not merely an empty but a noxious farce"? Lynching and burning of defenceless Negroes, who, in the sweat of their faces, have helped to make the power of the United States which is unable to protect them, convicts that Government of being "incapable of guaranteeing even primary justice", and exposes its Government before the civilised world as "an empty and noxious farce".

"Go forward in the path you have marked out" in Uganda, is the pronouncement of the greatest political mountebank of modern times, "which is all that is necessary".

As a matter of fact, I feel that this ink is really being wasted on such a superficial mass of political puerility. "Uganda has been the scene of an extraordinary development of Christianity" (!), proceeds
the American law-giver. "In East Africa you have a land which can be made a true white man’s country" (italics mine), "and all that is necessary is to follow the lead of the Governor, Sir Percy Girouard".

I must admit that I have not visited East Africa: Mr. Roosevelt has. Notwithstanding this I have come in contact, not with "settlers", but with those British subjects (!) who were not permitted to settle; and these informed me that throughout East Africa, including Uganda, with its "extraordinary development of Christianity", and where "white South Africans" had emigrated, that having brought their prejudices with them, the Asiatic officials in the Government services were compelled to resign, because colour prejudice had debarred them from rising or obtaining promotion. Colour prejudice is as strong there as it is against the Negroes in the Southern States of America. Can it therefore be a matter for surprise that Mr. Roosevelt should have appreciated conditions which reminded him so "strikingly of his own men in America"?

There is not a single hotel in British East Africa, except in Zanzibar, and there only in a restricted sense, where an Asiatic would be allowed to stay; the proprietor simply would not have him as a guest. If no one would accommodate him, in spite of the "extraordinary development of Christianity", he would be forced to wander about the streets night and day, and very possibly stand a good chance of being "run in" as a suspicious character. Therefore, follow "the lead of the Governor", for he and other Englishmen "in Africa are doing a great work for the British Empire and they are also doing a great work for civilisation"! Even in sport the colour line is drawn, for a rule of the Narobi Turf
Club forbids a coloured man to act as jockey; and the Sultan of Zanzibar, although possessed of excellent racing stock, must perforce engage a European jockey to ride for him. Of course, "Christianity being extraordinarily developed" in East Africa, it is most sinful and unseemly that the coloured people should think of sport. "Pray without ceasing" is the first and great commandment for "niggers"; and the second is very important, "Obey your masters".

"No one at present", said an Englishman recently returned from East Africa, "who is not European can rise above a clerkship, no matter what his merits are or his knowledge of local customs and languages. Colour prejudice is as strong throughout British East Africa and Uganda as it is against the Negroes of the Southern States of America".¹ "All that is necessary in East Africa is to follow the Governor, Sir Percy Girouard".

Like many another globe-trotting and scribbling interloper, Mr. Roosevelt evidently imagined that he could pay a flying visit to Cairo, remain a week, and write a book that would startle the world.

I am afraid that I am taking the ex-President as seriously as he takes himself.

I sincerely hope that I shall be alive when the memoirs of the Emperor William II of Germany are published, as I am rather curious to learn what suggestions Mr. Roosevelt made to His Imperial Majesty, during the review, with regard to the possible improvement of the German Army.

ALI KAMIL
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONALIST PARTY
FOUR days after the death of Boutros Pasha, Mohammed Said Pasha, a prominent Nationalist who, as previously stated, had been Minister of the Interior under Boutros Pasha, was appointed Prime Minister. He had been formerly a judge of the Court of First Instance at Alexandria, and his elevation to the chief office in the State, with the appointment of Ismail Pasha Sidky, another prominent Nationalist and former Government Municipal official, to the post of Under Secretary to the Interior, was undoubtedly a Nationalist triumph.

There can be little doubt that Mohammed Said Pasha is a very capable man, notwithstanding his love for the plaudits of the multitude; and as he represents the nation in a manner which did not obtain in the case of Boutros Pasha, there is no reason why his appointment should not give universal satisfaction. Up to the present, despite the rather stringent acts, noted in a previous chapter, his Ministry has been rather a success, and this might be largely owing to his well-known and widely expressed political opinions; but it is greatly to be feared that he will not have any more voice in the affairs of the Government than his Turco-Egyptian-Circassian-Jew predecessors. The Egyptians are a peace-loving people, and a little sympathy with their aims goes a long way towards softening bitterness; they can and will be led, but they will not be driven.
They only ask bare justice at the hands of Great Britain, and it is for the recognition of their just claims that they have agitated. They are not ungrateful to England, but the English claim upon their gratitude has been of a rather negative quantity. These pages have, I trust, abundantly proved that their grievances are real. Their political aspirations for the most part are analogous to those of the women of England at the present day. All the women of England do not trouble about a vote, because they do not realise what the power of the vote means to them in the way of enhanced social conditions and adequate legislative amelioration. The apathetic, unintellectual majority are the stumbling-block to the intellectual and progressive minority. No one possessing a knowledge of the subject will say that the masses in England knew or appreciated the political benefits conferred upon them by Lord John Russell’s great Reform Bill; nor must it be forgotten that the Tories of the time were absolutely opposed to the measure. Yet, in the light of subsequent events, the Bill has proved to be the starting-point for greater liberal and political reform in England, thereby justifying its existence. The Barons at Runnymede, by wresting the Great Charter from the unwilling John, built the foundation of all subsequent liberty in England; but the yeomen of England were unable to appreciate the magnitude and far-reaching results of the efforts of the Barons.

In like manner the claim has been made that the Egyptians are not ripe for self-government. No more were the people of England ripe for Lord John Russell’s Bill; for it is indisputable that they did not understand what it was all about, nor did they
appreciate what it meant for them. It is also asserted that the peasantry of Egypt are too ignorant to appreciate the difference between arbitrary rule, to which they have been accustomed for centuries, and the benefits to be derived from self-government, inasmuch as they had to be driven to the polls to vote for such limited representation as they already possess. This is arrant humbug. The people of England, until the subsequent efforts of the Labour Party, were quite as ignorant as the people of Egypt, possessing no more knowledge of their rights and liberties than the people of Egypt, and prior to the Corrupt Practices Act their votes were openly bought and sold, and this within contemporary memory. That a people are presumed to be unable to appreciate a benefit conferred is no reason why a benefit should be withheld; and that the people of Egypt are so deeply sunk in ignorance as to be unable to appreciate the blessings of self-government is one of the greatest falsehoods that has ever been uttered. Mere bookish learning, as pointed out elsewhere, does not necessarily imply a lack of intelligence, and the Nationalist Press of Egypt, although by no means perfect in other respects, has at any rate broadened the outlook of the Egyptian peasant; and I maintain without fear of contradiction that, notwithstanding his lack of "letters", after taking all the educational disadvantages under which he has laboured into consideration, it will be found that he compares favourably with any peasant class in the world.

The greatest trouble in Egypt has been, and is, the desire to keep the administration in the hands of a small band of narrow-minded English bureaucrats, who in order to maintain an illegal and unwarranted usurpation, underrate Egyptian intelli-
gence in the pages of their lying and contradictory reports, and the columns of their journals. Knowing that they are supported by the Government at home, they do pretty much as they like; and when they observe that intellectual progress is being made, they deliberately provoke breaches of the peace in order to impress the English public with "Egyptian intolerance", and "native turbulence and unrest".

The Egyptians do not love England, but England has herself produced this condition of ill-feeling by her oppressive measures, and her ever-present menace in the Army of Occupation.

Twenty-eight years have now passed since England aggressively occupied Egypt, and what has she to show for it in the way of intellectual progress? Education at a standstill: Liberal institutions practically where Lord Dufferin left them in 1883: Native Government officials bereft of initiative. Truly a great work!

We are told that the native official is incapable of using his brains, and that he is a mere machine. What incentive has the native had to use his brains? He is taught by the British official to do as he is told; when he does this he is accused of incompetence. If an official be sent to perform some allotted task, his instructions are minutely set out. He knows the British official to be an arrogant individual exercising unlimited power; should he act upon his own initiative, because of some occurrence which did not come within the ken of the "master mind", he is roundly rated for not obeying instructions; and when he carries out his instructions to the letter, should there be some unexpected development which the English head did not foresee, and the native,
in order to avoid censure, feared to remedy, he is accused of lack of intelligence and want of capacity.

Last February, in the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour urged the Government "to take steps to maintain our prestige in Egypt by letting the little band of our countrymen in Egypt feel that they were absolutely supported by the authority at home".

It is this knowledge that the little band is being supported in their aggression in Egypt which causes them not merely to keep the native officials down, but to commit unprovoked assault, such as that cited in a previous chapter. While this little band of Mr. Balfour's is so "supported by the Government at home", there can never be any peace in Egypt.

The little band has squandered the Reserve Fund on official residences and useless bridges in the Soudan, when a part at least of that money might have been more beneficially spent on education, or paying off the Public Debt.

This little band has kept native salaries down while they took good care to see that their own salaries were adequate, thereby fostering bribery and corruption on the part of the native official. If the salary of an individual is inadequate, there is the ever-present incentive to his turning a dishonest penny. When English writers recklessly accuse Egyptians of corruptibility, in order to maintain arguments which make for the discredit of Egyptian morals, these writers close their eyes to bribery and corruption at home, which include the wholesale convictions of London Boards of Guardians for municipal bribery and peculation. All arguments ad-

---

duced against Egyptians are one-sided, and few of them will stand the light of minute investigation.

Doubtless those reading these pages will long ere this have arrived at the wholly erroneous impression that I am anti-English.

If I have conveyed any such impression I regret it, inasmuch as I have lived too long among the English not to learn to appreciate their good qualities and their sense of justice. But the unfortunate and inexplicable fact is, that the Englishman at home is so different an individual from the Englishman in the various colonies and dependencies of Great Britain. Evidently that old Roman blood which he undoubtedly possesses, making as it does for conquest and mastery, has caused the Briton when abroad to display those latent elementary characteristics in the interests of prestige and power to the annihilation of his nobler qualities. In no other way can I account for his dual personality.

"There is nothing," says Matthew Arnold, "like love and admiration for bringing people to a likeness with what they love and admire; but the Englishman never seems to dream of employing these influences upon a race he wants to fuse with himself. He employs simply material interests for his work of fusion; and beyond these nothing but scorn and rebuke. Accordingly, there is no vital union between him and the races he has annexed."

It is this lack of love and admiration, the employment of material interests in the work of fusion, and the ever-present scorn and rebuke for annexed races, that have produced unrest in India and discontent in Egypt. No race possessing the most rudimentary elements of manhood wants to be molly-coddled; but by the same token, subject races expect that
their aims and desires will be treated with consideration and respect—a consideration and respect which in no wise detract from the merit or dignity of an Administrator, but which tend to enhance such merit and dignity. Great men prove their greatness in small things. Repressive measures are more frequently a sign of weakness than an indication of strength, and are the weapons of small men.

There are no great men in these degenerate days. “In the past,” says Professor Pearson, “the great man, whether he were a successful soldier, a Cæsar, or a Napoleon, or the organising statesman, an Augustus Cæsar, a Richelieu, or a Chatham, was a man who had a policy of his own, which he was prepared to carry out single-handed. His deeds were the big things he bequeathed to posterity.” Whether in the strenuousness of war or the peaceful arts of government these were men of iron. In these days of modern collectivity, in peace or war, there are a group of small men of lath, labelled “statesmen” and “soldiers,” deftly painted to look like iron. They make much noise; strut across the world’s stage during their little hour of bombast and vanity; disappear, and are quickly forgotten. But they perpetrate considerable evil, which they bequeath to other vainglorious tinkerers, and so it goes on. Mess and muddle, muddle and mess, in the interest of party gain. Pride without profit and party without patriotism. Accordingly, proper pride and wholehearted patriotism in subject races are accounted criminal and presumptuous.

The East has, however, found it high time to awake from the slumber of centuries.

Japan’s position in the congress of Nations and her defeat of a Power previously dreaded by the nations
of Europe have changed Oriental conditions and political aspirations for all time. China is also progressing unostentatiously. The treaty between Great Britain and Japan expires in 1915. One of two things is bound to happen. I have it on reliable authority that, unless there is some extraordinary development within the next few years, that treaty will not be renewed, and Japan and China will either come to grips for the mastery in the Far East; or, in the event of Japan finding China too strong, there will be a coalition. Should this happen, it were well that Europe keeps her powder dry against the day. England is bound to lose India in any case. Japan has her eye on that strip of Asia, and she will have it. Indians may dissemble, but they do not love England. Royal progresses and coronations may be brilliant spectacles, in which native Princes will participate and which the multitude will applaud, but they will not wipe out decades of scorn, repression, and humiliation. Nemesis is slow, but she is certain to arrive.

Egypt is not the property of England. England has vested interests in that country; so have other Powers. There is yet time to do a graceful action whereby hatred and bitterness may be turned into an undying gratitude, if the party wire-pullers in England have the good sense and perspicacity to improve the shining hour. The time will come when England will need all the available goodwill of other peoples. It behoves her to make preparation against that time. Rome was mighty; but Rome fell, and no subject nation wept her fall; they only turned to rend her. Materialism, greed, and the war of faction produced her fall. History is repeating itself.

"O wad some Pow'r the giftie gi'e us
To see oursel's as ither see us."
It is because of my express intention of enlightening the people of England with regard to the true situation in Egypt that I have been seemingly so drastic in my criticism of British Administrative methods. I trust that no offence will be caused nor ill-feeling engendered by my poor endeavours to portray such facts of Egyptian conditions as I am familiar with, in the hope that mutual appreciation may result therefrom, a better understanding be arrived at, and the just claims of the Egyptian people to self-government be recognised at the hands of a race whose traditional motto is Freedom, Justice, and Impartiality.

"Therefore I do not grieve. Oh, hear me, Egypt; Even in death thou art not wholly dead. And hear me, England! Nay: thou needs must hear me. I had a thing to say, and it is said ".

1 "The Whirlwind", by Wilfrid Scawen Blunt.
APPENDIX I

MORE PLEDGES

"I CANNOT do otherwise than express my general concurrence . . . that the occupation of Egypt is in the nature of a burden and difficulty; and that the permanent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our traditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith towards the Suzerain Power, while it would be contrary to the laws of Europe. . . . I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered. . . . The thing that we cannot do with perfect honour is either to deny that we are under engagements which preclude the idea of indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral consideration". (Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, 1 May, 1893.)

"The Government of Her Britannic Majesty declares that it has no intention of altering the political status of Egypt". (Text of the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April, 1904.)

"There are insuperable objections to the assumption of a British Protectorate over Egypt. It would involve a change in the 'political status' of the country. Now in Art. 1 of the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April, 1904, the British Government have explicitly declared that they have no intention of altering the political 'status' of Egypt." (Lord Cromer's report, 3 March, 1907; "Egypt", No. 1 (1907), p. 12.)

"It has been said that Great Britain proposes shortly to proclaim the protectorate or the annexation of Egypt to the
British Empire. Will Sir Eldon Gorst permit me to ask him whether this rumour is well founded or not?"

"The rumour has no foundation, and you may contradict it categorically. Great Britain has engaged herself by official agreements with Turkey and the European Powers to respect the suzerainty of the Sultan in Egypt. She will keep her engagements, which, moreover, she reiterated in 1904 at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement. England stipulated in that Agreement that she had no intention to change the political situation in Egypt. Neither the people nor the Government wish to rid themselves of these engagements". (Sir Eldon Gorst’s interview with Dr. Nimr, Editor of the “Mokattam,” 24 October, 1908. This interview was subsequently acknowledged as official by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons.)

"There exists among the better-educated sections of society a limited but gradually increasing class which interests itself in matters pertaining to the government and administration of the country. This class aspires quite rightly to help in bringing about the day when Egypt will be able to govern herself without outside assistance. This is also the end to which British policy is directed, and there need, therefore, be no antagonism of principle between the Egyptian and English reforming elements". (Sir Eldon Gorst’s Report, 27 March, 1909; “Egypt”, No. 1 (1909), p. 1.)

"Since the commencement of the Occupation the policy approved by the British Government has never varied, and its fundamental idea has been to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, while helping them in the meantime to enjoy the benefit of good government". (Sir Eldon Gorst, ib., p. 48.)

"British policy in Egypt in no way differs from that followed by Great Britain all over the world towards countries under her influence, namely to place before all else the welfare of their populations". (Sir Eldon Gorst’s Report, 26 March, 1910; “Egypt”, No. 1, 1910, p. 51.)
APPENDIX II

THE LAW OF LIQUIDATION

At the beginning of April, 1880, a Commission was instituted composed of the members of the Caisse, under the chairmanship of Sir Rivers Wilson, to deliberate on the finances of Egypt, the Great Powers having previously bound themselves to sanction any and all decisions of the Commission.

The Commission sat for three months, and the results of their labours were embodied in the law known as the Law of Liquidation. This law was sanctioned by Khedivial decree, dated 17 June, 1880. By that law the Egyptian revenue was taken at £8,576,000. The interest on the unified debt was taken at 4 per cent, together with 1 per cent sinking fund, making a total of 5 per cent, against the former combined rate of 7 per cent. The debt charges were thereby reduced by about £2,000,000 per annum. To compensate for this sacrifice the Law provided that in all cases the surpluses from the assigned revenue should be used exclusively for the redemption of stock, and that in some cases the surpluses from the non-assigned revenue should be made contributory to this end, so as to complete an annual redemption equal to \( \frac{1}{2} \) per cent of the nominal capital of the unified debt—over £57,000,000.

A fresh loan of £5,600,000 was to be raised and added to the privileged debt, so as to pay the floating debt.

The privileged debt was thereby raised to £22,530,000, secured on the railways, harbours, telegraphs, customs, and the revenue of four provinces.

The holders of the floating debt (of which the aggregate

1 "Egypt", No. 1 (1881), pp. 1-14.

368
amount claimed was over £12,000,000) were divided into various categories; of these some were paid their full claims, while others were compelled to accept a reduction of their claims of varying extent. Sir Rivers Wilson had undertaken to pay off a floating debt of £9,000,000.

Thus the European controllers, in their rearrangement of the debt, only proceeded on the same lines suggested by Ismail in 1876, and to which the Powers would not then consent.
INDEX

A
Abbas II, Hilmi Pasha, Khedive, succeeds on death of his father, 207, 270; intervenes in Government, 227, 228; supported by Legislative Council, 231; and discipline of Egyptian troops, 232, 233; and Lord Cromer, 234, 235, 281, 282, 283, 285; opens Assouan Dam, 316; negotiations in name of, 252, 328; his prize bull, 330, 331, 332; students demonstrate against, 342; and marriage, 265; his industry, 285, 286; and Mustapha Kamil, 282, 283-5
Abd-el-Kader, Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, 143
Abdul Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel, 24, 26, 39, 84, 119
Abdu Sheykh Mohammed, religious reformer (afterwards Egyptian Grand Mufti), his opinions, 48, 59, 124; leader of reform at the El-Azhar University, 19, 54; joins Arabi's movement, 64; supports Mr. Blunt's arguments of moderate reform, 70
Abdul Hamid, Sultan of Turkey, signs Cyprus Convention, 28, 29, 30; published by "The Globe," 30: his Pan-Islamic views, 12, 32; regarding reform, 11, 13, 22, 32; sends Commissioners to Egypt (1881), 51, 52; his letter to Arabi, 76, 94; his later attitude towards Arabi, 111 and following; sends Derwish Pasha to Egypt, 90, 91-4; his proclamation of Arabi, 111; and the Powers, 18, 90, and following; Powers divide Red Sea Littoral, 165-70, 182; the Wolff Convention, 175-83; the Tabah incident, 327-8; Firman confirming Abbas II, 270; and Mustapha Kamil, 271, 274; Turkish Commissioners in Egypt, 51-2, 90, 92-6, 103, 107, 176, 179, 180, 183, 199, 234; revolution in Turkey and deposition, 241 and note
Alexandria, riot, 95, 96; bombardment and burning of, 100-1
Ali Fehmy Pasha, fellah Colonel of Guards, A.D.C. to Khedive; intermediary between Tewfik and Arabi, 26, 27, 38, 39; with Arabi at Kasr-el Nil, 24, 36; his conduct at Abdin, 40, 41, 42; in command at Kassassin, 119-20; exiled, 127
Ali, Mehemet, Viceroy of Egypt, his method of taxation, 7; his ability, 8, 9; Princess Nazli on, 120 note; and conscription, 133; conquest of Soudan, 140; and the Sultan's Firman of 1841, ix, 91; National University, 279; Industrial School, 283; and irrigation works, 317
Alla-ed-Deen, Governor-General of the Soudan, 144; killed, 145
Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, his early history and character, 24, 25, 26, 27, 66; he advocates fellah rights, 50; Colonel of 3rd Regiment at Cairo, 23-4; arrested at Kasr-el-Nil, 24, 26, 27, 36; his appearance, 65; his demonstration at Abdin, 40, 41, 42; his great popularity, 27, 36, 46, 52-3, 65; leaves Government in hands of Cherif, but is watchful, 49, 50; his communications with the Sultan's Envoy, 52, 76, 92, 93; his connection with Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, 50, 68; explains Nationalist programme and reforms to Mr. Blunt, 85, 300 and note; Under-Secretary for War, 51 and following; view of the Joint Note, 103; Minister of War, 73; Sultan Pasha and, 79, 83, 118; Circassian plot, 74, 75, 76, 78; Ultimatum demanding his exile, 84; his attitude, 88, 89; resigns, 84; and is reinstated, 85, 90-3; refuses to go to Constantinople, 96; his alleged connection with Alexandria riot, 95; his alleged connection with Prince

371
Halim and the ex-Khedive Ismail, 87; proscribed by Khedive, 108; retained in his position by General Council, 109–10; allows Tewfik to escape to the English, 107; his conduct of war criticised, 111, 112, 116, 117; at Kafr Daraw, 108, 109, 110, 116; neglects to block Suez Canal, 112; his behaviour at Tel-el-Kebir, 120 and notes; at Cairo, after the battle surrenders, 112 and following; trial and exile, 127; returns, note 26.

Arabian Caliphate, 51; Ali Youseff, editor of "El Moayyad" and, 325

Assad, Sheykh Ahmed, of Medina, Sultan's Secret Agent Commissioner in Egypt, 93

Azhar, University, 19, 20, 51, 54, 109–10, 124, 251, 267, 271, 341–2

Baker, Sir Samuel White, conquers Equatorial provinces for Ismail, 141; reports on oppression of inhabitants of Soudan, ib.; warns British Government to hold Soudan, 156

Baker, General Valentine, Pasha, organizes Egyptian Army, 132; on his forlorn hope, 148; exterminated by Maldhi, ib.; Gladstone, Nonconformist conscience and aid to, 149, 150, 151

Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur James, M.P., his "little band" in Egypt, 361; one of the "little band," 331–2

Bedouins, 51, 101, 115; character of, 116, 132, 255

Beresford, Admiral Lord Charles, 116 note

Bismarck, Prince, German Chancellor, responsible for Ismail's deposition, 11; rescues "peace with honour" diplomatists, 31; on the Constantinople Conference, 95

Blignieres, M. de, French Financial Controller in Egypt, 69; resigns, 76

Blunt, Mr. Wilfrid Scawen, 2; and Arabi Pasha, 50, 68, 120 and notes, 128, 127; and Nationalist, 85, 93; and Lord Cromer, 95, 300, 315; and Foreign Office, 138, 139

Boutros, Pasha Ghali, Egyptian Prime Minister; appointed Finance Minister by Abbas II, 227–8; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 232; appointed Prime Minister, xii, 336; and the Denshawai trial, 336; and the Suez Canal Concession, 337–8; and Mohammed Said Pasha, ib.; his assassination, 338–9; opinion of in Egypt, 342–3; and Roosevelt, 348; the blame for his death, 351; his successor appointed, 357.

Buller, General Sir Redvers, 160, 161

Buonaparte, Napoleon, invades Egypt, 32, 34

Burns, Mr. John, Rt. Hon., M.P., 123

C

Cartwright, Mr. William, of Foreign Office, replaces Malét, 97, 108

Cave, Mr., M.P., his financial mission to Egypt, 289; speech regarding condition of fellaheen, in Commons, 311

Charles X, Bourbon, King of France, orders conquest of Algeria, 92

Charrington, Lieut., R.N., 115

Cherif Pasha, informs Ismail of deposition, 6; entrusted with formation of a Ministry by Tewfik, immediately resigns, 20, 21; efforts of Constitutionalists to restore, 36, 38; reappointed by Tewfik at the instance of colonels, 42, 46; intrigue with army through Sultan Pasha, 49, 87; and Commissioners, 52; disapproves Joint Note, 53, 64; Consuls depend on, for information, 56; opinions of Nationalists in regard to, 66–7; joins Controllers, 69, 71, 72; is deposed by Nationalists, 73, 79; declines to form Ministry, 84; reappointed Prime Minister, 128, 129; resigns, 147, 150, 157; Lord Cromer's opinion of, 218; and the Budget of 1892, 290

Chermise, Colonel, Governor-General Red Sea Littoral, 169

Circassian Plot, the 74–8

Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum Garrison, 147, 150

Colvin, Sir Auckland, English Financial Controller in Egypt, his action at Abdin, 40, 41; professes sympathy with Nationalists, 51, 58; his message to Arabi by Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, 68, 70; condemns Joint Note, 53, 64; his influence with Malét, 73, 76; resigns, 131

Conference at Constantinople. See Wolff and Dufferin.
INDEX

Connaught, H.R.H. Duke of, almost taken prisoner at Kassassin, 112; opens Assouan Dam, 316

Constitution, Egyptian, 41, 49, 54, 67, 68–9, 70, 72; Malet promises to respect, 79

Cookson, Sir Charles, Consul at Alexandria acting for Sir Edward Malet, negotiates with the colonels at the Abdin, 42; presses Cherif Pasha to accept Premiership, 43

Cromer, Earl of, and Ismail's financial operations, 16; on Arabi Pasha, 49, 114; and the Circassian Plot, 74; is appointed Consul-General, arrives at Cairo, 136; waiting for developments after Hicks's defeat, 150; supports Gordon's request for Zobier Pasha, 153; and the capture of Zeyla, 166; on intrigues and suffering, 172; and Lord Northbrook's friendship, 173 and note; race against bankruptcy, 177; and the difficult financial situation, 178; throws off weight during “race”, 183; on the dual interest of France and England, 186; and Egyptian revenue, 189 note; sells Daira and Domains lands, 191 and note, 192; and “legislation by diplomacy,” 194–5; disagrees with Nubar over reorganisation of police, 196–7; and Nubar's dismissal, 198–9; helps Ismail to obtain arrears of Civil List, 202 and note; on ignorance of natives, 226 note; compells Khedive to dismiss Ministry, 228; throws Abbas II into ranks of Nationalists, 229; and ideas of Egyptian University, 279–80; and the Khedive-Adam courtesies, 282–3; and his misleading comparisons, 288; and the Dual control, 290; nursing the financial achievement idea, 291; and irritation, 292; gives “Nature a chance,” 293; and the Commission of Liquidation, 294; suspends funding of the debt, 295; paints the terrible condition of the peasantry in lurid colours, 296–8; becomes optimistic, 299; on the new method of tax remission, 300; “abolishes the corvéé!” 300–1; military service revenue dudge, 301–2; and the Kurbash, 303–9; and British opinion as regards his reforms, 315; leads movement to repress English women, 318–4; and success of Agricultural Banks at Sheffield, 314–5; and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's history, 315; and the Assouan Dam, 316–7; suppresses tobacco cultivation and ruins the sugar industry, 318; as a “Free Trader”, 319; as a benefactor, 319; and the Denshawai atrocities, 321 note; his promise to remove British troops, 328; and his modern Star Chamber, 329 and note; at the Opera House, Cairo, 333; suggests repression whilst in the act of receiving the Freedom of the City of London, 326

D

Daoud Pasha, Tewfik's brother-in-law; appointed Egyptian War Minister, 37; orders banishment of colonels, 40

Denshawai incident, 321 note, 328; "short shift," 329 and note; the murder of the good Samaritan, 330; a precedent established by Jamaica Riots, 391–5

Digna, Osman, exterminates detachment sent to relieve Tokar, 147; evacuates Tamai, 162; defeated at Tokar, 170

Disraeli (Earl of Beaconsfield) purchases Suez Canal Shares, 14; their value, 16; Berlin Congress, 28; and Asiatic Provinces, 29, 30; "Peace with Honour," 31, 32, 275

Duclerc, M., French Foreign Minister, requests information on England's intentions, 128

Dufferin, Marquis of, High Commissioner to Egypt, and Ambassador at Constantinople, reports Constantinople Conference had done nothing, 96; and the Porte re bombardment of Alexandria, 100; his exaggerations at the Constantinople Conference as to anarchy in Egypt, 110; his mission to Egypt, 126 note; on England's friendship for the Egyptians, 128 note; his arrival in Cairo, 129; on the composition of the Egyptian Army, 132; and "the prudent development of popular liberties," 134–5; recommends Lord Cromer as Consul-General, 136; his general policy in Egypt, 138–9, and (appendix to chapter xvii), 208–11; and his
report 290; optimistic view of the finances, 297; and the Kurbash, 304-6
Dunlop, Educational "Adviser" in Egypt; ejects M. Lambert from Khedivial Law School, 277; his "professors," 278; National University and, 280

E
Earle, General, 160, 161, 162
Education in Egypt, efforts of Artin Pasha for adequate, 200-1, 226 note. See also Dunlop and Cromer Edward VII, R.I., and President of French Republic, 186; visits Egypt, 204
Egypt, people of, 253-69; question of the real Egyptian, 274-5
Emin Pasha, Governor of the Province of Equatoria [Lado Enclave], 167-8

F
Fakhri, Hassan Pasha, Minister of Justice, 199; troubles little about justice and is relieved of office, 206; professes Nationalist views, and is appointed Prime Minister by Abbas II, 227; Lord Cromer protests against his appointment, is dismissed, 228; appointed Minister of Public Works and Instruction, 232; is decorated with K.C.M.G. at opening of Assouan Dam, 317
Farid, Mohammed Bey, President of Nationalist Party, contributes to Nationalist movement, 274; the question of his origin, 275; elected on death of Mustapha Kamil, 324; on tasting the Occupation Water, 344; on the Canal Concession, 345-6; and the Grand Vizier, 346-7
Fehmi, Mustapha Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Arabist Ministry, 74; his appointment as Prime Minister suggested by French and British Consuls, 79; succeeds Riaz as Prime Minister, 205; deposed by Abbas II, 227; appointed Minister of War, 232; retires from public life, 336, xii
Flourens, M., French Minister for Foreign Affairs, issues Circular to French Representatives on Anglo-Turkish Convention, 184, 185
Forster, Mr. W. E., M.P., on the worthlessness of Western advice to Oriental administrators, 158
Freycinet, M. de, Prime Minister of France, succeeds M. Gambetta, 71; and the Circassian Plot, 76; Nationalists count on his support, 78, 79; supports non-Turkish intervention, 81; proposes Turkish intervention, 82, 83; refuses to sanction Admiral Conrad's participation in bombardment, 98-9; on the "Question d'Egypte," 242-3

G
Gambetta, M., Prime Minister of France, decides to strengthen Khedive's Government, 55; approaches Lord Granville, 56; instructs consuls to encourage Khedive to assert his authority, 57; Lord Granville agrees to Gambetta's proposals, 58; his Joint Note, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63; refuses to explain note, 64; his fall, 71; and de Freycinet's policy, 78, 81; and his plan of intervention, 86; Arabi and the Note, 103
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., and Egyptian liberty, 61; and Bulgarian, 126; and Arab "freedom," 151; Gordon and, 154-5; fall of his Ministry, 164; evacuation pledges, 208-13; at Newcastle, 206; on the time of evacuation, letter to Mustapha Kamil, 245 and note; in the Commons (Appendix I), 366
General Assembly, vote on Suez Canal rejecting renewal of Concession, 338; demands representative Government, 341
Gordon, General Charles George, R.E., Governor-General of Soudan under Ismail Pasha, appointed to Soudan, 141; recalled on economic grounds, 142; his administration of Soudan, 141, 142; despatch by British Government to Soudan, 150, 151; deserted by tribes, 152; throws up appointment with King of the Belgians, 153; murdered at Khartoum, 154; extract from his journal, 155; his representation to the British Government, 156; Egyptian opinion regarding his appointment, 157; on "smashing the Mahdi," 160, 161; Lord Wolsey's revenge for death of, 165;
his appointment of Emin Pasha as Governor of Equatoria, 167 note; death nullifies object of expedition, 160

Gorst, Sir Eldon, British Consul-General, takes University out of hands of Nationalists, 280; and the Agricultural Banks, 315; returns to Egypt, 333 and note; Egyptian opinion as to his appointment, 334; and the British officials, 334-5; appoints Boutros Pasha Prime Minister, 336; re-enacts Press laws, students demonstrate, 336-7, 342; and reforms, 340-1; his pledges on behalf of England (Appendix I), 366-7

Gortschakoff, Prince, Russian Ambassador at the Berlin Congress, 30-1

Graham, General Sir Gerald, 151, 162

Granville, Lord, British Foreign Secretary, mildly accepts French invasion of Tunis, 34; is approached by St. Hilaire to preserve the peace in Egypt, 58; is led by Gambetta, 55; his ambiguous reply to Gambetta, 56; thinks "something should be done," 57; agrees to Gambetta's proposal for joint interference in Egypt, 58-9; signs Joint Note, his flabby reservation, 60; his desire for joint explanation rejected by Gambetta, 64; tries to extricate himself from Egyptian muddle, 71; intervenes with France in the Circassian Plot, 76; his iniquity, 80-1; agrees with de Freycinet to despatch Anglo-French squadron to Egypt, 82-3; desires Turkey to be represented, de Freycinet declines, 16; does not propose to land troops, 85; Lord Dufferin forwards Porte's request for delay in bombardment, 100; requested by France to state future intentions in Egypt, 128; his Circular Note to the Powers re England's business in Egypt, 130; suggests abolition of Dual control, 131; Lord Dufferin and his pledges, 133-4; his "policy" in the Soudan, 148-9; permits Englishmen and Egyptians to be slaughtered in Soudan, 150; English opinion rouses him, 16; sends General Gordon to his doom, 16; abandons Gordon to his fate, 153; despatches Lord Wolseley, 153; and his muddle in the Soudan, 156-8; summons Conference of Powers to discuss Egyptian finance, 159; is elected president, 16; sends Lord Northbrook to Egypt, 160; annexes Berbera and Bulhar to restore order, 165; Zeyla annexed to preserve order, 166; consents to the Italian occupation of Massowah, 167; gives Bogos to King John of Abyssinia, 168; accepts international guarantee for the Egyptian Loan of £9,000,000, 174; and farcical diplomacy, 207; desire to evacuate Egypt, 217; and the restoration of order, 297

Grenfell, General Sir Francis, 170 note

Grey, Sir Edward, Foreign Secretary, on "trusteeship" at Huddersfield, 245-6; training the Egyptians for self-government, 279 and note; and the Roosevelt-Guildhall speech, 361

H

Halim Pasha, Prince, 6, 13; robbed of his inheritance by Ismail, 10 note; Sultan's opinion of, 77, 93; and Arabi, 87

Hardie, Mr. Keir, M.P., 123

Helbawi Bey, counsel defending Wardani, 339-40

Hewitt, Admiral Sir William, his mission to King John, 168

Hicks, Pasha, his disastrous march up the Nile, 144; annihilated by the Mahdi, 145, 146; is exterminated while Cromer waits, 150

I

Ismail, ex-Khedive of Egypt, his deposition, 6; his debt, 7, 8, 9; opening of Suez Canal, 10; increase of tribute to become Khedive, 10 and note, 11; and the El-Azhar University, 12; his extravagances, 14; value of State lands, 15; value of Canal shares present day, 16; and Nationalist, 23, 24; Abyssinian campaign, 25; and the Rothschilds, 62, 191, 192; Sultan's lack of confidence in, 77; he plots in Naples, 74, 75; his desire to suppress the slave trade in the Soudan, 140, 141, 149, 156; and education, 200, 226 note; death of, 202 and note; marries slave, 264; and the Kurbash, 310;
his claim for arrears of Civil List, 201, 202; and irrigation works, 317; and the Law of Liquidation, 368 (Appendix II)

J

Jemal-ed-din, Sheykh Afghani, Azhar Reformer, 12, 18, 124

John, King of Abyssinia, British Government solicits his assistance for retreat of Egyptian garrisons, 165; Bogos ceded to in consideration of help, ib.; feeds and clothes garrison and population of Gera, 169; receives province of Bogos, ib.

K

Kamil, Ali, Vice-President of Nationalist Party; reduced to the ranks, 274; elected Vice-President, 324

Kamil Mustapha Pasha, founder of new Nationalist Party, writes the "Egyptian Peril," 235; and Fashoda, 245; and Mr. Gladstone, ib. note; educates through "El-Lewa," 256; and Sheykh Ali Youseff, 271-2; and Madame Adam's introductions, 272-3; founds Nationalists' School, 273; and the Grand Vizier and Abdul Hamid, 273-4; and his critics, 276; announces National University Scheme, 279; founds "Egyptian Standard," 280; and French contributors, 281; Cromer on Kamil's connection with Kedive, 282; and his interview with the "Berliner Tageblatt," 282-3; and the Kedive's encouragement of, 284-5; severe relations with Court, 286; and practical reforms, 320; his last illness, 321; writes Sir Campbell Bannerman, 322; final speech and death, 322-3; his funeral, 324; Article III, Nationalist Programme, 345

Kamil, Prince Hussein, the Kedive's uncle, xi; defrauded of his inheritance, 16; his comments on the condition of the natives, 320

Kitchener, Lord, telegraphs the massacre of Gordon, 154; and commercial interests in the Soudan, 179; his success at Omdurman, 170; offers to resign because of Kedive's criticism of Army, 232; honoured by British Government, ib.; Arab captain from Fashoda brought before, 236, 237; arrives before Fashoda with reinforcement, 239; interviews Marchand, ib.; "a whisky and soda," 240; leaves Fashoda, ib.; at the Guildhall, 246

L

Lambert, M., ex-Director Khedivial School of Law; ejected from his post, 277 and note

Lascelles, Sir Frank, British Consul-General, 6, 12, 22

Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, M.P., criticises Gladstone's Egyptian "policy of injustice," 158

Layard, Sir Henry, British Ambassador at Constantinople; and the Cyprus Secret Convention, 28

Legislative Council: severely criticises British administration, 230-1; resolution asking the Khedive's Government for a representative Assembly, Appendix I, p. 345. See also Sir Eldon Gorst, Suez Canal and Yehia Pasha.

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, constructor of Suez Canal, and Ismail, 9; and the Arabi blockade of the Canal, 112, 118

Liquidation, Law of, Appendix II, p. 388

Lulfti, Omar Pasha, and Alexandria Riots, 95, 96; named for War Office, 199

M

McNeill, General Sir John, 162

Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed of Dongola, the product of Turco-Circassian Rule, 142; a Sherif of Mecca on the true, 142 and notes; his qualifications and rise, 148; besieges El-Obeid and captures garrison, 144; defeats Hicks Pasha, 145; Soudan "friendly tribes" and, 152; waning popularity of, 163; rival prophet in Kordofan, ib.; death of, 164; Mohammed El-Amin of Tunis (New Mahdi) establishes himself at El Obeid, is captured and hanged by Captain Mohan, note 170

Maelet, Sir Edward, succeeds Sir Frank Lascelles at Cairo, 22; absent on leave, Cookson acts for, 42; on the general tone of Tewik, 45; and Sherif's political views, 49; on the Kedive's "cheerfulness," 54; did not understand trend of Nationalist movement,
INDEX

56; on Gambetta's "support" to the Khedive, 57, 58; on Chamber and Khedive, 59; on the Joint Note, 63; considers trouble serious, 69; reports non-interference of Arabists with Law of Liquidation, 69; refuses permission to Chamber of Notables to vote Budget, 72; interferes with sentences on Circassian conspirators, 75, 78; conspires with Sultan Pasha to overthrow Arabists, 79; advises Tewfik to retain Ministry, 80; captures Sultan Pasha, 83; issues Ultimatum, with French Consul, banishing Arabi, 84; unmuzzles English Press which disseminates falsehood, 87; Mr. Cartwright acts for, 97; on the Alexandria Riots, 103; is appointed Minister at Brussels, 136

Marchand, Colonel, at Fashoda, 238; board, Lord Kitchener's steamer, 239; "die at my post," 239, 240; his force, 240; Delcassé and, 241, 242; French vintage and Egyptian fiction, 241 and note; M. De Froycinet on, 242, 243; repudiated by his Government, 244; meets Mustapha Kamil, 272 "Mokattam," newspaper, founded by Syrian Christians at Beirout, 229; transferred to Cairo, 230; its pernicious policy, 230, 233; duel with "El Moayyad," 271; interview with Sir Eldon Gorst (Appendix I), 266-7

Minshawi Pasha, fellah Notable, and the Khedive's bull, 331; European lives saved in 1882 by, 332 and note (2), 333

Moncrieff, Captain, English Consul at Suakin, killed at Tokar by Osman Digna, 147

Moncrieff, Sir Colin Scott, of the Public Works Department, on the condition of Egypt, 297; and the corvée, 305

N

Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, suggests partition of Northern Africa, 32

Northbrook, Lord High Commissioner to Egypt, instigates appointment of Palmer, who bribes the Bedouin tribes, 115 and note; Commissioner to Egypt, 160-72; his Reports, 173-4; refuses to seize tribute, 298; and the land tax, 299

Nubar Pasha, negotiates loans for Ismail, 7; and Ismail's Constitution, 19; and International Tribunals, 21, 192, 193; guides new judicial reform, 135; forms Ministry, 150; and English Administration, 197, 198, 199, 206; succeeds to office, 232; on condition of peasantry, 297

O

O'Donovan, Mr., "Daily News" correspondent, killed with General Hicks Pasha, 145

P

Palmer, Sir Elwin, Financial Adviser, defends financial policy, 331

Palmerston, Lord, his policy in Egypt, 32-3

Pledges, Britain's, Appendix to chapters xvii and xxvi

R

Ragheb, Pasha, nominated President of the Council, 98, 107

Ras Alula, Abyssinian general; rescues Egyptian garrisons and defeats Osman Digna, 169

Riaz Pasha, 12; summoned to Egypt by Europeans, 20; his appointment as Prime Minister unpopular, 22; is petitioned by Fellah officers, 25, 26, 27; is suspected of treachery by the Khedive, 35, 36; requests Mahmud Sami's resignation, 37; decides to banish Arabi, 37, 39; at Abdin Palace, 40; deposed at Arabi's instigation, 42, 43; Tewfik's delight at fall of, 46; opposed to Fellah liberty, 65, 66, 74; Minister of Interior, 129; re-appointed Prime Minister, 199, 228; resigns, 205; and the students, 229; rejects proposals of Legislative Council, 231; relieved of office, 232; praises occupation, 283

Rifky, Osman Pasha, War Minister, 22; and fellah officers, 26; dismissed by Tewfik, 27, 36; and the Circassian Plot, 75

Ring, Baron de, French Consul-General; supports claims of Fellah officers, 26, 36; recalled by his Government, 37; induces Sultan
to be represented at Constantinople Conference, 99
Roosevelt, ex-President, his Guildhall speech, 1, 348, 349, 350, 351; and American Negroes, 352, 353; and the "400," 353-4; and Uganda, 354; East Africa, 355, 356; and the German Army, 356

S

Sadyk, Ismail, "Muffetish" to Ismail Khedive, 7, 8, 14, 19, 336
Said Pasha, Viceroy, 7, 23, 24, 45, 317
Said Mohammed Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, 336, 338, 357
St. Hilaire, M. de Barthélemy, French Foreign Minister, suggests Anglo-French military control, 53
Salisbury, Marquis of, Berlin Congress, 28, 30, 35; on soliciting Sultan of Turkey's co-operation, 91, 92; succeeds Gladstone, 164; adopts policy of his predecessor in Soudan, 89; sends Sir H. D. Wolff to Constantinople and Egypt, 175; "pulling the Imperial leg" of the Sultan, 176; accepts the friendly overtures of France, 185; Gladstone and M. Ribot throw down gauntlet, 206; Gilbertian diplomacy, 206-7; on the evacuation pledge in the Lords, 213 (Appendix) and 214; and the Nile Valley, 246; and the British right in the Soudan, 247
Sami, Mahmud, Pasha, el Barodi, Liberal reformer; succeeds Osman Rifky as War Minister, 27, 36; dismissed by Riaz, 37; reappointed Minister of War under Cherif, 46; and his early proposals of reform, 66; Notables' suspicions of, 67; and the Army estimates, 67-8; Notables name him President of the Council, 78; threatens to resist Sultan's Commissioners, 78; Ministry resolve to appoint him Governor-General and depose Tewfik, 79; Dervish Pasha and, 96; deposed by Khedive in favour of Ragheb Pasha, 98; wounded at Kassassin, 119-20; exiled, 127
Scott, Sir John, of Bombay, appointed to inquire into the judicial system, 205
Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp (Lord Alcester), arrives off Alexandria, 84; knocks bottom out of Constantinople Conference, 95; spoiling for a fight, 98; demands discontinuation of works on Alexandrian fortification, 99; notifies European Councils of intended bombardment, 89; signals "Invincible" to fire shell into hospital battery, 100; signals fleet "attack the enemy's batteries," 100, 101; knew Arabi could not surrender land batteries, 103; Khedive under protection of, 107
Shawish Sheyk, editor of "Lews," and education through Press, 256; objections to his Tunisian origin, 275; imprisoned, 336
Sienkiewicz, M., French Consul-General at Cairo, 43, 56, 59, 84
Stephenson, General Sir Frederick, 164
Stewart, Colonel, reports on state of Soudan, 141; crosses Korosko Desert with Gordon, 150, 151; abandoned with Gordon in Kharroum, 153; massacred at Berber, 154; death nullifies object of expedition, 160; revenge for, 168 note
Stewart, General Sir Herbert, 154, 160
Stuart, Mr. Villers, m.p., 303, 312
Suez Canal, concession granted to de Lesseps, 8; opening of, 10; shares bought by British Government, 9, 14; present value, 16; scheme for prolonging concession, 337-8; vote of General Assembly on, 333
Suliman Pasha Sami, and the burning and looting of Alexandria, 101; executed for burning of Alexandria, 129 note
Sultan of Turkey. See Abdul Hamid
Sultan, Omar Bey, prominent Nationalist and friend of Mustapha Kamil, subscribers to Nationalist movement, 274; offers £1000 to National University, 279
Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable, President of Chamber of Notables Arabi takes counsel with, 37; arrives at Cairo with Notables, 43 used by Mahmud Sami and Cherif to bring Arab population into reform movement, 66; on Cherif Pasha's Constitution, 70; sows discord among Nationalists at instigation of Sir Edward Malet, 78; informs British and French Consuls
of impossibility to change Ministry while Arabi in power, 80; backs up Sir Edward Malet, 83; suggests ultimatum, 84; actively agitates with fellah chiefs against Arabi, 118 and note; on the state of the country under Cromer, 296

T

Tewfik Mehemet Pasha, Khedive, is nominated Khedive by the Powers, 10, 13; and Ismail’s Constitution, 18, 19; becomes his own Prime Minister, 20, 21, 206; opposes reforms, 22; Nationalist bitterness against, 23; plots against Riaz Pasha, 26, 27, 35; the Kasr-el-Nil mutiny, 1 February, 27, 36: and the Nationalist, 37, 38, 39; mutiny, 9 September, 40, 41, 42; countenances mutiny, 43, 44; delights at Riaz Pasha’s fall, 46; grants Constitution, 48; Gambetta and, 55, 57; and England and France, 59, 60, 61; and strength of army, 68; and Egyptian Chamber, 69, 73; conflict with Ministry, 75; Sultan’s opinion of, 77; breaks off relation with Ministers, 79, 80; dismisses Arabi’s Ministry, 83, 84; and Circassian Plot, 87, 88; asks for Commissioner to Egypt, 90; sends delegate to meet Turkish mission, 93; and the Alexandrian Riots, 95; backs up to Dervish Pasha, 96; nominates Ragheb Pasha Premier, 98; and Lord Alcester, 103, 116 note; and the General Council, 107, 108, 109; his agents, 117, 119; and Arabi, 120, 121; and notes, 126, 127, 138, 233; and the English, 128, note, 130, 145; abolishes Dual control, 131; and the Soudan, 146, 147 and on; Powers divide Soudan, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170; no love for England, 106 and note; death of, 207

Tunis, the Bey of, seized by General Bréart, who annexes Tunis for France, 84; influence of invasion on Egyptian Nationalist movement, 34, 56, 44, 61

Turkey. See Abdul Hamid.

V

Vincent, Sir Edgar, Financial Adviser, reports on imminent bankruptcy in 1885, 173 note, 299; his financial efforts, 196; and the wretchedness of the peasantry, 296

W

Waddington, M., representing France at the Berlin Congress, 30–1

Wilson, General Sir Charles, 154

Wilson, Sir Rivers, English Financial Controller, 7, 11 note, 33, (Appendix II) 368; his recommendation to Ismail, 289

Wingate, General Sir Reginald, 170, 171, 243

Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, High Commissioner, appointed by Lord Salisbury, 175; arrives in Constantinople, ib.; on the Turks and England, 176; signs Convention with Turkey, ib.; and the ineffectiveness of his mission, 178, 179; his proposals, 179, 180; sets period of evacuation at three years, 181 and note; and “internal unrest” in Clause 4, 182; France and Russia object to Sultan’s signature, ib.; returns to London, ib.; London opinion on mission, 182, 183

Wolsey, Lord, General, Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, consults with British Foreign Office on immediate occupation of Egypt, 83; despatched to Egypt, 105; on Arabi’s neglect to block Suez Canal, 112; the servant of the Khedive, 117; at Ismailia, 118; at Tel-el-Kebir, 120; sent to the Soudan, 153; operations in Soudan, 160, 161–3; retreat ordered, 164; on “the dignity and honour of the English nation,” 165

Women, Egyptian, 23, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267

Women, English, and Lord Cromer, 313–5; political aspirations analogous to Egyptian Nationalist, 358

Wood, General Sir Evelyn, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, organises Egyptian Army, 132; satisfaction with Egyptian Army, 146; idle in Cairo during Soudan rebellion, 143

Y

Yehia Pasha in the Legislative Council on Soudan expenditure, 171 and note; and the reckless use of Reserve Fund, 337
Yousseff, Sheykh Ali, editor of "El Moayyad", educates people, 256; and Lord Cromer, 271-2; entertains Dr. Rutherford, 325; Zobier Pasha telegraphed for by Gordon, 153; and the anti-Slavery Society, 153 note.
RETURN TO the circulation desk of any University of California Library
or to the
NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
Bldg. 400, Richmond Field Station
University of California
Richmond, CA 94804-4698

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS
• 2-month loans may be renewed by calling (510) 642-6753
• 1-year loans may be recharged by bringing books to NRLF
• Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

MAY 21 2005

DD20 6M 9-03