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ARISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION
THE EUDEMIEAN ETHICS
ON VIRTUES AND VICES
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## ON VIRTUES AND VICES:

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ARISTOTLE
THE ATHENIAN
CONSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION

The Politeiai

The place of the Athenian Constitution in the encyclopedia of Aristotle’s writings is known to us from the concluding paragraph of the Nicomachean Ethics. That work forms the first volume of a treatise on the welfare of man as a social being, of which the Politics forms the second volume; and at the end of the former (N.E. x. ix. 21, 23) a prefatory outline of the latter is given, in which occur the phrases ‘the collections of constitutions,’ ‘the collected constitutions’; it is stated that on these will be based that division of the Politics (i.e. Books III.-VI.) which will deal with the stability of states in general and of the various special forms of constitution, and with the causes of good and bad government.

These treatises are said in ancient lists of Aristotle’s writings to have been a hundred and fifty-eight in number. Each no doubt consisted, like the volume before us, of a constitutional history of the state in question followed by a description of its constitution at the time of writing. They are frequently spoken of as the work of Aristotle, but he may well have employed the aid of pupils in their compilation. They were not preserved through the Middle Ages in the Aristotelian Corpus, and until fifty years ago
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were only known to modern students from numerous references and quotations in later writers.

The Athenian Constitution: MSS.

But in 1880 two small and much damaged sheets of papyrus were found in the sands of Egypt which scholars eventually proved to come from a copy of the most important of all these constitutional treatises, the one on the Constitution of Athens. These sheets are now in the Berlin Museum. Palaeographers ascribe them to the fourth century A.D. Ten years later, among some papyrus rolls acquired from Egypt by the British Museum, the Librarian F. G. Kenyon recognized four sheets as containing a copy of almost the whole treatise. These sheets have writing on both sides. On the front are some accounts of receipts and expenses kept by a farm bailiff named Didymus for his master Epimachus, near the Egyptian town of Hermopolis, in the tenth and eleventh years of Vespasian, A.D. 78 and 79. On the back is the Aristotelian treatise; its beginning is wanting, and the first page of the book is blank, showing that it was copied from a damaged copy of the work; and the last roll is very fragmentary. Different parts are written in different hands, four in all; the script is said to date the copy at about A.D. 100. It was doubtless made for a private person (perhaps the writer of one of the four hands), and probably buried with its owner at his death.

Editions

In 1891 Sir Frederick Kenyon published a facsimile of the papyrus, and a printed edition of the text with
an introduction and notes. In 1893 a revised text with a full and valuable commentary was put out by Sandys. Kenyon prepared an edition for the Royal Academy of Berlin, published in 1903, in which he included the fragments of the fourth roll conjecturally arranged in a consecutive text; and his latest edition was published at Oxford in 1920. Of several published abroad, the latest is the Teubner text of 1928 by Oppermann, based on the previous editions of Blass and Thalheim.

Text

The text of the present edition is based on the editio princeps of Kenyon, but it has been corrected by later scholars’ readings of the papyrus. A few critical notes and suggested emendations are appended; but in regard to inaccuracies of grammar and arithmetic, trifling inelegancies of phrase (e.g. τόνδε τρόπον, for which most editors substitute τόνδε τὸν τρόπον), exactly how many are due to a copyist’s carelessness and how many are to be saddled on the author, no two scholars will agree. To the papyrus text have here been prefixed and appended the principal passages from the lost beginning and end of the treatise that the learned industry of scholars has gleaned from the quotations of later Greek authors.

Dates of Composition

The latest event mentioned in the Athenian Constitution (liv. 7) is the archonship of Cephisophon, 329 B.C. The book also mentions (xlvi. 1) triremes
and quadriremes, but not quinquiremes; and the earliest date at which quinquiremes in the Athenian navy are recorded is 325 B.C. The treatise can thus be dated between 328 and 325 B.C. Moreover it speaks (Ixii. 16) of officials still being sent to Samos, and Samos ceased to be under the control of Athens in the autumn of 322 B.C., the year of Aristotle's death.
OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

PART I. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENS TO 403 B.C.

(1) Fr. 1. Original hereditary absolute monarchy. Military command transferred from king to war-lord in time of Ion.
Fr. 2. Local division of royal power among four sons of Pandion.
Fr. 3. Unity restored by Theseus.
Fr. 4. Growth of popular power under Theseus.

(2) Fr. 5. Constitution in time of Theseus: four Tribes, Thirds, Brotherhods, Clans.
Fr. 6. Murder of Theseus. Recovery of his bones by Athens.
Fr. 7. End of hereditary monarchy.
Fr. 8. Conspiracy of Cylon put down by Megacles.
MS. c. i. Pollution and purification of Athens.
c. ii. Civil disorders from forced labour of debtors.
c. iii. Constitution before Draco. Third archon instituted, the king retaining religious functions. Three archonships finally made annual, and six Thesmothetae added. An aristocracy, the nine archons being elected by the Areopagus, whose members were ex-archons. Conspiracy of Cylon. Discontent and poverty of lower orders.


(4) cc. v.-ix. Constitution of Solon: four property-classes with graded functions, the fourth takes part in the assembly and law-courts.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION

c. x. Solon’s cancellation of debts, and system of weights and measures.
cc. xi., xii. Ten years of party strife. Solon’s poems.
(5) cc. xiii.-xix. Tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons.
(6) cc. xx.-xxii. Reforms of Cleisthenes. Creation of democracy.
(8) cc. xxv., xxvi. Democracy restored by Ephialtes, and extended by Pericles.
c. xxviii. Popular leadership, historical review.
(9) cc. xxix., xxx. Revolution of the Four Hundred; after failure of Sicilian expedition Athens forced to abandon democracy; citizenship to be limited to Five Thousand.
c. xxxi. The Council of Four Hundred govern as an oligarchy.
(10) cc. xxxii.-xxxiv. Counter-revolution: democracy restored. Then Sparta defeats Athens in the war and sets up the Thirty.
(11) cc. xxxv.-xxxviii. Despotic rule of the Thirty. They are put down by exiles led by Thrasybulus.
(12) cc. xxxix., xl. Extreme democracy restored: the people supreme; payment for attending Assembly.
c. xli. The eleven revolutions recapitulated.

PART II. THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION

c. xlii. The franchise.
cc. xliii.-lx. The officials (a) elected by lot—the Council, archons, and others;
c. lxii. (b) elected by vote—military officers.
c. lxiii. Payment of officials.
c. lxiii. and foll. The law-courts: procedure.
Primae partis Epitoma Heraclidis

[Heracleides Lembos in the second century B.C. compiled a book called 'Ιστορίαι which contained quotations from Aristotle's Constitutions. Excerpts made from this book, or from a later treatise by another author based upon it, have come down to us in a fragmentary form in a Vatican ms. of the 8th century, now at Paris, under the title 'Εκ τῶν 'Ηρακλείδου περὶ Πολιτείων. These were edited by Schneidewin in 1847 and by others later.

1. 'Αθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐξρώντο βασιλεῖα. συνοικησάντος δὲ ''Ιωνος αὐτοῖς τότε πρῶτον ''Ιωνες ἐκλήθησαν.

''Τούτου γὰρ οἰκήσαντος τῆν Ἀττικὴν, ὡς Ἄριστοτέλης φησά, τοὺς ''Αθηναίους ''Ιωνας κληθήναι, καὶ ''Ἀπόλλωνα Πατρῷον αὐτοῖς ὄνομασθήναι. (Harpocration s.v. 'Ἀπόλλων Πατρώος.) Πατρῷον τιμῶσιν ''Ἀπόλλωνα ''Αθηναίοι ἐπεὶ ''Ιων ὁ πολέμαρχος ''Αθηναίων ἐξ ''Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Κρεούσης τῆς Ξούθου1 ἐγένετο. (Schol. Aristoph. Λυ. 1537.)

1 Ξούθου <γυναικὸς> Rose.

a A word has perhaps been lost in the Greek, giving 'the wife of Xuthus'—unless indeed the text is a deliberate
ARISTOTLE—THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION

Heracleides' Epitome of the first part

For a complete study of these contributions to the reconstruction of The Athenian Constitution readers must consult the standard commentators on the latter; only those fragments which belong to the lost early part of the treatise are given here. Quotations of the same passages of Aristotle made by other writers have been collected by scholars, and are inserted in the text in brackets where they fill gaps in Heracleides.

Fr. 1. The Athenians originally had a royal government. It was when Ion came to dwell with them that they were first called Ionians.

(For when he came to dwell in Attica, as Aristotle says, the Athenians came to be called Ionians, and Apollo was named their Ancestral god.

The Athenians honour Ancestral Apollo because their War-lord Ion was the son of Apollo and Creusa the daughter of Xuthus.)

bowdlerization of the legend. Xuthus, King of Peloponnesus, married Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, King of Athens, after whose death he was banished; but Creusa's son Ion was recalled to aid Athens in war with Eleusis, won them victory, and died and was buried in Attica.
2. Πανδίων δὲ βασιλεύσας μετὰ Ὁρεχθέα διένειμε τὴν ἀρχήν τοῖς νῦσι 〈Ἄιγει μὲν δοὺς τήν περὶ τὸ ἀστρο χώραν, Λύκω δὲ τὴν διακρίαν, Πάλλαντι δὲ τήν παραλίαν, Νίσσῳ δὲ τὴν Μεγαρίδα (Id. Vesp. 1223.)〉 3. καὶ διετέλουσ εὐτοὺς οσια-ζοντες. Θησεὺς δὲ ἐκήρυξε καὶ συνεβίβασε τούτους ἐπ᾽ ἱση καὶ ὴμοια. 〈ἐκάλει πάντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱσοῖς καὶ τῷ ἱδὲ ὑτε, πάντες λέω“ κήρυγμα Θήσεως γενέσθαι φασὶ πανδημίαν τυνα καθιστάντος. (Plutarch, Theseus 25.)〉

4. ἄτι δὲ πρῶτος ἀπέκλινε πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον, ὡς Ὁριστοτέλης φησίν, καὶ ἄφηκε τὸ μονάρχειν, ἐοικε μαρτυρεῖν καὶ Ὀμήρος ἐν νεών καταλόγῳ μόνους 'Αθηναίοις δήμον προσαγορεύσας. (Plutarch, ib.)

5. Ἡμην ἀστορεῖ ἐν τῇ 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία 'Αριστοτέλης λέγων οὕτως. φυλᾶς δὲ αὐτῶν συν- νενεμήσθαι δ᾽, ἀπομμησαμένων τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἐναυτοῖς  ὠρας, ἐκάστην δὲ διηρήθηκαί εἰς τρία μέρη τῶν φυλῶν, ὅπως γίνηται τὰ πάντα δῶδεκα μέρη, καθάπερ οἱ μῆνες εἰς τὸν ἐναυτὸν, καλεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰ τριττάς καὶ φρατρίας· εἰς δὲ τὴν φρατρίαν τριάκοντα γένη διακεκοσμηθῶσαν, καθάπερ αἱ ἡμέραι εἰς τὸν μήνα, τὸ δὲ γένος εἶναι τριάκοντα ἀνδρῶν. (Lexicon Palm. p. 152 Sakkel.)

6. Ὁ γὰρ ἐλθὼν εἰς Σκύρων Ὁριστοτέλης ἀστορεῖ ὅτι ἐλθὼν Θησεύς εἰς Σκύρου ἐπὶ κατα- σκοπὴν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν Αἰγέως συγγένειαν . . . (Schol. Vatic. ad Eurip. Hipp. 11) ἐτελευτήσειν

1 Schneidewin: ὤμοια μοίρα (aut τιμῆ) codd.

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*Perhaps the formula of the crier sent round to announce the meetings of the Ecclesia: cf. ἄκοπτε, λέψ (‘Oyez’).*
Fr. 2. Erechtheus was succeeded as king by Pandion, who divided up his realm among his sons (giving the citadel and its neighbourhood to Aegeus, the hill country to Lycus, the coast to Pallas and the district of Megara to Nisus). Fr. 3. And these sections were continually quarrelling; but Theseus made a proclamation and brought them together on an equal and like footing. (He summoned all on equal terms, and it is said that the phrase 'Come hither, all ye folks' was the proclamation of Theseus made when he was instituting an assembly of the whole people.)

Fr. 4. (And that Theseus first leant towards the mob, as Aristotle says, and relinquished monarchical government, even Homer seems to testify, when he applies the term 'people' in the Catalogue of Ships to the Athenians only.)

Fr. 5. (. . . As Aristotle narrates in his Athenian Constitution, where he says: 'And they were grouped in four tribal divisions in imitation of the seasons in the year, and each of the tribes was divided into three parts, in order that there might be twelve parts in all, like the months of the year, and they were called Thirds and Brotherhods; and the arrangement of clans was in groups of thirty to the brotherhood, as the days to the month, and the clan consisted of thirty men.').

Fr. 6. He having come to Scyros (probably in order to inspect it because of his kinship with Aegeus)

\( Iliad, \text{ii. 547.} \)

\( ^{a} \) After Cleisthenes' reforms, 510 B.C., there were ten tribes, each divided into Thirds and also into ten or more Demes; each Deme was divided into Brotherhods (number unknown), and these perhaps into Clans.

\( ^{d} \) Aegeus, King of Athens, father of Theseus, is not connected in any extant myth with the Aegean island of Scyros.
ARISTOTLE

οσθείς κατὰ πετρῶν ὑπὸ Ἀυκομήδους, φοβηθέντος μή σφητερίζηται τὴν νήσον. 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ ὑστερον μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ μετεκόμισαν αὐτοὺ τὰ ὀστὰ. (Schol. l.c.)

7. Ἀπὸ δὲ Κοδριδῶν οὐκετε βασιλεῖς ἤροῦντο, διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τρυφᾶν καὶ μαλακοὺς γεγονέναι. Ἰππομένης δὲ εἰς τῶν Κοδριδῶν βουλόμενος ἀπώσασθαι τὴν διαβολὴν, λαβῶν ἐπὶ τὴν θυγατρὶ Λειμώνη μοιχόν, ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀνείλεν ὑποζεύξας μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς1 τῷ ἁρματὶ, τὴν δὲ ἱππῳ συνέκλεισεν ἐως ἀπώλετο.

8. Τοὺς μετὰ Κύλωνος διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν τῆς θεοῦ πεθερυθάς οἱ περὶ Μεγακλέα ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ τοὺς ἀδάσαντας ὡς ἐναγεῖς ἡλαυνον.

Incipit codex

1 Ι. . . . (κατηγοροῦντος)2 Μύρωνος, καθ' ἱερῶν ὄμοσαντες, ἀριστώνων. καταγνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἀγους, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν, τὸ δὲ γένους αὐτῶν ἐφυγεν ἀειφυγίαν. Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρής ἐπὶ τούτους ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν.


2 Wilamowitz e Plut. Sol. 12.

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1 King of Athens, died 1068 B.C. (by the mythical chronology).
2 722 B.C.; the Attic nobles deposed him in punishment.
3 This nobleman seized the Acropolis to make himself tyrant. When blockaded he escaped. His comrades were induced to surrender by the archon, Megacles of the
met his end by being thrust down a cliff by Lycomedes, who was afraid that he might appropriate the island. But subsequently the Athenians after the Persian Wars brought back his bones. (The Athenians, after the Persian Wars, in conformity with an oracle took up his bones and buried them.)

Fr. 7. Kings were no longer chosen from the house of Codrus, because they were thought to be luxurious and to have become soft. But one of the house of Codrus, Hippomenes, who wished to repel the slander, taking a man in adultery with his daughter Leimone, killed him by yoking him to his chariot with his daughter [? emend 'with his team'], and locked her up with a horse till she died."

Fr. 8. The associates of Cylon because of his tyranny were killed by the party of Megacles when they had taken refuge at the altar of Athena. And those who had done this were then banished as being under a curse.

The ms. begins here

I. (The Alcmaeonids were tried, on the prosecution) of Myron, (by jurymen) solemnly sworn in, selected according to noble birth. The charge of sacrilege having been confirmed by the verdict, the bodies of the guilty men themselves were cast out of their tombs, and their family was sentenced to everlasting banishment. Thereupon Epimenides of Crete purified the city.

II. Afterwards it came about that a party quarrel 1 Alcmaeonid family, who promised to spare their lives, but then put them to death. From what follows in the text it appears that the movement to punish this sacrilege only came to a head after Megacles was dead and buried.

a Lit. 'having taken an oath over the sacred victims.'
2 γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλήθος πολὺν χρόνον. ἢν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τ’ ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικὴ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ σένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες· καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται, καὶ ἐκτημόροι· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μισθωσιν ἠγάζοντο τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀγροὺς (ἡ δὲ πάσα γὴ δι’ ὀλίγων ἢν), καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν, ἄγωγμοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἐγίγνοντο· καὶ οἱ δανεισμοὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν μέχρι Σόλωνος· οὕτως δὲ πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δῆμου προστάτης.

3 χαλεπώτατον μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον ἢν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ δουλεύειν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδυσχέραων, οὐδὲνος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτύγχανον μετέχοντες.

1 III. Ἡν δ’ ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀρχαίας πολιτείας τῆς πρὸ Δράκοντος τοιάδε. τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς καθίστασαν ἀριστίνην καὶ πλουτίνην. ἦρχον δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον

2 διὰ βίου, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα δεκαέτειαν. μέγισται δὲ καὶ πρῶται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦσαν βασιλεύς καὶ πολέμο- αρχος καὶ ἀρχων. τούτων δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἦν πάτριος. δευτέρα δὲ ἐπικατέστη τολμερακχα διὰ τοῦ γενέσθαι τινὰς τῶν βασιλέων τὰ πολέμια μαλακούς· οθεν καὶ τὸν

3 Ἰωνα μετεπέμβαντο χρείας καταλαβούσης. τελευ- ταία δ’ ἡ τοῦ ἀρχοντος· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλείους ἐπὶ

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1 χρουνοντοῦδημον cod.: sce. Kenyon.

2 ἐλάτης., ‘one who approaches as a dependent,’ was later used as the Greek for cliens.

3 Apparently this became almost an official title, see c. xxviii.
took place between the notables and the multitude that lasted a long time. For the Athenian constitution was in all respects oligarchical, and in fact the poor themselves and also their wives and children were actually in slavery to the rich; and they were called Clients, and Sixth-part-tenants (for that was the rent they paid for the rich men's land which they farmed, and the whole of the country was in few hands), and if they ever failed to pay their rents, they themselves and their children were liable to arrest; and all borrowing was on the security of the debtors' persons down to the time of Solon: it was he who first became head of the People. Thus the most grievous and bitter thing in the state of public affairs for the masses was their slavery; not but what they were discontented also about everything else, for they found themselves virtually without a share in anything.

III. The form of the ancient constitution that existed before Draco was as follows. Appointment to the supreme offices of state went by birth and wealth; and they were held at first for life, and afterwards for a term of ten years. The greatest and oldest of the offices were the King, the War-lord and the Archon. Of these the office of King was the oldest, for it was ancestral. The second established was the office of War-lord, which was added because some of the Kings proved cowardly in warfare (which was the reason why the Athenians had summoned Ion to their aid in an emergency). The last of these three offices established was that of the Archon, the institution of which is dated by a majority of authorities in the time of

See Fr. 1 above.
Μέδοντος, ἕνιοι δ' ἔπι Ἀκάστου φασὶ γενέσθαι ταύτην· τεκμήριον δ' ἐπιφέρουσιν ὅτι οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ὀμνύουσιν ὧ τὰ 1 ἐπὶ Ἀκάστου ὀρκία 2 ποιήσειν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου τῆς βασιλείας παρα- χωρησάντων τῶν Κοδριδῶν ἀντὶ τῶν δοθεισῶν 3 τῷ ἄρχοντι δωρεῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὀποτέρως ποτ' ἔχει μικρὸν ἂν παραλλάττω τοῖς χρόνοις· ὅτι δὲ τελευταία τούτων ἐγένετο τῶν ἄρχων, σημεῖον καὶ τὸ μηδὲν τῶν πατρίων τὸν ἄρχοντα διοικεῖν, ὥσπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὁ πολέμαρχος, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὰ ἐπίθετα· διὸ καὶ νεωστὶ γέγονεν ἡ ἄρχη μεγάλη, 4 τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις αὐξηθεῖσα. θεσμοθετεῖ δὲ πολλοῖς ὑστερον ἔτεσιν ἡρέθησαν, ἥδη κατ' ἐναυτὸν αἴρου- μένων τὰς ἄρχας, ὅπως ἀναγράφαντες τὰ θέσμια φυλάττωσιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντων κρίσιν· διὸ καὶ μόνη τῶν ἄρχων οὐκ ἐγένετο πλεῖων 5 ἐνιαυσίας. τοῖς μὲν οὖν χρόνοις τοσοῦτον προέχο- σιν ἄλληλων. ἦσαν δ' οὖχ ἀμα πάντες οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν βασιλεὺς εἰχε τὸ νῦν καλοῦ- μενον Βουκόλιον, πλησίον τοῦ πρυτανείου (σημείον δὲ· ἐτι καὶ νῦν γὰρ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως γυναικὸς ἡ σύμμειξις ἐνταῦθα γίνεται τῷ Διονύσῳ καὶ ὁ γάμος), ὁ δὲ ἄρχων τὸ πρυτανείον, ὁ δὲ πολέμαρχος τὸ Ἐπιλυκείον (ὁ πρότερον μὲν ἐκαλεῖτο πολεμ-

1 ἡ <μὴν> τὰ Wilamowitz.
2 δίκαια (cf. lv. 5 δικαλως ἄρξειν) Richards.
3 αντιπονδοθεισων literis valde obscuris scriptum: ἀνταπο- 
δοθεισῶν ? Sandys.

a Son of Codrus (see Fr. 7 above) and life-archon.
b Medon’s successor.
c Or, with Sandys’s reading, ‘corresponding privileges being (at the same time) assigned to the Archon.’
d The official title of the six junior Archons.
Medon, though some put it in that of Acastus, ad-
ducing in evidence the fact that the Nine Archons
swear that they will perform their oaths even as in
the time of Acastus, showing that in his time the
house of Codrus retired from the Kingship in return
for the privileges bestowed on the Archon. Which-
ever of the two accounts is true, it would make very
little difference in the dates; but that this was the
last of these offices to be instituted is also indicated
by the fact that the Archon does not administer any
of the ancestral rites, as do the King and the War-
lord, but merely the duties added later; on ac-
count of which also the Archonship only became
great in recent times, when augmented by the
added duties. Legislators were elected many years later, when the elections to the offices were now yearly, to perform the function of publicly recording the ordinances and to preserve them for the trial of litigants; hence this alone of the supreme offices was never tenable for more than a year. These are the 5 intervals between the dates of the institution of the various supreme offices. And the Nine Archons were not all together, but the King had what is now called the Bucolium, near the town hall (as is indicated by the fact that even at the present day the union and marriage of the King's Wife with Dionysus takes place there), while the Archon had the President's Hall, and the War-lord the Epilyceum (which formerly used to be called the War-lord's House, but

\[ i.e. \text{their official residences and courts.} \]

\[ \text{Otherwise unknown.} \]

\[ \text{Position uncertain.} \]

\[ \text{An annual ceremony by which the god Dionysus was incorporated as an Athenian: the lady personifying his consort passed a night in his temple.} \]
Draco was presumably one of the Thesmothetae, Aristaeachmus being Archon Eponymus. For Draco’s work see 18
because Epilycus on becoming War-lord rebuilt and furnished it, it received the name of Epilyceum); and the Legislators had the Legislators’ Court. But in Solon’s time they all came together in the Legislators’ Court. They also had power to give final judgement in lawsuits, and not as now merely to hold a preliminary trial. Such then were the regulations relating to the supreme offices. The Council of 6 Areopagus had the official function of guarding the laws, but actually it administered the greatest number and the most important of the affairs of state, inflicting penalties and fines upon offenders against public order without appeal; for the elections of the Archons went by birth and wealth, and the members of the Areopagus were appointed from them, owing to which this alone of the offices has remained even to the present day tenable for life. This, then, was the outline of the first form of the constitution.

IV. And after this when a certain moderate length of time had passed, in the archonship of Aristaechmus, 621 B.C., Draco enacted his ordinances; and this system was on the following lines. Citizenship had already been bestowed on those who provided themselves with arms; and these elected as the Nine Archons and the Treasurers, who were owners of an unencumbered estate worth not less than 10 minae, and the other minor offices from those who provided themselves with arms, and as Generals and Masters of the Horse persons proving their possession of unencumbered estate worth not less than 100 minae and sons legitimately born in wedlock over ten years of age. The Politics 1274 b 15 ff.; it is there said that he ‘adapted his laws to a constitution that already existed.’

b For the Treasurers of Athena see xlvii. 1.

c Say £40.
Aristotle

τας τούτους δ’ ἐδει διεγγυάν τοὺς πρυτάνεις καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἵππαρχους τοὺς ἐννοοῦσι μέχρι εὐθυνῶν, ἐγγυητὰς δ’ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τέλους δεχομένους οὕτε οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἱππαρχοὶ.

3 Βουλεύειν δὲ τετρακοσίους καὶ ἕνα τοὺς λαχάντας ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας κληροῦσθαι δὲ καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἐτῆ γεγονότας καὶ δῖς τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ ἀρχεῖν πρὸ τοῦ πάντας ἐξελθεῖν, τότε δὲ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς κληροῦν. εἰ δὲ τις τῶν βουλευτῶν, ὅταν ἔδρα βούλης ἢ ἐκκλησίας ἢ, ἐκκλησίας, τῆς σύνοδος, ἀπέτυχον ὁ μὲν πεντακοσιομεδίμνος τρεῖς δραχμάς, ὃ δὲ ὑπεύθυς δύο,

4 ξενυγήθης δὲ μίαν. ἢ δὲ βούλη ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φύλαξ ἢ τῶν νόμων, καὶ διετήρει τὰς ἀρχὰς ὅτως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀρχησαι. ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρεσπαγιτῶν βούλην εἰσαγγέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ’ ὅν ἀδικεῖται νόμον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν οἱ δανεισμοί, καθάπερ εἰρηται, καὶ ἡ χώρα δι’ ὀλίγων ἦν.

1 V. Τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς τάξεως οὐσίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἀντέστη

2 τοῖς γνωρίμοις ὁ δήμος. ἱσχυρᾶς δὲ τῆς στάσεως οὐσίας καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντικαθημένων ἀλλήλως, εἰλοντο κοινῆ διαλακτὴν καὶ ἁρχοντα Σόλωνα καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ, ποιήσαντες τὴν ἐλεγείαν ἢς ἐστὶν ἀρχή.

3 ἐκλεῖπο Heerwerden, Leeuwen.
3 <ὁ> ξενυγήθη Kontos.

a Probably before Solon’s time this denotes the Archons.

b See vii. 3. A drachma (say 9½d. or 1 frane) was a hundredth part of a mina (say £4).

c On these quotations from Solon see Edmonds, Elegy and
new officials had to bail the outgoing Presidents and Generals and Masters of the Horse till the audit, accepting four sureties from the same rating as that to which the Generals and Masters of the Horse belonged. And the Council was to be formed of four hundred and one members chosen by lot from the citizen body, and lots were to be cast both for this and for the other offices by the citizens over thirty years of age; and the same person was not to hold office twice until the whole number had been gone through, and then lots were to be cast among them again from the beginning. And if any Councillor, whenever there was a sitting of the Council or Assembly, failed to attend the meeting, he paid a fine of 3 drachmae if of Five-hundred-measure rank, 2 drachmae if a Knight, and 1 if a Teamster. The Council of Areopagus was guardian of the laws, and kept a watch on the magistrates to make them govern in accordance with the laws. A person unjustly treated might lay a complaint before the Council of the Areopagites, stating the law in contravention of which he was treated unjustly. Loans were secured on the person, as has been said, and the land was divided among few owners.

V. Such being the system in the constitution, and the many being enslaved to the few, the people rose against the notables. The party struggle being violent and the parties remaining arrayed in opposition to one another for a long time, they jointly chose Solon as arbitrator and Archon, and entrusted the government to him, after he had composed the elegy that begins:

Iambus (L.C.L.), vol. i. pp. 104 ff., especially pp. 120-121, 142-143, and 148-153.
ARISTOTLE

γινώσκω, καὶ μοι φρενὸς ἐνδοθεν ἀλγεα κεῖται πρεσβυτάτην ἐσορῶν γαῖαν Ἰαονίας καινομένην.

ἐν ἢ πρὸς ἐκατέρως ὑπὲρ ἐκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κοινὴ παρανεῖ 3 καταπαύειν τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν φιλονικιάν. ἢν δ’ ὁ Σόλων τῇ μὲν φύσει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ τῶν πρώτων, τῇ δ’ οὕσι καὶ τοὺς πράγμασι τῶν μέσων, ὡς ἐκ τε τῶν ἄλλων ὁμολογεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς τοῖς ποιήμασι μαρτυρεῖ, παρανών τοῖς πλουσίωσι μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν.

ὑμεῖς δ’ ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ, οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον ἠλάσατε,
ἐν μετρίοισι2 τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον. οὐτε γάρ ἡμεῖς πεισόμεθ’, οὑθ’ ὑμῖν ἀρτια ταῦτ’3 ἐσεται.

καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίωσι; διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδουκέναι φησὶν

tὴν τε φιλαργυρίαν4 τὴν θ’ ὑπερηφανίαν,

ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστώσης.

1 VI. Κύριος δὲ γενόμενοι τῶν πραγμάτων Σόλων τόν τε δήμον ἡλευθέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ εἰς τὸ μέλλον, κωλύσας δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν, καὶ νόμους ἐθηκε, καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπᾶς ἐποίησε καὶ τῶν ἱδίων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων, ἃς σεισάχθειαν

1 κλινομένην, καρφομένην nonnulli legunt: καινομένην ? Edmonds.
2 μέτροισι Wilamowitz-Kaibel metri gratia (et τέμεσθε, 'cut to measure,' Edmonds).
3 πάντ’ nonnulli legunt: τάστ’ Edmonds.

22
I mark, and sorrow fills my breast to see,
Ionia's oldest land being done to death,—
in which he does battle on behalf of each party
against the other and acts as mediator, and after this
exhorts them jointly to stop the quarrel that pre-
vailed between them. Solon was by birth and re-
putation of the first rank, but by wealth and position
belonged to the middle class, as is admitted on the
part of the other authorities, and as he himself testi-
fies in these poems, exhorting the wealthy not to be
covetous:

Refrain ye in your hearts those stubborn moods,
Plunged in a surfeit of abundant goods,
And moderate your pride! We'll not submit,
Nor even you yourselves will this befit.\(^a\)

And he always attaches the blame for the civil strife
wholly to the rich; owing to which at the beginning
of the elegy he says that he fears

Both love of money and o'erweening pride—,

implying that these were the causes of the enmity
that prevailed.

VI. Solon having become master of affairs made
the people free both at the time and for the future
by prohibiting loans secured on the person, and he
laid down laws, and enacted cancellations of debts
both private and public, the measures\(^b\) that are known

\(^a\) 'Nor shall ye possess what ye have now without decrease' (Edmonds).
\(^b\) Their actual provisions are quite uncertain.

\(^4\) φιλοχρηστιαν legit Edmonds (cf. φιλοχρηστιαν Plutarch, Solon 14).
2 καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἀποσεισαμένων ἃ τῷ βάρος. ἐν οἷς πειρῶνται τινες διαβάλλειν αὐτῶν. συνεβη γὰρ τῷ Σόλωνει μέλλοντι ποιεῖν τὴν σεισάχθειαν προειπεῖν τισί τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπειδ’ ὡς μὲν οἱ δημοτικοὶ λέγουσι, παραστρατηγηθῆναι διὰ τῶν φίλων, ὡς δ’ οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν. δανεισάμενοι γὰρ οὗτοι συνεπρίαντο πολλὴν χῶραν, καὶ μετ’ οὗ πολὺ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπῆς γενομένης ἐπλοῦτον ὀθεν φασὶ γενέσθαι τοὺς 3 ύστερον δοκοῦντας εἶναι παλαιοπλοῦτους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πιθανώτερος οἱ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος. οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοισ οὕτω μέτρων γενέσθαι καὶ κοινῷ ἄστ’, εἶδον αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐτέρους ύπο- ποιησάμενον τυραννεῖν τῆς πόλεως, ἄμφοτέροις ἀπ- εχθέσθαι καὶ περὶ πλείονος ποιήσασθαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν ἢ τὴν αὐτοῦ πλεον- εξίαν, ἐν οὕτω δὲ μικροῖς καὶ ἀναξίοις καταρρυπαί- 4 νεών έαυτών. ὅτι δὲ ταύτην ἐσχε τὴν ἐξουσίαν, τὰ τε πράγματα νοσοῦντα μαρτυρεῖ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιή- μασιν αὐτῶς πολλαχοῦ μέμηνται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι συνομολογοῦσι πάντες. ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρῆ νομί- ζειν ψευδὴ τὴν αὐτίαν εἶναι.

1 VII. Πολιτείαν δὲ κατέστησε καὶ νόμους ἐθηκεν ἄλλους, τοῖς δὲ Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς ἐπαύσαντο χρώ- μενοι πλῆν τῶν φωνικῶν. ἀναγράψαντες δὲ τοὺς

1 Mayor: αποσεισαμένων cod.
2 Rutherford: γενομένης cod.
3 Φυνερώις incerte legit Rutherford.
as 'the Shaking-off of Burdens,' meaning that the people shook off their load. In these matters some people try to misrepresent him; for it happened that when Solon was intending to enact the Shaking-off of Burdens, he informed some of the notables beforehand, and afterwards, as those of popular sympathies say, he was out-manœuvred by his friends, but according to those who want to malign him he himself also took a share. For these persons borrowed money and bought up a quantity of land, and when not long afterwards the cancellation of debts took place they were rich men; and this is said to be the origin of the families subsequently reputed to be ancestrally wealthy. Nevertheless, the account of those of popular sympathies is more credible; for considering that he was so moderate and public-spirited in the rest of his conduct that, when he had the opportunity to reduce one of the two parties to subjection and so to be tyrant of the city, he incurred the enmity of both, and valued honour and the safety of the state more than his own aggrandizement, it is not probable that he besmirched himself in such worthless trifles. And that he got this opportunity is testified by the disordered state of affairs, and also he himself alludes to it in many places in his poems, and everybody else agrees with him. We are bound therefore to consider this charge to be false.

VII. And he established a constitution and made other laws, and they ceased to observe the ordinances of Draco, except those relating to homicide. They

\[\text{\footnotesize \textsuperscript{a}}\] Apparently certain well-known families, but not alluded to elsewhere.
nómous eis toús kúrbheis esthēsan en tê stoai tê
basiileiō kai ómooan xhrēsathai pântes. Oi dé
ênnéa árkhontes ommúntes prois toú lýw katefântiou
anathēsean ándriantha xhrousoun éan tina parabôsi
tôn nómovn. Óthei eti kai vûn oûtous ommúnoi.

2 katékleisæ de toûs nómovn eis ékaton étith. kai

3 diêtæxe tîn poluteinan tónde tropòpon. tîmîmati
dieîloν1 eis téttara telê, kathâper diûrûto kai
prōteron, eis pentakosioîmedîmon kai íppëa kai
xenúthi kai òthta. kai tás mên allas2 árkhas
apèneheim árchewn ēk pentakosioîmedîmwn kai
íppëw kai xenútwon, toûs ênnéa árkhontas kai
touς tâmias kai touς poulthas kai touς éndekas
kai touς koulkrêtas, ékástous ana lógon tou mege-
thei tou tîmîmatos apôdôðès ékástthn3 árkhyn-
tôis de tò òththikôn têloúsun xekklhiasias kai diká-

4 sthêrîwn metédwke moiôn. èdei de têleîn pentako-
sioîmedîmon mên òs aû ëk tîs4 oîkeias poîh
pentakóssia métra tâ synâmfow ëgrra kai ùgrâ,
ìppâda de touς trîakóssia poiountas—òs ð' ènîoi
fasi, touς èppotrofeîn dunameous. sthēsion de
férousoi tò te ònoma tou têlous, òs àpò5 tou
prâgmatoj keîmenon, kai tâ anathèmati tôn
árxhaim. anâkeintai gar ên ákropôlei eikôn
Dîfilouv6 éf' ë̄ ë̄ pivgeýrpaîn tâdē:

1 dieîloν <aûthên'>? Rutherford.
2 mên allas Diels: µ . . . as cod.: megístas Blass olim.
3 ed.: tûn cod. 4 ògês Bywater. 5 ápò ed.: anavw cod.
6 [Dîfilouv] Thompson.

Three-sided (or perhaps four-sided) structures of wood
(or perhaps stone) revolving on pivots; set up in the Stoa
Basilike, the court of the King-Archon, on the west side
of the Agora.

26
wrote up the laws on the Boards and set them in the Royal Colonnade, and all swore to observe them; and the Nine Archons used to make affirmation on oath at the Stone that if they transgressed any one of the laws they would dedicate a gold statue of a man; owing to which they are even now still sworn in with this oath. And he fixed the laws to stay unaltered for a hundred years. And he arranged the constitution in the following way: he divided the people by assessment into four classes, as they had been divided before, Five-hundred-measure man, Horseman, Teamster and Labourer, and he distributed the other offices to be held from among the Five-hundred-measure men, Horsemen and Teamsters—the Nine Archons, the Treasurers, the Vendors of Contracts, the Eleven and the Paymasters, assigning each office to the several classes in proportion to the amount of their assessment; while those who were rated in the Labourer class he admitted to the membership of the assembly and law-courts alone. Any man had to be rated as a Five-hundred-measure man the produce from whose estate was five hundred dry and liquid measures jointly, and at the cavalry-rate those who made three hundred,—or as some say, those who were able to keep a horse, and they adduce as a proof the name of the rating as being derived from the fact, and also the votive offerings of the ancients; for there stands dedicated in the Acropolis a statue of Diphilus on which are inscribed these lines:

$b$ Perhaps the altar of Zeus Agoraios.
$c$ See xlvii. 1.  
$d$ See xlvii. 2.  
$e$ See lxi. 1.  
$f$ i.e. measures of corn and of wine and oil amounting in all to five hundred.  
$g$ 'Of Diphilus' is probably a mistaken insertion; presumably the statue was of Anthemion himself.
Διφιλου Ἀνθεμίων τήν δ' άνέθηκε θεοῖς . . . θητικοῦ ἀντὶ τέλους ἐππάδ' ἀμειψάμενος—
καὶ παρέστηκεν ἵππος ἐκμαρτυρῶν1 ὡς τὴν ἐππάδα τούτῳ σημαινούσαν. οὗ μὴν ἀλλ' εὐλογώτερον
tοὺς μέτρους διηρῆσθαι καθάπερ τοὺς πεντα-
cοσιομεδίμνους. ζευγίσιον δὲ τελείν τοὺς διακόσια
tὰ συνάμφων ποιοῦντας, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους θητικον, οὔδεμιᾶς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς, διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔπειδ'ἀν
ἐρηται τὸν μέλλοντα κληροῦσθαι τῷ ἀρχὴν ποιὸν
tέλος τελεί, οὔδ' ἂν εἰς εἰποὶ θητικὸν.

1 VIII. Τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε κληρωτάς ἐκ προ-
kρίτων οὓς ἐκάστη προκρίνειε2 τῶν φυλῶν. προφ-
κρώνεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἀρχοντας ἐκάστη δέκα,
καὶ3 τούτων ἐκλήρουν. οἴδαν ἐτι διαμένει ταῖς
φυλαῖς τὸ δέκα κληροῦν ἐκάστην, εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων
κυαμεύειν. σημείον δ' ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν5
ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμιῶν νόμος
ὡς χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν ἐτι καὶ νῦν: κελεύει
γὰρ κληροῦν τοὺς ταμίας ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων.

2 Σόλων μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐνομοθέτησεν περὶ τῶν
ἐννέα ἀρχόντων: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἦ ἐν Ἀρείῳ
πάγῳ Βουλή ἀνακαλεσαμένη καὶ κρίνασα καὶ
ἀυτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ'
3 ἐναιστὸν ἀρξοντα6 ἀπέστελλεν. φυλαὶ δ' ἴσαι δ'


a Apparently the property qualification was ignored, without being formally repealed.
b i.e. nine were taken by lot out of forty elected by vote

28
Anthemion Diphilus's son dedicated this statue to the gods... having exchanged the Labourer rating for the Cavalry—and a horse stands beside him, in evidence that 'cavalry' meant the class able to keep a horse. Nevertheless it is more probable that the cavalry were distinguished by their amounts of produce as the Five-hundred-measure men were. And men had to be rated in the Teamster class who made two hundred measures, wet and dry together; while the rest were rated in the Labourer class, being admitted to no office: hence even now when the presiding official asks a man who is about to draw lots for some office what rate he pays, no one whatever would say that he was rated as a Labourer.a

VIII. For the offices of state he instituted election by lot from candidates selected by the tribes severally by a preliminary vote. For the Nine Archons each tribe made a preliminary selection of ten, and the election was made from among these by lot b; hence there still survives with the tribes the system that each elects ten by lot and then they choose from among these by ballot.c And a proof that he made the offices elective by lot according to assessments is the law in regard to the Treasurers that remains in force even at the present day; for it orders the Treasurers to be elected by lot from the Five-hundred-measure men. Solon, therefore, legislated thus about the Nine 2 Archons; for in ancient times the Council on the Areopagus used to issue a summons and select independently the person suitable for each of the offices, and commission him to hold office for a year. And 3 by the four tribes; whereas in the writer's day the preliminary election was also by lot and produced one hundred from the ten tribes. i.e. by lot again.
καθάπερ πρότερον καὶ φυλοβασιλείς τέσσαρες. ἐκ δὲ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης ἦσαν νενεμημέναι τριτυῖς μὲν τρεῖς, ναυκρατία δὲ δώδεκα καθ’ ἐκάστην, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν¹ ναυκρατιῶν ἄρχῃ καθεστηκυία ναύκρατος, τεταγμένη πρὸς τε τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς δαπάνας τὰς γινομένας. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς Σόλωνος, οίς οὐκέτι χρώνται, πολλαχοῦ γέγραπται τοὺς ναυκράτους εἰσπράττειν, καὶ ἀνα-

4 λίσκειν ἕκ τοῦ ναυκρατικοῦ ἄργυρίον. δουλὴν δ’ ἐποίησε τετρακοσίον, ἐκάτον ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς, τήν δὲ τῶν ’Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὸ νομο-

νυλικείν, ὥσπερ ὑπήρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὐσα τῆς πολιτείας, ἢ τὰ τε ἅλλα καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτικῶν² διετήρει καὶ τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ἁθυνεν κυρία οὐσα καὶ ζη-

µοῦν καὶ κολάζειν, καὶ τὰς ἐκτίσεις ἀνέφερεν εἰς πόλιν οὐκ ἐπιγράφωσα τὴν πρόφασιν τοῦ ἐκτίνη-

σθαι,³ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιστα-

µένους ἐκρίνειν, Σόλωνος θέντος νόμον εἰςαγγελίας

5 περὶ αὐτῶν. ὅρων δὲ τὴν μὲν πόλιν πολλάκις στασιάζουσαν τῶν δὲ πολιτῶν ἐνίοις διὰ τὴν ραθυμίαν ἀγαπώντας τὸ αὐτόματον, νόμον ἔθηκε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἰδίον, ὡς ἂν στασιαζοῦσης τῆς πόλεως µὴ θῆται τὰ ὅπλα µηδὲ µεθ’ ἐτέρων ἀτµον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως µὴ µετέχειν.

1 IX. Τὰ µὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἄρχας τούτον εἶχε τῶν τρόπων. δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία

1 ᾧν δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν nonnulli legunt.

2 πολιτικῶν coni. Richards: πολιτῶν cod,

3 εὐθύνεσθαι nonnulli legunt, δὲ δ’ ἐπὶ ἐκτίνεσθαι alii.

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³ The Naucrariae were forty-eight administrative districts into which the country was divided for taxation, each having 30
there were four Tribes, as before, and four Tribal Kings. And from each Tribe there had been assigned three Thirds and twelve Ship-boards to each, and over the Ship-boards there was established the office of Ship-commissioners, appointed for the levies and the expenditures that were made; because of which in the laws of Solon, which are no longer in force, the clauses frequently occur, 'the Ship-commissioner to levy' and 'to spend out of the Ship-commission Fund.' And he made a Council of four hundred members, a hundred from each tribe, but appointed the Council of the Areopagus to the duty of guarding the laws, just as it had existed even before as overseer of the constitution, and it was this Council that kept watch over the greatest number and the most important of the affairs of state, in particular correcting offenders with sovereign powers both to fine and punish, and making returns of its expenditure to the Acropolis without adding a statement of the reason for the outlay, and trying persons that conspired to put down the democracy, Solon having laid down a law of impeachment in regard to them. And as he saw that the state was often in a condition of party strife, while some of the citizens through slackness were content to let things slide, he laid down a special law to deal with them, enacting that whoever when civil strife prevailed did not join forces with either party was to be disfranchised and not to be a member of the state.

IX. This then was the nature of his reforms in regard to the offices of state. And the three most to defray the equipment of one battle-ship. Their presidents were Naucrari. Every four Naucrariae formed a Trittys, of which there were three in each Tribe.
taut' einai tā dēmōtikōtata, prōton mēn kai mégioston tō μὴ dανείζειν ἐπὶ τοὺς σώμασιν, ἔπειτα tò ἐξείναι tūv bouλoμένων τιμωρεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρῦτον δὲ, ὃ1 μάλιστα φασιν ἴσχυ-κέναι tò πλῆθος, ἢ eῖς tò δικαστήριον ἔφεσις: κύριος γάρ ὁ δήμος τῆς ψήφου κύριος γίνεται 2 tῆς πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ tò μὴ γεγράφθαι tòus νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὀσπερ ὁ_peri tῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ἀνάγκη πολλᾶς ἀμφιβολήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ tὰ κοινά καὶ tὰ ἱδία tò δικαστήριον. οὖνται mὲn ὃν τινες ἐπίτηδες ἀσαφεῖς αὐτὸν ποιήσαι τοὺs νόμουs ὅπως ὃ tῆς κρίσεως ὁ δήμος κύριος· οὐ μὴν εἰκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ tὸ μὴ δύνασθαι καθόλου περι-λαβεῖν tὸ βέλτιστον· οὔ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ tῶν νῦν γνωμένων ἀλλ' ἐκ tῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν tὴν ἑκείνου βουλήσαν.

1 X. Ἕν μὲν οὖν τοὺς νόμους ταῦτα δόκηι θείαι dημοτικὰ, πρὸ δὲ tῆς νομοθεσίας ποιήσας2 tῆν tῶν ἵρεων ἀποκοπῆν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα tῆν tῆν τῶν μετρῶν καὶ σταθμῶν καὶ tῆν tοῦ νομίσματος 2 αὐξήσιν. ἔτ' ἑκείνου γάρ ἐγένετο καὶ tὰ μέτρα μεῖζω τῶν Φειδωνείων, καὶ ἡ μνὰ πρότερον ἔχουσα σταθμὸν ἐβδομήκοντα δραχμὰς ἀνεπληρώθη ταῖς ἐκατὸν. ἦν δ' ὁ ἄρχαῖος χαρακτήρ διδραχμ. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ σταθμὰ πρὸς τὸ νόμισμα, τρεῖς καὶ

1 δὲ, ὃ Lipsius: δὲ cod. 2 ποιήσαι legit Kenyon.

a King of Argos, probably early 7th century B.C., see Politics 1310 b 26. His standards of coinage and weights and measures came to prevail through most of Greece.
b i.e. seventy of the new drachmae: the drachma coin
democratic features in Solon’s constitution seem to be these: first and most important the prohibition of loans secured upon the person, secondly the liberty allowed to anybody who wished to exact redress on behalf of injured persons, and third, what is said to have been the chief basis of the powers of the multitude, the right of appeal to the jury-court—for the people, having the power of the vote, becomes sovereign in the government. And also, since the laws are not drafted simply nor clearly, but like the law about inheritances and heiresses, it inevitably results that many disputes take place and that the jury-court is the umpire in all business both public and private. Therefore some people think that Solon purposely made his laws obscure, in order that the people might be sovereign over the verdict. But this is unlikely—probably it was due to his not being able to define the ideal in general terms; for it is not fair to study his intention in the light of what happens at the present day, but to judge it from the rest of his constitution.

X. Solon therefore seems to have laid down these enactments of a popular nature in his laws; while before his legislation his democratic reform was his cancellation of debts, and afterwards his raising the standard of the measures and weights and of the coinage. For it was in his time that the measures were made larger than those of Pheidon, and that the mina, which previously had a weight of seventy drachmae, was increased to the full hundred. The ancient coin-type was the two-drachma piece. Solon also instituted weights corresponding to the cur-
ARISTOTLE

εξήκοντα μνᾶς τὸ τάλαντον ἁγούσας, καὶ ἐπι-
diενεμήθησαν αἱ τρεῖς μνᾶ τῷ στατήρι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σταθμοῖς.

1 XI. Διαστάξας δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν ὄντερ εἴρηται τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνώχλουν τὰ μὲν ἐπιτιμῶντες τὰ δὲ ἀνακρίνοντες, βουλόμενος μήτε ταῦτα κινεῖν μήτ’ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι παρῶν, ἀποδημιάν ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐμπορίαν ἄμα καὶ θεωρίαν εἰς Αὔγουστον, εἰπὼν ὃς ὡς ἤξει δέκα ἐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ οἰεσθαί δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς νόμους ἐξηγεῖσθαι παρῶν ἄλλ’ ἐκαστὸν τὰ γεγραμμένα ποιήσαι. ἀμα δὲ καὶ συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τῶν τε γνωρίμων διαφόρους γεγενηθαι πολλοὺς διὰ τὰς τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, καὶ τὰς στάσεις ἀμφοτέρας μεταβέθαι διὰ τὸ παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοὶς γενέθαι τὴν κατάστασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δήμος ἤστο πάντ’ ἄναδαστα ποιήσειν αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ γνώριμοι πάλιν ἢ τὴν αὐτήν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν ἢ μικρὸν παραλ-
λάξαντα. ὁ δὲ Σόλων ἀμφοτέροις ἡναντιώθη, καὶ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ μεθ’ ὀποτέρων ἦβούλετο συντάντα τυραννεῖν ἔλετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἀπεχθάνει τὸν καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα νομοθετήσας.

2 XII. Ταῦτα δ’ ὅτι τούτον τρόπον ἐσχέν οἳ τ’ ἄλλοι συμφωνοῦσι πάντες καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δὲ.

δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐδώκα τὸσον γέρας ὅσον ἀπ-
αρκεῖ,

τιμής οὔτ’ ἄφελων οὔτ’ ἐπορεξάμενος,

1 Wyse: ἀπεχθασθήσαι cod. 2 εἶχενWilamowitz-Kaibel.

a The weight of a fiftieth part of a mina.
b See v. 2 n.
rency, the talent weighing sixty-three minae, and a
fraction proportionate to the additional three minae
was added to the stater a and the other weights.

XI. When Solon had organized the constitution
in the manner stated, people kept coming to him
and worrying him about his laws, criticizing some
points and asking questions about others; so as he
did not wish either to alter these provisions or to stay
and incur enmity, he went abroad on a journey to
Egypt, for the purpose both of trading and of seeing
the country, saying that he would not come back
for ten years, as he did not think it fair for him to
stay and explain his laws, but for everybody to carry
out their provisions for himself. At the same time 2
it befell him that many of the notables had become
at variance with him because of the cancellations of
debts, and also that both the factions changed their
attitude to him because the settlement had dis-
appointed them. For the people had thought that
he would institute universal communism of property,
whereas the notables had thought that he would
either restore the system in the same form as it was
before or with slight alteration; but Solon went
against them both, and when he might have been
tyrannt if he had taken sides with whichever of the
two factions he wished, he chose to incur the enmity
of both by saving the country and introducing the
legislation that was best.

XII. That this is how it happened is the unanimous 1
account of everybody, and in particular Solon him-
self in his poetry b recalls the matter in these words:

For to the people gave I grace enough,
Nor from their honour took, nor proffered more;
οἱ δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἁγητοί, καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν. ἕστην δ’ ἀμφιβαλῶν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέρους νικᾶν δ’ οὐκ εἴασ’ οὔδετέρους ἄδικως.

2 πάλιν δ’ ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ τοῦ πλήθους ὡς αὐτῷ δεὶ χρῆσθαι.

δήμος δ’ ὁδ’ ἄν ἀριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο, μήτε λίαν ἀνεθεῖς μήτε βιαζόμενος. τίκτει γὰρ κόροις ύβριν ὅταν πολὺς ὀλβὸς ἔπηται ἀνθρώποις οὕς μὴ νόσος ἀρτίος ἦ.

3 καὶ πάλιν δ’ ἐτέρωθι πον λέγει περὶ τῶν διανείμασθαι τὴν γην βουλομένων.

οἱ δ’ ἐφ’ ἀρπαγαίσιν ἥλθον ἐλπίδ’ εἶχον ἁφνεάν, καδόκουν ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ὀλβὸν εὐρησει πολὺν, καὶ με κωτίλλοντα λείως τραχύν ἐκφανεῖν νόσον. χαῦνα μὲν τὸτ’ ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δὲ μοι χολούμενοι λοξόν ὀφθαλμοῦ’ όρῳσι πάντες ὡστε δήμον, οὐ χρεῶν· ἀ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα σὺν θεοίσιν ἡμισα, ἄλλα δ’ οὐ μάτην ἔρειν, οὐδὲ μοι τυραννίδος ἡμᾶν δὲ βία τι βέλειν, οὐδὲ πιείρας χθονὸς πατρίδος κακοίσων ἔσθλουσ ἱσομοιρίαν ἐχεῖν.

4 πάλιν3 δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τῶν δουλευόντων μὲν πρότερον ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν.

1 ἐφ’ ἀρπαγὴν συνῆλθον κάλπιδ’ εἶχον (commate infra post νῦν posito) Ziegler: ἐφ’ ἀρπαγαῖς ἔχοντες ἐλπίδ’ ἥλθον Richards.
2 Richards: ἀνδάνει cod.
3 πάλιν Kenyon: λέγει Kontos: lacunam cod.
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 1–4

While those possessing power and graced with wealth,
These too I made to suffer nought unseemly;
I stood protecting both with a strong shield,
And suffered neither to prevail unjustly.

And again, when declaring about how the multitude ought to be treated:

Thus would the people with the chiefs best follow,
With neither too much freedom nor compulsion;
Satiety breeds insolence when riches
Attend the men whose mind is not prepared.

And again in a different place he says about those who wish to divide up the land:

They that came on plunder bent were filled with over-lavish hope,
Each and all imagining that they would find abundant wealth,
And that I, though smoothly glozing, would display a purpose rough.
Vain and boastful then their fancies; now their bile 'gainst me is stirred,
And with eyes askance they view me, and all deem me as a foe—
Wrongly: for the things I promised, those by heaven's aid I did,
And much else, no idle exploits; nothing did it please my mind
By tyrannic force to compass, nor that in our fatherland
Good and bad men should have equal portion in her fertile soil.

And again about the cancellation of debts, and those who were in slavery before but were liberated by the Shaking-off of Burdens:
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὖνακα ξυνήγαγον
dῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
συμμαρτυροῖ ταύτ’ ἂν ἐν δίκῃ Χρόνου
μῆτηρ μεγίστη δαμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
ἀριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
ὄρους ἀνέβοι πολλαχῇ πεπηγότας,
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἔλευθέρα.¹

πολλοὺς δ’ Ἀθήνας πατρίδ’ εἰς θεοκτιτόν
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἀλλὸν ἐκδίκως,
ἀλλὸν δικαίως, τοὺς δ’ ἀναγκαίας ὑπὸ
χρειοῦσ φυγόντας, γλώσσαν οὐκέτ’ Ἀττικῆν
ἐντάς, ὡς ἔν τολλαχῇ πλανωμένους,
τοὺς δ’ ἐνθάδ’ αὐτοῦ δουλήν ἀείκεα
ἐχοντας, ἦθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους,
ἐλευθέρους ἐθήκα. ταῦτα μὲν κρατεῖν,
ὄμοι βίαν τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας,
ἐρεξα καὶ διήλθον ὡς υπεσχόμην·
θεσμοὺς θ’ ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε καγαθῷ,
eὐθείαν εἰς ἐκαστὸν ἀρμόσας δίκην,
ἐγραμμα. κέντρον δ’ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών,
κακοφραδῆς τε καὶ φιλοκτῆμων ἀνήρ,
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἦθελον
ἀ τοῖς ἐναντίουσιν ἠμᾶν τότε,
ἀδείς δ’ ἂ τοῖσιν οὔτεροι φρασαίτο,
πολλῶν ἂν ἄνδρῶν ἧδ’ ἐχθρώθη πόλις.
τῶν οὖνεκ’ ἄλκην πάντοθεν ποιούμενος
ὡς ἐν κυνῶν πολλήσιν ἀπτράφην λύκος.

5 καὶ πάλιν ὀνειδίζων πρὸς ταῖς ὑστερον αὐτῶν
μεμψιμορίας ἀμφοτέρων·

δῆμῳ μὲν εἰ χρῆ διαφράζῃ ὀνειδίσαι,
ἀ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὔποτ’ ὀφθαλμόσιν ἄν

38
But what did I leave unachieved, of all
The ends for which I did unite the people?
Whereof before the judgement-seat of Time
The mighty mother of the Olympian gods,
Black Earth, would best bear witness, for 'twas I
Removed her many boundary-posts\textsuperscript{a} implanted:
Ere then she was a slave, but now is free.
And many sold away I did bring home
To god-built Athens, this one sold unjustly,
That other justly; others that had fled
From dire constraint of need, uttering no more
Their Attic tongue, so widely had they wandered,
And others suffering base slavery
Even here, trembling before their masters' humours.
I did set free. These deeds I made prevail,
Adjusting might and right to fit together,
And did accomplish even as I had promised.
And rules of law alike for base and noble,
Fitting straight justice unto each man's case,
I drafted. Had another than myself
Taken the goad, unwise and covetous,
He'd not have held the people! Had I willed
Now that pleased one of the opposing parties,
And then what'ehr the other party bade them,
The city had been bereft of many men.
Wherefore I stood at guard on every side,
A wolf at bay among a pack of hounds!

And again in his taunting reply to the later querulous complaints of both the parties:

If openly I must reprove the people,
Ne'er in the dreams of sleep could they have seen

\textsuperscript{a} i.e. posts marking mortgaged estates.
ARISTOTLE

εὐδοντες εἶδον. . . .
όσοι δὲ μεῖζοις καὶ βιαν ἀμείνονες
ἀινοὶ φὸ ἐν καὶ φίλων ποιοῖσιν.

εἰ γὰρ τὸς ἄλλος, φησί, ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἐτυχεὶν,

οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δήμων, οὐδὲ ἐπαύσατο
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πίαρ¹ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα:
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὕσπερ ἐν μεταχυμίῳ
ὁρὸς κατέστην.

1 XIII. Τὴν μὲν ὅσον ἀποδημίων ἐποιήσατο διὰ
tαῦτας τὰς αἰτίας. Σύλωνος δ’ ἀποδημήσαντος,
ἐτι τῆς πόλεως τεταραγμένης, ἔπε μὲν ἔτη τέτταρα
dιῆγον ἐν ἡσυχία: τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ μετὰ τὴν Σύλωνος
ἀρχὴν οὐκ κατέστησαν ἀρχοῦτα διὰ τὴν ὁπλασία,
καὶ πάλιν ἔτει πέμπτῳ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν

2 ἀναρχίαν ἐποίησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
χρόνων Δαμασίας αἱρεθεὶς ἀρχῶν ἔτη δύο καὶ δύο
μήνας ἦρξεν, ἔως ἐξηλάθη βία τῆς ἀρχῆς. εἰτ’
ἐδοξεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ στασίαζειν ἀρχοῦτα ἐλέσθαι
dέκα, πέντε μὲν εὐπατριδῶν τρεῖς δὲ ἀγροίκων
dύο δὲ δημιουργῶν, καὶ οὕτω τὸν μετὰ Δαμασίαν
ἡξεν ἐνιαυτὸν. οὐ καὶ δὴλον ὅτι μεγίστην ἐξέχεν
δύναμιν ὁ ἄρχων· φαίνονται γὰρ αἰεὶ στασιάζοντες

3 περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς. οὕλως δὲ διετέλουν νοσοῦν-
tες τὰ πρὸς ἐαυτούς, οἱ μὲν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρόφασιν
ἐχοντες τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπήν (συνεβεβήκει γὰρ
αὐτοὶς γεγονότας πένησιν), οἱ δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
δυσχεραίνοντες διὰ τὸ μεγάλην² γεγονότας μετα-
βολὴν, ἔνοι δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν.

40
ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION, xii. 5—xiii. 4

The things that they have now . . .
While all the greater and the mightier men
Might praise me and might deem me as a friend;

for had another, he says, won this office,

He had not checked the people nor refrained,
Ere he had churned and robbed the milk of cream;
But I as 'twere betwixt their armèd hosts
A frontier-post did stand.

XIII. Accordingly Solon made his journey abroad 1 for these reasons. And when he had gone abroad, though the city was still disturbed, for four years they kept at peace; but in the fifth year after Solon's 2 archonship because of party strife they did not appoint an archon, and again in the fifth year after 3 that they enacted a suspension of the archonship for the same cause. After this at the same interval of 2 time Damasias was elected Archon, and held the 581 B.C. ? post for two years and two months, until he was driven out of the office by force. Then because of the civil strife they decided to elect ten Archons, five from the nobles, three from the farmers and two from the artisans, and these held office for the year 579 B.C. ? after Damasias. This shows that the Archon had very great power; for we find that they were always engaging in party strife about this office. And they 3 continued in a state of general internal disorder, some having as their incentive and excuse the cancellation of debts (for it had resulted in their having become poor), others discontented with the constitution because a great change had taken place, and some because of their mutual rivalry. The factions 4

1 πιαρ edd. ex Plutarch, πιαρ cod.
3 <ου> μεγάλην Vollgraf.
ARISTOTLE

4 ἦσαν δ’ αἱ στάσεις τρεῖς· μία μὲν τῶν παραλίων, ὁν προειστήκει Μεγακλῆς ὁ Ἀλκμέωνος, οὔτε ἐδόκουν μάλιστα διώκειν τὴν μέσην πολιτείαν· ἀλλὰ δὲ τῶν πεδιακῶν, οἱ τὴν ὀλυγαρχίαν ἐξήτουν, ἤγειτο δ’ αὐτῶν Λυκοῦργος. τρίτη δ’ ἦ τῶν διακρίσεων, ἐφ’ ἦ τεταγμένος ἢν Πεισίστρατος, 5 δημοτικοῦτατος εἶναι δοκῶν. προσεκκόσμητο δὲ τούτοις οἱ τε ἀφηρημένοι τὰ χρέα διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν, καὶ οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροὶ διὰ τὸν φόβον· σημεῖον δ’, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐποίησαν διαφημισμὸνatonin πολλῶν κοινωνοῦντων τῆς πολιτείας οὐ προσήκουν. εἴχον δ’ ἐκαστοι τὰς ἐπωνυμίασ ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων ἐν οἷς ἐγεώργησαν.

1 XIV. Δημοτικοῦτατος δ’ εἶναι δοκῶν ὁ Πεισίστρατος καὶ σφόδρ’ εὐδοκημίκως ἐν τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμω, κατατραυματίσας ἐαυτὸν συνέπεσε τὸν δήμουν, ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν ταῦτα πεπονθῶς, φυλακὴν ἐαυτῷ δοῦναι τοῦ σώματος, Άριστίωνος γράψαντος τὴν γνώμην. λαβὼν δὲ τοὺς κορυνηφόρους καλουμένους, ἐπαναστὰς μετὰ τούτων τῷ δήμῳ κατέσχε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἔτει δευτέρῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ μετὰ τὴν τῶν 2 νόμων θέσιν, ἐπὶ Κωμέου ἄρχοντος. λέγεται δὲ Σόλωνα Πεισίστρατο τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦντος ἀντιλέξαι, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶν μὲν εὖ σοφότερος τῶν 3 ἀνδρειότερος· ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἀγνοοῦσι Πεισί-

1 διαφημισμὸν edd.: διαφημισμὸν cod.
2 δ’ (i.e. τετάρτῳ) coni. Bauer.

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a i.e. by Solon’s legislation.
b Perhaps the hostilities that ended in the Athenians’ capture of Nisaea about 570 B.C.

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were three: one was the party of the Men of the Coast, whose head was Megacles the son of Alemaeon, and they were thought chiefly to aim at the middle form of constitution; another was the party of the Men of the Plain, who desired the oligarchy, and their leader was Lycurgus; third was the party of the Hillmen, which had appointed Peisistratus over it, as he was thought to be an extreme advocate of the people. And on the side of this party were also arrayed, from the motive of poverty, those who had been deprived of the debts due to them, and, from the motive of fear, those who were not of pure descent; and this is proved by the fact that after the deposition of the tyrants the Athenians enacted a revision of the roll, because many people shared the citizenship who had no right to it. The different parties derived their names from the places where their farms were situated.

XIV. Peisistratus, being thought to be an extreme advocate of the people, and having won great fame in the war against Megara, inflicted a wound on himself with his own hand and then gave out that it had been done by the members of the opposite factions, and so persuaded the people to give him a bodyguard, the resolution being proposed by Aristophon. He was given the retainers called Club-bearers, and with their aid he rose against the people and seized the Acropolis, in the thirty-second year after the enactment of his laws, in the archonship of Comeas. It is said that when Peisistratus asked for the guard Solon opposed the request, and said that he was wiser than some men and braver than others—he was wiser than those who did not know that
παράκαλων. Πεισίστρατος δέ λαβὼν τὴν ἀρχήν διώκει τὰ κοινὰ πολιτικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς. οὔτω δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐρριξωμένης ὁμοφρονήσαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεγακλέα καὶ τὸν Λυκούργον ἐξέβαλον αὐτὸν ἐκτὸς ἔτει μετὰ τὴν πρώτην κατάστασιν, 4 ἐφ’ Ἡγησίου ἀρχικοῦ. ἔτει δὲ δωδεκάτῳ μετὰ ταῦτα περιελαυνόμενος οἱ Μεγακλής τῇ στάσει πάλιν ἐπικηρυκευόμενος πρὸς τὸν Πεισίστρατον, ἐφ’ ὦ τε τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ λήφηται κατηγαγεὶν αὐτὸν ἀρχαίως καὶ λίαν ἀπλῶς. προδιασπείρας γὰρ λόγον ὦς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καταγούσης Πεισίστρατον, καὶ γυναῖκα μεγάλην καὶ καλὴν ἔξευρῶν, ὦς μὲν Ἡρόδοτός φησιν εκ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Παιανέων, ὦς δὲ ἐνοικεὶ λέγουσιν εκ τοῦ Κολυττοῦ στεφανόπωλον Θρήτταν ἢ ὀνόμα Φύη, τὴν θεον ἀπομιμημένος τῷ κόσμῳ συνεισήγαγεν μετ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ δὲ μὲν Πεισίστρατος ἐφ’ ἀρματος εἰσῆλθεν παραβατοῦσῃ τῆς γυναικὸς, οἱ δ’ ἐν τῷ ἀστεί προσκυνοῦντες ἐδέχοντο θαυμάζοντες.

1 XV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη κάθοδος ἐγένετο τοιαῦτη. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἐξῆπεσε τὸ δεύτερον ἔτει μάλιστα ἐβδομῶς μετὰ τὴν κάθοδον,—οὐ γὰρ πολὺν χρόνον

1 τετάρτῳ Thompson.
2 ὡς del. Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
Peisistratus was aiming at tyranny, and braver than those who knew it but held their tongues. But as he failed to carry them with him by saying this, he brought his armour out in front of his door and said that for his part he had come to his country’s aid as far as he could (for he was now a very old man), and that he called on the others also to do the same. Solon’s exhortations on this occasion had no effect; and Peisistratus having seized the government proceeded to carry on the public business in a manner more constitutional than tyrannical. But before his government had taken root the partisans of Megacles and Lycurgus made common cause and expelled him, in the sixth year after his first establishment, in the archonship of Hegesias. In the twelfth year after this Megacles, being harried by party faction, made overtures again to Peisistratus, and on terms of receiving his daughter in marriage brought him back, in an old-fashioned and extremely simple manner. Having first spread a rumour that Athena was bringing Peisistratus back, he found a tall and beautiful woman, according to Herodotus a member of the Paeanian deme, but according to some accounts a Thracian flower-girl from Collytus named Phyē, dressed her up to look like the goddess, and brought her to the city with him, and Peisistratus drove in a chariot with the woman standing at his side, while the people in the city marvelled and received them with acts of reverence.

XV. In this way his first return took place. Afterwards, as he was expelled a second time in about the seventh year after his return—for he did not maintain his hold for long, but came to be afraid of both

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a Apparently, for some younger man to use.  

b i. 60.
κατέσχεν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τῇ τοῦ Μεγα-κλέους θυγατρὶ συγγίνεσθαι φοβηθεὶς ἀμφοτέρας 2 τὰς στάσεις ὑπεξήλθεν— καὶ τρότων μὲν συν-ώκυσε περί τὸν Θέρμαν κόλπον χωρίων ὁ καλεῖ ταῖς παρακήλος, ἐκείθεν δὲ παρῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς περὶ Πάγγαιον τόπους, ὃθεν χρηματισώμενους καὶ στρατιώτατας μισθωσάμενους, ἔλθὼν εἰς Ἐρετρίαν ἐνδεκάτῳ πάλιν ἔτει τὸ τρότων ἀνασώσασθαι βίᾳ τὴν ἄρχῃ ἐπεχείρει, συμπροδυμομυμένων αὐτῷ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἄλλων μάλιστα δὲ Θηβαίων καὶ Λυγδάμιος τοῦ Ναξίου, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ὑπερέων τῶν 3 ἔχοντων ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ τὴν πολυτείαν. νικήσας δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχην καὶ λαβὼν τὴν πόλιν καὶ παρελόμενος τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὅπλα, κατείχεν ήδη τὴν τυράννιδα βεβαίως, καὶ Νάξον ἐλών ἀρχοντα 4 κατέστησε Λυγδαμίων. παρείλετο δὲ τοῦ δήμου τὰ ὅπλα τὸν τρόπον ἐξοπλασίαν ἐν τῷ Θησείῳ ποιησάμενος ἐκκλησιάζειν ἐπεχείρει, τῆς δὲ φωνῆς ἐχάλασεν5 μικρῶν, οὐ φασκόντων δὲ κατακούσιν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτούς προσαναβῆναι πρὸς τὸ πρόπυλον τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ίνα γεγονυν μᾶλλον, ἐν οἷς ἐκείνους διέτριβε δημηγορῶν, ἀνελόντες οἱ ἐπὶ τούτω τεταγμένοι τὰ ὅπλα καὶ κατακλῆσαντες εἰς τὰ πλησίον οἰκήματα τοῦ Θησείου διεσήμησαν 5 ἐλθόντες πρὸς τὸν Πεισίστρατον. ὁ δὲ ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἄλλου λόγου ἐπετέλεσεν, εἰπε γε καὶ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων τὸ γεγονός ὡς οὐ χρῆ θαυμάζειν οὐδ' ἀθυμεῖν,
the factions owing to his unwillingness to live with Megacles' daughter as his wife, and secretly withdrew—; and first he collected a settlement at a place near the Gulf of Thermae called Rhaecelus, but from there he went on to the neighbourhood of Pangaeus, from where he got money and hired soldiers, and in the eleventh year went again to Eretria, and now for the first time set about an attempt to recover his power by force, being supported in this by a number of people, especially the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos, and also the knights who controlled the government of Eretria. Winning the battle of 3 Pallenis, he seized the government and disarmed the people; and now he held the tyranny firmly, and he took Naxos and appointed Lygdamis ruler. The way in which he disarmed the people was this: he held an armed muster at the Temple of Theseus, and began to hold an Assembly, but he lowered his voice a little, and when they said they could not hear him, he told them to come up to the forecourt of the Acropolis, in order that his voice might carry better; and while he used up time in making a speech, the men told off for this purpose gathered up the arms, locked them up in the neighbouring buildings of the Temple of Theseus, and came and informed Peisistratus. He, when he had finished the rest of his speech, told his audience not to be surprised at what had happened about their arms, and not to be dismayed, but to go

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*a* The deme Pallene, dedicated to Athena Pallenis, lay just N.E. of Athens.

*b* The citizens had piled their arms when Peisistratus began to make a speech, and left them behind when they went up the hill.
Ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελθόντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων εἰναι, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν αὐτὸς ἐπιμελήσεσθαι πάντων.

1. XVI. Ἡ μὲν οὖν Πεισιστράτου τυραννὶς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε κατέστη τούτων τοῦ πρῶτον καὶ μετα-
2. βολάς ἐσχε τοσαύτας. διώκει δ᾽ ὁ Πεισιστράτος, ὥσπερ εὐρηταὶ, τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν μετρίως καὶ 
μᾶλλον πολυτικῶς ἡ τυραννικῶς· ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖς 
ἀλλοις φιλάνθρωποι ἦν καὶ πράος καὶ τοῖς ἀμαρ-
τάνοντες συγγνωμονικός, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις 
προεδάνειζε χρήματα πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, ὅστε 
3. διατρέφεσθαι γεωργοῦντας. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐποίει δυοῖν 
χάρων, ἵνα μήτε ἐν τῷ ἀστεί διατρίβωσιν ἄλλα 
διεσπαρμένοι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὅπως εὐ-
ποροῦντες τῶν μετρίων καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις ὄντες 
μήτε ἐπιθυμῶσι μήτε σχολάζωσιν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
4. τῶν κοινῶν. ἂμα δὲ συνεβαίνεν αὐτῷ καὶ 
τὰς προσόδους γίνεσθαι μείζους ἐξεργαζόμενης τῆς 
χώρας· ἐπράττετο γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γιγνομένων δεκά-
5. την. διὸ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ δήμους κατεσκεύασε ἰ
dικαστάς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξῆλε πολλάκις εἰς τὴν χώραν 
ἐπισκοπῶν καὶ διαλύων τοὺς διαφερομένους, ὅπως 
μὴ καταβαίνοντες εἰς τὸ ἀστυ παραμελῶσι τῶν 
6. ἐργῶν. τοιαύτης γὰρ τῶν ἐξόδου τῷ Πεισι-
στράτῳ γιγνομένης συμβῆναι φασὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἐν 
tῷ ῼμηττῶ γεωργοῦντα τὸ κλῆθεν ὕστερον χωρίον 
ἀτελές. ἰδῶν γὰρ τυχανῶν παντελῶς πέτρας σκά-
πτοντα καὶ ἐργαζόμενον, διὰ τὸ θαυμάζοι τὸν 
παῖδα ἐκέλευσεν ἐρέσθαι τι γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου· 
ὁ δὲ ὁ σα κακὰ καὶ ὄδυναῖς ἔφη, "καὶ τούτων 
tῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ὄδυνῶν. Πεισιστράτον δεὶ 
1 Wilamowitz-Kaibel: κατεσκεύασε cod. 
2 [τῶν κακῶν καὶ ὄδυνῶν] Hude.

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away and occupy themselves with their private affairs, while he would attend to all public business.

XVI. This was the way, therefore, in which the tyranny of Peisistratus was originally set up, and this is a list of the changes that it underwent. Peisistratus's administration of the state was, as has been said, moderate, and more constitutional than tyrannic; he was kindly and mild in everything, and in particular he was merciful to offenders, and moreover he advanced loans of money to the poor for their industries, so that they might support themselves by farming. In doing this he had two objects, to prevent their stopping in the city and make them stay scattered about the country, and to cause them to have a moderate competence and be engaged in their private affairs, so as not to desire nor to have time to attend to public business. And also the land's being thoroughly cultivated resulted in increasing his revenues; for he levied a tithe from the produce. And for this reason he organized the Local Justices, and often went to the country on circuit in person, inspecting and settling disputes, in order that men might not neglect their agriculture by coming into the city. For it was when Peisistratus was making an expedition of this kind that the affair of the man on Hymettus cultivating the farm afterwards called Tax-free Farm is said to have occurred. He saw a man at farm-work, digging mere rocks, and because of his surprise ordered his servant to ask what crop the farm grew; and the man said, "All the aches and pains that there are, and of these aches and pains

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\( ^a \) ch. xiv. § 3.
\( ^b \) This policy will be found expressed in general formulae in *Politics* 1311 a 13, 1318 b 6, 1319 a 30, 1320 b 7.
\( ^c \) See xxvi. 5, liii. 1.
αριστοτέλεις τῇ εθικήν: δ' ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀνθρωπος ἀποκρίσατο ἀγνοοῦν, ὡς δὲ Πεισίστρατος ἦσθει διὰ τὴν παραπετασίαν καὶ τὴν ψυλλίσαν ἀτελῆ ἀπάντων
7 ἐποίησεν αὐτῶν. οὐδὲν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οὔδ' ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις παρηγορεῖ 1 κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρεσκευάζει εἰρήνην καὶ ἐτήρει τὴν ἰσχύαν. διὸ καὶ πολλάκις ἄκουειν ἰδιὸς ἦν ὡς ἡ Πεισίστρατος τυράννης ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος ἐπὶ συνέβη γὰρ ὑστερον διαδεξαμένων τῶν υἱῶν πολλῶν γενέσθαι τραπεζώριαν τὴν ἀρχήν. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων ἦν τῶν εἰρημένων τὸ δημοτικὸν εἶναι τῶ ἠθείοι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. ἔν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οὐδεμίαν ἐαυτῷ πλεονεξίαν δίδον γάρ πάγον αὐτός μὲν ἀπήντησεν ὡς ἀπολογησόμενος δὲ προσκαλεσάμενος φοβηθεῖς
8 ἔλθεν. διὸ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐμείων ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, καὶ ὁτ' ἐκπέσοι πάλιν ἀνελάμβανε βαδίσμα. ἐβοῦλοντο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γυνώμαν καὶ τῶν δημοτικῶν ὀι πολλοί· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀμίλιαι τοὺς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ὅρμα βοηθεῖας προσήγετο, καὶ πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἐπεφύκει καλώς. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ περὶ τῶν τυράννων νόμοι πράοι κατ' ἑκείνους τοὺς καυρούς οἱ τ' ἀλλοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ μάλιστα καθήκων πρὸς τὴν τῆς τυράννους κατάστασιν. νόμοις γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν ὁδεθησίμα τάδε Ἀθηναίων καὶ πάτρια, ἐὰν τίνες τυράννειν

1 Wyse: παρηγορεῖ cod.
2 ἄκουειν ἦν Blass e[Plat.] Hipparch. 229 b: abrasus cod.
3 ἐν supplevit Blass.
4 κατάστασιν insertum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
Peisistratus has to get the tithe." The man did not know who it was when he answered, but Peisistratus was pleased by his free speech and by his industry, and made him free from all taxes. And in all other matters too he gave the multitude no trouble during his rule, but always worked for peace and safeguarded tranquillity; so that men were often to be heard saying that the tyranny of Peisistratus was the Golden Age of Cronos; for it came about later when his sons had succeeded him that the government became much harsher. And the greatest of all the things said of him was that he was popular and kindly in temper. For he was willing to administer everything according to the laws in all matters, never giving himself any advantage; and once in particular when he was summoned to the Areopagus to be tried on a charge of murder, he appeared in person to make his defence, and the issuer of the summons was frightened and left. Owing to this he remained in his office for a long period, and every time that he was thrown out of it he easily got it back again. For both the notables and the men of the people were most of them willing for him to govern, since he won over the former by his hospitality and the latter by his assistance in their private affairs, and was good-natured to both. And also the laws of Athens concerning tyrants were mild at those periods, among the rest particularly the one that referred to the establishment of tyranny. For they had the following law: 'These are the ordinances and ancestral principles of Athens: if any persons rise in insurrection in
ἐπανιστῶνταί [ἐπί τυραννίδι] ἡ συγκαθιστὴ τῆν τυραννίδα ἅτιμον εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ γένος.  

1 XVII. Πεισίστρατος μὲν οὖν ἔγκατεγράσε ἥ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀπέθανε νοσήσας ἐπὶ Φιλόνεω ἀρχοντος, ἀφ' οὗ μὲν κατέστη τὸ πρῶτον τύραννος ἔτη τριάκοντα καὶ τρία βιώσας, ἀ δ' ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ διέμεινεν ἕνως δέοντα εἰκοσι, ἐφευγε γὰρ τὰ λουπὰ. 

2 διὸ καὶ φανερῶς ληροῦσι φάσκοντες ἐρώμενον εἶναι Πεισίστρατον Σόλωνος καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ περὶ Σαλαμῖνος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ἐάν τις ἀναλογίζηται τὸν ἐκατέρου βίων καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἀπέθανεν ἀρχοντος. τελευτήσαντος δὲ Πεισίστρατο κατείχον οἱ νῦες τῆν ἀρχήν, προαγαγόντες τὰ πράγματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. ἦσαν δὲ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς γαμετῆς Ἰτιπίας καὶ Ἰτιππαρχοῦ, δύο δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἀργείας Ἰοφίων καὶ Ἡγησίστρατος ὁ παρωνύμιον ἤν Θέταλος. 

3 ἔγνημεν γὰρ Πεισίστρατος ἐξ Ἀργοὺς ἄνδρος Ἀργείου θυγατέρα ὃ οἴνομα ἤν Γόργιλος, Τιμώνασσαν, ἣν πρότερον ἔσχεν γυναῖκα Ἀρχονὸς ὁ Ἀμπρακιώτης τῶν Κυψελίδων· οἴδεν καὶ ἡ πρὸς τούς Ἀργείους ἐνέστη φιλία, καὶ συνεμαχέσαντα τίλιοι τὴν ἐπὶ Παλληνίδι μάχην, Ἡγησίστρατο κομίσαντος. γῆμαι δὲ φασὶ τὴν Ἀργείαν οἱ μὲν ἐκπεσόντα τὸ πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ κατέχοντα τὴν ἁρχήν. 

1 XVIII. ἦσαν δὲ κύριοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἡλικίας Ἰτιππαρχοῦ καὶ Ἰτιπίας, προσβύτερος δ' ὃν ὁ Ἰτιπίας καὶ τῇ

1 Keil.
3 ληροῦσι <οί> edd.
4 προαγόντες edd.

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order to govern tyrannically, or if any person assists in establishing the tyranny, he himself and his family shall be disfranchised.\textsuperscript{a}

XVII. Peisistratus, therefore, grew old in office, and died of disease in the archonship of Philoneos, having lived thirty-three years since he first established himself as tyrant, but the time that he remained in office was nineteen\textsuperscript{b} years, as he was in exile for the remainder. Therefore the story that Peisistratus was a lover of Solon and that he commanded in the war against Megara for the recovery of Salamis is clearly nonsense, for it is made impossible by their ages, if one reckons up the life of each and the archonship in which he died. When Peisistratus was dead, his sons held the government, carrying on affairs in the same way. He had two sons by his wedded wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and two by his Argive consort, Iophon and Hegesistratus surnamed Thettalus. For Peisistratus married a consort from Argos, Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos named Gorgilus, who had previously been the wife of Archinus, a man of Ambracia of the Cypselid family. This was the cause of Peisistratus's friendship with Argos, and a thousand Argives brought by Hegesistratus fought for him in the battle of Pallenis.\textsuperscript{c} Some people date his marriage with the Argive lady during his first banishment, others in a period of office.

XVIII. Affairs were now under the authority of Hipparchus and Hippias, owing to their station and their ages, but the government was controlled by

\textsuperscript{a} The genuineness of § 10 may be questioned.  
\textsuperscript{b} Politics 1315 b 31 says 'seventeen.'  
\textsuperscript{c} See xv. 3.
φύσει πολιτικός καὶ ἐμφρων ἐπεστάτει τῆς ἀρχῆς· ὁ δὲ Ἰππαρχὸς παιδιώδης καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ φιλόμουσος ἦν (καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἀνακρέοντα καὶ Σιμωνίδην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς οὕτος ἦν ὁ 2 μεταπεμπόμενος), Θέτταλος δὲ νεώτερος πολὺ καὶ τῷ βίῳ θρασὺς καὶ υβριστής, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ συνέβη τῆν ἀρχήν αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι πάντων τῶν κακῶν. ἔρασθεις γὰρ τοῦ Ἀρμόδιον καὶ διαμαρτάνων τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας οὐ κατείχε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνεσημαίνετο πικρῶς καὶ τὸ τελευταίον μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀδελφήν κανη- φορεῖν Παναθηναίοις ἐκώλυσεν, λοιδορήσας τι τὸν Ἀρμόδιον ὡς μαλακὸν ὄντα· οἴθην συνέβη παρ- οξυνθέντα τὸν Ἀρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα 3 πράττειν τὴν πράξειν μετεχόντων1 πολλῶν.2 ἦδη δὲ παρατηροῦντες ἐν ἀκροπόλει τοῖς Παν- αθηναίοις Ἰππίαν (ἐτύγχανεν γὰρ οὗτος μὲν δεχόμενος ὁ δ’ Ἰππαρχὸς ἀποστέλλων τὴν πομπῆς), ἴδοντες τινὰ τῶν κοινωνοῦν τῆς πράξεως φιλανθρώπως ἐντυγχάνοντα τῷ Ἰππία καὶ νομί- σαντες μηνύειν, βουλόμενοι τι δρᾶσαι πρὸ τῆς συλλήψεως, καταβάντες καὶ προεξαναστάντες τῶν ἄλλων, τὸν μὲν Ἰππαρχὸν διακοσμοῦντα τὴν 4 πομπῆς παρὰ τὸ Δεσδόρειον ἀπέκτειναν, τῆς δ’ ὄλην ἐλυμήναντο πράξειν, αὐτῶν δ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀρ- μόδιος εὐθέως ἐτελευτήσειν ὑπὸ τῶν δορυφόρων,

1 μετὰ πολίτῶν nonnulli legunt.
2 <οὗ> πολλῶν Kaibel e Thuc.
Hippias, who was the elder and was statesmanlike and wise by nature; whereas Hipparchus was fond of amusement and love-making, and had literary tastes: it was he who brought to Athens poets such as Anacreon and Simonides, and the others. Thettalus was much younger, and bold and insolent in his mode of life, which proved to be the source of all their misfortunes. For he fell in love with Harmodius, and when his advances were continually unsuccessful he could not restrain his anger, but displayed it bitterly in various ways, and finally when Harmodius’s sister was going to be a Basket-carrier in the procession at the Panathenaic Festival he prevented her by uttering some insult against Harmodius as being effeminate; and the consequent wrath of Harmodius led him and Aristogeiton to enter on their plot with a number of accomplices. At the Panathenaic Festival on the Acropolis they were already keeping a watch on Hippias (who happened to be receiving the procession, while Hipparchus was directing its start), when they saw one of their partners in the plot conversing in a friendly way with Hippias. They thought that he was giving information, and wishing to do something before their arrest they went down and took the initiative without waiting for their confederates, killing Hipparchus as he was arranging the procession by the Leocoreum. This played havoc with the whole plot. Of the two of them Harmodius was at once dispatched by the spearmen, and Aristogeiton

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*a Baskets holding the requisites for the religious service were carried by maidens of high birth.

*b Thucydides (vi. 56. 3) says 'not many.'

*c A monument to three daughters of Leon who in obedience to an oracle gave their lives for their country by running against the enemy’s ranks in battle.
ο δ' 'Αριστογείτων ύστερον, συλληφθεῖς καὶ πολὺν χρόνον αἰκισθεῖς. κατηγόρησεν δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀνάγκαις πολλῶν οἱ καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν ἐπιφανῶν καὶ φίλοι τοῖς τυράννοις ἴσαν. οὐ γὰρ ἐδύνατο παρα-χρήμα λαβεῖν οὔδὲν ἤχος τῆς πράξεως, ἀλλ' οἱ λεγόμενοι λόγοι ωσ τὸ 'Ἰππίας ἀποστήσας ἀπὸ τῶν ὁπλῶν τούς πομπεύοντας ἐφώρασε τοὺς τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας οὐκ ἀλῆθης ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπεμπόν τότε ἡμεθ' ὁπλῶν, ἀλλ' ύστερον τούτο 5 κατεσκεύασεν ὁ δήμος. κατηγορεῖ δὲ τῶν τοῦ τυράννου φίλων, ωσ μὲν οἱ δημοτικοί φανώ, ἐπίτηδες ἢν ἀσεβήσασεν ἀμα καὶ γένουτο ἀσθενεῖς ἀνελόντες τοὺς ἀναίτιους καὶ φίλους ἑαυτῶν, ωσ δ' ἐνιού λέγονσιν, οὐχὶ πλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τοὺς 6 συνειδότας ἐμήνυεν. καὶ τέλος ωσ οὐκ ἐδύνατο πάντα ποιῶν ἀποθανείν, ἐπαγγειλάμενος ωσ ἄλλους μηνύσων πολλοὺς καὶ πείσας αὐτῷ τὸν 'Ἰππίαν δοῦναι τὴν δεξίαν πίστεως χάριν, ωσ ἔλαβεν ὀνειδίας ὅτι τῷ φονεῖ τοῦ ἄδελφοι τὴν δεξιὰν δέδωκε, οὕτω παρώξυνε τὸν Ἰππίαν ὥσθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς οὐ κατείχεν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ σπασάμενος τὴν μάχαιραν διέφθειτεν αὐτὸν.

1 XIX. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινεν πολλῶ τραχυ-τέραν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα· καὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ τιμωρῶν τῷ ἄδελφῳ [καὶ διὰ τὸ] τοῦ ἄνθρωπος ἀνηρρηκέναι καὶ 2 ἐκβεβληκέναι πάσων ἵν ἀπιστος καὶ πικρός. ἔτει δὲ τετάρτῳ μάλιστα μετὰ τὸν Ἰππάρχου θάνατον, ἐπεὶ κακῶς εἶχεν τὰ ἐν τῷ ὀστεῖ, τὴν Μουνυχίαν

1 ἐπεμπόν τότε Rutherford: ἐπεμπόντος cod.
2 Kokalos: τιμωρεῖν cod.
3 Kokalos.

A hill above the sea S. of the city, commanding Peiraeus and the two other harbours.

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died later, having been taken into custody and tortured for a long time. Under the strain of the tortures he gave the names of a number of men that belonged by birth to families of distinction, and were friends of the tyrants, as confederates. For they were not able immediately to find any trace of the plot, but the current story that Hippias made the people in the procession fall out away from their arms and searched for those that retained their daggers is not true, for in those days they did not walk in the procession armed, but this custom was instituted later by the democracy. According to the account of people of popular sympathies, Aristogeiton accused the tyrants' friends for the purpose of making his captors commit an impiety and weaken themselves at the same time by making away with men who were innocent and their own friends, but others say that his accusations were not fictitious but that he disclosed his actual accomplices. Finally, as do what he would he was unable to die, he offered to give information against many more, and induced Hippias to give him his right hand as a pledge of good faith, and when he grasped it he taunted him with giving his hand to his brother's murderer, and so enraged Hippias that in his anger he could not control himself but drew his dagger and made away with him.

XIX. After this it began to come about that the tyranny was much harsher; for Hippias's numerous executions and sentences of exile in revenge for his brother led to his being suspicious of everybody and embittered. About four years after Hipparchus's death the state of affairs in the city was so bad that he set about fortifying Munychia, with the intention
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ Περιέχεται τειχίζειν, διήρυνε συνάρμολος. ἐν τούτοις δ’ ὄν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λακε-δήμους βασιλέως, χρησμῷς γυνομένων ἀεὶ τοῖς Λάκωσι καταλέιψεν τὴν τυραννίδα διὰ τοιάδ’ αἰτίαν.

3 οἱ φυγάδες δὲν οἱ Ἀλκημενίδαι προειστήκεσαν αὐτοὶ μὲν δι’ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔδυναντο ποιήσασθαι τὴν κάθοδον, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ προσέπταιον· ἐν τε γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοις οἷς ἑπραττόν διεσφάλλοντο, καὶ τειχίσαντες ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ Λευψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ Πάρνηθος, εἰς οἱ συνεξιλθόν τινες τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως, ἑξεπελουρκήθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων, ὄθεν ὑστερον εἰς ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν ἔδων ἐν τοῖς σκολίοις.

αἰαὶ Λευψύδριον προδώσεταιρον, ὦν σὰνδρας ἀπώλεσας, μάχεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς τε καὶ εὐπατρίδας, ὦν τὸτ’ ἐδειξαν οἰών πατέρων ἐσαν.

4 ἀποτυγχάνοντες οὖν ἐν ἀπασί τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ἐμισθω-σαντο τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς νεὼν οἰκοδομεῖν, ὃθεν ἡ-πόρθησαν χρημάτων πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακώνων βοήθειαν. ἧ δὲ Πυθία προεφερεν αἰεὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίως χρηστηριαζομένως ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς Ἀθηναίας, εἰς τοῦθ’ ἔως προὔπρεψε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας, καίπερ ὄντων ἔγενων αὐτοῖς τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν· συν-εβάλλετο δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττων μοίραν τῆς ὀρμῆς τοῖς Λάκωσι ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους τοῖς Πεισιστρατί-5 δαίς ὑπάρχονσα φιλία. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Ἀγχῖ-μολον ἀπέστειλαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐχοντα στρατιάν.

1 ἐκεί<σε> Mayor. 2 eis Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex Etym. Mag. : meta cod. 3 σκολίοις edd. : σκολίοις ei cod. 4 τοῦθ’ ἔως Blass: τούτενθέως cod.
of moving his establishment there. While engaged in this he was driven out by the king of Sparta, Cleomenes, as oracles were constantly being given to the Spartans to put down the tyranny, for the following reason. The exiles headed by the Alcmeonidae were not able to effect their return by their own unaided efforts, but were always meeting reverses; for besides the other plans that were complete failures, they built the fort of Leipsydrion in the country, on the slopes of Parnes, where some of their friends in the city came out and joined them, but they were besieged and dislodged by the tyrants, owing to which afterwards they used to refer to this disaster in singing their catches:

Faithless Dry Fountain! Lackaday,
What good men’s lives you threw away!
True patriots and fighters game,
They showed the stock from which they came!

So as they were failing in everything else, they contracted to build the temple at Delphi, and so acquired a supply of money for the assistance of the Spartans. And the Pythian priestess constantly uttered a command to the Spartans, when they consulted the oracle, to liberate Athens, until she brought the Spartiates to the point, although the Peisistratidae were strangers to them; and an equally great amount of incitement was contributed to the Spartans by the friendship that subsisted between the Argives and the Peisistratidae. As a first step, therefore, they dispatched Anchimolus with a force by sea; but he

a The name suggests ‘water-failure.’ Parnes is a mountain in N.E. Attica.
b It had been burnt down in 548 B.C. Apparently they made a profit on the contract, but rebuilt it to the satisfaction of the priestess.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΩΣ ἦττηθέντος δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τελευτήσαντος διὰ τὸ
Κυνέαν βοηθῆσαι τὸν Θεσσαλὸν ἐχοντα χιλίως
ἵππεις, προσοργισθέντες τῶ γενομένω Κλεομένην
ἐξέπεμψαν τὸν βασιλέα στόλον ἐχοντα μείζω κατὰ
γῆν, δὲ ἐπεὶ τοὺς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἵππεις ἐνίκησεν
καλύννας αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν παριέναι, κατα-
κλεισας τὸν Ἰππίαν εἰς τὸ καλούμενον Πελαργικὸν
6 τεῖχος ἐπολιόρκει μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. προσκαθ-
ημένου δ’ αὐτοῦ συνέπεσεν ὑπεξίοντας ἀλώνι εἰς τοὺς
τῶν Πεισιστρατίδων υἱεῖς· ὅν ληφθέντων ὁμο-
λογίαν ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παίδων σωτηρία ποιησάμενοι
καὶ τὰ ἐαυτῶν ἐν πένθο ἡμέραις ἐκκομισάμενοι
παρέδωκαν τῇ ἀκρόπολιν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπὶ
Ἀρπακτίδου ἄρχοντος, κατασχόντες τὴν τυραννίδα
μετὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήν ἐτῇ μάλιστα ἐπτα-
καίδεκα, τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα σὺν οἷς ὁ πατήρ ἦρξεν
ἐνὸς δεῖν1 πεντήκοντα.

1 ΧΧ. Καταλυθείς δὲ τῆς τυραννίδος ἐστασίάζον
πρὸς ἀλλήλους Ἰσαγόρας ὁ Τεισάνδρου, φίλος ὅπν
τῶν τυράννων, καὶ Κλεοσθένης τοῦ γένους ὅπν τῶν
Ἀλκμεωνίδων. ἦττηθέντος2 δὲ ταῖς ἐταφρείας ὁ
Κλεοσθένης προσηγάγετο3 τὸν δήμον, ἀποδιὸν
2 τῷ πλῆθει τῆς πολιτείας. ὁ δὲ Ἰσαγόρας ἐπιλειπό-
μενος τῇ δυνάμει, πάλιν ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸν Κλεο-
μένην ὃντα ἐαυτῷ ἔενον συνέπεσεν ἐλευτεῖν τὸ
ἀγος, διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ἀλκμεωνίδας δοκεῖν εἶναι τῶν
3 ἑναγῶν. υπεξελθόντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεοσθένους, μετ’

1 Mayor: δέι cod.
2 ἦττωμενος edd. ex Herod. v. 66.
3 προσήγετο Thalheim.

a The fortification surrounding the west end of the Acropolis.
was defeated and lost his life, because the Thessalian Cineas came to the defence with a thousand cavalry. Enraged at this occurrence, they dispatched their king Cleomenes by land with a larger army; he won a victory over the Thessalian cavalry who tried to prevent his reaching Attica, and so shut up Hippias in the fortress called the Pelargicum \(^a\) and began to lay siege to it with the aid of the Athenians. While he was sitting down against it, it occurred that the sons of the Peisistratidae were caught when trying secretly to get away; and these being taken they came to terms on the condition of the boys’ safety, and conveyed away their belongings in five days, surrendering the Acropolis to the Athenians; this was in the archonship of Harpactides, and Peisistratus’s sons had retained the tyranny for about seventeen years after their father’s death, making when added to the period of their father’s power a total of forty-nine years.

XX. When the tyranny had been put down, there was a period of faction-strife between Isagoras son of Teisander, who was a friend of the tyrants, and Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonidae. Cleisthenes having got the worst of it in the Comradeships \(^b\) enlisted the people on his side, offering to hand over the government to the multitude. Isagoras began to lose power, so he again called in the aid of Cleomenes, who was a great friend of his, and jointly persuaded him to drive out the curse, \(^c\) because the Alcmaeonidae were reputed to be a family that was under a curse. Cleisthenes secretly withdrew, and Cleomenes with a few troops

\(^a\) Political clubs with anti-democratic leanings.

\(^b\) Cf. ch. i.
ολίγων ἡγηλάτει τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπτακοσίας οἰκίας· ταύτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος τὴν μὲν βουλήν ἐπειράτο καταλύειν Ἰσαγόραν δὲ καὶ τριακοσίους τῶν φίλων μετ' αὐτοῦ κυρίους καθιστάναι τῆς πόλεως. τῆς δὲ βουλῆς ἀντιστάσης καὶ συν- αθροισθέντος τοῦ πλήθους οἷς μὲν περὶ τῶν Κλεομένην καὶ Ἰσαγόραν κατέφυγον εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅ δὲ δήμος δύο μὲν ἡμέρας προσκαθεζόμενος ἐπολιορκεῖ, τῇ δὲ τρίτῃ Κλεομένην μὲν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πάντας ἀφείσαν ὑποστόνδους, Κλεισθένην δὲ καὶ 4 τοὺς ἄλλους φυγάδας μετεπέμψαντο. κατασχόντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου τὰ πράγματα Κλεισθένης ἡγεμόν ἦν καὶ τοῦ δήμου προστάτης. αὐτώτατοι γὰρ σχέδον ἐγένοντο τῆς ἐκβολῆς τῶν τυράννων οἷς Ἀλκ- μεωνίδαι, καὶ στασίάζοντες τὰ πολλὰ διετέλεσαν. 5 ἔτη δὲ πρῶτον τῶν Ἀλκμεωνίδῶν Κήδων ἐπέθετο τοῖς τυράννοις· διὸ καὶ ἤδον καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἐν τοῖς σκολίοις·

ἐγχει καὶ Κήδωνι, διάκονε, μηδ’ ἐπιλήθου, 
εἰ χρῆ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἶνοχοεῖν.

1 XXI. Διὰ μὲν ὁδὸν ταύτας τὰς αὐτίας ἐπίστευεν ὁ δήμος τῶ Κλεισθένει. τότε δὲ τοῦ πλήθους προ- εστηκώς ἔτει τετάρτῳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων
2 κατάλυσιν ἔπε Ἰσαγόρου ἅρχοντος, πρῶτον μὲν συνενεμείς πάντας εἰς δέκα φυλὰς ἀντὶ τῶν τεταρτῶν, ἀναμείζῃ βουλόμενος, ὡς μετάσχοσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας· θεν ἐλέχθη καὶ τὸ μὴ

1 ἄφικόμενος ὁ Κλεομένης> μετ’ ὀλίγων Wilamowitz-Kaibel ex Herod. v. 72.
2 <οί> καὶ Richards.
3 συνενεμεῖς Newman: συνενεμεῖς cod.
proceeded to expel as accursed seven hundred Athenian households; and having accomplished this he tried to put down the Council and set up Isagoras and three hundred of his friends with him in sovereign power over the state. But the Council resisted, and the multitude banded together, so the forces of Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the Acropolis, and the people invested it and laid siege to it for two days. On the third day they let Cleomenes and his comrades go away under a truce, and sent for Cleisthenes and the other exiles to come back. The people having taken control of affairs, Cleisthenes was their leader and was head of the People. For almost the chief initiative in the expulsion of the tyrants was taken by the Alcmaeonids, and they accomplished most of it by party faction. And even before the Alcmaeonids Cedon had attacked the tyrants, owing to which people also sang in his honour in their catches:

Now fill to Cedon, boy! let's drink him too,
If duty bids us toast good men and true.

XXI. These were the causes, therefore, that led the people to trust in Cleisthenes. And when this time he had become Chief of the multitude, in the fourth year after the deposition of the tyrants, in the archonship of Isagoras, he first divided the whole body into ten tribes instead of the existing four, wishing to mix them up, in order that more might take part in the government; from which arose the saying, 'Don’t draw distinctions between tribes,' addressed

\[ a \] Less incompletely stated in Politics iii. 275 b 37 ff. Members of the same class might now belong to different tribes; and a number of new citizens were enrolled (see § 4), free-born aliens and emancipated slaves, who were not members of clans.
ARISTOTLE

φυλοκρινεῖν, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξετάζειν τὰ γένη βουλομένους. ἔπειτα τὴν βουλὴν πεντακοσίους ἀντὶ τετρακοσίων κατέστησεν, πεντήκοντα ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς· τότε δὲ ἦσαν ἐκατόν. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εἰς δῶδεκα φυλὰς συνέταξεν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ μὴ συμβαίνῃ μερίζειν κατὰ τὰς προϋπαρχούσας τριττὰς (ἤσαν γὰρ ἐκ δ’ φυλῶν δῶδεκα τριττίαι), ὥστ’ οὐ συνέπιπτεν ἂν1 ἀναμίσγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.  

dieneime de καὶ τὴν χώραν κατὰ δήμους τριάκοντα μέρη, δέκα μὲν τῶν περὶ τὸ ἀστυν, δέκα δὲ τῆς παραλίας, δέκα δὲ τῆς μεσογείου· καὶ ταύτας ἐπονομάσας τριττὰς ἐκλήρωσε τρεῖς εἰς τὴν φυλὴν ἐκάστην, ὥσπερ ἐκάστη μετέχῃ πάντων τῶν τόπων. καὶ δημότας ἐποίησεν ἄλληλων τοὺς οἰκονυτάς ἐν ἐκάστω τῶν δήμων, ἵνα μὴ πατρόθεν προσαγορεύνοντες ἐξελέγχωσιν τοὺς νεοπολίτας, ἀλλὰ τῶν δήμων ἀναγορεύσωσιν· οὕτω καὶ καλοῦσιν.  

5 Ἀθηναῖοι σφάς αὐτοὺς τῶν δήμων. κατέστησε δὲ καὶ δημάρχους τὴν αὐτὴν ἑχοντας ἐπημέλειαν τοῖς πρότερον ναυκράτοις· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς δήμους ἀντὶ τῶν ναυκρατίων ἐποίησεν. προσηγόρευσε δὲ τῶν δήμων τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κτισάντων, οὐ γὰρ ἀπαντες ὑπήρχον ἐν2 τοῖς τόποις. τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἔλασεν ἐξειν ἐκάστους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.  

1 ἃν supplevit Hude.  

2 ἐν fr. Berol.: in cod. alii ἐν, alii ἐν ἑ τι legunt.

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a See viii. 3 n.  
b i.e. he made the deme a social group, united by almost a family feeling.  
c Cf., e.g., xxviii. 3 ‘Callierates of the Paeanian deme,’ and subsequent designations of persons by their demes; up to that point the father’s name is used.

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to those who want to inquire into people's clans. Next he made the Council to consist of five hundred members instead of four hundred, fifty from each Tribe, whereas under the old system there had been a hundred. This was the reason why he did not arrange them in twelve tribes, in order that he might not have to use the existing division of the Thirds (for the four Tribes contained twelve Thirds), with the result that the multitude would not have been mixed up. He also portioned out the land among the demes into thirty parts, ten belonging to the suburbs, ten to the coast, and ten to the inland district; and he gave these parts the name of Thirds, and assigned them among the Tribes by lot, three to each, in order that each Tribe might have a share in all the districts. And he made all the inhabitants in each of the demes fellow-demessmen of one another, in order that they might not call attention to the newly enfranchised citizens by addressing people by their fathers' names, but designate people officially by their demes; owing to which Athenians in private life also use the names of their demes as surnames. And he also appointed Demarchs, having the same duties as the former Ship-commissioners, for he put the demes in the place of the Ship-commissions. He named some of the demes from their localities, but others from their founders, for the demes were no longer all corresponding to the places. The clans and brotherhoods and priesthoods belonging to the various demes he allowed to remain on the ancestral

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*d* See viii. 3 n.  
*e* In *Politics* 1319 b 23 it is said that 'Cleisthenes increased the number of the brotherhoods,' but that no doubt refers to the new citizens.
τὰίς δὲ φυλαῖς, ἐποίησεν ἐπωνύμους ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ἐκατὸν ἄρχηγετῶν οὓς ἀνείλεν ἡ Πυθία δέκα.

1 ΧΧΙΙ. Τούτων δὲ γενομένων δημοτικωτέρα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία· καὶ γὰρ συνέβη τούς μὲν Σόλωνος νόμους ἀφανίσαι τὴν τυραννίδα διὰ τὸ μὴ χρήσθαι, καίνους δ' ἄλλους θεῖαι τὸν Κλεισθένης στοχαζόμενον τοῦ πλῆθους, ἐν οἷς ἐτέθη

καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἑτει πέμπτῳ ἑμετα ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν ἐφ' Ἐρμοκρέοντος ἀρχαντὸς τῇ βουλῇ τοῖς πεντακοσίοις τὸν ὁρκὸν ἐποίησαν ὃν ἐτι καὶ νῦν ὄμνουσιν. ἐπειτὰ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἱροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἑνα, τῆς δὲ ἀπάσης

3 στρατιάς ἁγεμών ἢν δ' ἀπόλεμαρχος. ἑτει δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ νικήσαντες τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην, ἐπὶ Φαινίππου ἀρχαντὸς, διαλυόντες ἑτη δύο μετὰ τὴν νίκην, θαρροῦντος ἢδη τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρῶτον ἐξήρισαντο τῷ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν, δι' ἑτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ὅτι 2 Πεισόστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ

4 στρατηγὸς ὁν τύραννος κατέστη. καὶ πρῶτος ῥουστρακίσθη τῶν ἐκείνων συγγενῶν Ἰππαρχος Χάρμου Κολλυτεύς, δι' ὃν καὶ μάλιστα τὸν νόμον ἔθηκεν ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐξελάσαι βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους, ὃσοι μὴ συνεξαμαρτάνοιεν 3 ἐν ταῖς ταραχαῖς, εἴων οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, χρώμενοι τῇ εἰσοδείᾳ τοῦ δήμου

1 πέμπτῳ (= ἐ') cod. ὁ γὰρ (= ἕ') ? Kenyon.

2 Kenyon: οτε cod.

3 Poste: συνεξαμαρτάνον cod.
plan. As eponymous deities of the Tribes he instituted ten tutelary heroes selected by an oracle of the Pythian priestess from a previously chosen list of a hundred.

XXII. These reforms made the constitution much more democratic than that of Solon; for it had come about that the tyranny had obliterated the laws of Solon by disuse, and Cleisthenes aiming at the multitude had instituted other new ones, including the enactment of the law about ostracism. First of all, in the fifth year after these enactments, in the archonship of Hermocreon, they instituted the oath of induction for the Council of Five Hundred that is still in use. Next they began to elect the Generals by tribes, one from each tribe, while the whole army was under the command of the War-lord. Eleven years afterwards came their victory in the battle of Marathon; and in the archonship of Phaenippus, two years after the victory, the people being now in high courage, they put in force for the first time the law about ostracism, which had been enacted owing to the suspicion felt against the men in the positions of power because Peisistratus when leader of the people and general set himself up as tyrant. The first person banished by ostracism was one of his relatives, Hipparchus son of Charmus of the deme of Collytus, the desire to banish whom had been Cleisthenes' principal motive in making the law. For the Athenians permitted all friends of the tyrants that had not taken part with them in their offences during the disorders to dwell in the city,—in this the customary mildness of the people was displayed; and

\[ a \text{ i.e. in } 504 \text{ B.C.}; \text{ but if Marathon (490 B.C.) was eleven years later (§ 3), perhaps the Greek should be altered here to give 'in the eighth year after.' } \]

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πραότητι· διν ἡγεμών καὶ προστάτης ἦν Ἰππαρχος. 5 εὕθως δὲ τῷ υστέρῳ ἔτει ἐπὶ Τελεσίων ἄρχοντος ἐκνάμευσαν τοὺς ἐνεά ἄρχοντας κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν Πεντακοσίων τότε μετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρῶτον· οἱ δὲ πρῶτοι πάντες ἠσαν αἱρετοὶ. καὶ ὁστρακίσθη Μεγακλής 6 Ἰπποκράτους Ἀλωπεκῆθεν. ἔπι μὲν οὖν ἦτη γ' τοὺς τῶν τυράννων φίλους ὁστρακίζον, ἃν χάριν ὁ νόμος ἑτέθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τις δοκοῖ μείζων εἶναι μεθίστατο· καὶ πρῶτος ὁστρακίσθη τῶν ἀπωθεί τῆς τυραν-7 νίδος Εάνθυππος ὁ Ἀρίφρονος. ἔτει δὲ τρίτω μετὰ ταῦτα Νικομήδου ἄρχοντος, ὡς ἐφάνη τὰ μέταλλα τὰ ἐν Μαρωνείᾳ καὶ περιεγένετο τῇ πόλει τάλαντα ἐκατόν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, συμβουλευ-όντων τινῶν τῷ δήμῳ διανείμασθαι τὸ ἀργύριον Θεομικηλίς ἐκώλυσεν, οὐ λέγων ὅ τι χρήσται τοῖς χρήμασιν, ἀλλὰ δανεῖσαι κελεύων τοῖς πλουσιώτατοι Ἀθηναίων ἐκατόν ἐκάστῳ τάλαντον, εἴτ' ἐὰν μὲν ἀρέσκῃ τὸ ἀνάλωμα, τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μῆ, κομίσασθαι τὰ χρῆματα παρὰ τῶν δανεισαμένων. λαβὼν δ' ἔπι τούτους ἑναυ-πηγήσατο τρυφείς ἐκατόν, ἐκάστου ναυπηγοῦ-μένου τῶν ἐκατόν μίαν, αἷς ἑναυμάχησαν ἐν Σαλαμίνι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους. ὁστρακίσθη δ' ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου.

1 δήμων fr. Berol.
2 τότε Whibley: τοις cod.
3 Νικοδήμου fr. Berol.
5 post εἶναι, in cod. alia manus τηνδαπαννυ supra lineam scripsit.
68
Hipparchus was the leader and chief of these persons. But directly afterwards, in the next year, in the archonship of Telesinus, they elected the Nine Archons by lot, tribe by tribe, from a preliminary list of five hundred chosen by the demesmen: this was the date of the first election on these lines, after the tyranny, the previous Archons having all been elected by vote. And Megacles son of Hippocrates of the deme Alopeke was ostracized. For three years they went on ostracizing the friends of the tyrants, at whom the legislation had been aimed, but afterwards in the fourth year it was also used to remove any other person who seemed to be too great; the first person unconnected with the tyranny to be ostracized was Xanthippus son of Arithron. Two years later, in the archonship of Nicomedes, in consequence of the discovery of the mines at Maronea, the working of which had given the state a profit of a hundred talents, the advice was given by some persons that the money should be distributed among the people; but Themistocles prevented this, not saying what use he would make of the money, but recommending that it should be lent to the hundred richest Athenians, each receiving a talent, so that if they should spend it in a satisfactory manner, the state would have the advantage, but if they did not, the state should call in the money from the borrowers. On these terms the money was put at his disposal, and he used it to get a fleet of a hundred triremes built, each of the hundred borrowers having one ship built, and with these they fought the naval battle at Salamis against the barbarians. And it was during this period that Aristeides son of Lysimachus was

a Possibly five miles north of Cape Sunium.
8 τετάρτω τ' ἐτεί κατεδέξαντο πάντας τοὺς ᾠστρακισμένους ἀρχοντος Ἡηηχίδου, διὰ τὴν Ἑρέξου στρατείαν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἠρίσαν τοῖς ᾠστρακιζομένοις ἑντὸς Γεραιστοῦ καὶ Σκυλλαίου (μὴ² κατοικεῖν ἡ ἀτίμους εἶναι καθάπαξ.

1 XXIII. Τότε μὲν οὖν μέχρι τούτου προήλθεν ἡ πόλις, ἀμα τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ κατὰ μικρὸν αὐξανομένη· μετὰ δὲ τὰ Μηνικὰ πάλιν ἤσχυσεν ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή καὶ διώκει τὴν πόλιν, οὔδεν δόγματι λαβοῦσα τὴν ἤγερμονίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα ναυμαχίας αὐτία. τῶν γὰρ στρατηγῶν εξαπορησάντων τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ κηρυξάντων σφέσει ἕκαστὸν ἑαυτόν, πορίσασα δραχμᾶς ἕκαστῳ ὀκτὼ διέδωκε καὶ ἐνεβίβασεν εἰς τὰς ναύς. διὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν αὐτίαν παρεχώρουν αὐτῆς τῷ ἄξιωματι καὶ ἐπολυτέθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι καλῶς κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καυροὺς· συνέβη γὰρ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον τὰ τε εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀσκήσαι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησει εὐδοκιμήσαι καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλαττῆς ἤγερμονίαν λαβεῖν ἅκιντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

3 ἦσαν δὲ προστάται τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καυροὺς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέους, ὃ μὲν τὰ πολέμια ἀσκῶν ὃ δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν

1 τριτῶ Wilamowitz-Kaibel collato Plut. Aristid. 8.  
2 μὴ supplevit Kaibel (ἐκτὸς πρὸ ἐντὸς Wyse).  
3 Blass: αὐτὴν cod.  
4 κατὰ (vel καὶ <μετρίως> κατὰ ἡ) Kenyon: καικατα cod.  
5 δοκῶν Richards: δοκῶν ἀσκεῖν Kenyon.
ostracized. Three years later in the archonship of 8 Hypsechides they allowed all the persons ostracized to return, because of the expedition of Xerxes; and they fixed a boundary thenceforward for persons ostracized, prohibiting them from living within a line drawn from Geraestus to Scyllaeum under penalty of absolute loss of citizenship.

XXIII. At this date, therefore, the state had advanced to this point, growing by slow stages with the growth of the democracy; but after the Persian Wars the Council on the Areopagus became powerful again, and carried on the administration, having gained the leadership by no definite resolution but owing to its having been the cause of the naval battle of Salamis. For the Generals had been reduced to utter despair by the situation and had made a proclamation that every man should see to his own safety; but the Council provided a fund and distributed eight drachmas a head and got them to man the ships. For this reason, therefore, the Generals gave place to the Council in esteem. And Athens was well governed in these periods; for during this time it occurred that the people practised military duties and won high esteem among the Greeks and gained the supremacy of the sea against the will of the Lacedaemonians. The heads of the People in these periods were Aristides son of Lysimachus and Themistocles son of Neocles, the latter practising to be skilful in military pursuits, and the former in polities, and to excel

a The ms. gives 'enacting that they must live.'
b The S. point of Euboea.
c The S.E. point of Argolis.
d See ii. 3 n.
e The Greek should perhaps be altered to give 'the latter practising military pursuits, and the former esteemed to be skilful in politics.'
ARISTOTLE

καθ' έαυτόν διαφέρειν· διό καί ἕχρωντο τῷ μὲν
4 στρατηγῷ τῷ δὲ συμβούλῳ. τῇ μὲν οὖν τῶν
tειχῶν ἀνοικοδόμησιν κοινῇ διώκησαν, καίπερ δια-
φερόμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ ἀπόστασιν
tῆς τῶν Ἰώνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμ-
μαχίας Ἰ' Αριστείδης ἢν ὁ προτρέψας, τηρήσας τοὺς
5 Λάκωνας διαβεβλημένους διὰ Παυσανίαν. διό καὶ
tοὺς φόρους οὗτος ἢν ὁ τάξας ταῖς πόλεσιν τοὺς
πρῶτους ἔτει τρίτῳ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυ-
μαχίαν ἐπὶ Τμωσθένους ἄρχοντος, καὶ τοὺς ὀρκους
ωμοσε τοῖς Ἰωσὶ ὧστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχρον εἶναι καὶ
φίλον, ἐφ' οἷς καὶ τοὺς μύδρους ἐν τῷ πελάγει
καθεῖσαν.

1 XXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα θαρρούσης ἦδη τῆς
πόλεως καὶ χρημάτων ἠθροισμένων πολλῶν, συν-
εβούλευεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ κατα-
βάντας ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀστεὶ τροφὴν
γὰρ ἔσεσθαι πᾶσι, τοῖς μὲν στρατευόμενοις τοῖς δὲ
φουροῦσι τοῖς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ πράττονσι, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω
2 κατασχήσειν τῆν ἡγεμονίαν. πεισθέντες δὲ ταύτα
καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἄρχην τοῖς συμμάχοις δε-
σποτικωτέρως ἕχρωντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ
Σαμίων· τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἄρχῆς,
ἐδώτες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν
3 δὲν ἑτυχεῖν ἄρχοντες. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς
πολλοῖς εὑπορίαν τροφῆς, ὥσπερ Ἰ' Αριστείδης

1 κατηρτωλακεδαιμονωνυμμαχιαν cod., corr. Blass.
2 τοῖς Blass: τοιστε cod.

The city fortifications were rebuilt, the harbour of Peiraeus completed and the Long Walls built to link Peiraeus and Phalerum with the city.

The parties swore to keep the covenant until the iron
his contemporaries in justice; hence the Athenians employed the one as general and the other as counsellor. So the rebuilding of the walls was directed by both these statesmen jointly, although they were at variance with one another; but the secession of the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance was promoted by Aristeides, who seized the opportunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited because of Pausanias. Hence it was Aristeides who assessed the tributes of the allied states on the first occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who administered the oaths to the Ionians when they swore to have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom out at sea.

XXIV. Afterwards, now that the state was emboldened and much money had been collected, he began to advise them to aim at the leadership, and to come down from their farms and live in the city, telling them that there would be food for all, some serving in the army and others as frontier-guards and others conducting the business of the community, and then by this method they would keep the leadership. Having taken this advice and won the empire, they treated the allies too masterfully, except Chios, Lesbos and Samos, which they kept as outposts of empire, and allowed to have their own governments and to rule the subjects that they had at the time. They also established a plentiful food-supply for the multitude, as Aristeides had proposed; for the corn appeared again on the surface, \( \pi\rho\nu \ \eta \ \tau\omicron\nu \ \mu\omicron\delta\omicron\rho\omicron\nu \ \tau\omicron\omicron\tau\omicron\nu \ \alpha\nu\alpha\phi\nu\nu\nu\alpha\iota \) Hdt. i. 165, and Hor. Epodes 16. 25—sed iuremus in haec: ‘simul imis saxa renarint vadis leuata, ne redire sit nefas.’
ARISTOTLE

eiσηγήσατο· συνέβαινεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν τελῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πλείους ἡ δισμυρίας ἄνδρας τρέφεσθαι. δικασταὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν ἔξακισχίλιοι, τοξόται δὲ ἔξακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἵππεις χίλιοι καὶ διακόσιοι, βουλὴ δὲ πεντακόσιοι, καὶ φρουροὶ νεωρίων πεντακόσιοι καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν τῇ πόλει φρουροὶ ν’, ἀρχαὶ δὲ ἐνδημοὶ μὲν εἰς ἑπτακόσιοις ἄνδρας ὑπερόριοι δὲ εἰς ἑπτακόσιοις1· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἔπει συνεστήσαντο2 τὸν πόλεμον ὑπερτεροῦν, ὀπλίται μὲν δισχίλιοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι, νῆς δὲ φρουρίδες εὔκοσι, ἀλλαὶ δὲ νῆς αἱ τοὺς φρούρους3 ἄγουσαν τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου δισχίλιους ἄνδρας· ἔτι δὲ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ὀρφανοὶ καὶ δεσμωτῶν φύλακες· ἀπασὶ γὰρ τοῦτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν.

1 XXV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τροφὴ τῷ δήμῳ διὰ τούτων ἐγίνετο. ἔτη δὲ ἑπτακαιδέκα μάλιστα μετὰ τὰ Μηδικᾶ διέμεινεν ἡ πολιτεία προεστῶτων τῶν Ἀρεοπάγιτῶν, καίπερ ὑποφερομένη κατὰ μικρὸν. αὐξανομένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους γενόμενος τοῦ δήμου προστάτης Ἐφιάλτης ὁ Σωφρονίδου καὶ δοκῶν4 ἀδωροδόκητος εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἔπεθετο τῇ βουλή. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀνείλεν πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀρεοπάγιτῶν ἀγώνας ἐπιφέρων περὶ τῶν διωκμένων· ἔπειτα τῆς βουλῆς ἐπὶ Κόνωνος ἀρχοντος ἀπαντὰ περιείλε5 τὰ ἐπίθετα δι’ ὅν ἦν ἡ τῆς πολιτείας φυλακὴ, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς πεντα-

1 numerum e priore versu male repetitum notant Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
2 συνεστήσαν τὰ <eis>? ed.: συνεστήσαντο τὰ eis Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
3 Blass, cf. lxii. 1: φοροὺς cod.
4 δοκῶν καὶ Kaibel.
5 περιείλετο Richards.

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bined proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men. For there were six thousand jurymen, one thousand six hundred archers and also one thousand two hundred cavalry, five hundred members of the Council, five hundred guardians of the docks, and also fifty watchmen in the city, as many as seven hundred officials at home and as many as seven hundred abroad; and in addition to these, when later they settled into the war, two thousand five hundred hoplites, twenty guard-ships and other ships conveying the guards to the number of two hundred elected by lot; and furthermore the prytaneum, orphans, and warders of prisoners—for all of these had their maintenance from public funds.

XXV. By these means the people were provided with their food-supply. The constitution remained under the leadership of the Areopagites for about seventeen years after the Persian War, although it was being gradually modified. But as the population increased, Ephialtes son of Sophonides, having become head of the People and having the reputation of being incorruptible and just in regard to the constitution, attacked the Council. First he made away with many of the Areopagites by bringing legal proceedings against them about their acts of administration; then in the archonship of Conon he stripped the Council of all its added powers which made it the safeguard of the constitution, and assigned some of

\[a\] The number is probably repeated from the previous line by mistake; otherwise 'also' would be added.

\[b\] The town-hall, probably in the old Agora, south of the Acropolis; in it a fire was kept continually burning, and the Prytaneis dined.

\[c\] See ii. 3 n.
κοσίών τὰ δὲ τῶν δῆμων καὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀπέδωκεν. ἔπραξε δὲ ταῦτα συναιτίων γενομένου Θεμιστοκλέους, ὃς ἦν μὲν τῶν Ἀρεσπαγιτῶν ἔμελλε δὲ κρίνεσθαι μηδισμοῦ. βουλόμενος δὲ καταλυθῆναι τὴν βουλὴν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἐφιάλτην ἐλεγεν ὅτι συναρτάζειν αὐτὸν ἡ βουλὴ μέλλει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀρεσπαγίτας ὅτι δεῖξει τινὰς συνισταμένους ἐπὶ καταλύσει τῆς πολιτείας. ἀγαγῶν δὲ τοὺς αἰρεθέντας τῆς βουλῆς οὗ διέστρεβεν ὁ Ἐφιάλτης ἵνα δείξῃ τοὺς ἀθροιζομένους, διελέγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς αὐτοῖς. ὃς ὁ Ἐφιάλτης ὦς εἰδεν καταπλαγεῖς καθίζει μονοχίτων ἐπὶ τῶν βωμῶν. θαυμασάντων δὲ πάντων τὸ γεγονός καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα συναθροισθείσης τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν Ἀρεσπαγιτῶν ὁ τῆς Ἐφιάλτης καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον, ἕως περείλοντο αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ ἁνηρέθη δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλτης δολοφονηθεῖς μετ’ οὗ πολὺν χρόνον δι’ Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ Ταναγραίου.

XXVI. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἀρεσπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τούτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπεστερήθη τῆς ἐπιμελείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινεν ἀνίεσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμεως δημαγωγοῦντας. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους συνέπεσεν μηδ’ ὧν μόνον ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους, ἀλλ’ αὐτῶν προεστάναι Κύμωνα τοῦ Μιλτιάδου νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρὸς

1 Kenyon: αφαίρεθεντας cod.
2 ὁ suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
3 [καὶ] Mayor: καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεμιστοκλῆς ... Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
4 νωθρὸν Blass: νωθρῶτερον Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
them to the Five Hundred and others to the People and to the jury-courts. For these acts of Ephialtes, Themistocles was partly responsible; he was a member of the Areopagus, but was destined to be put on trial for treasonable dealings with Persia. Themistocles desiring the Council to be destroyed used to tell Ephialtes that the Council was going to arrest him, while he told the Areopagites that he would give information about certain persons who were conspiring to destroy the constitution. And he used to take selected members of the Council to the place where Ephialtes resided to show them the people collecting there, and conversed with them seriously. Ephialtes was dismayed when he saw this, and took his seat at the altar in only his shirt. Everybody was amazed at what had happened, and afterwards when the Council of Five Hundred assembled Ephialtes and Themistocles kept on denouncing the Areopagites, and again similarly at the meetings of the people, until they deprived them of their power. And also Ephialtes was actually made away with not long after, being craftily murdered by Aristodicus of Tanagra.

XXVI. In this way the Council of the Areopagites was deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After this there came about an increased relaxation of the constitution, due to the eagerness of those who were the leaders of the People. For it so happened that during these periods the better classes had no leader at all, but the chief person among them, Cimon son of Miltiades, was a rather young man who had only

* a In Politics ii. xii. the place assigned here to Themistocles is taken by Pericles.

b Or 'more respectable': it is a vague term of social approval, cf. § 1 fin, xxvii. 4, xxviii. 1, xxxvi. 9.
τὴν πόλιν ὃψε προσελθόντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἐφθάρθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς κατὰ πόλεμον· τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γνωμένης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ στρατηγῶν ἐφισταμένων ἀπείρων μὲν τοῦ πολέμεων τιμωμένων δὲ διὰ τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας, αἰεὶ συνέβαινε τῶν ἐξιόντων ἀνὰ δισχιλίους ἡ τρισχιλίους ἀπόλυσθαι, ὡστε ἀναλίσκεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων.

2 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πάντα διώκουν οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρότερον τοῖς νόμοις προσέχοντες, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐννέα ἄρχοντων αἴρεσιν οὐκ ἐκίνουν ἅλλη ἡ ἐκτῷ ἐτεί μετὰ τὸν Ἐφιάλτου τάνατον ἐγνωσάν καὶ ἐκ ξενοτιῶν προκρίνεσθαι τοὺς κληρωσομένους τῶν ἐννέα ἄρχοντων· καὶ πρῶτος ἤρξεν ἐξ αὐτῶν Μνησιθείδης. οἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτου πάντες ἐξ ἰππεῶν καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ ἐξ ξενοτιΐα τὰς ἐγκυκλίους ἤρχον, εἴ μὴ τι παρ-

3 εῳράτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. ἔτει δὲ πέμπτῳ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔπλω Λυσικράτους ἄρχοντος οἱ τριάκοντα δικασταὶ κατέστησαν πάλιν οἱ καλούμενοι κατὰ δήμους· καὶ τρίτῳ μετὰ τοῦτον ἔπλω Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν Περικλέους εἰπόντος ἐγνωσάν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἄν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἅπτοιν ἡ γεγονός.

1 XXVII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ δημαγωγεῖν ἐλθόντος Περικλέους καὶ πρῶτον ἐυδοκιμήσαντος ὅτε κατηγόρησε τὰς εὐθύνας Κύμωνος στρατηγοῦντος νέος ὁ, δημοτικωτέραν ἐτὶ συνέβη

1 ἡ supplevit Blass. 2 δὲ supplevit Kenyon. 3 πρῶτον Blass: πωτον cod.: πρὸ τοῦ Jackson.

a Cf. xvi. 5.
lately entered public life; and in addition, that the multitude had suffered seriously in war, for in those days the expeditionary force was raised from a muster-roll, and was commanded by generals with no experience of war but promoted on account of their family reputations, so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy. Thus in general all the administration was conducted without the same attention to the laws as had been given before, although no innovation was made in the election of the Nine Archons, except that five years after the death of Ephialtes they decided to extend to the Teamster class eligibility to the preliminary roll from which the Nine Archons were to be selected by lot; and the first of the Teamster class to hold the archonship was Mnésitheides. (All the Archons hitherto had been from the Knights and Five-hundred-measure-men) while the Teamsters held the ordinary offices, unless some provision of the laws was ignored. Four years afterwards, in the archonship of Lysicrates, the thirty judges called the Local Justices were instituted again; and two years after Lysicrates, in the year of Antidotus, owing to the large number of the citizens an enactment was passed on the proposal of Pericles confining citizenship to persons of citizen birth on both sides.

XXVII. After this when Pericles advanced to the leadership of the people, having first distinguished himself when while still a young man he challenged the audits of Cimon who was a general, it came about that the constitution became still more democratic.
γενέσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν Ἀρεο-
pagitῶν ἐνια παρεῖλετο, καὶ μάλιστα προὕτρεψεν
tὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν δύναμιν, ἡς συνεβη
θαρρήσαντας τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπασαν τὴν πολιτείαν

2 μάλλον ἀγείν εἰς αὐτούς. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίν

ναυμαχίαν ἐνὸς δὲι πεντηκοστοῦ ἔτει ἐπὶ Πυθο-

δῶρον ἄρχοντος ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἐνέστη
pόλεμον, ἐν δὲ κατακλεισθεὶς δὴμος ἐν τῷ ἄστε
cαι συνεδριάδες ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις μισθοφορεῖν, τὰ

μὲν ἐκὼν τὰ δὲ ἂκων προηρεῖτο τὴν πολιτείαν
dιοικεῖν αὐτός. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μισθοφόρα τὰ
dικαστήρια Περικλῆς πρῶτος, ἀντιδημαγωγῶν

3 πρὸς τὴν Κῑμωνοῦ εὐπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ Κῑμὼν ἀτε
tυραννικὴν ἔχων οὐσίαν πρῶτον μὲν ὅσ τοὺς κοινάς

λητουργίας ἑλπιόρυγε λαμπρῶς, ἐπειτὰ τῶν
dημοτῶν ἔτρεφε πολλούς. ἔζην γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ

Λακιδῶν καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦντι παρ' ἀυτὸν ἔχειν τὰ μέτρια, ἔτι δὲ τὰ χωρία πάντα

ἀφρακτὰ ἢν, ὅπως ἔζην τῷ βουλομένῳ τῆς ὁπώρας

4 ἀπολαύειν. πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν ἐπι-

λειπόμενος ὁ Περικλῆς τῇ οὔσίᾳ, συμβουλεύσαντος

ἀυτῷ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἴθηδεν (ὅς ἐδόκει τῶν πολλῶν
eἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὸ καὶ ὠστράκισαν

ἀυτὸν ὑστεροῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἱδίοις ἦττατο διδόναι τοῖς

πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεσκεύασε μισθοφορὰν τοῖς
dικαστηρίοις. ἀφ' ὄν αἰτιῶνταί τινες χείρω
gενέσθαι, κληρομένων ἐπιμελῶς ἀεὶ μάλλον τῶν

5 τυχόντων ή τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἡράστο δὲ

1 προῆγετο Richards.
2 ἔζην Kenyon: ἔζην cod.
3 Blass: δικαστάις cod.
4 χείρωs Wilamowitz-Kaibel (servato δικαστήριοι).
For he took away some of the functions of the Areopagus, and he urged the state very strongly in the direction of naval power, which resulted in emboldening the multitude, who brought all the government more into their own hands. Forty-eight years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Pythodorus, the war against the Peloponnesians broke out, during which the people being locked up in the city, and becoming accustomed to earning pay on their military campaigns, came partly of their own will and partly against their will to the decision to administer the government themselves. Also Pericles first made service in the jury-courts a paid office, as a popular counter-measure against Cimon's wealth. For as Cimon had an estate large enough for a tyrant, in the first place he discharged the general public services in a brilliant manner, and moreover he supplied maintenance to a number of the members of his deme; for anyone of the Laciadae who liked could come to his house every day and have a moderate supply, and also all his farms were unfenced, to enable anyone who liked to avail himself of the harvest. So as Pericles' means were insufficient for this lavishness, he took the advice of Damonides of Oea (who was believed to suggest to Pericles most of his measures, owing to which they afterwards ostracized him), since he was getting the worst of it with his private resources, to give the multitude what was their own, and he instituted payment for the jury-courts; the result of which according to some critics was their deterioration, because ordinary persons always took more care than the respectable to cast lots for the duty. Also it was after this that the organized

\[a\] Cf. xxii. 7, xxiv. 1.
metà taïta kaì to dekaqeïn, prwton kataide-xaïtòs 'Anýtoù metà thn en Pûlôs strathgìán-kronoménon gar upò tìwn dià to apobaleîn Pûlôn, dekaqsa to dikastèrîon ápëfugven.

1 XXVIII. 'Ewos méen ouv Perikléûs pròeisstîkei toû díîmou bêltîw tâ katâ thn poluteîan òn, televtìsantos ðe Perikléous polù cheîrò. prwton gar tòte pròstàth õlabeven dò díîmou ouk eûdokî-

2 eî de ònpòtoi eîgynetô proostàth òtov díîmou Sólovn, deûteros ðe Peisôstratov, òtovn euqenvn ðe gnorîmîn: kataludeîs ðe ðèi tûranwîdôs Kleissthènè toû genous òw tûvn 'Alkmeónidôn, kai tòutîw méen oudeís ði anv-

3 Perikléous ðe televtìsantos òtovn méen èpifanôw pròeisstîkei Nikîas ð en Sikeïlà televtìsas, toû ðe díîmou Kléwv ð Kleaivnetov, ðs dokèi màlista diaphèrav òtovn díîmou tòis òrmwv,2 kai prwton èpî toû bímatos ânëkraîge kai èloidoðhîstato kai perizwswamovs èdhmhgorîs, òtovn állovn en kòsmw

1 [œî] Richards.

2 diavomâs Sandys: vòmâs Thalheim.

a Pylos (Navarino) on the W. coast of Peloponnesus, had been taken by Athens 425 B.C., but was retaken by Sparta 82
bribery of juries began, Anytus having first shown the way to it after his command at Pylos; for when he was brought to trial by certain persons for having lost Pylos he bribed the court and got off.

XXVIII. So long, then, as Pericles held the headship of the People, the affairs of the state went better, but when Pericles was dead they became much worse. For the People now for the first time adopted a head who was not in good repute with the respectable classes, whereas in former periods those always continued to lead the people. For Solon was the first and original head of the People, and the second was Peisistratus, who was one of the men of nobility and note. After the tyranny had been put down, Cleisthenes, a member of the family of the Alcmaeonidae, was head of the People, and he had no opponent, since the party of Isagoras was banished; but after this Xanthippus held the headship of the People, and Miltiades of the notables; and then Themistocles and Aristeides; and after them Ephialtes held the headship of the People, and Cimon son of Miltiades of the wealthy; and then Pericles of the People and Thucydides of the others, he being a relation of Cimon. When Pericles died, Nicias, who died in Sicily, held the headship of the men of distinction, and the head of the People was Cleon son of Cleaenetus, who is thought to have done the most to corrupt the people by his impetuous outbursts, and was the first person to use bawling and abuse on the platform, and to gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly 409 B.C. Anytus (see also xxxiv. 3, one of the prosecutors of Socrates) was sent with 30 triremes to its relief, but owing to weather never got round Cape Malea.

*b* See note on ii. 3.
leagontan. eita meta toutous twn men eteron
Thetaimeneis o 'Agywnos, touto de dhmou Kleofon o
lurotopoos, de kai tin diwbolian1 epomeire proutos-
kai chronon men tina dieididou,2 meta de tauta
kateutes Kallikratheus Piaianes proutos upos-
chomenos epithsinev pros touto douvo obolou allon
obolon. touton men ouv amftetron thatanon kata-
egnwsan USTERON: eiothen yar ka wekataethi to
plhthos usteron musein toutis ti proagagontas poeiv
4 autous twn my kalos exontwn. apo de Kleo-
phontos the diegethonty synexos twn demagogian
oi malista boulmenoi thrasunesbei kai xarize-
sebei toutis pollolos pros to parautika blepontes.
5 dokousi de3 belistoi yegonvai toutis 'Athanisi
politeuymeswv meta toutis arxaios Nikias kai
Ouukidhys kai Thetaimeneis. kai peri men Nikiou
kai Ouukidhou pantes schevon melologousin andra
yegonovai ou monon kalois kagathous alla kai
politeivos kai tis poli pase patrikos xrop-
menous, peri de Thetaimeneous dia to symbevai kai
auton paraxoides tais politeias eina4 amfis-
bytheis tis krisewos esti. dokesi mnetoi5 toutis
my parerignos apofranoimenous ouw asper auton
diaballousi paseis tais politeias katalinev, alla
paseis proagein eis mned paranoimovn, ws dunamo-
menos politeusethai kata paseis, asper estin agathou
politon ergon, paranoimousais de ou synxwrov
all aposthanoimenos.

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1 diwbeilias edd. 2 dieididoto Wyse.
3 de: duo (=d' oI) cod., e superscripto.
4 eina supplevit Richards. 5 mnetoi Kenyon: mev cod.

By instituting the 'theatre-fund' (to thewrikon), which was
fashion. Then after these Theramenes son of Hagnon was chief of the others and Cleophon the lyre-maker of the People, who first introduced the two-obol dole; he went on distributing this for a time, but afterwards Callicrates of the Paeanian deme abolished it, being the first person to promise to add to the two obols another obol. Both of these two leaders were afterwards condemned to death; for even though the multitude may be utterly deceived, subsequently it usually hates those who have led it to do anything improper. From Cleon onward the leadership of the People was handed on in an unbroken line by the men most willing to play a bold part and to gratify the many with an eye to immediate popularity. And it is thought that the best of the politicians at Athens after those of early times were Nicias, Thucydides and Theramenes. As to Nicias and Thucydides, almost everybody agrees that they were not only honourable gentlemen but also statesmanlike and patriotic servants of the whole state, but about Theramenes, owing to the confused nature of the constitutional changes that took place in his time, the verdict is a matter of dispute. However, the view of writers not making mere incidental references is that he was not a destroyer of all governments, as critics charge him with being, but guided them all forward into a fully law-abiding course, since he was capable of serving the state under all of them, which is the duty of a good citizen, but did not give in to them when they acted illegally, but faced their enmity.

a state fund for defraying the cost of an ordinary seat at the theatre, 2 obols. Plutarch attributes its institution to Pericles. An obol was about 1\(\frac{1}{4}\)d., 6 to a drachma.
ARISTOTLE

XXIX. "Εώς μὲν οὖν ἴσορροπα τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἢν διεφύλαττον τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ γενομένην συμφοράν ἰσχυρότατα τὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐγένετο διὰ τὴν πρὸς βασιλέα συμμαχίαν, ἦνακασθηκαν κυνῆσαντες τὴν δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτειῶν, εἰσόντος τὸν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ ὕψησματος λόγον Μηλοβίου, τὴν δὲ γνώμην γράψαντος Πυθοδώρου τοῦ Ἀναφλυστίου, μάλιστα δὲ συμπεισθέντων τῶν πολλῶν διὰ τὸ νομίζειν βασιλέα μᾶλλον ἐαυτοῖς συμπολεμήσεις εἰναὶ δὲ ὀλίγων πονήσωνται τὴν πολιτείαν. ἦν δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ Πυθοδώρου τοιόνιδε. τὸν δὴμον ἐλέσθαι μετὰ τῶν προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβούλων ἄλλους εἰκοσὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ τετράκοσια ζητήσεις γεγονότων, οἵτινες ὁμόσαντες ἢ μὴν συγγράψειν ἂν ἦν γιγαντια βέλτιστα εἶναι τῷ πόλει συγγράψουσι περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας. εξεῖναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφειν, ἵν' εἴξ ἀπάντων αἰρῶνται τὸ ἀριστον. Κλειστοφών δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναφηκεὶ δὲ τοὺς αἱρεθέντας ἐγραψεν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους οὓς Κλεισθένης ἐθεκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως ἀκούσαντες καὶ τοὺτων βουλεύσονται τὸ ἀριστον, ὥς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἄλλα παραπληγίαν οὖσαν τὴν Κλειστοφών δὲ αἱρεθέντας πρῶτον μὲν ἐγραψαν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι τοὺς πρυ-

Richards: διαφορὰν cod.
2 ἰσχυρότερα Mayor.
3 πρὸ] περὶ Wyse.
4 Blass: . . . τοῦ cod.
5 ὅπως <ἄν> Wilamowitz-Kaibel.

a Or ' before the resolution.'
XXIX. In the period of the war therefore, so long as fortunes were evenly balanced, they continued to preserve the democracy. But when after the occurrence of the disaster in Sicily the Lacedaemonian side became very strong owing to the alliance with the king of Persia, they were compelled to overthrow the democracy and set up the government of the Four Hundred, Melobius making the speech on behalf of the resolution but Pythodorus of the deme Anaphlystus having drafted the motion, and the acquiescence of the mass of the citizens being chiefly due to the belief that the king would help them more in the war if they limited their constitution. The resolution of Pythodorus was as follows: 'That in addition to the ten Preliminary Councillors already existing the people choose twenty others from those over forty years of age, and that these, after taking a solemn oath to draft whatever measures they think best for the state, shall draft measures for the public safety; and that it be open to any other person also that wishes, to frame proposals, in order that they may choose the one that is best out of them all.' Cleitophon moved an amendment to the resolution of Pythodorus, that the commissioners elected should also investigate the ancestral laws laid down by Cleisthenes when he was establishing the democracy, in order that they might decide on the best course to advise after hearing these laws also, on the ground that the constitution of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that of Solon. The commissioners when elected first pro-
τάνεις ἀπαντᾷ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπιψηφίζειν, ἐπειτα τὰς τῶν παρανόμων γραφὰς καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τὰς προσκλήσεις ἀνείλον, ὅπως ἄν οἱ ἐθέλοντες Ἀθηναῖοι συμβουλεύσωσι περὶ τῶν προκειμένων· εάν δὲ τίς τίνα τούτων χάριν ἢ ζημιόν ἢ προσκαλήται ἡ εἰσάγηθα εἰς δικαστήριον, ἐνδείξειν αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς παρά-
5 δούναι τοὺς ἐνδεκα βανάτῳ ζημιώσαι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν πολιτείαν διέταξαν τόν δὲ τρόπον· τὰ μὲν προσιόντα τιμὴ ἐξείναι ἀλλοστε δαπανῆσαι ἡ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἀμίσθους ἀρχεῖν ἀπάσας ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ἢ, πλὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν πρυτανείων οἱ ἂν ὃσιν, τούτους δὲ φέρειν τρεῖς ὀβολούς ἐκαστον τῆς ἡμέρας· τὴν δὲ ἀλλήν πολιτείαν ἐπιτρέψαι πάσαν Ἀθηναίῶν τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι λητουργεῖν μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις ἔως ἃν ὁ πόλεμος ἢ κυρίους δὲ εἶναι τούτους καὶ συνθήκας συντίθεσαι πρὸς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσιν· ἐλέσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης δέκα ἄνδρας ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἑτη γεγονότας οὕτως καταλέξουσι τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ὀμόσαντες καθ' ἱερῶν τελείων.

1 XXX. Οἱ μὲν οὖν αἴρεθέντες ταῦτα συνέγραψαν· κυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων εἴλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ

1 Blass: προκλήσεις cod.
2 τίς τίνα Richards: τίς cod.
4 πᾶσαν Mayor: πᾶσιν cod.
5 -ων (i.e. ἔλαττον πεντακισχιλίων) v.l. adscer. cod.
6 δ' ἐκ edd.: δεκαί cod.
posed that it should be compulsory for the Presidents\(^a\) to put to the vote all proposals made for the public safety, and then repealed the procedures of impeachment for illegal proposals, information and summons, in order that those Athenian citizens who wished might give advice about the matters before them; and enacted that, if anybody attempted to punish or summon or bring them into court for so doing, he be liable to information and summary arrest before the Generals, and that the Generals should hand him over to the Eleven to be punished with death. After\(^5\) this they framed the constitution in the following way: that it should not be permissible to spend the revenues on any other object than the war; that all the officers of state should be unpaid for the duration of the war, excepting those who held the posts of the Nine Archons and the Presidents, and these should draw three obols\(^b\) per man per day; and that all the rest of the functions of government should be entrusted to those Athenians who in person and property were most capable of serving the state, not less than five thousand, for the duration of the war; and that the powers of this body should include competence to contract treaties with whatever people they wished; and that they should elect ten men over forty years of age from each tribe, who should enroll the Five Thousand after taking oath over unblemished victims.

XXX. So the Commissioners drafted these proposals; and these being ratified, the Five Thousand

\(^a\) The Presidents of the Council, see xliii. 2.

\(^b\) Half a drachma, see iv. 3 n.
The secretary or registrar who with the actual representative, the Pylagoras, was sent by Athens, as by the other members, to the Amphictyonic Council.
elected a hundred of their members as a committee to draw up the constitution. This committee drew up and published the following resolutions: ‘The 2 Council to consist of members over thirty years of age holding office for a year and drawing no pay; these members to include the Generals, the Nine Archons, the Sacred Remembrancer, a the Company-commanders, b Officers of the Horse, c Officers of Tribes d and officers in command of the Guards, e the Treasurers of the Sacred Funds of the Goddess f and the ten Treasurers of the other gods, the Greek Treasurers, g and twenty Treasurers of all the secular funds h as well, who shall manage them, h and Sacrificial Officers and Superintendents, ten of each; and the Council to elect all of these from a larger preliminary list of candidates proposed by it from its members at the time, but all other offices to be elected by lot and not from the Council; and the Greek Treasurers i that are to manage the funds not to be members of the Council. And four Councils to be formed for the future from 3 persons of the stated age, and a division of these selected by lot to officiate, but the others also to be included in each such selection. And the Hundred Men to divide themselves and the others j into four divisions as nearly equal as possible, and to cast lots among them, and those on whom the lot falls to form the Council for a year. And the Council to frame 4

b See lxi. 3.  c See ib. 4.  d See ib. 5.  e See xxiv. 3.  f Athena.  g This contradicts the end of the section, and the text seems to be corrupt.  

h This clause seems to be interpolated from below.  
i The managers of the funds paid as tribute by the Confederacy of Delos.  

j i.e. the rest of the Five Thousand.
Δοκή αυτοίς ἀριστα ἔξειν περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς ἄν σῶ ἦ καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκηται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἂν δύνονται ἀριστα. ἕαν δὲ τι θέλωσιν βουλεύσασθαι μετά πλειόνων, ἑπεισκαλεῖν ἐκαστὸν ἑπείσκητον ὅυ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡλικίας. τὰς δ’ ἐδρασ ποιοῖς τῆς βουλῆς κατὰ πενθήμερον, ἕαν μὴ δένωνται πλειόνων.

5 κληροῦν δὲ τὴν βουλήν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας. τὰς δὲ χειροτονίαις χρίνειν πέντε τοὺς λαχῶντας ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐνα κληροδοθαί καθ’ ἐκάστην ἡμέραν τὸν ἐπιψηφιοῦντα. κληροῦν δὲ τοὺς λαχῶντας πέντε τοὺς ἐθέλοντας προσελθεῖν ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν ἱερῶν, δεύτερον δὲ κήρυξιν, τρίτον προσβείας, τέταρτον τῶν ἄλλων. τα δὲ τοῦ πολέμου όταν δὴ ἀκληρωτὶ προσαγα- 6 γόντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς χρηματίζεσθαι. τὸν δὲ μὴ ἱόντα εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν βουλευόντων τὴν ὅραν τὴν προρρηθείσαν ὀφείλειν δραχμῆς τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκάστης, ἕαν μὴ εὐρισκόμενος ᾧ ἀφεῖν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπῇ.

1 XXXI. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον ἀνέγραψαν τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι παρῴ κτήθε. βουλεύεις μὲν τετρακοσίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τετταράκοντα εἰς ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἐκ προ- κρίτων οὖς ἂν ἐλωνται οἱ φυλέται τῶν ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα ἐτή γεγονότων. τούτους δὲ τὰς τε ἄρχας καταστήσας, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὀρκου ὅντων χρῆ ῥόμος γράψαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πράττεν ἂν ἂν 2 ἡγῶνται συμφέρειν. τοῖς δὲ νόμοις οἷς ἂν τεθῶσιν

1 δὲ suppl. a Mayor. 2 χρηματίζειν Blass. 3 εὐρόμενος Tyrrell. 4 καὶ suppl. Kenyon.
such resolutions as may seem to them likely to be best to secure the safe preservation of the funds and their expenditure upon necessary objects, and about the other affairs to the best of their ability; and in case of their desiring to consider some matter with added numbers, each member to summon as a co-opted member anybody of the same age as himself that he may wish. To hold the sittings of the Council every five days, unless more sittings are required. The Council to elect the Nine Archons by lot. The tellers to be five persons elected by lot from the Council, and one of these to be chosen by lot to serve daily as putter of the question. And the five tellers elected to cast lots among those who desire an audience of the Council, first about matters of religion, second for Heralds, third for embassies, fourth about other business; but whenever questions relating to war need consideration they are to introduce the Generals without casting lots and take their business. A member of the Council not coming to the Council-chamber at the time previously announced to be liable to a fine of a drachma for each day, unless he obtain leave of absence from the Council.'

XXXI. This constitution, therefore, they drew up for the future, but the following to be in force in the present crisis: 'The Council to consist of four hundred members according to the ancestral regulations, forty from each tribe taken from a preliminary list of any persons over thirty years of age that the members of the tribe may elect. These to appoint the officials, and to draft a proposal about the form of oath to be taken, and to take action about the laws and the audits and other matters as they may think good. And to follow any laws that may be enacted
περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν χρήσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἔξειναι μετακινεῖν μηδ’ ἐτέρους θέσθαι. τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν τὸ νῦν εἶναι τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐξ ἀπάντων ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πεντακυσχιλίων, τὴν δὲ βουλὴν ἐπειδὰν καταστήμενας ἐξέτασιν ἐν ὅπλοις ἐλέσθαι δέκα ἄνδρας καὶ γραμματέα τοῦτοι, τοὺς δὲ αἱρεθέντας ἀρχεῖν τὸν εἰσόντα ἐναντίον αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ ἂν τι δέωνται συμβουλεύεσθαι μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς.
3 ἐλέσθαι δὲ καὶ ὑπ'αρχὸν ἐναὶ καὶ φυλάρχους δέκα· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὴν αἴρεσιν ποιεῖσθαι τούτων τὴν βουλὴν κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα. τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀρχῶν πλῆν τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν μὴ ἔξειναι μὴ τοῦτοι μὴ ἄλλοι μηδενὶ πλεῖον ἢ ἅπαξ ἀρξεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν. εἰς δὲ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον, ἦνα νεμισθῶσιν οἱ τετρακόσιοι εἰς τὰς τέτταρας λήξεις, ὅταν ἐκάστους γίγνεται μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βουλευόντων αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐκατόν ἄνδρες.
1 XXXII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐκατὸν οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν πεντακυσχιλίων αἱρεθέντες ταύτην ἀνέγραψαν τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐπικυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐπιμηφίσαντος Ἀριστομάχου, ἢ μὲν βουλή ἢ ἦν ἐπὶ Καλλίου πρὶν διαβουλεύσας κατελύθη μήν Θαργηλίωνος τετράδι ἐπὶ δέκα, οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι εἰσῆγαν ἐνάτῃ φθίνοντος Θαργηλιῶνος· ἔδει δὲ τὴν εἰληφθεῖν τῷ κυάμῳ βουλήν εἰσίναι δ’ ἐπὶ 2 δέκα Σκιροφοριῶνος. ἢ μὲν οὖν θλίψα τοῦτον κατέστη τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ Καλλίου μὲν ἀρχωντος ἐτέσιν δ’ ὑστερον τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆς

1 Wyse: καταστήσης cod. 2 ἐν supplevit Wyse.
3 ἐνα <καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα> Wilamowitz.
4 έκαστοις (vel τοῖς αὐτοῖς, αὐτοῖς) redd.: τοισαστοῖς cod.
5 ἢ supplevit Rutherford.
about the affairs of state, and not to have powers to alter them nor to enact others. The election of the Generals for the time being to be made from among all the Five Thousand, and the Council as soon as it is appointed to hold a review under arms and elect ten men to the post, and a secretary for them, and those elected to hold office for the ensuing year with autocratic powers, and to consult with the Council about any matter if they require. And also to elect three Master of the Horse and ten Tribe-commanders; and for the future the Council to conduct the election of these according to the procedure enacted. And none of the other officials except the Council and the Generals, nor anybody else, to be allowed to hold the same office more than once. And for the future, in order that the Four Hundred may be divided into the four lists,\(^a\) when each division takes its turn to form the Council with the rest, let the Hundred Men divide them into sections.'

XXXII. This then was the constitution drawn up by the Hundred elected by the Five Thousand. These proposals were carried by the multitude, being put to the vote by Aristomachus, and the Council in Callias’s year was dissolved on the 14th day of the month of Thargelion before it had completed its term of office; while the Four Hundred came into office on Thargelion the 21st; and the Council elected by lot was due to enter office on Scirophorion the 14th.\(^b\) In this way therefore the oligarchy was set up, in the archonship of Callias, about a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, the chief

\(^a\) Cf. xxx. 3.

\(^b\) The three dates are about May 31, June 7, and June 30.
μάλιστα ἐκατόν, αὐτῶν μάλιστα γενομένων Ἡεισ-ἀνδροῦ καὶ Ἀντιφώντος καὶ Θηραμένους, ἀνδρῶν καὶ γεγενημένων εὗ καὶ συνέσει καὶ γνώμη δοκοῦν-3 τῶν διαφέρειν. γενομένης δὲ ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας οἱ μὲν πεντακισχιλιού λόγω μόνον ἢρέθησαν, οἱ δὲ τετρακόσιοι μετὰ τῶν δέκα τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων εἰσελθόντες εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἤρχον τε1 τῆς πόλεως καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαίμονίους προσβεβεσάμενοι κατελύουντο τὸν πόλεμον ἐφ' οἷς ἐκάτεροι τυγ-χάνουσιν ἔχοντες, οὐχ ὑπακούοντων δὲ ἐκένων εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν ἁρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀφήσουσιν, οὕτως ἀπέστησαν.

1 XXXIII. Μὴνας μὲν οὖν ἵσως τέσσαρας δι-έμεινεν ἦ τῶν τετρακοσίων πολιτεία, καὶ ἤρξεν εἰς αὐτῶν Μνασίλοχος δήμην οὕτως ἔπληκτο χρόνον·1 τοὺς ἐπιλοίπους δέκα μὴνας. ἦττηθέντες δὲ τῇ περὶ Ἑρετρίαν ναυμαχία καὶ τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀποστάσεις ἡλικής πλὴν Ὀρεοῦ, χαλεπώς ἐνεγκόντες ἐπὶ τῇ συμφορᾷ μάλιστα τῶν προγεγενημένων (πλεῖον γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐτύγχανον ὕφελομενοι) κατέλυσαν τοὺς τετρακοσίους καὶ τὰ πράγματα παρέδωκαν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ὀπλῶν, ψηφισά-2 μενοὶ μηδεμίαν ἁρχὴν εἰναι μυσθοφόρον. αὐτῶ-τατοι δ' ἐγένοντο τῆς καταλύσεως Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ Θηραμένης, οὐ συναρέσκομεν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων γιγνομένοις· ἀπαντα γὰρ δι' αὐτῶν ἐπραττον, οὐδὲν ἐπαναφέροντες τοῖς πεντακι-σχιλίοις. δοκοῦσι δὲ καλῶς πολιτευθῆναι κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιρούς, πολέμου τε καθεστώτος καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλῶν τῆς πολιτείας οὔσης.

1 τε supplevit Hude. 2 δὲ supplevit Kenyon.
movers having been Peisander, Antiphon and Theramenes, men of good birth and of distinguished reputation for wisdom and judgement. But when this constitution had been set up, the Five Thousand were only nominally chosen, but the Four Hundred with the aid of the Ten with autocratic powers entered the Council-chamber and governed the state. They also sent envoys to the Lacedaemonians and proposed to conclude peace on terms of *uti possidetis*; but the Lacedaemonians would not consent unless Athens would also relinquish the empire of the sea, so that they finally abandoned the project.

XXXIII. The constitution of the Four Hundred lasted perhaps four months, for two of which Mnestilocthus was archon, in the year of the archonship of Theopompus, who received the office for the remaining ten months. But when they had been worsted in the naval battle off Eretria and the whole of Euboea except Oreum had revolted, they were more distressed at the misfortune than by any previous disaster (for they were actually getting more support from Euboea than from Attica), and they dissolved the Four Hundred and handed over affairs to the Five Thousand that were on the armed roll, having passed by vote a resolution that no office should receive pay. The persons chiefly responsible for the dissolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the proceedings of the Four Hundred; for they did everything on their own responsibility and referred nothing to the Five Thousand. But Athens seems to have been well governed during this critical period, although a war was going on and the government was confined to the armed roll.

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*a* The Ten Generals, see xxxi. 2.  
*b* Cf. iv. 2, xxix. 5.
ARISTOTLE

1. XXXIV. Τούτους μὲν οὖν ἀφεῖλετο τὴν πολιτείαν ὁ δῆμος διὰ τάχους· ἔτει δ' ἐβδόμῳ⁠¹ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάλυσιν, ἐπὶ Καλλίου τοῦ Ἀγγελῆθεν ἄρχοντος, γενομένης τῆς ἐν Ἀργυνούσαις ναυμαχίας, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς τήν ναυμαχία νικώντας συνέβη κριθήναι μιὰ χειροτονία πάντας, τοὺς μὲν οὐδὲ συνανατομήσαντας, τοὺς δ' ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς σωθέντας, ἔξαπατηθέντος τοῦ δήμου διὰ τοὺς παροργίσαντας· ἔπειτα Βουλομένων Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπιέναι² ἐφ' οἷς ἔχουσιν ἐκάτεροι καὶ εἰρήνην ἀγεῖν,³ ένοι μὲν ἐσπούδαζον, τὸ δὲ πλήθος οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν, ἔξαπατηθέντες ὑπὸ Κλεοφῶντος, ὃς ἔκώλυσε γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἔλθων εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδεδυκώς, οὐ φάσκων ἐπιτρέψειν ἐάν μὴ πᾶσαι ἀφιώσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς πόλεις. οὗ χρησάμενοι δὲ καλῶς τότε τοὺς πράγμασι μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἔγνωσαν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. τῷ γὰρ ύστερον ἔτει ἐπ' Ἀλεξίου ἄρχοντος ἡτύχησαν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν, ἐξ ἦς συνέβη κύριον γενόμενον τῆς πόλεως Λύσανδρον καταστήσατο τοὺς τριάκοντα τρόπους τούδε τῆς εἰρήνης γενομένης αὐτοῖς ἐφ' ὧδ' τε πολιτεύονται τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, οἱ μὲν δημοτικὸι διασώζειν ἐπειρῶντο τὸν δῆμον, τῶν δὲ

¹ ἔκτω edd. ² Mayor: ανεναι cod. ³ ἐφ' οἷς ... ἀγεῖν cum schol. Wilamowitz-Kaibel: καινοφόισχουσιν ἐρημηνεκατεραιγεν edc.

ᵃ ‘Sixth’ (in Greek arithmetic ‘seventh’) is a mistake for ‘fifth’ (Greek ‘sixth’): the Four Hundred fell in 411, Callias was archon 406 B.C.
ᵇ i.e. with his courage artificially stimulated and with armour to protect him against assassination (unless we adopt 98
XXXIV. So the people speedily took the government out of these men's hands; and in the sixth year after the dissolution of the Four Hundred, in the archonship of Callias of the deme of Angelē, after the occurrence of the naval battle at Arginusae, it came about first that the ten Generals to whom victory in the naval battle was due were all condemned by a single vote, some of them not even having been in the engagement at all and the others having escaped on board a ship not their own, the people being completely deceived through the persons who provoked their anger; and then, when the Lacedaemonians were willing to evacuate Decelea on terms of both parties retaining what they held, and to make peace, though some persons were eager to accept, yet the mass of the people refused to consent, being completely deceived by Cleophon, who prevented the conclusion of peace by coming into the assembly, drunk and wearing a corslet, and protesting that he would not allow it unless the Lacedaemonians surrendered all the cities. But though on this occasion they had managed their affairs ill, they realized their mistake not long afterwards. For in the next year, when Alexius was Archon, they met with the disaster in the naval battle of Aegospotami which resulted in the city's falling into the hands of Lysander, who set up the Thirty in the following way. The peace having been concluded on terms of their carrying on the government according to the ancestral constitution, the popular party endeavoured to preserve the conjecture that μεθύων καὶ θώρακα ἐνδέδυκὼς is a mistaken paraphrase of some original record giving θώρακα ἐχων in the slang sense of 'well primed with liquor,' cf. Aristoph. Ran. 1504).

i.e. those that they had taken in the war:
Aristotle

XIII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τριάκοντα τούτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου ἄρχοντας. γενόμενοι δὲ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τὰ δόξανται περὶ τῆς πολιτείας παρεώρων, πεντακοσίους δὲ βουλευτάς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστήσαντες ἐκ προκρίτων ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, καὶ προσελόμενοι σφόσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρχοντας δέκα καὶ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλακας ἑνδέκα καὶ μαστυγοφόρους τριακοσίους ὑπηρέτας κατείχον 2 τὴν πόλιν δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον μέτριον τοῖς πολίταις ἦσαν καὶ προσεποιοῦντο διοικεῖν τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς τῷ Ἐφιάλτου καὶ Ἀρχεστράτου νόμους τοὺς περὶ τῶν Ἀρεσπαγκτῶν καθείλον ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου καὶ τῶν Σόλωνος θεσμῶν ὁσοὶ διαμφισβητήσεις εἶχον, καὶ τὸ κύρος ὁ ἢν ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς κατέλυσαν, ὡς ἐπανορ-

2 διώκειν edd.
democracy, but the notables who belonged to the Comradeships and those exiles who had returned after the peace were eager for oligarchy, while those notables who were not members of any Comradeship but who otherwise were inferior in reputation to none of the citizens were aiming at the ancestral constitution; members of this party were Archinus, Anytus, Cleitophon and Phormisius, while its chief leader was Theramenes. And when Lysander sided with the oligarchical party, the people were cowed and were forced to vote for the oligarchy. The motion was proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna.

XXXV. So in this manner the Thirty were established, in the archonship of Pythodorus. Having become masters of the state they neglected most of the measures that had been resolved on in regard to the constitution, but appointed five hundred Councillors and the other offices from among persons previously selected from the Thousand, and also chose for themselves ten governors of Peiraeus, eleven guardians of the prison, and three hundred retainers carrying whips, and so kept the state in their own hands. At first, then, they were moderate towards the citizens and pretended to be administering the ancestral form of constitution, and they removed from the Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus about the Areopagites, and also such of the ordinances of Solon as were of doubtful purport, and abolished the sovereignty vested in the jurymen, claiming to be rectifying the constitution and removing its un-

a i.e. from the knights; but the text can hardly be correct, and may be emended to give 'from among a thousand persons previously selected.'

b Probably a supporter of Ephialtes, for whose legislation see ch. xxv.
θοῦντες καὶ ποιοῦντες ἀναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ὃ ἂν ἔθελῃ κύριον ποιῆσαντες καθάπαξ, τὰς δὲ προσούσας δυσκολίας "ἐὰν μὴ μανιῶν ἡ γῆρως (ἐνεκα) ἡ γυναικὴ πιθόμενος" ἀφείλου ὅπως μὴ ἢ τοῖς συκοφάνταις ἐφοδος· ὅμοιός δὲ τούτῳ ἔδρων καὶ 3 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ταῦτ’ ἐποίουν καὶ τοὺς συκοφάντας καὶ τοὺς τῶν δήμων πρὸς χάριν ὁμλούντας παρὰ τὸ βελτιστὸν καὶ κακοπράγ- μονας ὄντας καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνήρουν, ἐφ’ οἷς ἔχαρεν ἡ πόλις γυγνομένους, ἡγούμενοι τοῦ βελτίστου
4 χάριν ποιεῖν αὐτούς. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἐγκρατε- στερον ἔσχον, οὐδενὸς ἀπείχοντο τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τῶν γένει καὶ τοῖς ἀξιώμασι προέχοντας, ὑπεξαιρού- μενοὶ τε τὸν φόβον καὶ βουλόμενοι τὰς οὐσίας διαρράξειν καὶ χρόνου διαπεσόντος βραχέος οὐκ ἐλάττουσαν ἀνηρίκεςαν ἡ χιλίους πεντακοσίους.

1 XXXVI. Οὕτως δὲ τῆς πόλεως ὑποφερομένης Ὑηραμένης ἀγανακτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς γυγνομένοις τῆς μὲν ἀσελγείας αὐτοῖς παρηνεί παῦσασθαι μετα- δοῦναι δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς βελτίστοις. οἱ δὲ πρῶτον3 ἐναντιωθέντες, ἐπεὶ διεσπάρθησαν οὶ λόγοι πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ὑηραμένην οἰκεῖος εἶχον οἱ πολλοί, φοβηθέντες μὴ προστάσις γενό- μενος τοῦ δήμου καταλύσῃ τὴν δυναστείαν κατα- λέγουσιν τῶν πολιτῶν τρισχιλίους4 ὡς μετα-
2 δώσοντες τῆς πολιτείας. Ὡηραμένης δὲ πάλιν

1 ἐνεκα γῆρως Wyse: γῆρων cod.
2 Sidgwick (cf. xxxiv. 1 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν, ἐκαπατη-θέντες): ἐχαίρου cod.
3 edd.: πρῶτοι cod.
4 edd.: δισχιλίους cod.
certainties: for example, in regard to the bestowal of one’s property on whomsoever one wishes, making the single act of donation valid absolutely, while they removed the tiresome qualifications ‘save when in consequence of insanity or of old age, or under the influence of a woman,’ in order that there might be no opening for blackmailers; and similarly they did this in the other matters as well. At the outset, therefore, they were engaged in these matters, and in removing the blackmailers and the persons who consorted undesirably with the people to curry favour and were evil-doers and scoundrels; and the state was delighted at these measures, thinking that they were acting with the best intentions. But when they got a firmer hold on the state, they kept their hands off none of the citizens, but put to death those of outstanding wealth or birth or reputation, intending to put that source of danger out of the way, and also desiring to plunder their estates; and by the end of a brief interval of time they had made away with not less than fifteen hundred.

XXXVI. While the state was thus being undermined, Theramenes, resenting what was taking place, kept exhorting them to cease from their wantonness and to admit the best classes to a share in affairs. At first they opposed him, but since these proposals became disseminated among the multitude, and the general public were well disposed towards Theramenes, they grew afraid that he might become head of the People and put down the oligarchy, and so they enrolled three thousand of the citizens with the intention of giving them a share in the government. But Theramenes again criticized this procedure also, 2
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

ἐπιτιμᾷ καὶ τούτοις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι βουλόμενοι μεταδοῦναι τοὺς ἐπιτελεῖσθαι τρισχιλίους μόνοις μεταδίδοσι, ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πλῆθει τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁρισμένης, ἐπειδὴ ὅτι δύο τὰ ἑναντιώτατα ποιούσι, βίαιον τε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἢττω κατασκευάζοντες. οἱ δὲ τούτων μὲν ὕλικώρησαν, τὸν δὲ καταλογούν τῶν τρισχιλίων πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ὑπερεβάλλοντο1 καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἐφύλαττον τοὺς ἐγνωσμένους, ὅτε δὲ καὶ δόξειν αὐτοῖς ἐκφέρειν τοὺς μὲν ἐξήλειφον τῶν ἐγγεγραμμένων2 τοὺς δὲ ἀντενέγραφον τῶν ἐξωθέν.

1 ΧΧΧΧΧ. "Ἡδὴ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐνεστῶτος, καταλαβόντος Θρασυβοῦλον μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων Φυλῆν καὶ κατὰ τὴν στρατιάν ἢν ἐξῆγαγον οἱ τριάκοντα κακῶς ἀποχωρήσαντες, ἐγνωσαν τῶν μὲν ἀλλῶν τὰ ὅπλα παρελθοῦσι Θηραμένην δὲ διαφθείρα τόνδε τρόπον. νόμους εἰσήγεικαν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν δύο κελεύοντες ἐπιχειροτονεῖν, ὡς ὅ μὲν εἰς αὐτοκράτορας ἐποίει τοὺς τριάκοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποκτείνα τοὺς μὴ τοῦ καταλόγου μετέχοντας τῶν τρισχιλίων, δ’ ἐτέρος ἐκώλυος κοινωνεῖν τῆς παρούσης πολυτείας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν τὸ ἑν Ἡθικοῦ τείχους κατασκάψασι τῇ τετρακοσίᾳ ἑναντίον τοῖς πράξαντες τοῖς3 κατασκεύασαι τὴν προτέραν ὀλυγαρχίαν. ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ἀμφοτέρων κεκοιμηθηκώς δ’ Θηραμένης, ὥστε συνεβαινεν ἐπικυρωθέντων τῶν νόμων ἐξω

1 ὑπερεβάλλοντο <ἐκφέρειν> Gertz.
2 ἐγγεγραμμένων Herwerden: γεγραμμένων cod.
3 τοῖς Herwerden: ητοις cod.

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first on the ground that although willing to share the government with the respectable they were only giving a share to three thousand, as though moral worth were limited to that number, and next because they were doing two absolutely incompatible things, making their rule one of force and at the same time weaker than those they ruled. But they despised these remonstrances, and for a long time went on postponing the roll of the Three Thousand and keeping to themselves those on whom they had decided, and even on occasions when they thought fit to publish it they made a practice of erasing some of the names enrolled and writing in others instead from among those outside the roll. 

XXXVII. Winter had already set in, when Thrasybulus with the exiles occupied Phylê, and things went badly with the Thirty on the expedition that they led out against them; so they decided to disarm the others and to destroy Theramenes in the following way. They introduced two laws into the Council, with orders to pass them; one was to give the Thirty absolute powers to execute any citizens not members of the roll of Three Thousand, and the other prohibited admission to citizenship under the present constitution for all who had actually taken part in the demolition of the fort on Eêtionea, or in any act of opposition to the Four Hundred who had instituted the former oligarchy; in both of these proceedings Theramenes had in fact participated, so that the result was that when the laws had been ratified he

a So that no one would be sure of being on it.

b A projecting mole on the northern side of Peiraeus harbour, commanding the entrance. It had been begun, but was then demolished at the instigation of Theramenes (Thuc. viii. 90-92).
te γίγνεσθαι τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς τριά-
κόντα κυρίους εἶναι θανατοῦντας. ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ
Θηραμένους τὰ τε ὅπλα παρείλουτο πάντων πλή
των τρισχελῶν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἅλλοις πολὺ πρὸς
ὑμότητα καὶ πονηρίαν ἐπέδοσαν. πρέσβεις δὲ
πέμψαντες εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα τοῦ τε Θηραμένους
κατηγόρου καὶ βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς ἥξιον· ὡς ἀκού-
σαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Καλλίβιον ἀπέστειλαν
ἀρμοστὴν καὶ στρατιώτας ὡς ἐπτακοσίους, οἱ τὴν
ἀκρόπολιν ἑλθόντες ἐφρούρουν.

1 XXXVIII. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταλαβόντων τῶν
ἀπὸ Φυλῆς τὴν Μοναχίαν καὶ νυκτός τῶν μάχη
tους μετὰ τῶν τριάκοντα βοηθήσαντας, ἐπανα-
χωρήσαντες μετὰ τῶν κίνδυνον οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεως
καὶ συναξώσαντες εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν τῇ υστεραία,
tόπο μὲν τριάκοντα κατέλυμαν αἱροῦνται δὲ δέκα
τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοκράτορας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου
κατάλυσιν. οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφ’
οἷς μὲν ἤρεθον καὶ ἐκπραττὼν, ἐπεμπὸν ὅ’, εἰς
Λακεδαιμόνα βοηθείαν μεταπεμψάμενοι καὶ χρή-
2 ματα δανειζόμενοι. χαλεπῶς δὲ φερόντων ἐπὶ
tουτοῦ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, φοβούμενοι μὴ κατα-
λυθῶσιν τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ βουλόμενοι καταπλῆξαι
tου ἅλλους (ὅπερ ἐγένετο), συνελαβόντες Δημ-
ἀρετοῦν οὖν ἐν τούτοις τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπ-ekteinān, καὶ τὰ πράγματα βεβαιῶς εἰχον, συναγω-
νιζόμενον Καλλίβιον τε καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων
τῶν παρόντων καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἔνιων τῶν ἐν
τοῖς ἐπεῖν τούτων γὰρ τινὲς μάλιστα τῶν
πολιτῶν ἐσπούδαζον μὴ κατελθεῖν τοὺς ἀπὸ

1 δὲ supplevit Mayor.

2 ἐφ’ edd.: ἐν cod.

3 βιαῖως Mayor.
began outside the constitution and the Thirty had authority to put him to death. Theramenes having been put out of the way, they disarmed everybody except the Three Thousand, and in the rest of their proceedings went much further in the direction of cruelty and rascality. And they sent ambassadors to Sparta to denounce Theramenes and call upon the Spartans to assist them; and when the Spartans heard this message they dispatched Callibius as governor and about seven hundred troops, who came and garrisoned the Acropolis.

XXXVIII. After this the refugees in Phylē took Munichia, and defeated in action the force that came with the Thirty to the defence; and the force from the city, on their return after this dangerous expedition, held a meeting in the market-place the day after, deposed the Thirty, and elected ten of the citizens as plenipotentiaries to bring the war to a conclusion. These, however, having obtained this office did not proceed to do the things for the purpose of which they had been elected, but sent to Sparta to procure help and to borrow funds. But this was resented by those within the constitution, and the Ten, in their fear of being deposed from office and their desire to terrify the others (which they succeeded in doing), arrested one of the most leading citizens, Demaretus, and put him to death, and kept a firm hold upon affairs, while Callibius and the Peloponnesians at Athens actively supported them, and so did some members of the corps of Knights as well; for some of the Knights were the most eager of all the citizens that the men at Phylē should not
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3 Φυλής. ὡς δ' οἱ τὸν Πειραιέα καὶ τὴν Μουνυκίαν ἔχοντες ἀποστάντος ἀπάντος τοῦ δήμου πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπεκράτουν τῷ πολέμῳ, τότε καταλύσαντες τοὺς δέκα τοὺς πρώτους αἱρεθέντας, ἄλλους εἰλοντο δέκα τοὺς βελτίστους εἶναι δοκοῦντας, ἐφ' ἂν συνεβῇ καὶ τὰς διαλύσεις γενέσθαι καὶ κατελθεῖν τοῖς δήμοις, συναγωνιζομένων καὶ προθυμομένων τούτων. προειστήκεσαν δ' αὐτῶν μάλιστα Ῥώνων τε ὁ Παιανεὺς καὶ Φάυλλος ὁ Ἀχερδούσιος: οὕτω γὰρ πρὶν τὸν Παυσανίαν ἀφικέσθαι διεσπέραζον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πειραιῆ καὶ ἀφικομένου

4 συνεσπούδασαν τὴν κάθοδον. ἐπὶ πέρας γὰρ ἤγαγε τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς διαλύσεις Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς μετὰ τῶν δέκα διαλακτῶν τῶν ὑστερον ἀφικομένων ἐκ Λακεδαιμονίων οὖσ αὐτῶς ἐσπούδασεν ἐλθεῖν. οί δὲ περὶ τὸν Ῥώνων διὰ τῇ ἐνυοιᾳ τῆς εἰς τὸν δήμον ἐπινέοντας, καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐν ὀλγαρχίᾳ τὰς εὐθύνας ἔδοσαν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐνεκάλεσεν αὐτοῖς οὔτε τῶν ἐν ἀστεί μεινάντων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶν κατελθόντων, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταύτα καὶ στρατηγὸς εὐθὺς ἦρεθ Ῥώνων.

1 XXXIX. Ἐγένοντο δ' αἱ διαλύσεις ἐπ' Ἐυκλείδου ἄρχοντος κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας τάσδε. τοὺς βουλομένους Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐν ἀστεί μεινάντων ἐξουκεῖν ἔχειν Ἐλευσίνα ἐπιτίμους δυνταὶ καὶ κυρίους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας ἐαυτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν

2 καρποπομένους. τὸ δ' ἱερὸν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀμφο-

1 Blass: αὐτὴν cod.
2 τε Παυσανίαν Richards: ἡ παυσανίαντε cod.
return. But the party holding Peiraeus and Munichia, now that the whole of the people had come over to their side, began to get the upper hand in the war, and so finally they deposed the ten who had been elected first, and chose ten others whom they thought to be the best men, and while these were in power there took place the reconciliation and the return of the people, with the active and eager support of the ten. The most prominent among them were Rhinon of the Paeanian deme and Phaïllus of the Acherdusian; for these men had repeatedly gone on missions to the men at Peiraeus before Pausanias's arrival, and after his arrival they zealously supported the return. For it was Pausanias the king of the Lacedaemonians who brought the peace and reconciliation to fulfilment, with the aid of the ten mediators who later arrived from Sparta, and whose coming was due to the efforts of the king himself. Rhinon and his companions were commended for their goodwill towards the people, and having been appointed to superintend these negotiations under an oligarchy they gave in their accounts under a democracy, and no one made any charge against them whatever, whether of those who had remained in the city or of those who had returned from Peiraeus; indeed, on the contrary Rhinon was immediately elected general because of his conduct in this office.

XXXIX. The reconciliation took place in the archonship of Eucleides on the following terms: 403 B.C.

"That those of the Athenians who have remained in the city that desire to emigrate do have Eleusis, retaining their full rights, and having sovereignty and self-government, and enjoying their own revenues. And that the temple be the common property of both"
térων, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δὲ Κήρυκας καὶ Εὐμολπίδας κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. μὴ ἔξειναι δὲ μήτε τοῖς 'Ελευσίνοθεν εἰς τὸ ἀστυ μήτε τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεως 'Ελευσίναδ' εἰσινεῖ πλὴν μυστηρίους ἐκατέρους. συντελεῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προσώπων εἰς τὸ συμ- 3 μαχικὸν καθάπερ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. ἐὰν δὲ των ἀπίστων οἰκίαι λαμβάνωσιν Ἐλευσίνην, συμπείθειν τὸν κεκτημένον. εὰν δὲ μὴ συμ- βαίνωσιν ἀλλήλοις τιμητὰς ἐλέσθαι τρεῖς ἐκάτερον, καὶ ἦντιν ἃν οὕτω τάξου τιμῆν λαμβάνειν. Ἐλευσινίων δὲ συνοικεῖν οὐς ἃν οὕτοι βούλωμαι. 4 τὴν δ' ἀπογραφὴν εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξοικεῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἀφ' ἦς ἃν ὀμόσωσιν τοὺς ὅρκους δέκα ἥμερῶν, τὴν δ' ἐξοίκησιν εἶκοσι, τοῖς δ' ἀποδημοῦσιν ἐπειδὰν ἐπιδημήσωσιν κατὰ ταύτα. 5 μὴ ἔξειναι δὲ ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἄρχην τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀστεί τοῦ Ἐλευσίνη κατοικοῦντα πρὶν ἀπογράφηται πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἀστεί κατοικεῖν. τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, εἰ τίς τυα αὐτόχειρ 6 ἀπέκτεινεν ἢ ἐτρώσεσεν. 3 τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μησικακεὶν ἔξειναι πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἐνδέκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἁρξαντάς, μηδὲ πρὸς τούτους ἐὰν διδῶσιν εὐθύνας. εὐθύνας δὲ δοῦναι τοὺς μὲν ἐν Πειραιεὶ ἁρξαντάς ἐν τοῖς ἐν Πειραιεὶ, τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ ἀστεί ἐν τοῖς 4 τὰ τιμήματα παρ-

1 ἐκάτερον Bury: ἐκατερων cod.  
2 αὐτοὶ Richards.  
3 el tis . . . ἐτρώσεσεν Blass, partim ex aliis: valde confusa cod.  
4 ἐν τοῖς <ἐν τῷ ἀστεί> ? Kenyon.

a See lvii. 1.  
b Perhaps ' in the city ' should be inserted after ' property. ’

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sections, and be under the superintendence of the Heralds and the Eumolpidae according to the ancestral practice. But that it be not lawful for those at Eleusis to go into the city, nor for those in the city to go to Eleusis, except in either case at a celebration of the Mysteries. And that they contribute from their revenues like the other Athenians to the fund for the common defence. And that any of those who go away that take a house at Eleusis be helped to obtain the consent of the owner; and if they cannot come to terms with one another, each party to choose three valuers, and to accept whatever price these valuers assess. And that of the people of Eleusis those whom the settlers may be willing to allow do dwell in the place with them. And that the registration of those that wish to migrate be, for those who are in the country, within ten days of the date of their swearing the oaths of peace, and their migration within twenty days, and for those abroad similarly from the date when they return. And that it be not permitted for anyone residing at Eleusis to hold any of the offices in the city until he removes himself from the roll in order to reside again in the city. And that trials for homicide be in accordance with the ancestral ordinances, if a man has killed or wounded another with his own hand. And that there be a universal amnesty for past events, covering everybody except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and those that have been governors of Peiraeus, and that these also be covered by the amnesty if they render account. And that those who had been governors in Peiraeus render account before the courts held in Peiraeus, but those in the city before a court of persons that can produce ratable property.
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zeugmaiv: eiθ’ οὕτως ἐξοικείων τοῦς μὴ ἔθελοντας. 
τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρίς.

1 XL. Γενομένων δὲ τοιούτων τῶν διαλύσεων, καὶ φοβουμένων ὁσοὶ μετὰ τῶν τριάκοντα συνεπολεμησαν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἐπινοοῦντων ἐξοικείων ἀναβαλλομένων δὲ τὴν ἀπογραφήν εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας ἡμέρας, ὁπερ εἰώθασιν ποιεῖν ἀπαντες, Ἀρχίνος 
συνιδὼν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ βουλόμενος κατασχεῖν αὐτοὺς ύφειλε τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἡμέρας τῆς ἀπογραφῆς, ἔστε συναναγκασθήναι μένειν πολλοὺς ἀκοντασ

2 ἡς ἐθάρρησαν. καὶ δοκεὶ τούτῳ τε πολυτεύσασθαι καλῶς Ἀρχίνος, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γραψάμενος τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Ὀρασυβούλου παρανόμων, ἐν ᾧ μετεδίδου τῆς πολυτείας πᾶσι τοῖς ἐκ Πειραιῶς συγκατελθοῦσι, ὥν ἐνιοὶ φανερῶς ἦσαν δούλοι, καὶ τρίτον, ἐπεὶ τις ἥξεστο τῶν κατεληλυθότων μνησικακείν, ἀπαγαγὼν τούτον ἔπλη τὴν βουλήν καὶ πείσας ἀκριτον ἀποκτείναι, λέγων ὅτι νῦν δείξουσιν εἰ βούλονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν σώζειν καὶ τοῖς ὁρκοις ἐμμένειν· ἀφέντας μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον προτρέψεων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέλωσιν παράδειγμα ποιήσειν ἀπασίαν. ὁπερ καὶ συνέπεσεν· ἀποβλανόντος γὰρ οὐδεὶς πώποτε ὑστερον ἐμνησικάκησεν, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσιν κάλλιστα δὴ καὶ πολιτικώτατα ἀπάντων καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινὴ χρήσασθαι ταῖς προ-

γεγενημέναις συμφοραῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰς περὶ

1 τοὺς μὴ Blass: τοὺς δ cod. (δ supra lineam).

2 Jackson: ἀναγραφὴν cod.

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or that those who will not render account on these terms do migrate. And that each party separately repay their loans contracted for the war.

XL. The reconciliation having been made on these terms, all those who had fought on the side of the Thirty were alarmed, and many intended to migrate, but put off their registration to the latest days, as everybody usually does; so Archinus perceiving their numbers and wishing to retain them, cancelled the remainder of the days allowed for registration, so that many should be jointly compelled to stay against their will until they recovered courage. This seems to have been a statesmanlike act of Archinus; as was also later his indicting as unconstitutional the decree of Thrasybulus admitting to citizenship all those who had come back together from Peiraeus, some of whom were clearly slaves; and his third act of statesmanship was that when somebody began to stir up grudges against the returned citizens, he arraigned him before the Council and persuaded it to execute him without trial, saying that this was the moment for them to show if they wished to save the democracy and keep their oaths; for by letting this man off they would incite the others too, but if they put him out of the way they would make him an example to everybody. And this is what actually occurred; for never since he was put to death has anybody broken the amnesty, but the Athenians appear both in private and public to have behaved towards the past disasters in the most completely honourable and statesmanlike manner of any people in history; for they not only blotted out recriminations.

\textsuperscript{a} A variant reading (εἴδ' οὔτως ἔξιτεῖν τοὺς ἑλεόντας) gives 'then those who wish are to emigrate on these terms.'
τῶν προτέρων αἵτις ἐξῆλθαν ἄλλα καὶ τὰ χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίους ἂ οἱ τρίακοντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐλαβον ἀπέδωσαν κοινῇ, κελευσόμων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐκατέρως ἀποδίδοναι χωρίς, τοὺς τ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεως καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιέως, ἤγοιμενοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἄρχειν δεῖν τής ὁμονοίας. Εν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ οἶον ἔτι προστιθέασιν τῶν οἰκείων οἱ δημοκρατήσαντες ἄλλα καὶ τήν 4 χώραν ἀνάδαστον ποιοῦσιν. διελύθησαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν 'Ελευσίνι κατοικήσαντας ἔτει τρίτω μετὰ τὴν ἐξοίκησιν ἐπὶ Ξενανέτου ἄρχοντος.

1 XLI. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ύπότεροι συνέβη γενέσθαι καιροῖς, τότε δὲ κύριος ὁ δῆμος γενόμενος τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεστήσατο τὴν νῦν οὖσαν πολιτείαν ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου μὲν ἄρχοντος, δοκοῦντος δὲ δικαίως2 τοῦ δήμου λαβεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τὸ ποιήσασθαι τὴν κάθοδον δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸν δήμον.

2 ἢν δὲ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐνδεκάτη τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῆς πρῶτη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ κατάστασις3 τῶν εἰς ἄρχης Ἰωνος καὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτοῦ συνουκισάντων τότε γὰρ πρῶτον εἰς τὰς τέσσαρας συνενεμῆσαις φυλὰς καὶ τοὺς φυλοβασιλείας κατέστησαν. δευτέρα δὲ, καὶ πρῶτη μετὰ ταύτην ἐχουσά τι πολιτείας τάξις4 η ἐπὶ Θησέως γενομένη, μικρὸν παρεγκλίνουσα τῆς βασιλικῆς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἡ ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ἡ καὶ νόμος ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον. τρίτη δ’ ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλωνος, ἀφ’

1 οἱ δῆμοι κρατήσαντες edd.
2 δίκαιον Richards.
3 μετάστασις alii legunt.
4 Wilamowitz: ἐχουσάις πολιτειαντάξιν cod.

The Greek text is very doubtful, but apparently the 114
tions with regard to the past, but also publicly restored to the Spartans the funds that the Thirty had taken for the war, although the treaty ordered that the parties in the city and in Peiraeus were each to make restitution separately. The Athenians thought that they must take this as a first step to concord, whereas in the other states those who have set up democracy not only do not pay any more out of their own property but even make a redistribution of the land. They also made a reconciliation with those that had settled at Eleusis two years after the migration, in the archonship of Xenaenetus.

XLI. These events then came about in the following periods; but at the date mentioned the people having become sovereign over affairs established the now existing constitution, in the archonship of Pythodorus, when the People’s having accomplished its return by its own efforts made it appear just for it to assume the government. In the list of reforms this was the eleventh in number. There first occurred the organization of the original constitution after the settlement at Athens of Ion and his companions, for it was then that the people were first divided into the four Tribes and appointed the Tribal Kings. The second constitution, and the first subsequent one that involved a constitutional point, was the reform that took place in the time of Theseus, which was a slight divergence from the royal constitution. After that one came the reform in the time of Draco, in which a code of laws was first published. Third was the one that followed the civil disturbance in the time of Solon, from which democracy took its beginning. constitution in the time of Ion is taken as the starting-point, and the eleven revolutions follow.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

ἡ ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο. τετάρτη δ' ἢ ἐπὶ Πεισιστράτου τυραννίς. πέμπτη δ' ἢ μετὰ τὴν τῶν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἢ Κλεισθένους, δημοτικωτέρα τῆς Σόλωνος. ἐκτε δ' ἢ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, τῆς ἔξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ἐπιστατούσης. ἐβδόμη δὲ καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἢν Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν Ἐφίαλτης δ' ἐπετέλεσεν καταλύσας τὴν Ἀρεσπαγίτιν βουλῆν, ἐν ἢ πλείστα συνέβη τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν διὰ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν. ὅγδοι δ' ἢ τῶν τετρακοσίων κατάστασις, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἐνάτη δὲ ἡ δημοκρατία πάλιν. δεκάτη δ' ἢ τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ ἢ τῶν δέκα τυραννίς. ἑνδεκάτη δ' ἢ μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καὶ ἐκ Πειραιῶς κάθοδον ἀφ' ἡς διαγεγένηται μέχρι τῆς νῦν, ἀεὶ προσεπιλαμβάνουσα τῷ πλῆθει τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν δὴ δήμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ὑπηφίσμασι καὶ δικαστηρίοις ἐν ὅς δὴ δήμος ἐστι τοῦ κράτων, καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν. καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐνδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ ὅλοι τῶν 3 πολλῶν εἰσίν καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν. μισθοφόρον δ' ἐκκλησίαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπέγνωσαν ποιεῖν οὐ συλλεγομένων δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ σοφιζομένων τῶν πρυτάνεων ὅπως προσιτήτα τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὴν ἐπικύρωσιν τῆς χειροτονίας, πρῶτον μὲν Ἀγάρριος ὁβολὸν ἐπόρισεν, μετὰ δὲ

1 τῆς τῶν Kenyon: τῶν cod.
3 ⟨kal⟩ διὰ, κατὰ, διὰ . . . ἀρχὴν ⟨θαρρήσασαν⟩ coni. edd.
Fourth was the tyranny in the time of Peisistratus. Fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, following the deposition of the tyrants, which was more democratic than the constitution of Solon. Sixth the reform after the Persian War, under the superintendence of the Council of Areopagus. Seventh followed the reform outlined by Aristeides but completed by Ephialtes when he put down the Areopagite Council, during which it came about because of the demagogues that the state made many mistakes, because of the empire of the sea. Eighth was the establishment of the Four Hundred, and after that, ninth, democracy again. Tenth was the tyranny of the Thirty and that of the Ten. Eleventh was the constitution established after the return from Phyle and from Peiraeus, from which date the constitution has continued down to its present form, constantly taking on additions to the power of the multitude. For the people has made itself master of everything, and administers everything by decrees and by jury-courts in which the people is the ruling power, for even the cases tried by the Council have come to the people. And they seem to act rightly in doing this, for a few are more easily corrupted by gain and by influence than the many. The proposal to introduce payment for attendance at the Assembly was on the first occasion rejected; but as people were not attending the Assembly but the presidents kept contriving a number of devices to get the multitude to attend for the passing of the resolution by show of hands, first Agyrrhhius introduced a fee of an obol, and after

\[a\] Here again the exact text is doubtful.
τοῦτον Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Κλαξομένιος ὁ Βασιλεὺς ἐπικαλούμενος διώβολον, πάλιν δ’ Ἀγύρριος τριώβολον.

1 XLII. "Εχει δ’ ἡ νῦν κατάστασις τής πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. μετέχουσιν μὲν τής πολιτείας οἱ εἰς ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστῶν, ἐγγράφονται δ’ εἰς τοὺς δημότας ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτή γεγονότες. οταν δ’ ἐγγράφονται διαψηφίζονται περὶ αὐτῶν ὁμόσαντες οἱ δημόται, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δοκοῦσι γεγονέναι τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἕκ τοῦ νόμου, κἂν μὴ δόξωσι ἀπέρχονται πάλιν εἰς παίδας, δεύτερον δ’ εἰ ἐλεύθερος ἔστι καὶ γέγονε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους: ἔπειτ’ ἄν1 ἀποψηφίζωσιν2 μὴ εἰναι ἐλεύθερον, ὁ μὲν ἐφίησον εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, οἱ δὲ δημόται κατηγόρουσιν αἱροῦνται πέντε ἀνδρας εἰς αὐτῶν, κἂν μὲν μὴ δόξη δικαίως ἐγγράφοσθαι, πολεῖ τοῦτον ἡ πόλις: ἐὰν δὲ νυκήσῃ, τοῖς δημόταις ἐπάναγκες ἐγγράφειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δοκιμᾶτε τοὺς ἐγγραφέντας ἡ βουλή, κἂν τις δόξη νεώτερος ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν εἰναι, ζημιοὶ τοὺς δημότας τοὺς ἐγγράφαντας. ἔπαν δὲ δοκιμασθῶσιν οἱ ἐφήβοι, συλλεγέντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν κατὰ φυλὰς ὁμόσαντες αἱροῦνται τρεῖς εἰκ τῶν φυλετῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἐτή γεγονότων οὗς ἀν ἡγοῦνται βελτίστοις εἰναι καὶ ἐπιτήδειοτάτους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν ἐφήβων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦτων ὁ δῆμος ἔνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης χειροτονεῖ σωφρονιστῆν, καὶ κοσμητὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ πάντας. συλλαβώντες δ’ οὗτοι τοὺς ἐφήβους, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἔρα περιηλθοῦν, εἰτ’ εἰς Πειραιάς πορεύονται καὶ φρουροῦ-

1 ἄν Papageorgios: ανμεν cod. 2 Wyse: ετυψ. cod.
him Heracleides of Clazomenae, surnamed "King, two obols, and Agyrrhius again three obols.

XLII. The present form of the constitution is as follows. Citizenship belongs to persons of citizen parentage on both sides, and they are registered on the rolls of their demes at the age of eighteen. At the time of their registration the members of the deme make decision about them by vote on oath, first whether they are shown to have reached the lawful age, and if they are held not to be of age they go back again to the boys, and secondly whether the candidate is a freeman and of legitimate birth; after this, if the vote as to free status goes against him, he appeals to the jury-court, and the demesmen elect five men from among themselves to plead against him, and if it is decided that he has no claim to be registered, the state sells him, but if he wins, it is compulsory for the demesmen to register him. After this the Council revises the list of persons that have been registered, and if anyone is found to be under eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen that registered him. And when the cadets have been passed by this revision, their fathers hold meetings by tribes and after taking oath elect three members of the tribe of more than forty years of age, whom they think to be the best and most suitable to supervise the cadets, and from them the people elects by show of hands one of each tribe as disciplinary officer, and elects from the other citizens a marshal over them all. These take the cadets in a body, and after first making a circuit of the temples then go to

*Or 'nicknamed' (as was Peisistratus in Eupolis's comedy *Demos*); but perhaps his family claimed royal descent in Asia Minor.
σων οὶ μὲν τὴν Μουνιχίαν οἱ δὲ τὴν Ἀκτήν. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδακτεῖ αὐτοῖς ὑπομαχεῖ καὶ τοξεύει καὶ ἀκοντίζει καὶ καταπάλην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν. 1 δίδωσι δὲ καὶ εἰς τροφὴν τοῖς μὲν σωφρονισταῖς δραχμῆς α’ ἐκάστῳ, τοῖς δ’ ἐφήβους τέτταρας ὀβολοὺς ἐκάστῳ· τὰ δὲ τῶν φυλαττών τῶν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνων ὁ σωφρονιστής ἐκαστος ἀγοράζει τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πάσιν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν (συσσιτοῦσι γὰρ κατὰ φυλᾶς), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων.

4 καὶ τὸν μὲν πρῶτον ἐναυτὸν οὕτως διάγοουσιν τὸν δ’ ὦστερον, ἐκκλησίας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γενομένης ἀποδειξάμενοι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τὰς τάξεις καὶ λαβόντες ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, περιπολοῦν τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς 5 φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη· χλαμύδας ἐχουσι καὶ ἀτελεῖς εἰσὶ πάντων· καὶ δίκην οὕτε διδόσων οὕτε λαμβάνουσιν, ὅνα μὴ πρόφασις ἢ τοῦ ἀπιέναι, 2 πλὴν περὶ κλήρου καὶ ἐπικλήρου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ 3 γένους ἱερωσύνη γένηται. διεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν δυεῖν ἐτῶν ἥδη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν.

1 XLIII. Τα μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐγγραφήν καὶ τὸς ἐφήβους τοῦτον ἔχει τῶν τρόπων. τὰς δ’ ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἀπάσας ποιοῦσι κληρωτάς, πλὴν ταμίου στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν θεωρικῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητοῦ· ταύτας δὲ χειροτονοῦσιν, καὶ οἱ χειροτονηθέντες ἀρχουσιν ἐκ Παναθηναίων

1 διδάσκοντων Rutherford.
2 πρόφασις ... ἀπιέναι legit Blass, sed incertus cod.
3 κατὰ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: κατάτο cod.
Peiraeus, and some of them garrison Munichia, others the Point. And the people also elects two athletic trainers and instructors for them, to teach them their drill as heavy-armed soldiers, and the use of the bow, the javelin and the sling. It also grants the disciplinary officers one drachma a head for rations, and the cadets four obols a head; and each disciplinary officer takes the pay of those of his own tribe and buys provisions for all in common (for they mess together by tribes), and looks after everything else. They go on with this mode of life for the first year; in the following year an assembly is held in the theatre, and the cadets give a display of drill before the people, and receive a shield and spear from the state; and they then serve on patrols in the country and are quartered at the guard-posts. Their service on patrol goes on for two years; the uniform is a mantle; they are exempt from all taxes; and they are not allowed to be sued nor to sue at law, in order that they may have no pretext for absenting themselves, except in cases concerning estate, marriage of an heiress, and any priesthood that one of them may have inherited. When the two years are up, they now are members of the general body of citizens.

XLIII. Such, then, are the regulations about the registration of the citizens and about the cadets. All the officials concerned with the regular administration are appointed by lot, except a Treasurer of Military Funds, the Controllers of the Spectacle Fund, and the Superintendent of Wells; these officers are elected by show of hands, and their term of office runs from

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\[a\] See xix. 2 n.

\[b\] The southern promontory of Peiraeus.
eis Παναθήναια. χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπάσας.

2. Βουλὴ δὲ κληροῦται φ', ν' ἀπὸ φυλῆς ἐκάστης. πρυτανεύει δ' ἐν μέρει τῶν φυλῶν ἐκάστη καθ' ο' τι ᾧ λάχωσιν, αἱ μὲν πρῶται τέτταρες ς' καὶ Χ' ἡμέρας ἐκάστῃ, αἱ δὲ ς' αἱ ύστεραι πέντε καὶ Χ' ἡμέρας ἐκάστῃ· κατὰ σελήνην γὰρ ἀγοῦσιν τὸν 3 ἑνιαυτὸν. οἱ δὲ πρυτανεύοντες αὐτῶν πρῶτον μὲν συσσιτοῦσιν ἐν τῇ θόλῳ, λαμβάνοντες ἀργύριον παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἐπειτα συνάγονται καὶ τὴν Βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δήμον, τὴν μὲν οὖν βουλὴν ὅσι αὐτὸν ἡμέραι, 2 πλὴν εάν τις ἄφεσιμος ἢ, τὸν δὲ δήμον τετράκις τῆς πρυτανείας ἐκάστης. καὶ ὅσα δει χρηματίζειν τὴν Βουλὴν, καὶ ὅ τι ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ ὅπου καθίζειν, 3 οὕτω προγράφονται.

4 προγράφοντο δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας οὕτως μὲν κυρίαν, ἐν τῇ δει τὰς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν ἐὰν δοκοῦσιν καλῶς ἀρχεῖν, καὶ περὶ σῖτου καὶ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας χρηματίζειν, καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας ἐν ταύτη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοὺς βουλομένους ποιοῖσθαι, καὶ τὰς ἀπογραφὰς τῶν δημοτομείων ἀναγινώσκειν, καὶ τὰς λήξεις τῶν κληρῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων ἀναγινώσκειν, 4 ὅπως μηδένα λάθη μηδέν 5 ἐρήμου γενόμενον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκτὸς πρυτανείας πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ περὶ τῆς ὀστρακοφορίας ἐπιχειροτονίαν διδόσωμεν εἰ δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ, καὶ συκοφαντῶν προβολὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν με-

1 [οὖν] edd.  2 οὐσίμεραι Kenyon.  3 Wilamowitz-Kaibel: οὖσικαθίζει cod.  4 ἀναγινώσκειν Gennadios.

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* i.e. in every four years; the Great Panathenaic Festival, as also the Pythian, was held in the third Olympic year.
one Panathenaic Festival to the next. All military officers also are elected by show of hands.

The Council is elected by lot, and has five hundred members, fifty from each tribe. The Presidency is filled by each tribe in turn, in an order settled by lot, each of the first four selected holding the office for thirty-six days and each of the latter six for thirty-five days; for their year is divided into lunar months. Those of them serving as Presidents first dine together in the Round-house, receiving a sum of money from the state, and then convene meetings of the Council and the People, the Council indeed meeting on every day excepting holidays, but the People four times in each presidency. And the Presidents put up written notice of the business to be dealt with by the Council, and of each day’s agenda, and of the place of meeting. They also put up written notice of the meetings of the Assembly: one sovereign meeting, at which the business is to vote the confirmation of the magistrates in office if they are thought to govern well, and to deal with matters of food supply and the defence of the country; and on this day informations have to be laid by those who wish, and the inventories of estates being confiscated read, and the lists of suits about inheritance and heiresses, so that all may have cognizance of any vacancy in an estate that occurs. In the sixth presidency in addition to the business specified they take a vote on the desirability of holding an ostracism, and on preliminary informations against persons charged as malicious informers, citizens and resident aliens, up

\[\text{Alternate months of 29 and 30 days make a year of 354 days, as does } 36 \times 4 + 35 \times 6.\]

\[c\] At the N.E. of the Areopagus, near the Council-chamber.

\[d\] One in each presidential term of office.
τοίκων μέχρι τριῶν ἐκατέρων, καὶ τις ὑποσχόμενος
6 τι μὴ πουήσῃ τῷ δῆμῳ. ἔτεραν δὲ ταῖς ἱκετηρίαις,
ἐν ἡθεῖο βουλόμενος ἱκετηρίαν ὑπέρ ὅν ἂν βούληται καὶ ἱδίων καὶ δημοσίων διαλέξεται πρὸς
tὸν δῆμον. αἱ δὲ δύο περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰσίν, ἐν
αἷς κελεύουσιν οἱ νόμοι τρία μὲν ἱερῶν χρηματίζειν,
tρία δὲ κήρυξιν καὶ προσβείαις, τρία δ' ὅσιών.
χρηματίζουσιν δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ ἀνευ προχειροτονίας.
προσέρχονται δὲ καὶ οἱ κήρυκες καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις
tοῖς πρυτάνεσιν πρῶτον, καὶ οἱ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς
φέροντες τούτους ἀποδιδόσι.

1 XLIV. Ἑστὶ δ' ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων εἰς ὅ
λαχὼν. οὗτος δ' ἐπιστατεῖ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν, καὶ
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐτε πλείω χρόνον οὐτε δις τὸν αὐτὸν
gενέσθαι. τηρεῖ δ' οὗτος τάς τε κλεῖς τάς τῶν
ἰερῶν ἐν οἷς τὰ χρήματ' ἐστίν καὶ τὰ γράμματα
τῆς πόλεις, καὶ τὴν δημοσίαν σφαγίδα, καὶ μένειν
ἀναγκαίον ἐν τῇ θόλῳ τούτον ἐστίν καὶ τριττῶν
2 τῶν πρυτάνεων ἦν ἄν οὗτος κελεύη. καὶ ἐπειδὰν
συναγάγωσιν οἱ πρυτάνεις τῆς βουλῆς ἢ τὸν δήμον
οὗτος κληροὶ προέδρους ἐννέα, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς
ἐκάστης πλή τής πρυτανευόσης, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ
τούτων ἐπιστάτην ἔνα, καὶ παραδίδωσι τὸ πρό-
3 γραμμα αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες τῆς τ' εὐ-
κοσμίας ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὑπὲρ ὅν δεὶ χρηματίζειν
προτιθέασιν καὶ τὰς χειροτονίας κρίνουσιν καὶ τὰ
ἀλλα πάντα διοικοῦσιν καὶ τοῦ 2 ἀφείναι κύριοί εἰσιν.

1 τὰ suppletum ab edd.
2 τοῦ Richards: tōν cod.: τοῦ δ' Hude.
to the number of not more than three cases of either class, and charges of failure to perform a service promised to the People. Another meeting is given to petitions, at which anyone who wishes, after placing a suppliant-branch, may speak to the People about any matter he may wish whether public or private. The two other meetings deal with all other business, at which the laws enact that three cases of sacred matters are to be dealt with, three audiences for heralds and embassies, and three cases of secular matters. And sometimes they do business without a preliminary vote being taken. Also the Presidents give a first audience to heralds and to ambassadors, and to the Presidents dispatches are delivered by their bearers.

XLIV. The Presidents have a single Head elected by lot; he holds office for a day and a night, and may not hold office longer, nor serve a second time. He is keeper of the keys of the temples in which the money and documents of the state are lodged, and of the state seal, and he is required to stay in the Round-house, and so is whichever Third of the Presidential Boards he orders. And whenever the Presidents call a meeting of the Council or of the People, this official selects by lot nine Chairmen, one from each tribe except the tribe presiding, and again from these a single Head, and he hands over the list of agenda to them; and after receiving it they superintend procedure, bring forward the business to be dealt with, act as tellers, direct all the other business and have power to dismiss the meeting. A man

\[a\] An olive-branch wreathed with wool was carried by the 'suppliant' and placed on the altar in the assembly.

\[b\] See viii. 30 n.
καὶ ἐπιστατήσαι μὲν οὐκ ἔξεστιν πλεῖον ἡ ἀπαξ ἑν τῷ ἑναὐτῷ, προεδρεύειν δ’ ἔξεστιν ἀπαξ ἑπὶ τῆς πρωτανείας ἐκάστης.

4 Ποιοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιρεσίας στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐππάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ’ ὅ τι ἄν τῷ δῆμῳ δοκῇ ποιοῦσι δ’, οἱ μετὰ τὴν σ’ πρωτανεύοντες ἐδ’ ὤν ἂν εὐσήμα γένηται. δεὶ δὲ προβούλευμα γενέσθαι καὶ περὶ τούτων.

1 XLV. Ἡ δὲ βουλὴ πρότερον μὲν ἢν κυρία καὶ χρήμασιν ζημιῶσαι καὶ δῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ Λυσίμαχον δ’ αὐτῆς ἀγανοῦσης ὡς τὸν δῆμον, καθήμενον ἡ δη μέλλοντα ἀπολυθήσειν Ἔυμηλίδης δ’ Ἀλωπεκηθεῖν ἀφεῖλετο, οὐ φάσκων δεῖν ἄνευ δικαστηρίου γνώσεως οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπολυθήσεις καὶ κρίσεως ἐν δικαστηρίῳ γενομένης ὃ μὲν Λυσίμαχος ἀπέφυγεν, καὶ ἐπινυμίαν ἔσχεν ὃ ἀπὸ τοῦ τυπάνου. δ’ ὃ δῆμος ἀφεῖλετο τῆς βουλῆς τὸ θανατοῦν καὶ δεῖν καὶ χρήμασι ζημιῶν, καὶ νόμον ἔθετο, ἂν τινος ἀδικεῖν ἡ βουλὴ καταγνωρίσῃ καὶ τῆς καταγνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιζημιώσεως εἰσάγειν τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὅ τι ἄν οἱ δικασται ψηφίσωται τοῦτο κῦρων εἶναι.

2 Κρίνει δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ βουλὴ τὰς πλείστας, καὶ μάλιστ’ ὅσαι χρήματα διαχειρίζοντον οὐ κυρία δ’ ἡ κρίσις ἄλλ’ ἐφεσιμος εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις εἰσαγγέλλειν ὃν ἄν βουλώνται.

1 edd.: δεκακαὶδεκαπενταετίας (dittographia) cod.
2 Λυσίμαχον δ’ Παπαγεωργίως: καὶ λυσίμαχον codex.
cannot become Head more than once a year, but he
will be Chairman once in each presidency.
They also conduct elections of Generals, and 4
Cavalry Commanders and the other military officers
in the Assembly, in whatever manner seems good to
the People; and these elections are held by the first
Board of Presidents, after the sixth Presidency, a in
whose term of office favourable weather-omens may
occur. These matters also require a preliminary
resolution of the Council.

XLV. The Council formerly had sovereign power 1
to pass sentences of fine, imprisonment and death.
But once it had brought Lysimachus to the public
executioner, when, as he already sat awaiting death,
Hemelides of the deme Alopecē rescued him, saying
that no citizen ought to die without sentence by a
jury; and when a trial was held in a jury-court
Lysimachus got off, and he got the nickname of 'the
man from the drum-stick' b; and the People deprived
the Council of the power to sentence to death and
imprisonment and to impose fines, and made a law
that all verdicts of guilty and penalties passed by the
Council must be brought before the jury-court by the
legislators, and that any vote of the jurymen should
be sovereign.

Trials of officials are held in most cases by the 2
Council, particularly those of the officials who handle
forces, but the verdict of the Council is not sovereign,
but subject to appeal to the jury-court. Private
actions also have the right to lay an information
at the Presidents holding the seventh or a later term
of office, see xliii. 2. Rain, thunder, etc., were bad omens,
that the regulation had a practical value for the open-air
meetings in the Pnyx.

a i.e. the man who escaped the bastinado.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕ 

τῶν ἀρχῶν μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις· ἐφεσίς δὲ τοῖς τούτοις ἔστιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐὰν αὐτῷ ἡ βουλή καταγωγῇ.

3 Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς βουλευτὰς τοὺς τῶν ύστερων ἐνιαυτὸν βουλεύσοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐνέα ἀρχομένα καὶ πρότεροι μὲν ἢν ἀποδοκιμάσαι κυρία, νῦν δὲ τούτοις ἐφεσίς ἔστιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.

4 Τούτων μὲν οὖν ἀκυρός ἔστιν ἡ βουλὴ, προ-βουλεύει δ' εἰς τὸν δήμον, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ δήμος ἀπροβολευτὸν οὐδὲ δ' ἢ τι ἢν μὴ προγράφησον οἱ πρυτάνεις ψηφίσασθαι τῷ δήμῳ· κατ' αὐτὰ γερ 

ταῦτα ἐνοχὸς ἔστιν ὁ νίκησας γραφή παραπόμων.

1 XLVI. Ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν πεποιημένων τριήρων καὶ τῶν σκευῶν καὶ τῶν νεωσοίκων, καὶ 

ποιεῖται κανός τριήρεις ἡ τετρήρεις, ὁποτέρας ἢ τὸν δήμος χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ σκέυη ταύταις καὶ 

νεωσοίκους· χειροτονεῖ δ' ἀρχιτεκτόνων ὁ δήμος 

ἕτε τάς ναίς. ἢν δὲ μὴ παραδώσων ἔξεργασμένα 

ταῦτα τῇ νέᾳ βουλῇ, τῇ διωρεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχίς 

λαβεῖν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς ύστερον βουλῆς λαμβάνουσιν, 

ποιεῖται δὲ τὰς τριήρεις, δέκα ἄνδρας εἰς ὁμή 

2 ἐλομένη τριήρουσί. ἐξετάζει δὲ καὶ τὰ ὀικο- 

δομήματα τὰ δημόσια πάντα, καὶ τὰς ἀδικεῖν ἀυτῆ 

δόξης τῷ τε δήμῳ τοῦτον ἀποφαίνει καὶ καταγγέλει 

παραδίδουσι δικαστήριον.

1 XLVII. Συνδιοικεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαί 

τὰ πλείστα, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οἱ ταμίαι τῇ 

Ἄθηνᾶς εἰσὶ μὲν δέκα, κληροῦσι δ' εἰς ἐκ τῆ 

φυλῆς, ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων κατὰ τὸν Σδλωμο- 

1 <καὶ> τοῦτος Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

2 κανός Kenyon; κανόνες cod. 

3-καταγγέλει Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

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of illegal procedure against any official they may wish; but in these cases also there is an appeal to the People if the Council passes a verdict of guilty.

The Council also checks the qualifications of the 3 Councillors who are to hold office for the following year, and of the Nine Archons. And formerly it had sovereign power to reject them as disqualified, but now they have an appeal to the jury-court.

In these matters therefore the Council is not sovereign, but it prepares resolutions for the People, and the People cannot pass any measures that have not been prepared by the Council and published in writing in advance by the Presidents; for the proposer who carries such a measure is ipso facto liable to penalty by indictment for illegal procedure.

XLVI. The Council also inspects triremes after construction, and their rigging, and the naval sheds, and has new triremes or quadriremes, whichever the People votes for, built and rigged, and naval sheds built; but naval architects are elected by the People. If the outgoing Council does not hand over these works completed to the new Council, the members cannot draw their honorarium, which is payable when the next Council is in office. For the building of triremes it elects ten of its own members as Naval Constructors. It also inspects all public buildings, and if it finds any commissioner in default it reports him to the People, and if it gets a verdict of guilty hands him over to a jury-court.

XLVII. The Council also shares in the administration of the other offices in most affairs. First there are the ten Treasurers of Athena, elected one from a tribe by lot, from the Five-hundred-bushel class, according to the law of Solon (which is still in force),
νόμον (ἐτὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κύριός ἐστιν), ἀρχεῖ δ’ ὁ λαχῶν καὶ πάντων πένης ἦ. παραλαμβάνουσι δὲ τὸ τε ἄγαλμα τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ τὰς Νίκας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κόσμον καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἕναντίον τῆς βουλῆς.

2 "Επειθ ’οι πωληταὶ τ’ μὲν εἰσι, κληροῦται δ’ εἰς ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς. μισθοῦσι δὲ τὰ μισθώματα πάντα καὶ τὰ μέταλλα πωλοῦσι καὶ τὰ τέλη μετὰ τοῦ ταμιου τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρυκὸν ἑρμηνεύων ἕναντίον τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ κυροῦσιν ὅτως ἣν ἡ βουλὴ χειροτονήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πραθέντα μέταλλα τὰ τ’ ἐργάσιμα τὰ εἰς τρία ἐτή πεπραμένα καὶ τὰ συγκεκριμένα τὰ εἰς . . . ἡ πεπραμένα. καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τῶν εἴς ’Αρείου πάγου φευγόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕναντίον τῆς βουλῆς πωλοῦσιν, κατακυροῦσι δ’ οἱ θ’ ἀρχοντες. καὶ τὰ τέλη τὰ εἰς ἕναντίον πεπραμένα ἀναγράφαντες εἰς λελευκωμένα γραμματεῖα τὸν τε πριάμενον καὶ ὅσον’ ἂν πριηταὶ τῇ βουλῇ παραδίδοσιν. ἀναγράφουσι δὲ χωρίς μὲν οὕς δεῖ κατὰ πρυτανεῖαν ἐκάστην καταβάλλειν εἰς δέκα γραμματεία, χωρίς δ’ οὕς τρὶς τοῦ ἕναντος, γραμματείοι κατὰ τὴν καταβολὴν ἐκάστην πούροντας, χωρίς δ’ οὕς ἐπὶ τῆς ἑνάτης πρυτανείας. ἀναγράφουσι δὲ καὶ τὰ χωρία καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τὰ πογραφεῖτα καὶ πραθέντα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ καὶ γὰρ ταῦθ’ οὕτοι πωλοῦσιν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν οἰκίων ἐν εἴ ἐτεσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν τιμῆν ἀποδοῦναι,

1 τὰ τ’ ἐργα καὶ τὰ ἐργάσιμα Sandys.
2 numerum rasum alii  ’, alii γ’ legunt.
3 erasum supplevit Wilamowitz.

a Golden figures, kept in the Parthenon; probably there
and the one on whom the lot falls holds office even though he is quite a poor man. They take over the custody of the statue of Athena and the Victories and the other monuments and the funds in the presence of the Council.

Then there are the ten Vendors, elected by lot one from a tribe. They farm out all public contracts and sell the mines and the taxes, with the co-operation of the Treasurer of Military Funds and those elected to superintend the Spectacle Fund, in the presence of the Council, and ratify the purchase for the person for whom the Council votes, and the mines sold and the workings that have been sold for three years and the concessions sold for . . . years. And the estates of persons banished by the Areopagus and of the others they sell at a meeting of the Council, but the sale is ratified by the Nine Archons. And they draw up and furnish to the Council a list written on whitened tablets of the taxes sold for a year, showing the purchaser and the price that he is paying. And they draw up ten separate lists of those who have to pay in each presidency, and separate lists of those who have to pay three times in the year, making a list for each date of payment, and a separate list of those who have to pay in the ninth presidency. They also draw up a list of the farms and houses written off and sold in the jury-court; for these sales are also conducted by these officials. Payment must be made for purchases of houses within five years, and for had been ten, but eight were melted down for coinage towards the end of the Peloponnesian War.

b The number half erased may be 10 or 3.

c Wooden boards coated with chalk, on which notices were scratched; they could be easily rubbed off, cf. xlviii. 1.

d i.e. registered as confiscated.
τῶν δὲ χωρίων ἐν δέκα· καταβάλλουσιν δὲ ταῦτα
4 ἐπὶ τῆς ένάτης πρυτανείας. εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ ὁ
βασιλεὺς τὰς μισθώσεις τῶν τεμνὼν ἀναγράφας
ἐν γραμματείοις λελευκωμένοις. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τού-
των ἡ μὲν μίσθωσις εἰς ἐτή δέκα, καταβάλλεται
δ' ἐπὶ τῆς θ' πρυτανείας· διὸ καὶ πλεῖστα χρή-
5 ματα ἐπὶ ταύτης συλλέγεται τῆς πρυτανείας. εἰσ-
φέρεται μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν τὰ γραμματεῖα
κατὰ τὰς καταβολὰς ἀναγεγραμμένα, τηρεῖ δ' ὁ
δημόσιος· ὅταν δ' ἐφ' χρήματι καταβολῆ, παρα-
δίδωσι τοῖς ἀποδέκταις αὐτὰ ταῦτα καθελῶν ἀπὸ
τῶν ἐπιστυλίων ὃν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δεί τὰ
χρήματα καταβληθῆναι καὶ ἀπαλειφθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἀπόκειται χωρίς ὅνα μὴ προεξαλειφθῆ.

1 XLVIII. Εἰσὶ δ' ἀποδέκται δέκα κεκληρωμένοι
κατὰ φυλάς· οὕτως δὲ παραλαβόντες τὰ γραμματεῖα
ἀπαλείφουσι τὰ καταβαλλόμενα χρήματα ἐναντίον
τῆς βουλῆς ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ πάλιν ἀπο-
δίδοσι τὰ γραμματεῖα τῷ δημοσίῳ· κἂν τις ἐλλήνη
καταβολῆν, ἐνταῦθ' ἐγγεγραται, καὶ διπλασίαι
ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν καταβάλλειν ἢ δεδέσθαι·
kαὶ ταῦτα εἰσπράττειν ἡ βουλή καὶ δῆσαι κυρία
2 κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐστίν. τῇ μὲν οὖν προτεραιᾶ
δέχονται τὰς καταβολὰς· καὶ μερίζουσι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς,
tῇ δ' ύστεραί τὸν τε μερισμὸν εἰσφέρουσι γράφωντες
ἐν σανίδι καὶ καταλέγουσιν ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ,
καὶ προτιθέον ἐν τῇ βουλῇ εἰ τὶς τινὰ οἶδεν
ἀδικοῦντα περὶ τῶν μερισμῶν ἢ ἀρχοντα ἢ ἰδιωτήν,
kαὶ γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζουσιν εὰν τις τῷ δοκῇ ἀδικεῖν.

1 τὰς καταβολὰς (vel τὰς πάσας) Kaibel: τα . . . . . . s cod.
farms within ten; and they make these payments in the ninth presidency. Also the King-archon introduces the letting of domains, having made a list of them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in. The tablets written up with the list of payments are brought before the Council, but are in the keeping of the official clerk; and whenever a payment of money is made, he takes down from the pillars and hands over to the receivers just these tablets showing the persons whose money is to be paid on that day and wiped off the record, but the other tablets are stored away separately in order that they may not be wiped off before payment is made.

XLVIII. There are ten Receivers elected by lot, one from each tribe; these take over the tablets and wipe off the sums paid in the presence of the Council in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back again to the official clerk; and anybody that has defaulted in a payment is entered on them, and has to pay double the amount of his arrears or go to prison; and the legal authority to impose this fine and imprisonment is the Council. On the first day, therefore, they receive the payments and apportion them among the magistrates, and on the second day they introduce the apportionment, written on a wooden tablet, and recount it in the Council-chamber, and bring forward in the Council any case in which somebody knows of anyone, either an official or a private person, having committed a wrong in relation to the apportionment, and put resolutions to the vote in case anyone is found to have committed any wrong.

* See xlvii. 2 n.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

3 Κληρούσι δὲ καὶ λογιστὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν οἱ βουλευταὶ δέκα τοὺς λογιουμένους ταῖς ἀρχαῖς κατὰ τὴν πρωτανείαν ἐκάστην. κληρούσι δὲ καὶ εὐθύνους, ἔνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης, καὶ παρέδρους β’ ἐκάστῳ τῶν εὐθύνων, οἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ ταῖς ἀγοραῖς1 κατὰ τὸν ἐπώνυμον τὸν τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης καθῆσθαι, κἂν τις βουληταὶ τινὶ τῶν τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δεδωκότων ἐντὸς γ’ ἡμερῶν ἁφ’ ἢ ἐδωκε τὰς εὐθύνας εὐθυναν ἃν τ’ ἱδίαν ἂν τε δημοσίαν ἐμβαλέσθαι, γράψας εἰς πινάκιον λελευκώμενον τόνομα τὸ θ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φεύγοντος καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημο’ τ’ ἵνα ἔγκαλη, καὶ τίμημα ἐπιγραψάμενος ἢ τ’ ἵνα αὐτῷ δοκή, δίδωσι τῷ εὐθύνω. 5 ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγνωσά, ἑάν2 καταγγέλλει παραδίδωσι τὰ μὲν ἵδια τοῖς δικασταῖς τοῖς κατὰ δήμους τοῖς τῆς φυλῆς ταύτην εἰσάγονοι,3 τὰ δὲ δημόσια τοῖς θεσμοθέταις ἐπιγράφει. οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται ἐὰν παραλάβωσιν πάλιν εἰσάγονοι ταύτην τὴν4 εὐθυναν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ὃ τι ἵνα γνώσι τοὺς δικασταὶ τοῦτο κύριον ἐστίν.

1 XLIX. Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἱπποὺς ἡ βουλή, κἂν μὲν τίς καλὸν ἱππὸν ἔχων κακῶς δοκῆ τρέφειν, ἤμισοὶ τῷ σίτῳ, τοῖς δὲ μὴ δυναμένοις ἀκολουθεῖν ἢ μὴ θέλουσί μένειν ἄλλ’ ἀνάγονοι5 τροχὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γνάθον ἐπιβάλλει, καὶ ὃ τοῦτο6 παθῶν ἀδócιμος ἐστὶ. δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς

1 Kenyon, sed γ incertum, ὑρ desunt.
2 εάν Herwerden: εαμεν cod.
3 δικάζουσι Richards.
4 ταύτην ante τὴν supplet Blass.
5 ἀλλ’ ἀνάγονοι Blass, sed incertum: ἀλλ’ ἀναγ<γ>ώνοι o[v]i (’unbroken’) Wyse.
The Council also elect by lot ten of their own body as Accountants, to keep the accounts of the officials for each presidency. Also they elect by lot Auditors, one for each tribe, and two Assessors for each Auditor, who are required to sit at the tribal meetings according to the hero after whom each tribe is named, and if anyone wishes to prefer a charge, of either a private or a public nature, against any magistrate who has rendered his accounts before the jury-court, within three days from the day on which he rendered his accounts, he writes on a tablet his own name and that of the defendant, and the offence of which he accuses him, adding whatever fine he thinks suitable, and gives it to the Auditor; and the Auditor takes it and reads it, and if he considers the charge proved, he hands it over, if a private case, to those jurors in the villages who introduced this tribe, and if a public suit, he marks it to the Legislators. And the Legislators, if they receive it, introduce this audit again before the jury-court, and the verdict of the jurors holds good.

XLIX. The Council also inspects the Knights' chargers, and if anybody having a good horse keeps it in bad condition, it fines him the cost of the feed, and horses that cannot keep up with the squadron or will not stay in line but jib it brands on the jaw with the sign of a wheel, and a horse so treated has failed to pass the inspection. It also inspects

\[a\] *i.e.* one Auditor and two Assessors are assigned to each tribe, the assignment being indicated by the name of the hero after whom the tribe was named. See liii. 5 n.
Aristotle

προδρόμους ὁσοὶ ἂν αὐτῇ δοκῶσιν ἐπιτήδειοι προ-
δρομεύειν εἰναι, κἂν τιν’ ἀποχειροτονησθῇ, κατα-
βεβηκείν οὕτως. δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἁμίππους,
κἂν τινα ἀποχειροτονησθῇ, πέπαυται μισθοφορῶν
2 οὕτως. τοὺς δ’ ἰππέας καταλέγουσιν οἱ καταλογεῖς,
ούς ἂν ὁ δήμος χειροτονησθῇ δέκα ἀνδραίς. οὔς δ’
ἀν καταλέξουσι παραδιδόσαι τοῖς ἰππάρχοις καὶ
φυλάρχοις, οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες εἰσφέρουσι τὸν
κατάλογον εἰς τὴν βουλήν καὶ τὸν πίνακα ἀν-
οίξαντες ἐν ᾧ κατασεσσαμεσένα τὰ ὁνόματα τῶν
ἰππέων ἐστὶ, τοὺς μὲν ἐξομυνέων ὑπὸ δυνατοὺς εἰναι τοῖς σώμασιν
ἰππεύειν ἐξαλείφουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατευλεγμένοις
καλοῦσι, κἂν μὲν τις ἐξομόσηται μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ
σώματι ἰππεύειν ἢ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦτον ἁμιᾶσιν, τὸν
dὲ μὴ ἐξομυνόμενον διαχειροτονοῦσιν οἱ βουλευταὶ
πότερον ἐπιτήδειος ἐστιν ἰππεύειν ἢ οὐ. κἂν μὲν
χειροτονῄσκωσιν, ἐγγράφουσι εἰς τὸν πίνακα, εἰ
dὲ μὴ, καὶ τοῦτον ἁμιᾶσιν.

3 "Εκρινεν δὲ ποτὲ καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τὸν
πέπλον ἡ βουλή, νῦν δὲ τὸ δικαστήριον τὸ λαχοῦ-
ἐδόκουν γάρ οὕτως καταχαρίζεσθαι τὴν κρίσιν.
καὶ τὴς ποιήσεως τῶν Νικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀθλῶν τῶν
eἰς τὰ Παναθηναία συνεπιμελεῖται μετὰ τοῦ ταμίου
τῶν στρατιωτικῶν.

4 Δοκιμάζει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἁμίππους ἡ βουλή:
νόμος γάρ ἐστιν ὅσ κελεύει τοὺς ἐντὸς τριῶν μηνῶν
κεκτημένους καὶ τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένους ὥστε

1 καὶ τὰ εἰς coniecit Blass.

a Woven for Athena at every Panathenaic Festival and
carried in the procession.

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the mounted skirmishers, to see which it considers fit for skirmishing duty, and any that it votes to reject are thereby deposed from that rank. It also inspects the foot-soldiers that fight in the ranks of the cavalry, and anyone it votes against is thereby stopped from drawing his pay. The Knights' roll is made by the ten Roll-keepers elected by the People; and they pass on the names of all whom they enroll to the Cavalry Commanders and Tribe Commanders, and these take over the roll and bring it into the Council, and opening the tablet on which the names of the Knights have been inscribed, they delete those among the persons previously entered who claim on oath exemption from cavalry service on the ground of bodily incapacity, and summon those enrolled, and grant discharge to anyone who claims exemption on oath on the ground of bodily incapacity for cavalry service or lack of means, and as to those who do not claim exemption the Councillors decide by vote whether they are fit for cavalry service or not; and if they vote for them as fit they enter them on the tablet, but if not, these also they dismiss.

At one time the Council used also to judge the patterns for the Robe, but now this is done by the jury-court selected by lot, because the Council was thought to show favouritism in its decision. And the Council has joint supervision with the Steward of the Army Funds over the construction of the Victories and over the prizes for the Panathenaic Games.

The Council also inspects the Incapables; for there is a law enacting that persons possessing less than 3 minae and incapacitated by bodily infirmity

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*b* See iv. 4 n.
μὴ δύνασθαι μηδὲν ἐργὸν ἐργάζομαι δοκιμάζειν μὲν τὴν βουλήν, διδόναι δὲ δημοσία τροφήν δύο ὀβολοὺς ἔκάστῳ τῆς ἡμέρας. καὶ ταμίας ἐστὶν αὐτοὶς κληρωτὸς.

Συνδιοικεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς τὰ πλείσθ᾽ ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν.

1 Λ. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς διωκούμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἵππων ἐπισκευαστὰλ δέκα ἄνδρες, οἱ λάμβανοντες τριάκοντα μνῖας παρὰ τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν ἐπισκεύαζον τὰ μάλιστα

2 δεύμενα τῶν ἵππων, καὶ ἁστυνόμοι δέκα· τούτων δὲ ε' μὲν ἄρχουσιν ἐν Πειραιαῖ κέντε δ' ἐν ἀστεί, καὶ τὰς τε αὐλητρίδας καὶ τὰς ψαλτίαις καὶ τὰς κυθαριστρίαις οὕτως σκοποῦσιν ὅπως μὴ πλείονος ἡ δυεῖν δραχμαῖς μισθωθήσονται, κἂν πλείους τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδάσωσι λαβεῖν οὕτω διακληροῦσι καὶ τῷ λαχόντι μισθοῦσι. καὶ ὅπως τῶν κοπρολόγων μηδὲς ἐντὸς ἵ σταδίων τοῦ τείχους καταβαλεῖ κόπρον ἐπιμελεῖται, καὶ τὰς ἰδίους κωλύουσι κατοικοδομεῖν καὶ δρυφάκτους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὦδων ὑπερτείνειν καὶ ὅχετος μετεώρους εἰς τὴν ὦδον ἐκρουν ἔχοντας ποιεῖν καὶ τὰς θυρίδας εἰς τὴν ὦδον ἀνοίγειν· καὶ τους ἐν ταῖς ὦδοῖς ἀπογιγνομένους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἔχοντες δημοσίους ὑπηρέτας.

1 ΛΠ. Κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ ἁγορανόμοι ἵ,1 πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιά, ε' δ' εἰς ἀστυν. τούτως δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων προστατεύεται τῶν ἄνδρων ἐπιμελεῖοθαι πάντων, ὅπως καθαρά καὶ ἀκιδηθλα πωληται.

2 Κληροῦνται δὲ καὶ μετρονόμοι ἵ,1 πέντε μὲν εἰς ἀστυν, ε' δὲ εἰς Πειραιά· καὶ οὕτω τῶν μέτρων

1 numerum ἵ' bis supplevit Papageorgios.
from doing any work are to be inspected by the Council, which is to give them a grant for food at the public expense at the rate of 2 obols \(^a\) a day each. And there is a Treasurer for these persons, elected by lot.

The Council also shares in the administration of virtually the greatest number of the duties of the other offices.

L. These then are the matters administered by the Council. Also ten men are elected by lot as Restorers of Temples, who draw 30 minae \(^b\) from the Receivers and repair the temples that most require it; and ten City Controllers, five of whom hold office in Peiraeus and five in the city; it is they who supervise the flute-girls and harp-girls and lyre-girls to prevent their receiving fees of more than two drachmas, and if several persons want to take the same girl these officials cast lots between them and hire her out to the winner. And they keep watch to prevent any scavenger from depositing ordure within a mile and a quarter of the wall; and they prevent the construction of buildings encroaching on and balconies overhanging the roads, of overhead conduits with an overflow into the road, and of windows opening outward on to the road; and they remove for burial the bodies of persons who die on the roads, having public slaves for this service.

LI. Also Market-controllers are elected by lot, five for Peiraeus and five for the city. To these the laws assign the superintendence of all merchandise, to prevent the sale of adulterated and spurious articles.

Also ten Controllers of Measures are appointed by lot, five for the city and five for Peiraeus, who super-

\(^a\) Say threepence.
\(^b\) See iv. 4 n.
καὶ τῶν σταθμῶν ἐπιμελοῦνται πάντων, ὅπως οἱ πωλοῦντες χρήσωνται \(^1\) δικαίους.

3 Ἡσαύ δὲ καὶ σιτοφύλακες κληρωτοί \(^{1/2}\) πέντε μὲν εἰς Πειραιά, πέντε δ' εἰς ἀστυ, νῦν δ' εἰκοσι μὲν εἰς ἀστυ, πεντεκαίδεκα δ' εἰς Πειραιά. οὗτοι δ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως ὁ ἐν ἁγορᾷ σίτων ἄργος ὄνισι ἐσται δικαίως, ἐπειδ' ὅπως οἱ τε μυλωθροὶ πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν κριθῶν τὰ ἄλφιτα πωλήσουσιν καὶ οἱ ἀρτοπώλαι πρὸς τὰς τιμὰς τῶν πυρῶν τους ἄρτους, καὶ τὸν σταθμὸν ἄγοντας ὅσον ἄν οὗτοι τάξωσιν' ὁ γὰρ νόμος τούτους κελεύει τάττειν.

4 Ἐμπορίον δ' ἐπιμελητάς δέκα κληροῦσιν· τοῦτοι δ' προστετακται τῶν τ' ἐμπορίων ἐπιμελείσθαι, καὶ τοῦ σίτου του καταπλέοντος εἰς τὸ σιτικὸν\(^3\) ἐμπόριον τὰ δύο μέρη τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἀναγκάζειν εἰς τὸ ἀστυ κομίζειν.

1 LII. Καθιστάσι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἑνδέκα κληρωτοὺς, ἐπιμελησμένους τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ τοὺς ἀπαγομένους κλέπτας καὶ τοὺς ἀνδραποδιστὰς καὶ τοὺς λωποδύτας ἂν μὲν όμολογώσι βανάτω ξημώσοντας, ἂν δ' ἀμφισβητῶσι εἰσάζοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ μὲν ἀποφύγωσιν ἀφήσοντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ τότε βανατώσθουσι, καὶ τὰ ἀπογραφόμενα χωρία καὶ οἰκίας εἰσάζοντας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ τὰ δόξαντα δημόσια εἶναι παραδώσοντας τοῖς πωληταῖς, καὶ τὰς ἑνδείξεις εἰσάζοντας—καὶ γὰρ ταύτας εἰσάγουσι οἱ ἑνδέκα· εἰσάγουσι δὲ τῶν ἑνδείξεων τινάς καὶ οἱ θεσμοθέται.

\(^1\) χρήσονται Rutherford.

\(^2\) \(\text{i' suppletum ex Harpocracione a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.}\)

\(^3\) \(\text{άστικὸν vel 'Αστικὸν edd. (v.ll. ex Harpocracione).}\)
intend all measures and weights, in order that sellers may use just ones.

Also there used to be ten Corn-wardens elected by 3 lot, five for Peiraeus and five for the city, but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Peiraeus. Their duties are first to see that unground corn in the market is on sale at a fair price, and next that millers sell barley-meal at a price corresponding with that of barley, and baker-women loaves at a price corresponding with that of wheat, and weighing the amount fixed by the officials—for the law orders that these shall fix the weights.

They elect by lot ten Port-superintendents, whose 4 duty is to superintend the harbour-markets and to compel the traders to bring to the city two-thirds of the sea-borne corn that reaches the corn-market.

LII. They also appoint the Eleven, officers chosen 1 by lot to superintend the persons in the prison, and to punish with death people arrested as thieves and kidnappers and footpads that confess their guilt, but if they deny the charge to bring them before the Jury-court, and if they are acquitted discharge them, but if not then to execute them; and to bring before the Jury-court lists of farms and houses declared to be public property and to hand over to the Vendors a those that it is decided to confiscate; and to bring in informations—for these too are brought in by the Eleven, though the Legislators also bring in some informations.

\[a\] See xlvii. 2.
2 Κληρούσι δὲ καὶ εἰσαγωγέας ε’ ἄνδρας, οὗ τὰς ἐμμήνους εἰσάγοντι δίκας, δυοὶ φυλαῖν ἐκαστός. εἰσὶ δ’ ἐμμὴνοι προικός, ἐὰν τις ὀφείλων μὴ ἀποδῶ, κἂν τις ἐπὶ δραχμῆ δανεισάμενον ἀποστῆ, κἂν τις ἐν ἀγορᾷ βουλόμενος ἐργάζεσθαι δανείονται παρά τινος ἀφορμήν. ἔτι δ’ αἰκείας καὶ ἐρανικὰς καὶ κοινωνικὰς καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ ὑποζυγίων
3 καὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ τραπεζιτικάς. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτας δικαίους ἐμμήνους εἰσάγοντες, οἱ δ’ ἀποδέκται τοὺς τελώνας καὶ κατὰ τῶν τελωνῶν, τὰ μὲν μέχρι δέκα δραχμῶν ὄντες κύριοι, τὰ δ’ ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγοντες ἐμμὴν.

1 LIII. Κληρούσι δὲ καὶ τετταράκοντα, τέτταρας ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης, πρὸς οὓς τὰς ἄλλας δίκας λαγχάνουσιν. οἱ πρότερον μὲν ἦσαν τριάκοντα καὶ κατὰ δὴμοὺς περίοντες ἐδίκαζον, μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ὀλυγαρχίαν τετταράκοντα γεγο- νασιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν μέχρι δέκα δραχμῶν αὐτοτελεῖς εἰς δικάζειν, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τὸ τίμημα τοῖς διώμητας παραδίδοσιν. οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες εὰν μὴ δύνωνται διαλύσαι γιγνώσκοντι, κἂν μὲν ἀμφότερος ἄρεσκῃ τὰ γνωσθέντα καὶ ἐμμένωσιν, ἔχει τέλος ἡ δίκη. ἄν δ’ ὁ ἐτερός ἐφ’ τῶν ἀντι- δίκων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐμβαλόντες τὰς μαρτυρίας καὶ τὰς προκλήσεις καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἰς ἐχίνους, χωρὶς μὲν τὰς τοῦ διώκοντος χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τοῦ φεύγοντος, καὶ τούτους κατασχημάτυνοι

1 ἐρανικαὶ ... κοινωνικαὶ ... τραπεζιτικαὶ Bury.
2 καὶ ⟨τοὺς⟩ Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
3 περιόντες Kenyon.

— A drachma a mina a month =12 per cent per annum.
— i.e. particularly an action to recover expenses, brought

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They also elect by lot five men as Introducers, who introduce the cases to be tried within a month, each official those of two tribes. These cases include prosecutions for non-payment of dowry due, actions for the recovery of loans borrowed at a drachma interest, and of capital borrowed from one party by another wishing to do business in the market; and also actions about outrage, friendly-society business, partnerships, slaves, draft animals, naval command, and bank cases. These officials, therefore, bring into court and decide these suits within a month; but the Receivers decide suits brought by tax-farmers or against them, having power to deal summarily with suits up to ten francs but bringing the others into the Jury-court within a month.

LIII. They also elect by lot forty persons, four from each tribe, who are the court before which the other suits are brought; formerly they were thirty and went on circuit trying cases in each parish, but since the oligarchy of the Thirty their number has been raised to forty. They have summary jurisdiction in claims not exceeding ten drachmas, but suits above that value they pass on to the Arbitrators. These take over the cases, and if they are unable to effect a compromise, they give judgement, and if both parties are satisfied with their judgement and abide by it, that ends the suit. But if one of the two parties appeals to the Jury-court, they put the witnesses' evidence and the challenges and the laws concerned into deed-boxes, those of the prosecutor and those of the defendant separately, and seal them up, and by the captain of a trireme against his successor who had failed to relieve him when his year of office was over.

See xlviii. 1.

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'the Forty.'
Of the 100 Attic heroes 10 gave their names to the Tribes (see xxi. 6), and of the remaining 90, 42 names were affixed to the successive years of active citizenship, military service being from the age of 18 to 59, and those in their 60th year serving as diaetetae. As each year expired, the
attach to them a copy of the Arbitrator's verdict written on a tablet, and hand them over to the four judges taking the cases of the defendant's tribe. When these have received them they bring them before the Jury-court, claims within 1000 drachmas before a court of two hundred and one jurymen, and claims above that before one of four hundred and one. The litigants are not permitted to put in laws or challenges or evidence other than those passed on by the Arbitrator, that have been put into the deed-boxes. Persons fifty-nine years of age may serve as Arbitrators, as appears from the regulations for the Archons and Name-heroes; for the Heroes giving their names to the Tribes are ten in number and those of the years of military age forty-two, and the cadets used formerly when being enrolled to be inscribed on whitened tablets, and above them the Archon in whose term of office they were enrolled and the Name-hero of those that had been Arbitrators the year before, but now they are inscribed on a copper pillar and this is set up in front of the Council-chamber at the side of the list of Name-heroes. The Forty take the last one of the Name-heroes and distribute the arbitration-cases among those of his year and assign by lot the cases that each is to arbitrate upon; and it is compulsory for each of them to complete the arbitration of the cases allotted to him, for the law enacts the disfranchisement of anybody who does not become Arbitrator when of the proper age, unless he happens to hold some office in that year or to be abroad, these being the only grounds of exemption. Name-hero of the men now passing the age of 60 was transferred to those now just 18.

b i.e. the senior of the Nine Archons, called Ἐπώνυμος because his name dated the year.
6 εἰσὶ μόνοι. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ εἰςαγγέλλειν εἰς τοὺς διαιτητάς1 εάν τις ἄδικηθῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ διαἰτητοῦ, κἂν τινὸς καταγγώσιν ἀτμοῦσθαι κελεύοσιν οἱ νόμοι·
7 ἐφεσις δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τούτοις. χρώνται δὲ τοῖς ἑπωνύμοις καὶ πρὸς τὰς στρατείας, καὶ ὅταν ἡλικίαν ἐκπέμψωσι προγράφουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντος καὶ ἑπωνύμου μέχρι τῶν δεὶ στρατευοῦσθαι.
1 LIV. Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ τάσδε τὰς ἁρχὰς· ὀδοποιοὺς πέντε, οἳ προστέτομεν δημοσίους ἐργάτας
2 ἔχουσι τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐπισκεύαζεν· καὶ λογιστὰς δέκα καὶ συνηγόρους τούτοις δέκα, πρὸς οὓς ἀπαντᾷ ἀνάγκη τοὺς τὰς ἁρχὰς ἄρξαντας λόγον ἀπενεγκεῖν. οὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν οἱ2 μόνοι τοῖς ὑπευθύνοις λογιζόμενοι καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰς ἀγοντες. κἂν μὲν τινα κλέπτοντε 'ξελέγξωσι, κλοπὴν οἱ δικασταὶ καταγινώσκοι, καὶ τὸ γνωσθὲν ἀποτίνεται δεκαπλοῦν· εὰν δὲ τινα δώρα λαβόντα ἐπιδιέξωσι καὶ καταγώνως οἱ δικασταὶ, δώρῳς τιμῶσιν, ἀποτίνεται δὲ καὶ τούτο δεκαπλοῦν· ἀν δ᾽ ἄδικειν καταγινώσων, ἄδικοις τιμῶσιν, ἀποτίνεται δὲ τούθ᾽ ἀπλοῦν εὰν πρὸ τῆς θ᾽ πρυτανείας ἐκτείσῃ τις, εἰ δὲ μή, διπλοῦται· τὸ δὲ3 δεκαπλοῦν οὐ διπλοῦται.
3 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ πρυτανείαν καλοῦμενον, οὐ τῶν γραμμάτων4 ἐστὶ κύριος καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ γιγνόμενα φυλάττει καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀντιγράφει καὶ παρακάθηται τῇ βουλῇ. πρὸτερον μὲν οὖν οὔτος ἢν χειροτονητός,

1 δικαστάς Kenyon.
2 eliων οι Jos. Mayor: εἰσιν cod. 3 δὲ supplevit Kenyon. 4 ex Harpocratetime edd.: γραμματέων cod.

a Perhaps διαίτητας is a mistake for δικαστάς, ‘jurymen.’

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Anybody unjustly dealt with by the Arbitrator may 6 indictment him before the Arbitrators, and the laws prescribe the penalty of disfranchisement for an Arbitrator found guilty; but the Arbitrators also have an appeal. The Name-heroes also are employed 7 to regulate military service; when soldiers of a certain age are being sent on an expedition, a notice is posted stating the years that they are to serve, indicated by the Archon and Name-hero of the earliest and latest.

LIV. They also elect by lot the following officials: 1 five Highway-constructors, whose duty is to repair the roads, with workmen who are public slaves; and 2 ten Auditors and ten Assessors with them, to whom all retiring officials have to render account. For these are the only magistrates who audit the returns of officials liable to account and bring the audits before the Jury-court. And if an official is proved by them to have committed peculation, the Jury convict him of peculation, and the fine is ten times the amount of which he is found guilty; and if they show that a man has taken bribes and the Jury convict, they assess the value of the bribes and in this case also the fine is ten times the amount; but if they find him guilty of maladministration, they assess the damage, and the fine paid is that amount only, provided that it is paid before the ninth presidency; otherwise it is doubled. But a fine of ten times the amount is not doubled.

They also appoint by lot the officer called Clerk for 3 the Presidency, who is responsible for documents, is keeper of the decrees that are passed and supervises the transcription of all other documents, and who attends the sittings of the Council. Formerly this officer was elected by show of hands, and the most
kaı toûs éνδοξοτάτους kai πιστοτάτους ἔχειροτόνον, kaı γαρ ἐν ταῖς στήλαις πρὸς ταῖς συμμαχίαις kai προξενίαις kai πολιτείαις οὗτος ἀναγράφεται. νῦν δὲ γέγονε κληρωτός. κληροῦσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕπι τοὺς νόμους ἐτέρους ὅς παρακάθηται τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ ἀντιγράφεται καὶ οὕτως πάντας. χειροτονεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ δῆμος γραμματέα τὸν ἀναγνωσόμενον αὐτῷ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδενὸς ἔστι κύριος ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀναγνώσαναι.

6 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἱεροποιοῦσι δέκα τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκθύματα καλουμένους, οἱ τὰ τε μαντευτὰ ἱερὰ θύουσι, κἀν τι καλλιερήσαι δέχῃ καλλιεροῦσι μετὰ τῶν μάντεων. κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρους δέκα τοὺς κατ' ἐναντὸν καλουμένους, οἱ θυσίας τὲ τινας θύουσι καὶ τὰς πεντετερίδας ἀπάσας διωκοῦσι πλῆν Παναθηναίων. εἰσὶ δὲ πεντετερίδες μία μὲν ἡ εἰς Δῆλον (ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπετετήρις ἐνταῦθα), δευτέρα δὲ Βραυρώνα, τρίτη δὲ Ἰράκλεια, τετάρτῃ δὲ Ἐλευσίνα. εἰς Ἐλευσίνα, καὶ τούτων οὐδεμιᾶς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐγγίνεται. νῦν δὲ πρόσκειται καὶ Ἰράκλεια ἐπὶ Κηφισοφῶντος ἄρχοντος.

8 Κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰς Σαλαμῖνα ἄρχοντα καὶ εἰς Πειραιάδο δῆμαρχον, οἱ τὰ τε Διονύσια ποιοῦσι ἐκατέρωθι καὶ χορηγοὺς καθιστῶσι· ἐν Σαλαμῖνι δὲ καὶ τούνομα τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀναγράφεται.

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1 e Polluce Kenyon: επιτουτοιςνομον cod.
2 Wilamowitz-Kaibel: ουδεμια cod.
3 ἀπὸ Blass.

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a An honourable office assigned to a citizen of another state who represented Athenian interests there.

b i.e. taking place once in every four or six years; in Greek this is called “five-yearly,” “seven-yearly.”

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distinguished and trustworthy men used to be elected, for this officer's name is inscribed on the monumental slabs above records of alliances and appointments to consulships and grants of citizenship; but now it has been made an office elected by lot. They also elect another officer to superintend the laws, who attends the sittings of the Council, and he also has copies made of all the laws. The People also elect by show of hands a clerk to read documents to the Assembly and to the Council; he has no duties except as reader.

The People also elects by lot the ten sacrificial officers entitled Superintendents of Expiations, who offer the sacrifices prescribed by oracle, and for business requiring omens to be taken watch for good omens in co-operation with the soothsayers. It also elects by lot ten others called the Yearly Sacrificial Officers, who perform certain sacrifices and administer all the four-yearly festivals except the Panathenaic Festival. One of the four-yearly festivals is the Mission to Delos (and there is also a six-yearly festival there), a second is the Brauronia, a third the Heraclea, and a fourth the Eleusinia; a fifth is the Panathenaic, which is not held in the same year as any of the others mentioned. There has now been added the Festival of Hephaestus, instituted in the archonship of Cephasophon.

They also elect by lot an archon for Salamis and a demarch for Peiraeus, who hold the Festivals of Dionysus in each of those places and appoint Choir-leaders; at Salamis the name of the archon is recorded in an inscription.

Both the text and the facts are most uncertain.
ARISTOTLE

1 LV. Αὕτα μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ κληρωταί τε καὶ κύριαι τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων εἰσιν. οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι ἐννέα ἄρχοντες τὸ μὲν ἐς ἄρχης ὁν τρόπον καθίσταντο εἰρήταιν· νῦν δὲ κληροῦσιν θεσμοθέτας μὲν ἐς καὶ γραμματέα τούτοις, ἐτί δ᾽ ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ πολέμαρχον, κατὰ μέρος 2 ἐς ἕκαστης φυλῆς. δοκιμάζονται δ᾽ οὗτοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ τοῖς ϕ`, πλὴν τοῦ γραμματέως, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μόνον, ὠσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες (πάντες γὰρ καὶ οἱ κληρωταί καὶ οἱ χειροτονητοὶ δοκιμασθέντες ἄρχοντες), οἱ δ᾽ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ πάλιν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. καὶ πρὸτερον μὲν οὔκ ἠρχεν δυντι ἀποδοκιμάσειεν ἡ βουλή, νῦν δ᾽ ἐφεσίς ἐστιν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, 3 καὶ τούτο κύριον ἐστὶ τῆς δοκιμασίας. ἐπερωτώσων δ᾽ ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν πρῶτον μὲν "τίς σοι πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατρὸς πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων;" μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἐστιν αὐτῶ Ἄπολλων Πατρώος καὶ Ζεὺς Ἐρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερὰ ἐστιν· ἐτα ἦρια εἰ ἐστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα· ἐπειτα γονεάς εἰ εὗ ποιεῖ, κεῖ τὰ τέλη τελεῖ, καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ ἐστρατεύεται. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀνερωτήσας "κάλει" φησίν "τούτων τοὺς μάρτυρας." ἐπειδαν δὲ παρασχεται τοὺς μάρτυρας, ἐπερωτᾶ "τούτου βουλεταί τις κατηγορεῖν," καὶ μὲν ἡ τις κατήγοροι, δοὺς κατηγοροί καὶ

1 πάντων Kenyon: πράξεων allii: . . . ων cod.  
2 Thalheim: καὶ cod. (καὶ τὰ τέλη <ei> Wilamowitz-Kaibel).  

a Chaps. iii., viii., xxii., xxvi.
LV. These offices, then, are elected by lot and have authority over all the matters stated. As to the officials designated the Nine Archons, the mode of their appointment that was originally in force has been stated before; but now the six Lawgivers and their clerk are elected by lot, and also the Archon, King and War-lord, from each tribe in turn. The qualifications of these are first checked in the Council of Five Hundred, except the Clerk, but he is checked only in a Jury-court, as are the other officials (for all of them, both those elected by lot and those elected by show of hands, have their qualifications checked before they hold office), while the Nine Archons are checked in the Council and also again in a Jury-court. Formerly any official not passed by the Council did not hold office, but now there is an appeal to the Jury-court, and with this rests the final decision as to qualification. The questions put in examining qualifications are, first, 'Who is your father and to what deme does he belong, and who is your father's father, and who your mother, and who her father and what his deme?' then whether he has a Family Apollo and Homestead Zeus, and where these shrines are; then whether he has family tombs and where they are; then whether he treats his parents well, and whether he pays his taxes, and whether he has done his military service. And after putting these questions the officer says, 'Call your witnesses to these statements.' And when he has produced his witnesses, the officer further asks, 'Does anybody wish to bring a charge against this man?' And if any accuser is forthcoming, he is given a hearing and

\[b \text{ i.e. the Archon Eponymus, see liv. 4 n.} \]

\[c \text{ The gods of the Athenian's home.} \]
Ἀριστοτέλης, οὕτω διδώσων ἐν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ τὴν ἐπιχειροτονίαν ἐν δὲ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν ψήφου· εἶν δὲ μηδεὶς βούληται καταγγελεῖν, εὐθὺς δίδωσι τὴν ψήφου· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἐνέβαλλε τὴν ψήφου, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη πάντας ἑστι διαψηφίζεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἂν τις πονηρὸς ὁν ἀπαλλάξῃ τοὺς κατηγόρους ἐπὶ τοὺς δικασταῖς γένηται τοῦτον ἅπασθιμάσαι. δοκιμάσθεν δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, βαδίζουσι πρὸς τὸν λίθον ἐφ' οὗ τὰ τόμι' ἔστω (ἐφ' οὗ καὶ οἱ διαίτητα ὁμόσαντες ἀποφαίνονται τὰς διαίτας καὶ οἱ μάρτυρες ἐξομυνοῦνται τὰς μαρτυρίας), ἀναβάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ὁμολόγους δικάιος ἄρξειν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ δώρα μὴ λήψεθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑνεκα, κἂν τι λάβωσιν ἀν- δριάντα ἀναθῆσει χρυσοῦν. ἐντεύθεν δ' ὁμόσαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν βαδίζουσιν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰσ- ἐρχοῦνται.

1 ΛVI. Διαιμβάνουσι δὲ καὶ παρέδρους ὁ τε ἄρχων καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὁ πολέμαρχος δῦο ἐκαστὸς οὗς ἂν βουλήται, καὶ οὕτω δοκιμάζονται ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ πρὶν παρεδρεύειν, καὶ εὐθύνεις διδάσκεις ἐπὶ παρεδρεύωσιν.

2 Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρχων εὐθὺς εἰσελθὼν πρῶτον μὲν κηρύττει ὅσα τις ἑχει πρὶν αὐτὸν εἰσελθείν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῦτ' ἑχει καὶ κρατεῖν μέχρι ἀρχῆς τέλος. ἑπείτα χορηγοῦσι τραγῳδοὺς καθίστησι τρεῖς, ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλούσιωτάτους· πρῶτον δὲ καὶ κωμῳδοῖς καθίστη πέντε, νῦν δὲ

1 δοκιμάσθεν<τες> Rutherford.
the man on trial an opportunity of defence, and then the official puts the question to a show of hands in the Council or to a vote by ballot in the Jury-court; but if nobody wishes to bring a charge against him, he puts the vote at once; formerly one person used to throw in his ballot-pebble, but now all are compelled to vote one way or the other about them, in order that if anyone being a rascal has got rid of his accusers, it may rest with the jurymen to disqualify him. And when the matter has been checked in this way, they go to the stone on which are the victims cut up for sacrifice (the one on which Arbitrators also take oath before they issue their decisions, and persons summoned as witnesses swear that they have no evidence to give), and mounting on this stone they swear that they will govern justly and according to the laws, and will not take presents on account of their office, and that if they should take anything they will set up a golden statue. After taking oath they go from the stone to the Acropolis and take the same oath again there, and after that they enter on their office.

LVI. The Archon, the King and the War-lord also take two assessors each, chosen by themselves, and the qualifications of these are checked in the Jury-court before they hold office, and they are called to account when they retire from office.

Immediately on coming into office the Archon first makes proclamation that all men shall hold until the end of his office those possessions and powers that they held before his entry into office. Then he appoints three Chorus-leaders for the tragedies, the wealthiest men among all the Athenians; and formerly he used also to appoint five for the comedies,

\[i.e. \text{ has bribed them to let him off.}\]
A festival in May, at which there were competitions of cyclic choruses and a procession (§ 5).

A citizen appointed to one of these expensive public offices could challenge another as better able to afford it,

1 Wyse: toıtous cod. 2 ðe supplent edd.
but these are now returned by the Tribes. Afterwards he receives the Chorus-leaders nominated by the Tribes for the men's and boys' competitions and the comedies at the Dionysia and for men and boys at the Thargelia (for the Dionysia one for each tribe, for the Thargelia one for two tribes, which take turns to supply them), and deals with their claims for substitution by exchange of property, and brings forward their claims to exemption on the ground of having performed that public service before, or of being exempt because of having performed another service and the period of exemption not having expired, or of not being of the right age (for a man serving as Chorus-leader for the boys must be over forty). He also appoints Chorus-leaders for Delos and a Procession-leader for the thirty-oared vessel that carries the youths. He supervises processions, the one celebrated in honour of Asclepius when initiates keep a watch-night, and the one at the Great Dionysia, in which he acts jointly with the Supervisors; these were formerly ten men elected by show of hands by the People, and they found the expenses of the procession out of their own pockets, but now they are elected by lot, one from each tribe, and given 100 minae for equipment; and he also supervises the procession of Thargelia, and the one in honour of Zeus the Saviour. This official also administers the competition of the Dionysia and of the Thargelia. These, then, are the festivals that he supervises. Criminal and civil law-suits are instituted and the man challenged could only escape undertaking the office by exchanging estates with the challenger.

* For the festival at Delos see liv. 7; boys' choruses went from Athens.
νονται πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὃς ἀνακρίνας εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσάγει, γονέων κακώσεως (αὕται δὲ εἰσὶν ἀξίμιοι τῷ βουλομένῳ διώκειν), ὀρφανῶν κακώσεως (αὕται δ᾽ εἰσὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων), ἐπικλήρου κακώσεως (αὕται δὲ εἰσὶ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων καὶ τῶν συνοικούντων), οἶκου ὀρφανικοῦ κακώσεως (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὕται κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτρόπων), παρανοίας, εάν τις αἰτιᾶται τινα παρανοοῦντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀπολλύναι, εἰς δατητῶν αἴρεσιν, εάν τις μὴ θέλῃ κοινὰ τὰ ὄντα νέμεσθαι, εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς κατάστασιν, εἰς ἐπιτροπῆς διαδικασίαν, εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατάστασιν, ἐπιτροποῦν αὐτὸν ἐγγράψι, κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασία. ἐπιμελεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὅσαι ἃν τελευτήσαντος τοῦ ἄνδρος σκήπτονται κύειν, καὶ κύριός ἐστι τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἐπιβάλλειν ἢ εἰσάγει εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. μυσθὸι δὲ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπικλήρων ἐως ἃν τις τετταρακαίδεκατος2 γένηται καὶ τὰ ἀποτιμήματα λαμβάνει, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους3 ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι τοῖς παισίν τὸν σύτον οὖτος εἰσπράττει.

1 LVII. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρχων ἐπιμελεῖται4 τοῦτων. οἱ δὲ βασιλεὺς πρῶτον μὲν μυστηρίων ἐπιμελεῖται μετὰ τῶν ἐπιμελητῶν οὗς ὁ δῆμος ἑξειροτονεῖ, δύο μὲν ἐξ Αθηναίων ἀπάντων, ἕνα δὲ ἐξ Εὐμολπίδων, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ Κηρύκων. ἔπειτα Διονυσίων τῶν Ἐπι-

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1 Blass (alii alia): τα . . . απολλυν . . . cod.
2 Blass: επικλ . . . . ακαίδε . . . tis cod.
3 Brooks: και . . . . ους cod.
4 Blass: καιο . . . . ai cod.
before him, and after a preliminary trial he brings them in before the Jury-court: actions for ill-usage of parents (in which anybody who wishes may act as prosecutor without liability to penalty); for ill-usage of orphans (which lie against their guardians); for ill-usage of an heiress (which lie against the guardians or the relations that they live with); for injury to an orphan's estate (these also lie against the guardians); prosecutions for insanity, when one man accuses another of wasting his property when insane; actions for the appointment of liquidators, when a man is unwilling for property to be administered in partnership; actions for the institution of guardianship; actions for deciding rival claims to guardianship; actions for the production of goods or documents; actions for enrolment as trustee; claims to estates and to heiresses. He also supervises orphans and heiresses and women professing to be with child after the husband's death, and he has absolute power to fine offenders against them or to bring them before the Jury-court. He grants leases of houses belonging to orphans and heiresses until they are fourteen years of age, and receives the rents, and he exacts maintenance for children from guardians who fail to supply it.

LVII. These are the matters superintended by the 1 Archon. But the King superintends, first, the mysteries, in co-operation with Superintendents elected by show of hands by the People, two from the whole body of the citizens, one from the Eumolpidae and one from the Heralds. a Next the Dionysia in

a The Eumolpidae and Kerykes were two ancient priestly families at Athens.
ARISTOTLE

ληναίων¹. ταύτα δ’ ἐστὶ πομπή τε καὶ ἀγών.²
tὴν μὲν οὖν πομπῆν κωνὴ πέμπουσιν ὁ τε βασιλεὺς
cαὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ, τὸν δὲ ἀγώνα διατίθησιν ὁ
βασιλεὺς. τίθησι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τῶν λαμπάδων
ἀγώνας ἀπαντᾶς, ὡς δ’ ἔπως εἰπεῖν καὶ τὰς
2 πατρίων θυσίας διοικεῖ ὁσὶς πάσας. γραφαῖ δὲ
λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἁσβείας, κἂν τις ἱερω-
σύνης ἀμφισβητῆ ὁ πρὸς τινα. διαδικάζει δὲ καὶ τοῖς
gένεσι καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις τὰς
ὑπὲρ τῶν γερῶν ἀπάσας ὁσὶς. λαγχάνονται δὲ
καὶ αἱ τοῦ φόνου δίκαι καὶ πάσαι πρὸς τοῦτον, καὶ ὁ
προαγορέυμων εἰργεσθαι τῶν νομίμων ὁσὶς ἐστιν.
3 εἰσὶ δὲ φόνου δίκαι καὶ τραύματος, ἀν μὲν ἐκ
προνοίας ἀποκτείνης< την τρωσι, ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ,
cαι φαρμάκων, ἐὰν ἀποκτείνην δοὺς, καὶ πυρκαῖς-
tαύτα γὰρ ἡ βουλη μόνα δικάζει, τῶν δ’ ἄκουσιν
καὶ βουλεύσεως κἂν οἰκέτην ἀποκτείνη τις ἡ
μέτοικον ἡ ἐξένοι, οἱ ἐπὶ Παλλάδιῳ. ἐὰν δ’ ἀπο-
kτείναι μὲν τις ὁμολογή, φη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους,
οῖον μοιχὸν λαβὼν ἡ ἐν πολέμῳ ἄγνοισας ἡ ἐν
ἀθλώ ἄγωνιζόμενος, τούτῳ ἐπὶ Δελφίνων δικά-
ζουσιν. ἐὰν δὲ φεύγων φυγῇ ὅπως ἄρεις ἐστι
αὐτῶν ἐχὴ ἀποκτείναι ἡ τρωσαί τινα, τούτῳ δ’ ἐν
Φρεατῶν δικαίουσιν, ὁ δ’ ἀπολογεῖται προσ-
4 ὁμοσάμενος ἐν πλοίῳ. δικάζουσι δ’ οἱ λαχόντες
tαύτ’ ἐφέται πλῆν⁴ τῶν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ γυνο-

¹ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ Bywater.
² Van Leeuwen: ἐστὶ . . . η . . . cod.
³ ἀποκτείνη (<τις> Papageorgios.
⁴ Kenyon: τα . . . πλην cod.

* Held at the Limnae, S.E. of the Acropolis, at the end of January. The 7th Attic month, Gamelion (January-February), was in old Ionic called Lenaeon.

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Lenaeon; this festival consists of a procession and a competition, the former conducted by the King and the Superintendents jointly, the latter organized by the King. He also holds all the Torch-race Competitions; also he is the director of practically all the ancestral sacrifices. He holds the court that tries charges of impiety and disputed claims to hereditary priesthoods. He adjudicates between clans and between priests in all disputed claims to privileges. Before him are also brought all murder cases, and proclamations of exclusion from customary rites are made by him. Trials for deliberate murder and wounding are held in the Areopagus, and for causing death by poison, and for arson; for these only are tried by the Council, whereas involuntary homicide and plotting to murder, and murder of a slave or resident alien or foreigner, come before the court at the Palladium; and one who admits homicide but declares it to have been legal (for instance when he has killed a man taken in adultery), or who in war has killed a fellow-citizen in ignorance, or in an athletic contest, is tried at the Delphinium; but if, when a man has taken refuge in exile after an offence that admits of satisfaction, he is charged with homicide or wounding, he is tried at the Precinct of Phreatus, and delivers his defence from a ship anchored near the shore. Commissioners appointed by lot try these cases, except those that are held on the Areopagus; the cases are introduced by the King,

b This shrine and the Delphinium were probably S.E. of the Acropolis.

c Near the harbour of Zea; doubtless the eponymous hero was fictitious, the place being really named from a well, φρήατς. If the defendant had landed he would have been arrested for his former offence.
μένων. εἰσάγει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ δικάζουσιν ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ ὑπαίθριοι, καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅταν δικάζῃ περιαρεῖται τὸν στέφανον. δ' ὅ ἐστὶν ἐξων τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον εὑρεται τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ οὐδ' εἰς τὴν ἁγορὰν νόμος ἐμβαλεῖν αὐτῷ, τότε δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν εἰσελθὼν ἀπολογεῖται. ὅταν δὲ μὴ εἰδῆ τὸν ποιήσαντα, τῷ δράσαντι λαγχάνει, δικάζει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ φυλοβασιλεῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔρων.

1 LVIII. Ὁ δὲ πολέμαρχος θύει μὲν θυσίας τὴν τε τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Ἀγροτέρᾳ καὶ τῷ Ἐνναλίῳ, διατίθησι δ' ἁγώνα τὸν ἐπιτάφιον [καὶ]¹ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσιν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ Ἀρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἄριστογείτονι ἑναγίσματα ποιεῖ. δίκαι δὲ λαγχάνονται πρὸς αὐτὸν ἵδιαι μόνον,² αἱ τοῖς μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς ἱσοτελεῖ καὶ (αἱ)³ τοῖς προεόνοις γιγνόμεναι καὶ δἐ τοῦτον λαβόντα καὶ διανείμαντα δέκα μέρη τῷ λαχων ἐκάστῃ τῇ φυλῇ μέρος προσθέναι, τοὺς δὲ τὴν φυλῆν δικάζοντας

3 τοῖς διαίτηταις ἀποδοῦναι. αὐτὸς δ' εἰσάγει δίκας τάς τε τοῦ ἀποστασίου καὶ ἀπροστασίου καὶ κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων τοῖς μετοίκοις, καὶ τάλλ' ὅσα τοῖς πολίταις ὁ ἁρχῶν ταῦτα τοῖς μετοίκοις ὁ πολέμαρχος.

1 LIX. Ὡς δὲ θεσμοθετάτω πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ προγράμμα τα δικαστηρία εἰσὶ κύριοι τάς ἡμέρας δεῖ δικάζειν,⁴ ἔσπειτα τοῦ δοῦναι ταῖς ἁρχαῖς· καθότι γὰρ ἂν οὗτοι ἰώσων, κατὰ τοῦτο χρωνται.

¹ Kenyon secundum Polluceum.
² μόνον Wilamowitz-Kaibel: μὲν cod.
³ Kaibel.
⁴ kabh'ειν Richards.

a A form of Ares.
and the court sits within the sacred precinct in the open air, and when the King is acting in a case he takes off his crown. The accused man all the rest of the time is debarred from sacred places and is even forbidden by law from setting foot in the marketplace, but at the trial he enters the precinct and makes his defence. When the King does not know who committed the act, he institutes proceedings against 'the guilty man,' and the King and Tribal Kings try the case, as also prosecutions of inanimate objects and animals for homicide.

LVIII. The War-lord offers sacrifices to Artemis the Huntress and to Enyalius, and arranges the funeral games in honour of those who have fallen in war, and makes memorial offerings to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Only private law-suits are brought before him in which resident aliens, ordinary and privileged, and foreign consuls are concerned; he has to take the list of cases and divide it into ten portions and assign one portion by lot to each tribe, and to assign the jurymen for each tribe to the Arbitrators. He himself brings forward cases in which resident aliens are concerned, on charges of acting without their protectors or of lacking a protector, and as to estates and heiresses; and all other actions that in the case of citizens are brought in by the Archon, in the case of resident aliens are introduced by the War-lord.

LIX. The Lawgivers are responsible, first, for preparing lists of the days on which the jury-courts are to sit, and then for giving them to the officers, for these follow the arrangements that the Lawgivers

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A metoikos (other than the isoteleis, who for taxation and military service ranked with citizens) had to be enrolled under a citizen, whose sanction was necessary for his actions if important.
2 ἐτι δὲ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἰσαγγέλλοντον εἰς τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τὰς καταχείρισθενίας καὶ τὰς προβολὰς ἀπάσας εἰσάγουσιν οὖτοι, καὶ γραφὰς παρανόμων, καὶ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτῆδειον θέναι, καὶ προεδρικὴν
3 καὶ ἐπιστατικὴν καὶ στρατηγοῦς εὐθύνας. εἶοι δὲ καὶ γραφαὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ παράστασις τίθεται, ἐξέναις καὶ δωροζέναις (ἀν τις δῶρα δοὺς ἀποφύγῃ τὴν ἐξένας) καὶ συνκοφαντίας καὶ δώρων καὶ ἕστειλα· καὶ βουλεύσεως
4 καὶ ἀγάφων καὶ μοιχείας. εἰσάγουσιν δὲ καὶ τὰς δοκιμασίας ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀπάσας, καὶ τοὺς ἀπεβηλιμένους ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν, καὶ τὰς κατα-
5 γνώσεις τὰς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς. εἰσάγουσι δὲ καὶ δίκας ἰδίας, ἐμπορικάς καὶ μεταλλικάς, καὶ δούλων, ἀν τὶς τὸν ἐλεύθερον κακῶς λέγῃ, καὶ ἐπι-
κληροῦσι ταῖς ἀρχαίς οὕτω ἡ δικαστήρια τὰ τρίτη ἱδιὰ
6 καὶ τὰ δημόσια. καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις οὕτω κυροῦσι, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν συμβόλων εἰσάγουσι, καὶ τὰ ψευδομαρτύρια τὰ ἔξι Αρείου πάγου.

7 Τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς κληροῦσι πάντες οἱ ἐννέα ἄρ-
χontes δέκατος δὲ τὸ γραμματείον τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, τοὺς τῆς αὐτοῦ φυλῆς ἐκαστοῖς.
1 LX. Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἄρχοντας τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. κληροῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀθλοθέτας δέκα ἄνδρας, ἕνα τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης. οὕτω δὲ δοκι-
μασθέντες ἄρχοντες τέτταρα ἐτη, καὶ διουκοῦσι τὴν το πομπὴν τῶν Παναθηναίων καὶ τὸν ἀγώνα

1 ἀσ ἢν ὅτις εἰσαγγέλλωσι Blass: ἐις... δῆμον secl. Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 2 τ' suppletum a Kaibel. 3 τὰ suppletum a Bernadakis. 4 πάντες coni. Kenyon: παντας cod.
assign. Moreover it is they who bring before the People indictments, and bring in all votes of removal from office, preliminary informations sent on by the Assembly, impeachments for illegal procedure, proceedings against inexpedient legislation, a suit against a President or a Superintendent, and audits imposed on Generals. Also they hear indictments for which a fee is paid, on charges of alien birth, alien corruption (that is, if a person charged with alien birth secures his acquittal by bribery), malicious information, bribery, false entry of public debts, personation of a witness, conspiracy, non-registration, adultery. They also introduce a the tests of qualification for all offices, and claims to citizenship rejected by vote of the deme, and verdicts of guilty passed on from the Council. They also introduce private actions in commercial and mining cases, and actions against slaves for slandering a freeman. And they assign the public and the private jury-courts by lot among the magistrates. They ratify contracts with other states, and bring into court suits arising under those contracts, and prosecutions for false witness instituted by the Areopagus.

All the Nine Archons with the Lawgivers' Clerk, making ten, elect by lot the jurymen, each electing those of his own tribe.

LX. These are the functions of the Nine Archons. They also elect by lot ten men as Stewards of the Games, one from each tribe, who when passed as qualified hold office for four years, and administer the procession of the Panathenaic Festival, and the con-

\[a \text{ i.e. before the bodies that checked these qualifications, see lv. 2-4.}\]

\[b \text{ See xlv. 2 fin.}\]
τῆς μουσικῆς καὶ τὸν γυμνικὸν ἀγώνα καὶ τὴν ἐπιποδρομίαν, καὶ τὸν πέπλον ποιοῦνται, καὶ τοὺς ἀμφορεῖς ποιοῦνται μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ τὸ ἐλαιον 2 τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἀποδιδόσαι. συλλέγεται δὲ τὸ ἐλαιον ἀπὸ τῶν μοριῶν· εἰσπράττει δὲ τοὺς τὰ χωρία κεκτημένους ἐν οἷς αἱ μορίαι εἰσὶν ὁ ἄρχων, τρὶς ἕμικοτλίαι ἀπὸ τοῦ στελέχους ἐκάστου. πρότερον δὲ ἔπωλε τὸν καρπὸν ἡ πόλις, καὶ εἰ τις ἐξορύξειν ἐλαίαν μορίαν ἡ κατάξειν, ἐκρινεν ἡ ἐξ Ἄρειον πάγου βουλῆ, καὶ εἰ τοῦ καταγνοίη, ἃνατω τοῦτον ἐξημίων. εἰς οὔ δὲ τὸ ἐλαιον ὁ τὸ χωρίον κεκτημένοις ἀποτίνει, ὁ μὲν νόμος ἔστων, ἡ δὲ κρίσις καταλέλυται· τὸ δὲ2 ἐλαιον ἐκ τοῦ κτήματος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν στελέχων, ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει.

3 συλλέγας οὖν ὁ ἄρχων τὸ ἐφ' ἕαυτοι γυγομένου τοῖς ταμίαις παραδίδωσιν εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ οὖκ ἔστω ἀναβηναι πρότερον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον πρῶ τῶν παραδῷ τοῖς ταμίαις. οἱ δὲ ταμίαι τὸν μὲν ἀλλὸν χρόνον τηροῦσιν ἐν ἀκρόπολιν, τοὺς δὲ Παναθηναίους ἀπομετροῦσιν τοὺς ἀθλοθέταις, οἱ δ' ἀθλοθέτα τοῖς νικῶσι τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄθλα τοὺς μὲν τὴν μουσικὴν νικῶσιν ἄργυριον3 καὶ χρυσᾶ, τοὺς δὲ τὴν εὐανδρίαν ἀσπίδες, τοὺς δὲ τὸν γυμνικὸν ἀγώνα καὶ τὴν ἐπιποδρομίαν ἐλαιον.

1 LXI. Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἁρχὰς ἀπάσας, στρατηγοὺς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ' ἐκάστης4 φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων, καὶ τούτους διατάττουσι τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, ἑνα μὲν ἐπὶ

1 δὲ τὸ Richards: τὸδ cod. 2 δ': γὰρ coni. Blass. 3 Wilamowitz-Kaibel: ἀργυρία cod. 4 ἐκάστης supplevit Kenyon: αφυλῆς cod.
test in music, the gymnastic contest and the horse-race, and have the Robe\(^a\) made, and in conjunction with the Council have the vases\(^b\) made, and assign the olive-oil to the competitors. The oil is procured from the sacred trees; and the Archon levies it from the owners of the farms in which the trees are, three quarters of a pint from each trunk. Formerly the state used to sell the fruit, and anybody who dug up or cut down a sacred olive-tree was tried by the Council of Areopagus, and if found guilty punished with death; but ever since the olive-oil has been provided as rent by the owner of the farm, though the law still stands, the trial has gone out; and the state's claim to the oil is calculated on the estate and not on the number of trees.\(^c\) So the Archon collects the tribute of oil accruing in his year, and passes it on to the Treasurers at the Acropolis, and he is not allowed to go up to the Areopagus before he has handed the full quantity over to the Treasurers. These have it in their keeping in the Acropolis always, except that at the Panathenaic Festival they dole it out to the Directors of the Games and these to the victorious competitors. For the prizes are for the victors in music silver money and gold vessels, for those in manly beauty shields, and for those in the gymnastic contest and the horse-race olive-oil.

LXI. They also elect by show of hands all the military officers—ten Generals, formerly one from each tribe, but now from all the citizens together, and the vote decides the assignment of duties to these

\(^a\) In athletic contests the prize was a vase of oil and a garland of foliage from the sacred olive-trees.

\(^b\) In athletic contests the prize was a vase of oil and a garland of foliage from the sacred olive-trees.

\(^c\) i.e. the amount per tree stated above is only approximately calculated.
τοὺς ὀπλίτας, ὃς ἦγείται τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἀν ἔξωσι, ἕνα δ' ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὃς φυλάττει, κἂν πόλεμος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίγνηται πολέμει ὦτος· δύο δ' ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιαέα, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν τὸν δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀκτὴν, οἱ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν ἐν Πειραιαί· ἐνα δ' ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας, ὃς τοὺς τε τριμμαρχοὺς καταλέγει καὶ τὰς ἀντιδόσεις αὐτοῖς ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς διαδικασίας αὐτοῖς εἰσάγει· τοὺς δ' ἀλλοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα πράγματα ἐκπέμπουσιν. 

2 ἐπιχειροτονία δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρυτανείαν ἐκάστην, εἰ δοκοῦσιν καλῶς ἄρχειν· κἂν τινα ἀπο- 

κηρυγγίσωσιν, κρίνουσιν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, κἂν 

μὲν ἀλὸ τιμῶσιν ὃ τι χρή παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτεθεῖ, ἀν 

δ' ἀποφύγῃ πάλιν ἄρχειν. κύριοι δὲ εἰσὶ διὸν 

ἡγῶνται καὶ δῆσαι τῶν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ ἐκ- 

κηρύξει· καὶ ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλει· οὐκ εἰώθασι δὲ 

ἐπιβάλλειν.

3 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ταξιάρχους δέκα, ἐνα τῆς 


φυλῆς ἐκάστης· οὕτως δ' ἠγείται τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ 


λοχαγοὺς καθίστησιν.

4 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἰππάρχους δύο ἐξ ἀπάντων· 


οὕτω δ' ἠγούνται τῶν ἐπεύων, διελόμουν τᾶς 


φυλᾶς ἐ' ἐκάτερος· κύριοι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσὶν ὄντερ 


οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν. ἐπιχειροτονία δὲ 


γίνεται καὶ τούτων.

5 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ φυλάρχους ἵ, ἐνα τῆς 


1 φυλακῆς coni. Kenyon, φυλῆς secundum codicem dedit. 

2 τῶν Wilamowitz-Kaibel: kai tw cod. 

3 τῶν cod.: corr. Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

4 κηροῦσαι cod.: corr. Blass. 

5 εἰσὶν ὄντερ Wilamowitz-Kaibel: ὄντερεισων cod. 

6 καὶ suppleuit Gertz. 

7 numerum ἵ suppleuit Richards.
—one being appointed to the heavy infantry, who commands them on foreign expeditions; one to the country, who guards it and commands in any war that takes place in it; two to Peiraeus, one of them to Munychia and the other to the Point, who superintend the protection of the population of Peiraeus; one to the Symmories, who enrolls the Captains of triremes and carries out their exchanges and introduces their claims for exemption; and the others they dispatch on expeditions as occasion arises. A confirmatory vote is taken in each presidency upon the satisfactoriness of their administration; and if this vote goes against any officer he is tried in the jury-court, and if convicted, the penalty or fine to be imposed on him is assessed, but if he is acquitted he resumes office. When in command of a force they have power to punish breach of discipline with imprisonment, exile, or the infliction of a fine; but a fine is not usual.

They also elect by show of hands ten Regimental Commanders, one of each tribe; these lead their fellow-tribesmen and appoint company-commanders.

They also elect by show of hands two Cavalry Commanders from the whole body of citizens; these lead the Knights, each commanding a division consisting of five tribes, and their powers are the same as those of the Generals over the heavy infantry. The Cavalry Commanders' election also is submitted to a confirmatory vote.

They also elect by show of hands ten Tribal Commanders.

* The 20 companies in which the 1200 richest citizens were enrolled for payment of the ἐλαφορά or property-tax levied to meet emergency expenses of war.
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ϕυλής, τῶν ἡγησόμενον τῶν ἰππέων잡σπέρ οἱ ταξίαρχοι τῶν ὀπλιτῶν.

6 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ εἰς Λήμνον ἵππαρχον, ὅσ ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν ἰππέων τῶν ἐν Λήμνῳ.

7 Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ταμίαν τῆς Παράλου καὶ νῦν2 τῆς τοῦ "Αμμωνος.

1 LXII. Αἱ δὲ κληρωταὶ ἀρχαὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἥσαν αἱ μὲν μετ' ἐννέα ἀρχόντων ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ὅλης κληρούμεναι, αἱ δ' ἐν Θησείῳ κληρούμεναι διηγοῦντο εἰς τοὺς δήμους. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπώλουν οἱ δήμοι, καὶ ταύτας ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς ὅλης κληρούσι, πλὴν βουλευτῶν καὶ φρουρῶν τούτους δ' εἰς τοὺς δήμους ἀποδιδόμει.

2 Μισθοφοροῦσι δὲ πρῶτον ὁ δήμος ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ἐκκλησίαις δραχμη, τῇ δὲ κυρίᾳ ἐννέα ὁβόλους3. ἐπειτα τὰ δικαστήρια τρεῖς ὁβολοῦς. εἰθ' ἡ βουλὴ πέντε ὁβολοῦς. τοὺς δὲ πρυτανεύουσιν εἰς σύγκλητα ὁβολὸς προστίθεται [δέκα προστίθενται].

ἐπειτ' εἰς σύγκλητα λαμβάνουσιν ἐννέα ἀρχόντες τέτταρα ὁβολοῦς ἕκαστος, καὶ παρατρέφουσι κήρυκα καὶ αὐλητήν. ἐπειτ' ἄρχων εἰς Σαλαμίνα δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας. ἀθλοθέται δ' ἐν πρυτανείῳ δειπνοῦσι τὸν Ἑκατομβαιώνα μήνα οταν ἦ τὰ Παναθήναια, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς τετράδου ἰσταμένου. ἀμφικτύνους εἰς Δήλου δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐκάστης ἐκ Δήλου λαμβάνουσι.5 λαμβάνουσι δὲ

1 τῶν ἰππέων suppleuit Kenyon.
2 νῦν Blass: erasum, δίχα legit Kenyon.
3 ὁβόλους suppletum a Wilamowitz-Kaibel.
4 Blass.
5 λαμβάνουσι suppleuit Kenyon (cf. lvii. 2).
manders, one for each tribe, to lead the cavalry as the Regimental Commanders lead the heavy infantry.

They also elect by show of hands a Cavalry Commander for Lemnos, to take control of the cavalry in that island.

They also elect by show of hands a Treasurer of the Paralus, and at the present day a Treasurer of the ship of Ammon.

LXII. The officials elected by lot were formerly those elected from the whole tribe together with the Nine Archons and those now elected in the temple of Theseus who used to be divided among the demes; but since the demes began to sell their offices, the latter also are elected by lot from the whole tribe, excepting members of the Council and Guards; these they entrust to the demes.

Payment for public duties is as follows: first, the People draw a drachma for ordinary meetings of the Assembly, and a drachma and a half for a sovereign meeting; second, the Jury-courts half a drachma; third, the Council five obols; and those acting as president have an additional obol for food. Also the Nine Archons get four obols each for food, and have to keep a herald and a flute-player as well; and the archon for Salamis gets a drachma a day. Games-directors dine in the Prytaneum in the month of Hecatombaeon, during the Panathenaic Festival, from the fourth of the month onward. Amphictyons for Delos get a drachma a day from Delos. All the

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*a One of the state triremes used for embassies, etc. The other, the Salaminia, was superseded by the one named after Zeus Ammon, specially used to convey missions to Cyrene on the way to the shrine of Zeus Ammon.

*b Possibly the guards of the docks, mentioned at xxiv. 3.

*c See xliii. 4.
The dicasts in each tribe are distributed over all the 10 divisions into which all the dicasts are divided. In each tribe all the tickets (πινάκια) bearing the names of the dicasts in the division Α are placed in the first κιβώτιον, those of...
officials sent to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros also get money for food.

The military offices may be held repeatedly, but none of the others, except that a man may become a member of the Council twice.

LXIII. The Jury-courts are elected by lot by the Nine Archons by tribes, and the Clerk of the Law-givers from the tenth tribe. The courts have ten entrances, one for each tribe, twenty rooms, two for each tribe, in which courts are allotted to jurors, a hundred small boxes, ten for each tribe, and other boxes into which the tickets of the jurymen drawn by lot are thrown, and two urns. Staves are placed at each entrance, as many as there are jurymen, and acorns to the same number as the staves are thrown into the urn, and on the acorns are written the letters of the alphabet, starting with the eleventh, lambda, as many as the courts that are going to be filled. Right to sit on juries belongs to all those over thirty years old who are not in debt to the Treasury or disfranchised. If any unqualified person sits on a jury, information is laid against him and he is brought before the jury-court, and if convicted the jurymen assess against him whatever punishment or fine he is thought to deserve; and if given a money fine, he has division B in the second, and so on for all the 10 divisions. According to the number of dicasts required, an equal number of tickets is drawn by lot from each of the 100 κιβωτία. Each ticket so drawn has a court assigned to it by lot; and the tickets are now all placed in the second set of 10 κιβωτία, all tickets assigned to dicasts of any special court being placed in the κιβωτίαυ which bears the letter corresponding to that court. The names of all the dicasts selected to serve are thus distributed over the several courts that are to sit on the day in question' (Sandys). See further ch. lxiv.
δέσθαι ἕως ἅν ἐκτίσῃ τὸ τε πρότερον ὄφλημα ἐφ' ὦ ἐνεδείχθη καὶ ὃ τι ἅν αὐτῷ προστιμήσῃ τὸ 4 δικαστήριον. ἔχει δ' ἐκαστὸς δικαστὴς ἐν πινάκιον πυξίνον, ἐπιγεγραμμένον τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐαυτοῦ πα- τρόθεν καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ γράμμα ἐν τῶν στοι- χείων μέχρι τοῦ κ. νενέμηται γὰρ κατὰ φυλὰς δέκα μέρη οἱ δικασταὶ, παραπλησίως ἵσοι ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῷ γράμματι.

5 Ἐπειδὰν δὲ ὁ θεσμοθέτης ἐπικληρώσῃ τὰ γράμ- ματα ἃ δεὶ προσπαρατίθεσθαι τοῖς δικαστήριοις, ἐπέθηκε φέρων ὁ υπηρέτης ἐφ' ἐκαστὸν τὸ δικα- στήριον τὸ γράμμα τὸ λαχὸν.

Only fragments of the remaining pages of the ms. survive, much defaced. The most legible passages are here appended, gaps having been filled in without note where the restoration is generally accepted or is very probable.

1 LXIV. Τὰ δὲ κιβώτια τὰ δέκα κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν τῆς εἰσόδου καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν φυλὴν. ἐπιγεγραπτεί τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὰ στοιχεία μεχρὶ τοῦ κ. ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐμβάλωσιν οἱ δικασταὶ τὰ πινάκια εἰς τὸ κιβώτιον ἐφ' οὖ ἄν ἢ ἐπιγεγραμμένον τὸ γράμμα τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἐπὶ τῷ πινακίῳ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τῶν στοιχείων, διασείςαντος τοῦ υπηρέτου ἔλκει ὁ θεσμοθέτης ἐξ ἐκάστου τοῦ κιβωτίου πινακίων ἐν.

2 οὔτος δὲ καλεῖται ἐμπήκτης, καὶ ἐμπήγνυσι τὰ πινάκια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κιβωτίου εἰς τὴν κανονίδα ἐφ' ἢς τὸ αὐτὸ γράμμα ἐπεστὶν ὑπὲρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κιβωτίου. κληροῦται δὲ οὔτος ἢν µὴ ἂεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐμπηγνύσων κακουργῇ. εἰσὶ δὲ κανονίδες πέντε

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to go to prison until he has paid both the former debt, for which the information was laid, and whatever additional sum has been imposed on him as a fine by the court. Each juryman has one box-wood ticket, with his own name and that of his father and deme written on it, and one letter of the alphabet as far as kappa; for the jurymen of each tribe are divided into ten sections, approximately an equal number under each letter.

As soon as the Lawgiver has drawn by lot the letters to be assigned to the courts, the attendant immediately takes them and affixes to each court its allotted letter.

LXIV. The ten boxes lie in front of the entrance for each tribe. They have inscribed on them the letters as far as kappa. When the jurymen have thrown their tickets into the box on which is inscribed the same letter of the alphabet as is on the ticket itself, the attendant shakes them thoroughly and the Lawgiver draws one ticket from each box. This attendant is called the Affixer, and he affixes the tickets taken from the box to the ledged frame on which is the same letter that is on the box. This attendant is chosen by lot, in order that the same person may not always affix the tickets and cheat. There are five

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1 πέντε Blass, δέκα alii: lacunam cod.
3 in eκαστω των κληρωτηρίων. οταν δε εμβάλη τους κύβους, ο αρχων την φυλην κληροι κατα κληρωτηριον. εισι δε κύβοι χαλκοι μέλανες και λευκοι οσους δ' αν δεη λαχειν δικαστας, τοσούτου εμβάλλονται λευκοι, κατα πέντε πνώκαι εις, οι δε μέλανες τον αυτον τρόπον. επειδαν δ' εξαιρη τους κύβους, καλει τους ειληχότας δ' κηρυξ.

4 υπάρχει δε και ο εμπήκτης εις τον αριθμον. δος κγθεις και υπακούσας ελκει βάλανον εκ της υδριας, και αρεξ αυτην ανεχων το γράμμα, δεικνυσι πρωτον μεν τω αρχοντι τω εφεστηκτι. δε αρχων επειδαν ιδη, εμβάλλει το πνώκιν αυτου εις το κιβωτιον οπου αν η επιγεγραμμενον το αυτο στοιχειον οπερ εν τη βαλανω, ιν εις οιον αν λαχη ειση και μη ειιον αν βουληται, μιδε η συναγαγειν εις δικαστηριον ους αν βουληται τις.

5 παρακειται δε τω αρχοντι κιβωτια οσαπερ αν μελη τα δικαστηρια πληρωθησεθαι, εχοντα στοιχειον εκαστον οπερ αν η επι του δικαστηριου εκαστου ειληχος.

1 LXV. Αυτος δε δειξας παλιν τω υπηρετη ειτ' εντος εισερχεται της κιγχλιδος. δος υπηρετης διδωσι αυτω βακτηριαν ομοιων τω δικαστηριω εφ' ου το αυτο γραμμα εστιν οπερ εν τη βαλανω, ινα αναγιαλιν η αυτω εισελθειν εις ο ειληχι δικαστηριων εαν γαρ εις ετερον ειση εξελεγχεται υπο τω χρωματος της βακτηριας. τοις γαρ δικαστηριους χρωματα επιγεγραπται εκαστω επι τω σφηκισκον της εισοδου. δος λαβων την βακτηριαν

1 εξελη' alii: e . . . cod.
2 primae sententiae supersunt tantum paucae literae incertae.
ledged frames in each of the balloting-rooms. When he has thrown in the dice, the Archon casts lots for the tribe for each balloting-room; they are dice of copper, black and white. As many white ones are thrown in as jurymen are required to be selected, one white die for each five tickets, and the black dice correspondingly. As he draws out the dice the herald calls those on whom the lot has fallen. Also the Affixer is there corresponding to the number. The man called obeys and draws an acorn from the urn and, holding it out with the inscription upward, shows it first to the superintending Archon; when the Archon has seen it, he throws the man’s ticket into the box that has the same letter written on it as the one on the acorn, in order that he may go into whatever court he is allotted to and not into whatever court he chooses and in order that it may not be possible to collect into a court whatever jurymen a person wishes. The Archon has by him as many boxes as courts are going to be filled, each lettered with whichever is the letter assigned by lot to each court.

LXV. And the man himself having again shown it to the attendant then goes inside the barrier, and the attendant gives him a staff of the same colour as the court bearing the same letter as the one on the acorn, in order that it may be necessary for him to go into the court to which he has been assigned by lot; for if he goes into another, he is detected by the colour of his staff, for each of the courts has a colour painted on the lintel of its entrance. He takes the staff and
βαδίζει εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον τὸ ὀμόχρων μὲν τῇ βακτηρίᾳ ἔχων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ γράμμα ὅπερ ἐν τῷ βαλάνῳ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ εἰσέλθη, παραλαμβάνει σύμβολον δημοσίᾳ παρὰ τοῦ εἰληχότος ταύτην τήν 3 ἀρχήν. εἰτα τήν τε βάλανον καὶ τήν βακτηρίαν ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ τούτον τρόπον εἰσεληλυθότες. τοῖς δὲ ἀπολαγχάνουσι ἀποδυδόσιν οἱ ἐμπήκται 4 τὰ πινάκια. οἱ δὲ ὑπηρετά τοῖς δημόσιοι ἀπὸ τῆς φυλῆς ἐκάστης παραδιδόσι τὰ κιβώτια, ἐν ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἐκαστον, ἐν ᾧ ἐνεστὶ τὰ ὁνόματα τῆς φυλῆς τὰ ὁντα ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν δικαστηρίων. παραδιδόσι οἱ τοῖς εἰληχοσί ταύτα ἀποδυδόναι τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐν ἑκάστῳ [τῷ] δικαστήριῳ ἀριθμῷ τὰ πινάκια ὅπως ἐκ τούτων σκοπουῦντες ἀποδιδόσι τὸν μισθόν.

1 LXXVI. Ἐπειδὰν δὲ πάντα πλήρη ἢ τὰ δικαστήρια, τίθεται ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ τῶν δικαστηρίων β’ κληρωτήρια καὶ κύβοι χαλκοί ἐν οἷς ἐπιγέρασσι τὰ χρώματα τῶν δικαστηρίων, καὶ ἐτεροὶ κύβοι ἐν οἷς ἔστιν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ὁνόματα ἐπιγεγραμμένα. λαχόντες δὲ τῶν θεσμοθετῶν δύο χωρίς ἐκατέρων τοὺς κύβους ἐμβάλλουσιν, ὁ μὲν τὰ χρώματα εἰς τὸ ἐν κληρωτήριον, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ὁνόματα εἰς τὸ ἐτερον. ἡ δ’ ἂν πρῶτῃ λάχη τῶν ἀρχῶν, αὐτὴ ἄναγορεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ κήρυκος ὅτι χρήσεται τῷ πρῶτῳ λαχόντι δικαστήριῳ...

Of cc. lxvi. 2–lxviii. 2 (ms. pp. 33, 34) only fragments remain, variously put together and supplemented by editors.
goes to the court of the same colour as his staff and having the same letter as is on the acorn. And when he has come into it he receives a token publicly from the person appointed by lot to this office. Then with the acorn and the staff they take their seats in the court, when they have thus entered. And to those to whom the lot does not fall the Affixers give back their tickets. And the public attendants from each tribe hand over the boxes, one to each court, in which are those names of the tribe that are in each of the courts. And they hand them over to the persons appointed by lot to restore the tickets to the jurymen in each court by number, in order that according to these when they examine them they may assign the pay.

LXVI. When all the courts are full, two ballot-boxes are placed in the first of the courts, and copper dice with the colours of the courts painted on them, and other dice with the names of the offices written on them. And two of the Lawgivers are chosen by lot, and throw the two sets of dice in separately, one throwing in the coloured dice into one ballot-box and the other the names of the offices into the other. And to whichever of the offices the lot falls first, it is proclaimed by the herald that this will use the first court allotted. . . .

2 si recte legitur, dittographiam secl. ed.
2 LXVIII. ... μετὰ τὸν γ’ (άποδιδοῦσ γὰρ γ’ λαμβάνει) ἵνα ψηφίζωνται πάντες· οὖ γὰρ ἐστι
3 λαβεῖν σύμβολον οὐδὲν εἶναι μὴ ψηφίζηται. εἰσὶ δὲ ἀμφορεῖς δύο κείμενοι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ὁ μὲν χαλκοῦς ὁ δὲ ξύλινος, διαφερομένῳ ὅπως μὴ λάθη ὑποβάλλων τις ψήφους, εἰς οὔς ψηφίζονται οἱ δικασται, ὁ μὲν χαλκοῦς κύριος ὁ δὲ ξύλινος ἄκυρος, ἔχων οἱ χαλκοῦς ἐπίθηκον διερρυμένον ὡστ’ αὐτὴν μόνην χωρεῖν τὴν ψήφον, ἵνα μὴ δύο ὁ αὐτὸς
4 ἐμβάλλῃ. ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαψηφίζεσθαι μέλλωσι οἱ δικασταί, ὁ κήρυξ ἀγορεύει πρῶτον ἀν ἐπισκῆ- πτώνται οἱ ἀντίδικοι ταῖς μαρτυρίαις· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἐπισκήψασθαι ὅταν ἀρξώνται διαψηφίζουσαν. ἐπειτα πάλιν ἀνακηρύττει “ἡ τετραπημένη τοῦ πρῶτον λέγοντος ἡ ὀδ πλήρης τοῦ ὑστερον λέγοντος.” ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς λαβὼν ἀμα ἐκ τοῦ λυχνείου τὰς ψήφους, πιέζων τὸν ἄυλισκον τῆς ψήφου καὶ οὐ δεικνύων τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τὸ τετραπημένον οὔτε τὸ πλήρες, ἐμβάλλει τὴν μὲν κυρίαν εἰς τὸν χαλκοῦν ἀμφορέα τὴν δὲ ἄκυρον εἰς τὸν ξύλινον.

1 LXIX. Πάντες δ’ ἐπειδὰν ὕσι διεψηφισμένοι, λαβόντες οἱ ὑπηρέται τὸν ἀμφορέα τὸν κύριον ἐξερωσαν ἐπὶ ἄβακα τρυπήματα ἔχοντα ὀσαπτερ εἰσίν αἱ ψήφαι, ἣν αὐται φανεραὶ προκειμέναι εὐαρίθμητοι ὡσιν, καὶ τὰ τρυπήτα καὶ τὰ πλήρη δῆλα τοῖς ἀντιδίκοις. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ψήφους ἐθνι- χότες διαρκθμοῦσιν αὐτὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄβακου, χωρὶς μὲν τὰς πλήρεις χωρὶς δὲ τὰς τετραπημένας. καὶ ἀναγορεύει ὁ κήρυς τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ψήφων,

1 λαβόμενος alii : ὁ ἐ . . . cod.
LXVIII. . . . (<a copper token marked with a) 2 3 (for on giving this up he gets three obols), so that they all may vote; for nobody can get a token if he does not vote. And there are two jars placed in the court, one of copper and one of wood, separate so that a man may not secretly throw in pebbles undetected, into which the jurymen put their votes, the copper jar to count and the wooden jar for pebbles not used, the copper jar having a lid with a hole in it only large enough to take just the pebble alone, so that the same man may not throw in two. And when the jury are about to give their verdict, the herald first asks whether the litigants wish to challenge the evidence of the witnesses; for they are not allowed to challenge it after the voting has begun. Then he proclaims again, ‘The pebble with the hole through it is a vote for the first speaker, and the whole pebble one for the second speaker.’ And the juryman when taking the pebbles out of the lamp-stand presses the pebble against the lamp-stand and does not let the parties to the action see either the perforated pebble or the whole one, and throws the one that he wishes to count into the copper vessel and the one that he discards into the wooden one.

LXIX. And when all have voted, the attendants take the vessel that is to count and empty it out on to a reckoning-board with as many holes in it as there are pebbles, in order that they may be set out visibly and be easy to count, and that the perforated and the whole ones may be clearly seen by the litigants. And those assigned by lot to count the voting-pebbles count them out on to the reckoning-board, in two sets, one the whole ones and the other those perforated. And the herald proclaims the number of
τοῦ μὲν διώκοντος τὰς τετρυπημένας τοῦ δὲ
φεύγοντος τὰς πλήρεις· ὁποτέρῳ δὲ ἂν πλεῖσιν
γένηται, οὐτός νικᾶ, ἣν δὲ ἱσα, ὁ φεύγων.
2 ἔπειτα πάλιν τιμῶσι, ἣν δὲ τιμήσει, τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον ψηφιζόμενοι, τὸ μὲν σύμβολον ἀπο-
ἀδοντες βακτηρίαν δὲ πάλιν παραλαμβάνοντες· ἢ
δὲ τιμησίς ἐστιν πρὸς ἡμίχουν ὑδατὸς ἐκατέρῳ,
ἐπειδὰν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἢ δεδικασμένα τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων,
ἀπολαμβάνουσιν τὸν μισθὸν ἐν τῷ μέρει οὗ ἔλαχον
ἐκαστοι. . . .
votes, the perforated pebbles being for the prosecutor, and the whole ones for the defendant; and whichever gets the larger number wins the suit, but if the votes are equal, the defendant wins. Then again they assess the damages, if this has to be done, voting in the same way, giving up their ticket and receiving back a staff; as to assessment of damages each party is allowed to speak during three pints of water. And when they have completed their legal duties as jurymen, they take their pay in the division to which each was assigned by lot.
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THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS
INTRODUCTION

I. Place of the Eudemian Ethics in the Aristotelian Corpus

All the extant books attributed to Aristotle (including probably the recently recovered treatise on the Athenian Constitution) belong to the group of his works designated by ancient authorities ἀκροατικοῖ λόγοι, ‘lecture-courses.’ These are scientific treatises, in places hardly more than mere outlines, though for the larger part fully written out arguments; presumably they are records of Aristotle’s doctrine made for his pupils, and preserved in the library of the Peripatetic School. The other class of his writings, now lost, were more popular expositions intended for the general reader; some of them were in dialogue form. They were published, and they are alluded to as ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι.

The former group includes three works on the philosophy of conduct, entitled the Eudemian Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia. The two former are full scientific treatises, in eight and ten Books respectively. Magna Moralia is a smaller work, more discursive in style, of which only two Books survive, the latter part being lost; its contents correspond partly with the Eudemian and partly with the Nicomachean Ethics; it was probably compiled
by a Peripatetic of the generation after Aristotle. Eudemus was the pupil of Aristotle who followed his doctrine most closely; Nicomachus was Aristotle's son, who fell in battle when a mere lad. Both may have been the compilers of the treatises that bear their names: Cicero (De Finibus v. 12) says that the Nicomachean Ethics, though attributed to Aristotle himself, can well have been by his son, and Diogenes of Laerte quotes from it as by Nicomachus. But the early commentator Porphyry speaks of both works as 'dedicated to' the persons whose names they bear. Whatever the truth may be, the Nicomachean Ethics has always been accepted as the authoritative exposition of Aristotle's moral science; and it seems probable that the Eudemian, so far as it differs, represents an earlier stage of its development.\(^a\)

This view is not necessarily precluded by the fact that in some places the Eudemian Ethics is fuller in expression or more discursive than the Nicomachean.

II. The Eudemian–Nicomachean Books

For about one third of the whole the two works overlap, the Eudemian Books IV., V., VI. being identical with the Nicomachean V., VI., VII.; these are given in the mss. and editions of the latter work only. Scholars have debated to which they really belong, some holding that they fit the argument of

\(^a\) This is the view of Jaeger, followed by Burnet in his Essays and Addresses and by Mansion; but the Eudemian Ethics is regarded as later than the Nicomachean by Spengel, Susemihl 1900, and Stocks (in the Oxford Aristotle vol. ix.); as it was by Burnet in his earlier work, his edition of N.E. Magna Moralia is put last by almost all scholars, but first of the three treatises by Schleiermacher and Arnim.
the *Eudemian* and that the corresponding parts of the *Nicomachean* have been lost, others the opposite. But all Aristotle’s treatises are so loosely put together that the arguments for neither view are convincing. It is more probable that the three common Books represent his final doctrine, except in so far as they are modified by other parts of his works—thus the excursus on the ethical value of pleasure in *E.E.* VI. = *N.E.* VII. was doubtless superseded by the more accurate treatment of the topic at the beginning of *N.E.* X.

**III. The *Eudemian Ethics*: Outline of Contents and Comparison with the *Nicomachean***

Book I. introduces the subject—the nature of Happiness or Well-being, the supreme End or Aim of human conduct. This is a practical study: knowledge of the good is an aid to its attainment. The different views that prevail are crystallized in three typical Lives, the philosopher’s life of thought, the statesman’s life of action, the voluptuary’s life of pleasure. The Platonic theory of an Absolute Good is of questionable philosophic validity, and in any case has no bearing on practical life.

Book II. c. i. defines Happiness as consisting in the right exercise of the functions of man’s nature, moral and intellectual. The contents of *E.E.* so far correspond with those of *N.E.* Book I.; the remainder of Book II. with *N.E.* II. and III. i.-v. It examines the nature of Moral Goodness or Virtue, which is defined as a fixed disposition of character that in action or emotion steers a middle course between too much and too little. The various virtues are
EUDEMIAN ETHICS

tabulated, with the vices of excess and defect that correspond to each. The problem of the Freedom of the Will is studied in the light of the psychology of Volition and Purpose.

Book III. discusses the Virtues and some minor Graces of Character seriatim, each with its corresponding pair of Vices. The list tallies with that in N.E. III., vi. ff. and IV., except that it inserts the virtue of Mildness between Temperance and Liberality, and adds to the minor Graces of Character Nemesis (righteous indignation at another’s undeserved good or bad fortune), Friendliness and Dignity, while it omits Gentleness and Agreeableness (N.E. IV., v., vi.).

(Books IV., V., VI. are omitted in mss. and editions of the Eudemian Ethics, as they are the same as Books V., VI., VII. of the Nicomachean; the first of these three Books deals with Justice, thus completing the examination of the Moral Virtues; the second treats the Intellectual Virtues of Prudence or Practical Wisdom and Theoria or Speculative Wisdom; the third forms an appendix to the section on Moral Virtue—it examines Weakness of Will and studies the psychology of Pleasure—a subject again treated differently and more accurately in N.E. X. init.)

The subject of Book VII. is Friendship. The term includes all forms of friendly mutual regard, whether between equals or superior and inferior, relatives or other associates, and whether based on the motive of utility or the pleasure of society or respect for worth. The psychology of friendship is analysed in relation to that of self-love.

In N.E. VIII. and IX. Friendship is discussed at greater length with fuller detail; the arrangement
ARISTOTLE

of the topics is different but there is perhaps no striking discrepancy of view.

E.E. VIII. notices the epistemological aspect of Virtue (treated in N.E. I., ix., but differently); and discusses the ethical bearing of Good Luck (more fully dealt with in a different connexion in c. iii. of N.E. VII. = E.E. VI.), and there follows an essay on Kalokágathia, Moral Nobility (a virtue merely alluded to without analysis in N.E., as a necessary quality of the Great-spirited man, 1124 a 4 and 1179 b 10); it is treated as the consummation of the particular virtues. In conclusion there is a glance at Theoria, the activity of Speculative Wisdom, as the highest life of man; at Book II. init. this was coupled with Moral Conduct as constituting happiness. There is nothing corresponding to the full treatment of Theoria as the consummation of human well-being that is given in N.E. X. vii., viii., or to the transition from ethics to politics (glancing at the importance of public education) which concludes that work.

IV. TEXT, MSS. AND EDITIONS

The Eudemian Ethics is not contained in the two best mss. of Aristotle, the 10th c. Laurentianus (denoted by the sign K\(^b\)) and the 12th c. Parisiensis (L\(^b\)); we derive it chiefly from Vaticanus (P\(^b\)), a 13th c. copy of K\(^b\), and the early 15th c. Marcianus (M\(^b\)), not so good a text as P\(^b\) but an indispensable adjunct to it—according to Jackson, who refers to the text of these two mss. as 'the Greek tradition.' Other later copies certainly contain more errors, and are of little value as actual traditions of a sound text—some of their variants may be mere conjectural variations.
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corrections; their readings are only occasionally given in this edition.

The 13th c. Latin translation attributed to William of Moerbeke follows the Greek very closely, and is almost equivalent to another ms. ranking in value next to Vaticanus and Marcianus; it is occasionally adduced in this edition either in Latin or in its original Greek when this can be inferred with certainty.

There is an old Latin version of Book VIII. c. ii. with Magna Moralia Book II. c. viii., entitled De Bona Fortuna, printed in a Latin Aristotle of 1482, which indicates an independent Greek text of that passage.

The earliest printed edition of Aristotle is the Aldine, Venice 1498. The foundation of all modern work on the text is the monumental Berlin edition, with a Latin translation, scholia and indices, published by the Academia Regia Borussica in 1831 and the following years. The text, edited by Bekker, forms Volumes I. and II. which are paged consecutively, the Eudemian Ethics occupying pp. 1214-1249; the Berlin pages, the columns (indicated by a and b) and the numbering of the lines are shown in the margin of the present text.

Fritzsche's edition of the Eudemian Ethics (Ratisbon 1851) has an introduction on the authorship and contents, a text with explanatory notes, illustrative quotations and critical notes, a Latin translation and a Greek index.

The Teubner text of Susemihl (Leipzig 1884) has useful critical notes, collecting the corrections of other scholars published in the learned journals.

Henry Jackson contributed a valuable study of the text and contents of Book VII. cc. i., ii. to The Journal
of Philology xxxii. pp. 170 ff.; and also supplied a number of printed notes to the Oxford translator, J. Solomon.

Solomon's translation, in Volume IX. of the Oxford Aristotle 1945, is the most recent work on the book. Mr. Solomon in his footnotes gives full references to the corresponding passages of the Nicomachean Ethics and Magna Moralia; and his notes on the readings of the Greek that he has adopted make his work a valuable critical edition: they include conjectures of the translator himself, of Professor Ross the general editor of the series, and of other scholars, among them the notes of Henry Jackson referred to above.

In view of the comparatively scanty amount of work on the text hitherto published, the present editor has thought himself justified in making a considerable number of conjectural emendations of his own. Some freedom has been used in incorporating these and those of other scholars in the text; it seems in keeping with the purpose of this series to present the reader directly with what Aristotle probably wrote, leaving him to glance at the critical notes to discover what he is represented as having written by his copyists. At the same time in the interests of scholarship emended passages in the text are marked by a number referring to the corresponding note.

Similarly, the style of the translation is intended to make it serve as an aid to a student reading the original. It is as interpretative as was possible without becoming a mere paraphrase; it is not intended as a substitute for the Greek, which might take the form either of a rigidly literal version or
EUDEMIAN ETHICS

of a rendering into idiomatic English conveying the sense but ignoring the form of the original.

The following signs are used in the critical notes:

mss.
Pᵇ = Vaticanus.
Mᵇ = Marcianus.
cet. = all the other mss. collated by editors where their readings agree.
v.l. = the reading of one or some of these other mss.
Guil. = the Latin version of William of Moerbeke.
Γ = the conjectured Greek original of this.
Bᶠ = De Bona Fortuna.

The following abbreviations are used for the names of some editors and commentators quoted for the text:

Ald. = editio princeps Aldina.
Bck. = Bekker.
Bus. = Busolt.
Bz. = Bonitz.
Cas. = Casaubon.
Fr. = Fritsche.
Iac. = Henry Jackson.
Rac. = the present editor.
Ras. = Rassow.
Ric. = Richards.
Sol. = Solomon.
Sp. = Spengler.
Sus. = Susemihl.
Syl. = Sylburg.
Vict. = Victorius.

November 1934.

H. R.
ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ Α

1214 a

I. 'Ο μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρά τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητών διελών ὡσ' ὅν ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἓδυ, ποιήσας

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίοτατον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν, πάντων ἡδιστον δ'' οὗ τις ἔρα τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον ἀπάντων οὔσα ἡδιστόν ἐστιν.

Πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ὁ περὶ ἐκαστον 2 πράγμα καὶ περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν ἀποριάν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις 3 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν 3 ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καυρὸν ὁ τι περὶ αὐν οἴκειον ἦν 4 τῆς

1 ὃς add. Sp.

2 δ' hic Fr.: ante ηδιστον aut om. codd.

3 χρήσεις Sp.

4 Ric.: ὁ τι περὶ οἴκειον ἦν.

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a Theognis (255 f. with slight variation, quoted also in N.E. i., 1099 a 27).
1 I. The man who at Delos set forth in the precinct of the god his own opinion composed an inscription for the forecourt of the temple of Leto in which he distinguished goodness, beauty and pleasantness as not all being properties of the same thing. His verses are:

Justice is fairest, and Health is best,
But to win one's desire is the pleasantest.

But for our part let us not allow that he is right; for Happiness is at once the pleasantest and the fairest and best of all things whatever.

2 About every thing and every natural species there are many views that involve difficulty and require examination; of these some relate only to our knowledge of the thing, others deal also with modes of acquiring it and of acting in relation to it. As to all those views therefore that involve only speculative philosophy, we must say whatever may be proper to the inquiry when the suitable occasion occurs.

Or 'Righteousness'; the term includes more than justice.

Or 'Well-being'; the Greek word is entirely non-committal, and does not necessarily denote a state of feeling, consciousness of welfare.
15 μεθόδω. πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ἐπὶ 4 καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιάν διαφέροντες, ἦ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὕσης ἐπιστήμης τῶν τῆς εὐδαίμονίας, ἦ διὰ τῶν ἀσκήσεως 20 (πολλὰ γὰρ οὕτε κατὰ φύσιν οὕτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐνθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαύλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐνθισθεῖσι, χρήστα δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς); ἦ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυνών δὲ ἢ θάτερον, ἦτοι καθ' αἱρετικὴν τινὰ ὑπολειπτοί καὶ θεολητοῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιτυχείσης δαιμονίου τινὸς 25 ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἦ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ γὰρ ταύτων φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία1 διὰ τούτων ἀπάντων ἡ 6 τινῶν ἡ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἀδηλονι ἀπασιαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πιπτουσι εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς (καὶ γὰρ τὰς2 ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας 30 ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπ' ἐπιστήμης ἃς τις συναγάγων πράξεις). τὸ δ' εὐδαίμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως 7 καὶ καλῶς εἶν αὐ ἐν τριῶν μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκούσιν αἱρετιστάτως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρονήσεων μέγιστον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθῶν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δὲ τῆν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαίμονίαν ἐννοι 8 1214 b περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰσ

1 v.l. παρουσία τῆς εὐδαίμονίας.  2 τὰς add. Cas.

a The Greek term here still retains the general sense that it has in Plato. In the Nicomachean Ethics it is limited to 200
But we must consider first what the good life consists in and how it is to be obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation 'happy' acquire happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and shortness of stature and differences of complexion, or by study, which would imply that there is a science of happiness, or by some form of training, for there are many human attributes that are not bestowed by nature nor acquired by study but gained by habituation—bad attributes by those trained in bad habits and good attributes by those trained in good ones.

Or does happiness come in none of these ways, but either by a sort of elevation of mind inspired by some divine power, as in the case of persons possessed by a nymph or a god, or, alternatively, by fortune? for many people identify happiness with good fortune.

Now it is pretty clear that the presence of happiness is bestowed upon men by all of these things, or by some or one of them; for almost all the modes in which it is produced fall under these principles, inasmuch as all the acts that spring from thought may be included with those that spring from knowledge.

But to be happy and to live blissfully and finely may consist chiefly in three things deemed to be most desirable: some people say that Wisdom is the greatest good, others Goodness and others Pleasure. And certain persons debate about their importance in relation to happiness, declaring that one contributes more to it than another—some holding Practical Wisdom, prudentia, 'prudence,' as distinct from sapientia, 'speculative wisdom.'

It must always be remembered that the Greek term is less limited in meaning than 'virtue,' and may denote excellence in any department, not only moral goodness.
αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τῆν ἔδοξαν· καὶ τοις μὲν 5 ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ δυνών, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζήν εὐδαιμόνως.

II. Περὶ δὴ τούτων ἐπιστήματα ἀπαντά τὸν δυνάμενον ζήν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζήν, ἦτοι τιμῆν ἡ δόξαν ἡ πλοῦτον ἡ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὅν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τὸ γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τὶ τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημειών ἐστιν), μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ διορίσασθαι 10 μήτε προπετῶς μήτε βαθύμως ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζήν εὖ καὶ τίνων ἀνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταύτων ὃν τ' ἀνευ οὐχ οἶδον τε ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, ὁμοίως 15 δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἔτερων πολλῶν· ὡστ' οὔδε τὸ ζήν καλῶς καὶ ὃν ἀνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς. ἐστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἑιδα τῆς ὑγιείας 20 οὔδε τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὃς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἔξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἶδον ἀνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῶν ἡ ἐγγεγορεῖν ἡ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὔθεν ἂν ὑπάρξειν ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν, τὰ δ' ἑιδα μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκάστην φύσιν, οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεῳφαγία καὶ τῶν περιπάτων οἱ μετὰ δείπνων. ἀ δεῖ μὴ

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that Wisdom is a greater good than Goodness, others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a greater good than either of them; and some think that the happy life comes from them all, others from two of them, others that it consists in some one of them.

1 II. Having then in regard to this subject established its essential conditions, that everybody able to live according to his own purposeful choice should set before him some object for noble living to aim at—either honour or else glory or wealth or culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark of much folly not to have one's life regulated with regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in which of the things that belong to us the good life consists, and what are the indispensable conditions for men's possessing it. For there is a distinction between health and the things that are indispensable conditions of health, and this is similarly the case with many other things; consequently also to live finely is not the same as the things without which living finely is impossible. And in the latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions of health and life are not peculiar to special people but common to practically all men—both some states and some actions—for instance, without breathing or being awake or participating in movement we could not possess any good or any evil at all; whereas others are more peculiar to special types of natural constitution—for instance, eating meat and taking walking exercise after dinner are not closely related to health in the same way as the conditions mentioned. And these facts
λανθάνειν.εστὶ γὰρ ταῦτ’ αὕτη τῆς ἄμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὑρίσκειν τὸ ἐστὶ καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἶνον τε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

III. Πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν ὅσα 1 ἔχουσι τινὲς περὶ αὐτῆς περιέργον. πολλὰ γὰρ 20 φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι περὶ ὧν ἄν οὕθεις νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειν, δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἡλικίας ἔν ἣ μεταβαλοῦσιν 2 οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς (κόλασις γὰρ ἢ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστὶν). ὅμως δὲ 2 1215 a ταῦτας οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν, εἰκή γὰρ λέγουσι σχέδον περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ταύτης. τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν 3 ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι μόνον. ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγου τοῖς λόγου μηδὲν δεομένοις ἀλλὰ πάθους. 4 ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰςιν ἀπορίας περὶ ἐκάστην 3 πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν. ταῦτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν, οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἄμφισβητούντων ἑλεγχοί τῶν ἐναντιομένων αὐταῖς 5 λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσίν.

"Ετι δὲ πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνεν 4 μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δὲ οὐνεῖν τὰσ σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδεχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὗ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν

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1 a . . . λανθάνειν hic Rac.: supra post φūsiv.
2 Sp.: μεταβάλλουσιν.
3 ταύτης . . . σοφῶν add. Ivb marg. (δὲ add. Rac.).
4 πείθος Iac.
5 Rac.: αὕτοῖς.

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a In the mss. this clause comes before the preceding one, 'for instance, eating meat ... mentioned.'
b Cf. N.E. i., 1095 a 28-30, b 19 ff.
must not be overlooked, for these are the causes of the disputes about the real nature of happiness and about the means of procuring it; for some people regard the things that are indispensable conditions of being happy as actual parts of happiness.

III. Now to examine all the opinions that any people hold about happiness is a superfluous task. For children and the sick and insane have many opinions which no sensible man would discuss, for these persons need not argument but the former time in which to grow up and alter and the latter medical or official chastisement (treatment with drugs being chastisement just as much as flogging is). And similarly it is also superfluous to examine the opinions of the multitude either; for they talk at random about almost everything, and especially about happiness. We ought to examine only the opinions of the wise; for it is out of place to apply reasoning to those who do not need reasoning at all, but experience. But since every subject has special difficulties related to it, it is clear that there are such in regard to the highest life and the best mode of existence; it is then well to examine the opinions putting these difficulties, since the refutations advanced by those who challenge them are demonstrations of the theories that are opposed to them.

Moreover to notice such matters is especially advantageous with a view to the subjects to which all inquiry ought to be directed—the question what are the means that make it possible to participate in living well and finely (if 'blissfully' is too invidious

\[ C f . N . E . i . , 1095 b 19. \]

\[ d \] The words translated 'happiness' and 'the opinions of the wise' are conjectural insertions in the Greek.
(εἰ τὸ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν), καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἑκαστα γενομένην ἃν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τὰ ψυχὴν γυνομένοις 5 ἡ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ἦν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἰ ἐπολλοῖς, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτήσις οὔδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὔδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας· εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῶν ποιῶν τινα εἰναι καὶ 6 τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἰ ἑαν ἀγαθον καὶ θείοτερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θείοτερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς 4 αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιοὺς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

IV. Ἑσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλείοτα τῶν ἁμφιος-1 βητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων ἃν καλῶς ὀρισθῇ τὴ χρή νομίζειν εἰναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιῶν τινα μόνον εἰναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καθάπερ τινὲς ψήφησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἡ δὲ μὲν καὶ ποιῶν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεὶ τὰς πράξεις εἰναι ποιὰς τινας.

Διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων καὶ τῶν μὲν οὔδ' 2 ἁμφισβητούντων τῆς τουατῆς εὐμερείας ἀλλ' ἀλλως 3 τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οίνων τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τὰς βαναύσους 7 καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν (λέγω δὲ 30 φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευμομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἔδραίας καὶ μυσθαρνικάς,

1 τῷ Vict., τῷ τῷ Fr.: τῷ.
2 οὔδὲ om. Sp.
3 οὔδὲ διὰ ῾Pb.
4 v.l. ἐν τοῖς: ἐν τῷ . . . παρασκευάζειν? Rac.
5 οὔδ' add. Bz.
6 οὔδ' Sp. òs.
7 Sp.: καὶ τὰς βαναύσους post χρηματισμὸν.

a The word ψυχή, usually rendered 'soul,' has no term exactly corresponding to it in English, as it denotes the whole 206
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an expression)—and with a view to the hope that we may have of the things that are good in the various departments. For if living finely depends on things that come by fortune or by nature, it would be beyond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment is not to be secured by effort, and does not rest with men themselves and is not a matter of their own conduct; but if it consists in oneself and one's own actions having a particular quality, the good would be more common and more divine—more common because it would be possible for more people to share it, and more divine because happiness would then be in store for those who made themselves and their actions of a particular quality.

IV. Most of the points debated and the difficulties raised will be clear if it be satisfactorily determined what the proper conception of happiness is—does it consist merely in a person's possessing some particular quality of spirit, as some of the sages and the older thinkers held, or although a particular personal character is indeed an indispensable condition, is a particular quality of conduct even more necessary?

There are various different modes of life, and some do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake of things necessary—for instance the lives devoted to the vulgar and mechanic arts and those dealing with business (by vulgar arts I mean those pursued only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those vitality of a living creature, with the unconscious factors of nutrition and growth as well as conscious feelings or emotions and thoughts.

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χρηματιστικάς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὁνὰς ἀγοραίας καὶ πράσεις κατηλικάς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν ὄντων τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας οὐς οἱ ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες

προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἀπαντεῖς, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλὰς (αὕτα δ' εἰσίν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς συμματικὰς. διόπερ ἐτερος ἐτερον εὑδαίμωνα προσαγορεῖν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαξομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονεστάτος, "οὐθεὶς" εἶπεν "όν πο νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανεῖν." τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἡ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ ὅσος ὕπτι τὸν ἐρόντα ἀλύσως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἡ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἀνθρωπὸν εἶπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

V. Περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐτέρων οὐ βάδιον

1 Sol.: πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν.
2 Sp.: ἐτερος ἐτερον <ὄντες> τυγχάνοντες ὁνά τις.
3 ἐτερος add. Ras.
4 ἐτερον Rac.: ἐτερον τῶν.
5 καὶ add. ? Sus.
6 εἶπεῖν <δεῖν> ? Ric.

See 1214 a 30-b 5.

Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give 'those who happen to be in power.'

i.e. active citizenship: 'statesmanship' is too lofty a term.

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concerned with market purchase and retail selling); but on the other hand, the things related to the happy conduct of life being three, the things already mentioned as the greatest possible goods for men—goodness, wisdom and pleasure, we see that there are also three ways of life in which those to whom fortune gives opportunity invariably choose to live, the life of politics, the life of philosophy, and the life of enjoyment. Of these the philosophic life denotes being concerned with the contemplation of truth, the political life means being occupied with honourable activities (and these are the activities that spring from goodness), and the life of enjoyment is concerned with the pleasures of the body. Owing to this, different people give the name of happy to different persons, as was said before too; and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae when asked 'Who is the happiest man?' said 'None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.' But Anaxagoras answered in that way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation 'happy' without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice without pain and in purity, or participates in some form of divine contemplation.

While there are many different things as to

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1 The physical philosopher, 500–428 B.C., born at Clazomenae in Ionia, taught at Athens.
2 i.e. the man who displays the virtues of Temperance, Justice and Wisdom (the fourth cardinal virtue, Courage, is omitted), enhanced by pleasure or freedom from pain. This passage illustrates how Aristotle prepared the way for the hedonism of Epicurus.
τὸ κρῶναι καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι βράστον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ γνῶναι, τί τῶν εὖ τῷ ζῆν αἴρετον, καὶ λαβών ἃν τις ἔχου πλῆρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων δὴ ἄρτον τῷ ζῆν, ὅπως

νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμώνας· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἂν εὖ ἀρχῆς αἴρετον ἢ, εἴ τις αἴρεσιν ἐδίδον, διὰ γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους δὲ 2 βίοι δὲν ζῶσιν ἐτί παίδες ὄντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἄν ὑπομείνεις εὖ φρόνῳ.

ἐτὶ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν ἢ 3 λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν μὴ καλῆν δὲ, τοιαύτ᾽ ἐστίν ὡστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρείττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν.  ὅλως δὲ εἰ τις ἀπαντά συναγάγοι οὐσα 4 πράττονι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν ἀπαντεῖς, ἐκὸντες μέντοι μηθέν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ

προσθεὶς χρόνου πλῆθος ἀπεραντόν τι, οὐ μᾶλλον ἕνεκ' αὐτὸ τοῦτον ἐλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἀλλὰ 5 μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεῖσων τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἃς τὸ γυνώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὔτ' ἄν εἰς

προτιμήσεις τὸ ζῆν μὴ παντελῶς ὡν ἀνδράποδον, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτῃ ποιομένῳ τὴν αἴρεσιν οὐθέν ἄν διενέγκεις γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον.

1216 a ὁ γὰρ ἐν Αἴγυπτῳ βοῦς, ὅν ὡς Ἀπιν τιμῶν, ἐν 6 πλείοσί τῶν τοιούτων ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μονάρχων. 2

1 <τίς> ὁ . . . ; Cas.  
2 Γ': μονάρχιων.

a Cf. Soph. O.C. 1225 μὴ φῶναι τὸν ἀπαντά νικά λόγον.
which it is not easy to make a right judgement, this is especially the case with one about which everybody thinks that it is very easy to judge and that anybody can decide—the question which of the things contained in being alive is preferable, and which when attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For many of life's events are such that they cause men to throw life away, for instance, diseases, excessive pains, storms; so that it is clear that on account of these things any way it would actually be preferable, if someone offered us the choice, not to be born at all. And in addition, the kind of life that people live while still children is not desirable—in fact no sensible person could endure to go back to it again.

And further, many of the experiences that contain no pleasure nor pain, and also of those that do contain pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such that non-existence would be better than being alive. And generally, if one collected together the whole of the things that the whole of mankind do and experience yet do and experience unwillingly, because not for the sake of the things themselves, and if one added an infinite extent of time, these things would not cause a man to choose to be alive rather than not alive. But moreover, also the pleasure of food or of sex alone, with the other pleasures abstracted that knowledge or sight or any other of the senses provides for human beings, would not induce anybody to value life higher if he were not utterly slavish, for it is clear that to one making this choice there would be no difference between being born a beast or a man; at all events, the ox in Egypt, which they reverence as Apis, has a greater abundance of such indulgences than many monarchs. Nor like-
ομοίως δὲ οὔδὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καθεύδειν ἥδονήν· τὶ γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὑπίνοιν ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ετών ἀριθμοῦν χιλίων ἡ ὄποσωνοῦν; ἡ δὲ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν φυτὰ τοιαύτης τῶν ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν πεφυκότα μὲν διατελεῖ καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον. ὡστε φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι διαφεύγει σκοτουμένους τί 

Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασίν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαύτη ἀττα καὶ διερωτώντα τῶν ἐνεκ’ ἀν τίς ἔλοιπο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ γενέσθαι “τὸν” φάναι “θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τὰξεών.” οὔτος μὲν ὃς εἰστήμης τινὸς ἐνεκεν τὴν αἴρεσιν ὢκτο τιμῶν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἶ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον ὁ μακαρίζοντες ἡ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἦ τῶν ἀλλῶν τινᾶς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες εἰν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττευν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἐτεροὶ δὲ τίνες οὔτ’ ἄν 

φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἐλοιποῦ τοῦ ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς· αἱροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἔννοι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσεως. ἀλλ’ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι

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1 v.I. ἔτων ἀριθμῶν χιλίων ἀριθμοὶ ὃ ὄποσωνοῦν; ἐτῶν χιλίων ἢ ὄποσωνοῦν? (exciso ἀριθμοῦ gloss. ad ὄποσωνοῦν erratum) Rac. 

2 μήτρα Γ.

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a See 1215 b 6 n.
b A mythical king of Assyria, proverbial for luxury, cf. N.E. i., 1295 b 22.
wise would anyone desire life for the pleasure of sleep either; for what is the difference between slumbering without being awakened from the first day till the last of a thousand or any number of years, and living a vegetable existence? any way plants seem to participate in life of that kind; and so do children too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the mother, although alive, they stay asleep all the time.

So that it is clear from considerations of this sort that the precise nature of well-being and of the good in life escapes our investigation.

Now it is said that when somebody persisted in putting various difficulties of this sort to Anaxagoras and went on asking for what object one should choose to come into existence rather than not, he replied by saying, 'For the sake of contemplating the heavens and the whole order of the universe.' Anaxagoras therefore thought that the alternative of being alive was valuable for the sake of some kind of knowledge; but those who ascribe bliss to Sar-danapallus or Smindyrides of Sybaris or some of the others living the life of enjoyment, all appear for their part to place happiness in delight; while a different set would not choose either wisdom of any kind or the bodily pleasures in preference to the actions that spring from goodness: at all events, some people choose those actions not only for the sake of reputation but even when they are not going to get any credit. But the majority of those engaged in politics are not correctly designated 'politicians,' for

^ Greek colony in S. Italy. For Smindyrides, who travelled with 1000 slaves in attendance, see Herod vi. 127, Athenaeus, v. p. 273.
The Greek word is specially associated with sensual pleasures.

The promised discussion does not occur, but see N.E. vii., 1153 b 7-25.
they are not truly political, since the political man is one who purposely chooses noble actions for their own sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life for the sake of money and gain.

13 What has been said, therefore, demonstrates that all men ascribe happiness to three modes of life—the political, the philosophic, and the life of enjoyment. Among these, the nature and quality of the pleasure connected with the body and with enjoyment, and the means that procure it, are not hard to see; so that it is not necessary for us to inquire what these pleasures are, but whether they conduce at all to happiness or not, and how they so conduce, and, if it be the case that the noble life ought to have some pleasures attached to it, whether these are the pleasures that ought to be attached, or whether these must be enjoyed in some other way, whereas the pleasures which people reasonably believe to make the happy man's life pleasant and not merely painless are different ones.

14 But these matters must be examined later. Let us first consider Goodness and Wisdom—what the nature of each is, and also whether they themselves or the actions that spring from them are parts of the good life, since that they are connected with happiness is asserted, if not by everybody, at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of consideration.

15 Accordingly Socrates the senior thought that the End is to get to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and
μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει δὲ ταὐτ' εὐλόγως· ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ἄλλ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσθ' ἀμα συμβαίνει εἰδέναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον· ἀμα γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐσμὲν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι·

dióter ἢτει τί ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἂλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τούτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐτερον τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἄστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων τἀς ἐπιστήμας (οὐ μὴν ἂλλα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν), τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἶδον ύγίεια μὲν ἰατρικής, εὐνομία δὲ ἡ τι τοιοῦθ' ἐτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἑκαστὸν τῶν καλῶν, οὐ μὴν ἂλλα περὶ γ' ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμώτατον τί ἐστιν ἂλλα τὸ γνώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἂλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρείας, οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἂλλ' εἶναι δίκαιος, καθάπερ καὶ υγιαίνεις μᾶλλον ἡ γνώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τῆν ἑξιν μᾶλλον ἡ γνώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.

1 Fr.: γάρ. 2 τέλος add. Cas. 3 Ric.: γε περὶ.

The Greek term primarily denotes biology, rather than physics in the modern sense (with which contrast the modern
each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the virtues are forms of knowledge, so that knowing justice and being just must go together, for as soon as we have learnt geometry and architecture, we are architects and geometricians; owing to which he used to inquire what virtue is, but not how and from what sources it is produced. But although this does happen in the case of the theoretical sciences, inasmuch as astronomy and natural science \( ^a \) and geometry have no other End except to get to know and to contemplate the nature of the things that are the subjects of the sciences (although it is true that they may quite possibly be useful to us accidentally for many of our necessary requirements), yet the End of the productive sciences is something different from science and knowledge, for example the End of medicine is health and that of political science ordered government, or something of that sort, different from mere knowledge of the science.

Although, therefore, it is fine even to attain a knowledge of the various fine things, all the same nevertheless in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of its essential nature that is most valuable but the ascertaintment of the sources that produce it. For our aim is not to know what courage is but to be courageous, not to know what justice is but to be just, in the same way as we want to be healthy rather than to ascertain what health is, and to be in good condition of body rather than to ascertain what good bodily condition is.

limitation of the term 'physiology,' and of 'physic' in the sense of medicine); accordingly it does not here include astronomy.
VI. Πειρατέον δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων¹ ζητεῖν ἡτείν 1 τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παρα-
δείγμασι χρώμενον τόσο φαινομένοις. κράτιστον
μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομο-
λογούντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρόπον
γέ τινα πάντας. ² ὀπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν
ἐχεῖ γὰρ ἐκάστος οἰκεῖον τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
eus de ἀναγκαίων δεικνύει πως περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐκ
γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ
προϊόσουν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουν
ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰσθότων λέγεσθαι
συγκεκριμένως. διαφέροντι δὲ οἱ λόγοι περὶ 2
ἐκάστην μέθοδον οἱ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ οἱ
μὴ φιλοσόφως. διόσπερ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ ³ οὐ χρη
νομίζειν περιέργων εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν δι'
حوال οὔ μονὸν τὸ τί φανερὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὸ διὰ τί
φιλοσόφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον.
δεῖται μὲν τοῦτο πολλὴς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γὰρ 3
τινες οἳ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφον εἶναι τὸ μηθὲν
εἰκῇ λέγειν ἄλλα μετὰ λόγου πολλάκις λανθάνουσι
λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ
κενούς (τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅτε μὲν δι' ἀγνοιαν ὅτε ⁴
de di' ἀλαζονείαν), ύψω δὲ ἀλίσκεσθαι συμβαίνει
καὶ τούς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ
τούτων τῶν μὴ' ἔχοντων μὴτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν
ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἡ πρακτικὴν. πάσχουσι δὲ τούτῳ ⁵

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¹ πάντα (vel 27 χρωμένους) Sp. ² Vic.: πάντως.
³ <ἀντὶ> τῶν? Ric. ⁴ Ric.: τῶν πολιτικῶν.

² Or perhaps 'led on step by step.'
³ i.e. practical men often think that any string of arguments constitutes philosophy, though the arguers may be mere charlatans.
VI. And about all these matters the endeavour must be made to seek to convince by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and examples. For the best thing would be if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the views that will be stated, but failing that, at any rate that all should agree in some way. And this they will do if led to change their ground, for everyone has something relative to contribute to the truth, and we must start from this to give a sort of proof about our views; for from statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more scientific positions in exchange for the customary confused statements. And in every investigation arguments stated in philosophical form are different from those that are non-philosophical; hence we must not think that theoretical study of such a sort as to make manifest not only the nature of a thing but also its cause is superfluous even for the political student, since that is the philosophic procedure in every field of inquiry. Nevertheless this requires much caution. For because to say nothing at random but use reasoned argument seems to mark a philosopher, some people often without being detected advance arguments that are not germane to the subject under treatment and that have nothing in them (and they do this sometimes through ignorance and sometimes from charlatanry), which bring it about that even men of experience and practical capacity are taken in by these people, who neither possess nor are capable of constructive or practical thought. And this befalls them owing to lack of...
di' āpайдευσίαιν· āpайдευσία γάρ ἦστι περὶ ēκαστον πράγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τοὺς τ’ οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.

10 καὶ λέω δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρίς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας β λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διὰ τὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὦτι προσέχειν οὐ δεὶ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοὺς φαινομένους (νῦν δ’ ὁπότ’ ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδείχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστὶν οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

VII. Πεπροοιμισμένων δὲ καὶ τούτων, λέγωμεν ἕν ἀρξάμενοι πρώτων ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἰρηταί, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, ἢτοιντες ἐπειτα ὑπερεῖν τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὅμολογεῖται δὲ μεγίστον εἶναι καὶ ἀριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων (ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τὰχ’ ἂν εἰκαὶ βελτίωνος τινος ἄλλον τῶν ὁντων εὐδαιμονία, οἶνον θεοῦ). τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ζώων, οἶσα 3 χείρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν, οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονίαν ἵπποι οὐδ’ ὅρνις οὐδ’ ἰχθύς οὐδ’ ἄλλο τῶν ὁντων οὐδὲν ὁ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινος, ἄλλα κατ’ ἄλλην

1. Rac.: τὸ μέν.
2. πρώτων <τῶν> ? Ric.
3. ἐπειτα Ras.: ἐπὶ τὸ (<προείναι> ἐπὶ τὸ ? Ric.).
4. Rac.: τῶν μέν.

a § 1 above.
b i.e. a proposition that logically follows from premisses
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. vi. 5—VII. 3

education—for in respect of each subject inability to distinguish arguments germane to the subject from those foreign to it is lack of education. And it is also well to judge separately the statement of the cause and the demonstrated fact, both for the reason stated just now, that it is not proper in regard to all things to attend to theoretical arguments, but often rather to the facts of observation (whereas now when men are unable to refute an argument they are forced to believe what has been said), and also because often, although the result that seems to have been proved by the arguments is true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in the argument. For it is possible to prove truth by falsehood, as is clear from Analytics.¹

¹ VII. These prefatory remarks having also been made, let us proceed by starting first from the first statements, which, as has been said, are not clearly expressed, afterwards seeking to discover clearly the essential nature of happiness. Now it is agreed that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods (and we say 'human' because there might very likely also be a happiness belonging to some higher being, for instance a god); since none of the other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the designation 'happy,' for a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine, but it is by some other mode of participating in things that are false may be a true one: see Anal. Pr. ii., 53 b 26 ff., Anal. Post. i., 88 a 20 ff. Aristotle's simplest example is the syllogism 'A man is a stone, but a stone is an animal, therefore a man is an animal.'

² 1216 b 32 ff.
This promise is not kept.

'Ídea is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for elidos, class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality. An ídea is perceptible
good that one of them has a better life and another a worse.

4 But the fact that this is so must be considered later. At the present let us say that among things good some are within the range of action for a human being and others are not. And we make this distinction for the reason that some existing things do not participate in change at all, and therefore some good things do not, and these are perhaps in their nature the best things; and some things, though practicable, are only practicable for beings superior to us. And inasmuch as 'practicable' has two meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the actions that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for example we class among things practicable both health and wealth and the pursuits that are followed for the sake of health and wealth, healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear that happiness must be set down as the best of the things practicable for a human being.

8 We must consider, therefore, what the best is, and in how many senses the term is used. The answer seems to be principally contained in three views. For it is said that the best of all things is the Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that which has the attributes of being the first of goods and of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good; and both of these attributes, it is said, belong to the Form of good (I mean both being the first of goods and being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good), since it is of that only by the mind, but the word does not denote the content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary English.
The use of this phrase by Aristotle elsewhere seems to show that it denotes doctrines, recorded in books or familiar in debate, that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, I. viii. 2-7

Form that goodness is most truly predicated (inasmuch as the other goods are good by participation in and resemblance to the Form of good) and also it is the first of goods, for the destruction of that which is participated in involves the destruction of the things participating in the Form (which get their designation by participating in it), and that is the relation existing between what is primary and what is subsequent; so that the Form of good is the Absolute Good, inasmuch as the Form of good is separable from the things that participate in it, as are the other Forms also.

Now a thorough examination of this opinion belongs to another course of study, and one that for the most part necessarily lies more in the field of Logic, for that is the only science dealing with arguments that are at the same time destructive and general. But if we are to speak about it concisely, we say that in the first place to assert the existence of a Form not only of good but of anything else is an expression of logic and a mere abstraction (but this has been considered in various ways both in extraneous discourses and in those on philosophical lines); next, even granting that Forms and the Form of good exist in the fullest sense, surely this is of no practical value for the good life or for conduct.

For 'good' has many senses, in fact as many as 'being.' For the term 'is,' as it has been analysed in other works, signifies now substance, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in addition to these meanings it consists now in undergoing change and now in causing it; and the good is found in each of these cases —

A. The Idea of Good does not exist, because

i.e. categories. The last two specified are elsewhere designated κίνησιν and κινέσθαι, Action and Passion.
ARISTOTLE

1217 b

ο νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεὸς, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν, ὥσπερ οὖν οὔδε τὸ οὖν ἐν τι ἐστὶ περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, 8 οὔτως οὔδε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, οὔδε ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὔδε τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι, οἰον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἐτέρα ἔτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἐτέρα ἔτερον μέτριον, οἰον περὶ τροφῆν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὔτως ἐτέρα περὶ ἔτεραι πράξεων,

1218 a ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτῷ γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς. 'Ἔτι ἐν ὅσιοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον, 9 οὖκ ἐστὶ κοινὸν τι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν· εἰ ὡς γὰρ ἂν τι τοῦ πρῶτου πρότερον, πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναφερόμενον τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναφερέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον. οἰον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὖκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλασίον τὸ κοινῆς κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστὸν· ἐσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, οἰον εἰ χωριστὸν ποιήσει τις τὸ κοινὸν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀνδρεία, ἐστὶ τούναυ, φασίν, αὐτὸ τι ἀγαθὸν· τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινὸν. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἰ ἐπὶ πλῆν ὅτι ἀἴδιον καὶ χωριστὸν; ἀλλ' οὔδεν μᾶλλον λευκὸν

1 παρὰ Vic. 2 τούτων Sp. 3 lacunam hic Sus.
in essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in quantity moderation, in time opportunity, and as instances of change, the teacher and the taught.

Therefore, just as being is not some one thing in respect of the categories mentioned, so neither is the good, and there is no one science either of the real or of the good. But also even the goods predicated in the same category, for example opportunity or moderation, do not fall within the province of a single science to study, but different sorts of opportunity and of moderation are studied by different sciences, for instance opportunity and moderation in respect of food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military operations by strategies, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science; so that it can hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the subject of only one science.

Again, wherever there is a sequence of factors, a prior and a subsequent, there is not some common element beside these factors and that element separable; for then there would be something prior to the first in the series, for the common and separable term would be prior because when the common element was destroyed the first factor would be destroyed. For example, if double is the first of the multiples, the multiplicity predicated of them in common cannot exist as a separable thing, for then it will be prior to double, if it is the case that the common element is the Form, as it would be if one were to make the common element separable: for if justice is a good, and courage, there is then, they say, a Good-in-itself, so the term 'in itself' is added to the common definition. But what could this denote except that the good is eternal and separable? Yet a thing that is
ARISTOTLE.

1218 a
to pollas hemeras leukon tov mou hemeron. ost' oude (to agathon mallon agathon to idion einai. oude)1 de to kouvon agathon tauto tis ideai pasi gar uparxei kouvon.

Anapalain dei kai deikteon h ws vun deikynousi to agathon auton. vun men gar ek twon mi2 omo-logoumevwn exein to agathon, eis ekeinwn ta omoologoumevna einai agatha deikynousin oion3 ex arithmovi oti h dikaiosunh kai h yngieia agathon, tazeis gar kai arithmoi, ws tois arithmous kai taioi monaion agathon uparxhon dia to einai to en auton agathon.4 dei de ek twon omoologoumevnon oion h yngieias ischus sofrasunhs oti kai en tois akinitous mallon to kalon. pantata gar tade tazeis kai hreminai eis apa, ekeina mallon, ekeinous gar uparxei taute mallon.—parabolos dei kai h apo-
deizis oti to en auton to agathon oti oi arithmoi efienintai autou5. ouste gar ous efienintai legousi6 faneiros alla lian apllos toutou fasi, kai orexin einai piws avin tis upolaboi en ois zwni mi uparxei; dei de peri tou tou pragnateuthesinai, kai mi axion7 melthen allogos dei kai metala lagon pisteusin ou radion.—to te fanei pantata tata ontai efiesithai evos twnos agathon ouk alithes ekastov gar idiou agathov orgetai, ophthalmos ofheos, swma yngieias, ouswos alllo alllon.

1 <to agathon . . . oude> Ras.
2 mi add. Zeller.
3 oion add. Rac.
4 Fr.: agathon.
5 autou add. ? Ric. (supra post oti Fr.).
6 Sp.: legonntai.
7 Sp.: a.

a The words rendered ‘the good is . . . eternal’ are a conjectural insertion.
white for many days is no more white than a thing that is white for one day, so that the good is no more good by being eternal; nor yet therefore is the common good the same as the Form, for it is the common property of all the goods.

2 Also the proper method of proving the Absolute Good is the contrary of the method now adopted. At present it is from things not admitted to possess goodness that they prove the things admitted to be good, for instance, they prove from numbers that justice and health are good, because they are arrangements and numbers—on the assumption that goodness is a property of numbers and monads because the Absolute Good is unity. But the proper method is to start from things admitted to be good, for instance health, strength, sobriety of mind, and prove that beauty is present even more in the unchanging; for all these admitted goods consist in order and rest, and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging are good in an even greater degree, for they possess order and rest in a greater degree.—And it is a hazardous way of proving that the Absolute Good is unity to say that numbers aim at unity; for it is not clearly stated how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too unqualified a manner; and how can one suppose that things not possessing life can have appition? One ought to study this matter carefully, and not make an unreasoned assumption about something as to which it is not easy to attain certainty even with the aid of reason.—And the statement that all existing things desire some one good is not true; each thing seeks its own particular good, the eye sight, the body health, and similarly another thing another good.
"Ότι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἐχει τὰ ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ χρήσιμον τῇ πολιτικῇ, ἄλλ’ ἵδιόν τι ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, οἶον γνωνστικῇ εὐεξίᾳ.

"Ετι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον. ἥ γὰρ οὔδεμιά χρήσιμον αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴδος ἡ πάσαις ομοίωσ.

"Ετι οὗ πρακτόν.

'Ομοίως δ’ οὔδὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε αὐτὸ3 ἄν 

ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν (καὶ γὰρ ἀν μικρῷ ὑπάρξει ἀγαθῶ) οὔτε πρακτόν. οὐ γὰρ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὅπως ὑπάρξει τὸ ὅπως ή ἱατρική πραγματεύεται ἄλλ’ ὅπως ὑγίεια, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἐκάστη. ἄλλα 5 πολλαχῶς τὸ ἁγαθόν, καὶ ἔστι τι αὐτοῦ καλὸν,4 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρακτὸν τὸ δ’ οὗ πρακτόν. πρακτὸν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἁγαθόν, τὸ οὔ ἔνεκα, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις.

Φανερὸν οὖν5 ὅτι οὔτε ἢ ἰδέα τᾶς ἁγαθοῦ τὸ ξηπτούμενον αὐτὸ τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ κοινὸν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκίνητον καὶ οὗ πρακτόν, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν μὲν ἄλλ’ οὗ πρακτόν). τὸ δ’ οὔ ἔνεκα ὡς τέλος ἀριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν υφ’ αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων. ὥστε τοῦτ’ ἄν εἰη αὐτὸ τὸ ἁγαθὸν, τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν, αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ πολιτικῇ καὶ οἰκονομικῇ καὶ πρόνοιαι. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὕται 15 αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς τᾶς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαύτα τινή (πρὸς δ’

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1 τὸ ? Rac. 2 ἔτι... πρακτόν secl. Wilson. 3 αὐτὸ τὸ ? Rae. 4 καὶ... καλὸν secl. Sus. 5 οὖν add. Brandis.

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This sentence reads like a mere note. The reference seems to be to 1217 b 16-1218 a 32, especially 1217 a 19-25. 230
16 Such then are the difficulties indicating that the Absolute Good does not exist,—and that it is of no use for political science, but that this has a special good of its own, as have the other sciences also—for instance the good of gymnastics is good bodily condition.

17 a Further there is also what has been written in the discourse: either the Class-form of the good is in itself useful to no science, or it is useful to all alike.

Further it is not practicable.

18 And similarly the good as universal also is not an Absolute Good (for universality might be an attribute of even a small good), and also it is not practicable; for medical science does not study how to procure an attribute that belongs to anything, but how to procure health, and similarly also each of the other practical sciences. But ‘good’ has many meanings, and there is a part of it that is beautiful, and one form of it is practicable but another is not. The sort of good that is practicable is that which is an object aimed at, but the good in things unchangeable is not practicable.

It is manifest, therefore, that the Absolute Good we are looking for is not the Form of good, nor yet the good as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and impracticable, and the universal good though changeable is not practicable. But the object aimed at as End is the chief good, and is the cause of the subordinate goods and first of all; so that the Absolute Good would be this—the End of the goods practicable for man. And this is the good that comes under the supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics and Economics and Wisdom; for these states of character differ from the others in the fact that they
1218 b

ἀλλήλας εἰ τι διαφέρουσιν ὑστερον λεκτέον). ὅτι 21 δ' αὐτιον τὸ τέλος τῶν υφ' αὐτό δηλοὶ ἡ διδασκαλία: ὀρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τάλλα δεικνύουσιν ὅτι ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἄγαθὸν, αὐτιον γὰρ τὸ ὑν ἐνεκα· οἴον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο εἶναι 20 τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτὴν, τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν τῆς ὑγιειας αὐτιον ὡς κινήσαν, καίτοις τοῦ εἶναι ἄλλ' ὑπ' τοῦ ἄγαθον εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἦτι οὖδὲ δεικνύουσιν οὔθεις 22 ὅτι ἄγαθον ἡ ὑγίεια (ἂν μὴ σοφιστής ἢ καὶ μὴ ιατρός, οὔτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφιζονται), ὡσπερ οὖδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.

25 Τὸ δ' ὡς τέλος ἄγαθον ἀνθρώπως καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν σκεπτέον ποσακχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάντων, ἐπειδὴ τούτο ἄριστον, μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν.

1 τοῦ ? Sp.: τόδε.
2 καίτοι Ross: καὶ τότε (καὶ τόδε ? Ric.).
3 τὸ δὲ τέλος ὡς vel ὡς δὲ τὸ τέλος Ric.
4 πάντων <λέγεται?> ? Rac.
5 ἐπειδὴ . . . ἀρχὴν secl. ? Rac. (μετὰ . . . ἀρχὴν secl. Sus.).

See 1141 b 21-1142 a 11 (E.E. v.= N.E. vi. viii. init.).
are supreme (whether they differ at all from one another must be discussed later on a). And that the End stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is shown by the method of teachers; they prove that the various means are each good by first defining the End, because the End aimed at is a cause: for example, since to be in health is so-and-so, what contributes to health must necessarily be so-and-so; the wholesome is the efficient cause of health, though only the cause of its existing—it is not the cause of health’s being a good. Furthermore nobody proves that health is a good (unless he is a sophist and not a physician—it is sophists that juggle with irrelevant arguments), any more than he proves any other first principle.

After this we must take a fresh starting-point b and consider, in regard to the good as End for man and in regard to the best of practicable goods, how many senses there are of the term ‘best of all,’ since this is best.

b This clause and the last clause of the sentence render words that look like an interpolation patched into the text from the opening sentence of Book II.
I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ’ ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν περὶ τῶν ἐπομένων λεκτέων.

Πάντα δὴ τὰ γαθὰ ἡ ἑκτὸς ἡ ἐν¹ ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱ ἑρετῶτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαφορούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἴδιον ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅπερ ἡ ἐνια ἡ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πάσης. τῶν δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἔξεις ἡ δύναμεις εἰςί, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

Ταῦτα δὴ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω, καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ὁτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἡ ἔξεις ἡ δύναμις ἀκάστων ὁσῶν ἐστὶ τις χρῆσις ἡ ἔργον. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ οὕτω τίθεμεν καὶ τῆς ἐματίου ἀρετῆς ἐστὶν, καὶ γὰρ ἔργον τι καὶ χρῆσις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ βελτίστη ἔξεις τοῦ ἰματίου ἀρετῆς ἐστὶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλοίον καὶ οἰκίας καὶ τῶν ἀλλών. ὅστε καὶ ψυχῆς, ἐστὶ γὰρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίων δὴ ἔξεις ἐστὶν βελτίων τὸ ἔργον, καὶ ὅπερ ἔχουσιν αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἔχετω. καὶ τέλος ἐκάστοτι τὸ ἔργον· φανερὸν ἐν add. Camot: ἡ <ἐν σῶματι ἡ ἐν> Sus. (et infra αἱ ἑρετῶτα Ἐρα.) 234
BOOK II

1. After this we must take a fresh starting-point 
and discuss the subjects that follow. 

Now all goods are either external or within the 
spirit, and of these two kinds the latter are preferable, as we class them even in the extraneous dis- 
courses. For Wisdom and Goodness and Pleasure 
are in the spirit, and either some or all of these are 
thought by everybody to be an End. And the 
contents of the spirit are in two groups, one states or 
faculties, the other activities and processes. 

2. Let these assumptions, then, be made, and let it be 
assumed as to Goodness that it is the best disposition 
or state or faculty of each class of things that have 
some use or work. This is clear from induction, for 
we posit this in all cases: for instance, there is a 
goodness that belongs to a coat, for a coat has a par- 
ticular function and use, and the best state of a 
coat is its goodness; and similarly with a ship and 
a house and the rest. So that the same is true also 
3 of the spirit, for it has a work of its own. And there- 
fore let us assume that the better the state is the 
better is the work of that state, and that as states 
stand in relation to one another so do the works 
4 that result from them. And the work of each thing 

a See note on 1217 b 23.
1219 a
toínun ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἔξεως.
10 τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἀριστον ὡς τέλος, ὑπόκειται γὰρ
τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἐσχατον οὐ ἐνεκα τάλλα
πάντα· ὅτι μὲν τούν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἔξεως
καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δήλον.
'Αλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ 5
ἐστιν ἐτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οίνον
οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησι καὶ ἱα-
15 τρικῆς υγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ υγιάνης οὔθ' ἱατρευσις,
tῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οίνον ὡφεισ ὁρασι καὶ μαθη-
ματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη δὲν ἔργον
ἡ χρῆσις τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἔξεως.
Τούτων δὲ τούτων τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένων, 6
λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ
20 τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἀλλ' οὐχ ὠσαύτως), οίνον σκυτοτομικῆς
καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ τις ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ
σκυτικῆ 2 καὶ σπουδαίος σκυτεύς, 3 τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ
σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄλλων.
"Ετι ἐστὶν ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζην ποιεῖν, τοῦτο 7
25 δὲ χρῆσις καὶ ἐγρήγορος (ὁ γὰρ ὑπνος ἄργια τις
καὶ ἡσυχία). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἐν καὶ
ταύτῳ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἄν
εὑ τῆς ἀρετῆς ᾽ζωῆ σπουδαία. τούτ' ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ

1 aυτὸ add. Rac. (ταυτὸ ante τὸ ἔργον Cas.).
2 Rac.: σκυτικῆς.
3 Sp.: σπουδαῖον σκυτεύς.
4 Wilson: τοῦ.
is its End; from this, therefore, it is plain that the work is a greater good than the state, for the End is the best as being an End, since the greatest good is assumed as an End and as the ultimate object for the sake of which all the other things exist. It is clear, therefore, that the work is a greater good than the state and disposition.

5 But the term 'work' has two meanings; for some things have a work that is something different from the employment of them, for instance the work of architecture is a house, not the act of building, that of medicine health, not the process of healing or curing, whereas with other things their work is the process of using them, for instance the work of sight is the act of seeing, that of mathematical science the contemplation of mathematical truths. So it follows that with the things whose work is the employment of them, the act of employing them must be of more value than the state of possessing them.

6 And these points having been decided in this way, we say that the same work belongs to a thing and to its goodness (although not in the same way): for example, a shoe is the work of the art of shoemaking and of the act of shoemaking; so if there is such a thing as shoemaking goodness and a good shoemaker, their work is a good shoe; and in the same way in the case of the other arts also.

7 Again, let us grant that the work of the spirit is to cause life, and that being alive is employment and being awake (for sleep is a kind of inactivity and rest); with the consequence that since the work of the spirit and that of its goodness are necessarily one and the same, the work of goodness would be good life. Therefore this is the perfect good, which (which is not necessarily a productive process), and its exercise constitutes Happiness.
τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἤν ἡ εὐδαίμονια. δῆλον δὲ 8 ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἤν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαίμονια τὸ ἀριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἀριστὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ1 δὲ ἡ ἔξις ἡ ἐνέργεια), ἔτει βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἔξεως ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ βελτίστη ἔξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν2 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριστον εἶναι. ἤν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαίμονια τὸ ἀριστον· ἔστιν 9 ἀρα ἡ εὐδαίμονια ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς4 ἐνέργεια. ἔτει δὲ ἤν ἡ εὐδαίμονια τέλεον τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωῆ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελῆς, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὄσαυτως (ἤ μὲν γὰρ ὀλη, ἢ δὲ μόριον), ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελῆς, εἴη ἄν ἡ εὐδαίμονια ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

"Οτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὄρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν 10 καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τὸ τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐ- 

1219 b 

δαίμονειν, δὲν ἐκάτερον5 χρήσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πράξις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ 

χρηστικὴ ἐστιν, ὃ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινὸν 

χρῆται δ’ ὁ ἐπικός. καὶ τὸ μῆτε μίαν ἡμέραν 

εἶναι6 εὐδαιμόνα μῆτε παῖδα μὴδ’ ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν 

(διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ’ 

eὐδαιμονιζεὶν ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος): οὐθὲν γὰρ 

ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ ὄλον. ἔτι δ’ οἱ ἐπαινοῦν 11

1 τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ Sus.: αὐτῇ aut αὐτη.
2 τὴν add. ? Ric.
3 Bz.: ἐνέργεια ἡ aut ἡ.
4 ἀγαθῆ Sp.
5 ἐκάτερον ? Ric.: ἐκαστον.
6 ἡμέραν <εὐδαιμόνα ποιεῖν μὴτ’> εἶναι Fr.

6 Cf. 1218 b 7-12.

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as we saw is happiness. And it is clear from the assumptions laid down (for we said that happiness is the greatest good and that the Ends or the greatest of goods are in the spirit, but things in the spirit are either a state or an activity) that, since an activity is a better thing than a disposition and the best activity than the best state, and since goodness is the best state, the activity of goodness is the spirit’s greatest good. But also we saw that the greatest good is happiness. Therefore happiness is the activity of a good spirit. And since we saw that happiness is something perfect, and life is either perfect or imperfect, and the same with goodness (for some goodness is a whole and some a part), but the activity of imperfect things is imperfect, it would follow that happiness is an activity of perfect life in accordance with perfect goodness.

And that our classification and definition of it are correct is evidenced by opinions that we all hold. For we think that to do well and live well are the same as to be happy; but each of these, both life and action, is employment and activity, inasmuch as active life involves employing things—the coppersmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses it. There is also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not happy for one day only, and that a child is not happy, nor any period of life (hence also Solon’s advice holds good, not to call a man happy while he is alive, but only when he has reached the end), for nothing incomplete is happy, since it is not a whole. And again,

A single happy day does not make one a happy (i.e. fortunate) man.

It is a mistake to say that youth (or maturity, or old age) is the happy time of life.
τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων (καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν μὴ νικῶντες δὲ), καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὁποῖός τις ἔστιν. ἔτι διὰ τὴν εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπανεῖται; ῥήτι διὰ ταύτην τάλλα, η τῇ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἤ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἐτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἐπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἐκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ' ἐπαινος τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου, ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους. καὶ τὸ ἀπ' ὁρούμενον δ' ἐνίοτε δὴδὲν ἐκ τούτων διὰ τὶ ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίως οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τῶν ἡμῶν τοῦ βίου, ὃμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αὐτίων δ' ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὑπνος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι μόριον ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ βραδυκόν, ἡ τουτοῦ ἀρετῆ οὐκ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὡσπερ οὔδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὑπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ βραδυκόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικόν καὶ τὸ ἀρεκτικόν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῳ. ὀσον δὲ τού πη ταῦτα τοις νοσούσι, καὶ αἱ φαν- τασίαι βελτίως αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἡ πήρωσιν.

Μετὰ ταύτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετή ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τά λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν τὸ ἐπίταττειν τῷ δὲ
there are the praises given to goodness on account of its deeds, and panegyrics describing deeds (and it is the victorious who are given wreaths, not those who are capable of winning but do not win); and there is the fact that we judge a man's character from his actions. Also why is happiness not praised? It is because it is on account of it that the other things are praised, either by being placed in relation to it or as being parts of it. Hence felicitation, praise and panegyric are different things: panegyric is a recital of a particular exploit, praise a statement of a man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on an end achieved. From these considerations light is also thrown on the question sometimes raised—what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for half their lives no better than the base, since all men are alike when asleep? The reason is that sleep is inaction of the spirit, not an activity. Hence the goodness of any other part of the spirit, for instance the nutritive, is not a portion of goodness as a whole, just as also goodness of the body is not; for the nutritive part functions more actively in sleep, whereas the sensory and appetitive parts are ineffective in sleep. But even the imaginations of the virtuous, so far as the imaginative faculty participates in any mode of motion, are better than those of the base, provided they are not perverted by disease or mutilation.

Next we must study the spirit; for goodness is a property of the spirit, it is not accidental. And since it is human goodness that we are investigating, let us begin by positing that the spirit has two parts that partake of reason, but that they do not both partake of reason in the same manner, but one of them by having by nature the capacity to give orders, and the
1219 b  

τὸ¹ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν ἐπικέναι (εἰ δὲ τι ἐστὶν ἐτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τὸῦτο τὸ μόριον). διαφέρει δὲ οὐθέν οὔτ', εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτ', εἰ 16 ἀμερὴς, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥστε ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοίλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἄδιακχόριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν, καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκὸν ἄλλ' ἡ² κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τῇ αὐτοῦ.³ ἀφήρηται⁴ 17 δὲ καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικὸν.⁵ ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια ἔδια, διὸ οὔδ', οἳ ἀρεταί οἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ⁶ ἀνθρώπον. δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ ἡ ἀνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνείναι πρὸς ἀρχήν καὶ πράξιν, ἀρχει 1220 a δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἄλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων. ἀνάγκη ἁρα ταῦτ’ ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. 18 καὶ ὥστε ἡ εὐεξία συγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὔτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετή ἥ τέλος. 'Αρετῆς δ' εἰδὴ δύο, ἡ μὲν θηκή ἡ δὲ διανοητική. 19 ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφούς. ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἥ⁹ ἀρετή ἥ τὸ ἑργον, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ ἄλλ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεια. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ 20 διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦτα τοῦ λόγου ἐχοντος δ' ἐπιτακτικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥ λόγον

¹ τῷ μὲν . . . τῷ . . . τῷ δὲ . . . τῷ. ² ἄλλ' ἡ Ric.: ἄλλα. ³ Ric.: οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ (οὐσία τὸ αὐτό Bz.). ⁴ ἀφήρησθω Fr.: ἀφείσθω Bz. ⁵ Vict.: φυσικὸν. ⁶ Γ: δὲ. ⁷ Bz.: ὀρεκτικοῦ. ⁸ Sic.: kai (ὡς Sus.). ⁹ ἡ Sol.: ἡ.

¹ i.e. the part 'connected with nutrition and growth,' man's animal life, which is irrational absolutely, and not


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other to obey and listen (let us leave out any part that is irrational in another way\(^{a}\)). And it makes no difference whether the spirit is divisible or is undivided yet possessed of different capacities, namely those mentioned, just as the concave and convex sides in a curve are inseparable, and the straightness and whiteness in a straight white line, although a straight thing is not white except accidentally and not by its own essence. And we have also abstracted any other part of the spirit that there may be, for instance the factor of growth; for the parts that we have mentioned are the special properties of the human spirit, and hence the excellences of the part dealing with nutrition and growth are not the special property of a man, for necessarily, if considered as a man, he must possess a reasoning faculty for a principle and with a view to conduct, and the reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and passions; therefore he must necessarily possess those parts. And just as a good constitution consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the body, so also the goodness of the spirit, as being an End, is composed of the separate virtues.

And goodness has two forms, moral virtue and intellectual excellence; for we praise not only the just but also the intelligent and the wise. For we assumed\(^{b}\) that what is praiseworthy is either goodness or its work, and these are not activities but possess activities. And since the intellectual excellences involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to the rational part, which as having reason is in command merely in the sense of not possessing reason but being capable of obedience to it.

\(^{a}\) Cf. 1218 a 37 ff., 1219 b 8 ff., 15 ff.
10 ἔχει, αἰ δ' ἡθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν ἀκολουθητικοὶ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποιός τις τὸ ἦθος, ὅτι σοφὸς ἡ δεινός, ἀλλ' ὅτι πράος ἡ θρασύς.

Μετὰ ταῦτα σκέπτεόν πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡθικῶς, κήσε τι ἐστι καὶ ποια μόρια αὐτῆς (εἰς τούτο γὰρ ἀνήκεται) καὶ γίνεται διὰ τὸν τῶν ἡθῶν πάντες, ὡστε δεῖ διὰ τῶν ἂλθῶν μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ πειράσθαι λαβεῖν τὸ καὶ ἂλθῶς καὶ σαφῶς.

νῦν γὰρ ὄμως ἔχομεν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ εἰδείημεν καὶ ἔγειραι ὅτι ἡ ἀρίστη διάθεσις τοῦ σώματος καὶ

20 Κορίσκον ὅτι ὁ τῶν ἐν ἡ ἁγορά μελάντατος: τί μὲν γὰρ ἐκάτερον τούτων οὐκ ἔσμεν, πρὸς μέντοι τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὸ οὕτως ἔσχεν.—ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις υπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίγνεσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι τὰ ἀριστα περὶ ἐκάστου ἀντὶ τῆς ἐκάστου ἁρετῆς,

25 οἷον πονηρὲ τὸ ἀριστοῦ καὶ τρῳφὴ ἂφ ὅν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἀρίστα: ἔτι πᾶσαι διάθεσιν υπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ φθειρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων, ὡσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ τρῳφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ἀρά: ταῦτα δὲ δὴ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἁρετὴ ἀρα ἡ τοιαύτη διά-θεσις ἐστὶν ἡ γίνεται τοῦτο τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ἰσχὺς κινήσεων καὶ ἂφ' ἂς πράττεται τὰ ἀριστα τῆς ἰσχύς ἐργα καὶ πάθη: καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν...

1 τὸ καὶ Ric.: καὶ τὸ.
2 eideiēmen add. Sp.
3 Rac.: Κορίσκος.
4 ὅτι add. Sp.
5 rec. M*: αὐτῆς.
6 τὰ add. Rac.
7 τε add. Rac.

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α Cf. 1240 b 25 n.
of the spirit; whereas the moral virtues belong to the part that is irrational but by nature capable of following the rational—for in stating a man's moral qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever but that he is gentle or rash.

21 After this we must first consider Moral Goodness—its essence and the nature of its divisions (for that is the subject now arrived at), and the means by which it is produced. Our method of inquiry then must be that employed by all people in other matters when they have something in hand to start with—we must endeavour by means of statements that are true but not clearly expressed to arrive at a result that is both true and clear. For our present state is as if we knew that health is the best disposition of the body and that Coriscus is the darkest man in the market-place; for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help to-wards knowing each of these things.—Then let it first be taken as granted that the best disposition is pro-duced by the best means, and that the best actions in each department of conduct result from the excellences belonging to each department—for example, it is the best exercises and food that produce a good condition of body, and a good condition of body en-ables men to do the best work; further, that every disposition is both produced and destroyed by the same things applied in a certain manner, for example health by food and exercises and climate; these points are clear from induction. Therefore goodness too is the sort of disposition that is created by the best movements in the spirit and is also the source of the production of the spirit's best actions and emotions; and it is in one way produced and in another way
πῶς μὲν γίνεται πῶς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὅν καὶ αὐξεῖται καὶ φθείρεται πρὸς ἀ βέλτιστα διατίθεσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ 35 ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἑναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

II. "Ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἡ θυσικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ, δήλον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἡθος—

ἰδώστε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἐθύους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς τὸ μὴ ἐμφυτον1 τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πως οὖτως ἡδὴ2 ἐνεργητικοῦ (ὅ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὕς ὀρῶμεν, ὀυδέ γὰρ ἀν μυριάκις ρύψης ἄνω τὸν λίθον οὐδέποτε 5 ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βία)—διὸ ἐστώ τὸ3 ἡθος τοῦτο, ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτηκτικὸν λόγον δυναμενὴ4 ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότητης. λεκτέων δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς 10 ποι' ἀττα5 ἡθη. ἐσται δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δύναμεν τῶν παθημάτων καθ' ἂς πῶς6 παθητικὸι λέγονται καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἑξεις καθ' ἂς πρὸς τὰ πάθη τοιούτοι7 λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἡ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διάφεσις ἐν τοῖς διειλεγμένοις8 τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δύναμεν καὶ τῶν ἑξειν.

1 Fr.: ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφυτοῦν.
2 ἡθη Rac.: ἡθη το.
3 τὸ add. Rac.
6 Rac.: ὄς.
7 τοιούτοι Ric.: ταῦτα.
8 Ras.: ἀπηλλαγμένοι.

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a e.g. fever, which is caused by heat, is cured by cold (the contrary doctrine to homocopathy, similia similibus curantur).
b ἡθος derived from ἡθος by lengthening of ἐ to η: cf. N.E. 246
destroyed by the same things, and its employment of the things that cause both its increase and its destruction is directed towards the things towards which it creates the best disposition. And this is indicated by the fact that both goodness and badness have to do with things pleasant and painful; for punishments, which are medicines, and which as is the case with other cures operate by means of opposites, operate by means of pleasures and pains.

1 II. It is clear, therefore, that Moral Goodness has to do with pleasures and pains. And since moral character is, as even its name implies that it has its growth from habit, and by our often moving in a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects, for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in accordance with governing reason that is capable of following the reason. We have then to say what is the part of the spirit in respect of which our moral characters are of a certain quality. And it will be in respect of our faculties for emotions according to which people are termed liable to some emotion, and also of the states of character according to which people receive certain designations in respect of the emotions, because of their experiencing or being exempt from some form of emotion.

2 After this comes the classification, made in previous discussions, of the modes of emotion, the faculties.

3 This clause and the one following interrupt the construction of the sentence.

4 Perhaps a reference to *N.E.* 1105 b 20, inserted in the belief that the *Eudemian Ethics* is the later work.
λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἵδω ἐπιθυμίαν, ὦλως οις ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ᾽ αὐτὰ· καὶ κατὰ μὲν 5 ταῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶ ποιότης [ἀλλὰ πάσχει]¹, κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης· λέγω δὲ² δυνάμεις καθ᾽ ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἶον ὁργίλος ἀνάλγητος ἐρωτικὸς ἀισχυνητὸς ἀναίσχυντος. ἕξεις δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσαι ἀυταὶ εἰς τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἶον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη 20 δειλία ἀκολογία.

III. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ληπτεόν ὅτι ἐν 1 ἀπαντή συνεχεῖ καὶ διαρετῶ ἐστὶν ὑπεροχή καὶ ἐλλειψὶς καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἶον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἱατρικῇ, ἐν 25 οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιοῖς πράξει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ κύνησις συνεχές, ἢ δὲ 2 πράξει κύνησις. ἐν πάσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ 30 ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν. καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· καὶ τοῦ λόγου· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἄλληλα· τὰ δ᾽ ἄκρα καὶ ἄλληλοι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία, τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον ἐστίν, οἶον τὸ ἰσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττωνος μείζον τοῦ μείζονος δὲ ἐλαττῶν. ὥστε ἀνάγκῃ 3 τὴν θηκὴν ἀρετῆν περὶ μέσον ἀττα εἶναι καὶ 35 μεσοτητά τυνα. ληπτεόν ἃρα ἡ ποίᾳ μεσοτητὶς

¹ pravum glossema Rac.
² δὲ Sus.: δὲ τάς.

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¹ This interpolation was made by an editor who derived ποιότης from ποιεῖν.
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EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. ii. 4—III. 3

and the states of character. By emotions I mean such things as anger, fear, shame, desire, and generally those experiences that are in themselves usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain. And to these there is no quality corresponding [but they are passive].\(^a\) But quality corresponds to the faculties: by faculties I mean the properties acting by which persons are designated by the names of the various emotions, for instance choleric, insensitive, erotic, bashful, shameless. States of character are the states that cause the emotions to be present either rationally or the opposite: for example courage, sobriety of mind, cowardice, profligacy.

III. These distinctions having been established, it must be grasped that in every continuum that is divisible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or architecture or navigation, and in any practical pursuit of whatever sort, both scientific and unscientific, both technical and untechnical; for motion is a continuum, and conduct is a motion. And in all things the mean in relation to us is the best, for that is as knowledge and reason bid. And everywhere this also produces the best state. This is proved by induction and reason: contraries are mutually destructive, and extremes are contrary both to each other and to the mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the other—for example the equal is greater than the less and less than the greater. Hence moral goodness must be concerned with certain means and must be a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what sort of middle state is goodness and with what sort of
ARISTOTLE

1220 b

ἀρετὴ καὶ περὶ ποία μέσα. εἰλήφθω δὴ παρά
deīγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρεῖσθω ἐκαστὸν ἐκ τῆς
ὑπογραφῆς:

ὀργιλότης ἀοργησία¹ πραότης.
θραυστής δειλία ἀνδρεία.

1221 a

ἀναισχυντία κατάπληξις αἰδώς.
ἀκολασία ἀναισθησία σαφροσύνη.
φθόνος ἀνώνυμον νέμεσις.
κέρδος ζημία δίκαιον.

5 ἀσωτία ἀνελευθερία ἑλευθεριότης.
ἀλαζονεία εἰρωνεία ἀλήθεια.
κολακεία ἀπέχθεια φιλία.
ἀρέσκεια αὐθάδεια σεμνότης.

τρυφερότης κακοπάθεια καρτερία.

10 χαυνότης μικροψυχία μεγαλοψυχία.
δαπανηρία μικροπρότεινα μεγαλοπρότεινα.
πανουργία εὐθεία φρόνησις.

tà μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς 5 ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλον
tà δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
μᾶλλον ἢ δέι ὀργιζόμενος καὶ βάττων καὶ πλείοσων
η ὀσ ὤς δὲ, ἀόργητος² δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ
οτὲ καὶ ὃς· καὶ θρασύς μὲν ὁ μήτε ἄ χρη φοβούμενος
μῆθ᾽ ὅτε μηθ᾽ ὃς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἀ μῆ δεὶ καὶ
οτ' οὔ δεὶ καὶ ὃς οὐ δεὶ. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος 6

20 καὶ³ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ δ' ὑπερβάλλων πάσιν ὅσις

¹ Rac. (cf. N.E. 1108 a 7 et 1100 b 33): ἀναλγησία.
² Rac.: ἀναλγήτος.

⁴ This place is filled in N.E. 1108 a 7 by ἀοργησία, Spiritlessness, lack of irascibility, and perhaps the Greek should be altered to that here.

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EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. iii. 4–6

4 means it is concerned. Let each then be taken by way of illustration and studied with the help of the schedule:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vices</th>
<th>Vices</th>
<th>Vices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irascibility</td>
<td>Spiritlessness *</td>
<td>Gentleness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td>Courage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamelessness</td>
<td>Diffidence</td>
<td>Modesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profligacy</td>
<td>Insensitiveness</td>
<td>Temperance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envy</td>
<td>(nameless b)</td>
<td>Righteous Indignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>The Just</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prodigality</td>
<td>Meanness</td>
<td>Liberality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boastfulness</td>
<td>Self-depreciation</td>
<td>Sincerity e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flattery</td>
<td>Surliness</td>
<td>Friendliness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subservience</td>
<td>Stubbornness</td>
<td>Dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxuriousness</td>
<td>Endurance d</td>
<td>Hardiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanity</td>
<td>Smallness of Spirit</td>
<td>Greatness of Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extravagance</td>
<td>Shabbiness</td>
<td>Magnificence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rascality</td>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 These and such as these are the emotions that the spirit experiences, and they are all designated from being either excessive or defective. The man that gets angry more and more quickly and with more people than he ought is irascible, he that in respect of persons and occasions and manner is deficient in anger is insensitive; the man that is not afraid of things of which he ought to be afraid, nor when nor as he ought, is rash, he that is afraid of things of which he ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not to be, is cowardly. e Similarly also one that is a prey to his desires and that exceeds in everything possible

b In N.E. 1108 b 2 ἐπιχαίρεικαλα, Malice, rejoicing in another’s misfortune.

c N.E. iv. vii. shows that sincerity in asserting one’s own merits is meant.

d Submission to evils (Solomon): not in N.E.

e The shameless and diffident are omitted here; see the table above.

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ARISTOTLE

1221 a

एंदेहेताः, आनास्थितस देः ओ एलेयिप्टων कαί μήδ’ ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀπαθῆς ὑσπερ λίθος. κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεον-7 εκτικός, ξημιώδης δὲ ὁ εἰ μὴ1 μηδαμόθεν ἀλλ’ ὀλιγαχόθεν. ἀλαζὼν δὲ ὁ πλεῖω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων 8

25 προσποιούμενος, εὔρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω. καὶ κόλαξ8 μὲν ὁ πλεῖω συνεπαίνων ἡ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικός δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω. καὶ τὸ μὲν λιῶν πρὸς ἵδονήν ἄρεσκεια, τὸ δ’ ὀλίγα καὶ μόνις αὐθάδεια. ἐτὶ δ’ 9 ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μηδ’ εἰ βέλτιον, 10 τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πάσαν ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορὰ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικός. χαῖνος δ’ ὁ10 μειζόνων ἀξιῶν αὐτὸν, μικρόψυχος δ’ ὁ ἐλαττόνων. ἐτὶ δ’ ἄσωτος μὲν ὁ πρὸς ἄπασαν δαπάνην ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἄπασαν 12 ἐλλείπτων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ11 σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ’ ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος. καὶ ὁ μὲν πανούργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ’ εὐήθης12 οὐδ’ ὅθεν δεῖ. φθονερός δὲ τῷ12 λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ13 πλείουν εὐπραγίας ἥ δεῖ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀξιοὶ εὖ 40 πράττειν λυποῦσι τοὺς φθονερούς εὖ πράττοντεσ· ὁ δ’ ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων 1221 b τῷ2 μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν, ἀλλ’ εὐχερῆς ὑσπερ οἱ γαστρήμαργοι πρὸς τροφῆν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερῆς κατὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἔκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός13

1 εἰ μὴ add. Fr. (ἀΛΛ’ <εἰ γε> Bussemaker).
2 τῷ Sp.: ἐπὶ τῷ.

a Envy in § 12 comes here in the schedule.

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is profligate, and one that is deficient and does not desire even to a proper degree and in a natural way, but is as devoid of feeling as a stone, is insensitive.a

7 The man that seeks gain from every source is a profiteer, and he that seeks gain if not from no source, yet from few, is a waster. b He that pretends to have more possessions than he really has is a boaster, and he that pretends to have fewer is a self-depreciator.

8 One that joins in approval more than is fitting is a flatterer, one that does so less than is fitting is surly. To be too complaisant is subservience; to be complaisant seldom and reluctantly is stubbornness.

9 Again, the man that endures no pain, not even if it is good for him, is luxurious; one that can endure all pain alike is strictly speaking nameless, but by metaphor he is called hard, patient or enduring. He that rates himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low, small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all expenditure is prodigal, he that falls short in all, mean.

11 Similarly the shabby man and the swaggerer—the latter exceeds what is fitting and the former falls below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means and from every source, the simpleton does not make profit even from the proper sources. Envy consists in being annoyed at prosperity more often than one ought to be, for the envious are annoyed by the prosperity even of those who deserve to prosper; the opposite character is less definitely named, but it is the man that goes too far in not being annoyed even at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy-going, as gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his opposite is difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.—

13 It is superfluous to state in the definition that the

a The prodigal and mean in § 10 comes here in the schedule.
5 οὕτως ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζειν. οὐδεμία γάρ ἐπιστήμην οὔτε θεωρητική οὔτε ποιητική οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τούτῳ προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δὲ ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἔξεων λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.
10 Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἴδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὶ τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δὲ οἷον ὑζύθυμος μὲν τῷ θάττον 15 πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς δὲ τῷ φυλακτικός εἶναι τῆς ὁργῆς, 15 πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς κολάσεις ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὁργῆς. ὑμοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι 16 καὶ οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὁποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἄγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐνία τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ 17 ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνεται 20 τῷ μᾶλλον πάσχειν. οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησίασερ (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτῇ ήδη ἐστίν, συνελημμένον γάρ τὸ τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 18 συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες ἀλλ’ οὐ μοιχεῖσθαι, 25 ἄγνοοντες γάρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, καὶ πατάξαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαν ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

1 προσδιορίζειν ? (ut De Interpr. 17 a 36, Met. iii., 1005 b 21) Rac.
2 Ric. τοῦ.
3 Rac.: δῆ.

\[ \text{a In Book III.} \]
\[ \text{b τοιόνδε = μοιχηθρόν.} \]

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specified relation to each thing must not be accidental; no science whether theoretical or productive makes this addition to the definition either in discourse or in practice, but this addition is aimed against the logical quibbling of the sciences. Let us then accept these simple definitions, and let us make them more precise when we are speaking about the opposite dispositions.a

But these modes of emotion themselves are divided into species designated according to their difference in respect of time or intensity or in regard to one of the objects that cause the emotions. I mean for instance that a man is called quick-tempered from feeling the emotion of anger sooner than he ought, harsh and passionate from feeling it more than he ought, bitter from having a tendency to cherish his anger, violent and abusive owing to the acts of retaliation to which his anger gives rise. Men are called gourmands or gluttons and drunkards from having an irrational liability to indulgence in one or the other sort of nutriment.

But it must not be ignored that some of the vices mentioned cannot be classed under the heading of manner, if manner is taken to be feeling the emotion to excess. For example, a man is not an adulterer because he exceeds in intercourse with married women, for ‘excess’ does not apply here, but adultery merely in itself is a vice, since the term denoting the passion implicitly denotes that the man is vicious b; and similarly with outrage. Hence men dispute the charge, and admit intercourse but deny adultery on the ground of having acted in ignorance or under compulsion, or admit striking a blow but deny committing an outrage; and similarly in meeting the other charges of the same kind.

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a Sub-species of Vices.
b Some Vices absolute.
IV. Ἐιλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον 1 ὅτι ἐπειδῆ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διήρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἐχοντος διανοητικαί, 1 ὡν ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἡ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἡ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου ἐχοντος ὁ ὀρέξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ὀρέξιν εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαύλου τοῦ ἱθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονᾶς τινας καὶ λύπας. δὴλον δὲ τούτο έκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἐξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἐξεις τῶν2 παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπη καὶ ἡδονή διώρισται ώστε διὰ τα ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς 3 ἐμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἡθικήν ἀρετήν περὶ ἡδονᾶς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχή 3 υφ' οὖν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων,

1222 a πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἐστιν ἡ ἐξεις.4 δι' ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους φαμέν εἶναι, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡ ὡς μὴ δεῖ η ἂς μὴ δεί. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες5 προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἡρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς, τὰς δὲ κακίας έκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετή εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐξεις αὖ ἢ πρακτικοί τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἦν ἀριστο διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τούτο δ' 1 [διανοητικαί] ? Rac. 2 <αἵτιαί> τῶν Bus. 3 πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς Bz. 4 Bz.: ἡδονή. 5 [πάντες] Spengel: tines ? Sus.

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1 Cf. 1220 b 7-20. 2 See 1218 b 37 ff.
IV. These points having been taken, we must next say that since the spirit has two parts, and the virtues are divided between them, one set being those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose work is truth, whether about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses appetition (for if the spirit is divided into parts, not any and every part possesses appetition), it therefore follows that the moral character is vicious or virtuous by reason of pursuing or avoiding certain pleasures and pains. This is clear from the classification of the emotions, faculties and states of character. For the faculties and the states are concerned with the modes of emotion, and the emotions are distinguished by pain and pleasure; so that it follows from these considerations as well as from the positions already laid down that all moral goodness is concerned with pleasures and pains. For our state of character is related to and concerned with such things as have the property of making every person's spirit worse and better. But we say that men are wicked owing to pleasures and pains, through pursuing and avoiding the wrong ones or in the wrong way. Hence all men readily define the virtues as insensitiveness or tranquillity in regard to pleasures and pains, and the vices by the opposite qualities.

V. But since it has been assumed that goodness is a state of character of a sort that causes men to be capable of doing the best actions and gives them the best disposition in regard to the greatest good, and the best and greatest good is that which is in accordance with right principle, and this is the mean be-
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΣ

1222 α

10 ἦστι τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἰη τὴν ἡθικὴν ἁρετὴν κατ' αὐτὴν ἐκάστην 1 μεσότητα εἰναι καὶ 2 περὶ μέσο̣ ἄττα ἐν ἠδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἱδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς. ἦσται 2 δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτε μὲν ἐν ἠδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις), ὅτε δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτε δ' ἐν ἄμφοτέραις.

15 ὅ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἱδεὶ υπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀπλώς ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ὀρόν, οἷον ὅταν μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος δ' μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν δ' δὲ τὴν ἐλλείψιν, ἀνάγκη ὡς ταύτ', ἀλλήλως ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἐξεῖς ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαις εἰναι καὶ τῇ ἁρετῇ.

Συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἐνθα μὲν 4 φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἐνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ την ὑπερβολὴν, ἐναχοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ την ἐλλείψιν. 25 αὐτον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ ἄει ἐπὶ ταύτα ὅπρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν θάττων ἂν μεταβαίνῃ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἐξεῖν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἢς ὅς 7 πλέον ἀπέχει 8 οὕτω δοκεὶ ἐναντιώτεροι εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἐλλείψεως καὶ 30 ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἡ ἐλλείψις

1 Ric.: καθ' αὐτὸν ἐκαστον.
3 μᾶλλον ἡ lac.: μή.
5 ταύτα ἐρχεται vel ἡκεῖ Ric.
6 Bz.: ἡ ὁμοιότητος.
8 ἀπέχων Μδ.

2 καί Sus.: ἡ.
4 ὁ (bis) Bz.: οὐ.
7 ὅς add. Sus.
tween excess and deficiency relative to ourselves, it
would necessarily follow that moral goodness corre-
sponds with each particular middle state and is
concerned with certain mean points in pleasures
and pains and pleasant and painful things. And
this middle state will sometimes be in pleasures (for
even in these there is excess and deficiency), sometimes
in pains, sometimes in both. For he that exceeds
in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that
exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and
this whether his feelings are excessive absolutely
or excessive in relation to some standard, for in-
stance are felt more than ordinary men feel them;
whereas the good man feels in the proper way.—

And since there is a certain state of character which
results in its possessor’s being in one instance such
as to accept an excess and in another such as to
accept a deficiency of the same thing, it follows that
as these actions are contrary to each other and to the
mean, so also the states of character that cause them
are contrary to each other and to virtue.

It comes about, however, that sometimes all the
oppositions are more evident, sometimes those on the
side of excess, in some cases those on the side of
deficiency. The cause of this contrariety is that the
resemblance does not always reach the same point
of inequality in regard to the middle, but sometimes
it may pass over more quickly from the excess,
sometimes from the deficiency, to the middle state,
the person farther removed from which seems to
be more contrary: for instance, with regard to the
body excess is more healthy and nearer the middle
than deficiency in the case of exercises but deficiency
than excess in the case of food. Consequently the
1222 a ὑπερβολῆς. ἦστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ έξεις αἱ ἕνεκα τῶν μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ᾽ ἐκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἐνθα μὲν οἱ πολυπονώτεροι ἐνθα δ᾽ οἱ ὑποστατικώτεροι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὧς ὁ λόγος ἐνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἐνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ διότι ἡ φύσις εὑθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ᾽ ἤττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀπολαυστικοὶ. ὁμοίως δὲ ταύτ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἔξω ἐφ᾽ ἢν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἢν οἱ πολλοὶ, ἡ δ᾽ ἐτέρα ὡστερ οὐκ οὕσα λανθάνει, διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὅλιγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστιν. οὖν ὡργὴν πραότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράγματι καὶ τοῖς ἐστὶν ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλεον εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μή ὡργίζεσθαι ῥαπτοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὃλιγοι οἱ του- ωτοὶ, ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέουσι μᾶλλον διὸ καὶ οὖ κολακικὸν ὁ θυμός.

1222 b ὁ ὀργίλον τῷ πράγματι καὶ τοῖς ἐστὶν ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλεον εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὡργίζεσθαι ῥαπτοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ ὃλιγοι οἱ του- ωτοὶ. Ὁ ἔκεινο δὲ πάντες ῥέουσι μᾶλλον διὸ καὶ οὖ κολακικὸν ὁ θυμός.

Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἶλημπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἐξεον καὶ θ᾽ ἐκαστα τὰ πάθη ή καὶ ἑκατονταὶ καὶ ἐλλείμβεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐξεον καὶ θ᾽ ἐχούσι ταύτα τὸν ὄρθον λόγον (τίς δ᾽ ὁ ὄρθος λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὁρον ἀποβλέποντα λέγειν τὸ μέσον ὑστεροῦ ἐπισκεπτεῖν), φανερὸν ὥστε πᾶσαι αἱ ἡθικαὶ ἁρεται

1 αἱ πολυπονώτεραι Βζ. 2 αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι Βζ. 3 Βζ.: δέ καὶ. 4 τὸ . . . τὸ Βζ.: τῷ . . . τῷ. 5 καταλλακτικὸν Γρ., έυκέλεστον Ρίκ. 6 ἡ καὶ Ρας.: καὶ αἱ.

a In respect of amount of exercise.
b In respect of amount of food.
c A probable alteration of the Greek gives ‘is not ready to make up a quarrel.’
d See 1249 a 21 ff.
states of will favourable to athletic training will be variously favourable to health according to the two different fields of choice—in the one case the over-energetic men (will be nearer the mean than the slack ones), in the other the too hardy (will be nearer the mean than the self-indulgent ones); and also the character contrary to the moderate and rational will be in the one case the slack and not both the slack and the over-energetic, and in the other case the self-indulgent and not the man who goes hungry. And this comes about because from the start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the same way as regards everything, but in energy we are deficient and in self-indulgence excessive; and this is also the same with regard to the spirit. And we class as contrary to the mean the disposition to which we, and most men, are more liable to err; whereas the other passes unnoticed as if non-existent, because its rarity makes it not observed. For instance we count anger the contrary of gentleness and the passionate man the contrary of the gentle; yet there is also excess in the direction of being gentle and placable and not being angry when struck, but men of that sort are few, and everyone is more prone to the other extreme; on which account moreover a passionate temper is not a characteristic of a toady.

And since we have dealt with the scheme of states of character in respect of the various emotions in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite states in accordance with which men are disposed in accordance with right principle (though the question what is the right principle and what rule is to guide us in defining the mean must be considered later), it is evident that all the
The writer proceeds to distinguish the strict sense of ἀρχή, ‘origin or cause of change’ (which applies to man as capable of volition and action) from its secondary sense, ‘cause or explanation of an unchanging state of things’ (which applies to the ‘first principles’ of mathematics).

e.g. if ἀρχή A led to B and C, of which C was absurd.
forms of moral goodness and badness have to do with excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and pains, and that pleasures and pains result from the states of character and modes of emotion mentioned. But then the best state in relation to each class of thing is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the virtues will be either all or some of these middle states.

VI. Let us, therefore, take another starting-point for the ensuing inquiry. Now all essences are by nature first principles of a certain kind, owing to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself, for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal animals, and a plant plants. And in addition to this, obviously man alone among animals initiates certain conduct—for we should not ascribe conduct to any of the others. And the first principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those that have necessary results; doubtless God is a ruling principle that acts in this way. But the strict sense of 'first principle' is not found in first principles incapable of movement, for example those of mathematics, although the term is indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics if the first principle were changed virtually all the things proved from it would change, though they do not change owing to themselves, one being destroyed by the other, except by destroying the assumption and thereby establishing a proof. But man is a first principle of a certain motion, for action is motion. And since as in other matters then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence B (Solomon).
aιτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν ὄντων ἡ γινομένων, δεὶ νοησαί καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ ἔχοντος τοῦ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετρά-
γωνον ἔχειν τέσσαρας ὀρθὰς, φανερῶν ὡς αἰτίων τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον εἰ δὲ γε

35 μεταβάλλοι
1 τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετρά-
γωνον μεταβάλλειν, οἴον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτ-
σαρας,2 ὡκτὼ. κἂν εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλει
3 τοιοῦτον δ' ἐστὶ, κάκεινο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

Δὴ λογος δ' ὁ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐκ τῶν 7 ἀναλυτικῶν νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν ἀκριβῶς οἶον τε πλὴν τοιοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν

40 ἀλλο αἰτίων τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ
tις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἰτίων τῶν ὑστερον. ὡστ' 8 εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἐνα τῶν οὕτων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως
ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας.

1223 a ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰς ἁναγκῆς ἀναγκαίον τὸ συμβαίνον
ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδεχεται γενέσθαι ἐπὶ
tάναντία. καὶ δ' ἐφ' αὐτοίς ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
polla τῶν τοιοῦτων, καὶ ἀρχαι τῶν τοιοῦτων
εἰσὶν αὐτοί. ὡστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἀνθρωπός
5 ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδεχεται καὶ
γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταύτ' ἐστὶ
gίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὅπε γε κύριος ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ

1 μεταβάλλει Ric.
2 Sp.: τέσσαρες.
3 Ric.: μεταβάλλοι.
4 ἐπὶ add. Bz.
5 Fr.: δ.

the first principle is a cause of the things that exist or come into existence because of it, we must think as we do in the case of demonstrations. For example, if as the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles the angles of a quadrilateral are necessarily equal to four right angles, that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle were to change, a quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if the angles of a triangle became equal to three right angles, the angles of a quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, or if four, eight; also if a triangle does not change but is as described, a quadrilateral too must of necessity be as described.

The necessity of what we are arguing is clear from Analytics\(^a\); at present we cannot either deny or affirm anything definitely except just this. Supposing there were no further cause of the triangle's having the property stated, then the triangle would be a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages. Hence if in fact there are among existing things some that admit of the opposite state, their first principles also must necessarily have the same quality; for of things that are of necessity the result is necessary, albeit the subsequent stages may possibly happen in the opposite way. And the things that depend on men themselves in many cases belong to this class of variables, and men are themselves the first principle of things of this sort. Hence it is clear that all the actions of which a man is the first principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that it depends on himself for them to happen or not, as he controls their existence or non-existence.
τοῦ μὴ εἴναι. ὥσα δ’ ἔφ’ αὐτῷ ἐστὶ ποιεῖν ἡ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἵτιος τοῦτον αὐτὸς ἔστιν, καὶ ὅσων α&oacute;ιος, ἔφ’ αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦ τε ἀρετή καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ
10 ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ θεκτά (ψέγεται γάρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τύχης ἡ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα ἄλλ' ὅσων αὐτοῖ· αἵ-
τιοι ἐσμέν, ὅσων γάρ ἄλλος αἴτιος ἐκείνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἐπαινοῦν ἔχει), δὴλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὅν αὐτὸς αἵτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέων ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἵτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὥσα μὲν ἐκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκάστου, ἐκείνων αἵτιον εἶναι, ὥσα δ’ ἐκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἵτιον. πάντα δ’ ὥσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἔκων δῆλον ὅτι. δήλον τούτων ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐκούσιων ἃν εἴησαν.

VII. Ληπτέων ἄρα τι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τι τὸ 1 ἐκούσιον, καὶ τι ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία δρίζεται τούτων· καὶ 4 πρώτων σκέπτεον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον. τριῶν δὴ 2 τούτων ἐν τι δόξειεν ἃν 5 εἶναι, ἦτοι κατ’ ὀρέξιν ἡ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἡ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ’ ἐκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι. ἄλλα μὴν ἡ ὀρέξις εἰς τρία διαφέρεται, εἰς βούλησιν 3

1 Bz.: οὕτως.
3 Fr.: ἐκείνον.
2 Fr.: διὰ τὰ.
4 kal add. Fr.
5 ἃν add. Sp.
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But of things which it depends on him to do or not to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of depends on himself. And since goodness and badness and the actions that spring from them are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given to things that we possess from necessity or fortune or nature but to things of which we ourselves are the cause, since for things of which another person is the cause, that person has the blame and the praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness have to do with things where a man is himself the cause and origin of his actions. We must, then, ascertain what is the kind of actions of which a man is himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree that each man is the cause of all those acts that are voluntary and purposive for him individually, and that he is not himself the cause of those that are involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear, then, that both goodness and badness will be in the class of things voluntary.

1 VII. We must, therefore, ascertain what voluntary and involuntary mean, and what is purposive choice, since they enter into the definition of goodness and badness. And first we must consider the meaning of voluntary and involuntary. Now they would seem to refer to one of three things—conformity with appetite, or with purposive choice, or with thought: voluntary is what conforms with one of these and involuntary is what contravenes one of them. But moreover there are three subdivisions of appetite—
καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, ὡστε ταῦτα διαρρέετον·
καὶ πρῶτον τὸ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν.

Δόξειε δ’ ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκουσίον ἐίναι.
τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον,

30 τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἀναγκαζόμενοι
ποιοῦσιν ἡ πάσχουσιν, ὡσπερ καὶ Εὐηνὸς φησιν·

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμα ἀνιαρόν ἐφυ·

ὡστ’ εἰ τι λυπηρὸν βίαιον καὶ εἰ τι βίαιον λυπη·
ρόν· τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρὸν (ἡ

35 γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδεός), ὡστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον.
τὸ ἄρα κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκουσίον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ
ἀλλήλως. ἐτι ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἢ

ὁ δ’ ἀκρασία μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι· ὃ δ’ ἀκρατής
οἷς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν
πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ’ ὅταν ἐνεργῆ κατ’ αὐτὴν·

1223 b ὡσθ’ ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἀδικήσει τῷ πράττειν κατ’
ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δ’ ἀδικεῖν ἐκουσίον. ἐκὼν ἄρα
πράξει, καὶ ἐκουσίον τὸ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ γὰρ
ἀτοπον εἰ δικαιότεροι ἐσονται οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἐνο
μενοι. — ἐκ μὲν τοινυν τούτων δόξειν ἃν τὸ κατ’

5 ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκουσίον εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοὐναντίον,
ἀπαν γὰρ ὁ ἐκὼν τοὺς πράττει βουλόμενοι πράττει,

1 το add. Cas.
2 εἰ τε rec. Pb: el.
3 οἷος κατὰ Sp: ὃ κατὰ et οἷος infra ante πράττειν.
4 τὸ δ’ . . . ἐκουσίον hic Rac.: supra ante ὡσθ’ ὁ ἀκρατὴς.
5 καὶ γὰρ . . . γινόμενοι supra post τῷ πράττειν κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν

tr. ? Rac.

a Quoted also Met. 1015 a 28 and (without author’s name)
Rhet. 1370 a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has χρημα
ἀνιαρόν); probably by the elder Evenus of Paros, fl. 460 b.c.
(Bowra, Ol. Rev. xlviii. 2).

b In the mss. this sentence precedes the one before.

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wish, passion and desire; so that we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity with desire.

It would seem that everything that conforms with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be forced, and what is forced and everything that people do or suffer under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says:

For all necessity doth cause distress—

so that if a thing is painful it is forced and if a thing is forced it is painful; but everything contrary to desire is painful (for desire is for what is pleasant), so that it is forced and involuntary. Therefore what conforms with desire is voluntary, for things contrary to and things in conformity with desire are opposite to one another. Again, all wickedness makes a man more unrighteous, and lack of self-control seems to be wickedness; and the uncontrolled man is the sort of man to act in conformity with desire contrary to calculation, and he shows his lack of control when his conduct is guided by desire; so that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous action is voluntary. Therefore he will be acting voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be more righteous.—From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the opposite follows, for all that a man does voluntarily

\(^a\) This sentence would come in better above, after ‘acting in conformity with desire.’

\(^b\) Viz. that what is against desire is involuntary.
καὶ ὁ βούλεται ἐκὼν, βούλεται δ’ οὐθεὶς ὃ οἴεται εἶναι κακῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ ἀκρατεύμονεος οὐχ ὁ βούλεται ποιεῖ, τὸ γὰρ παρ’ ὃ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστιν. 10 ὡστε ἀμα συμβησται τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν. τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον. ἐτὶ δ’ ὁ ἐγκρατής 8 δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἡ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ δικαιοστέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ’ ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν. ἀτ’ εἶ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἐκούσιον, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἐκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη εἰ θάτερον ἐκούσιον καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον, ἃμα ἀρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἐκὼν καὶ ἄκων.

‘Ο δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ ἀκρασία γὰρ 9 καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι ὡσπερ καὶ 20 ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρὸν καὶ βίαιον ἡ κάθεξις, ὡστ’ εἶ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκούσιον ἀν εἰη πάν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἦρακλείτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἱσχῦν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κόλυσις αὐτοῦ. ἧ χαλεπὸν γάρ ἐπεὶ “θυμὸν μάχεσθαι, ψυχῆς γὰρ ὤνεται.” 25 εἰ δ’ ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτόν 1 ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἃμα καὶ 2 κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος, μᾶλλον ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν

1 Pb: τὸ αὐτὸν Mb: τὸν αὐτὸν edd. 2 καὶ Bz. : τὸ.
he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time. But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

The same argument applies also in the case of passion; for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even Heracleitus \(^a\) seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for 'It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the same part of the act, action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than

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\(^a\) Or of wish (which also involves contradiction).
ARISTOTLE

1223 b

καὶ θυμόν. τεκμήριον δὲ: πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκόντες ἀνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

Λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐκούσιον 1111 ταὐτὸ σκέψασθαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἡ δ’ ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται. συμβῆσται δὲ τοῦνατίον. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὔθεις ἀ οἴτει εἶναι κακά, πράττει δ’ ὅταν γένηται1 ἀκρατής: εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ’ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βουλήσιν, ὅταν ἀκρατῆς γένηται, οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ’ ἔσται δικαιότερος ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατῆς. τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον. ὦτι μὲν τούνων οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατὰ ὦρεξιν πράττειν οὐδ’ ἐκούσιον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὦρεξιν φανερὸν.

VIII. "Οτι δ’ οὔδὲ κατὰ προαιρέσιν, πάλιν ἐκ 1 τῶνδε δῆλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βουλησίν ὡς οὐκ ἐκούσιον2 ἀπεδείχθη, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον3 πὰν δ’ βούληται καὶ ἐκούσιον. ἀλλ’ ὦτι καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἐνδέχεται πράττειν ἐκόντα, τοῦτο δεδεικται μόνον.4 πολλὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι πράττομεν ἐξαιφνη, προαιρεῖται δ’ οὔθεις οὔδεν ἐξαιφνη.

5 Εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἢν τρώῳ τούτων ἐν τῇ εἶναι 2 τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἡ κατ’ ὦρεξιν ἡ κατὰ προαιρέσιν ἡ

1 Sol.: γίνεται.
2 οὐχ ὡς ἐκούσιον? Rac. (οὐχ ὡς ἀκ. Ras.; ὡς ἀκ. οὐκ, Bz.).
3 μᾶλλον <ὅτι>? Rac.
4 [μόνον] Sol.

"Or, altering the text, 'It was proved not that acting in accordance with one's wishes is the same as acting voluntarily, but rather that all one wishes is also voluntary although it is possible to act voluntarily without wishing—this is all that has been proved; but many things that we wish——'

Cf. 1223 a 23 ff.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, II. vii. 10—viii. 2

action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire.

It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same. This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental assumption with us, and a general opinion, that wickedness makes men more unrighteous; and lack of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness. But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will result; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to be bad, yet he does them when he has become uncontrolled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish, then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no longer be acting unjustly but will be more just than he was before he lost control of himself. But this is impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting voluntarily does not mean acting in accordance with appetition nor acting involuntarily acting in opposition to appetition.

VIII. Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was proved that acting in accordance with one's wish is not acting involuntarily, but rather everything that one wishes is also voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice suddenly.

But if as we said the voluntary must necessarily be one of three things—what is in conformity with appetition, or with purposive choice, or with thought—,
κατὰ διάνοιαν, τούτων δὲ τὰ δύο μὴ ἔστι, λείπεται ἐν τῷ διανοούμενῷ πως πράττειν εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον. ἔτι δὲ μικρὸν προαγαγότες τὸν λόγον ἐπιθῶμεν τέλος τῷ περὶ τοῦ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον διορισμῷ.

10 δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ βία καὶ μὴ βία τι ποιεῖν οἷκεῖα τοῖς εἱρημένοις εἶναι· τὸ τε γὰρ βίαν ἀκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαιν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίας σκεπτέον πρῶτον τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ 4 βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ τῇ πειθώ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄψυχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βία καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαινέν, ταῦτα¹ δ', ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει² καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὀρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βίαν —οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος

²ον ἀντίθεσις, ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βία φαινέν. ὑμωῖς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων 5 ὀρῶμεν βία πολλά καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῶ ὀρμήν ἔξωθεν τι κινή. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄψυχοις ἀπλῇ ἡ ἄρχῃ, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὀρεξὶ καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖν. ὥστε ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπλοῦν 6 τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄψυχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει

¹ Fr.: τούτω.
² v.l. φύσιν.
and if it is not the two former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some kind of thought.

Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary and involuntary by carrying the argument a little further. Acting under compulsion and not under compulsion seem to be terms akin to the ones mentioned; for we say that everything forced is involuntary and everything involuntary is forced. So we must first consider the exact meaning of 'forced,' and how what is forced is related to the voluntary and involuntary. It seems, then, that in the sphere of conduct 'forced' or 'necessary,' and force or necessity, are the opposite of 'voluntary,' and of persuasion. And we employ the terms force and necessity in a general sense even in the case of inanimate objects: we say that a stone travels upwards and fire downwards by force and under necessity, whereas when they travel according to their natural and intrinsic impulse we say that they do not move under force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving voluntarily: the state opposite to forced motion has no name, but when they travel contrary to their natural impulse we say that they move by force. Similarly also in the case of living things and of animals, we see many being acted on by force, and also acting under force when something moves them from outside, contrary to the impulse within the thing itself. In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in living things it is multiple, for appetition and rational principle are not always in harmony. Hence whereas in the case of the other animals the factor of force is simple, as it is in the case of inanimate objects, for animals do not possess rational principle and appetition in

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λόγον καὶ ὦρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὦρεξει (ζῆ). ἐν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ἑνεστὶν ἁμφώ, καὶ ἐν τωι ἡλικίᾳ, ἦ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν (οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίόν πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἡδή
da λογισμὸν πράττοντα). δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαν τοῦ ἄπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὕθεις βία μὲν ποιεῖ
χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατὴ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατὴ
πλείστη ἁμφισβήτησις ἐστὶν. ἐναντίας γὰρ ὅρμας
ἐχων αὐτὸς ἐκάτερος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὡσθ' ὁ τ' ἐγκρατὴς βία, φασίν, ἀφέλκων αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν
ἡδεῶν ἐπιθυμῶν (ἀλγεὶ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντι-
τεύνουσαν τὴν ὦρεξιν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατὴς βίας παρὰ τὸν
λογισμὸν. ἦττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι, ἢ γὰρ ἐπι-
θυμία του ἡδεός, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων. ὡσθ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἐκών καὶ οὐ βία, ὡτι οὐ λυπηρῶς.
ἡ δὲ πειθῶ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐφ' ὁ πέπεισται ἂγεται, καὶ πορεύεται
οὐ βία ἀλλ' ἐκών. ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ πείσασα ἂγει,
οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου. ὡτι μὲν οὐν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι ἑν
μόνον βία καὶ ἀκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν,
ὅτι καθ' ὀμοιότητα τινα τοῦ βία, καθ' ἤν καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄφιξιν λέγουμεν, εἴρηται. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰ 10
τις προσθείη τὸ ἐν τῶ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον

1 Iac.: ἀλλ' ὄταν. 2 Sp.: ἐκαστος.
3 Sp.: ἀφέλκει.
4 Bek.: ἐπιθυμῶν (τῶν τῶν> ἡδεόν ἐπιθυμῶν Fr.).
6 Rac.: μόνοι.
7 Sp.: προσθή.

a Or 'conduct.'
opposition to it, but live by their appetition, in man both forms of force are present—that is, at a certain age, the age to which we attribute action* in the proper sense; for we do not speak of a child as acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person who has attained to acting by rational calculation.

7 So what is forced always seems to be painful, and no one acting under force acts gladly. Consequently there is a great deal of dispute about the self-controlled man and the uncontrolled. For each of them acts under a conflict of impulses within him, so that the self-controlled man, they say, acts under force in dragging himself away from the pleasures that he covets (for he feels pain in dragging himself away against the resistance of appetition), while the uncontrolled man acts under force in going contrary to his rational faculty. But he seems to feel less pain, because desire is for what is pleasant, and he follows his desire; so that the uncontrolled man rather acts voluntarily and not under force, because not painfully. On the other hand persuasion is thought to be the opposite of force and necessity; and the self-controlled man is led towards things that he has been persuaded to pursue, and proceeds not under force but voluntarily; whereas desire leads a man on without employing persuasion, since it possesses no element of rational principle. It has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects too. Yet nevertheless if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the statement is
κάκει, λύσται τὸ λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τι τῶν ἐξωθεὶν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὀρμήν κινή ἡ ἀρεμίζη, βιὰ φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, οὐ βιὰ· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ
καὶ ἀκρατεὶ ἡ καθ’ αὐτὸν ὀρμή ἐνούσα ἀγει (ἀμφώ γὰρ ἔχει), ὡστ’ οὐ βιὰ οὐδέτερος ἄλλ’ ἐκὼν διὰ γε ταύτα πράττοι ἀν’ οὐδ’ ἄναγκαζόμενος, τὴν γὰρ ἐξωθεὶν ἀρχὴν τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὀρμήν ἡ ἐμποδίζουσαν ἡ κινοῦσαν ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὡσπερ εἰ τις λαβὼν τὴν χείρα τύπτοι τινὰ ἀντιτεύνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν. ὅταν δ’ ἔσωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, οὐ βιὰ. ἔτι καὶ ἴδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέρων ἐνεστὶν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατεύομενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττον πῆδη καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ’ ἐλπίδος ἴδονὴν ὅτι ὑστερον ὡφεληθήσεται ἡ καὶ ὑδη ὡφελεῖται ὑμιαίνον, καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατεύομενος οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ λυπεῖται δε τὴν ἀπ’ ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἴεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὡστε τὸ μὲν βιὰ ἐκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὀρεξίν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκάτερον ἀκοντα ποτε πράττειν· κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὅντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων. ὠθεῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὀλὴν μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὀρῷσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν, ἡ δ’ ὀλὴ ἐκούσα ψυχή καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ

1 Sus.: ὅτι.
2 ὅτι ἐπὶ Sol.: ὅτι.

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refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under force, but voluntarily; nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B's hand and with it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting; whereas when the source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done under force. Again, both pleasure and pain are present in both cases; for a man exercising self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good health; and the uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is doing a bad thing. Hence it is reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit. Now it is admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a whole
1224 b

ἐγκρατούς πράττει, βία δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἑκείνοις τι, ἐπεί καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει ὁτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὑπὲρ τὴν πρατεῖ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἐνεστίν· σχεδὸν δὲ τοῦτοι δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε 15 ὁσα εὐθὺς γινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πάσι, καὶ ὁσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίνεται ἡμῖν, ὅπως καὶ γῆρας καὶ τάλα τὰ τουαῖτα. ὡστε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος πράττει πῶς, ἀπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν. αἱ μὲν οὖν 16 περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατὴ καὶ ἀκρατή ἀπορία αὐτὰ, περὶ τοῦ βία πράττειν ἡ ἀμφότερος ἡ τῶν ἑτερον, ὡστε ἡ μὴ ἐκόντας ἡ ἁμα βία καὶ ἐκόντας, εἰ δὲ τὸ βία ἀκοῦσιον, ἡ ἁμα ἐκόντας καὶ ἐκόντας 1225 α πράττειν· σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ἡμῖν ὡς ἀπαντητέον.

Δέγονται δὲ κατ' ἀλλ' ἄλλου τρόπου βία καὶ ἀναγκα- 17 σθέντες πράξαι οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσι δ καὶ λυπηρόν καὶ 5 φαύλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο πράττοντον πληγαί ἡ δεσμοί ἡ θάνατοι ὑσιν· ταῦτα γάρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πράξαι. ἡ οὖ, ἀλλὰ 18 πάντες ἐκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἐξεστὶ γάρ

1 οὐδέτερον ? Rac.
3 πῶς add. ante μὴ Sus., hic Sol. (cf. 1225 a 12 ed.).
4 αὐτὰ add. Bus.
6 Bz.: ἐκούσιον.
8 Sp.: πράττωσι.
9 Sp.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο.
2 υπάρχει Ras.: ἀρχων.
5 Sp.: ἐκούσιον.
7 Rac.: ἀλλ' ἄν.
both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion, but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property, because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not stunted, and also desire is natural, because it accompanies and is present in us from birth; and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but absolutely each does act according to nature, though not according to the same nature.

The difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has been said how these difficulties are to be met.

But there is another way in which people are said to act under compulsion and of necessity without disagreement between rational principle and apposition, when they do something that they consider actually painful and bad but they are faced by flogging or imprisonment or execution if they do not do it; for in these cases they say that they are acting under necessity. Possibly, however, this is not the case, but they all do the actual deeds willingly, since
μὴ ποιεῖν ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο υπομείναι τὸ πάθος. ἔτι 19
ισως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὅσα
μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἡ
ὑπάρξαι, 1 καὶ ὅσα πράττει ἡ μὴ βούλεται ἐκῶν
πράττει καὶ οὐ βία. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν
tοιούτων, βίᾳ πώς, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἀπλῶς ὅτι οὐκ
αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὁ πράττει ἄλλ' οὐ ἑνε-
κα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ 20
inha μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνῃ, γελοίος ἂν εἰη
εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βία καὶ ἀναγκαιόμενος, ἄλλα δεὶ
μείζων κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι δ' πείσεται
μὴ ποιῆσας. οὔτω γὰρ ἀναγκαιόμενος καὶ ἡ βία
πράξει ἡ οὐ φύσει οταν κακὸν ἀγαθὸν ἑνεκα ἡ
μείζωνος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε·
oυ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα 21
πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν καὶ θυμοῦς ἐνίους καὶ
τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἵσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπέρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ
συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν
φύσιν. καὶ μάλλον ἂν δόξευε βία καὶ ἄκων
πράττειν ἵνα μὴ ἁλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς ἢ ἵνα μὴ ἥρεμα,
καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἁλγῇ ἢ ἵνα χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ'

1 μὴ πράξαι ἡ πράξαι Sp. 2 kal (vel dei) Bz.: dei.
3 Bz.: μὴ.

a Or ' for in those of such acts which it rests with himself
to do or not.'
b i.e. in blind-man's-buff, μυνδα or χαλκη μυη.
it is open to them not to do them but to endure the penalty threatened. Moreover, perhaps someone might say that in some cases these actions are done of necessity and in others not. For in cases where the presence or absence of such circumstances depends on the agent himself, even the actions that he does without wishing to do them he does willingly and not under compulsion; but where in such cases the circumstances do not rest with himself, he acts under compulsion in a sense, though not indeed under compulsion absolutely, because he does not definitely choose the actual thing that he does but the object for which he does it; since even in the objects of action there is a certain difference. For if someone were to kill a man to prevent his catching him by groping for him, it would be ridiculous for him to say that he had done it under compulsion and of necessity—there must be some greater and more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not do it. It is when a man does something evil for the sake of something good, or for deliverance from another evil, that he will be acting under necessity and by compulsion, or at all events not by nature; and then he will really be acting unwillingly, for these actions do not rest with himself. On this account many reckon even love as involuntary, and some forms of anger, and natural impulses, because their power is even beyond nature; and we pardon them as naturally capable of constraining nature. And it would be thought that a man is acting more under compulsion and involuntarily when his object is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild pain, and in general more when his object is the avoidance of pain than when it is to gain enjoyment.
ARISTOTLE

1225 a

αὐτῷ, εἰς δ' ἀνάγεταί ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δ' ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις ὁν ἐς φέρειν: δ' ἐδὲ μὴ ὁν ἐς μηδ' ἐστὶν τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὁρέξεως ἡ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιώντας καὶ προλέγοντας, 22 καίτερ διανοίας ἐργον ποιοῦντας, ὠμος οὐ φαμεν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι οὐτ' εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον οὔτε πράξαι ἂ ἐπράξαν. ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ὡστε 23 ἦ διάνοιαι τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν εἰσίν ἡ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιούτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' ὁσπερ Φιλόλαος ἐφη εἴναι τινας λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

"Ωστ' εἰ τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον καὶ πρὸς τὸ βία ἐδεί σκέψασθαι, τούτο μὲν οὐτὸ διηρήσθω (οἱ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἐκούσιον . . . ὡς βία πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἐκόντες).

IX. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐχεῖ τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ 1 ὁρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ἄρισταν, 1225 b λοιπὸν δὴ ὀρθάσασθαι τὸ 3 κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ 2 δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκούσιῳ, καὶ τὸ εἰδῶτα ἢ δ ν ὡ ἢ οὖν ἐνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὧτι πατὴρ ἁλλ' οὖν ἑνα ἀποκτείνῃ ἁλλ' ἑνα σώσῃ, ὠσπερ αἱ Πελαδίας, ἢτοι ὡς τοῦ 4 μὲν πόμα ἁλλ' 5 ὃς φίλτρον καὶ οἴνον, τὸ δ' ἡν κώνειν) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα 5 καὶ ὡν καὶ ὡ καὶ δ' ἀγνοοιαν, μη

1 ἦ? Ric.: καὶ.
2 lacunam edd.
3 τὸ e M.M. 1188 b 26 Sp.: τὰ.
4 τοῦ Fr.: ὁπτ.
5 Rieckher: ἀγνοοῦντα.

a Pythagorean philosopher contemporary with Socrates.
b Some words seem to have been lost here (ἄλλα suggests that they contained a negative).
c The daughters of Pelias, King of Iolehus, cut him up and boiled him, having been told by Medea (who wanted Jason to leave his throne) that this would restore his youth.
For what rests with himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his nature is able to bear; what his nature is not able to bear and what is not a matter of his own natural appetition or calculation does not rest with himself. On this account also in the case of persons who are inspired and utter prophecies, although they perform an act of thought, nevertheless we do not say that saying what they said and doing what they did rested with themselves.

Nor yet do we say that what men do because of desire rests with themselves; so that some thoughts and emotions, or the actions that are guided by such thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, but it is as Philolaus \(^a\) said—'some arguments are too strong for us.'

Hence if it was necessary to consider the voluntary and involuntary with reference also to acting under compulsion, let this be our decision of the matter (for those who cause most hindrance . . . the voluntary . . . \(^b\) as acting under compulsion, but voluntarily).

IX. Now that this is concluded, and as the voluntary has been found not to be defined by appetition, nor yet by purposive choice, it therefore remains to define it as that which is in accordance with thought.

Now the voluntary seems to be the opposite of the involuntary; and acting with knowledge of either the person acted on or the instrument or the result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is his father but does not intend to kill him but to save him—as the Peliads \(^c\) did—or knows that what he is offering is a drink but offers it as a love-charm or wine, when really it is hemlock) seems to be the opposite of acting without knowing the person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through

\(^{\text{Definition of Voluntary and Involuntary. An act done in ignorance due to oneself is involuntary.}}\)
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τὸ δὲ δι’ ἀγνοιαν καὶ δ καὶ ὃ καὶ ἐν ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἑναντίον ἂρ’ ἐκούσιον. ὡσα 3 μὲν οὐν ἐφ’ ἐαυτῷ ὃν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι’ αὐτόν, ἐκούσια ταῦτ’ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, 10 καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν. ὡσα δ’ ἀγνοῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀκων. ἔπει δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ 4 τὸ εἰδέναι διιττόν, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐχεῖν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ ἐχον μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δικαίως άν1 ἄγνοων λέγοιτο, ἐστι δ’ ὡς οὔ δικαίως, οἴον εἰ δι’ ἄμελειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. ὅμως 15 δὲ καὶ μὴ ἐχον τις ψῄγοιτο ἀν, εἰ δ’ ράδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢν μὴ ἐχεὶ2 δι’ ἄμελειαν ἡ ἡδονῆν ἡ λύπην. ταῦτ’ οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον δι- ωρίσθω3 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

X. Περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, 1 διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς. 20 διστάσεις γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ποιῶ θεῖαι αὐτῆς χρῆ, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταύτον τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρέτον ἢ ταύτον ἐστιν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρὰ τινῶν καὶ ἤπειρων 2 δόξειν4 ἂν δυοῦν εἰναι βάτερον ἢ προαιρέσεως, ἢτοι δόξα ἢ ὀρέξεις· ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολου- 25 θοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀρέξεις, φανερον. 3

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1 άν add. Ras.  
2 εἰ η μὴ έχοι ? Ric.  
3 διερήσθω ? Rac.  
4 Fr.: δόξειε δ’.

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a Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘Let this be our decision.’
b The term denotes not the deliberate choice of an object but the selection of means to attain an object: see § 7.
ignorance and not by accident. But to act through ignorance of the act, the means and the person acted on is involuntary action. Therefore the opposite is voluntary. It follows then that all the things that a man does not in ignorance, and through his own agency, when it is in his power not to do them, are voluntary acts, and it is in this that the voluntary consists; and all the things that he does in ignorance, and through being in ignorance, he does involuntarily. But since to understand or know has two meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the other to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not using it would in one case be justly described as acting in ignorance but in another case unjustly—namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge were due to carelessness. And similarly one would be blamed for not having the knowledge, if it were something that was easy or necessary and his not having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain. These points therefore must be added to our definition.

Let this, then, be our mode of definition about the voluntary and involuntary.

1 X. Next let us speak about purposive choice,\(^b\) Purpose. first raising various difficulties about it. For one might doubt to which class it naturally belongs and in what class it ought to be put, and whether the voluntary and the purposely chosen are different things or the same thing. And a view specially put forward from some quarters, which on inquiry may seem correct, is that purposive choice is one of two things, either opinion or appetition; for both are seen to accompany it. Now it is evident that it is not appetition; for in that case it is not
1225 b

ἡ γὰρ βουλήσις ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἡ θυμὸς· οὐδὲ εἰς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθῶς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ύπάρχει, προαιρεσίς δ’ οὖ. ἦτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ύπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνευ θυμὸ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὖ προαιροῦνται ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἦτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιροῦμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βουλήσις καὶ 4 προαιρεσίς ταῦτόν. βουλοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἐνια καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων έιδότες, οἶον βαυλεύεν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐθε- 35 εἰς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ’ ὄλος ὁ δυνατόν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ’ αὐτῷ δ’ οἴεται πράξαι ἡ μὴ πράξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη το προαιρετῶν τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ τι εἴναι. ὡμοίως δὲ 5 ἐδήλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ’ ἀπλῶς εἰ τις οἴεται τι· τῶν γὰρ ἐφ’ αὐτῷ τι ἣν το προαιρετῶν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ’ ἣμῖν, οἶον τὴν διάμετρον ἀσύμμετρον. ἦτι οὐκ ἔστι προαιρεσίς 1226 a ἀληθῆς ἡ ὑποθές. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ’ αὐτῷ ὄν· 6 τῶν πρακτῶν δόξα ἡ τυγχάνομεν οἶομενοὶ δεῖν τι πράττειν ἡ οὐ πράττειν. κοινὸν δὲ περὶ δόξης τούτο καὶ βουλήσεως. οὐθέοις γὰρ τέλος οὐθὲν 7 προαιρεῖται, ἄλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. λέγω δ’ οἶον

1 Pb: ἀνάγκη μὲν Mb, ἀνάγκη ἣν Fr.
2 Bz.: εἶναι.
3 Rac.: σύμμετρον.

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a 1223 a 16-19.
b The mss. give 'commensurable,' but there is no point in specifying an untrue opinion. Cf. N.E. 1112 a 22 περὶ δὴ 288
would be either wish or desire or passion, since nobody wants to get a thing without having experienced one of those feelings. Now even animals possess passion and desire, but they do not have purposive choice. And again, beings that possess both of these often make choices even without passion and desire; and while they are experiencing these feelings do not make a choice but hold out. Again, desire and passion are always accompanied by pain, but we often make a choice even without pain. But moreover purposive choice is not the same as wish either; for men wish for some things that they know to be impossible, for instance to be king of all mankind and to be immortal, but nobody purposively chooses a thing knowing it to be impossible, nor in general a thing that, though possible, he does not think in his own power to do or not to do. So that this much is clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be something that rests with oneself. And similarly it is manifest that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one simply thinks; for we saw that a thing chosen is something in one’s own power, but we have opinions as to many things that do not depend on us, for instance that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side; and again, choice is not true or false. Nor yet is purposive choice an opinion about practicable things within one’s own power that makes us think that we ought to do or not to do something; but this characteristic is common to opinion and to wish. For no one purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean for instance no one
οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπταῖν ἡ
καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὔτ᾽ εὐδαίμονεῖν,
ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἡ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαίμονεῖν
ἔνεκα, καὶ ὅλως δῆλοι οἴει οἳ προαιροῦμενος τί τε
καὶ τίνος ἔνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος
οὗ ἔνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, οὗ προαιρεῖται
ἔνεκα ἄλλον. βούλεται δὲ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, 8
καὶ δοξάζει3 δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὗ πράττειν.
ὡστε φανερὸν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ
βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν γὰρ4 καὶ δοξάζειν5
μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ’ οὐκ ἔστων.
"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστων οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα 9
οὐθ᾽ ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις, δῆλον τί δὲ
dιαφέρει τούτων; καὶ πώς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον;
ἄμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ τί ἐστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι
δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
ὡστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, περὶ
ἐνίων δ’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν
ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν
αὐτῶν ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ
dὲ δ’ ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται. περὶ δὲ ὅπου οὐδεὶς ἂν
οὐθ’ ἐγχειρήσει βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἅγνωσὶ. περὶ 11
ἐνίων δ’ ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὸ7 βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ταῦτα δ’
ἔστων ὅσα ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔστι πρᾶξαι ἡ μὴ πρᾶξαι. διὸ
οὗ βουλεύσαμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πώς ἂν
ὄ κύκλος τετραγωνισθεῖσ’ τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ’

1 ὁ add. Fr. 2 τίνος <ἔνεκα> ? Rac. 3 Vic.: δοξάζειν.
4 γὰρ add. Sp. 5 Sp.: δόξα.
6 sic Sol.: ἄν.
7 lacunam hic edd.

a See p. 199, note c.
290
chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit down for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be well off, but to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off; and generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and what its object is, 'object' meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something else and 'choice' meaning that which he chooses for the sake of something else. Whereas clearly it is specially an End that a man wishes, and the feeling that he ought to be healthy and prosperous is an opinion. So these considerations make it clear that purposive choice is different from both opinion and wish. Forming wishes and forming opinions apply specially to one's End; purposive choice is not of Ends.

9 It is clear, then, that purposive choice is not either wish or opinion or judgement simply; but in what does it differ from them? and how is it related to the voluntary? To answer these questions will make it clear what purposive choice is. Now of things that can both be and not be, some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, but about others it is not possible. Some things can either be or not be but their coming into being does not rest with us, but in some cases is due to the operation of nature and in others to other causes; and about these things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance of the facts. But with some things not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests with us to do or not to do. Hence we do not deliberate about affairs in India, or about how to square the circle; for affairs in India do not rest with us, whereas the objects of
1226 a ἡμῶν,1 τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐντων ἔστι, τὸ δ' οἷς οὐ πρακτόν (ὢ καὶ δὴλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις ἔστιν). ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν2 ἡμῶν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων. διό καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, τι δὴ ποθ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὐ; αὖτιν δ᾽ ὅτι δικὴ γνωμενής τῆς ἀμαρτίας (ἡ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δράντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἦς ἀν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἀπειροῦν3 ἡξουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις ἡ4 προαίρεσις ἔστιν ὡς ἔκατερον, οὐδ᾽ ἄμφω (ἐξαιρόθη γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθεὶς, δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν5 πράττειν καὶ βουλοῦνται), ὃς6 εἰς ἄμφοιν ἀρα. ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρομένῳ ταύτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτεόν. δηλοῖ δὲ πῶς καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἴρεσις μὲν ἔστιν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐτέρου πρὸ ἐτέρου τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἶν τε ἂνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις.

1226 b Περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πάσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τὸ δὲ ἡ τὸδε συντείνει, ἡ δεδογμένον τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται. βουλευόμεθα δὲ πάντες7 τοῦτο

1 ll. 30-33 traiecit Bz.: ἡμῶν, τὸ δ᾽ ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῶν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπάντων. ἡ καὶ δήλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἀπλῶς ἡ προαιρέας ἔστι: τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπότων ἔστιν, διὸ κτλ.
2 τῶν Rac.: περὶ τῶν ἐν.
3 εἰς ἀκριβῆ πείραν Bus.
4 ἡ Bz.: ἔστι.
5 δεῖν add. ? Sus.
choice and things practicable are among things resting with us, and squaring the circle is entirely impracticable (and thus it is clear that purposive choice is not simply opinion either). But purposive choice does not deal with all the practicable things resting with us either. Hence one might also raise the question, why is it exactly that, whereas doctors deliberate about things in their field of science, scholars do not? The reason is that since error occurs in two ways (for we err either in reasoning, or in perception when actually doing the thing), in medicine it is possible to err in both ways, but in grammar error only occurs in our perception and action, to investigate which would be an endless undertaking.

Since then purposive choice is not either opinion nor wish separately, nor yet both (for no one makes a deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly think they ought to act and wish to act), therefore it arises as from both, for both of them are present with a person choosing. But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term 'choice' makes this clear. 'Choice' is 'taking,' but not taking simply—it is taking one thing in preference to another; but this cannot be done without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises out of deliberative opinion.

Now nobody deliberates about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate about the means leading to their End—does this contribute to it, or does this? or when a means has been decided on, how will that be procured? and this deliberation

7 M: πάντως P (sed cf. N.E. 1113 a 5 ἐκαστός).
1226 b

ἐῶς ἃν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τῆν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρά- 15 σκευεσάμενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος εἰ1 χείρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται2 δὲ ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δὴλον ὅτι ἡ προαιρεσίς μὲν ἐστὶν ὀρέξεις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτική. ἀπαντά3 γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἢ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἢ βουλευόμεθα πάντα προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικὴν ἢς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βουλευσίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ὥρεγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὕτε ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ξύλοις 18 ἐστὶν ἡ προαιρεσίς οὕτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ οὕτε πάντως4 ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύ- σασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τὰ, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολ- λοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἐστὶ γὰρ 19 τὸ5 βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας των· ἢ γὰρ οὐ ἐνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστὶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰ αἰτία, οὐ δ' ἐνεκα ἐστὶν ἢ γίγνεται τι, τοῦτ' αἰτίον φαμεν εἶναι, οἶον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἃς κομιδὴ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἐνεκα 30 βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικὸς. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὃν ἢ 20 πράττειν ἡ μὴ πράττειν εάν τις πράττῃ ἡ ἀπρακτή δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ δι' ἀγνοιαν, ἐκὼν πράττει ἡ

1 Fr.: ἡ.  
2 v.l. βουλεταί.  
3 Bz.: ἀπαντες.  
4 Bz.: παντὸς (παντὸς <λόγον> Sp.).  
5 τὸ add. Sus.  

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as to means we all pursue until we have carried the starting-point in the process of producing the End back to ourselves. If, then, nobody chooses without first preparing, and deliberating as to the comparative merits of the alternatives, and a man deliberates as to those among the means to the End capable of existing or not existing that are within our power, it is clear that purposive choice is deliberative appetition of things within one's power. For we deliberate about everything that we choose, although of course we do not choose everything that we deliberate about. I call appetition deliberative when its origin or cause is deliberation, and when a man desires because of having deliberated. Therefore the faculty of purposive choice is not present in the other animals, nor in man at every age nor in every condition, for no more is the act of deliberation, nor yet the concept of cause: it is quite possible that many men may possess the faculty of forming an opinion whether to do or not to do a thing without also having the power of forming this opinion by process of reasoning. For the deliberative faculty is the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause—for one sort of cause is the final cause, as although cause means anything because of which a thing comes about, it is the object of a thing's existence or production that we specially designate as its cause: for instance, if a man walks in order to fetch things, fetching things is the cause of his walking. Consequently people who have no fixed aim are not given to deliberation. Hence inasmuch as if a man of his own accord and not through ignorance does or refrains from doing something resting with himself either to do or not to do, he acts or refrains from
άπρακτεί, πολλά δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὖν
βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν
προαιρετὸν ἀπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον
35 μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαιρεσιν πάντα
ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἐκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ
προαιρεσιν. ἀμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι
καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν ἀδικημάτων2 τὰ μὲν
ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκούσια3 τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας

1227 a νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀποτελεῖ γέ πη τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν 22
tούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψεως.
η δὲ προαιρεσις ὅτι οὐτε ἀπλῶς βουλήσεις οὔτε
dόξα ἐστί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὀρεξις ὅταν
5 ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι συμπεράνθωσιν.

'Εσεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται αἰεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἐνεκα
τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις αἰεὶ τῶν βουλευομένων
πρὸς δὲν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους
οὐθείς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἄρχη καὶ
ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις 23
ὑπόθεσεις (ἐἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν
ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δὶ' ἄκρι-
βείας). περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ή
σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἀνευ τέχνης πᾶσίν
ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ή μὴ πολεμῶσι τούτῳ4
βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ 24
dι' ὅ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος ή
15 ἡδονή ή τι ἀλλο τοιοῦτον δ οὐχεχάνει οὐ ένεκα.

1 μὴ <ἀπαν> ? Sus. 2 Bz.: παθημάτων.
3 Rac.: τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια.
4 τοῦτω Fr. (τοντυθ? Rac.): τοῦτο.

*a* Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. 1135 a 16 ff.
acting voluntarily, but yet we do many such things without deliberation or previous thought, it necessarily follows that, although all that has been purposely chosen is voluntary, 'voluntary' is not the same as 'chosen,' and, although all things done by purposive choice are voluntary, not all things voluntary are done by purposive choice. And at the same time it is clear from these considerations that the classification of offences made by legislators as involuntary, voluntary and premeditated is a good one; for even if it is not precisely accurate, yet at all events it approximates to the truth in a way. But we will speak about this in our examination of justice.

As to purposive choice, it is clear that it is not absolutely identical with wish nor with opinion, but is opinion plus appetition when these follow as a conclusion from deliberation.

But since one who deliberates always deliberates for the sake of some object, and a man deliberating always has some aim in view with reference to which he considers what is expedient, nobody deliberates about his End, but this is a starting-point or assumption, like the postulates in the theoretic sciences (we have spoken about this briefly at the beginning of this discourse, and in detail in Analytics b); whereas with all men deliberation whether technical or untechnical is about the means that lead to their End, e.g. when they deliberate about whether to go to war or not to go to war with a given person. And the question of means will depend rather on a prior question, that is, the question of object, for instance wealth or pleasure or something else of that kind which happens to be our object. For one who deliberates

b See 1214 b 6 ff., and Anal. Post. i., 72 a 20 and context.
βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἐσκεπται ἦ τι ἐκεῖσε συντείνει ὡς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγη  ἦ ἦ αὐτὸς δύναται ἵναι πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἂεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ περὶ 25 οὐ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται (οἶνον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσατο

ἀν εἰ δὲ φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγός ποὺ στρατο-

πεδεύσηται) οἶς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀριστὸν ἑστὶν. παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ 26 ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν. αὐτίον δὲ οὐ τῶν ὄντων τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἑστὶν ἐπ’ ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι ἤ πρὸς ἀ πέφυκεν, οἶον ὀφεί: οὐ γὰρ οἶον τ’ ιδεῖν

οὐ μὴ ἑστὶν ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἀκοῦσαι οὐ μὴ ἑστὶν ἀκοῆ. ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὐ μὴ ἑστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὀμοίως τῆς ύποίειας ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις 27 φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑστὶ, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βουλεύειν φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ κατὰ 10 διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακὸν.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ οὐκ ἐις τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἑστὶν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ 35 ἐναντία ὅσοις ἑστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἑστὶν.

1 Μβ ἦ. 2 ἦ add. Fr. 3 Rac.: ἐκεῖ.

4 Fr.: ἀγάγη. 5 ἦ add. Rac. 6 ἵναι add. Rac. 7 Sp.: δφη.

8 κατὰ add. Syl.: διὰ στροφὴν Iac., διαστροφή Fr. 9 Ric.: τὰ. 10 κατὰ add. Syl.
deliberates if he has considered, from the standpoint of the End, either what tends to enable him to bring the End to himself or how he can himself go to the End.\(^a\) And by nature the End is always a good and a thing about which men deliberate step by step (for example a doctor may deliberate whether he shall give a drug, and a general where he shall pitch his camp) when their End is the good that is the absolute best; but in contravention of nature and by perversion not the good but the apparent good is the End. The reason is that there are some things that cannot be employed for something other than their natural objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not audible; but a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the science. For health and disease are not the objects of the same science in the same way: health is its object in accordance with nature, and disease in contravention of nature. And similarly, by nature good is the object of wish, but evil is also its object in contravention of nature; by nature one wishes good, against nature and by perversion one even wishes evil.

But moreover with everything its corruption and perversion are not in any chance direction, but leads to the contrary and intermediate states. For it is not possible to go outside these, since even error does not lead to any chance thing, but, in the case of things that have contraries, to the contraries, and to those contraries that are contrary according to

\(^a\) *i.e.* he works back in thought from his intended End to some means to its attainment that is already within his power.
ARISTOTLE

This division of contraries is unusual: elsewhere (e.g. Met. K, 1061 a 18) Aristotle merely states that contraries are the objects of the same science.

The connexion of pleasure and pain with virtue is here clearer than in N.E., and forms part of the definition (Stocks).
Their science. It therefore necessarily follows that both error and purposive choice take place from the middle point to the contraries (the contraries of the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is pleasure and pain; for things are so constituted that the pleasant appears to the spirit good and the more pleasant better, the painful bad and the more painful worse. So from these things also it is clear that goodness and badness have to do with pleasures and pains; for they occur in connexion with the objects of purposive choice, and this has to do with good and bad and what appears to be good and bad, and pleasure and pain are by nature things of that kind.

It therefore follows that since moral goodness is itself a middle state and is entirely concerned with pleasures and pains, and badness consists in excess and defect and is concerned with the same things as goodness, moral goodness or virtue is a state of purposively choosing the mean in relation to ourselves in all those pleasant and painful things in regard to which according as a person feels pleasure or pain he is described as having some particular moral quality (for a person is not said to have a particular moral character merely for being fond of sweets or savouries).

These things having been settled, let us say whether goodness makes the purposive choice correct and the End right in the sense of making the agent choose for the sake of the proper End, or whether (as some hold) it makes the rational principle right. But what does this is self-control—for that saves the rational principle from being corrupted; and goodness and self-control are different. But we must...
ARISTOTLE

1227 b

περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὅρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἁρετή, τούτῳ αὐτίον. ἦ μὲν ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινεῖτων δ’ ἡ ἐγκράτεια. λέγωμεν 3
dὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὅρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτήσαν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαινοῦντα ὅρθῶς ἐχειν· καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δ’ ἡ ἁρετή ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν 4
ἡ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διότι τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὕδε λόγος, ἀλλὰ δὴ ὡς περὶ ἁρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὐτέ γὰρ ἱατός σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἡ μή, ἀλλ’ εἰ περιπατεῖν ἡ μή, οὐτέ ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὐ ἐχειν ἡ μή, ἀλλ’ εἰ παλαίσαι ἡ μή. ὡμοίως 5
δ’ οὐδ’ ἄλλη 2 οὔδεμεν περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ὡς περὶ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ύποθέσεις ἁρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἁρχὴ καὶ ύποθεσίς· ἐπειδὴ δεί τοῦτο 3 ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο ὑπάρξει εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὡς περὶ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὅρθαι, ἀνάγκη τοῦτο εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως 6 ἁρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτη. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὄρθοτητος ἥ ὁ λόγος ἡ ἡ 35 ἁρετή αἰτία, εἰ μή ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἁρετὴν ἄν

1 σκοπὸν <ὁρθὸν>? Rac. 2 ἄλλη <τεχνη>? Rac. 3 Sp.: τόδε.

* Or, altering the text, 'makes the aim right.'
speak about this later, since all who do hold that goodness makes the rational principle right think so on the ground that that is the nature of self-control and self-control is a praiseworthy thing. Having raised this preliminary question let us continue. It is possible to have one’s aim right but to be entirely wrong in one’s means to the end aimed at; and it is possible for the aim to have been wrongly chosen but the means conducing to it to be right; and for neither to be right. But does goodness decide the aim or the means to it? Well, our position is that it decides the aim, because this is not a matter of logical inference or rational principle, but in fact this must be assumed as a starting-point. For a doctor does not consider whether his patient ought to be healthy or not, but whether he ought to take walking exercise or not, and the gymnastic trainer does not consider whether his pupil ought to be in good condition or not, but whether he ought to go in for wrestling or not; and similarly no other science either deliberates about its End. For as in the theoretic sciences the assumptions are first principles, so in the productive sciences the End is a starting-point and assumption: since it is required that so-and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as in mathematics, if the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, such-and-such a consequence necessarily follows. Therefore the End is the starting-point of the process of thought, but the conclusion of the process of thought is the starting-point of action. If, then, of all rightness either rational principle or goodness is the cause, if rational principle is not the cause of
ορθὸν εἰ ὁ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἐνέκα. ἐστὶ γάρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τῶν καὶ ἐνεκά τῶν. οὐ μὲν οὖν ἐνέκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῶν προαίρεσει|  

νάμεως οὔσα ἐνέκα τοῦ τέλους δεὶ πράττει, τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαίρεσεως ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαίρεσεως κρίνομεν ἐν τούτῳ τοις, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἐνέκα πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐν -  

αντίων ἐνέκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὴ τις, ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὰν πράττει μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπράκτειν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, τοὖναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαίος ἐστὶν οὕτος ὁ ἀνθρώπος. ὡςτ' ἀνάγκη τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐδεμία γάρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα  

c. ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔπαινετον τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔπαινεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια. ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἡ εἰς τὰ ἐργα (καίτοι αἱρετῶτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὅτι πράττομεν μὲν φαύλα  

c. καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, προαίρεται δ' οὔδεις. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἱδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅπως τις,
the rightness of the End, then the End (though not the means to the End) will be right owing to goodness.

7 But the End is the object for which one acts; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End. Therefore though it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done for the sake of the End, goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being right.

8 And owing to this it is by a man’s purposive choice that we judge his character—that is, not by what he does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honourable and refrain from doing what is base, he does the opposite, it is clear that this man is not virtuous. Hence it necessarily follows that both badness and goodness are voluntary; for there is no necessity to do wicked things.

9 For this reason badness is a blameworthy thing and goodness praiseworthy; for involuntary baseness and evil are not blamed nor involuntary good things praised, but voluntary ones are. Moreover we praise and blame all men with regard to their purpose rather than with regard to their actions (although activity is a more desirable thing than goodness), because men may do bad acts under compulsion, but no one is compelled to choose to do them. Moreover because it is not easy to see the quality of

\[ \text{Virtue by choosing the right means to achieve the End causes the End to be realized.} \]
διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἑργῶν ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ὁποῖος τις· αἱρετῶτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπανετῶτερον δ' ἡ προαίρεσις. ἐκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα καὶ ἕτεροι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

1 ὁμολογεῖ τοῖς Sp.
a man's purpose we are forced to judge his character from his actions; therefore activity is more desirable, but purpose more praiseworthy. And this not only follows from our assumptions but also is admitted by reason of observed facts.\textsuperscript{a}

\textsuperscript{a} Or, emending the text, 'agrees with observation.'
1. "Οτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητες τ' εἰσι' ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ αὕται προαιρετικοί, καὶ αἳ ἐναντίαι κακίαι καὶ τίνες εἰσίν αὕται, καθόλου εἰρηται: καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξής, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πάσιν ὁ τ' ἀνδρείας εἶναι περὶ ὀφόσοι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία: καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ποια ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλων. δὴλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὅμοιοι ἀντικείμονας σφόντων αὐτοῖς, οἶον ὁ δειλός (οὕτως γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβείσθαι μᾶλλον ή δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἦττον ή δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς (καὶ γὰρ οὕτως κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι οἶος φοβείσθαι μὲν ἦττον ή δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ή δεῖ· διὸ καὶ παρωνυμίζεται, ὁ γὰρ θρασύς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμωσ). ὡστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρης, δεῖ δὲ μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι) μὴθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ταύτῳ ποιοῦσι, πλῆν

1 τ' εἰσὶ Rac.: εἰσὶ τε.  
2 Bz.: πότερον.  
3 Bz.: φόβος.
BOOK III

1. It has then been stated in general terms that there are middle states in the virtues and that these are purposive, and also that the opposite dispositions are vices and what these are. But let us take them separately and discuss them seriatim. And first let us speak about Courage.

2. Now almost everybody holds that the brave man is concerned with fears, and that courage is one of the virtues. And in our schedule we distinguished daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed to one another.

3. It is clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper and more daring than is proper)—and from this the name is derived, as the word ‘daring’ is cognate with the word ‘dare’). So that since courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring (for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same things...
οὐ περὶ ταύτα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, τῷ μὲν γὰρ βαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δήλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία: αὔτη γὰρ βελτίωτη.

Δοκεὶ δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 5 πολὺ, δ' ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλά καὶ ὁλίγα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὁλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα· καὶ ὁ μὲν υπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἡρέμα. ποιὰ οὖν υπομένει ὁ ἀνδρείος; πρῶτον, 6 πότερον τὰ αὐτῶ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ ἐτέρω; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἐτέρω φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἂν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῶ, εἴη ἂν αὐτῶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ1 φοβερά· τὰ δὲ φοβερὰ2 φόβου ποιητικά ἐκάστῳ ὃ φοβερά, οἶον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος, εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἀσθενής· ὡστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρείον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς φο- 15 βεῖσθαι.3 ἔδοκει δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τούτῳ δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἡ μηθὲν ἢ ὁλίγα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρέμα καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἰσως 7 τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὦσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τάγαθον, δικώς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τυί μὲν καὶ ἦδεα

1 πολλὰ om. M b.
2 τὰ δὲ φοβερὰ add. Bz. (τὰ δὲ φοβερὰ τοιοῦτον add. ? Rac.).
3 v.l. ποιεῖσθαι vulg.

Or, emending the text, 'of corresponding fear.'
but inversely—they fall short in daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the best state.

5 And it seems that the brave man is in general fearless, and the coward liable to fear; and that the latter fears things when they are few in number and small in size as well as when numerous and great, and fears violently, and gets frightened quickly, whereas the former on the contrary never feels fear at all or only slightly and reluctantly and seldom, and in regard to things of magnitude; and he endures things that are extremely formidable, whereas the other does not endure even those that are slightly formidable. What sort of things, then, does the brave man endure? First, is it the things that are formidable to himself or formidable to somebody else? If the things formidable to somebody else, one would not indeed call it anything remarkable; but if it is those that are formidable to himself, what is formidable to him must be things of great magnitude and number. But formidable things are productive of fear in the particular person to whom they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable, the fear they produce will be violent, if slightly formidable, it will be weak; so it follows that the brave man’s fears are great and many. Yet on the contrary it appeared that courage makes a man fearless, and that fearlessness consists in fearing nothing, or else few things, and those slightly and reluctantly. But perhaps ‘formidable’ is an ambiguous term, like ‘pleasant’ and ‘good.’ Some things are pleasant and good absolutely, whereas others are so to a particular
καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστιν, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὖ, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον 
φαιλα καὶ οὐχ ἢδεα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὄφελμα,
καὶ ὅσα ἢδεα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. ὠμοίως δὲ 8
καὶ τὰ φοβερά τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ τινὶ: ἃ
μὲν δὴ ὁ δ’ ἁελὸς φοβεῖται ἢ ἁελὸς, τὰ μὲν οὗδεν
ἐστὶ φοβερά, τὰ δ’ ἢρέμα: τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις
φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ’
ἀπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγομεν: ὃ δ’ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ’ 9
ἐχει ἀφόβως, καὶ υπομένει τὰ τοιαύτα φοβερά,
ἀ ἐστι μὲν ὃς φοβερά αὐτῶ ἐστὶ δ’ ὃς οὖ, ἃ μὲν
ἀνθρωπος φοβερά, ἃ δ’ ἀνδρεῖος οὖ φοβερὰ ἀλλ’
ἡ ἢρέμα, ἡ οὖδαμῶς. ἐστὶ μέντοι φοβερὰ ταῦτα:
τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπανεῖται ἡ
ἐξις: ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἱσχυρὸς καὶ ὄγεινὸς ἐχεί. καὶ
γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῶ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὁ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι
ὁ δ’ ὑπὸ μηθεμίας ὑπερβολῆς τουούτοι εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ
tῶ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς εἰναι ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἢρέμα
ὑφ’ ὃν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶοἱ πλείστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν
νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἁελοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσι τι, πλὴν θάττον τε
καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ, ... 3 καὶ ἐτι υφ’ ὃν οἱ
πολλοὶ πάσχουσι, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς ἡ ὅλως ἡ
ἡρέμα.

Ἀπορεῖται δ’ εἰ τῶ ἀνδρεῖω οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, 12

1 ὃ add. Fr. 2 οἱ πολλοὶ ἡ καὶ vel οἱ ἄλλοι καὶ Ρικ.
3 ὃι δ’ ὄγεινοι καὶ ἱσχυροὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων
πάσχουσιν, ἀλλὰ βραδύτερον τε καὶ ἡττον ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ Bz. (aut
secl. καὶ ἐτι ... ἡρέμα ut prave e II. 34 seq. repetita).

a The words ‘the healthy, strong and brave... mass of men’ are a conjectural addition to the ms. text.
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person but absolutely are not so, but on the contrary are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant to children qua children. And similarly some things are formidable absolutely and others to a particular person: thus the things that the coward qua coward fears are some of them not formidable to anybody and others only slightly formidable, but things that are formidable to most men, and all that are formidable to human nature, we pronounce to be formidable absolutely. But the brave man is fearless in regard to them, and endures formidable things of this sort, which are formidable to him in one way but in another way are not—they are formidable to him qua human being, but qua brave not formidable except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things really are formidable, for they are formidable to most men. Owing to this the brave man’s state of character is praised, because it resembles that of the strong and the healthy. These have those characters not because no labour in the one case or extreme of temperature in the other can crush them, but because they are not affected at all, or only affected slightly, by the things that affect the many or the majority. Therefore whereas the sickly and weak and cowardly are affected also by the afflictions commonly felt, only more quickly and to a greater extent than the mass of men, the healthy, strong and brave, although affected by the very great afflictions, are affected by them more slowly and less than the mass of men, and moreover they are entirely unaffected or only slightly affected by things that affect the mass.

But the question is raised whether to the brave
οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθεῖν. ἦν οὐθέν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον
τρόπον; ἦ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ εἶκεν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αὑρείσθαι κελεύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τούτον ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὕτος ἦτοι ἔξεστηκεν ἡ θρασύς. ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείας μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ὁ μὴ δεί φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασύς καὶ ὁ μὴ δεὶ θαρρεῖ. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείας ἄμφω ἂ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτη μέσος εἶκεν, ὁ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύη, ταύτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ἦ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταύτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείας μόνος ἐὰν κελεύῃ.

’Εστὶ δ' εἴδη ἰνδείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ’ ὤμοιότητα: τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική: αὐτή δ' εἰκεν ἢ δι' αἰσθῆσαν, δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική: αὐτή δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἀγνοίαν, δι' ἂν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μανόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὁφείς. ἀλλ' δὲ ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἂν οἱ τε κατευθυνόμενοι πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες: εὐλπισθᾶς γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἀλλ' δὲ
man nothing is formidable, and whether he would be insensible to fear. Or is it not possible that he may feel fear in the way described? For courage is following reason, and reason bids us choose what is fine. Hence he who endures formidable things not on account of reason is either out of his mind or daring, but only he who does so from motives of honour is fearless and brave. The coward, therefore, fears even things that he ought not to fear, and the daring man is bold even about things about which he ought not to be bold, but the brave man alone does both as he ought, and is intermediate in this respect, for he feels both confidence and fear about whatever things reason bids; but reason does not bid him endure things that are extremely painful and destructive, unless they are fine. The daring man, therefore, faces such things with confidence even if reason does not bid him face them, and the coward does not face them even if it does, but only the brave man faces them if reason bids.

There are five kinds of courage so called by analogy, because brave men of these kinds endure the same things as the really courageous but not for the same reasons. One is civic courage; this is courage due to a sense of shame. Second is military courage; this is due to experience and to knowledge, not of what is formidable, as Socrates said, but of ways of encountering what is formidable. Third is the courage due to inexperience and ignorance, that makes children and madmen face things rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure dangers, and those who are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine.
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día πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἂν τε γὰρ ἔρα, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖλος, καὶ ύπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὦ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὦ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργήν καὶ θυμόν ὄσαύτως· ἑκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύς ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοὺσι εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἑκστάσει, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. οὕμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀντίθετον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἀριστα μᾶχονται. διὰ νόμων δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὕδεμα τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, 2 δὲ βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὡς μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου, τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένους λύπην ἔτερα μὲν ἂν τὶς ἵσις λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἔτερον, φόβος δὲ οὕκ ἐστι, οἷον εἰ τις προορῶ ὅτι λυπησται λύπην ἢν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἡ τοιαύτην οίαν οἱ ξηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι. 35 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἐσεσθαι 2 λύπαις φόβος γίνεται ὥσεν ἡ φύσις ἀναφερτικὴ τοῦ ἕνεκα ἀνδρείοι εἰσι, καὶ ἐνοικοὶ κάτω οἷον καὶ καρτερίκοι καὶ δεῖλοι. καὶ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἕδιον τῆς 2

1 Ῥβ.: Μδ θῆρες.
2 καὶ secl. Vic.

* Unknown.
Another is due to some irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like the man who murdered the tyrant at Metapontium and the person in Crete in the story; and similarly if a man is under the influence of anger and passion, for passion is a thing that makes him beside himself. Hence wild boars are thought to be brave, though they are not really, for they are so when they are beside themselves, but otherwise they are variable, like daring men. But nevertheless the courage of passion is in the highest degree natural; passion is a thing that does not know defeat, owing to which the young are the best fighters.

Civic courage is due to law. But none of these is truly courage, though they are all useful for encouragement in dangers.

Up to this point we have spoken about things formidable in general terms, but it will be better to define them more precisely. As a general term 'formidable' denotes what causes fear, and that is a property of things that appear capable of causing pain of a destructive kind: for persons expecting some other pain might perhaps experience a different sort of pain and a different feeling, but will not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of pain felt by the envious or by those who are ashamed.

But fear only occurs in the case of pains that seem likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy life. Hence some people who are even very soft about certain things are brave, and some who are hard and enduring are also cowardly. Moreover it is thought to be almost a special property of courage
άνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν τοῦτον ἀλής καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικὸς ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκυδόνους οὕσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακός καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ δὲ ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἀλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθησεῖς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ᾧ εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, οὕτος δ' ἄνδρειος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν ὅταν πλησίον ἦ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικῶν, φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται. 

Τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρείον εἰρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φανόμενα ποιητικά λύπης τῆς φθορικῆς, τάυτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσάτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἡ φανόμενα ὡστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἀνθρωπον ἐνεα γάρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι. ἀνθρώπων φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράστειν, οὐθέν γὰρ κωλύει, ὅσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἐξεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

Οἷς μὲν οὖν δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς διαφεύγονται διὰ τὰς ἐξεις, τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τὰ τῇ μή φοβερὰ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἡρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τοῦναντίον τὰ τὸ φοβερὰ θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἡρέμα. τῷ δ' ἄνδρειον τάληθε μάλιστα. διόπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τὶς ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ δι' ἀγνοιαν, ἄνδρειος, συμενετικὸς <εἶναι> ᾧ Syl. 

1 Syl.: φαίνεται. 2 Syl.: φαίνεται. 3 οὖν add. Bz. 4 υπομένει Pd.: -νοι M b, Syl.
to be of a certain disposition in regard to death and the pain of death; for if a man were such as to be capable of rational endurance in respect of heat and cold and pains of that sort that are not dangerous, but at the same time soft and excessively timid about death, not because of any other feeling but just because it brings destruction, while another man was soft in regard to those pains but impassive as regards death, the former would be thought a coward and the latter brave. For we speak of danger only in the case of such formidable things as bring near to us what causes destruction of that sort, and when this appears near it appears to be danger.

The formidable things, therefore, in relation to which we speak of a man as brave are, we have said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand and not far off, and are or appear to be of a magnitude proportionate to a human being; for some things must necessarily appear fearful to every human being and throw everybody into alarm, since it is quite possible that, just as heat and cold and some of the other forces are above us and above the conditions of the human body, so also are some mental sufferings.

Therefore whereas the cowardly and the daring are mistaken owing to their characters, since the coward thinks things not formidable formidable and things slightly formidable extremely formidable, and the daring man on the contrary thinks formidable things perfectly safe and extremely formidable things only slightly formidable, to the brave man on the other hand things seem exactly what they are. Hence a man is not brave if he endures formidable
οιον εἰ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένοι1 φερομένους2 διὰ μανίαν, οὔτ' εἰ γινώσκων ὅσος ὁ κωύδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἰον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὀπλα ἀπαντᾶσι λαβόντες: καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἑστίν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἢδονὰς 2 ὑπομένουσι: καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἢδονὴν ἔχει τινά, μετ' ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶ τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ', εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ', εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἢδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τῶν θάνατον, ἡ φυγὴν3 μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὔδεις δικαίως αὖ ἄνδρείος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ ἦν 2 ἢδον τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν δι' ἀκρασίαις ἀπέθνησκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὡσπέρ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἢδεός, τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δ' ἀκρασίαν περιπτώσεις εἰδότες, ὡν οὔδεις ἄν4 ἄνδρείος εἰναι δόξειν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἐτοίμως5 ἀποθνήσκειν.6 οὔτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ ποιεῖν, ὡσπέρ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὔδὲ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὔθεὶς ἄνδρείος, καθάπερ καὶ 1230 α Ἀγάθων φησὶ

φαίλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἰσσώμενοι θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν.

ὡσπέρ καὶ τῶν Χείρωνα μυθολογούσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔλκους ὀδύνην εὐξασθαί ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτως καὶ ὅσοι 2

5 δι' ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κωύδυνους, ὄντερ τρό-

1 ὑπομένοι Syl.: ὑπομένει.
2 ἐπιφερομένους ? (cf. a 17) Rac.
3 <διὰ> φυγὴν ? Rac.
4 ἄν bis add. Sp.
5 V.l. ἐτοίμως.
6 ἀποθνήσκει Vic.: -κοι ? Rac.

a This appears to be loosely quoted from a verse passage:
things through ignorance (for instance, if owing to madness he were to endure a flight of thunderbolts), nor if he does so owing to passion when knowing the greatness of the danger, as the Celts 'take arms and march against the waves' \(^a\); and in general, the courage of barbarians has an element of passion. And some men endure terrors for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion contains pleasure of a sort, since it is combined with hope of revenge. But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for the sake of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the sake of avoiding greater pains, would any of these persons justly be termed brave. For if dying were pleasant, profligates would be dying constantly, owing to lack of self-control, just as even as it is, when, although death itself is not pleasant, things that cause it are, many men through lack of self-control knowingly encounter it; none of whom would be thought brave, even though he were thought to die quite readily. Nor yet are any of those brave who, as many men do, commit suicide to escape from trouble, as Agathon \(^b\) says:

> The base among mankind, by toil o'ercome,  
> Conceive a love of death.

As also Cheiron,\(^c\) in the legendary story of the poets, because of the pain from his wound prayed that though immortal he might die. And in like manner to these, all who face dangers because of experience

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\(^a\) The motives of true Courage.

\(^b\) Athenian tragic poet, friend of Plato.

\(^c\) The Centaur sage and physician, accidentally wounded by a poisoned arrow of Heracles, transferred his immortality to Prometheus.
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πον σχέδον οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώ
πων ὑπομένουσιν. αὕτο γὰρ τοῦντιόν ἔχει ἡ ὑσ
ὕτε Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην οἰόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀν
δρείαν. οὔτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἴδεναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρρ
ρῶσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵστους ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι,

αλλ’ ὅτι ἵσασθ’ οἱ βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. οὔτε δὲ ὁ
θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία, καὶ γὰρ ἡ
ἀν ἡ ἴσχὺς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θεόγνων ἀνδρεία
eιν’.

πάς γὰρ ἀνήρ πενή ἐδεμημένος.

φανερῶς δ’ ἕνοι δειλοὶ οὔτε ὁμος ὑπομένουσι
δί’ ἐμπειρίαν, τούτῳ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ οἴονται κίνδυνον

ἐναι, ἵσασθ’ γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δὲ: ὅταν

γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οἴονται βοηθείαν ἀλλ’ ἡ ἴσχυς πλησίον

ἡ τὸ δεινὸν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τῶν 3

τοιούτων αὐτῶν2 οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδὼν ὑπομένοντες

μάλιστα φανεῖν ἀν3 ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ Ὁμήρος

τὸν Ἐκτόρα φησιν ὑπομείναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν

πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα.

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"Ἐκτόρα δ’ αἰδὼς εἶλε’.

καὶ4

Πουλιδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει.

καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ’ ἀληθῆς 3

οὔτε αὕτη οὔτε ἐκεῖνων οὐδεμιά, ἀλλ’ ὀμοία μὲν,

ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἀ διὰ τῶν θυμῶν ὀμόσῃ

τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτι ἀδοξήσει δει’

1 δ’ add. Rieckher. 2 [αἰτίων] ? Ric.: ἀνδρείων Sp. 3 αὐτ’ add. Sus. 4 καὶ add. Fr.
are not brave; this is how perhaps most of the military class face dangers. For the fact is the exact opposite of the view of Socrates, who thought that bravery was knowledge: sailors who know how to go aloft are not daring through knowing what things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves against the dangers; also courage is not merely what makes men more daring fighters, for in that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis puts it:

For every man by poverty subdued.\(^a\)

But manifestly some men do face emergencies in spite of being cowards, owing to experience, and they do so because they do not think that there is any danger, as they know how to protect themselves. A proof of this is that when they think that they have no protection and that the cause of alarm is now close at hand, they turn tail. But among all such causes, it is when shame makes men face what is alarming that they would appear to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles:

And shame on Hector seized—\(^b\)

and

Polydamas will be the first to taunt me.\(^c\)

31 Civic courage is this kind. But true courage is neither this nor any of the others, though it resembles them, as does the courage of wild animals, which are led by passion to rush to meet the blow. For it is not from fear that he will incur disgrace that a

\(^a\) Theognis 177. \(^b\) Not in our Homer. \(^c\) Iliad xxii. 100.
1230 a  
μένειν φοβουμένου, 1 οὔτε δι’ ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζεων ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὔδε γὰρ οἱσηται οὔτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γ’ ἀρετὴ προαιρε- 

tικὴ (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἰρήται πρότερον, ὧτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρείσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ οὔ ἕνεκα τὸ καλὸν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἦ 

ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὕσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡστ’ οὔτε δι’ ἄγνοιαν (ὄρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνει) οὔτε δι’ ἡδονήν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καλὸν, ἐπεῖ, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ἦ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, 

οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ3· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.  

Περὶ ποιὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ 35 

τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν 

ἔχει, σχεδόν εἰρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἐφοδον 

ἰκανῶς.

II. Περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ 1 

tαῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται δ’ ὁ ἀκόλαστος 

πολλαχῶς. ὃ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πῶς4 μηδ’ 

iatreúmenos, 5 ύστερ ἀτμητος ὃ μὴ τετμημένος; 

καὶ τούτων ὃ μὲν δυνατὸς ὃ δ’ ἀδύνατος: ἀτμητον 

γὰρ τὸ τε μὴ δυνάμενον τυμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν 

μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 

τὸ ἀκόλαστον καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι 2 

κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ 

1 Cas.: φοβουμένου.  

2 γ’ add. M.  

3 Ric.: ὑπομενεί.  

4 πω Vict.  

5 Sp.: iatreúmenos.
man ought to stand his ground, nor from motives of anger, nor because he does not think that he will be killed or because he has forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there is really any-thing to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance (for it rather makes him judge correctly), nor yet for pleasure, but because it is fine, since in a case where it is not fine but insane he will not face them, for then it would be base to do so.

We have now given an account that is fairly adequate for our present procedure of the kind of things in relation to which Courage is a middle state, and between what vices and for what reason it is this, and what is the power that formidable things exercise.

II. We must next attempt to decide about Temperance and Profligacy. The term ‘profligate’ (unchaste) has a variety of meanings. It means the man who has not been (as it were) ‘chastized’ or cured, just as ‘undivided’ means one that has not been divided; and these terms include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: ‘undivided’ means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with ‘unchaste’—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chast-
ARISTOTLE

1230 b

περὶ ἀμαρτίας περὶ δὲ ὀρθοπραγεὶ ὁ σῶφρων, ὦσπερ οἱ παιδεῖς. κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ἐτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὦτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονᾶς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσὶ, φανερῶν, καὶ ὦτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακείσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλῆλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὄνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἐχοντας δι’ ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰ ταύτα τὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους,

οἱ δ’ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιοῦτοι προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐστὶ δ’ οὐ πάνω γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ’ ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀμαρτάνεις μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφωνον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἤδεων ἤταν καὶ αἰσθήσεις. μάλιστα δ’ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι οἶνοι οἰ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσι ἄγροικος, οἱ

οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν.

'Επει δ’ ὁ σῶφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεὶ δὴ λα-βεῖν περὶ τίνας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἀπαντα τὰ ἤδεα ὁ σῶφρων σῶφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τοῦ γενοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀπτὸν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ

1 Sus.: γὰρ.
2 ταύτας τὰς Sp.: τὰς αὐτὰς.
3 προσαγορεύουσιν <οἶνον . . . > Sus. (cf. 1231 b 1).
4 οὐδ’ ε<δ’> vel οὐδ’ ἐ<κ’>? Rac.

άκολαστος (lit. 'incorrigible') often means no more than 'naughty' (Solomon).

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ened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this sense that the term 'unchaste' is used, whereas another use of it again refers to persons hard to cure or entirely incurable by chastisement. But though 'profligacy' has more than one sense, it is clear that the profligate are concerned with certain pleasures and pains and that they differ from one another and from the other vicious characters in being disposed in a certain manner towards these; and we described previously the way in which we apply the term 'profligacy' by analogy. Persons on the other hand who owing to insensitiveness are uninfluenced by these pleasures are called by some people 'insensitive' and by others are designated by other names of the same sort; but the state is not a very familiar one nor of common occurrence, because all men err more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches to persons like the boors who are a stock character in comedy—people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indulgences.

And since the temperate character is shown in connexion with pleasures, it follows that it is also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what these are. For the temperate man is not temperate about all pleasures nor about everything pleasant, but apparently about the objects of two of the senses, taste and touch, and in reality about

"This seems to refer to words which must have been lost at 1221 a 20 (Solomon)."
ἀπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὁφεως ἠδονῆς τῶν καλῶν (ἀνευ ἐπιθυμίαις ἀφροδισίων) ἡ λύπη τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐ- 
αρμόστων ἡ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι’ ὀσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσ-
ωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος 
οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πᾶσχειν ἐπὶ τούτων ἡ μὴ 
pᾶσχειν· εἰ γοῦν τὸς καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος 
ἡ ἵππον ἡ ἀνθρωπον, ἡ ἀκροόμενον ἄδοντος, μὴ 
βούλοιτο μὴτε ἐσθίειν μὴτε πίνειν μὴτε ἀφροδισιά-
ζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν ὁ ἄδοντων 
ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἃν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὡσπερ 
οὐδ’ οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ τὰς Σειρήσιν. ἀλλὰ 9 
περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα περὶ ἄπερ καὶ 
tάλλα θηρία μόνα τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα καὶ 
χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γενοῦτα καὶ 
ἄπτα, περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἅλλων αἰσθησεων ἡ ἱδέα 10 
σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἠπαντά φαίνεται ἀναίσθητος δια-
κείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἡ κάλλος· οὐθὲν 
γὰρ ὁ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου φαίνεται πᾶσχοντα αὐτῇ 
τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἡ τῇ ἀκρόασει τῶν εὐαρ-
μόστων, εἰ μὴ τί ποιο συμβέβηκε τεταρτῶδες. ἀλλ’ 
οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐωδία ἡ δυσώδη καὶ τοῖς γε 
αισθήσεις ἄξυτέρας ἐχοῦσιν πᾶσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 11 
ὀσμῶν ταῦταις χαίροντοι ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὰς· λέγω δὲ μὴ 
καθ’ αὐτὰς αἰς ἡ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἡ μεμνημέ-
the objects of touch. For the temperate man is not concerned with the pleasure of beautiful things (apart from sexual desire) or pain caused by ugly things, the medium of which is sight, nor with the pleasure of harmonious sounds or pain of discords conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents; for neither is anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive to sensations of that sort—for example, a man would not be considered profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or listen to the music,—any more than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so constituted as to be insensitive—e.g. harmonious sound, or beauty; for clearly they are not affected in any degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some miraculous occurrences. Nor yet are they sensitive to good or bad smells, although it is true that all their senses are keener than man’s; but even the smells they enjoy are those that have agreeable associations, and are not intrinsically agreeable. By smells not intrinsically agreeable I mean those that we enjoy because of either anticipation or recollection, for example the
νοι, οἶον ὅψων καὶ ποτῶν, δὴ ἐτέραν γὰρ ἡδονήν

taútais χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πίεῖν· καθ’
autᾶς δὲ οἴαι αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν (διὸ ἐμμελῶς
ἐφη Στρατόνικος τὰ μὲν καλὸν ὦξειν, τὰ1 δὲ ἡδύ).
ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν
ἡδονήν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ’ ὃσων τῷ ἀκρῷ
τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ’ ὃσων τῷ φάρυγγι,
καὶ ἔοικεν ἀφῇ μᾶλλον ἡ γεύσει τὸ πάθος· διὸ οἱ
ὕψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακράν
ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὡσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ
Ἐρυξίδος.2 ὡστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα ὡς ἁπλῶς
εἴπειν θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν· οἰνοφλυία
γὰρ καὶ γαστρομαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ ὦψοφαγία3
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα περὶ τὰς εἰρήμενας ἐστὶν
αισθήσεις, εἰς ἀπέρ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται.
περὶ δὲ τὰς δὴ ὄψεως ἡ ἀκοὴς ἡ ὀσφρήσεως
ἡδονᾶς οὔθείς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ,
ἀλλ’ ἀνευ ὀνείδους τὰς ἀμαρτίας φέγγομεν ταύτας,
καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἔγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ’
ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.

'Αναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἡ ὄψως δὲ ὄνομάζειν, δ’15
οὕτως ἔχων ὡστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὃσων ἀνάγκη
cōwneiv ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ
δ’ ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις

30 φύσει τε χαίρουσι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ

1 τὰ . . . τὰ Cas.: τὰs . . . τὰs.
2 Syl.: ἑρέξιος, ἐξ ὑρίδος. 3 ὦψοφαγία καὶ λαγνεία Ric.

4 A contemporary musician, a number of whose smart
sayings are recorded by Athenaeus viii. 347 f–352 d.
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smell of things to eat or drink, for we enjoy these scents on account of a different pleasure, that of eating or drinking; by intrinsically agreeable I mean scents such as those of flowers (this is the reason of Stratonicus's neat remark that the scent of flowers is beautiful but that of things to eat and drink sweet).

12 For even the pleasures of taste are not all attractive to animals, nor are those perceived with the tip of the tongue, but those perceived by the throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryx/is. It follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of that sort that the profligate is concerned; for tipp/ling and gluttony and lechery and gormandizing and the like all have to do with the sensations specified, and these are the departments into which profligacy is divided. But nobody is called profligate if he exceeds in regard to the pleasures of sight or hearing or smell; those errors we criticize without severe rebuke, and generally all the things included under the term 'lack of self-control': the uncontrolled are not profligate, yet they are not temperate.

15 Therefore the person of such a character as to be deficient in all the enjoyments which practically everybody must share and must enjoy, is insensitive (or whatever the proper term is), and he that exceeds in them is profligate. For all people by nature enjoy these things, and conceive desires for them,

b Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch—presumably a character in comedy.
ARISTOTLE

1231 a

οὐκ εἰσὶν οὗτος λέγονται ἀκόλαστοί, οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπείσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνοντες· οὐδὲ ἀνάλγητοι, οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπείσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσι.

35 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὐτὴ ἢ ἔξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἑναντία. ὥστε εἰ ἱσσωφροσὺν ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις περὶ ἀδ ἢ ἀκόλαστος, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἣδεα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσὺν ἢν εἴη, μεσότης οὔσα ἀκόλασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας.

1231 b ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκόλασια, ἡ δ' ἐλλειψις ἦτοι ἀνώνυμος ἡ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑμόμασι προσαγορευμένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἴδιων ἔσται διαιρετέων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ύστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

5 III. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ 1 πραότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρᾶον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὁρῶμεν ὅμως, τῶν πρὸς ταῦτην ἔχειν πώς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τουαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόργητον. 10 σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μηδ' ἐφ' 2 ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένοις τὸν θυμὸν, ἀλλὰ προτηλακομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλυγωρίας· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ

1 Sp.: ὥστε. 2 Rac. (cf. 1220 b 38, 1221 a 17): ἀνόργητον.

a ἀνάλγητοι is thrown in as a possible synonym for ἀναισθητοί, see § 15.
b Perhaps in a sentence lost at 1230 b 15.
c See 1220 b 38, 1221 b 12-15.
without being or being called profligate, for they do not exceed by feeling more joy than they ought when they get them nor more pain than they ought when they do not get them; nor yet are they unfeeling, for they do not fall short in feeling joy or pain, but rather exceed.

And since there are excess and deficiency in regard to these things, it is clear that there is also a middle state, and that this state of character is the best one, and is the opposite of both the others. Hence if temperance is the best state of character in relation to the things with which the profligate is concerned, the middle state in regard to the pleasant objects of sense mentioned will be Temperance, being a middle state between profligacy and insensitiveness: the excess will be Profligacy, and the deficiency will either be nameless or will be denoted by the terms mentioned. We shall have to define the class of pleasures concerned more exactly in our discussion of Self-control and Lack of Control later on.

III. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the term 'gentle' is concerned with the pain that arises from passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. And in our diagram we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce man (for all such traits belong to the same disposition) the slavish and spiritless man; for these are perhaps the most usual words to denote those whose passion is not aroused even at all the things at which it ought to be, but who undergo insulting treatment readily and meet slights with humility; since as opposed to feeling the pain that

\[ a \text{ The mss. give 'slavish and senseless.'} \]
μόλις, τῷ δ' ἦρέμα τῷ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν 
χρόνον τῷ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τῇν λύπην ἢν 
καλούμεν θυμόν. ἔπει δ' ὄσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ᾧ 
ἀλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 
ἐλλεψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιούτος ἐστὶν, ὁ 
καὶ θάττων καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ 
ὁτ' οὐ ἰδεῖ καὶ ήποῖος οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, 
ὁ δ' ἀνδραποδώδης τούναντιον), δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶ 
τις καὶ ὁδικός τῆς ἀνισοτητος. ἔπει οὖν ἡμαρτή 
μέναι ἀμφότεραι αἱ ἔξεις ἐκεῖναι, φανερῶ ὅτι ἐπι 
εἰκῆς ἡ μέση τούτων ἔξεις. οὕτε γὰρ προτερεῖ 
οὕτ' υπερίζει, οὕτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὁργίζεται οὕτε 
οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὁργίζεται. ὡστ' ἔπει καὶ πραότης ἡ 
βελτίστῃ ἔξεις περὶ ταύτα ὁ πάθη ἐστίν, εἰδή ἂν 
καὶ ἡ πραότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πράος μέσος τοῦ 
χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.

IV. "Ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγα-
λοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθερίατος μεσότητας, ἡ μὲν 
ἐλευθερίατος περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσει μὲν πάση μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ 
ἀποβολὴ δὲ πάση λυποῦμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ 
ἀνελευθέρος, ὁ δ' ἀμφότερα ὢττων ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος, 
ὁ δ' ἀμφω ὡς δεῖ ἐλευθέριο (τούτῳ δὲ λέγω τὸ 
ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ 
ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός). ἔπει δ' ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν 2 
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεψις, ὅπου δὲ ἐσχατά εἰσιν, καὶ 
μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βελτιστόν, ἐν δὲ περὶ ἐκαστον 
τῷ εἴδει τὸ βελτιστον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίατην

1 ὁ καὶ ... πάσχων: οἶος καὶ ... πάσχουν Sp.

a i.e. half-way between excess and defect.
we call passion quickly, extremely or for a long time there is feeling it slowly, slightly, or for a short time.

3 And since, as we said in the other cases, so here also there is excess and deficiency (for the harsh man is the sort of man that feels this emotion too quickly, too long, at the wrong time, with the wrong kind of people, and with many people, while the slavish man is the opposite), it is clear that there is also somebody who is at the middle point in the inequality.

4 Since, therefore, both those states of character are wrong, it is clear that the state midway between them is right, for it is neither too hasty nor too slow tempered, nor does it get angry with the people with whom it ought not nor fail to get angry with those with whom it ought. So that since the best state of character in regard to those feelings is gentleness, Gentleness also would be a middle state, and the gentle man would be midway between the harsh man and the slavish man.

1 IV. Greatness of Spirit and Magnificence and Liberality are also middle states. Liberality is the mean in regard to the acquisition and expenditure of wealth. The man who is more pleased than he ought to be by all acquisition and more pained than he ought to be by all expenditure is mean, he that feels both feelings less than he ought is prodigal, and he that feels both as he ought is liberal (what I mean by ‘as he ought,’ both in this and in the other cases, is ‘as right principle directs’). And since the two former characters consist in excess and deficiency, and where there are extremes there is also a mean, and that mean is best, there being a single best for each kind of action, a single thing, it necessarily follows that liberality is a middle state between...
μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. διότι δὲ τὰ 3 χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματός ἐστιν, οἶον ὑποδήματος ἡ ἰματία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῷ χρήσαιτο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ’ οἶον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρῆται γὰρ ἡ ὑπόδημα. 1 ὃ δὲ φιλ- 4 áργυρος ὃ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα ἐστιν ἐσπονδακώς, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτῆσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεως ἐστιν. ὃ δ’ ἀνελευθερος εἶν ἂν καὶ 5 ἀσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὐξήσιν διάκει. ὃ δ’ ἀσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, ὃ δ’ ἐλευθέριος τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη 6 λέγονται διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον περὶ μόρια: οἶον ἀνελευθερος φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδῆς, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μῇ προῖεσθαι, αἰσχροκερδῆς δ’ ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, παραλογισμὸς τῆς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητῆς ὃ ἂδικος κατ’ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτον ὑσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὃ ἐν τῷ 7 ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλογιστὸς δὲ ὃ ἐν τῷ μῇ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογίσμον λύτην.

V. Περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλο- 1 ψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεὶ διορίσαι τὸ ἓδον. ἄσπερ 3

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1 <ἡ> ὑπόδημα Rac. (ὑποδήματι Vic., ὑποδήματι <ἡ> ὑπόδημα> Sus.): ὑποδήματος aut -ta. 2 v.l. ἂν εἶνη. 3 Βζ.: αἰτιον.

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a Cf. Pol. 1., 1257 a 14, where the use of a shoe for sale is included with its use for wear under χρήσις καθ’ αὐτῶ, but dis-
prodigality and meanness as regards getting and parting with wealth. But the terms 'wealth' and 'art of wealth' we use in two senses, since one way of using an article of property, for example a shoe or a cloak, is proper to the article itself, another is accidental, though not as using a shoe for a weight would be an accidental use of it, but for example selling it or letting it on hire, for these uses do employ it as a shoe. The covetous man is the party whose interest centres on money, and money is a thing of ownership instead of accidental use. But the mean man might be even prodigal in regard to the accidental mode of getting wealth, inasmuch as it is in the natural acquisition of wealth that he pursues increase. The prodigal man lacks necessities, but the liberal man gives his superfluity. And of these classes themselves there are species designated as exceeding or deficient in respect of parts of the matter concerned: for example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer are mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skinflint is he who is very excited about small sums; also the man who offends by way of meanness is a false reckoner and a cheat. Similarly 'prodigal' includes the spendthrift who is prodigal in unregulated spending and the reckless man who is prodigal in not being able to endure the pain of calculation.

1 V. On the subject of Greatness of Spirit we must define its characteristic from the attributes of the distinguished from it as οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αυτό, because not its οἰκεία χρήσις, οὗ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκα γέγονεν. The term χρήματα itself denotes to the Greek ear 'useful things.'
ARISTOTLE

1232 a

gάρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὀμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνειν διαφέροντα πόρρω προίόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταύτο συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίως τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερῷ καὶ ὁ ἀνθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασύς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ εἰς γάρ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὀμοροι μέχρι τινὸς, ὡσπερ ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασύς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὅπει ὁ δ' ὅπει ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλείστων. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλοψυχὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὡσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμει.

30 ὡστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεί ὁμοίους εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὡστι καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἁρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ γάρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίνα τὸ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν: δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ἀ διάκει τῇ τὴν κρατίστῃν ἔχον ἔξων περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἥδεα, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη. κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ ἐκαστον ἁρετὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ὀρθῶς, ἀπερ' ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσει καὶ ἡ ἁρετή, ὡστε ἔπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσαις τὰς ἁρεταῖς, ἡ αὐτὴν ἔπεσθαι πάσαις.

"Ετι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψυχὸν εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἐκάστη δ' ἁρετή καταφρονητικὸς ποιεῖ τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἶον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γάρ ἥγεισθαι οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πάν φοβερόν), καὶ σῶφρων ἰδονῶν

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1 Fr. 2 Cas.: τοῦ λανθάνειν. 3 Rac.
4 Γ': δυνάμεως. 5 Sus.: ὡτε.
8 ἡ <τοιαῦτῆς> ἁρετῆ vel ἡ φρονησις ? Rac.
9 ἀνδρεῖος Sp. 10 ἥγεισθαι (cf. 1233 a 31) add. Sol.
great-spirited man. For just as in the other cases of things that, owing to their affinity and similarity up to a point, are not noticed to differ when they advance further, the same has happened about greatness of spirit. Hence sometimes the opposite characters claim the same quality, for instance the extravagant man claims to be the same as the liberal, the self-willed as the proud, the daring as the brave; for they are concerned with the same things, and also are neighbours up to a point, as the brave man can endure dangers and so can the daring man, but the former in one way and the latter in another, and that makes a very great difference. And we use the term 'great-spirited' according to the designation of the word, as consisting in a certain greatness or power of spirit. So that the great-spirited man seems to resemble both the proud man and the magnificent, because greatness of spirit seems to go with all the virtues also. For it is praiseworthy to judge great and small goods rightly; and those goods seem great which a man pursues who possesses the best state of character in relation to such pleasures, and greatness of spirit is the best. And the virtue concerned with each thing judges rightly the greater and the smaller good, just as the wise man and virtue would bid, so that all the virtues go with it, or it goes with all the virtues.

Again, it is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man to be disdainful. Each virtue makes men disdainful of things irrationally deemed great: for example, courage makes a man disdainful of dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not always formidable; and the sober-minded man dis-
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1232 b

μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθερίας χρημάτων. μεγαλοφύσχου δὲ τοῦτο δοκεῖ εἶναι\(^1\) διὰ τὸ περὶ 7
οἵ λίγα σπουδάζειν καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὁ τι\(^2\) δοκεῖ ἐπέρῳ τινί. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόφυσχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνί σπουδαίῳ ἣ πολ-
λοίς τοῖς τυχάνουσιν,\(^3\) ὡστερ 'Αντιφῶν ἐφη πρὸς 'Αγάθωνα κατεξθησμένος\(^4\) τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλιγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοφύσχου μάλιστ' εἶναι πάθος ὅδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ 8
τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλοῦτον, περὶ δὲν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποί, ὀδὴν φροντίζειν\(^5\) περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς· καὶ λυποῖτ' ἂν \(^6\) ἀτιμαξόμενος καὶ ἅρχο-
μενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου, καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυχάνων.

Ὅτω μὲν οὖν δόξειν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν, τὸ 9

γὰρ εἶναι τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμῆς καὶ καταφρονη-
tικῶν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν καὶ δόξης\(^7\) οὐχ ὀμολογεῖσθαι. δεὶ δὲ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἶπειν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμῆ 10
καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχώς· ἡ γὰρ τῶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ καὶ \(^8\) ὑπὸ\(^9\) τῶν ἄξιων λόγου, καὶ

πάλιν τῶ ἐπὶ τῖνι ἡ τιμὴ διαφέρει· μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῶ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῶ ποιῶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶ τιμῆ\(^{10}\) εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ αἳ ἅρχαι καὶ τάλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμω καὶ ἁξὶα σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ ἄρετὴ

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1 εἶναι add. Rac.: τοῦτο δοκεὶ ant δοκεῖ τοῦτο.
2 Rac.: ὁτὶ edd.
3 τυχόντων Cas.
4 v.l. κατεξθησμένος.
5 φροντίζει Cas.
6 Ric. (vel λυπηθήσεται): λυπηθήσετ' ἂν.
7 εἶναι τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης? (καὶ om. λ') Rac.
8 Ric.: ἢ.
9 ὑπὸ? Ric.: τῷ ὑπὸ.

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\(^{a}\) A variant reading gives 'as A. said to A. when he in-
dains great and numerous pleasures, and the liberal 7 man wealth. But the reason why this is thought characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of his caring about few things and those great ones, and not about whatever somebody else thinks. And a great-spirited man would consider more what one virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary people think, as Antiphon after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his speech for his defence. And a feeling thought to be specially characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain. 8 On the other hand, as to the accepted objects of human interest, honour, life, wealth, he is thought to care nothing about any of them except honour; it would grieve him to be dishonoured and ruled by someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is to obtain honour.

9 Thus he might therefore be thought inconsistent, on the ground that to be specially concerned about honour and to be disdainful of the multitude and of reputation do not go together. But in saying this we must distinguish. Honour is small or great in two ways: it differs in being conferred either by many ordinary people or by persons of consideration, and again it differs in what it is conferred for, since its greatness does not depend only on the number or the quality of those who confer it, but also on its being honourable; and in reality those offices and other good things are honourable and worthy of serious pursuit that are truly great, so that there is sincerely praised his defence.’ For Antiphon’s indictment as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens see Thuc. viii. 68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet, see Plato’s Symposium. The anecdote is not recorded elsewhere.
οὔδεμια ἀνεν μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοφύχους

25 ποιεῖν ἐκάστη περὶ ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν, ἄσπερ εἴπομεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοφυχία, ὥστε¹ καὶ ἵδια μεγαλό-

ψυχον τούτων λεκτέων τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ

δ' ἐστὶν ἐνα τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' οὐ,²

ὡς διωρίσθη πρῶτον, τῶν τοιούτων δ' ἀγαθῶν

ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά,

καὶ τοιούτων ἐνιοὶ ἄξιοι καὶ ἄξιοις αὐτοὺς, ἐν
tοιούτωι ξητητέοι ὁ μεγαλοφυχιος. τετραχῶς δ' ¹²

ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι

μεγάλων καὶ ἄξιοι τοιοῦτων, ἐστὶ δὲ μικρὰ

καὶ ἄξιον εἶναι³ τηλικούτων καὶ ἄξιοιν ἑαυτὸν
tοιούτων, ἐστὶ δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὁ

35 μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοιοῦτοις οἶος ἄξιοι ἐν μικρῶν

μεγάλων⁴ ἄξιοιν ἑαυτόν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὥ

dὲ ἄξιοι ἐν μεγάλων ἄξιοι ἐν μικρῶν ἑαυτῶν.

ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιοι μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἄξιοιν ἑαυτῶν, ¹³

ψεκτος· ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν

ἄξιαν⁵ τυχάνειν. ψεκτος δὲ καὶ ὁστὶς ἄξιοι ὅ

υπαρχόντων αὐτῶ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχειν μὴ ἄξιοι

ἑαυτῶν. λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίοις τοιοῦτοις ¹⁴

ἀμφοτέροις οἷος ὅν ἄξιος μεγάλων ἄξιοι ἐαυτὸς

ἑαυτῶν τοιοῦτων, καὶ τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν οἷος ἄξιοιν⁶
no goodness without greatness; owing to which each of the virtues seems to make men great-spirited in regard to the things with which that virtue is concerned, as we said. But nevertheless there is a single virtue of greatness of spirit side by side with the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue must be termed great-spirited in a special sense. And since there are certain goods which are in some cases honourable and in others not, according to the distinction made before, and of goods of this sort some are truly great and others small, and some men deserve and claim the former, it is among these men that the great-spirited man must be looked for. And there are necessarily four varieties of claim: it is possible to deserve great things and to claim them as one's desert; and there are small things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is possible—one man may be of such a character that although deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held in high honour, and another man though deserving great things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it is foolish and not fine to obtain what does not correspond to one's deserts. And he also is blameworthy who though worthy of such things does not deem himself worthy to partake of them although they are available for him. But there is left here the man who is the opposite of both of these, who being worthy of great things claims them as his desert, and is of such a character as to deem

\[\text{The Greek phrase combines the senses of rating one's deserts high and asserting one's claims.}\]


1233 a

εαυτόν· οὗτος ἐπαινετός καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἔπει 15
5 οὖν περὶ τιμής αἱρεσιν καὶ χρήσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλ-

λων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ

μεγαλοψυχία καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, 1 καὶ τοῦτ'

ἀποδίδομεν τῷ μεγαλόψυχῳ, 2 ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης

[αὕτη] 3 ἐπαινετωτάτη, δήλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία

μεσότης ἂν εὑ. τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὡσπερ διεγρά-

10 φαμεν, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων

ἀνάξιον ὑπτα χαυνότης (τοὺς τοιούτους γὰρ χαύ-

νους λέγομεν ὅσοι μεγάλων οἶονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ

όντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὑπτα μὴ ἄξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν

μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικρόψυχος) γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ

όστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' ἀ δικαίως ἂν ἄξιοῖτο μὴ

15 ἄξιοί μηθενός μεγάλου ἑαυτοῦ), ὡστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ
tὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ

μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων 17

οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτοὺς οὔτε μεγαλοψυχοὺς, περὶ

οὐδὲν ὡν ἔχον 5 μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἄξιοὶ

μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος· καὶ τοῖς δόξειν ᾧν

20 ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἄξιον ὑπτα μεγάλων τὸ

μικρῶν ὑπτα ἄξιον μικρῶν ἄξιον ἑαυτοῦ. οὖκ

ἐστι δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε 7 τῷ μεμπτὸς εἶναι, ὥσ γὰρ ὁ

1 οὗ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα hic Ric.: post ἀποδίδομεν.
2 Fr.: τὸν μεγαλόψυχον.
3 Rac.
4 Fr.: μικροψυχοῦ.
5 ὡν ἔχον Rac. (ἔχον ὡν Sus.): ἔχων.
6 μικρῶν add. Sus.
7 Sp.: οὔτε.

a Or, emending the text, 'and is as worthy as he claims to be.'
himself worthy: he is praiseworthy, and he is in the middle between the two. Since, therefore, greatness of spirit is the best disposition in relation to the choice and the employment of honour and of the other good things that are esteemed, and not in relation to useful things, and since we assign this to the great-spirited man, and since also at the same time the middle state is most praiseworthy, it is clear that even greatness of spirit must be a middle state.

And of the opposites as shown in our diagram, the one in the direction of deeming oneself worthy of great goods when one is not worthy is vanity (for the sort of men that fancy themselves worthy of great things though they are not we call vain), and the one that is concerned with not deeming oneself worthy of great things when one is worthy of them is smallness of spirit (for if a man does not think himself worthy of anything great although he possesses qualities which would justly make him considered worthy of it, he is thought small-spirited); so that it follows that greatness of spirit is a middle state between vanity and smallness of spirit. But the fourth of the persons in our classification is neither entirely reprehensible nor is he great-spirited, as he is concerned with nothing possessing greatness, for he neither is nor thinks himself worthy of great things; owing to which he is not the opposite of the man of great spirit. Yet thinking oneself worthy of small things when one is worthy of small things might be thought the opposite of thinking oneself worthy of great ones when one is worthy of great ones; but he is not opposite to the great-spirited man because he is not blameworthy.
Aristotle

1233 a

λόγος κελεύει ἐχει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοπήχω· ὅν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἄξιον ἄντων ἄμφω. καὶ ὁ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλοπήχως, ἄξιος 19 γὰρ ὃν ἐστὶν ἄξιοι· ὁ δὲ μικρόπηχως, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῶ μεγάλων κατὰ τιμήν ἁγαθῶν οὕκ ἄξιοι, τί ἂν ἐποίει1 εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιοι ἦν; ἡ2 γὰρ ἂν3 μεγάλων ἄξιῶν χαύνος ἦν, ἡ4 ἢ ἔτι ἑλλαττόνων. διὸ καὶ οὔθεις ἂν εἴποι μικρόπηχων εἰ τις μέτουκος 20 ὃν ἄρχειν μή ἄξιοι ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὑπείκει, ἀλλ' εἰ τις εὐγενῆς ὃν καὶ ἴγούμενοι μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.

VI. "Εστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν 1 τυχοῦσαν πράξειν καὶ προαιρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μὴ ποι ὑπαρχόντων μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἀνεύ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια σοφῶς ἄστιν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστὶν, ὃ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλομάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ 2 πρέποντος μεγάλους προαιρετικὸς, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῆ6 ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπῆς. ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος 3 ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐχουσι' τινὰ γειτνίασιν οὐσ καλοῦσι τινὲς ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκων.

1 Γ': εἴποι.
2 Μβ: εἰ Ρβ.
3 ἂν ομ. Μβ: εἰ γὰρ μεγάλων ἄξιῶν <αὐτῶν ἄνεξιων> ὡν Σπ.
4 post ἢν lacunam Sus.
5 ἀλλ' τὴν δαπάνην infra post λέγομεν Ric.
6 δαπάνη ? Ric.
7 Cas.: ἐχει.

a The ms. reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation gives "for if he conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things when unworthy," and supposes a gap in the text before the following words.

b A probable emendation substitutes "expenditure" for "pleasure."

c The ms. text gives "he has a certain set of neighbours"
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. v. 18—vi. 3

either, for his character is as reason bids, and in nature he is the same as the great-spirited man, for both claim as their desert the things that they are worthy of. And he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he is worthy of; whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy of them,—what would he have done if his deserts were small? For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things, or of still less. Hence nobody would call a man small-spirited for not claiming to hold office and submitting to authority if he is a resident alien, but one would do so if he were of noble birth and attached great importance to office.

VI. The Magnificent Man also (except in a case when we are using the term metaphorically) is not concerned with any and every action and purposive choice, but with expenditure. Without expenditure there is no magnificence, for it is what is appropriate in ornament, and ornament does not result from any chance expenditure, but consists in going beyond the merely necessary. Therefore the magnificent man is the man who purposively chooses the appropriate greatness in great expenditure, and who even on the occasion of a pleasure of this nature aims at this sort of moderation. There is no name denoting the man who likes spending to excess and inappropriately; however the persons whom some people call tasteless and swaggering have a certain affinity to him. For instance if a whom some people call . . .': but ἀποικίας is abstract at 1232 a 21 and Pol. i., 1257 a 2. Its concrete use in later Greek, 'neighbourhood' = 'set of neighbours' (Plutarch, etc.) has led to corruption here.
οἶνον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλοῦσιος ὡς, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατα- σκεύην όιαν¹ ἀγαθοδαμονιστὰς ἐστὶντι, οὕτος 5 μὲν μικροπρεπῆς, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι᾽ ἐξουσίαν ὅμοιος τῷ σαλάκων, ὁ δὲ κατ’ ἄξιαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος μεγαλο- πρεπῆς· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ’ ἄξιαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἄξιαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον 4 ἱναι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρᾶττοντος² κατ’ ἄξιαν, καὶ περὶ δὲν⁴ καὶ περὶ ὁ, οἶνον περὶ οἰκέτου 10 γάμον ἐτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου· καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰπὲν ἐστὶν⁵ τοσοῦτον ἡ τοιοῦτον, οἶνον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ὄντο⁶ Θεομοστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἢν ἐποίη- σατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προὐπάρξασαν ταπεινό- τητα, ἀλλὰ Κύμωνι. ὁ δ’ ὁπως ἐνυχεῖν ἔχων πρὸς 5 τὴν ἄξιαν οὐθεὶς⁷ τούτων.

Καὶ ἔπ’ ἔλευθεριότητος ὀδανύτως· ἔστι γὰρ τις οὔτ’ ἔλευθερος οὔτ’ ἀνελευθερος.⁸

VII. Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκαστα τῶν περὶ 1 τὸ ἕθος ἐπανετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ύπερβολαῖ 1 τὰ δ’ ἐλλειψεις τὰ δὲ μεσοτητές εἰςι παθητικαὶ, οἶον ὁ φθονερὸς καὶ ὁ ἐπιχαρέκακος. καθ’ ὁς 20 γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ


ᵃ i.e. persons who only drink the formal toast ('Here's to Good Luck'), with which dinner ended.
rich man spending money on the wedding of a favourite thinks it fitting for him to have the sort of arrangements that would be fitting when entertaining abstainers, he is shabby, while one who entertains guests of that sort after the manner of a wedding feast, if he does not do it for the sake of reputation or to gain an office, resembles the swaggerer; but he that entertains suitably and as reason directs is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable. But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favourite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would have been for Cimon. But he who is casual in regard to the question of suitability is not in any of these classes.

Similarly in regard to liberality: a man may be neither liberal nor illiberal.

VII. Generally speaking the other praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect of an emotion: for instance, the envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of character after which they are named—Envy means being

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\(^a\) The story of Themistocles at the Olympic festival incurring disapproval by vying with Cimon in the splendour of his equipment and entertainments is told by Plutarch, *Vit. Them.* 5.
The man who calls each thing itself, i.e. what it really is, calls a spade a spade.
pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy at undeserved adversities; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity.

3 Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness: the man who pays regard to nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards everybody's is bashful, he who regards the opinion of those who appear good is modest.

4 Friendliness is a middle state between Animosity and Flattery; the man who accommodates himself readily to his associates' desires in everything is a flatterer, he who runs counter to them all shows animosity, he who neither falls in with nor resists every pleasure, but falls in with what seems to be the best, is friendly.

5 Dignity is a middle state between Self-will and Obsequiousness. A man who in his conduct pays no regard at all to another but is contemptuous is self-willed; he who regards another in everything and is inferior to everybody is obsequious; he who regards another in some things but not in others, and is regardful of persons worthy of regard, is dignified.

6 The truthful and sincere man, called 'downright,' is midway between the dissembler and the charlatan. He that wittingly makes a false statement against himself that is depreciatory is a dissembler, he that exaggerates his merits is a charlatan, he that speaks
The term εὐτράπελος means literally ‘able to turn easily,’ versatile; it denotes both ‘witty’ and ‘easy-going.’
of himself as he is is truthful and in Homer's phrase 'sagacious'; and in general the one is a lover of truth and the others lovers of falsehood.

7 Wittiness also is a middle state, and the witty man is midway between the boorish or stiff man and the buffoon. For just as in the matter of food the squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on principle, that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the quality to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of character, and also a middle state is praiseworthy, whereas extremes are blameworthy. But as there are two kinds of wit (one consisting in liking a joke, even one that tells against oneself if it is funny, for instance a jeer, the other in the ability to produce things of this sort), these kinds of wit differ from one another, but both are middle states; for a man who can produce jokes of a sort that will give pleasure to a person of good judgement even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good.

b Viz. βωμολοχία, 'buffoonery,' N.E. 1128 a 15.
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Πάσαι δ' αὕται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεται μὲν,
25 οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἁρεταὶ, οὔτ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, ἀνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ· ταῦτα δέ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαφέρεσιν, ἐκαστον γάρ αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς ἰ
φυσικὰς συμβάλλειται ἁρετάς· ἐστὶ γάρ, ὡσπερ λεχθῆσαι ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἁρετὴ
30 καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως, μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἰ
φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γάρ ἄλλον ἰ
αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιο-
σύνην καὶ ἡ ἁίδως εἰς σωφροσύνην (διὸ καὶ ὀρί-
ζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τῆς σωφροσύνης), ὁ δ' ἀληθῆς καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἐμφρων ὁ δ' ἀφρων.

1234 b "Εστὶ δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἀκροῖς τὸ μέσον ἤ]
ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλους, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνε-
ται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλὰκις μετ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνίστε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ
δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς· ὅταν μὲν
5 γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ἔστιν, μέσοι γίνονται, ἐν τῷ
μέσῳ γάρ ἐστὶ πῶς τὰ ἀκρα.

Αἱ δ' ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀκροῖς πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὅτε
μὲν καθ' ύπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ καθ' ἐλλεψιν. αὕται
δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα δύο, ὁλυγότης τε, οἶον
10 τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ οτι ἐφ' ὁ ἀμαρ-
τάνομεν μᾶλλον, τούτῳ ἐναντιώτερον εἰναι δοκεῖ· τὸ

1 καὶ add. Rac.

a Not in E.E., but cf. N.E. vi., 1144 b 1-17.
b Truthfulness and mendacity contribute to wisdom and folly as νέμεσις and φθόνος do to δικαιοσύνη and ἁδικία, and αἴδως (and ἀναιδεία) to σωφροσύνη (and ἀκολασία).
c Cf. 1222 a 22-b 4.
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, III. vii. 10-16

10 All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each of them is an emotion. But because they are natural they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said in what follows, \(^a\) each virtue exists both naturally and otherwise, that is, in conjunction with thought.

11 Therefore envy contributes to injustice (for the actions that spring from it affect another person), and righteous indignation to justice, and modesty to temperance (owing to which people even define temperance as a species of emotion), and the sincere and false are respectively wise and foolish. \(^b\)

12 And the mean is more opposed to the extremes than the extremes are to one another, because the mean does not occur in combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in others, and in general not uniform in a bad way—for when men lack uniformity in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the mean contains both extremes.

The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to be the same in the case of both the extremes, but sometimes the greater opposition is by way of excess, sometimes by way of deficiency. The causes of this are partly the two first mentioned, \(^c\) rarity (for example, the rarity of people insensitive to pleasant things) and the fact that the error to which we are more prone seems more opposite to the mean, and thirdly the fact that
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dè τρίτον, ὃτι τὸ ὀμοιότερον ἦττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος¹ καὶ ἁσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδὸν, περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἦδη λεκτέον.

¹ τὸ θάρσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος Mᵇ (sed cf. 1220 b 39): τὸ θάρσος (potius θράσος Rac.) πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν Bz.

ᵃ Or, 'confidence'; but perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'courage.'
the extreme that more resembles the mean seems less opposite to it, as is the case with daring in relation to boldness a and extravagance in relation to liberality.

We have therefore sufficiently discussed the other praiseworthy virtues, and must now speak about Justice.

(Books IV, V, VI are omitted, as they are identical with Books V, VI, VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.)
I. Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖὸν τι, καὶ τὶς ὁ 1 φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἡ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἡ
πλεοναχῶς, καὶ εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, 1 ἐτι δὲ
πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν,
ἐπισκεπτέον οὔθενὸς ἦττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθη καλῶν
καὶ αἱρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργοιν εἶναι 2
dokei μάλιστα ποιήσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ
touτὸ φασιν εἶναι χρῆσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι
φίλους ἐαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ’ ἀλλή-
λων. ἐτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους 3
eῖναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ
ἀνήρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἡθική
tis εἶναι ξισι· καὶ ἐὰν οἱ δουλαται ποιησαι 2 ὡστε
μὴ ἄδικεῖν, ἀλί 3 φίλους ποιῆσαι, οἱ γὰρ ἄληθιοι
φίλοι οὐκ ἄδικοσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι 4
ὡσιν, οὐκ ἄδικήσουσιν· ἡ ταύτων ἀρα ἡ ἐγγύς τι ἡ
dικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτων τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον 5
eῖναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν
ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἀπας καὶ ἡ ἐκου-
1 πόσαι εἰσὶν Sp.: ποσαχῶς? Rac. (ποσαχῶς ἐστίν vel πόσα ἐστίν <εἴδη> Bz.).
2 πεῖσαι? Ric.
3 ἀλί Iac.: ἄλλ’ εἰς. (ἀλλοις, φίλους ποιήσει Sp., ἄλλους φίλους
ποιήσαι dein Fr.)

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I. Friendship—its nature and qualities, what constitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship has one or several meanings, and if several, how many, and also what is our duty towards a friend and what are the just claims of friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less than any of the things that are fine and desirable in men's characters. For to promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political science; and people say that it is on this account that goodness is a valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by one another cannot be each other's friends. Furthermore we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly displayed towards friends; it is thought that a good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a state of the moral character; and if one wishes to make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them friends, for true friends do not wrong one another. But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are either the same or nearly the same thing.

In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude a very terrible thing, because the whole of life and voluntary association is with friends; for we pass
απορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὃς οἱ ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὀμοίων τῷ ὀμοίῳ εἶναι φίλοι, οὖν εἰρήται

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὀμοίον ἀγεί θέος ὡς τὸν ὀμοίον·
καὶ γὰρ κολοΐς παρὰ κολοΐν . . .

ἐγὼν δὲ φῶρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον.

οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὀλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν αἱ ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ τὸ ὀμοίου ἵναι πρὸς τὸ ὀμοίον, διὸ Ἔμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κῦν ἐφη καθήσαται ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὀμοίον.

οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸν φίλον λέγοντον· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασίν εἶναι φίλον, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητόν πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμεῖν· δὲ οὐ τὸ ἕχρον τοῦ ἕχρου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἕγρου (οὖν εἰρήται

ἔρα μὲν ὀμβροῦ γαία,
καὶ τὸ
μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκὸν·

1 v.l. τὸ. 2 Fr.: ἐπιθυμεῖ. 3 τοῦ add. Mb.

a Od. xvii. 218.
b 'Birds of a feather flock together.' Sc. ἱζάνει, 'perches': an iambic verse quoted in full M.M. 1208 b 9, and in the form κολοΐν ποτὶ κολοΐν N.E. viii., 1155 a 35, where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).
our days with our family or relations or comrades,  
children, parents or wife. And our private rights  
in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves,  
whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men  
are established by law and do not depend on us.  

Many questions are raised about friendship—first,  
on the line of those who take in wider considera-

tions and extend the term. For some hold that like  
is friend to like, whence the sayings:

Mark how God ever brings like men together a;  
For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . . b;  
And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf. c

And the natural philosophers even arrange the  
whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first  
principle that like goes to like, owing to which  
Empedocles d said that the dog sits on the tiling  
because it is most like him. e

Some people then give this account of a friend; or on con-

trast?

but others say that opposite is dear to opposite,  
since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to  
everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but  
the wet (whence the sayings—

Earth loveth rain, f  
and

In all things change is sweet— g

a 'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is  
unknown.

b Mystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of  
Agrigentum (Girgenti), fl. 490 B.C.

c Presumably, like in colour; true of Greek dogs to-day.  
Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer pro-

tective mimicry.

d Quoted as from Euripides, N.E. viii., 1155 a 34; the play  
is not known.

e Euripides, Orestes 234.
1235 a  

η δὲ μεταβολή εἰς τούναντίον· τὸ δὲ ὁμοιὸν ἔχθρον 

τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ γὰρ 

κεραμέως κεραμεῖ κοτεῖν, 

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἄλλη λοις 

ζῶα. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ υπολήψεις τοσοῦτον δι- 10 
estάσων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοιὸν φίλον, 2 τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον 
pολέμιον—

tῷ πλέονι δὲ αἱ πολέμιοι καθίσταται 
tούλασσον, ἔχθρᾶς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται, 

ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἦ 11 

dὲ φιλία δοκεῖ συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ 

'Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾶ τῷ ποιήσαντι 

ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τῆς θεών καὶ 3 ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο, 

οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐνίαν ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὄξεως καὶ βαρέως, 

οὐδὲ τὰ ζώα ἄνευ θήλεως καὶ ἀρρενος ἐναντίων 

ὄντων.

Δύο μὲν οὖν 4 αὐταὶ δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσὶ, λίαν 12 

tε καθόλου κεχωρισμέναι 5 τοσοῦτον, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἢδη 

ἐγγυτέρω 6 καὶ οἰκείοτεραι τῶν φανομένων. τοῖς 

μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι 

φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δὲ ἄτοπον 

eἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται 13 

d' ἦδη 8 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαπο- 

θυνήσκειν γονέων αἱροῦνται τῶν τέκνων). τοῖς δὲ ἐν τὸ 14 

χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι

1 Fr.: αἱ. 2 φίλον <φασί> vel <οἴονται> Ric. 

3 Rac.: καὶ (ἐκ τ' II. xviii. 107). 

4 οὖν add. Sus. 5 καὶ κεχωρισμέναι Cas. 

6 ἐγγυτέραι Mb. 7 οἰκείοτεραι Rac.: οἰκεῖαι. 

8 δ' ἦδη Rac.: δὲ (γὰρ ἦ). 9 Fr.: οὖν.
change being transition to the opposite), whereas like hates like, for

Potter 'gainst potter hath a grudge, and animals that live on the same food are hostile to one another. These opinions, therefore, are thus widely variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—

The less is rooted enemy to the more, for ever, and begins the day of hate,

and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, whereas friendship seems to bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and Heracleitus rebukes the poet who wrote—

Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth, for, he says, there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no animals without male and female, which are opposites.

These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and being so widely separated they are too general; but there are others that are closer together and more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends, but only for the good. Others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children (and maternal affection we see existing even among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their young). Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do

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\[a\] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 25 ("Two of a trade never agree").

\[b\] Euripides, *Phoenissae* 539 f. (ἐχθρᾶς ἡμέρας = ἔχθρας, cf. δοῦλον ἡμαρ = δούλεια, Paley).

\[c\] The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. end of 6th cent. B.C.

\[d\] Iliad xviii. 107.

\[e\] *i.e.* being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are too sweeping, and do not really correspond with the facts.
καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοί αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν (ὡσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων), καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥυπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ, ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός· ὅσ ἐπὶ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὡσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλους εἶναι. τὸ τε γὰρ ὅμοιον3 ἄχρηστον τῷ ὅμοιῷ καὶ ἐναντίότητι ὀμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλείστου, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἄχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, φθαρτικόν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον. ἦτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν βαδίου τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον, τοῖς δὲ σπανίωτατον γνώσιν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχεσθαι ἀνευ ἀτυχίας4, τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι· οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοὺς συνδιαμένουσιν εἰς ταῖς ἀτυχοῦντων ὁμιλίαις πάλιν εὐτυχοῦντων φιλίαι.

II. Ληστέος δὴ λόγος5 ὅστις ἦμιν ἀμα τὰ τε δικοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δικοῦντα. μάλιστα γὰρ ὅμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις· συμβαίνει δὲ μένει τὰς ἐναντίωσεις ἐὰν ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἄλθες ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ.

"Εχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἢδυ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 2

1 ἀφ' ἔαυτῶν Iac. 2 [καὶ] ? Rac. 3 ὅμοιον add. Fr. 4 Vict.: εὐτυχίας. 5 Cas.: λοιπὸς. (λοιπὸς <λόγος> Sp., τρόπος Syl.)
pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own persons (as the old Socrates \(^a\) used to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factors \(^b\) seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest removed from likeness, and at the same time opposite is most useless to opposite, since opposite is destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought a friend of the prosperous; and others maintain that we must not trust even those who stay with us in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us and pretending, in order that by associating with us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship when we are again prosperous.

II. Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will best explain to us the views held on these matters and at the same time solve the difficulties and contradictions. And this will be secured if the contradictory views are shown to be held with some reason. For such a line of argument will be most in agreement with the observed facts: and in the upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views stand good.

There is also a question as to whether what is Friendship is based on

\(^a\) Cf. 1216 b 3.

\(^b\) *i.e.* likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon).
ARISTOTLE

1235 b
20 ἐστὶ τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὐ ἐπι-
θυμοῦμεν (καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον, οὔδεὶς γὰρ
ἐραστῆς ὅστις οὐκ ἄει φιλεῖ),
ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἠδέος, ταῦτη μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον
tοῦ ἠδοῦ, εἰ δὲ ὁ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἄγαθὸν· ἐστὶ δ' ἐτερον τὸ ἠδοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν.
Περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν 3
25 τούτως πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τηνδὲ.
tοῦ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἢ τὸ
φαινόμενον ἄγαθὸν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἠδὸν ὀρεκτὸν, φαι-
νόμενον γὰρ τι ἄγαθὸν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς
δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ (οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῳ τῆς
ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα). ὅτι μέντοι φίλον
30 καὶ τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἠδὸν δῆλον.
Τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἐτέραν. 4
τῶν γὰρ ἄγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἄγαθά, τὰ δὲ
τινὶ, ἄπλως δ' οὔ· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθα καὶ
ἀπλῶς ἠδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι φαμεν
σώματι συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἄγαθά, τὰ
35 δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἠδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι 5
καὶ ὀλοκλήρω, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ τῇ καὶ οὐ τὸ
ἐν τῷ σκότει· καὶ τοῖς τῷ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐναντίως.
καὶ οἶνος ἢδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλώτταν
ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ ἐνίοτε 3 ὤξος παρεγχέουσιν,

1 Sus.: δὲ Pb, om. Mb.
2 Iac. (cf. Hist. An. 488 a 26 τὰ μὲν νυκτερόβια . . . τὰ δ' ἐν
τῷ φωτὶ τῇ): ὄραν.
3 Ric.: οὔτε.

a Euripides, Troades 1051.

b i.e. are different psychological experiences.
dear to us is the pleasant or the good. If we hold dear what we desire (and that is specially characteristic of love, for

None is a lover that holds not dear for aye a),

and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is the pleasant that is dear; whereas if we hold dear what we wish, it is the good; but the pleasant and the good are different things.

3 We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting-point the following. The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the spirit). Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear.

4 This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example doses of medicine and surgical operations; and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse is the case for a man with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ

1236 a ἄλλα τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἑπτά
ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἄ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις,
ἀλλ’ ἄ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν ἀμφοτέρων γονῶν μεμνη-
μένοι ταῦτ’ αἱρούμεθα. ὡς δ’ ἔχει παιδίον καὶ
θηρίον πρὸς ἀνθρωπον καθεστώτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ

5 φαύλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον.
τούτοις δὲ ἥδεα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ
tὰ ἁγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.

Ἐπεί οὖν τὸ ἁγαθὸν¹ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ

8 τοιόνδ’ εἰναι λέγομεν ἁγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὑφέλιμον
καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ² τὸ ἥδυ τὸ μὲν ἄπλῶς καὶ

10 ἁγαθὸν ἄπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τυι καὶ³ φαινόμενον ἁγαθὸν,
ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁφύχων δὲ’ ἐκαστὸν τούτων
ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαι τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω⁴ καὶ
ἀνθρωπὸν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὅτι τοιόσοδ’ καὶ δ’ ἀρετήν,

15 τὸν δ’ ὅτι ὑφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ’ ὅτι ἥδυς
καὶ δ’ ἡδονήν. φίλος δὲ⁵ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος

Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἰναι, καὶ μῆτε⁹

καθ’ ἐν ἀπάσας μηθ’΄ ὡς εἶδη ἐνὸς γένους μῆτε

20 πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμονύμως. πρὸς μίαν γὰρ τινα

λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὡσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν, καὶ ψυχῆν

ιατρικήν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὦργανον καὶ ἔργον,

¹ Sp.: τὰ ἁγαθὰ. ² ἐτὶ δὲ Bz.: ἔτει δὲ Ph., ἐτεί Mβ.
³ καὶ Beier: ἥ (om. Γ). ⁴ οὕτω Bz.: ὡσπερ.
⁵ Ric.: τὸν μὲν γὰρ τοιόσος. ⁶ Iac.: ἡ.
⁷ Sus.: μήθ’. ⁸
in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste.

6 And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really pleasant things are not those pleasant to children and animals, but those pleasant to the adult; at least it is these that we prefer when we remember both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult human being, so the bad and foolish man stands to the good and wise man; and these take pleasure in things that correspond to their characters, and these are things good and fine.

7 Since therefore good is a term of more than one meaning (for we call one thing good because that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the other are in some way aware of this.

8 It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of friendship, and that they are not all so termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is primary, like the term ‘surgical’—and we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical operation, but we apply the term
αλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ’ οὗ δ’ λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, οἴον ὄργανον ἰατρικόν ὃ ἄν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσατο, ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὄργανον. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τῷ πρῶτον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι πρῶτον λαμβάνουσι καὶ τῷ πρῶτον καθόλου τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ψεύδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ’ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα οὐ γὰρ ἐφ- ἀρμόττοντος ἐνὸς λόγου οὐκ οἰονται τὰς ἀλλὰς φιλίας εἶναι οἱ δ’ εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσίν. οἱ δ’ ὅταν ἡ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμότητη, ὡς οὕσαν καθόλου ἂν εἴπερ ἥν πρώτη, οὖδ’ εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἀλλὰς φασίν. ἐστὶ δὲ πολλὰ εἴδη φιλίας τῶν γὰρ ρηθέντων ἡν ἡδη, ἐπειδὴ διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν, ἡ μὲν γὰρ διώρισται δι’ ἀρετὴν ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδυ.
Τούτων ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον ἐστὶ νὴ Δία’ τῶν πλείστων φιλία. διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρῆσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου, ὡσπερ ἡ παροιμία

Γλαύκ’, ἐπίκουρος ἀνήρ τόσον φῖλος εἶς κέ μάχηται,

καί

οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρᾶς.

ἡ δὲ δι’ ἡδονῆν τῶν νέων, τούτου γὰρ αἰσθησιν ἔχουσιν. διὸ εὐμετάβολος φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων, μεταβάλλοντων γὰρ τὰ ἡθη κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας

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1 ὁ add. Ric.  2 πᾶσιν Sus.: ἡμῖν.  3 τῷ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι Sus.: τῷ καθόλου εἶναι τό.  4 τῷ add. Sp.  5 οὐκ οὖν ? Rac.  6 τὰς add. Bz.  7 ἐστι νὴ Δία lac.: ἐστὶν ἦ.  8 τὸσον φῖλος Fr.: τῶν σώφων φῖλον.  9 ἐστε Sol.
properly to that which is primarily so called. The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not implicit in that of surgeon. Therefore in every case people seek the primary, and because the universal is primary they assume that also the primary is universal; but this is untrue. Hence in the case of friendship, they cannot take account of all the observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, they think that the other kinds of friendship are not friendships at all; but really they are, although not in the same way, but when they find that the primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it would be universal if it really were primary, they say that the others are not friendships at all. But in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the things said already, as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.

Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are so, as says the proverb—

Glaucus, an ally is a friend
  As long as he our battle fights,

and

Athens no longer knoweth Megara.

On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people’s friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as
Herodotus, ii. 68, says that the *trochilus* picks leeches out of the crocodile's throat, Aristotle, *Hist. An.* ix. 6. 6, that it picks the crocodile's teeth. In reality it picks gnats from the crocodile's open mouth.

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they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best men.

16 It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual reciprocity of affection and purpose. For the object of affection is dear to the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is himself dear to the object. This friendship, therefore, only occurs in man, for he alone perceives purpose; but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small extent between the domestic animals and man, and between animals themselves, for instance Herodotus’s account of the friendship between the crocodile and the sandpiper, and the perching together and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak. 17

18 The bad may be each other’s friends from motives both of utility and of pleasure; though some say that they are not really friends, because the primary kind of friendship does not belong to them, since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another do not feel affection for one another. But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one another, though not according to the primary form of friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they are lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, when people look into the matter closely, that those who feel affection for each other on account of pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable.
αὐτὴ δὲ ἀβέβαιος. ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὡσπερ εἰρηταί, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δὲ ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν 22 ἐκεῖνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ' ἕνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἄδυνατον.¹ λείπεσαι τοῖνυν 23 οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μόνη ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἐστι δ' ὡς πάσαι, οὕτε ὡς ὀμόνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἐτυχεῖν ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτάς, οὕτε καθ' ἐν εἴδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἐν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ τὸ αὐτὸ 24 καὶ ἁμα ἂν μὴ τὶ ἐμποδίζῃ, δ' ἂληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ πρῶτος ἐστὶν, ἐστὶ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ 30 αὐτὸς δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸς (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὡς γὰρ βουλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τάγαθα, ἀνάγκη καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸν εἶναι), ὡς ἂληθινὸς φίλος 25 καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ἀπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὀπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. ἐτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλον. 35 ἐχει γὰρ ἐπιστασιν, πότερον τὸ γ' αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν ἡ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν φίλον, καὶ πότερον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὡστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡδύ, ὡς οὕ. ἀμφω γὰρ εἰς ταύτο συνακτέον· τὰ τε γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἂν πως ⁹ τύχῃ φευκτά, καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὸν οὐθέν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὁ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ¹⁰ ὔπως εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἐστι γὰρ αἰρετὸν μὲν τὸ 27 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν· ἀ δεὶ

¹ Bz.: δύνατον.
² L': τίς.
³ Sp.: ὡς.
⁴ δι' add. Sp.
⁵ Sp.: αἱρείσθαι.
⁶ Sp.: ὁ δ'.
⁷ Erasmus: ἔχει ἐπιστασιν. πότερον γάρ.
⁸ ὡστε τὸ φιλητὸν καὶ ἡδύ? Rac.
⁹ ἂν πως Iac.: ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ἂν ἡδέα δυτα> Ric.).
¹⁰ μὲν ἃπλῶς? Rac.
But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been said, though not that sort of friendship but one derived from it. Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to that form of friendship alone is to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible to bring all friendship under one definition. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as related to one thing.

And since the same thing is absolutely good and absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must necessarily be desirable for his own sake), a true friend is also absolutely pleasant; owing to which it is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant. But we must define this still further, for it is debatable whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or what is absolutely good, and whether the actual exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure, so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not. Both questions must be brought to the same issue; for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that things absolutely good shall be good for oneself.

For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself;
ΟΣΤ' ἔπειδὴ ἡ πρώτῃ φιλία κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἔσον-20
tαι καὶ αὐτὸι ἀπλῶς ἁγαθοὶ, τοῦτο δ' ὑπ' ὁτι
χρήσιμοι, ἄλλ' ἄλλου τρόπουν. διχὼς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ 30
τῶδε ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθὸν καὶ ὁμοίως,
ἄσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξεων:
ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ὁφελίμοι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο (δὲν
τρόπον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύσθαι).
ὡστε καὶ ἡ ἔξος, ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετή (ἔστω γὰρ ὁ 31
ἀνθρώπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων). ἡ ἄρα τοῦ φύσει
σπουδαίου ἀρετῆ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθὸν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ
ἐκεῖνω.
Ομοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ 32
ἔπιστατέον καὶ σκεπτόν πότερον ἔστω ἄνευ ἡδονῆς
φιλία, καὶ τῇ διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἔστι

1 Rac.: εὐθέτως (ante quod lacunam Sp., initium protaseos
cuius apodosis l. 6 ἀνάγκη).
2 ὁ add. Iac.
3 Bus.: ἀφυῆς εὐφυῶς.
4 Bus.: τοῦτο.
5 sic versio Solomonis: σπουδαίον.
6 Ἄρα τὸ.
7 ὁ add. Rac.
8 τὸ ... τρόπον Iac. (τὸ add. Rac.): τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον.
and the two ought to come into agreement. This is effected by goodness; and the purpose of political science is to bring it about in cases where it does not yet exist. And one who is a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), similarly a man rather than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the pleasant in the emotions.

Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner.

For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two kinds—

for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good for that thing.

The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure, and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which

Friendship based on virtue the primary kind.
1237 a

tο φιλεῖν, πότερον¹ ὅτι ἄγαθὸς κἂν εἰ μὴ ἥδυς, ἀλλ' ὦτ² δι' τοῦτο; διὰ χῶς δὴ λέγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἄγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἥδονῆς φαίνεται; δὴ λογικῶς ὅτι ἔστερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωροῦσι καὶ μαθήσεις αἰσθηται μάλιστα τῷ ἕδει, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἁμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀριθμός ἄγαθὸν ἥδυς ἀριθμός, καὶ οἷς ἄγαθον, τούτως ἥδυ. διὸ εὕρεσε τὰ ὄμοια 34 ἀλλήλους χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἔδιστον ἀνθρωπος· ὥστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελή, δὴ λογικῶς ὅτι καὶ τελειωθήσεται· ὅ ὅμως ὅ σπουδαίος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἥδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δὴ λογικῶς ὅτι καὶ ὀλοκλήρως ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἄγαθον καὶ ἠδέων ὅτι ἄγαθὰ καὶ ἠδέα· ἔστι δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φιλία ἔξις ἀφ' 35 ἢς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἐργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὐτῆς δ' οὐκ ἔξις ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῶ τῷ φιλοῦντι· δυνάμεως δὲ πάσης ἔξις, ἡ γὰρ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἡ ἡ ἐπιφον. διὸ τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι οὐ 36 τοῦ φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμφύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν 37


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a Goodness and pleasantness.
b Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘or not, but because he is pleasant.’
c Potential and actual (Solomon).
d Ross marks this clause as corrupted.
exactly of the two things the affection depends—
do we love a man because he is good even if he
is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?
Then, affection having two meanings, does actual
affection seem to involve pleasure because activity
is good? It is clear that as in science recent studies
and acquirements are most fully apprehended, be-
cause of their pleasantness, so with the recognition
of familiar things, and the principle is the same in
both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely
good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good
is pleasant to those for whom it is good. Hence
ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the
thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even
with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things
when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man.
And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, ac-
companied by pleasure, of one another’s acquaint-
ance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind
is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely
good and pleasant because they are good and
pleasant; and friendship itself is a state from which
such choice arises. For its function is an activity,
but this not external but within the lover himself;
whereas the function of every faculty is external,
for it is either in another or in oneself qua other.
Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is
not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing
loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of
friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate
thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate
thing also, for even inanimate things are loved.
And since to love actively is to treat the loved

* Sc. (τὸ τοῦτον ἄγαθόν) οῖς ἄγαθόν, τούτων ἕδυ.
 Aristotle

1237 b τῶν φιλομένων ἐστὶν χρήσθαι ἣν φιλομενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλομένων τῶν φίλων ἣν φίλος ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἱατρός, ἡδονή τοῖνυν ἢ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτός, αὐτὴ φιλική· αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἀλλο. 3 ωστ' ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἢ πρῶτη φιλία. οὔδὲ δεὶ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθέν τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνει· τί γὰρ; σφόδρα δυσώδης λείπεται· ἀγαπητῶν γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν συζητητέον ἢ μὴ.

Αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ πρῶτη φιλία, ἡν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν. αἱ δ' ἀλλαὶ δι' αὐτῆς καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ 39 ἀμφισβητοῦνται, βέβαιον γὰρ τὶ δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία, μόνη δ' αὐτὴ βέβαιος· τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥαδίως ποιεῖ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθὴν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἂνευ πίστεως φιλία 40 βέβαιος, ἢ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἂνευ χρόνου· δεὶ γὰρ πείραν λαβεῖν, ὡσπερ λέγει καὶ Θεόγνις.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρός νόοι οὔδε γυναικὸς, πρὶν πειραθείης ὡσπερ ὑποζυγίου.

οἱ δ' ἂνευ χρόνου οὐ φιλοι ἀλλὰ βούλονται εἶναι φιλοι. καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἢ τοιαύτη ἑξίς ὡς φιλία· ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχωσι φιλοι εἶναι, διὰ 41 τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλοι ἀλλ' εἶναι φιλοι. τὸ δ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς

1 Fr.: τὸ φιλομένου δ. 2 Bz.: καὶ.
3 Iac.: ἄλλῳ. 4 Rac.: εὐφραίνειν.
5 οἶνον εἰ σφόδρα δυσώδης γίνεται Ric.
6 Ross: ἀγαπαται. 7 Sol.: συζητήτωσι.
8 Fr.: ἥ. 9 Bz.: οὐ ποιεῖ.
10 οἱ δ' ... φιλοι Fr.: οὐδ' ἂνευ χρόνου φιλοι. 11 εἶναι add. Fr.
12 εἶναι add. Rac.
object *qua* loved, and the friend is an object of love to the friend *qua* dear to him but not *qua* musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself *qua* himself; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him *qua* good, it is not the primary friendship. Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society!

This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be something stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says:

Thou canst not know the mind of man nor woman 
E'er thou hast tried them as thou triest cattle.

Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends; and such a character very readily passes for friendship, because when eager to be friends they think that by rendering each other all friendly services they do not merely wish to be friends but actually are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in friendship as in everything else; people are not
1237 b

φιλίας: οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται υψαίνειν υψαίνουσιν, ὁστ' οὐδ' εἰ εἶναι1 φίλοι βούλονται ᾗδη καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημείον δὲ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι 1238 a τὸν ἀγνώτα εἰ βελτίων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀνευ πείρας

25 ἀνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὃν μὲν γὰρ πεῖραν δεδώκασιν ἄλληλοι, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὃν δὲ μὴ, πεισθεὶς ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες. ἀμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὐτῇ ἡ φιλία· ἀπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαύλοι καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροι εἰσίν οἱ ἁγαθοὶ, ἃν μὴ διὰ πεῖραν ἀπιστῶσιν. οὶ δὲ φαύλοι αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἁγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεὶ μᾶλλον ἀνθρωπον ἡ πράγματα, ὡστ' οὕτω φίλοι· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις.

30 Οὐ γίνεται ἢ ρ' ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτῃ ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πεῖραν λαβεῖν· εκάστῳ γὰρ ἢν ἐδει2 συζήσατε. οὐδὲ δη αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἰματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτω τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντος δυνοῦν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ χείρον πάλαι ἐχρήτο, τῷ βελτίον δὲ μηδέπω,

40 τοῦθ' αἰρετέον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου

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1 εἶναι add. Rac.
2 Bus.: ἢν ἐδε (δει? Rac.).
healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that even if people wish to be friends they are not actually friends already. A proof of this is that people who have come into this position without first testing one another are easily set at variance; for though men are not set at variance easily about things in which they have allowed each other to test them, in cases where they have not, whenever those who are attempting to set them at variance produce evidence they may be convinced. At the same time it is manifest that this friendship does not occur between base people either; for the base and evil-natured man is distrustful towards everybody, because he measures other people by himself. Hence good men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial ‘common property as between friends’ is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends.

Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a coat; although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. For a friend is
ουδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἄλλα χρόνον δεῖ· διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἄλων. ἀμα δὲ δεῖ· μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἄγαθόν εἶναι ἄλλα ἄλλα ἄγαθός καὶ σοί, εἰ δὲ φίλος ἐσται σοι φίλος· ἄγαθός μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ἄγαθός εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἄγαθός· ἀπλῶς τε δ' ἄγαθός καὶ φίλος ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτα ἄμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς ἄγαθόν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλω· ἥ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαῖος, ἄλλω δ' ἄγαθός· ὅτι χρήσιμος· τὸ δὲ πολλὸις ἀμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἀμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

Ἑκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαιῶν, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εὑρηται "ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα—
polū δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἁρετή τῆς φύσεως. 50 καὶ δὲ τὰ χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύον τὸν φίλον καὶ αἰ ἀτυχία μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχίων. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων, οὕτω γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἄγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ δὲ αἰ εὐτυχία καὶ αἰ δυστυχία, αἱροῦνται μᾶλλον ἀνθρώποι τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· ἡ δ' ἀτυχία δῆλοι τοὺς μὴ ὀντως ὄντας φίλους 5 ἄλλα διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόν. ὅ δ' ὅ τοὺς χρόνος δῆλοι ἀμφοτέρους· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος,
not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the 'peck of salt' has come to be proverbial. At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful. But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once.

These things, therefore, show the correctness of the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said:  

\[\text{Nature is permanent, but wealth is not—} \]

although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship' than 'Nature.' And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying 'friends' possessions are common property' is clear, for only friends, instead of the natural goods and natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, choose a human being rather than the presence of the former and the absence of the latter; and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one—
1238 a

ἀλλ’ ὁ ἢδυς μᾶλλον, πλὴν οὔδ’ ὁ ἀπλῶς ἢδυς ταχύς. ὁμοιοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἶνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν γλυκύ2 ταχύ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γυνόμενον ἄγδες καὶ οὗ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢδυ τῷ τέλει ὄριστεόν καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ’ ἄν καὶ οἱ πολλοί, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν 5 ἀποβαίνοντων μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὃσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τούτο γὰρ οὔ3 διὰ τὸ ἀποβαίνων οὐχ ἢδυ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχέσ ἀλλὰ τὸ πρώτον ἐξαπατάν.

′Η μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία καὶ δι’ ἦν αἱ ἀλλαί 5 λέγονται ἢ κατ’ ἄρετήν ἐστὶ καὶ δι’ ἢδονήν τὴν ἄρετῆς, ὃσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον. αἱ δ’ ἀλλαί ἐγγύνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισί καὶ θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις· οθεν λέγεται “ἡλιξ ἡλικα τέρπει” καὶ “κακος κακη συντέτηκεν ἢδονή.” ἐνδέχεται δὲ 5 καὶ ἢδεις ἀλλήλους εἰναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ’ ἢ φαύλοι ἡ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ’ οἶνον εἰ5 ὦδικοι ἁμφω, ἦ δὲ μὲν φιλωδος6 ὃ δ’ ὦδικος ἐστώ, καὶ ἦ πάντες ἐχουσι τι7 ἀγαθῶν καὶ θαύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι χρήσιμοι ἂν εἰεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὄφελοι5 (οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν) οὐχ’ ἢ φαύλοι8 ἡ οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐπὶ- δεικτῇ φαύλον εἰναι φιλον· καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμοι ἂν εἰη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν ὃ μὲν φαύλος πρὸς τὴν

1 ταχύ Guil. 2 Ric.: ἢδυ. 3 οὔ add. Rac. 4 οὐχ Γ: καὶ. 5 ele (vel ἦ) add. Ric. 6 Vict.: φειδωλός. 7 ἐχοισι τι Fr.: ἐχοισιν. 8 οὐχ ἢ φαύλοι add. Rac. (<φαύλοι> Ric.). 9 Γ: τὸν ἐπιεικῆ.
except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.

The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked people: whence the sayings—

Two of an age each other gladden

and

Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad.a

And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral,b but if for instance both are musicians or one fond of music and the other a musician, and in the way in which all men have some good in them and so fit in with one another. Further they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad or neutral. It is also possible for a bad man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to the good man for his purpose at the time

a Euripides, Bellerophontes, fr. 298 (Nauck).

b i.e. neither good nor bad.
υπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὃ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ
5 πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν
cata φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἁγαθά, ἀπλῶς μὲν
tὰ ἀπλᾶ,1 τὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνω εξ ὑποθέσεως, ἥ πενία
συμφέρει ἡ νόσος—ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶν1 ἁγαθῶν
ἐνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ2
βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐνεκα βούλεται. ἔτι καθ’ 5
10 οὐς τρόπους καὶ ἄλληλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαίοι εἰσιν ἂν
φίλοι· εἰ ἡ γὰρ ἄν ἡδὺς ὑμᾶς ἡ φαύλος, ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν
κοινῶν τυόσ μετέχει, οἶδαν εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ἡ
ἐνι τι πάσιν ἐπεικέσ (διὸ ἐνι οἱ ὑμηλητικοί εἰσιν3
ἀν καὶ σπουδαίοι4), ἡ ἡ προσαρμόττουσιν ἐκάστῳ
ἐχουσι γὰρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ.
15 III. Τρία μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πάσι δὲ 1
tούτοις κατ’ ἱσότητα πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία· καὶ
γὰρ οἱ κατ’ ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἱσότητι πως ἀρετῆς
εἰσιν φίλοι ἄλληλοις.

"Ἀλλ’ δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ καθ’ ὑπερβολήν, 2
ὥσπερ θεοὶ [ἀρετή]5 πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, τούτῳ γὰρ
20 ἐτερον εἴδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντο καὶ ἄρχο-
μένου· καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐτερον, κατ’
ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ’ ἀριθμοῦ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἴσον. ἐν
tούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης

1 ἀπλῶς Rieckher.
2 αὐτὸ hic Rac.: ante τὸ φάρμακον.
3 εἶν Ald. 4 Pb: σπουδαῖος M, <μὴ> σπουδαίοι Bz.
5 [ἀρετή] Rac. (vel ἀρετῆ vel κατ’ ἀρετὴν subaudito φιλία).

a i.e. ready to associate with all and sundry, regardless of
moral inferiority. But perhaps the Greek should be altered
to give ‘some (bad men) might be worthy to associate with,
even in the judgement of a good man,’ or ‘some might be
worthy to associate with even though not good.’

b Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in
proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not
and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it for the given purpose. Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are sociable even though good), or in the way in which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of good.

1 III. These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness.

2 But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man, for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically. The friendship of father for son is in this equal to each other but each equal to its recipient's merit. The word ἱκον itself connotes 'fair,' just, reasonable.
πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τοὺτων διαφορά εἰσιν. ἄλλη πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὐτὴ μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἄρχομένου, ἡ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἡ οὐκ ἐνεστὶν ἡ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γὰρ εἰ τις ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ θεῷ ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖ ὡς φιλεῖται, ἡ τῷ ἄρχοντι ὁ ἄρχομένος φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἡ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ ἡ ἡ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει, οὐδ' ἐν ἔν τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἡ παιδί καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐνδεός ἐπὶ τῷ γνωμένῳ. ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρήσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονῆς, οἱ μὲν κατ' ἱσότητα εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ καθ' ύπεροχήν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκεῖνοι οἴομενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν εὰν μὴ ὁμοίως ὡσι' χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις, ἄγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ τῆς προθυμίας. διὸ εὑρηκεν Ἀὐνίκος.

ἐρώμενος τοιαῦτ' ἂν, οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι.
oi δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

1239 a IV. Ὄσπερ οὖν εἰρηται τριῶν οὖτων εἰδῆν

1 Ἡ: ἄλλῃ Pb, ἄλλᾳ <καί> Sp.
2 δὲ ὡς Sp.
3 ἡ: τῷ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι.
4 ὁ ἄρχομένος Bz.: καὶ ἄρχομένῳ.
5 ἡ add. Iac.
6 οὐδ' ἐν Iac.: οὔδὲν.
7 ὡσι add. Cas.
8 καὶ ὁμοίως vel ὡσαυτῶς? Rac.
9 Ἡ: λόγος τῆς ἐπὶ τῆς προθυμίας?
10 Iac.: διὸ εὑρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ.

a i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in pro-
class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way. And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same. And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure. This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus has said:

A loved one so would speak, but not a lover.

But they think that the reason is the same.

IV. There being then, as has been said, three portion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they give to him.

^ A dramatist of the Old Comedy.

See 1236 a 7—1237 b 15.
ARISTOTLE

1289 a

"\( \text{φιλίας, κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, αὐταὶ πάλιν διήρηνται εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἵσον αἰ δὲ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν εἰσιν.}

5 \( \text{φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δ’ οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἴσοτητα· ἀτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἰη ἐι ἀνὴρ παιδίω φίλος, φιλεῖ δὲ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐναχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλή, οὐειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν· τῇ γὰρ ἀξίᾳ τῶν φιλῶν μετρεῖται καὶ τινὶ ἵσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δ’ ἡλικίας 3}

10 ἐλλευσιν ἀνάξια ὀμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἥ γένος ἡ κατά ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν· δεὶ3 δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἡ ἤττον ἡ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξίουν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρήσιμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕδει καὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται 4 ἀμφισβητῆσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐναχοῦ οὔδεν ἰσχύειν, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλῳ σταθμῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐν χρυσίῳ4· ἀλλὰ τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν, φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκείον ἁγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα τὸ δ’ ἄλλοτριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρὸν· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ 5 ἦ, οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεὶ ἡ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἡ ὀμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἶον εἰ τις ἄξιοι τὸν θεόν.

20 ἐφωνερὸν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἵσῳ, τὸ 6 ἀντιφιλεῖν δ’ ἐστὶν ἁνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι. δῆλον 7 δὲ καὶ διὰ τὶ ξητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀνθρώποι τὴν καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ’ ἴσοτητα· ἀμα γὰρ

1 καὶ add. Rac.
2 τῷ φιλεῖν: τὸ φιλεῖν Bz.
3 Wilson: ἐδέ.
4 χρυσίου Sp.

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\( ^{a} \text{i.e. proportional equality: see note on 1238 b 21.} \)

\( ^{b} \text{Or ‘one ought to expect the superior to feel . . .’} \)
kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality.\(^a\)

So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel\(^b\) either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one’s own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one
Aristotle

1239 a

υπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλείσθαι καὶ Ἡ ὑπεροχῆ. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ’ ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου. ἀμφοί γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευμένῳ. μάλιστα δ’ οἱ φιλότιμοι τουούτοι τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζουσιν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικός δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαῖρων μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ φιλείσθαι, ἐκείνος δὲ φιλοῦμενος1 μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαῖρων τῷ θαυμάζουσιν καὶ φιλείσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῆς2 ὁ φιλητικός. ἐνεστὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντι3. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλείσθαι συμβεβήκος, ἑστὶ γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλοῦμενον, φιλοῦτα δ’ οὖ. ἑστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ 9

35 φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ φιλείσθαι,4 τὸ δὲ φιλείσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημειοῦν δὲ ἑλοῦτ’ ἀν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἀμφοί, γινώσκειν ἡ γινώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς5 οἱ γυναίκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἡ Ἀντιφώντος. καὶ γάρ ἑστι τὸ μὲν ἑθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τοῦ ἀγαθῶν ἄλλα μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἑνεκα. διὸ 1

1239 b καὶ τοὺς ἐμμενούσας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκοιν γὰρ, ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκοντι.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι

1 Rac.: φιλότιμος.
2 ἡ . . . ἡδονή Sp. (et Ric. om. ὁ).
3 Ric. et Sol.: ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα.
5 Vict.: ὑποβολαῖς.

a This poet lived at Syracuse at the court of Dionysius the elder (who came into power 406 B.C.). He is said to have written tragedies in collaboration with the tyrant; and he was sentenced by him to death by flogging (Rhet. 1384 a 9).
of equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honours, since to be admired implies superiority. Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it. Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon. Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and bestowing affection. For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead; for they know, but are not known.

It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there
1239 b

τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντὶ-
5 φιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι διαφέρουσιν οὐ τε κατ’
ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ’ ὑπεροχήν, εἰρηται.

V. Ἑπεί δὲ τὸ φίλου λέγεται καὶ καθόλου 1
μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐξωθεν συμπαραλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
ὁμοιόν φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον),
λεκτέων καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσὶ πρὸς τὸς
10 εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὁμοιόν καὶ 2
εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τὸ τε γὰρ ἀγαθόν
ἀπλοῦν τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς
μὲν ὁμοιός ἀεί καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἡδὸς, ὁ
dὲ φαύλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἐσικεῖν ἐσθεν καὶ
15 ἔστερας. διὸ εάν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φαύλοι, οὐ 3
φίλοι ἐναυτοὶς ἀλλὰ διίστανται· ἡ δ’ οὐ βέβαιοις
φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὡστε οὔτω μὲν τὸ ὁμοιόν φίλον,
ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁμοιόν. ἔστι δὲ ώς καὶ κατὰ τὸ
ἡδὺ· τοὺς γὰρ ὁμοίους ταῦθ’ ἡδέα, καὶ ἐκαστὸν δὲ
φύσει αὐτῷ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναῖ καὶ ἐξεῖς4
20 καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοὺς ὁμογενεύσιν ἡδίστατα ἀλλήλοις,
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κύριοις· καὶ ταύτη ἐνδέχεται καὶ
tοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακῶς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῆ.

Τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίω φίλον κατὰ 4 τὸ 5
χρήσιμον. αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ ὁμοιόν ἄχρηστον,
25 διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δούλος δεσπότου
καὶ γυνῆ καὶ ἀνήρ ἄλληλων· καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπι-

1 Sp.: συμπεριλαμβανόντων. 2 τὸ add. Bz.
3 v.l. αἱ ἐξεῖς: πράξεις? Rac. (diálexeis vel diálexis Ric., sed
cf. l. 20). 4 Rac.: ὡς.

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a 1235 a 4 ff. b Cf. 1238 a 34 note.
are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one's affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.

1 V. But as the term 'friend' is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning, by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself.

2 Owing to this relations find one another's voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other:

But pleasure weds the bad man to the bad. But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant
The two halves of a bone or coin broken in half by two contracting parties and one kept by each, to serve as a token of identification when found to fit together.
and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry.

6 But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies, because in that way one middle thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle points. But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside their natural state. This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state.

7 Hence accidentally, as was said, opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good.

It has, then, been said how many kinds of friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers

\[b\ 1239\ b\ 32.\]
VI. Peri de touton autow philon einai he μη 

ekastos autos autow philos einai, kai tou'tw 

xrwmenoi kanon krinouso t'hn pros tous allous 

philous philia. kata de tou's logous kai ta 
dokointh uparchein tois philois ta men upenauntioita, 
ta d' omoia fainetai ontai. esti gar pws kata' 

analogian authe philia aplwos d' ou. ev dusi gar 

diaphemwos to philisthai kai philin. di' a mallo

ou'tos autow philos ws epit tou akrateous 

kai en克拉tous eirnetai pws ekwv he akwn, twv 

ta merei exein pws pros alla ta ths psuchhs. kai 

omoion t'na touidta pantata, ei philos autous autw 

kai exhros, kai ei adikei tis autous auton pantata 

gar ev dusi tausta kai diaphemwos. he he dvo 

pws kai he psuchh, uparchei pws tausta, he d' ou 

diaphemena, oux uparchei.

Apd de t'hs pros auton exeinws eiswv oi loipoi 

tropoi tou philon einai orismenoi kath' ous ev 

tous logous episkopein eiswthamev. dokei gar philos 
einai o bouloymenos twn tagnath, he oia oieteai 

agath, me' di' auton all' ekenein eneka. allon de' 4

1 Ric.: auta he. 2 ou'tos Mb. 3 ws add. G. 4 omoia Sp. 5 Bz.: diaphemwns. 6 Fr.: ei Pb. he Mb. 7 Sp. (enim Guil.): de. 8 he codd, ei Bk. 9 Sp.: ws (kai Ric.). 10 Iac.: philisthai diaphemwn.

* Cf. 1223 a 36- b 17. Self-restraint (or the lack of it) indicates that a man's personality has in a sense two parts, one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in regard to another part.
and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.

1 VI. The question whether one is one's own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar.

2 For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said a how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,—whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly. For all these relations involve two separate factors; in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.

From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses. b For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other's sake;

b Cf. 1244 a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle's lectures (Stock).
1240 a

τρόπον ὃ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι’ ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτὸν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τάγαθα, μήτου ὁ τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξει μάλιστα φίλος εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὃ συζην αἴρεται δι’ αὐτὴν τὴν 5 

30 ὀμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι’ ἐτέρον τι, ὦν ὦ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῆσι δ’ ἐτέροις. μάχεται δὲ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα; οἱ μὲν γάρ ἂν μὴ τοὐδ’ αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἐτι τὸ τῶν ἀλγοῦντι συν- 7 

1240 b 

αλγεῖν μὴ δι’ ἐτέρον τι ἄγαπάν θήσομεν—οἰον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλ’ ὦ δι’ αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ αἱ ματέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὀρνιθες. Βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστα 8 

τε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ ἄλλα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύτην (οἰον διωγόντι συνυπήν) εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, εἴτε μὴ, ὅτι ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς 9 

10 λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν, μὴ δι’ ἐτέρον τι ἄλλα δι’ ἐκεῖνον ὅτι χαίρει φιλικόν. ἐτὶ 

tà touáde légetai perì filías, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ μίαν ψυχήν εἶναι τοῖς ἀληθῶς φίλοις. ἀπάντα 

taúta épavaphéretai πρὸς τὸν ἐνα· καὶ γὰρ βούλεται 

τάγαθα αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, οὐθεῖς γὰρ 

αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εὗ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἐτέρον, οὐδὲ χάριν 

tosouði εὗ λέγει, ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἰς· δοκεῖν γὰρ

1 Iac.: μὴ τῷ.  
2 Iac.: μάλιστα φιλεῖν.  
3 Sp. δη.  
4 Iac.: μὴ τὸ ἐνατοῖς.  
5 τὸ τῶ Γρ.: τῷ.  
6 εἴτε μὴ, ὦτι Rac.: ὥτι μὴ (εἴτε μὴ Iac.).  
7 τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν add. Γ.  
8 Cas.: καὶ μὴ μίαν φιλίαν.  
9 Rac.: τοὺς . . . φίλους.  
10 Bek.: αὐτῷ.  
11 χάριν τοσοῦτι εὗ Rac.: χάριτος οὐδὲ (χάριν τοσοῦδε Iac.).  
12 Iac.: δοκεῖ.
and in another way when a man wishes another's existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other; and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children's existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another; some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society. Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other's pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. Again there are sayings about friendship such as 'Amity is equality' and 'True friends have one spirit.' All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an
φιλεῖν βούλεται ὁ δὴλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν.\(^1\) καὶ τὸ εἶναι βούλεσθαι\(^2\) καὶ τὸ συζήν \(\) καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μῆ δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἄλληλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν—οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἰς, καὶ οὔτως\(^3\) ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ—πάντα δὴ \(\) τὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ \(\) διαφωνεῖ, οἶον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἔχθρον ἐνδεχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι. ἃ δὲ εἰς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὁρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. τοιοῦτος ὁ \(\) ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος ἑπεὶ ὁ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἑτερος καὶ ἐμπληκτος. ὡστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γάρ πη ὁμοίος\(^5\) καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός, ταύτη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὁρεκτός. φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς οὔθε \(\) ἀμα λοιποῖται ἐαυτῷ, ὡσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔθε \(\) ὤστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὡσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός,\(^7\) οὔτε ὁ ἐμπροσθεν τῷ ὦστερον, ὡσπερ ὁ μεῦστης (ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὡσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διωρίζουσιν).

25 ὡσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος, δὴλον γὰρ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαίον αὐτῶν\(^8\) ἐπει ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς,\(^9\) ἀποκτινώσωσιν αὐτοὺς,\(^10\) ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός.

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\(^1\) φιλεῖ? Rac.
\(^2\) Rac.: μάλιστα.
\(^3\) Rac.: ἰσως.
\(^4\) Iac.: γὰρ (δὲ Γ.).
\(^5\) Bk.: ὁμοίοι.
\(^6\) Syl.: οὐδὲ.
\(^7\) Cas.: μεταμελητικός.
\(^8\) Fr.: αὐτῶν.
\(^9\) Fr.: αὐτοῖς.
\(^10\) Fr.: αὐτοὺς.

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\(^a\) Cf. l. 3: δὴ marks a quotation.
\(^b\) See Sophistici Elenchi, 175 b 15 ff. ‘Coriscus’ is used for any imaginary person, cf. 1220 a 19 f.
individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate. And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being one spirit' and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the good man in relation to himself. In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's affection for himself carries back to love of the good; for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar—(and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related to 'good John Styles'; for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is
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ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἄπλως ὥν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δὲ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἄδυνατον. διὸ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἐκαστὸς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ 10 φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῷων οὐ, ὅποιος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ . . . 2 οὗκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὔδε τὰ παιδία, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ δὴ ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν ἡ δὴ γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς 3 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔσοικε 1'

35 δ' ἡ φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν 4 τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λύσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται ὅμως οὕτωι μὲν συγγενεῖς ἐτι, 5 ὃ δὲ ἐτι εἰς ἐως ἃν ζη.

Ποσακῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀναγονταὶ πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

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VII. Οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρήσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἶναι ταυτό, 6 τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀνευ ἀλλῆλων. ἔστι δ' ἡ εὐνοία τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἐτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διηρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, 2 οὔτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ' ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡδονήν ἔστιν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρῆσιμος 7 βούλεται αὐτῷ τάαγαθά, οὔ δι' ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν βούλοιτ' ἄν, δοκεῖ δ' ὥσπερ . . . 8 καὶ ἡ εὐνοία οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα 9 τοῦ

1 οὐ add. Sp. 2 lacunam Sus. 3 Fr.: παῖς. 4 Syl.: αὐτὸν. 5 εἰσὶ Sp. 6 Rac.: ταυτά. 7 Sp.: χρῆσιμον. 8 lacunam edd.: <καὶ ἡ κατ' ἄρετῆν φιλία> Sus. 9 lac.: εὐνοία.

a ll. 13-21.

b Some words seem to have been lost here.
absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said, because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself... so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connexion is in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives.

From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term 'affection,' and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.

1 VII. It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet identical with it. If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like... is not for the sake of the person.

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^ These are Solomon's versions of the terms usually rendered 'concord and goodwill.'

^ Perhaps 'virtuous friendship' should be supplied.
εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι ἄλλα τοῦ Ὑ εὐνοεῖ· εἴτ' ἐν τῇ 
τοῦ ἴδεος φιλίᾳ, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ηὐνόουν· ὥστε 
δὴ λοι ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἰθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὐνοια ἐστίν. 
アルバム τοῦ μὲν εὐνοούντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστὶν, τοῦ δὲ 
φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἀ βούλεται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ 
eὐνοια ἁρχὴ φιλίας. ὃ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὐνοεῖ, ὃ 
δ' εὐνοεῖν οὐ πᾶς φίλος, ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἑοικεν ὁ 
eὐνοών μόνον. διὸ ἁρχὴ φιλίας, ἄλλ' οὐ φιλία.

Δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τε φίλοι ὑμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὑμονοοῦν-
tes φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὖ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὑμόνοια ἡ 
φιλικὴ, ἄλλα περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὑμονοοῦσι καὶ 
ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζήν συντείνει. οὖδὲ2 μόνον κατὰ διά-
νοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὀρέξιν· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὰναντία νοεῖν καὶ3 
ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεί διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο- 
ούδ' εἰ4 κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσειν ὑμονοεῖ,5 καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὑμόνοια· οἱ5 
γε φαύλου ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες 
βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἐοίκε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑμόνοια οὐχ 
ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία, ἄλλ' ἡ μὲν 
πρώτη καὶ φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ τοὺς 
φαύλους οὔτως6 ὑμονοεῖν, ἔτέρα δὲ καθ' ἦν καὶ οἱ 
φαύλοι ὑμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαιρέσειν 
καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχουσιν. οὔτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν7 
ὁρέγεσθαι ὅστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέρους ὑπάρχειν

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1 Sp.: εἰ δ' aut ei ἰη. 2 Sus.: οὔτε 
3 νοεῖν καὶ Sol.: τὸ κινοῦν, 4 οὔ δε? M b
5 ὑμονοεῖν Pb. 6 <οὔτως> add. Rac.
who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship that is based on character. But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship.

For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetite, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things, as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also. Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when
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οὐ δρέγονται: ἄν γὰρ τοιούτου δρέγονται ὁ μὴ
30 ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται. οἱ ὁμοοὐντες δ’
οὐ μάχονται.1

"Εστι δὴ ὁμόνοια ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχεων καὶ τῆς ἀρχεσθαῖ̂ 3 ἡ αὐτῆ προαίρεσις ἡ, μὴ τοῦ ἐκάτερον,
ἐλλὰ τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
πολιτικῆ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοιας εἰρήσθω
τοσαῦτα.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον φιλοῦσαν οἱ 1
ποιήσαντες εἰ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εἰ τοὺς
ποιήσαντας: δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τούναντίον.
τοῦτο δ’ ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἂν τὸ τὴν χρῆσιμον 2
καὶ τὸ αὐτῶ ὕφελιμον συμβαίνειν. τὸ4 μὲν
γὰρ ὀφειλεῖται5 τὸν δ’ ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
τοῦτο μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ φυσικῶν: ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια 3

1241 b αἰρετῶτερον, τὸν αὐτόν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ
ἕν ἐνεργεια, ὁ δ’ εἰ τοὺς παθῶς ὁσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εἰ
ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῷοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα
σπουδὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸν γεννῆσαι καὶ τὸν7 τὰ8 γεννῶ-
μενα σώζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες 4

5 τὰ τέκνα (καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων)9 ἡ φιλοῦνται,
καὶ οὔτοι πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἡ τοὺς γεννή-
σαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἀριστον. καὶ
αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, οὔτε μᾶλλον οἴονται αὐτῶν
εἰναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ 5

1 Rac.: μαχοῦνται.
3 [καὶ ἀρχεσθαὶ] ? Rac.
4 Fr.: τὸ (τὸν edd.).
5 Fr.: ὀφειλεῖται.
6 Sp.: ἰη.
7 τὸν add. Rac.
8 τὰ add. Sp.
9 [καὶ . . . πατέρων] Sp.
it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.

Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship.

So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.

VIII. The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice seems to require the opposite. One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party’s duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone; it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced. And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers) and these in their turn love their children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work; for people estimate

\[a\] This clause is probably an interpolation in the Greek.
διορίζουσιν, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἥ μὴτηρ.

10 Καὶ περὶ μὲν φιλίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῆς ἐν πλείοσι διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

IX. Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἵσον τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἵσοτητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἵσοτητι ἡ φιλότητι. αἱ δὲ πολυτελαὶ πᾶσαι δικαίον τι εἶδος.

15 κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πάν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε όσα εἴδη φιλίας, τοσαῦτα καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐγγύς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. ἐπεὶ δὲ 2 ὀμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοχλον, τούτων μὲν ὀφκ ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δὐ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς υἱὸ ἐν6- υἱὸ διαίρετον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκατέρω, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἐνὸς υἱὸ ἐνεκά ἔστιν. τὸ τε γὰρ σῶμα ἔστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοχλος ψπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον7 ἀφαιρετον, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον ψπερ δοχλος ἀψυχος.

25 Αἱ δὲ ἀλλαὶ κοινωνίαι εἰς ὅ πᾶ ἐστὶν, µόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἶνον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἡ τῶν ὄργεων9 ἡ αἱ χρηµατιστικαὶ [ἐπὶ πολυτελαὶ].10 αἱ δὲ πολυτελαι πᾶσαι ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις11 συνυπάρχουν, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ

1 ᾧ add. Rac. (et olim Fr.).
2 Bz.: κοινωνία.
3 ὥστε ὅσα εἴδη Bz.: ὅστις ἄεὶ ὅ (ἐὰν MBB).
5 δ' <οὐχ> ? Rac.
6 Iac.: οὐδέν.
7 [καὶ ὄργανον] ? Rac.
8 Bz.: εἰσὶν ἡ.
10 Fr.
11 <ταῖς> οἰκίαις (cf. N.E. 1160 b 24) Fr.: οἰκεῖαις.
work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain.

Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.

1 IX. It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying ‘Amity is equality.’ And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related. But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar, between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership; for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul’s tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.

2 The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in

\[a\ i.e.\ to\ one\ another.\ \text{Perhaps\ the\ Greek\ should\ be\ emended\ to\ give\ ‘not\ similar’\ (to\ those\ just\ mentioned).}\]
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αὐτὸ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις), βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἄριστο-κρατικὴ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννίς, ὀλυγαρχία, δῆμος· καὶ τὰ δίκαια δῆς τοσάτα.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν μὲν γάρ ἡ (δημοκρατική)2 κοινωνία, καὶ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ φιλία (τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὄρῳ μετρεῖται), κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἡ3 ἀρίστη καὶ ἡ4 βασιλικὴ (οὗ γὰρ ταύτων δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχο-μένῳ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον). καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως 6 πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.

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X. Λέγονται δὴ5 φιλία συγγενική, ἐταιρική, κοινωνικὴ, ἡ λεγομένη πολιτικὴ. ἐστὶ μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἴδη, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἡ δὲ ὡς πατρὸς καὶ νιῶν6· καὶ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, οἶνον ἡ πατρικὴ, καὶ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν, οἶνον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν. ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὐτῇ τῆς ἐταιρικῆς· ἐπι-λαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα προσβείων. ἡ δὲ 2 πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσμον καὶ μάλιστα· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐτάρκες7 δοκοῦσι συμ-

1 Sp.: τῶν ἐν.
2 Sus.
3 ἡ add. Ross.
4 ἡ add. Rac.
5 Sp.: δὲ.
6 [ἡ μὲν ὡς . . . νιῶν] ? Rac.
7 Rac.: αὐτάρκη.

* Cf. Politics viii., 1342 a 24 τῶν ἀρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσι
constitutions as in the case of musical modes

paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice.

And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical and proportional, there will also be various species of justice and of partnership and friendship. The partnership of democracy is based on numerical equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it is measured by the same standard; whereas the aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares; and similarly also the friendship of father and son, and the same way in partnerships.

Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really friendship of relatives has more than one species, one as between brothers, another as of father and son: it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority. Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual’s lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent.
μένειν, ἐπεὶ συνήλθον γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζήν χάριν.
10 μόνη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις
οὐ μόνον φιλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν,
αἱ δ' ἀλλαὶ καθ' ὑπεροχῆν. μᾶλλον δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ
tῶν χρησίμων φιλία, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ
πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνήλθον
πρὶν καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τυνός (οἶνος γὰρ
ὁργανὸν καὶ ψυχὴ) ἄλλα τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν.
συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὁργανὸν ἐπιμελείας
τυγχάνειν ἢς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἐργον' ἐκεῖνον γὰρ
ἔνεκέν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ τρυπάνῳ εἶναι διττόν, ὅτι
κυριώτερον ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
eἰδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

20 Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὅμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν
dίκαιον τι ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἀπαν
πρὸς φίλον· τὸ τε γὰρ δίκαιον τις καὶ κοινωνοῖς,
καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὁ μὲν γένους, ὃ δὲ βίου. ὁ
γὰρ ἀνθρωπός οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ
οἰκονομικὸν ζῷον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰλλά ποτὲ
συνυπάλειται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι καὶ θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι,
ἀλλ' ἵδια οὐ μοναυλικοῦ ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἀνθρώπος
ζῷον πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστὶν· καὶ κοινωνία
tοῖνυν καὶ δίκαιον τι καὶ εἶ μὴ πόλις εἰς. οἰκία
δ' ἐστὶ τις φιλία· δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δοῦλου

a Not its ἔξις, its shape, hardness, etc.
b 1241 b 17-24.
c i.e. 'friend' in the sense of 'relation.'
since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority. The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them. It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring. And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.

Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons, and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one's family or in one's life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male, but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership, and justice of a sort, even if there were no state. And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationship of master and
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1242 a

ηπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὄργανων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ
σώματος, αết ὃ δὲ τοιαύταί οὖτε φιλία οὖτε δικαιο-
σύναι ἄλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγείων ὁ ὧν
δικαιοὺ ἄλλ' ἀνάλογον. γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρος ὁ
φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία: πατρὸς δὲ καὶ
νίοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἦπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὐ
ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει
ἀρχοντός πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον. ἦ δὲ τῶν 9
ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑταρικὴ μάλιστα, ἦ δὲ κατ'
ἰσότητα—

οὐ γὰρ τι νόθος τῷ ὧν ἀπεδείχθην, 3
ἀμφοῖν ὃ δὲ πατὴρ 4 αὐτὸς ὁ ἐκλήθη
Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἀρχων—

40 ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἱσον ἕτοιμων λέγεται. διὸ ἐὰν
1242 b οἰκία πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας
καὶ δικαίου.

'Επεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ 10
χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἥδυ, τούτων δὲ ἐκάστης δύο
dιαφορά (ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ δὲ κατ'
ἰσότητα ἐστιν ἐκάστη αὐτῶν), τὸ δὲ δικαιοῦ τὸ περὶ
αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄμφισβητήσεων 6 δῆλον, ἐν μὲν τῷ̇
καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον οὕτω ὡσαύτως,
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον,
ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάτ-
tόνος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτῶ, 8 διακείμενος 9 ὡς-
περ ἀρχῶν πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ 11
τὸ ἱσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἄξιοῖ (καὶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ

1 ὑγείων corruptum edd.: ἐπιεικὲς ? Sus.
2 Iac.: ἡ.
3 Cas.: ἀπεδείχθη.
4 Γ': πατρὸς.
5 Nauck: αὐτὸς.
6 Fr.: ἄμφισβητήσαντων (ἀμφισβητηθέντων Bz.).
7 Fr.: τῷ.
8 Rac.: αὐτῶ.
9 Bz.: διακείμενον.

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slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health is not justice but analogous to it. But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject. That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being on a footing of equality—

For never did he make me out a bastard,
But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire
Of both—,

for these are the words of men seeking equality. Hence in the household are first found the origins and springs of friendship, of political organization and of justice.

And since there are three sorts of friendship, based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject; or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in

\[ a \text{ Perhaps the text is corrupt.} \\
\[ b \text{ Sophocles fr. 755 Jebb and Pearson (684 Nauck). The third line is completed in a quotation by Philo, } \theta\nu\eta\tau\nu \delta' \omega\upsilon\delta'\upsilon. \text{ (For } \tau\upsilon\delta'\upsilon \text{ dative of agent see Kühner-Gerth, i. 422).} \]
The inferior party p claims to draw a larger share of benefit B and to leave the smaller share b to the superior party P, the result of which would be p + B and P + b. The superior party P also invokes the principle of inverse proportion (line 7), but applies it to their contributions to the common cause, not to the benefits drawn from it: he claims to make a smaller contribution c, while the inferior party makes a larger one C, the result of which would be P - c and p - C. The proposed conjunctions are in fact both of
fact it happens in this way in other circumstances too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and makes a diagonal conjunction; but it would seem that in this way the superior comes off worse, and the friendship or partnership is a charitable service.

Therefore equality must be restored and proportion secured by some other means; and this means is honour, which belongs by nature to a ruler and god in relation to a subject. But the profit must be made equal to the honour.

Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another’s friends in the same way as different cities are, and Athens no longer knoweth Megara, nor similarly do citizens know one another, when they are not useful to one another; their friendship diagonal, connecting the larger person with the smaller thing and vice versa:

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{P} & & \text{B} \\
& p & & b
\end{align*}
\qquad
\begin{align*}
& \text{P} & & \text{C} \\
& p & & c
\end{align*}
\]

Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘friendship is a charity and not a partnership.’

i.e. the advantage in the shape of protection, guidance, etc., that the inferior party derives from the friendship.

Lit. ‘the Athenians no longer recognize the Megarians.’ Author unknown (Bergk, Fr. Eleg., Adespota 6).
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1242 b

χειρὸς εἰς χειρὰ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον, οὕτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὐτε τὸ βασιλικὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου

30 ἠνέκα ὅπως εὐ ποιῆ ὡς ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ ἴνα ἵσον ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἴσοτητα δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἡ

χρησίμου φιλίας εἰδή δύο, ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' θεικὴ. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλούντες καὶ οἱ ἀνούμενοι.

dιὸ εἰρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

35 ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαιν ἢ, ἡ πολιτικὴ αὐτὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ νομική· ὅταν δὲ ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἡθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἔταιρική. διὸ

μάλιστα τὰ ἐγκληματα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλιᾷ· αἰτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν ἔτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ

χρησίμου καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δ' ἀμφότερα βούλονται ἀμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὀμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου

1243 a ἠνέκα, ἡθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς

πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν.

"Ολως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλείστα τὰ ἐγκληματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆ ἀνέγκλητος) οἱ δ' ἥδεις ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ δὲ

χρησίμοι οὐκ εὔθυς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἔταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται. ὅμως δὲ τῆς ἡ

1 ἡχῆ; ? Rac.

2 καὶ Γ: ἢ (ἰσον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῇ λειτουργίᾳ ? Rac.).

3 Fr. (et 1') : ἢ.

4 Rac. : αὐτοῖς.

5 τὰ ἐγκληματα Sp. : ἐγκλημα.

6 ἀμφότερα ? Rac.

7 πλείστα τὰ Sp.

8 Sp. : ἀνέγκλητον.

9 καὶ: ἀλλ' ? Rac.


b N.E. 1164 a 28. Hesiod, W.D. 371 μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ

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ship is a ready-money transaction. Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality.

But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do—hence the saying

Unto a friend his wage—.

When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement, this is civic and legal friendship; but when they trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the kind of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust.

For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur (for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got and given their share break it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not merely legal lines); nevertheless the legal sort of 

εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω, 'let the wage stated for a friend stand good.'
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1243 a

χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετερεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἵσον), ἡ δ’ θηκὴ ἐκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαξοῦν νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὄμιλουσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι
díkas tῶν ἐκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὅρθως· τοῖς
gὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκη1 εἶναι, οἱ δ’ ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶς2 συναλλάττουσι. ἔστι δ’ ἐν τῇ
tαύτῃ τῇ φιλία τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, πῶς ἐκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ,3 ὅταν θηκὶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.

Καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ4 δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πράγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθέν πόσον ἢ ποῖον, ἡ5 τῷ πεπονθότι ἐν-
dέχεται γὰρ6 εἶναι ὅπερ λέγει Θεογνις—

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεὰ, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα,
ἐνδέχεται δὲ7 καὶ τοῦνατίον γενέσθαι, ὡσπερ ἐν
tῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παθιὰν τοῦτ’ εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ
θάνατον. ἐντεύθεν δ’ ὡσπερ8 εἰρηταὶ9 ἐγκλήματα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιῶν ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας ὦτι δεομένω ἐποίησεν, ἡ τί ἀλλὸ τοιοῦτο λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὥφελειαν πόσον ἐδύνατο ἀλλ’ οὐ
tί ἢν αὐτῷ,10 ὁ δὲ τοῦνατιον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ’

1 Sol.: δικαιον (ἀγαθοῖς αὐτοῖς πέφυκε δικαίος Sp.).
2 Iac.: τοῖς.
3 [πῶς . . . ἐγκαλεῖ]? gloss. (an lege ἐγκαλέσει;) Rac.
4 Sp.: τὸν.
5 ἢ Fr.
6 ἢ: δὲ.
7 Fr.: γὰρ.
8 ὡσπερ add. Fr.
9 Rac.: εἰρηταὶ τὰ.
10 Rac.: αὐτῷ.

Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, 'since it is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.'

Solomon renders 'It is uncertain how either will re-
criminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not
useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law,\textsuperscript{a} and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people. And in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal.\textsuperscript{b}

\begin{verse}
Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for it may be as Theognis says—

\textit{Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me,}\textsuperscript{c}

and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying

\textit{This is sport to you but death to me.' Hence recriminations, as has been said}\textsuperscript{d}; for one party claims recompense as having rendered a great service, because he did it for his friend in need, or saying something else of the sort as to how much it was worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient and not what it was to himself, while the other party on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the
\end{verse}

in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.' But the Greek text may be questioned.

\textsuperscript{c} Theognis 14. This quotation illustrates that the amount of a service is 'subjective,' the next quotation shows that its quality is.

\textsuperscript{d} 1242 b 37.
25 οὐχ οὗν αὐτῶ. ὅτε δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλει: ο μὲν 23
γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῶ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ο δ' ὅσον αὐτῶ
μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἶνον, εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον
ωφέλησεν, ο μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ο δὲ τὸ
tοῦ ἁργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει
30 —καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις:
ο μὲν γὰρ ἄξιοι πῶς τότε ἢν, ὧν ὃ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν
μὴ διείπωνται.

'Ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν 24
καὶ εἰς τὸ πράγμα, ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν:
ωστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστι, καὶ δικαιο-
sύνη φιλική. αὐτίον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι διότι καλλίων 25
μὲν ἡ ἡθικὴ φίλια ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη· οἱ
δ' ἀρχονται μὲν ὡς ήθικοι φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν
όντες, ὅταν δ' ἀντικρούσι τι τῶν ἱδίων, δῆλοι γε

1243 b κουσίν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλὸν, διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω

νότε φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. 28
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικὸν φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν.
βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὔθεν ἄλλο ἄξιωτεόν θατέρω
παρὰ θατέρων εἰ δ' ὡς χρῆσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί,
5 ὡς ἂν ἐλυσίτελει ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν

φη ὅδε ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνως, οὐ καλὸν, ἀντιποίησιν
δέου, τῶν καλῶν λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοῖως δὲ καὶ

1 (bis) Rac.: αὐτῶ.
2 μεταβάλλει (vel metalembánei) Rac.: μεταλαμβάνων καὶ

3 [μέγα] Sol.
4 Bus.: ἄρχονται.
5 Iac.: ἀντικροὺς.
6 ἡς ἂν λυσιτελή; Rac. (ὡς ἂν λυσιτελή Sp.).
7 Rac.: καλὸν μὲν.

a Or, altering the Greek, ‘they agree for as long as it
profits them.’
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23 donor and not how much it was to himself. And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent, the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract.

24 Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice.

25 The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on grounds of goodness, but when some private interest comes into collision it becomes clear that really they were different. For most men pursue what is fine only when they have a good margin in hand, and so with the finer sort of friendship too.

26 Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. If they are moral friends, we must consider if their intentions are equal, and nothing else must be claimed by either from the other; and if they are friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we must consider what form of agreement would have been profitable for them. But if one says they are friends on one footing and the other on another, it is not honourable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in
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1243 b

... έπι θατέρου: ἀλλ' ἐπειδή οὗ διείπουτο ὡς ήθικώς, δει κρίνειν τινά, μηδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπαταῖν: ὥστε δει στέργειν ἕκατέρου τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ήθική κατὰ προαίρεσιν δήλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθῶν μὴ ἀποδώῃ δι' ἀδυναμίαν ἀλλ' ὁσ'' ἐδύνατο, καλῶς καὶ γὰρ οὗ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔξει ἃν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.

15 Πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ταῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον· χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρήσαι ἐνι τῶδε τὰ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν· οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ως τὸν ἡδύν ἐπὶ τὸ συζήν, ὁ δ' ἐκείνου ἐνίοτε ως χρήσιμον, ὅταν δὲ παῦσηται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γενομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται τί ἀντὶ τίνος, καὶ ως Πῦθων καὶ Παμμένης διεφέροντο, καὶ ὅλως διδάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἐνι μετρεῖται), καὶ ως Ἡρόδικος ὁ ἰατρός πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθὸν, καὶ ως ὁ κυθαρῳδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ως ἦδει ὁ δ' ὃς 33:

1 Syl.: ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον. 2 Rac.: ὡς. 3 καὶ γὰρ Fr.: καὶ. 4 Βz.: τοῖς. 5 Γ.: γὰρ χαλεπῶν. 6 Γ': τῷ. 7 [τὸν] Σp. 8 Rac.: γενομένου. 9 τί ἀντὶ Iac.: παντὶ. 10 Sp.: Πρόδικος.

a i.e. in a moral friendship it is not honourable to insist on a return on a business footing.

b 'Dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are not in the same straight line' (Solomon).

c The distinguished Theban general, friend of Epa-minondas. Pytho may be a dramatist of Catana, or a Byzantine rhetorician of the period.
the other case;—but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a man after having received great benefits owing to inability did not repay them, but only repaid as much as he was able, he acts honourably; for even God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance with our ability. But a seller will not be satisfied if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who has made a loan.

In friendships not based on direct reciprocity many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not easy to see what is just; for it is difficult to measure by one given thing relations that are not directly reciprocal. This is how it happens in love affairs, since in them one party pursues the other as a pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, he having changed the other changes, and then they calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pytho and Pammenes used, and as teacher and pupil do in general (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and as Herodicus the doctor did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out.

The king associated with the harpist as pleasant and the harpist with the king as useful; but the

Born in Thrace, practised in Athens fifth cent. B.C.; tutor of Hippocrates. The mss. give 'Prodicus' (the sophist, who figures frequently in Plato), and possibly the text has suffered haplography, and both names should be read.
The story (also told N.E. ix., 1164 a 16) is related by
king, when the time came for him to pay, made out that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said
that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by
his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by
his promises to him. Nevertheless here too it is
clear how we must decide: here too we must measure
by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number.
For we must measure by proportion, as also the
civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoe-
maker to be partner with a farmer unless their
products are equalized by proportion? Therefore
the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal
is proportion—for example if one party complains
that he has given wisdom and the other says he has
given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom
to being rich? and then, what is the amount given
for each? for if one party has given half of the
smaller amount but the other not even a small
fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is
cheating. But here too there is a dispute at the
outset, if one says that they came together on
grounds of utility and the other denies it and says
it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship.

XI. About the good friend and the friend on the
basis of goodness, we must consider whether one
ought to render useful services and assistance to
him or to the friend who is able to make an equal
return. This is the same problem as whether it
is more one's duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous
man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps

Plutarch, De Alexandri fortuna ii. 1, of the tyrant
Dionysius of Syracuse.

Or, altering the punctuation with Fritsche, 'is a friend
and virtuous equally.'
ARISTOTLE

1244 a

άν μή τις τὸ μέν αὐξῆσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα εὖ1 ποιῶν, ἐπιεικὴ δὲ ἡρέμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἢν οὐκ ἐσται δὲ, ὁ δὲ ἐσται οὐπω δὲ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο ἐστὶ δ’ οὐ, ὁ δ’2 ἐστιν οὐκ ἢν δὲ οὐδὲ ἐσται. ἀλλ’ ἐκείνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γὰρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης 3 ποιήσας

λόγων2 δίκαιον μισθὸν ἄν λόγους φέροις,4 ἔργον δ’ ἐκείνου5 ἔργον ὅ6 παρέσχετο·

καὶ οὗ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἂ δεὶ7 τῇ μητρί, καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ· οὓδε γὰρ τῷ
15 Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ’ ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἄλλα τιμᾶς. ἵσως οὖν ἐστιν ᾧ δεὶ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα 4 δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· οἷον οὖκ εἰ σύτων δίδωσι καὶ τάναγ- καία, καὶ συζήν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδ’ ὃ τοίνυν τὸ συζήν,8 τούτῳ ᾧ μὴ οὕτος δίδωσιν ἀλλ’ ὅ9 χρήσιμος· ἀλλ’ οἱ τούτῳ ποιοῦντες [τοῦτῳ]10 πάντα τῷ ἐρω- μένῳ διδάσκαν οὗ δέον, οὗδενὸς11 εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

20 Καὶ οἵ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μὲν πῶς εἰσὶ φιλίας, ἄλλ’ οὗ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν 5 γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τάκειν ἀγαθά, καὶ τῷ εὑ ποιῆσαντι, καὶ τῷ ὅποιῳ δὴ12 (οὗ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὕτος ὁ ὅρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἀλλ’ δὲ

1 εὖ add. Rac. 2 ὅ δ’ Syl.: διδ.

4 Bus.: λόγου.

5 Musgrave: ἐκείνους.

6 ἔργον δὲ Meineke: ἔργα.

7 ἀλλ’ οὗ δεὶ Sus.: ἀλλὰ δεῖ.

8 Bz.: τὸ εὖ ἤπν.

9 Sus.: ἀλλὰ.

10 Rac.

11 Fr.: οὐδ’.

12 Iac.: ὅποιος δεῖ.

— See the first sentence of the chapter.

— Fr. 882 Nauck.
it is not over-difficult, provided one does not ex-
aggerate the one factor and underrate the other,
benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as
good. But in other cases many problems arise, for
instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and
B is going to be but is not now, or if A became one
but is not one now and B is one now but was not
and is going not to be. But the former problem
3 is more difficult. For possibly there is something
in the lines of Euripides:

Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,
But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have;
and it is not one’s duty to give everything to one’s
father, but there are other things that one ought
to give to one’s mother, although the father is the
superior; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are
offered, nor does he have all the honours but some
particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are some
services that ought to be rendered to the useful
friend and others to the good friend: for instance,
if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are
not therefore bound to give him your society, and
accordingly also you are not bound to render to the
friend to whom you give your society the things that
you do not get from him but from the useful friend;
but those who by so doing wrongly give everything
to whom they love are good-for-nothing people.

And the defining marks of friendship stated in the
discourses all belong to friendship in some sense,
but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a mark
of the useful friend that one wishes the things
good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact
a friend of any sort (for this definition of friend-
ship is not distinctive); of another friend, that one
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

1244 a

25 τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλω τὸ συζήν, τῷ δὲ καθ’ ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν. πάντες δ’ οὕτωι οἱ ὁροὶ κατὰ φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινα, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ᾽ οὐδείς. διὸ πολλοὶ εἰσιν, καὶ ἔκαστος μᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὄν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προαιρέσις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ βουλεταί τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν (καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεὶ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι), ἀλλὰ συζήν οὐ τούτῳ ἄλλα τῷ ἡδεῖ.

'Αδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἐννοεῖν ἄλληλους, τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἄλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἑξοντα· διὸ φίλοι2 κάκεινω3 (οἶον διότι ἡδοῖς τὸν οἰνον εἰλετο καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἰλετο), χρήσιμωτερος γὰρ. διὸ δὴ ἄγανακτεί,4 ὡστερ ἂν εἶ μᾶλλον εἰλοντο5 ἀντὶ ἠττονος· οἱ δ’6 ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ἦττοσί τοῦ ἄγαθον, πρότερον ἔμησαντες τὸν ἡδοῖν η τὸν χρήσιμον.

1244 b

XII. Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἄλληλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τὶς πότερον, εἰ τὶς εὖ κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ φίλος, ἡ7 κατ’ ἐνδειαν ἦττοσί τοῦ ἄγαθος8 αὐτ- αρκέστατος. εἰ δ’ μετ’ ἄρετῆς βίος9 εὐδαιμον, τὶ ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεὶσαν αὐτάρκους, οὔτε τῶν ἐβραμοῦντων10 οὔτε τοῦ ὁ.11

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1 Bz.: τα. 2 edd.: φιλεῖ. 3 Rac.: κάκεινως. 4 rec. Pb: δεῖ. 5 Rac.: εἰλετο. 6 Vict.: ὁ δ’. 7 Ald.: εἰ. 8 Fr.: ἡ. 9 Ross: ἄγαθος. 10 bios add. Syl. 11 Sp.: εὖ φρονοῦντων.

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a i.e. the beneficiary.

b This also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of the benefactor’s being a benefactor; so the benefactor ought to repay him in kind by wishing his existence (as he does also for the reason that he is his own product).
wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his society; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that one shares his grief and his joy. All these defining marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, but none of them with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes existence to belong to his own work—and to him who gave one existence it is one's duty to give existence in return; but he wishes the society not of this friend but of the pleasant one.

Friends in some cases wrong each other, because they love things more, not the possessor of them, and are friends of the possessor too on this account (just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is more useful. Hence naturally he is annoyed, just as if they had preferred his possessions to himself as being inferior; and they complain, for now they look to find in him the good man, having previously looked for the pleasant or the useful man.

We must also consider self-sufficiency and friendship, and the interrelationship of their potentialities. For one may raise the question whether if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend is sought for in need, and the good man will be most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with goodness is happy, what need would there be of a friend? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse

\[ Sc. \text{ on account of his possessions.} \]
αὐτὸς¹ γάρ αὐτῷ ἰκανός συνεῖναι. μάλιστα ² δὲ τούτῳ φανερῷ ἐπὶ θεοῦ. δήλον γάρ ὡς οὐδε-νὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φιλῶν δεῖσται, οὐδὲ ἐσται αὐτῷ εἴ γε μηθὲν δέοιτο του.² ώστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονεστατὸς ἥκιστα δείσται φιλῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἥ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ³ ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἀριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ³ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅτις ὡσι φίλοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν⁴ εἰς τὸ συζήν αἱρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε⁵ φανερῶν ἃν εἶναι δόξειν ὡς οὐ χρῆσεως ἐνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ᾽ ωφελείας, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δι᾽ ἁρετῆν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γάρ μηθενὸς ἔνδεεις ὅμεν,⁴ τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσμένους ζητοῦμεν⁷ πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὐ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἡ τοὺς ποιήσωντας⁸. αἰμεῖνω δ᾽ ἐχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἡ μετ᾽ ἐνδειάς, μάλιστα τε⁹ τῶν συζήν αξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον μὴ ποτε ⁵ τὸ μὲν τι λέγεται καλῶς τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολὴν. δήλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζήν τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ ⁶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὅστε καὶ τὸ συζήν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἑστίν. ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ αἴσθανεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον ἐκάστῳ (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζήν πάσιν ἐμφυτος ἡ ὀρέξεις, τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι

him and society, for he is sufficient society for himself. This is most manifest in the case of God; for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will not need a friend, and that supposing he has no need of one he will not have one. Consequently the happiest human being also will very little need a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is impossible. Of necessity, therefore, he who lives the best life will have fewest friends, and they will constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager to have friends but will think lightly not only of useful friends but also of those desirable for society. But assuredly even his case would seem to show that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but that one loved on account of goodness is the only real friend. For when we are not in need of something, then we all seek people to share our enjoyments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors; and we can judge them better when we are self-sufficing than when in need, and we most need friends who are worthy of our society.

But about this question we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison. The matter is clear if we ascertain what life in the active sense and as an End is. It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the appetite for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must

\[a\] i.e. of man with God, l. 8 above; cf. 1245 b 13.
ARISTOTLE

1244 b

gnōsōn tina). et oūn tis ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσει 7
tō gnōskein autō kath' autō kai tō1 μή (ἀλλὰ
tōtō mon λανθάνει ωσπερ en tō λόγῳ γέγραπται,
tō mon ton πράγματi εστι μή λανθάνειν), outhēn
an dianfēro, o tō gnōskein allon an' autōi; tō
d' ʻ̲̂ oμοιον tō2 x̄̄n an' autōi allon, eułógwas de
τo éautōi oisbánesthai kai3 gnwrixein aíretpoerōn.

deī γαρ ἀμα συνθείναι δύο en tō λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ
x̄̄n aíretpo4 kai ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων
1245 a ὅτι τo ουτοὺς5 ὑπάρχει τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. et8
oùn ʻ̲̂ lai τῆς τοιαύτης συστοῖχαι ἢ ἐτέρα
ἐν τῇ του αίρετοι τάξει, kai τὸ gnwstōn kai τὸ
aisbētōn6 ἐστιν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεὶ τῷ7 κοινωνεῖν τῆς
ωρισμένης φύσεως.8 ὅστε τo αὐτόi boulēsthai
aisbánesthai τὸ αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιοῦτο boulēsthai
ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ oūn ou kai' autoi's ἐσμέν ἕκαστον
τούτων ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν
tō aírbānesthai ἡ gnwrixein (aisbēnōmenos γαρ
aisbētōs gînetai tōutō kai9 ἄύτη kai kατὰ
tōtō kath' d10 πρῶτον aísbāneita kai x̄̄n kai ou,
gnwstōs de gnwskων)—ὡστε διὰ τούτο καὶ x̄̄n
10 ἐπεὶ boulētai ὅτι boulētai ἐπεὶ gnwrixein, tōtō de
ὅτι autoi's eînai tō gnwstōn. tō dē suz̄̄n aíreisβhai 9
doiēs eînai kai ποιημένοι πως εὗθες—

1 tō add. Wilson.
3 kai ἐαντoν> Sp.
5 Brandis: τo αυτo τοίς.
7 Fr.: τo.
9 τούτω kai add. Rac.

Sol.: tōu.
4 Fr.: καὶ aíretpo.
6 corr. Ππ.: aíretpo.
8 hic lacunam Sus.
10 Fr.: καθά.

a τοιαύτην = ἀγαθήν.
b e.g. the Pythagorean pair of series, One, Good, etc.
opposed to Many, Bad, etc. (Solomon). ' The Determined '
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, VII. xii. 7-9

7 be deemed a mode of knowing). If therefore one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the argument as we have written it, but it may be observed in experience), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another person’s knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person’s living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality. If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the ‘determined’ nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives, in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known.

8 To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (opposed to ‘the Indeterminate’) belonged to the ‘desirable’ series.

9 i.e. perception of something outside oneself causes consciousness of self.
1245 a

(ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν 1 πρῶτον καὶ τοίς ἄλλοις ζύγως, οἶνον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ὡς τοῦ 2 συμπίνειν. τί γὰρ δια-
féreit τὸ πλησίον οὕτως ταῦτα συμβαίνει πώς ἡ χωρὶς
ἀν ἀφέλης τὸν λόγον; ἄλλα μὴν 3 καὶ τοῦ λόγου
κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἔτερον τοιοῦτον, ἄμα τ’
οὕτε διδάσκειν οὕτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκεῖσι
φίλοις οἶνον τε, μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτός οὐκ ἔχει
ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ’ ὁ 4 φίλος, ὡς δ’ ὁμοίωτης
φιλία) — ἄλλα μὴν φαίνεται γε ὅτι 5 καὶ πάντες 10

20 ἦδιον τῶν ἁγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν,
καθ’ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἐκάστῳ 6 καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστου,
ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἲδονῆς σωματικῆς 11
τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μονοικῆς τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας· καὶ
τό ἀμα δὴ 7 εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ (διὸ φησι ‘μόχθοι οἱ
τηλοῦ φίλοι’), ὡστ” 8 οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων
τούτου γνωμένου. οθὲν καὶ ο’ ἐρως δοκεῖ φιλία
ὁμοιον εἶναι. τοῦ γὰρ συζήτην ὀρέγεται ο’ ἔρων,
ἂλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἡ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἄλλα κατ’ αἰσθήσιν.

‘Ο μὲν τοῖνυν λόγος ἐκείναι φησὶ διαπορῶν, τὸ 15
δ’ ἐργον οὕτω φαίνεται γνώμενον, ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι
παρακροῦται πως ἡμᾶς δ’ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον 16
οὖν 9 ἐντεῦθεν 10 τάληθες· ο’ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι,

30 ὡσπέρ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, ‘ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς,’ ἄλλος

1 Bz.: κοινωνών. 2 Bz.: οἶνον τὸ . . . ὡς τὸ.
3 Bk.: μὴ. 4 Bz.: οὐ.
5 ὅτι add. (et καὶ om.) Fr.
6 Ross: ἐκαστον.
7 Rac. (καὶ τὸ ἁμα δεῖ Camerarius): καὶ τοῦμα δὴ (δεῖ 1’).
8 Fr.: ὡς.
9 οὖν add. Fr.
10 Sp.: ἐνθεῦ.

This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of
verse.

See 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27.

* Ib. 22 ff.
(first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is friendship)—but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasant to share good things with our friends, as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can—

but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—; and so it is pleasant to be with one's friend (whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are')^a), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.

Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former position,^b but the facts of experience are obviously on the latter lines,^c so that it is clear that the raiser of the question in a way misleads us. We must therefore examine the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes, in the language of the proverb,\textsuperscript{d} 'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are

\textsuperscript{a} Quoted elsewhere in the same connexion, but one may conjecture that the phrase originally meant 'as strong as Hercules.'
αὐτὸς· διέσπασται δὲ, καὶ χαλέπουν πάντα ἐφ' ἐνὸς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν ὁ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοίος ἔτερος, ἀλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἔτερον ἔτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν γε ἤττον βούλεται οὕσπερ αὐτὸς διαφέρει ἐγὼ ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι (καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου γνωρίζειν) τὸ αὐτὸν πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν πως γνωρίζειν. οὕστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζήν τῷ φίλῳ ἤδυ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον ἃμα αἰσθήσις ἂεί), μάλλον δὲ τὰς θεωτέρας ἡδονάς· αἰτιον δ' ὅτι ἂεὶ ἁδινὸν ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίων ἀγαθῷ, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πράξεις, ὅτε δὲ ἔτερον τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὐ ζήν καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλου, ἐν δὲ τῷ5 συζήν συνεργεῖν, ἥ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστα γε. διὸ δεῖ6 συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευχεῖσθαι, οὗ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (αἱ τοιαῦται γὰρ κοινωνίαι οὐχ ὀμιλίαι δοκοῦσι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀπολαύσεις), ἀλλ' ἑκατὸς οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλος, ἐν τούτω 15 βούλεται συζήν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ ποιεῖν εὐ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἱροῦνται μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν τοῖς καὶ δεῖ συζήν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὔδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἁριστὸς μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερὸν. ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνεβαίνει, λέγοντος

1 Rac.: τὰ.  
2 Syl.: τε.  
3 Rac.  
4 v.l. εἰ δυνατὸν (εἰ δ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν εὐ ζήν οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον Sus.).  
5 εἰ δὲ τὸ Fr.  
6 δεῖ add. Fr.  
7 γὰρ κοινωνίαι οὐχ add. Rac. (ὀμιλίαι γὰρ οὐχ Sus.).

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*Cf. 1244 b 2 ff., 1245 a 27.*
scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in
the case of one person; though by nature a friend
is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend
in body and another in spirit, and one in one part
of the body or spirit, another in another. But still
none the less a friend really means as it were a
separate self. To perceive and to know a friend,
therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive
and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently
to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life
with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always
involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend),
but more so to share the more divine pleasures;
the reason of which is that it is always more pleas-
ant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good,
and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active
experience, sometimes something else. But if it is
pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend
also to live well, and if living together involves
working together, surely their partnership will be pre-
eminently in things included in the End. Hence we
should study together, and feast together—not on
the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures
(for such partnerships do not seem to be real social
intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really
wishes to share with his friends the End that he
is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose
most of all to benefit their friends and to be bene-
fited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live
together is actually a duty, and that all people wish
it very much, and that this is most the case with
the man that is the happiest and best. But that the
contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argu-
ment a was also reasonable, the statement being
ARISTOTLE

1245 b

άληθή: κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς
ἀληθοῦσι οὔσης ἡ λύσις ἔστιν· ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ
tοιοῦτος οἶος δείσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὄμοιον ἀξιοὶ.¹
καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔδεν² νοῆσει ὁ 1
σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὗ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
βέλτιον ἢ ὡστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ’ αὐτός αὐτὸν.
αὐτοῖο δ’ ὅτι ἦμῖν μὲν τὸ εὗ καθ’ ἑτερον, ἐκεῖνος³
dὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοὺ τὸ εὗ ἔστιν.

20 Καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἦμῖν καὶ εὐχεσθαὶ πολλοὺς φίλους, 1
ἀμα δὲ λέγειν ὃς οὕθεις φίλος ὁ πολλοὶ φίλοι,
ἀμφοι λέγεται ὁρθῶς. εὐδεχόμενον⁴ γὰρ πολλοῖς
συζῆν ἀμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι, ὡς πλείστοις⁵
αἱρετώτατοι: ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν
ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἰναι, ὡστ’ 1
25 οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτῆσασθαι (πείρας
γὰρ δεῖ⁶), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕσι χρήσασθαι.

Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἀπείναε εὗ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον
βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν. καὶ τὸ
ἀμα βουλέσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν· εὐδεχόμενον⁴ μὲν γὰρ
ἀμα καὶ εὔ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ εὐδεχό-
30 μενον⁴ δὲ ἀμα,⁷ ὅσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆται ἢσως ἃν ἡ
μήτηρ εἰλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ’ αὐτῆς ὁντα
τὸ Εὐρυσθῆθε θητεύειν. ὄμοιως γὰρ ἃν εἴποιεν καὶ 1
οὐ ὁ Δάκων ἔσκωμην, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοῦν
χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκερόνους.

¹ Bz.: ἀξιοῦ. ² Rac.: οὐδε. ³ εἰκεῖνος ? Rac.
⁴ Rac.: εὐδεχόμενον. ⁵ Sp.: πλείστοις.
⁶ Syl.: ἀεί. ⁷ Iac.: ἀλλα.
⁸ Γ’: τῷ Ἡρακλῆι. ⁹ Iac.: ὅν.

a i.e. of man with God, 1244 b 7.
b He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did
not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it (Solomon).
true. For the solution is on the line of the comparison, the correspondence being true; for the fact that God is not of such a nature as to need a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also does not need one. Yet according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being.

17 As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many friends, and at the same time saying that one who has many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them to be the largest possible number; but as that is very difficult, active community of perception must of necessity be in a smaller circle, so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation is needed), but also to use them when one has got them.

One for whom we feel affection we sometimes wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes to share the same experiences. And to wish to be together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible to be together and to prosper all choose this; but if it is not possible to prosper together, then we choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to be with her but in service to Eurystheus. For men would say things like the jest which the Spartan made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm.
Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλούντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς 
35 συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλομένου τὸ 
βουλέσθαι συμμετέχειν. καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφοτερα συμ-
βαίνει εὐλόγως. δεὶ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω 
λυπηρῶν ὡς ἤδιν τὸν φίλον, δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι 
μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ. διὸ κωλύοντι συμμετέχειν ἰκανοὶ 2
γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἡν μὴ φαίνωνται τὸ 
αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπο-
μένου τοῦ φίλου, ἔτι δὲ κοινότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι 
φέροντες τὰ κακά. ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱρετον τὸ τ’ εὐ καὶ τὸ 2
ἀμα, δήλων ὦτι καὶ τὸ ἀμα εἶναι μετ’ ἐλάττονος 
ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον πως ἡ χώρις μετὰ μείζονος. 
5 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἁδήλων τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἀμα, ἡδὴ 
διαφέρονται, καὶ οἱ μὲν οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἀμα 
pάντων φιλικόν, καὶ ὥσπερ συνδεπνεύων ἀμα φασιν 
ἡδιον ταῦτα ἔχοντας. οἱ δ’ ἀμα μὲν τοῦ εὐ 
βουλονται, ἐπειδὴ εἰ τις ὑπερβολᾶς ποιήσειν, ὁμολογοῦν 
eῖναι ἀμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἡ 12 εὖ 
10 σφόδρα χώρις. παραπλήσιον δὲ τοῦτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς 
ἀτυχίας ὦτι μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπ-
eῖναι, όμως λυπεῖν ὦταν μηθὲν μέλλως ποιήσειν 
πλέον, ὦτε δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡδιον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ 
15 τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταῦτας καὶ μᾶλ’ εὐλόγον. διὰ 
γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὦτι μὲν 
τὸ λυποῦμενον ἡ ἔν φαιλή ὀντα ἕξει τὸν φίλον

1 δὲ (et lacunam ante ἐτι) Bk.: δὲ τό.
2 Sp.: αἰρετῶν.
4 οἱ μὲν add. Sus.
6 καὶ om. Γ.
6 Sp.: ἀν.
8 Iac.: ἐπειδὴ δὲ γέ.
14 Syl.: τοὺς.
It seems to be characteristic of one who feels affection for another to debar him from sharing his troubles, and of the person for whom affection is felt to wish to share them. Both these things happen reasonably; for to a friend nothing ought to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest.

Hence people hinder their friends from sharing their sorrows; they are content to be in trouble by themselves, in order that they may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a relief not to bear their misfortunes alone. And as both well-being and companionship are desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with company though having the same food; others wish to share only in well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately are on a par. And it is much the same as this in regard to misfortunes also; sometimes we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is very easily explained; it comes about because of the things stated before, and because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing.

\[a\ C f. \ 1245 \ b \ 26—1246 \ a \ 2.\]
θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, τὸ δ’ ὅραν τὸν φίλον ἢδυ ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἥδιστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴν1 κάμνοντα εἰ αὐτός. ὥστε ὅπότερον ἃν τούτων ἦ μᾶλλον ἢδυ, 25
ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπήν τοῦ βουλεύσας παρεῖναι ἡ μῆ. καὶ
tοῦτο2 εἰπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει3 καὶ διὰ τὴν
αὐτήν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι: μάλιστα γάρ φιλοτιμοῦνται
τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ’ ἀπεῖναι4 ἂν5
ἀνάγκη ἢ6 αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρω-
μένους συναποκτινύασιν μᾶλλον γάρ τοῦ οἰκείου
αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν, εἰ καὶ μεμημένος
ὅτι ποτὲ εὐ ἑπραττε, μᾶλλον ἦ εἰ ὄστο αἰε̣ κακῶς
πράττειν.

1 Sol.: μῆ.
3 Camot: συμβαίνειν.
5 ἂν add. Fr.
2 Fr.: τότε.
4 Rac.: εἰναι.
6 ἢ add. Fr.
we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated, and indeed to see him ill if one is ill oneself; so that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him to be present or not. And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.

\[a\] Cf. 1245 a 26–b 9.

\[b\] In the Greek this clause is left to be understood.
I. Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τοὺς εἰς ἐστιν ἐκαστῶν 1 χρῆσαι 1 οἷς καὶ ἕφ' ὅς πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀυτῷ ἢ αὖ 3 κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἶον ἢ ὁφθαλμός, 30 ηδεὶν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν διαστρέφαντα ὦστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανήναι, αὕτω μὲν ἡ χρείαι ἅμφω ὦτι μὲν ὁφθαλμός ἐστιν, ἢν δ' ὁφθαλμῷ ἅλλῃ 7 δὲ, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἶον εἰ ἢν ἀποδόσθαι ἡ φαγεῖν. ὦμοίως 2 δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη 9· καὶ γὰρ ἀλήθως καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, οἶον ὅταν ἐκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ, ὃς ἀγνοία δὴ νῦν χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ μεταστρέψασαι 10 τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὸν πόδα 11 τῷ ποδὲ ποτὲ ὡς χειρὶ καὶ ταύτη ὄς ποδὶ χρωνται αὐτοὶ ὀρχύστριδες. εἰ δὴ πᾶσαι αἱ 3 ὀρεταὶ 13 ἐπιστήμαι, εἰτη ἄν 14 καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὃς ἀδικία χρῆσθαι· ἀδικήσει 15 ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης τὰ ἀδικα πράττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀγνοητικά ἀπὸ 1246 ἐπιστήμης· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, φανερὸν ὦτι οὐκ

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1 Ρβ.: ἐκαστὼ φίλῳ Μβ.
2 Σπ.: ἄποινά.
3 Ιακ.: τοῦτο ἢ αὐτὸ ἢδύ.
4 Ιακ.: ἢ.
5 χρείαι άδικήσει.
6 ἐστίν Ιακ.: ὅτι.
7 Ιακ.: ἅ
8 Σπ.: ἀδύνατον.
9 Ιακ.: μεταστρέψασι.
10 Σπ.: ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης.
11 τὸν πόδα Ιακ.
12 Αἰ add. Sp.
13 Ιακ.: ἀρισταῖ.
14 εἰτη ἄν Σπ.: ἐλπιᾶν.
15 Σπ.: ἐπιστήμης εἰ.
BOOK VIII

1 I. But one may raise the question whether it is possible to use any given thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use it qua itself or on the contrary incidentally: for instance, with an eye qua eye, to see, or also just to see wrong, by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses of the eye, then, use it because it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally, for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat it.

2 And similarly with the use of knowledge: one can use it truly, and one can use it wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot. If then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible to use even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge; but if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot

ceeding Book, and some editors print it as cc. xiii.-xv. of Book VII. The text has been fully treated by Jackson, J. Phil. xxii. 170.

* i.e. stand on their hands and wave their feet in the air, see Dict. Ant., "Saltatio."
ARISTOTLE

1246 b

ἀν εἰπεν ἑπιστήμαι αἱ ἄρεται. οὔδ’ εἰ μὴ ἐστιν ἀγνοεῖν ἀπὸ ἑπιστήμης ἀλλ’ ἀμαρτάνειν μόνον καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ποιεῖν, οὔτι ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης γε ὡς ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πράξει. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ 5 φρόνησις ἑπιστήμη καὶ ἀληθὲς τι, τὸ αὐτὸ ποιήσει κάκεινη· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἀφρόνως ἀπὸ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν ταῦτα ἀπερ ὁ ἀφρων· εἰ δὲ ἀπλὴ 2 ἡ ἐκάστου χρεία ἡ ἐκαστον, κἂν φρονίμως ἐπραττον οὕτω πράπτοντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ταῖς 4 ἄλλαις ἑπιστήμαις ἄλλῃ κυρία ποιεῖ τὴν στροφήν.

10 αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς πασῶν κυρίας τίς; οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἑπιστήμην γε ἡ νοῦς. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδ’ ἄρετή· χρήται γὰρ αὐτή, 3 ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἄρετή τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρήται. τὶς οὖν ἐστὶν; ἡ ὥσπερ λέγεται 5 ἀκρασία ἡ 4 κακία τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ πως ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατής, ἔχων νοῦν, ἄλλʼ ὥδη ἂν ἰσχυρὰ ἢ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, στρέφει καὶ λογεῖται τάναντια; ἡ ἑστὶ 6 δῆλον ὅτι, κἂν ἐν μὲν τούτῳ ἄρετῇ ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἄνοια ἢ, ἑτέρα 7 μεταποιοῦνται; ὡστε ἐσται δικαιοσύνη τ’ οὐ 8 δικαίως χρήσθαι καὶ κακώς καὶ φρονίσει ἀφρόνως· ὡστε καὶ τάναντια. ἀτοπον 20 γὰρ εἰ τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἄρετῆν 9 μοχθηρίᾳ ποτε ἐγγενομένη ἐν 10 τῷ ἀλόγῳ 11 στρέφει καὶ

1 ἐπεὶ ἢ ? Rac.
2 ὡν add. Rac. (ὡν pro ὡ Bus.)
3 αὐτή αὐτή ? Rac.
4 ὡ add. Rac.
5 Iac.: πῶς.
6 Iac.: ἥ σφι.
7 Iac.: ἑτέραι.
8 τ’ οὐ lac.: το.
9 Γ: τῆς . . . ἄρετῆς.
10 Sp.: μὲν.
11 Sus.: λόγῳ.

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be branches of knowledge. And also if it is not possible from knowledge to be ignorant, but only to make mistakes and do the same things as one does from ignorance, a man will assuredly never act from justice in the same way as he will act from injustice. But since wisdom is knowledge and a form of truth, wisdom also will produce the same effect as knowledge, that is, it would be possible from wisdom to act unwisely and to make the same mistakes as the unwise man does; but if the use of anything qua itself were single, when so acting men would be acting wisely. In the case of the other forms of knowledge, therefore, another higher form causes their diversion; but what knowledge causes the diversion of the actually highest of all? Obviously there is no longer any knowledge or any mind to do it. But moreover goodness does not cause it either; for wisdom makes use of goodness, since the goodness of the ruling part uses that of the ruled. Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man is in a manner profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are transformed in another way? so that it will be possible to use justice unjustly and badly, and wisdom unwisely; and therefore the opposite uses also will be possible. For it is strange if whereas when wickedness at any time arises in the irrational part it will pervert the goodness in

\[a\] As in § 1 above it was shown not to be.
ποιήσει ἁγνοεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀρετή ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀνοίας ἐννοοῦσιν οὐ στρέφει ταύτην καὶ ποιήσει φρονίμως κρίνειν καὶ τὰ δέοντα, καὶ πάλιν ἢ φρόνησις ἢ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῇ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀκολούθιαν σωφρόνως πράττειν, ὁπερ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ ἐγκράτεια. ὡστ' ἐσται καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνοίας φρονίμως. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα ἀτοπα, ἀλλωσ τε καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνοίας χρήσθαι φρονίσει φρονίμως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλών οὐδαμῶς ἵνα ὁσπερ τὴν ιατρικὴν ἢ γραμματικὴν στρέφει ἀκολούθια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ἁγνοιαν, ἐὰν ἢ ἐναντία διὰ τοῦ μη ἐνείναι τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅλως μᾶλλον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν οὕτως ἐμοίου· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὁ ἀδικος πάντα ὁ δίκαιος δύναται, καὶ ὅλως ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἡ ἀδύναμια. ὡστε δήλον ὃτι ἀμα φρό- νιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ, ἐκεῖναι δ' ἀλλού ἐξεις, καὶ ὁρθὸν τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ὃτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονίςεως. ἀλλ' ὃτι ἐπιστήμην ἐφή, οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀρετή γὰρ ἐστί, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη οἰκά γένος ἀλλο γνώσεως.

II. Ἐπει δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ φαμέν καὶ τοὺς εὐ-
1247 a τυχεῖς εὐ πράττειν ως καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἐμποιοῦσθη εὐπραγίαν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ ἐπιστήμην, σκεπτέον

1 ἡ ἀποθετ. Rac. 2 ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ add. Sus. 3 δέονται <πράττειν> vel <ποιεῖν> ἢ Rac. 4 Γ': κόλασιν ἄν. 5 εἶναι add. Rac. 6 καὶ Γ': καὶ ἡ. 7 (bis) Iac.: ἁγνολας. 8 ἐστι δὲ Sp.: ἐπὶ τε. 9 φρονίσει add. Sp. 10 οὐ Rac.: οὖν ὃ (οὖν οὐ Iac.). 11 καὶ add. Iac. (post πάντα Γ'). 12 Iac.: καὶ ἀγαθαὶ ἐκεῖναι αὐτ. 13 Rac.: ὁρθῶς. 14 Bek.: τὸ σῶμα κρατητικὸν. 15 Rac.: ὁρθὸν. 16 Sp.: γνώσ . . . 17 Iac.: καὶ ἀρετή (καὶ ἀρετή Sp.).

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the rational and cause it to be ignorant, yet goodness in the irrational part when there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational part should not make profligacy in the irrational act temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially is. So that there will actually be wise action arising from folly. But these consequences are absurd, especially using wisdom wisely as a result of folly; it is a thing which we certainly do not see cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to badness; for example, the just man is capable of all that the unjust man is, and in general inability is contained in ability. So that it is clear that men are wise and good simultaneously, and that the states of character above described belong to a different person, and the Socratic dictum 'Nothing is mightier than wisdom,' is right. But in that by 'wisdom' he meant 'knowledge,' he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of cognition.

II. But wisdom is not the only thing which acting in accordance with goodness causes welfare, but we also speak of the fortunate as faring well, which implies that good fortune also engenders welfare in the same way as knowledge does; we must therefore consider whether one man is fortu-

18 ἐμποιούσης Fr.: ἐδ ποιοῦσης.
19 Sp.: καλ.
20 Sp.: τῆς ἐπιστήμης.
ἀρ’ ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὁ δ’ ἀτυχὴς ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τούτων. ὃτι μὲν γάρ εἰσὶ τινες 2 εὐτυχεῖς ὁρῶμεν· ἄφρονες γὰρ οhtdocs καταρθοῦσιν 5 πολλοὶ ἐν οῖς ἡ τύχη κυρία, οί δὲ καὶ ἐν οῖς τέχνη ἐστὶ, πολλὴ 2 μέντοι καὶ τύχη 3 ἐνυπάρχει, οἶον ἐν στρατηγίᾳ καὶ κυβερνητικῇ. πότερον οὖν ἀπὸ τινος 3 ἔξως οὗτοι εἰσιν, ἡ οὔ τῷ 4 αὐτοὶ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι γάρ τικοί εἰσι τῶν εὐτυχημάτων; νῦν μὲν γὰρ 10 οὗτως οἴονται ὃς φύσει τινῶν ὄντων· ἡ δὲ φύσις ποιοὺς τινας ποιῄ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς διαφέρουσιν, ὃσπερ οἱ μὲν γλαυκοὶ οἱ δὲ μελανόμματοι 5 τῷ τοδὲ 5 τοιοῦτο ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ εὐτυχεῖς καὶ ἀτυχεῖς. ὃτι μὲν γὰρ οὐ φρονήσει καταρθοῦσι 4 δῆλον, οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἡ φρόνησις ἂλλ’ ἔχει λόγον 15 διὰ τί οὗτω πράττει, οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν διὰ τί καταρθοῦσι, τέχνη γὰρ ἂν ἦν· ἐτὶ δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι 5 οὗτες ἄφρονες, οὐχ ὃτι περὶ ἄλλα (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄτοπον, οὐον Ἡπποκράτης γεωμετρικὸς ὄν, ἄλλα περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔδοκεν βλας καὶ ἄφρων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ χρυσίων πλέων 8 ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν 20 Βυζαντίῳ πεντηκοστολόγων δι’ εὐήθειαν, ὡς λέγουσιν) ἂλλ’ ὃτι καὶ ἐν οἷς εὐτυχοῦσιν ἄφρονες. περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν οὐχ οἱ δεινότατοι εὐτυχεῖς, ἂν ἂλλ’ (ὡσπερ ἐν κυβων πτώσει ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ἄλλος
nate and another unfortunate by nature or not, and how it stands with these matters. For that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which involve skill although also containing a large element of luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate as a result of a certain state of character, or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not by reason of a certain quality in themselves? As it is, people think the latter, holding that some men are successful by natural causes; but nature makes men of a certain quality, and the fortunate and unfortunate are different even from birth, in the same way as some men are blue-eyed and others black-eyed because a particular part of them is of a particular quality. For it is clear that they do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they could not say why they succeed—for that would be science; and moreover it is manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not unwise about other matters (for that would not be anything strange, for example Hippocrates \(^a\) was skilled in geometry but was thought to be stupid and unwise in other matters, and it is said that on a voyage owing to foolishness he lost a great deal of money, taken from him by the collectors of the two-per-cent duty at Byzantium), but even though they are unwise about the matters in which they are fortunate. For in navigation it is not the cleverest who are fortunate, but (just as in throwing dice one man throws a

\(^a\) A Pythagorean philosopher of Chios, fl. 460 B.C.
δ' ἐξι βάλλει· καθὰ ἤντο φύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς. ἦ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν, οἷον πλοῖον κακῶς νεανιτηγημένον ἀμεινὸν πολλάκις διαπλεῖ. ἀλλ' οὖ δι' αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθὸν; ἀλλ' οὖτως ὁ εὐτυχῶν τὸν δαίμον' ἔχει κυβερνήτην. ἀλλ' ἀτοπον θεὸν ἡ δαίμονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν φρονιμώτατον. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκῃ ἡ φύσει ἡ νόω ἡ ἐπιτροπία τινὶ κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἐστὶ, φύσει ἀν εἶν οἱ εὐτυχεῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ γε φύσις αὐτία ἡ τοῦ ἀεὶ ωσαύτως ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἡ ἰ δὲ τύχη τοῦναντίον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παραλόγως ἐπιτυγχάνειν τύχης δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς, οὐκ ἄν δόξειε τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ αἰτιον οἷον ἀεὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐτι εἰ ὅτι τοιοσδὲ ἐπιτυγχάνει ἡ ἀποτυγχάνει, ὥσπερ ὅτι γλαυκὸς οὐκ ὃς ὃρφ, οὐ τύχη αὐτία ἀλλὰ φύσις: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν εὐτυχῆς ἀλλ' οἷον εὐφυῆς. ὅστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, οὐ διὰ τύχην εἰσίν· οὐκ ἄρα εἰσίν εὐτυχεῖς, εὐτυχεῖς γὰρ ὁσοῖς αὐτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν.

1 ἐξ add. hic Rac. (post βάλλει Bf, Iac.).
2 Iac. (et post φύσει, <τ' ὧν φύσει εὐτυχῆς> Καθ' ἤν.
3 Syl.: δὲ πλει.
4 Syl.: οὖτος εὐτυχῆς (εὐτυχῶν add.).
5 post κυβερνήτην add. ἀγαθὸν codd. plur.
6 οὐν <ουτω> τὸ Bus.
7 εἶναι <ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην εὐτυχῆς> Iac., <ὁ δὲ διὰ τύχην ἐπιτυγχάνων εὐτυχῆς> ? Rac.
8 δόξειε add. Iac.
9 ὅτι add. Fr.
10 ἡ ἀποτυγχάνει add. Sus.
11 δότι τὸ codd. plur.
12 Bf: εὐτυχῆς.
13 Iac.: ὁσων.
blank and another a six) a man is fortunate according as things were arranged by nature. Or is it because he is loved by God, as the phrase goes, and because success is something from outside? as for instance a badly built ship often gets through a voyage better, though not owing to itself, but because it has a good man at the helm. But on this showing the fortunate man has the deity as steersman. But it is strange that a god or deity should love a man of this sort, and not the best and most prudent. If, then, the success of the lucky must necessarily be due to either nature or intellect or some guardianship, and of these three causes two are ruled out, those who are fortunate will be so by nature. But again, nature of course is the cause of a thing that happens either always or generally in the same way, whereas fortune is the opposite. If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort as to produce the same result always or generally—further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune but nature is the cause; therefore he is not a man who has good fortune but one who has as it were a good nature. Hence we should have to say that the people we call fortunate are so not by reason of fortune; therefore they are not fortunate, for the fortunate are those for whom good fortune is a cause of good things.

a Or, with Jackson's emendations, 'another a six according as nature determines, so here a man is lucky because his nature is such.'
ARISTOTLE

1247 b

Εἰ δ’ οὖτω, πότερον οὐκ ἐσται τύχη ὅλως, ἥ ἐσται μέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰτία; ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι. ἐσται ὁρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν τισιν 10

5 αἰτία ἦ κακῶν· εἰ δ' ὅλως ἐξαιρετέον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης φατέον γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἕμεις ἀλλης ὁσής αἰτίας διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄραν τύχην εἶναι φαμεν αἰτίαν· διὸ καὶ ὅριζόμενοι τὴν τύχην τιθέασιν αἰτίαν ἀλογον ἀνθρωπίνω λογισμῷ, ὡς ὁσής τινὸς φύσεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀλλὰ πρόβλημα ἄν εἰη.

10 ἐπει δὲ ὅρωμέν τινας ἀπαξ εὐνυχήσαντες, διὰ τὸ οὐ καὶ πάλιν ἄν διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθώσαις, καὶ πάλιν, καὶ πάλιν; τοὺ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀιτίον. οὐκ ἀρα ἐσται τύχης τοῦτο. ἀλλ' ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ 15 ἀποβαίνῃ ἀπ' ἀπειρῶν καὶ ἀφιζόταν, ἐσται μὲν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἦ κακῶν, ἐπιστήμη δ' οὐκ ἐσται αὐτοῦ ἦ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, ἐπεὶ ἐμάνθανον ἄν τινες εὐνυχεῖς,

15 ἦ καὶ πᾶσαι ἂν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, ὡσπερ ἐφή Σωκράτης, εὐνυχίαι ἤπαι. τί οὖν κωλύει συμβηναὶ τίνι ἐφ- εῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλάκις οὐχ ὅτι τοιούτῳ, ἀλλ' οἰον ἄν εἰη ἐφ' τὸ κύβος ἀεὶ μακαρίαν ἐβάλλει; τί δὲ δή; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνείσοι ὀρμαὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ αἱ δ' ἀπὸ ὅρεξεως ἀλόγου; καὶ πρότεραι αὐται; εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν

1 οὐκ Sp.: ἦ.
3 [καὶ] Sp.
5 Iac.: ἀνάλογον.
7 Iac.: διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθώσαι (propert idem dirigere unum Bf).
8 καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν Mb.: καὶ πάλιν Pb.
9 Bf.: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοὐτ'.
11 Bf.: ἀπ' om. codd.
13 Bf.: ἀπειρίαι.
15 Iac.: τοῖς δεῖ.
17 Fr.: μακράν.
But if so, shall we say that there is no such thing as fortune at all, or that it does exist but is not a cause? No, it must both exist and be a cause. Consequently it will furthermore be a cause of goods or evils to certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some people have good fortune on one occasion, why should they not succeed a second time too owing to the same cause? and a third time? and a fourth? for the same cause produces the same effect. Therefore this will not be a matter of fortune; but when the same result follows from indeterminate and indefinite antecedents, it will be good or bad for somebody, but there will not be the knowledge of it that comes by experience, since, if there were, some fortunate persons would learn it, or indeed all branches of knowledge would, as Socrates said, be forms of good fortune. What, then, prevents such things from happening to somebody a number of times running not because he has a certain character, but in the way in which for instance it would be possible to make the highest throw at dice every time? And what then? are there not some impulses in the spirit that arise from reasoning and others from irrational appetition? and are not the latter prior? because if the impulse caused by desire for what is

\[ \textit{a} \] Plato, \textit{Euthydemus} 279 d.
ηδέος, καὶ ἡ ὀρεξὶς φύσει γε ἐπὶ τὸ ἁγαθὸν βαδίζου ἂν πάντοτε. ¹ εἰ δὴ τινὲς εἰσὶν εὐφυὲς (ὡσπερ οἱ ωδικοὶ ὅντα ἐπιστάμενοι ζήσων οὕτως εὑρεῖται) καὶ ἄνευ λόγου ὀρμῶσιν η ³ ὡς φύσις πέφυκε καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦσι καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τότε ⁴ καὶ οὕτως ὅς δὲι καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ οὗτοι κατορθώσουσιν ⁵ καὶ τύχωσιν ἄφρονες οὕτως καὶ ἁλογοῦ, ὡσπερ καὶ εὗ ἀσοντι ⁶ οὗ διδασκαλικοὶ ἀντες. οἱ δὲ γε τοιούτου εὔτυχεῖς, οὗτοι ἂνευ λόγου κατορθοῦσιν ὅς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. φύσει ἄρα οἱ εὔτυχεῖς εἶνεν ἂν.

"Ἡ πλεοναχῆς λέγεται ἡ εὔτυχία; τὰ μὲν γὰρ ¹ ² πράττεται ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς καὶ προελομένων πράξαι, τὰ δὲ οὗ, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον καὶ εἰ ⁸ ἐν ἐκεῖνοις κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκοῦσι κατορθοῦσες, καὶ εὐ-
τυχήσατε φαμεν καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις, εἰ ἐβοῦλοντο ἄλλο ¹⁰ ἡ ἐλαττον ἡ ¹¹ ἔλαβον τὰγαθὸν. ἐκεῖνοις ¹² μὲν τοῖνυν εὔτυχεῖν διὰ φύσων ἐνδεχεται ἡ γὰρ ὀρμὴ καὶ ἡ ὀρεξὶς οὐσα οὗ ἐδει ¹² κατάρθωσεν, δὲ λογισμὸς ἡν ἡλίθιος καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐνταῦθα, ὅταν δὲ ¹³ μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὀρθὸς ¹⁴ εἰναι τύχη, ¹⁵ ὀρμὴ δ’ αὐτοῦ αἰτία οὕσα, αὐτὴ ¹⁷ ὀρθὴ οὕσα ἔσωσεν ¹⁸. ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε δι’ εἵπθυμιαν ἐλογίσαντο ¹⁹ πάλιν οὕτω καὶ ἡτύχησαν. ²⁰ εὖ δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἐτέροις ²¹

¹ Iac. (semper B'): πᾶν.
² Syl.: ἄδικα (ἄδικα τοι ὕδικοι Iac., indocti B').
³ ἡ add. Iac. (secundum quod B').
⁴ Sp. (tunc B'): ποτὲ.
⁵ Fr. (dirigent B'): κατορθοῦσι.
⁶ Syl.: ἐσονταί.
⁷ Fr. (non B'): οὐ Pb, εἰ Mb.
⁸ εἰ add. Rac. (post ἐκεῖνοις Sp.).
⁹ [καὶ] (vel κατευτυχήσαι) Bus.
¹⁰ Iac.: ἄν.
¹¹ ἡ add. Iac.
¹² Fr.: δεῖ.
¹³ ὁ add. Rac.
¹⁴ v.l.: ὀρθὸς Pb, Mb.
¹⁵ Sp.: τύχη.
¹⁶ ὀρμὴ add. Rac. (ἡ add. Sp.).
¹⁷ Sp.: αὐτὴ δ’.
¹⁸ Sp. (saluauit B'): ἔξωσεν.
pleasant exists by nature, appertition also would merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If, therefore, some men have good natures—just as musical people though they have not learnt to sing a have a natural aptitude for it—and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by nature.

14 Or has the term ‘good fortune’ more than one meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the agents’ purposive choice, other things not so but on the contrary; and if in the former cases when the agents succeed they seem to have reasoned badly, we say that in fact they have had good fortune; and again in the latter cases, if they wished for a different good or less good than they have got. The former persons then may possibly owe their good fortune to nature, for their impulse and appertition, being for the right object, succeeded, but their reasoning was foolish; and in their case, when it happens that their reasoning seems to be incorrect but that impulse is the cause of it, this impulse being right has saved them; although sometimes on the contrary owing to appetite they have reasoned in this way and come to misfortune.

a Or, with Jackson’s additions, ‘just as untaught musical geniuses, without professional knowledge of singing.’

19 Sp.: ἐλογίσατο. 20 Sp.: ἠπόχησεν.
πῶς ἦσται ἡ εὐτυχία κατ' εὐφυιαν ὀρέξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία κάκειν ἡ αὐτή. ἡ πλείους αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ τύχη διστή; ἐπεὶ δ' ἰδρύμεν παρὰ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τῶν λογισμῶν τῶν ὀρθοὺς εὐτυχοῦντας τινας, δῆλον ὅτι ἐτερον ἄν τι εὕη τὸ αἴτιον τῆς εὐτυχίας. ἐκεῖνη δὲ πότερον ἔστιν εὐτυχία ἡ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐπεθυμήθησεν ἄν ἐδει καὶ ὅτε ἐδει ὁ λογισμὸς ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ ἂν τούτου εὕη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλογιστὸν τοῦτο οὐ γε φυσικῇ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ἀλλὰ διαφθείρεται ὑπὸ τινὸς. εὐτυχεῖν μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ὅτι η τύχη τῶν παρὰ λόγον αἰτία, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ λόγου, παρὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ καθόλου. ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ διὰ τοῦτο. ὥσποτ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος οὐ δείκνυσθαι ὅτι φύσει εὐτυχεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες εὐτυχεῖν διὰ τύχην κατορθοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν οὐδ' ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστὶ τύχη <οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τύχη> αἰτία οὐθενὸς δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ τῶν πάντων ὁν δοκεῖ.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἂν ἀπορθίσει τις, ἄρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτον τὴν τύχη αἰτία, τοῦ ἐπιθυμηθῆσαι οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ; οὐκ γὰρ γε πάντων ἦσται, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ νοῆσαι καὶ βουλεύσασθαι οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐβουλεύσατο βουλευσάμενος καὶ πρὶν τοῦτ' ἐβουλεύσατο οὖν ἐνόησε...

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1 καὶ τύχη διστή hic Sp.: ante κάκειν codd.
2 ἔστιν Sp.: ἦ Mb, om. Pb. 3 Fr.: ὠ. 4 Iac.: τὸ.
5 οὐ γε Iac.: οὔτε. 6 Vict. (hoc B'): τοῦτον.
7 Iac. (bene fortunate agatur B'): εὐτυχεῖν.
8 ἀλλ' <ἐνιατε> ? Rac.: ἀλλὰ <πολλοί> ? Sus. 9 Iac.: ὅτι add. Cas.
10 πρὶν add. Rac. (antequam consiliaretur B').
11 Cf. 1247 b 30 τὰ δ' οὖ (Solomon).
16 But in the case of the others, then, how will good fortune be due to natural goodness of appetite and desire? The fact is that the good fortune here and that in the other case are the same. Or is good fortune of more than one kind, and is fortune two-fold? But since we see some people being fortunate contrary to all the teachings of science and correct calculation, it is clear that the cause of good fortune must be something different. But is it or is it not good fortune whereby a man formed a desire for the right thing and at the right time when in his case human reasoning could not make this calculation? For a thing the desire for which is natural is not altogether uncalculated, but the reasoning is perverted by something. So no doubt he seems fortunate, because fortune is the cause of things contrary to reason, and this is contrary to reason, for it is contrary to knowledge and to general principle. But probably it does not really come from fortune, but seems to do so from the above cause. So that this argument does not prove that good fortune comes by nature, but that not all those who seem fortunate succeed because of fortune, but because of nature; nor does it prove that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all the things of which it seems to be the cause.

18 Yet someone may raise the question whether fortune is the cause of precisely this—our forming a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, on that showing, will not fortune be the cause of everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not the case that one only deliberates when one has deliberated even previously to that
20 νοήσας πρότερον ἡ νοήσαι, καὶ τοῦτ′ εἰς ἀπειρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχῇ τις.  
25 δὲ ζητούμενον τοῦτ′ ἐστὶ, τίς ἡ τῆς κωνήσεως ἀρχῇ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. δηλον δὴ ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ, θεῶς καὶ πάν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ· κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θείον. λόγου δ᾽ ἀρχῇ οὐ λόγος ἄλλα τι κρείττον.  
30 τί οὖν ἂν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἰή καὶ νοῦ πληθεός; ἡ γὰρ ἀρετή τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, δὲν πάλαι ἐλεγον, εὑρισκεῖς καλοῦνtau  οὐ  ἂν ὀρμήσωσι κατορθοῦσιν ἂλογοι οὔντες. καὶ βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμφέρει αὐτοῖς· ἐχουσί γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην ἡ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ βουλεύεσθως (οὐ δὲ τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχουσι), καὶ ἐν-  
35 θουσιασμόν, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐ δύνανται, ἂλογοι γὰρ οὔντες ἐπιτυγχάνουσι καὶ τοῦ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχείαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν· καὶ μόνον οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, ἂλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν τῶν τοῦ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν

1 ἡ add. Sp.  
2 ἀλλ᾽ ... τίς hic Rac.: ante οὐ τν ἐνηθες codd.  
3 ο νοῦς Cas.: συνοῦσα.  
4 ἡ Sus. (aut B') : εἰ (ei <μή> Sp.).  
5 Iac.: διὰ τι τοιαύτη τοῦ ἐλευς τὸ τοῦτο.  
6 Syl. (potest B') : δύνασθαι.  
7 εκεῖ κινεῖ Iac.: εκεῖνω.  
8 ιπποι.  
9 καὶ νοῦ add. Sp. (et intellectu B').  
10 οὶ add. Ross.  
11 Iac.: οί.  
12 οὶ add. Ross.  
13 Fr. (dirigunt B') : κατορθοῦν.  
14 Ald.: κρείττον.  
15 Sp.: ἐνθουσιασμοί.  
16 Syl.: ἀποτυγχάνουσι.  
17 τοῦ τῶν Syl.: τοῦτον (horum B').  
18 τοῦ Sol.: τε ἐν.
deliberation, nor does one only think when one has previously thought before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some starting-point; therefore thought is not the starting-point of thinking, nor deliberation of deliberating. Then what else is, save fortune? It will follow that everything originates from fortune. Or shall we say that there is a certain starting-point outside which there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such and such a nature, can produce a result of such and such a nature? But this is what we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason. What, then, could be superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God? Not goodness, for goodness is an instrument of the mind; and owing to this, as I was saying some time ago, those are called fortunate who although irrational succeed in whatever they start on. And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind that is better than mind and deliberation (whereas the others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even what belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use of observation;

\[a\] See 1247 b 26.
1248 a

χρήσθαι: τῷ θείῳ¹ δὲ οὖτοι.² τοῦτο γὰρ³ εὖ ὀρᾶ καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ὃν ἀπολύεται ὁ λόγος οὖτοι.⁴ διὸ οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθυνόειροι.

1248 b

ἐοίκε γὰρ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἀπολυμένου τοῦ λόγου⁵ ἵσχύειν μάλλον, ὁσπερ⁶ οἱ τυφλοὶ μνημονεύουσι μάλλον, ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὀρωμένοις⁷ εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον.⁸

Φανερὸν δὴ⁹ ὅτι δύο εἴδη εὐτυχίας, ἢ μὲν θεία. ² διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ θεοῦ κατορθοῦν, οὖτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν κατορθωτικὸς,¹⁰ ὁ δ’ ἐτερὸς ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν. Ἀλογοὶ δ’ ἀμφότεροι. καὶ ἢ μὲν συνεχὴς εὐτυχία μᾶλλον, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐ συνεχῆ.

III. Κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς ¹ ἐιρνηταὶ πρότερον, ἑπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαρθρωτέουν¹¹ τῆς ἐκ τοῦτων ἢν καλοῦμεν¹² ἡδὴ καλοκαγαθίαν.


ᵃ The ms. reading gives 'and experience and habit use God.'
ᵇ Or, with Jackson's text, 'But some of them by experi-
and these men use the divine.\(^a\) For this quality discerns aright the future as well as the present, and these are the men whose reason is disengaged.\(^b\) This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged principle has more strength—just as the blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with objects of sight.\(^c\)

24 It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man’s success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The former kind is more continuous good fortune, the latter is not continuous.

1 III. We have, then, previously spoken about each virtue in particular; and as we have distinguished their meaning separately, we must also describe in detail the virtue constituted from them, to which we now give the name\(^d\) of nobility.\(^e\) Now it is mani-

\(^a\) The ms. reading gives, ‘we were already giving the name,’ but if that is correct, the passage referred to has been lost.

\(^b\) Καλοκάγαθος, like ‘nobility’, connotes both social status and moral excellence; so καλοκάγαθος may be rendered ‘gentleman.’

469
οτι μεν ουν αναγκη την ταυτης αληθως τευξομενον 2
της προσηγοριας εχειν τας κατα μερος άρετας,
φανερων ουδε γαρ επι των αλλων ουθενος οιον τ'
αλλως εχειν, ουθεις γαρ ολον μεν το σωμα υγιαινει
μερος δ' ουθεν, αλλ' αναγκαιον παντα τη τα πλειοντα
και κυριωτατα των αυτων εχειν τροπον τω ολω.
εστι δη το αγαθον ειναι και το καλον καγαθον ου 3
μονον κατα τα ονοματα αλλα και kal κατα εχοντα
diαφοραν. των γαρ αγαθων παντων τελη
εστιν αυτα αυτων ενεκα εστιν αιρετα. τουτων δε 4
καλα όσα δι' αυτα οντα παντα2 επαινετα εστιν
ταυτα γαρ εστιν αφ' ουν αι τε πραξεις εισιν
επαινεται και αυτα επαινετα, δικαιοσυνη4 και
αυτη και αι πραξεις, και αι5 σωφρονες, επαινετη
gαρ και η σωφροσυνη. άλλ' ουχ υγιεια επαινετον,
ουδε γαρ το έργον, ουδε το ισχυρως, ουδε γαρ η
ισχυς, άλλ' αγαθα μεν, επαινετα δ' ου. ομοιως 5
de touto δηλον και επι των αλλων δια της
eπαιγωγης. αγαθος μεν ουν εστιν, ω τα φυσει
αγαθα εστιν αγαθα. ta γαρ περιμαχητα και
μεγιστα ειναι δοκουντα αγαθα, τιμη και πλουτος
και σωματος άρεταλ και ευτυχια και δυναμεις,
αγαθα μεν φυσει εστιν, ενδεχεται δ' ειναι βλαβερα
tis dia taes eixeis. ouste γαρ αφρων ou't adikos η
ακολαστος ουν ουδεν αν ονησε1 χρωμενος αυτωις,
ωσπερ ουδ' ο καμων τη του υγιαινοντος τροφη
χρωμενος, ουδ' ο ασθενης και αναπηρος τοις του
υγιους και τοις του ολοκληρου κοσμους. καλως 6
dε καγαθος τυ των αγαθων τα καλα υπαρχειν
αυτω δι' αυτα, και τυ πρακτικος ειναι των καλων

1 kal add. Bus.
2 alreta pro pantan? Sp.
3 Syl.: ep.
4 <oiou> dikaiosunh Syl.
fest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must necessarily be in the same condition as the whole. Now being good and being noble are really different not only in their names but also in themselves. For all goods have Ends that are desirable in and for themselves. Of these, all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable, for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength is not—these things are good but they are not laudable. And similarly induction makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore a man is good for whom the things good by nature are good. For the things men fight about and think the greatest, honour and wealth and bodily excellences and pieces of good fortune and powers, are good by nature but may possibly be harmful to some men owing to their characters. If a man is foolish or unjust or profligate he would gain no profit by employing them, any more than an invalid would benefit from using the diet of a man in good health, or a weakling and cripple from the equipment of a healthy man and of a sound one. A man is noble because he possesses those good things that are fine for their own sake and because he is a doer of

5 Sol.; "οί.
6 Γ, Sp.: οὐδ' ὅνησεν.
καὶ αὐτῶν ἐνεκα· καλὰ δ’ ἐστὶν αἳ τε ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

"Εστὶ δὲ τις ἔξις πολιτικῆ, οἷαν οἱ Λάκωνες 7 ἐχουσιν ἡ ἀλλοι τουοῦτοι ἔχουσιν ἃν, αὐτῇ δ’ ἐστὶν ἔξις τουαύτης. εἰλὲ γὰρ οἱ οὔονται τὴν ἀρετήν δεῖν

αὐτῶν ἐνέχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ἐνεκεῖν: διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες εἰσὶν (τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ 2 αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν) καλοκαγαθίαν δὲ 3 οὐκ ἐχουσίν ὡς γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι’ αὐτὰ καὶ προαιροῦνται καλὰ κἀγαθὰ 4. καὶ οὐ μόνον

ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ καλὰ μὲν φύσει ὄντα, ἀγαθὰ δὲ φύσει ὄντα, τοῦτοι καλὰ. καλὰ γὰρ 8 ἐστὶν ὅταν οὐ ἐνεκα πράττουσι καὶ αἴροινται καλὸν ἡ. διὸ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν καλὰ ἐστὶ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἄξιος δ’ οὕτος τοῦτων· καὶ τὸ πρέπον 9

καλὸν, πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτῳ, 5 πλούτος εὐγένεια δύνασι. ὥστε τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ 6 συμφέροντα καὶ καλὰ ἐστὶν· τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς διάφωνοι ταῦτα, 7 οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ κἀκεῖνος ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, τῶν δ’ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰ· τῶν δὲ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν 8 καὶ καλά, πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ καλὰς πράξεις δι’ αὐτὰ ἐπράξεν. ὃ δ’ οἶομενος τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν 10
deίν ἐνεκα τῶν ἔκτος ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καλὰ πράττει.

"Εστὶν οὖν καλοκαγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος.

Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ’ εἰρηται ποιῶν τι καὶ πῶς 11

1 [μὲν]? Rac.
2 ἀγαθὰ alterum add. Sol. (cf. 1248 b 26).
3 Γ’: γὰρ.
4 Ross: καλὸι κἀγαθοί.
5 Γ’: πλούτῳ.
6 Brandis: καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ aut καὶ αὐτὰ.
7 Rac.: τοῦτο.
8 Sp.: τῷ δ’ ἀγαθῷ.
fine deeds even for their own sake; and the fine things are the virtues and the actions that arise from virtue.

7 But there is also a state of character that is the 'civic' character, such as the Spartans have or others like them may have; and this character is of the following sort. There are those who think that one ought, it is true, to possess goodness, but for the sake of the things that are naturally good; hence though they are good men (for the things naturally good are good for them), yet they have not nobility, for it is not the case with them that they possess fine things for their own sake and that they purpose fine actions, and not only this, but also that things not fine by nature but good by nature are fine for them. For things are fine when that for which men do them and choose them is fine. Therefore to the noble man the things good by nature are fine; for what is just is fine, and what is according to worth is just, and he is worthy of these things; and what is befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous and fine; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are good for the good man; and to the noble man they are also fine, for he performs many fine actions because of them.

10 But he who thinks that one ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods does fine things only by accident.

Nobility then is perfect goodness.

11 We have also spoken about the nature of pleasure Its pleasantness.
1249 a

ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὁτι τά τε ἀπλώς ἦδέα καὶ καλὰ τά τε ἀπλώς ἀγαθά καὶ ἦδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἦδον μη
eν πράξει· διὰ τούτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαιμών καὶ ἦδιστα
ζήσει, καὶ τούτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἰδιοῦσιν.
Επει δ' ἐστὶ τις ὃρος καὶ τῷ ιατρῷ πρὸς ὄν 
ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιαῖον2 σῶμα καὶ ὃ
cαι πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἔκαστον καὶ
ὑγιεῖνον4 εἰ δὲ ἐλαττον ἡ πλέον οὐκέτι, οὔτω καὶ
τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν
φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶς οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεὶ τινὰ εἶναι
ὁρὸν καὶ ἔξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ
περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλυγότητα5 καὶ τῶν εὐ-
τυχείματων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέξθη τὸ 15
ὡς ὁ λόγος τούτο δ' ἐστὶν ὦσπερ ἂν εἰ τις
ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἴπειν ὡς ἢ ιατρική καὶ
ὁ λόγος ταύτης, τούτῳ δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐ σαφὲς
dε. δεὶ δὴ ὦσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις πρὸς τὸ 14
ἀρχὸν ἥν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν
τὴν τοῦ ἀρχόντος, οἷον δούλων πρὸς δεσπότον καὶ
ἔκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστω7 καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπει 15
δὲ καὶ ἀνθρωπὸς φύσει συνεστήκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντος
καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἔκαστον ἃν8 δεός πρὸς τὴν
αὐτοῦ9 ἀρχὴν ἥν (αὐτὴ δὲ διττῇ, ἀλλὰς γὰρ ἢ
ιατρικῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἀλλὰς ἢ ὑγίεια, ταύτης δὲ ἑνεκα
ἐκεῖνη), οὔτω δὴ10 ἔχει καὶ11 κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικῶν.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὐ ἑνεκα

1 καὶ hic Rac.: ante τά τε ἀπλώς. 2 Vat.: ὑγιεῖνον. 3 τὸ add. Rac. 4 Ross: καὶ εὐ ὑγιαῖον. 5 Zeller: καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλυγότητας. 6 καὶ Ross: κατὰ. 7 Rac.: ἐκάστου. 8 ἃν Sp.: δὴ. 9 Sp.: ἐαυτῶν (ἐν αὐτῷ ? Rac.). 11 καὶ add. Sus. 10 Rieckher: δεῖ.
and the manner in which it is a good, and have said that things pleasant absolutely are also fine and that things good absolutely are also pleasant. Pleasure does not occur except in action; on this account the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not without reason that people demand this.

12 But since a doctor has a certain standard by referring to which he judges the healthy body and the unhealthy, and in relation to which each thing up to a certain point ought to be done and is wholesome, but if less is done, or more, it ceases to be wholesome, so in regard to actions and choices of things good by nature but not laudable a virtuous man ought to have a certain standard both of character and of choice and avoidance; and also in regard to large and small amount of property and of good fortune. Now in what preceded we stated the standard 'as reason directs'; but this is as if in matters of diet one were to say 'as medical science and its principles direct,' and this though true is not clear. It is proper, therefore, here as in other matters to live with reference to the ruling factor, and to the state and the activity of the ruling factor, as for example slave must live with reference to the rule of master, and each person with reference to the rule appropriate to each. And since man consists by nature of a ruling part and a subject part, and each would properly live with reference to the ruling principle within him (and this is twofold, for medical science is a ruling principle in one way and health is in another, and the former is a means to the latter), this is therefore the case in regard to the faculty of contemplation. For God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands, but is the End as a means.
ARISTOTLE

1249 b

15 ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (δι' τὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἐνεκα, διώρισται δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος γε οὖθεν ὁ δέοισται. ἦτις οὖν αἰρέσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσεων ἁγαθῶν ποιήσει μᾶλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, η ἱσόματος ἡ χρημάτων ἡ φίλων ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἁγαθῶν, αὕτη ἄριστη καὶ οὕτως ὁ ὁρὸς κάλλιστος. εἴ τις δ' ἡ δι' ἐνδειαν ἡ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεοῦ θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἐχει 1' δὲ τούτῳ οὔτως τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὔτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρὸς ἄριστος, τὸ 2' ἡκίστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου 4 μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἃ τοιοῦτον.

Τίς μὲν οὖν ὁ ὁρὸς τῆς καλοκαγαθίας καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπός τῶν ἀπλῶς ἁγαθῶν ἐστω εἰρημένον.

1 Syl.: τε. 2 οὗτω add. Rac. 3 Zeller: τά. 4 Fr.: ἄλλοι.

* End or ‘final cause’ (οὗ ἐνεκα) denotes (1) the person or thing for whose good something is done, (2) the purpose for which it is done. God is the Final Cause in the latter sense:
to which wisdom gives commands (and the term ‘End’ has two meanings, but these have been distinguished elsewhere); since clearly God is in need of nothing. Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest; and any mode of choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one. This is how it is for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to be as far as possible unconscious of the irrational part of the spirit, as such.

Let this, then, be our statement of what is the standard of nobility and what is the aim of things absolutely good.

cf. Phys. 194 a 32-36, De An. 415 b 2, Met. 1072 b 2 (Solomon).
INDEX I.—PROPER NAMES

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ON VIRTUES AND VICES
INTRODUCTION

Contents

This essay is of interest as an example of the way in which Aristotle's reduction to scientific form of the ethical system adumbrated by Plato was later systematized and stereotyped by smaller minds. It classifies the various kinds of good and bad conduct under the virtues and vices of which they are manifestations. It starts from the ethical psychology of Plato, dividing the Soul or personality of man into three parts, the reason, the passions and the appetites. Then turning to conduct, it ranges the various actions and emotions under the virtues and vices which they exemplify.

Affinities

The list of Virtues or forms of Goodness is Aristotelian, as in addition to the four cardinal virtues of Plato, Wisdom or prudence, Courage or manliness, Temperance or sobriety of mind, and Justice or righteousness, it includes Gentleness, Self-control, Liber-

a The word 'virtue' to the modern English ear denotes only one department of ἀρετή, viz. ἡθική ἀρετή or 'moral goodness.' The Greek mind saw the unity of human excellence behind its various forms.

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ON VIRTUES AND VICES

ality or generosity, and Magnanimity or greatness of spirit. But the analysis of these virtues adopted is not Aristotle's. He exhibited them as forms of moderation, lying midway between vicious extremes of excess and deficiency; but here each virtue is merely contrasted with a single vice as its opposite. And near the end of the essay (c. viii.) there is an allusion to the comparison drawn by Plato in the Republic between the well-ordered Soul and the well-constituted State.

It is true that the rigorously systematic arrangement of the matter and the concise fullness of detail (in cc. vii., viii. three of the Vices are neatly subdivided into three species each) are more characteristic of the Peripatetic School than of the Academy; the formal exposition of a subject already fully explored has replaced the tentative heuristic method which Plato in his dialogues inherited from Socrates. The descriptive treatment of the virtues and vices (a method that had been first foreshadowed in the Nicomachean Ethics, in for instance the portrait of the Magnanimous Man) links the work with the Characters of Theophrastus, and seems to have been customary in the Peripatetic School from his time onward. Zeller points out that the recognition of an order of beings between gods and men, the daimones, in the passages dealing with piety and godliness (cc. v., vii.), also indicates a late period. A faint trace of Stoic influence may be seen in the formal antithesis of praiseworthy and blameworthy actions at the beginning and the end of the treatise.

* Eclectics, p. 145.
ARISTOTLE

Date

Susemihl agrees with Zeller that the book probably belongs to the eclectic period; he dates it not earlier than the first century B.C. and perhaps in the first century A.D., and sees in it an author of no great ability, apparently a Peripatetic, attempting to reconcile the moral philosophy of Aristotle with that of Plato.

The earlier date suggested brings it within range of Andronicus of Rhodes, who was head of the Peripatetic School at Athens in Cicero's student days. Andronicus edited and commentated on the Master's works, making some modifications of his own in logic and psychology. Under his name, though scholars usually assign it to a later date, there has come down to us a treatise Πετος παθῶν, and appended to this treatise is an essay On Virtues and Vices which is a copy of the one before us, though the order of the contents has been rearranged. This book serves as additional evidence for our text.

Some further evidence is supplied by the mss. of the Florilegium of Joannes Stobaeus (John of Stobi in Macedonia, fifth century A.D. or later), of which miscellany the present essay forms c. xviii of Book I.

Manuscripts and Texts

The text of this edition is based on that of Bekker in the Berlin Aristotle, 1833, where Πετος ἀρετῶν καὶ κακίων occupies pp. 1249-1251 in the second volume; Bekker gives no critical notes. The Berlin

ON VIRTUES AND VICES

page-numbers, columns (a and b) and lines are printed in the margin here. The only considerable later work on the text is that of Susemihl, who included this essay in the volume containing the Eudemian Ethics (Teubner, Leipzig, 1884); his text has full critical notes, a few selections from which are given here. Susemihl uses chiefly four mss.: L\textsuperscript{b}, the twelfth-century Paris ms. of the Nicomachean Ethics which, has Of Virtues and Vices appended, in a hand dating probably at the beginning of the thirteenth century; F\textsuperscript{c}, the fourteenth-century Laurentian ms.; and two at Madrid, one grouping with F\textsuperscript{c} and the other with L\textsuperscript{b}, as do six others of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (one in the Bodleian) which he has collated, and the oldest extant edition, published at Basel in 1539: an older edition has now disappeared.

In the brief critical notes beneath the present text the variants of L\textsuperscript{b} and F\textsuperscript{c} are sometimes quoted, and the readings of one or more other mss. are denoted by v.l. The sources of conjectural emendations are indicated by the following abbreviations:

\begin{itemize}
  \item And. = Andronicus
  \item Rac. = Rackham
  \item St. = Stobaeus
  \item Sus. = Susemihl
\end{itemize}

A few conjectures of Bussemaker and of Sylburg are quoted from Susemihl.

H. R.

December 1934.
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΙΩΝ

1249 a

26 Ἡ ἐπανετὰ μὲν ἔστιν τὰ καλὰ, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ 1 αἰσχρὰ· καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἤγοινται αἱ ἁρεταὶ, τῶν δὲ αἰσχρῶν αἱ κακίαι. ὡστε ἐπανετὰ μὲν αἱ 2 ἁρεταί, ἐπανετὰ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ αὖτα τῶν ἁρετῶν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα ταῖς ἁρεταῖς καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ³ ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἑναντία.

Τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ 3

1249 b Πλάτωνα, τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἁρετῆ ἔστιν ἡ 27 φρόνησις, τοῦ δὲ θυμοειδοῦς ἡ τε πραότης καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, τοῦ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἡ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ὅλης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία· κακία δὲ 4

30 ἔστιν τοῦ μὲν λογιστικοῦ ἡ ἁφροσύνη, τοῦ δὲ θυμοειδοῦς ἡ τε ὀργιλότης καὶ ἡ δειλία, τοῦ δὲ 1250 a ἐπιθυμητικοῦ ἡ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία, ὅλης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία καὶ ἡ μικροψυχία.

Π. Ἡ ἐστὶν δὲ φρόνησις μὲν ἁρετῆ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ 1 παρασκευαστικῆς τῶν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεινον- 5 τῶν, πραότης δὲ ἔστιν ἁρετῆ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ' 2 ἡν πρὸς ὀργᾶς γίνονται δυσκίνητοι. ἀνδρεία δὲ 3

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ON VIRTUES AND VICES

I. Fine things are the objects of praise, base things of blame; and at the head of the fine stand the virtues, at the head of the base the vices; consequently the virtues are objects of praise, and also the causes of the virtues are objects of praise, and the things that accompany the virtues and that result from them, and their works, while the opposite are the objects of blame.

If in accordance with Plato the spirit is taken as having three parts, wisdom is goodness of the rational part, gentleness and courage of the passionate, of the appetitive sobriety of mind and self-control, and of the spirit as a whole righteousness, liberality and great-spiritedness; while badness of the rational part is folly, of the passionate ill-temper and cowardice, of the appetitive profligacy and uncontrol, and of the spirit as a whole unrighteousness, meanness and smallmindedness.

II. Wisdom is goodness of the rational part that is productive of the things contributing to happiness. Gentleness is goodness of the passionate part that makes people difficult to move to anger. Courage is

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1 ὡστε ... ἀρεταὶ And.: om. codd.
2 καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν om. Fc.
ἐστιν ἀρετή τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ’ ἣν δυσεκπληκτοί εἰσιν ὑπὸ φόβων τῶν περὶ θάνατον. σωφροσύνη 4
dὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ’ ἣν ἀνόρεξτοι γίνονται τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις φαύλων ἡδονῶν.
10 ἐγκράτεια δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ’ ἣν κατέχουσι τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀρμῶσαν ἐπὶ φαύλας ἡδονᾶς. δικαιοσύνη δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή 6
ψυχής διανεμητικῆ τοῦ καθ’ ἀξίαν. ἐλευθεριότης 7
dὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή ἡ ψυχής εὐδαπάνος εἰς τὰ καλά.
megalopuvxia δὲ ἐστὶν ἀρετή ψυχῆς καθ’ ἣν δύναν-
tαι φέρειν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν, τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν.
III. Ἀφροσύνη δὲ ἐστὶν κακία τοῦ λογιστικοῦ 1
αἰτία τοῦ ἤν κακῶς. ὀργιλότης δὲ ἐστὶ κακία 2
tοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ’ ἣν εὐκίνητοι γίνονται πρὸς ὀργήν.
δελία δὲ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς καθ’ 3
ἤν ἐκπλήττονται ὑπὸ φόβων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
περὶ θάνατον. ἀκολασία δὲ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ ἐπι-
4
θυμητικοῦ καθ’ ἣν ὀρεκτικοὶ γίνονται τῶν περὶ τάς ἀπολαύσεις φαύλων ἡδονῶν. 1
ἀκρασία δὲ ἐστὶ κακία τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ καθ’ ἣν ἀιροῦνται τὰς φαύλας ἡδονᾶς κωλύοντος 2
tοῦ λογισμοῦ. 3
ἀδικία 6
dὲ ἐστὶ κακία ψυχῆς καθ’ ἣν πλεονεκτικοὶ γίνονται
tοῦ 4 παρὰ τήν ἀξίαν. ἀνελευθερία δὲ ἐστὶν κακία 7
ψυχῆς καθ’ ἣν ὀρέγονται τοῦ πανταχόθεν κέρδους.
mikrophiuvxia δὲ ἐστὶ κακία ψυχῆς καθ’ ἣν ἀδύνατοι 8
εἰςι φέρειν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ
ἀτιμίαν.
30 IV. Τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως ἐστὶ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, 1
τὸ κρίναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ 5 ἐν

1 ὀρεκτικὸς... ἡδονῶν: v.l. αἰροῦνται τὰς φαύλας ἡδονᾶς.
2 <μῆ> κωλύοντος St.
goodness of the passionate part that makes them undismayed by fear of death. Sobriety of mind is goodness of the appetitive part that makes them not desirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment. Self-control is goodness of the appetitive part that enables men by means of reason to restrain their appetite when it is set on base pleasures. Righteousness is goodness of the spirit shown in distributing what is according to desert. Liberality is goodness of spirit shown in spending rightly on fine objects. Great-spiritedness is goodness of spirit that enables men to bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.

III. On the other hand folly is badness of the rational part that causes bad living. Ill-temper is badness of the passionate part that makes men easy to provoke to anger. Cowardice is badness of the passionate part that causes men to be dismayed by fear, and especially by fear of death. Profligacy is badness of the appetitive part that makes men desirous of the base pleasures of sensual enjoyment. Uncontrol is badness of the appetitive part that makes men choose base pleasures when reason tries to hinder. Unrighteousness is badness of spirit that makes men covetous of what is contrary to their desert. Meanness is badness of spirit that makes men try to get profit from all sources. Smallmindedness is badness of spirit that makes men unable to bear good fortune and bad, honour and dishonour.

IV. It belongs to wisdom to take counsel, to judge the goods and evils and all the things in life that are classified.

3 αἱροῦνται... λογισμοῦ: v.l. παρασύροντι τῇ ἀλογίᾳ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὥθουσαν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν ἀπολαύσεις.
4 τοῦ add. Rac. (cf. i. 13).
5 τὰ add. Rac.
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕΣ

1250 a

τῷ βίῳ αἱρετὰ καὶ φιλοκτά, τὸ χρήσασθαι καλῶς
πάσιν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀγαθοῖς, τὸ ὁμιλῆσαι ὑρθῶς,
τὸ συνεδεῖν τοὺς καυροὺς, τὸ ἁγχύνως χρῆσασθαι
καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ, τὸ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἐχεῖν τῶν
χρησίμων πάντων. μνήμη δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρία καὶ 2
ἀγχύνοια ἦτοι ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν
ἔστιν ἢ παρέπεται τῇ φρονήσει· ἢ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν
οἶνον συναίτια τῆς φρονήσεως ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ ἐμ-
πειρία καὶ ἡ μνήμη, τὰ δὲ οἶνον μέρη,1 οἶνον ἐυβουλία
καὶ ἀγχύνοια.

Πραότητος δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι φέρειν μετρίως 3
ἔγκληματα καὶ ὀλγωρίας, καὶ τὸ μὴ ταχέως
ὀρμᾶν ἐπὶ τάς τιμωρίας, καὶ τὸ μὴ εὐκίνητον εἶναι
πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς, ἀπίκρον δὲ τῷ ἦθει καὶ ἀφιλό-
νεικον, ἔχοντα τὸ ἱρεμαῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ
στάσιμον.

'Ανδρείας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ δυσέκπληκτον εἶναι ὑπὸ 4
φόβων τῶν περὶ θάνατον καὶ εὐθαρσῆ ἐν τοῖς
δεινοῖς καὶ εὐτολμον πρὸς τοὺς κυνδύνους, καὶ τὸ
μάλλον αἱρεῖσθαι τεθνάναι καλῶς ἢ αἰσχρῶς
σωθῆναι, καὶ τὸ νίκης αἴτιον εἶναι. ἐτὶ δὲ ἀνδρείας
ἔστι καὶ τὸ πονεῖν καὶ καρτερεῖν καὶ ἀνδραγαθί-
ζοσθαι.3 παρέπεται δὲ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τε εὐτολμία
καὶ ἡ εὐψυχία καὶ τὸ θάρσος,4 ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ τε φιλο-
πονία καὶ ἡ καρτερία.

Σωφροσύνης δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ θαυμάζειν τὰς ἀπο- 5
λαύσεις τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,5 καὶ τὸ εἶναι
πάσης ἀπολαυστικῆς [αἰσχρᾶς]6 ἡδονῆς ἀνόρκοντον,
καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν ἀταξίαν,7 καὶ τὸ τετάχθαι
περὶ τὸν βίον ὁμοίως ἐν τε μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοισ.
παρέπεται δὲ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ εὐταξία, κοσμιώτης,
αἰδῶς, εὐλάβεια.

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ON VIRTUES AND VICES, iv. 1–5

desirable and to be avoided, to use all the available goods finely, to behave rightly in society, to observe due occasions, to employ both speech and action with sagacity, to have expert knowledge of all things that are useful. Memory and experience and acuteness are each of them either a consequence or a concomitant of wisdom; or some of them are as it were subsidiary causes of wisdom, as for instance experience and memory, others as it were parts of it, for example good counsel and acuteness.

To gentleness belongs ability to bear reproaches and slights with moderation, and not to embark on revenge quickly, and not to be easily provoked to anger, but free from bitterness and contentiousness, having tranquillity and stability in the spirit.

To courage it belongs to be undismayed by fears of death and confident in alarms and brave in face of dangers, and to prefer a fine death to base security, and to be a cause of victory. It also belongs to courage to labour and endure and play a manly part. Courage is accompanied by confidence and bravery and daring, and also by perseverance and endurance.

To sobriety of mind it belongs not to value highly bodily pleasures and enjoyments, not to be covetous of every enjoyable pleasure, to fear disorder, and to live an orderly life in small things and great alike. Sobriety of mind is accompanied by orderliness, regularity, modesty, caution.
V. Ἐγκρατείας δὲ ἐστί τὸ δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀρμώσαν ἐπὶ φαύλας ἀπολαύσεις καὶ ἡδονὰς, καὶ καρτερεῖν, καὶ τὸ υπομενετικὸν εἶναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ένδειας τε καὶ λύπης.

Δικαιοσύνης δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἄξιαν, καὶ τὸ σφέων τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους, καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἐν τῷ διαφέροντι, καὶ τὸ διαφυλάττειν τὰς ὁμολογίας. ἔστι δὲ πρῶτα τῶν δικαίων τὸ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, εἶτα τὰ πρὸς δαίμονας, εἶτα τὰ πρὸς πατρίδα καὶ γονεῖς, εἶτα τὰ πρὸς τοὺς κατοικομένους. ἐν οἷς ἔστι καὶ ἡ εὐσέβεια, ἢτοι μέρος οὕσα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἡ παρακολουθοῦσα. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἡ όσιότης καὶ ἡ ἀληθεία καὶ τῇ πίστις καὶ ἡ μυσοπονηρία.

Ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ ἔστι τὸ προετικὸν εἶναι χρημάτων εἰς τὰ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ δαιμόνη ἐπὶ τῷ εἰς τὰ δέοντα ἀναλωθῆναι, καὶ τὸ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι ἐν τῷ διαφόρῳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν οἴνον μὴ δεῖ. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐλευθερίου καὶ περὶ ἐσθήτα καθάριος καὶ περὶ οἴκησιν, καὶ κατασκευαστικὸς τῶν περιτῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ διαγωγῆ ἐχόντων ἠδίκον ἄνευ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος, καὶ θρεπτικὸς τῶν ζῷων τῶν ὦν ἐχόντων τῷ ἡθομαστὸν. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἡ τοῦ ἡθους ύγρότης καὶ ἐναγωγία καὶ φιλανθρωπία καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐλεητικὸν καὶ φιλό-φιλον καὶ φιλόξενον καὶ φιλόκαλον.

1 Λb: ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῶν.
2 Λb: καὶ τῷ.
3 τε add. St., And.
4 καὶ Rac.: το (aut καὶ τὸ) σφέων.
5 v.l. ἔστι δὲ πρῶτη τῶν δικαίων.
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, v. 1-5

1 V. To self-control belongs ability to restrain desire by reason when it is set on base enjoyments and pleasures, and to be resolute, and readiness to endure natural want and pain.

2 To righteousness it belongs to be ready to distribute according to desert, and to preserve ancestral customs and institutions and the established laws, and to tell the truth when interest is at stake, and to keep agreements. First among the claims of righteousness are our duties to the gods, then our duties to the spirits, then those to country and parents, then those to the departed; and among these claims is piety, which is either a part of righteousness or a concomitant of it. Righteousness is also accompanied by holiness and truth and loyalty and hatred of wickedness.

3 To liberality it belongs to be profuse of money on praiseworthy objects and lavish in spending on what is necessary, and to be helpful in a matter of dispute, and not to take from wrong sources. The liberal man is cleanly in his dress and dwelling, and fond of providing himself with things that are above the ordinary and fine and that afford entertainment without being profitable; and he is fond of keeping animals that have something special or remarkable about them. Liberality is accompanied by elasticity and ductility of character, and kindness, and a compassionate and affectionate and hospitable and honourable nature.

4 Deities of a minor order, in some cases the souls of dead men of the heroic age; often the object of only local worship.

5 ἀγαθή Sylburg: ἐπίδαιρεῖα Fc, ἀγαλέι Lb, ἐπίδαιρεῖειν Gaisford.

6 τὰ δέοντα v.l.: λόγοι Lb, δέον Fc, δέον τι edd.

7 καὶ περὶ οἰκησιων om. v.l.
ARISTOTLE

1250 b

35 Μεγαλοψυχίας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν καὶ θεραπεῖν μὴ χείροστά τὶς νήματα τὰς πάντας εὐγενή τὰς ἔναγωγιας, ἔχει δὲ τοῖς βάθοις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μέγεθος. ἔστι δὲ μεγαλοψυχὸς οὐθ' ὁ δὲ τὸ ξῆν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμενος οὖθ' ὁ δὲ φιλόξως. ἀπλοῦς δὲ τῷ ήθει καὶ γενναῖος ἀδικεῖσθαι δυνάμενος καὶ οὔ τιμωρητικός. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἀπλότης καὶ ἀληθεία.

VI. Ἀφροσύνης δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κρίναι κακῶς τὰ πράγματα, τὸ βουλευσασθαι κακῶς, τὸ ὀμιλῆσαι κακῶς, τὸ χρῆσαι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἁγαθοῖς, τὸ ψευδός δοξάζει περὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν. παρακολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀφροσύνη 2 ἀπειρία, ἀμαθία, ἀκρασία, ἐπαριστερότης, ἀμημοσύνη.

Ὀργιλότητος δὲ ἐστιν εἴδη τρία, ἀκροχολία 3 πικρία βαρυθυμία. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ ὀργίου τὸ μή δύνασθαι φέρειν μῆτε τὰς μικρὰς ὁλυγωρίας μῆτε τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἶναι δὲ κολαστικὸν καὶ τιμωρητικὸν καὶ εὐκίνητον πρὸς ὁργήν καὶ ὑπὸ ἔργου καὶ ὑπὸ λόγου τοῦ τυχόντος. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ὀρ- 4 γιλότητι τὸ παροξυστικὸν τοῦ ἢθους καὶ τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἡ πυκνολογία καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ μικροῖς 10 λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ταῦτα πάσχειν ταχέως καὶ παρὰ βραχὺν καιρῶν.

Δειλίας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων φόβων 5 εὐκίνητον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ βάναυσαν καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς πηρώσεις, καὶ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν κρείττον εἶναι ὁπωσοῦν σωθῆναι ἡ τελευτήσαν καλῶς. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ δειλίᾳ μαλακία, ἀνανδρία, 6 496
ON VIRTUES AND VICES, v. 6—vi. 6

6 To greatness of spirit it belongs to bear finely both good fortune and bad, honour and disgrace, and not to think highly of luxury or attention or power or victories in contests, and to possess a certain depth and magnitude of spirit. He who values life highly and who is fond of life is not great-spirited. The great-spirited man is simple and noble in character, able to bear injustice and not revengeful. Greatness of spirit is accompanied by simplicity and sincerity.

1 VI. To folly belongs bad judgement of affairs, bad counsel, bad fellowship, bad use of one's resources, false opinions about what is fine and good in life.

2 Folly is accompanied by unskilfulness, ignorance, un-control, awkwardness, forgetfulness.

3 Of ill-temper there are three kinds, irascibility, bitterness, sullenness. It belongs to the ill-tempered man to be unable to bear either small slights or defeats but to be given to retaliation and revenge, and easily moved to anger by any chance deed or word. Ill-temper is accompanied by excitability of character, instability, bitter speech, and liability to take offence at trifles and to feel these feelings quickly and on slight occasions.

5 To cowardice it belongs to be easily excited by chance alarms, and especially by fear of death or of bodily injuries, and to think it better to save oneself by any means than to meet a fine end. Cowardice is accompanied by softness, unmanliness, faint-hearted-
1251 a

ἀπόνοια, φιλοψυχία· ὑπεστὶ δὲ τις καὶ εὐλάβεια καὶ τὸ ἀφιλόνεικον τοῦ Ἡθος.  

'Ακολασίας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν βλαβερῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ξώντας, καὶ τὸ φιλογέλοιον εἶναι καὶ φιλοσκώπτην καὶ φιλευτράπελον καὶ τὸ ῥάδιουργὸν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἀκο-λουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ ἀταξίᾳ, ἀναιδείᾳ, ἀκοσμίᾳ, τρυφῇ, ῥαθυμίᾳ, ἀμέλειᾳ, ὀλυγωρίᾳ, ἐκλυσίᾳ.

'Ακρασίας δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κωλύωντος τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνοντα κρείττον εἶναι μὴ μετασχεῖν αὐτῶν μετέχειν3 μηδὲν ἤττον, καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι μὲν δεῖν πράττειν καὶ τὰ καλά καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ἀφ-ιστασθαι δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ τὰς ἡδονὰς. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ μαλακίᾳ καὶ ἀμέλειᾳ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα ταύτα ἄ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ.

30 VII. 'Αδικίας δὲ ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἀσέβεια πλεον-εξία ύβρις. ἀσέβεια μὲν ἡ περὶ θεούς πλημ-μέλεια καὶ περὶ δαίμονας, ἡ περὶ τοὺς κατοιχο-μένους καὶ περὶ γονεῖς καὶ πατρίδας: πλεονεξία δὲ τῇ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια, παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν αἱρουμένη τὸ διάφορον: ύβρις δὲ καθ' ἡν τὰς ἡδονὰς αὐτῶς παρασκευάζουσιν εἰς οἷον τὰς ἅγιον ἐτέρους, οἴθεν Ἠθος περὶ αὐτής λέγει

ητις κερδαίνουσι' οὐδὲν ὁμως ἄδικει.

ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸ παραβαίνειν τὰ πάτρια ἐθῆ καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τὸ ἀπειθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἀρχούσι, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, τὸ παρα-

1 καὶ . . . Ἡθος om. v.l. 2 καὶ cet.: καὶ τὸ I βε. 498
ness, fondness of life; and it also has an element of cautiousness and submissiveness of character.

7 To profligacy belongs choosing harmful and base pleasures and enjoyments, and thinking that the happiest people are those who pass their lives in pleasures of that kind, and being fond of laughter and mockery and jokes and levity in words and deeds.

8 Profligacy is accompanied by disorder, shamelessness, irregularity, luxury, slackness, carelessness, negligence, remissness.

9 To uncontrol it belongs to choose the enjoyment of pleasures when reason would restrain, and although one believes that it would be better not to participate in them, to participate in them all the same, and while thinking one ought to do fine and expedient things yet to abstain from them for the sake of one's pleasures. The concomitants of uncontrol are softness and negligence and in general the same as those of profligacy.

1 VIIT. Of unrighteousness there are three kinds, 2 impiety, greed, outrage. Transgression in regard to gods and spirits, or even in regard to the departed 3 and to parents and country, is impiety. Transgression in regard to contracts, taking what is in dispute 4 contrary to one's desert, is greed. Outrage is the unrighteousness that makes men procure pleasures for themselves while leading others into disgrace; in consequence of which Evenus says about outrage:

She that wrongs others e'en when she gaineth nought.

5 And it belongs to unrighteousness to transgress ancestral customs and regulations, to disobey the laws and the rulers, to lie, to perjure, to transgress

\[\text{And.}: \mu\varepsilon\tau\varepsilon\chi\varepsilon\nu\ \delta\varepsilon. \quad 4 \quad \kappa\alpha\iota \text{ v.l.: om. } L^b F^c. \quad 5 \quad \nu.\iota. \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \eta, \ \kappa\alpha\iota. \quad 6 \quad \varepsilon\theta\eta \text{ om. } L^b F^c.\]
ARISTOTLE

1251 b

βαίνειν τὰς ὀμολογίας καὶ τὰς πίστεις. ἀκολουθεῖ 6 δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ συκοφαντία, ἀλαζονεία, φιλανθρωπία προσποίητος, κακοθεία, πανουργία.

'Ανελευθερίας δὲ ἔστιν εἶδη τρία, αἰσχρόκερδεια 7 θείωλία κιμβικία. αἰσχρόκερδεια μὲν καθ’ ἢν 8 κερδαίες εἴητοι πανταχόθεν καὶ τὸ κέρδος τῆς αἰσχύνης περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦνται. θείωλία δὲ 9 καθ’ ἢν ἀδάπανοι γίνονται τῶν χρημάτων εἰς τὸ δέον. κιμβικία δὲ καθ’ ἢν δαπανώσι μὲν, κατὰ 10 μικρὸν δὲ καὶ κακῶς, καὶ πλεῖω βλάπτονται τῷ μή κατὰ καιρὸν προεῖσθαι τὸ διάφορον. ἔστι δὲ 11 τῆς ανελευθερίας τὸ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι χρή- ματα καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ούνειδος ἥγεισθαι τῶν ποιοῦντων κέρδος, βίος θητικὸς καὶ δουλοπρεπὴς καὶ ρυπαρός, φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἀλλότριος. ἀκολουθεῖ 12 δὲ τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ μικρολογία, βαρυθυμία [μικρο- ψυχία], ταπεινότης, ἀμετρία, ἀγένεια, μισαι- ϊθρωπία.

Μικροψυχίας δὲ ἔστι τὸ μήτε τιμήν μήτε ἀτιμίαν, 13 μήτε εὐτυχίαν μήτε ἀτυχίαν δύνασθαι φέρειν, ἀλλὰ τιμώμενον μὲν χαυνοῦσθαι μικρὰ δὲ εὐτυχήσαται 14 εξαιρεθαί, ἀτιμίαν δὲ μηδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἑνεγκείν δύνασθαι ἀπότευμα δὲ ὁτιῶν ἀτυχίαν κρίνειν μεγάλην, ὀδύρεσθαι δὲ ἐπὶ πάσιν καὶ δυσφορεῖν. ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔστιν ὁ μικρόψυχος οἷος πάντα τὰ ὀλυγρήματα καλεῖν ὑβρίν καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ τὰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦν ἡ λήθη γινόμενα. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ μικρο- 15 ψυχία μικρολογία, μεμψιμοιρία, δυσελπιστία, ταπει- νότης.

VIII. Καθόλου δὲ τῆς μὲν ἄρετῆς ἔστι τὸ ποιεῖν 1 σπουδαίαν τὴν διάθεσιν περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, Ἡρεμαίας καὶ τεταγμέναις κινήσεις χρωμένην καὶ συμφωνοῦ- 500
6 covenants and pledges. Unrighteousness is accompanied by slander, imposture, pretence of kindness, malignity, unscrupulousness.

7 Of meanness there are three kinds, love of base gain, parsimony, niggardliness. Love of base gain makes men seek profit from all sources and pay more regard to the profit than to the disgrace; parsimony makes them unwilling to spend money on a necessary object; niggardliness causes them only to spend in driblets and in a bad way, and to lose more than they gain by not at the proper moment letting go the difference. It belongs to meanness to set a very high value on money and to think nothing that brings profit a disgrace—a menial and servile and squalid mode of life, alien to ambition and to liberality. Meanness is accompanied by pettiness, sulkiness, self-abasement, lack of proportion, ignobleness, misanthropy.

13 It belongs to small-mindedness to be unable to bear either honour or dishonour, either good fortune or bad, but to be filled with conceit when honoured and puffed up by trifling good fortune, and to be unable to bear even the smallest dishonour and to deem any chance failure a great misfortune, and to be distressed and annoyed at everything. Moreover the small-minded man is the sort of person to call all slights an insult and dishonour, even those that are due to ignorance or forgetfulness. Small-mindedness is accompanied by pettiness, querulousness, pessimism, self-abasement.

1 VIII. In general it belongs to goodness to make the spirit's disposition virtuous, experiencing tranquil and ordered emotions and in harmony throughout all its

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1 Sylburg.  
2 v.l. ἄναχαρσοσθαι LbFc cet.
ARISTOTLE

1251 b

σαν κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ παρά-
30 δείγμα πολυτελασ ἀγαθῆς εἶναι ψυχῆς σπουδαίας
diάθεσις. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὸ εὐργετεῖν 2
tous ἀξίως καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν tous ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸ
μυσεῖν tous φαύλους, ¹ καὶ τὸ μήτε κολαστικὸν
εἶναι μήτε τιμωρητικὸν, ἄλλα ἱλεων καὶ εὐμενικὸν
καὶ συγγνωμονικὸν. ἀκολούθει δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ χρή- 3
στότης, ἐπιείκεια, εὐγνωμοσύνη, ἐλπὶς ἀγαθῆς, ² ἔτι
dὲ καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα ὅιον φιλοικείον εἶναι καὶ φιλό-
φιλον καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ φιλόξενον καὶ φιλάνθρω-
pον καὶ φιλόκαλον· ἀ δὴ πάντα τῶν ἐπαινομένων
ἔστι.

Τῇς δὲ κακίας ἔστι τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ παρακολουθεῖ 4
τὰ ἐναντία αὐτῆ· ἀπαντά δὲ τὰ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὰ
παρακολουθοῦντα αὐτῆ τῶν ψεγομένων ἔστιν.

¹ καὶ τὸ μυσεῖν tous φαύλους om. v.l.
² post ἀγαθῆ add. μνῆμη ἀγαθῆ Fc.
parts; this is the cause of the opinion that the disposition of a good spirit is a pattern of a good constitution of the state. It also belongs to goodness to do good to the deserving and love the good and hate the wicked, and not to be eager to inflict punishment or take vengeance, but gracious and kindly and forgiving. Goodness is accompanied by honesty, reasonableness, kindness, hopefulness, and also by such traits as love of home and of friends and comrades and guests, and of one's fellow-men, and love of what is noble—all of which qualities are among those that are praised.

To badness belong the opposite qualities, and it has the opposite concomitants: all the qualities and concomitants of badness are among the things that are blamed.
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